®
SPECIAL ISSUE
Analysis of Pre- and Post-Disaster Management
and Recovery in Puerto Rico from Hurricane Maria
Special Issue on Puerto Rico, Volume 19, Number 8
ISSN 1543-5865
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12234 2/24/21 Rev av
JEM William L. Waugh, Jr., PhD
Editor-in-Chief
Professor Emeritus, Department of Public Management & Policy,
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia
EDITORIAL BOARD Steven J. Charvat, CEM
Emergency Management Director,
Barbara Audley, DPA University of Washington, Office
Western Washington University (Ret.), of Emergency Management,
Bellingham, Washington Seattle, Washington
Paul Barnes, PhD George W. Contreras, DrPH(c),
Head, Risk and Resilience Program MEP, MPH, MS, CEM, EMTP
Australian Strategic Policy Institute Assistant Director, Center for
Canberra, Australia’ Disaster Medicine; Assistant
Professor, Institute of Public Health,
Richard A. Bissell, PhD at New York Medical College; Adjunct
Professor, University of Maryland– Associate Professor, John Jay College;
Baltimore County, Adjunct Professor, Metropolitan
Baltimore, Maryland College of New York
New York, New York
B. Wayne Blanchard, PhD, CEM
Past Director, Higher Education John B. Copenhaver
Project Emergency Management Chairman and CEO,
Institute, Federal Emergency Contingency Management Group,
Management Agency (FEMA), Alpharetta, Georgia
Department of Homeland Security,
Emmitsburg, Maryland Russell J. Decker, PhD, CEM
Deputy Director, Ohio Emergency
Hilda J. Blanco, PhD Management Agency, Columbus, Ohio
Research Professor; Interim
Director, Center for Sustainable Daniel E. Della-Giustina, PhD
Cities, Sol Price School of Public Professor, Industrial and Management
Policy, University of Southern Systems Engineering, Safety &
California, Los Angeles, California Environmental Management Program,
College of Engineering and Mineral
Paul A. Bott, EdD Resources, West Virginia University,
President, Paul Bott Associates, Inc., Morgantown, West Virginia
Los Alamitos, California
Raymond V. DeMichiei, BA, EMT-P
Michael W. Brand, PhD Deputy Director; WMD Coordinator,
Associate Professor, University City of Pittsburgh, Office of the
of Oklahoma Health Sciences Mayor, Emergency Management
Center, College of Medicine, Agency, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences, Oklahoma J. Eric Dietz, PhD
City, Oklahoma Professor, Computer and Information
Technology; Director, Purdue
Anthony E. Brown, PhD, MPA Homeland Security Institute, Purdue
Associate Professor and Coordinator, University, West Lafayette, Indiana
Oklahoma State University,
Stillwater, Oklahoma Amy K. Donahue, PhD
Professor and Department Head,
Lucien G. Canton, CEM, CPP, CBCP Department of Public Policy,
Emergency Management Consultant, University of Connecticut, West
San Francisco, California Hartford, Connecticut
Stephen Stuart Carter, MS Thomas Drabek, PhD
Instructional Coordinator and John Evans Professor, Emeritus,
Adjunct Faculty, Mid-Atlantic Department of Sociology and
Center for Emergency Management, Criminology, University of Denver,
Frederick Community College, Denver, Colorado
Frederick, Maryland
12235 9/10/21 Rev aac
Roger E. Glick, MS, MBA, CEM, Daniel J. Klenow, PhD Fernando I. Rivera, PhD
FACHE Professor, Department of Emergency Hurricane Maria Special Issue Editor
Fire & Emergency Management Management, North Dakota State Professor of Sociology and Director
Consultant, RPA, a Jensen Hughes University, Fargo, North Dakota of the Puerto Rico Research Hub
Company, Plainville, Connecticut at the University of Central Florida,
Bruce Lindsay, PhD Orlando, Florida
Kay C. Goss, CEM Analyst, Congressional Research
Graduate Faculty, Metropolitan Service, Library of Congress, Scott Robinson, PhD
College of New York, University of Washington DC Associate Professor and Bellmon Chair
Nevada at Las Vegas; Senior Fellow, of Public Service, University of
National Academy of Public John Roderick Lindsay, MCP Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma
Administration; Board of Directors, Assistant Professor and Chair,
Epsilon Pi Phi, Council for Department of Applied Disaster Havidan Rodriguez, PhD
Accreditation of Emergency and Emergency Studies, Director, Disaster Research Center,
Management Education, Brandon University, University of Delaware, Newark,
Alexandria, Virginia Brandon, Manitoba, Canada Delaware
Jeffery A. Hartle, MS, CFPS, Valerie Lucus-McEwen, CEM, CBCP Abdul-Akeem Sadiq, PhD
MIFireE, Vice President, Skillful Professor, Emergency Services Assistant Professor, Indiana University
Means, Inc., Knob Noster, Missouri Administration, California State Purdue University, Indianapolis, Indiana
University, Long Beach, California
Vincent E. Henry, CPP, PhD Robert O. Schneider, PhD
Professor and Director, Homeland David A. McEntire, PhD Associate Vice Chancellor International
Security Management Institute, A DHS Associate Professor, University of Programs, University of North Carolina
National Transportation Security North Texas, Denton, Texas at Pembroke, Pembroke, North Carolina
Center of Excellence, Long Island
University, Southampton, New York Robert K. McLellan, MD, MPH Robert M. Schwartz, PhD
Occupational Medicine, Dartmouth Professor of Emergency Management
Attila J. Hertelendy, PhD Hitchcock Medical Center, and Homeland Security, Center for
COVID-19 Special Issue Editor Lebanon, New Hampshire Emergency Management and Homeland
Associate Professor, Florida Security Policy Research, The
International University, Miami, Florida Edith F. Neumann, PhD University of Akron, Akron, Ohio
Professor; President, TUI Institute
Thad Hicks, PhD, CEM, MEP of Learning, Touro University Gary Leonard Simon, MD, PhD
COVID-19 Mental Health International, Cypress, California Professor of Medicine (Infectious
Special Issue Editor Diseases), Biochemistry, and Molecular
Professor of Emergency William C. Nicholson, JD Biology, George Washington University
Management & Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Medical Center, Washington, DC
Mount Vernon Nazarene University, North Carolina Central University,
Mount Vernon, Ohio Durham, North Carolina Neil Simon, MA
President, Incident Mitigation LLC,
Peter J. Hotez, MD, FAAP, PhD Corinne Peek-Asa, MPH, PhD Southfield, Michigan
Founding Dean, National School of Professor, Associate Dean for Research,
Tropical Medicine; Texas Children’s Occupational and Environmental Susan M. Smith, EdD, MSPH
Hospital Endowed Chair in Tropical Health, College of Public Health, The Associate Professor, Department of
Pediatrics; Professor, Departments of University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa Applied Health Sciences, Indiana
Pediatrics and Molecular Virology & University, Bloomington, Indiana
Microbiology, Baylor College of Danny M. Peterson, PhD
Medicine, Houston, Texas Professor of Practice, Arizona State Christine Springer, PhD
University, Mesa, Arizona Professor and Director, Executive
Andrea Jennings, DrPh Master of Science in Crisis and
Senior Nurse Researcher, Geriatric Scot Phelps, JD, MPH, Paramedic, Emergency Management, University of
Research Education and Clinical CEM/CBCP/MEP Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada
Center, VA Northeast Ohio Healthcare Professor, Emergency Management
System, Cleveland, Ohio Academy, New York City, New York Richard T. Sylves, PhD
Professor, Political Science
David Johnston, PhD Brenda D. Phillips, PhD Department, University of Delaware,
Director, Joint Centre for Disaster Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Newark, Delaware
Research, Massey University, Sciences, Indiana University South
Wellington, New Zealand Bend, South Bend, Indiana Derin Ural, PhD
Professor in Practice, and Associate
Naim Kapucu, PhD John C. Pine, EdD Dean of Student Affairs, College of
Professor and Director, University of Director, Research Institute Engineering, Department of Civil,
Central Florida, Orlando, Florida for Environment, Energy and Architectural and Environmental
Economics, Appalachian State Engineering, Coral Gables, Florida
Karl Kim, PhD University, (Ret.) Boone,
Professor, Urban and Regional North Carolina Steven Weinstein, MPH, PhD,
Planning, University of Hawaii, Environmental, Health & Safety
Honolulu, Hawaii Randy Rapp, DMgt, PE Specialist, Abbott Laboratories,
Associate Professor, College of MediSense Products, Bedford,
Technology, Purdue University, Massachusetts
West Lafayette, Indiana
JEM CONTENTS
Editorial
nn Analysis of pre- and post-disaster management and
recovery in Puerto Rico from Hurricane Maria................................9
Fernando I. Rivera, PhD, Special Issue Editor
FEATURE ARTICLES
nn Resilience of environment, infrastructure, communities,
and governance in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria
and the need for community empowerment to develop
decentralized, nature-based solutions to sustainability................ 11
Thomas L. Crisman, PhD
David Dumke, MA
Fernando I. Rivera, PhD
Liz Santiago-Pimentel, MS
nn Restoration versus transformative adaptation of
community drinking water systems after Hurricanes
Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico....................................................... 25
Victor Dionel Ruiz-Aviles, PhD student
David Pijawka
David Manuel-Navarrete
Dave White
Cecilio Ortiz-Garcia
nn Principles for collaborative risk communication:
Reducing landslide losses in Puerto Rico....................................... 41
Jocelyn West, PhD student
Lindsay Davis, MS
Raquel Lugo Bendezú, BSc
Yahaira D. Álvarez Gandía, BSc
K. Stephen Hughes, PhD
Jonathan Godt, PhD
Lori Peek, PhD
nn Public health branch incident management and support
as part of the Federal Government response during the
emergency phase of Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto
Rico and the US Virgin Islands....................................................... 63
Miguel Angel Cruz, PhD Jonathan Yoder, MPH
Luis O. Rivera-González, PhD Joseph Laco, MS
Elizabeth Irvin-Barnwell, PhD Alberto Santana, MS
Jessica Cabrera-Marquez, PhD Tesfaye Bayleyegn, MD
Esther Ellis, PhD Carolina Luna-Pinto, MPH
Brett Ellis, PhD Luis Orlando Rodriguez, MS
Benjamin Qi, PhD Joseph Roth, MPH
Christopher Maniglier-Poulet, MS John Bermingham, MS
Justin Andrew Gerding, DHA Renée H. Funk, DVM
Alice Shumate, PhD Murad Raheem, BS
Ashley Andujar, MHSA
JEM CONTENTS
nn Factors affecting the post-disaster temporary housing
construction...................................................................................... 79
Mahdi Afkhamiaghda, PhD candidate
Emad Elwakil, PhD, PE, CCE, PMP
Kereshmeh Afsari, PhD
Randy Rapp, DMgt, PE, CCP
nn Vulnerable populations: A cross-case synthesis of
correctional facility disaster response during Hurricanes
Katrina and Maria........................................................................... 97
Carl Dement, BA (Hons), MA
Tony McAleavy, BA (Hons), MSc, PhD
nn Understanding recovery and resilience from natural
disasters in hospitality organizations..........................................109
Kristin A. Horan, PhD
Blake Scott, MPH
Ahlam Farzan, MD
Marian L. Ortíz-Aponte, MS
Alejandra Rivera-García, MS
Jennifer Marshall, PhD
Anthony J. Masys, PhD
Mindy Shoss, PhD
Adriana Campos, MPH
Lida Orta-Anés, PhD
nn Displacement after disaster: Challenges and opportunities
responding to Puerto Rican evacuees in Central Florida
after Hurricane Maria...................................................................123
Tanya Buhler Corbin, PhD
nn Hurricane effects, mitigation, and preparedness in
the Caribbean: Perspectives on high importance–low
prevalence practices from agricultural advisors..........................135
Nora L. Álvarez-Berríos, PhD
Sarah S. Wiener, MS
Kathleen A. McGinley, PhD
Angela B. Lindsey, PhD
William A. Gould, PhD
nn Individual response and recovery: A learning experience
from Hurricane María...................................................................157
Verónica Díaz-Pacheco, MS
Frederick González-Román
Clara Isaza, PhD
Thomas Richardson, MS
Robert Whalin, PhD
Mauricio Cabrera-Ríos, PhD
JEM CONTENTS
nn Provision of mental health services immediately following
a natural disaster: Experiences after Hurricane Maria in
Puerto Rico.....................................................................................167
Michelle E. Alto, PhD Tania D. Rodríguez-Sanfiorenzo, PhD
Andel V. Nicasio, PhD Gisela González-Elías, PhD
Regan Stewart, PhD Rosaura Orengo-Aguayo, PhD
nn Six months after Maria: A post-hurricane examination
of mental health and associated risk factors in older
Puerto Ricans.................................................................................177
Jani L. Swiatek, BS
Joseph P. Corcoran IV, BA
Frederick V. Ramsey, PhD
Nina T. Gentile, MD
nn Case study of VA Caribbean Healthcare System’s
community response to Hurricane Maria.....................................189
Tamar Wyte-Lake, DPT, MPH
Susan Schmitz, MAIDP
Cosme Torres-Sabater, RN, MEP, CHCM
Aram Dobalian, PhD, JD
nn Exploring frames of environmental crises on Twitter and
Weibo: Crisis communication about Hurricane Maria
and haze.........................................................................................201
Xianlin Jin, PhD
nn Multisectoral perspectives toward a sustainable energy
transition in Puerto Rico: Implications for the post-2017
Atlantic Hurricane Season............................................................217
Glorynel Ojeda-Matos, MP, MS
Marla Pérez-Lugo, PhD
Cecilio Ortiz-García, PhD
Elvia J. Meléndez-Ackerman, PhD
nn Equity, participation, and planning for recovery
in Puerto Rico.................................................................................235
Karl Kim, PhD Ruperto Chaparro Serrano, MS
Roberto Porro, MURP Bernardo Gonzalez, MURP
Jiwnath Ghimire, PhD Eric Yamashita, MURP
Lillian Ramirez Durand, MS
nn Principles for data management, visualization, and
communication to improve disaster response management:
Lessons from the Hurricane Maria response mission.................255
Marin M. Kress, PhD
Katherine F. Chambers, MS
Darixa D. Hernández-Abrams, MS
S. Kyle McKay, PhD, PE
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Editorial JEM
Analysis of pre- and post-disaster management and
recovery in Puerto Rico from Hurricane Maria
Fernando I. Rivera, PhD, Special Issue Editor
Hurricane Maria, similar to other recent emer- It touches on disaster population displacement, of
gency events, continues to remind emergency man- particularly importance to Puerto Rico, which has
agement of the continuous threats communities seen its population decline from 3.7 million in 2010 to
encounter. Years prior to Hurricane Maria, Puerto 3.3 million in 2020 with an accelerated exodus after
Rico was experiencing dire economic conditions which Hurricane Maria. Other topics include disaster plan-
accelerated when the government declared bankrupt- ning and response to vulnerable populations such as
cy in 2014. Austerity measures were put in place to those in correctional facilities.
confront the growing public debt resulting in higher
taxes, a crumbling infrastructure, and economic The issue also raises awareness of inclusive gov-
restrictions impacting pensions and other social serv- ernance for long-term recovery plans and processes.
ices. On top of these economic struggles, Puerto Rico In addition to practical guides and outreach tools to
experienced catastrophic damages from Hurricanes handle other hazards triggered by Hurricane Maria
Irma and Maria. The aftermath of these storms and such as landslides.
the subsequent experiences with seismic events and
the COVID-19 pandemic are reminders of the com- The pre- and post-experience of Puerto Rico from
plexities emergency management is currently facing. Hurricane Maria, while unique in its challenges and
As the frequency and intensity of major weather scope, does provide an example of the changing nature
events continues to rise there is a need for a holistic of events that emergency management needs to con-
understanding for emergency managers to better mit- tend with. Economic struggles coupled with the after-
igate, prepare, response, and recover to disasters and math of hurricanes, landslides, drought, tornadoes,
emergency situations. floods, and pandemics reveal how cascading disaster
and emergency events provide the context in which
This special issue provides such understanding. emergency management operates. This special issue
Grounded on the nexus between energy, water, and raises the awareness of this reality and provides a com-
food, this collection of manuscripts explores the emer- prehensive look, not only of the challenges, but poten-
gency management challenges faced in Puerto Rico in tial solutions and recommendations on how to deal with
relation to several areas of inquiry, including hous- the ever-changing nature of emergency management.
ing, agriculture, the hospitality industry, communica-
tion, health and mental health, public health, and Fernando I. Rivera, PhD, Professor of Sociology and Director of the
access to healthcare services. These studies not only Puerto Rico Research Hub at the University of Central Florida. He has
identify some of the challenges faced in these contexts established an ongoing research program in the fields of medical soci-
but provide recommendations and tools to use in ology/sociology of health, race and ethnicity, and the sociology of dis-
future emergencies. asters. He has studied the differential patterns of health among Puerto
Ricans in the United States and investigated factors associated with dis-
aster resilience, restoration and resilience in coupled human-natural
systems, and climate migration.
DOI:10.5055/jem.0601 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 9
Vol. 19, No. 8
From the publisher JEM
Dear Reader,
Good things come from conferences!
At a recent IAEM conference, Dr. William Waugh, Jr, PhD, our Editor-in-Chief, and I were enjoying
a conference luncheon and while introducing ourselves to those around us, we were fortunate to meet
Damarys Acevedo-Markey, PE, an environmental engineer with the US Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE), who has been instrumental in USACE's post-disaster recovery analysis in Puerto Rico. The
introductions led to a deeper discussion about the issues surrounding Hurricane Maria and the devasta-
tion it caused in Puerto Rico. The disaster presented real pre- and post-disaster challenges across the
spectrum. There was much to be researched and a new paradigm is needed to ensure this disaster does
not happen again. From this discussion at the conference, the special issue on this important disaster
was born! So our sincere thanks to Damarys for her support of this project!
As we formulated the special issue, Dr. Waugh suggested just one individual as Special Issue Editor.
A researcher, sociologist, public health expert, and thought leader, we were thrilled when Dr. Fernando
I. Rivera, PhD accepted our invitation to lead this project. Our sincere thanks to Dr. Rivera for his time
and dedication to this special issue.
And finally, to the authors and reviewers who spent countless hours researching, writing and peer-
reviewing, we extend our sincere thanks for a job well done. I know we taxed your patience while getting
this issue ready during the pandemic. But, I also offer a challenge. The work in Puerto Rico is not done.
I challenge everyone to put that research into practice and make that island a beacon of preparedness
and resilience by the year 2025. To that end, I invite researchers, authors, and practitioners to step for-
ward as we pull together a conference on this topic. Please send a letter of interest to the JEM mailbox
at [email protected]. We are looking for conference committee members, planners, and others who share
the passion on this subject.
Again, my sincere thanks to all involved in this special issue.
Richard A. DeVito, Jr
Publisher
Journal of Emergency Management
DOI:10.5055/jem.0630 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
10
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
JEM Resilience of environment, infrastructure, communities, and
governance in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria and the
need for community empowerment to develop decentralized,
nature-based solutions to sustainability
Thomas L. Crisman, PhD
David Dumke, MA
Fernando I. Rivera, PhD
Liz Santiago-Pimentel, MS
ABSTRACT society, and governance. Here, we evaluate what went
wrong with each of these sectors with the hope that
Collapse of electric and water infrastructure Puerto Rico can implement an adaptive management
throughout Puerto Rico with Hurricane Maria is well plan that will promote resilience and, hence, sustain-
documented but assessment of interactions among ability in the face of disasters and serve as a model for
environment, infrastructure, and society is lacking. small island nations of the Caribbean.
A classification system is developed to assess the
resilience of each component based on principles of We have identified four general ecosystem resil-
ecosystem responses to long-term and unexpected ience responses that also can characterize the response
environmental change. All infrastructure sectors have of four sustainability components to Hurricane Maria
experienced long-term decline because of a patch and in Puerto Rico (Table 1).
stabilize approach that excludes strengthen and inno-
vate. Maria was the tipping point for system collapse. Holling1 first proposed resilience as the level of
The weakest sector, however, is governance and an ina- disturbance necessary to exceed the ability of an
bility to change direction from traditional centralized, ecosystem to remain at its current stable state and
engineered approaches incapable of meeting current or to shift its structure and function to an alternative
projected changes in resource availability and societal stable state. Gunderson2 defined adaptive capac-
needs. The two most resilient sectors are environment ity as processes that modify ecological resilience,
and human communities. Their strong interrelation- recognizing the potential for multiple stable states
ship is key to developing decentralized, nature-based and the role that resilience plays in the transi-
solutions to address immediate and projected threats tion among states. In the early 21st century, the
to resiliency and sustainability of communities in Nexus was proposed as a framework for integrating
Puerto Rico. Still in its infancy, community ownership the three factors controlling the sustainability of
of the water-energy-food Nexus shows a great promise human communities and ecosystems: water, energy,
for island. and food (WEF). Crisman3 suggested that the WEF
could be envisioned as a three spoked wheel whose
Key words: Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico, central hub represented human health and whose
resilience, disaster management rim is economics. Thus, all three components influ-
ence and are influenced by external human expecta-
INTRODUCTION tions and consequences. Significant changes in the
supply and/or demand of one component of the WEF
Hurricane Maria had a serious impact on Puerto will promote system instability unless balanced by
Rico’s environment, physical infrastructure, human
DOI:10.5055/jem.0608 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8 11
Table 1. General responses of ecosystem ENVIRONMENT
resilience to disturbance
Water is the ultimate environmental factor gov-
Resistant. System shows no significant change to erning ecosystem and human societal sustainability.
disturbance. Watershed retention of water (short and long term)
also displays profound temporal oscillations regulated
Resilient. System shows short-term instability to by geology, slope, soils, and vegetation cover. In addi-
disturbance but returns to current stable state. tion to its influence on groundwater percolation and
subsurface runoff, geology determines soil genesis
Alternative stable state. System shows massive instability and the ability to store water short term. Together
to disturbance and reaches stability at a different stable with landscape slope and soil ability to resist move-
state, the “new normal.” ment, the landscape is dynamic, especially in heavy
precipitation events.
Collapse. System shows massive alteration of structure
and function and collapses without reaching a new stable Over 70,000 landslides were associated with
state. Hurricane Maria among at least 75 percent of the
municipalities of Puerto Rico,5,6 especially on steep
proportional changes in the other two components slopes below ridges in mountains. While often lim-
to counterbalance change in the first component. ited to surficial soils, landslides also extended deeper
Winters4 developed WEF Nexus models for several into chemically weathered saprolites and bedrock
small island developing nations in the Caribbean to such as Utuado granodiorite, where >25 landslides/
assess sustainability under existing conditions and km2 were reported.7 Clay content played a major
gauging societal and ecosystem response resilience role in movement intensity, and landslides in soils on
to projected and unexpected resource availability marine volcaniclastics were most mobile, and those
and consumption under a variety of scenarios. on submarine basalt and chert were the least mobile.6
Tracking annual demand for each WEF component Although geology and slope set the stage for slumping
of the Nexus as a percent of resource availability and landslides, the >500 mm of rain associated with
is useful for predicting the threshold of resource Hurricane Maria, added to high totals from Irma 2
depletion that becomes the tipping point beyond weeks earlier, super saturated soils and became the
which the resource is no longer sustainable. ultimate factor controlling the locations and extent of
landslides.5-7
While valuable for charting long-term sustain-
ability and adaptive management actions, the WEF Although geology is a constant baseline, for-
Nexus is less robust at predicting immediate responses ests and landscape alterations are dynamic and
to unpredictable disasters. In spite of being based on play a pivotal role in how the physical environment
supply and demand, even the most sustainable Nexus responds to hurricanes. Maria killed or severely
can experience instant failure if external environmen- damaged approximately 23-31 million trees,8 affect-
tal, infrastructural, human societal, and governance ing an estimated 23 percent of Puerto Rican forest
factors controlling the supply chain of WEF collapse biomass.9 Forest impact was highly correlated with
or lack contingency plans for adaptive management. distance from the storm’s path across the island10
We examine the response of each of these external and was greatest at high elevation, steep slopes, and
factors affecting the Nexus to Hurricane Maria and windward facing landscapes.11 Rainfall, however, was
characterize their resilience to disasters using the a stronger predictor of damage than wind intensity.9
four ecologically based models of resilience. There has Especially hard hits were tall cloud forests, seasonal
been sufficient time since Maria to identify the weak- evergreen forests in mountainous watersheds, and
est links among these factors and to propose potential coastal mangroves.11
actions to correct them.
Increased cyclone intensity associated with climate
change is projected to shift forest ecosystems in Puerto
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
12 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
Rico from carbon sinks to sources,9 and catastrophic for the society, when new policies were implemented
removal of intact forests results in massive sediment to industrialize the island. The result was a major
erosion in upper watersheds.12 Initially, during hur- movement of the population to urban centers and
ricanes, large quantities of eroded sediments that col- an associated expansion of food consumption and
lected in stream channels between major storm events imports. Interior areas were abandoned in favor of
are flushed from Puerto Rican watersheds experienc- massive housing projects (caserios) constructed in the
ing major forest destruction, but sediment loss from 1960s.19 Food sustainability declined exponentially
both Hurricanes Hugo13 and Maria14 rapidly declined, after 1960, and by the 1990s, many agriculture sub-
thereafter, as woody debris shifted down slope and cre- sectors had collapsed as the island expanded reliance
ated effective retention barriers for eroded sediment. on imported goods and services.18,20
This unexpected benefit of forest destruction returned
erosion rates and landslides to pre-storm levels within Just prior to Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico was
2 years in some basins.14 Although incomplete, there importing 80-85 percent of its food, both a reflection of
is evidence that forest fauna, especially birds, are the long-standing priority to export crops of sugar, cof-
equally resilient as the physical environment and fee, and tobacco over local food supply and increasing
recover quickly after major hurricanes like Maria even urbanization of the population.19,21 Local agricultural
before forest regeneration in relatively undisturbed production has been hindered by both reluctance of
watersheds.15 over half of farmers to implement adaptive manage-
ment to both climate change and extreme events
While the physical and biological environments in spite of knowing they are vulnerable22 and land
have proven resilient to major disturbances from abandonment.21 Approximately 42 percent of the area
hurricanes, both the ability and time to recover are of Puerto Rico can potentially support agriculture,
strongly controlled by human disturbance and land- including 23 percent for row crops, fruit production,
scape management. Land use influences both water- and pasture and 19 percent for forestry and shade
shed export of sediment and the ability to store water coffee. Gonzalez-Mejia and Ma20 noted, however, that
during storms, thus buffering major flooding down- reforestation of the island after 1998 has not offset
stream. Sheet flow and associated erosion are great- rapid industrialization dependent on fossil fuel.
est on cleared construction sites, followed in decreas-
ing order by crop lands, pastures, and forests.16 Farmers observed immediately after Hurricane
Landscape changes in Puerto Rico occurred rapidly Maria that while above ground crops were destroyed,
as industrialization has expanded and led to urbani- traditional root crops survived,19 raising hope that
zation replacing forest and agricultural lands.17 The adaptive management through agroecology, whereby
percent of the Puerto Rican population in urban areas appropriate crops integrated with local ecology are
increased from 11 to 27 percent between 1977 and favored, is the best hope of reinstituting resilience
1994, equating with a 6 percent loss of potential agri- in Puerto Rican food production. A food sovereignty,
cultural lands. Implementing best management prac- self-help movement is expanding to provide locally
tices, including reforestation of crop lands to reduce grown traditional crops to replace processed imported
sedimentation in major reservoirs, is often counter products in both urban and rural communities as the
balanced by explosive urbanization in the watershed first step in reaching agricultural sustainability.
with a 194 percent population increase between 1950
and 1990 around Lago Loiza.16 PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
As early as 1898, Puerto Rico was experiencing Puerto Rico has experienced direct hits from
food deficiency and reliance on food imports to sup- 17 hurricanes between 1852 and 2017 (Figure 1).
port local production and diet.18 Food production Most passed from southeast to northeast through
declined progressively into the 1950s, but the island the center of the island, each leaving a lasting mark
still was able to produce a significant portion of food on critical infrastructure. The final tipping point in
infrastructure stability was the back-to-back landfalls
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 13
Vol. 19, No. 8
Figure 1. Historical hurricane paths across Puerto Rico (A) and paths of Hurricanes Irene and Maria relative to
power generation facilities and transmission grids (B). Data sources were (1) NOAA, (2) https://www.ncdc.noaa.
gov/ibtracs/index.php?name=ib-v4-access, (3) Knapp et al.,28,29 and (4) additional US and Puerto Rican government
sites. All diagrams in this article were created using ArcGIS Pro® under University of South Florida license.
of Hurricanes Irma and Maria within a 2-week period were responsible for a detailed 2018 assessment of
in September 2017. Maria was the most intense storm overall infrastructure as failing (electric) or extremely
to strike Puerto Rico in recorded history. Chronic low degraded.23
investment, maintenance, innovation, and unwill-
ingness to abandon centralized systems historically The most catastrophic failure of infrastructure
after Hurricane Maria was for electric power. While
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
14 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
power plants were largely intact after the storm, reli- loss electric power from the centralized distribution
ance on a centralized power grid with long-distance system.31
transmission was catastrophic. Destruction of 30 per-
cent of the power grid resulted in complete blackout The average age of the 37 principal dams in
for the island,24 and 45 percent of the population was Puerto Rico is 66 years, and the created reservoirs
without power for over 3 months after the storm.25 supply 67 percent of drinking water but only 1.8 per-
Restoration of the power grid took over 10 months26 cent of power generation for the island.23 Hydropower
and was slowest in sparsely populated, poor rural capacity in Puerto Rico expanded exponentially
municipalities in the island interior (41 percent vs. 29 from 1930 until the 1950s, after which it remained
percent in urban areas) that were in the direct path unchanged to the present.33 It has never been able
of Maria and crisscrossed with long-distance trans- to keep pace with population and electricity demand
mission lines27 (Figure 1). Approximately 13 percent and has been abandoned in favor of traditional fossil
of power infrastructure was lost totaling $92 billion fuel generation.
USD.25
Although Maria triggered landslides,5 their
Puerto Rico has failed to move from 98 percent impact on reservoir sediment infilling, while a sig-
reliance on fossil fuel for electric generation and a nificant even for some, was likely of short dura-
centralized power grid system to innovative decen- tion.14 It is commonly accepted that long-term basin
tralized options. Instead, the response of government sedimentation is most likely related to land use
to storms in general, and Maria in particular, has practices in its watershed.34,35 Lago Loiza was built
been to “patch” the grid and quickly returning power in 1953 as a keystone drinking water source for
distribution to pre-storm levels, in effect creating a San Juan, serving >179,000 residents.16 By 1994,
slow downward spiral in service after each storm and it had lost 47 percent of its water storage capacity
moving the island farther from power sustainability through sedimentation. High sedimentation rates in
without a long-term management plan and innova- the lake increased early reflecting erosion from crop
tion.23 It is becoming clear that Puerto Rico must lands that comprised 48 percent of the watershed
convert to a decentralized power system of micro- until the 1960s, when conservation efforts stressed
grids relying on renewable energy production.26,30 conversion to tree cover, which exceeded 20 percent
Replacing 30 percent of the current distribution of total area by 1987 accompanied by lower ero-
network with microgrids could ensure functionality sion. Contemporaneous urbanization, however, led to
of the entire power system even if 80 percent of the counter balancing increased sedimentation as basin
power nodes were destroyed, a major milestone in population increased 77 percent between 1950 and
reaching electric resiliency.24 1990 and housing increased 194 percent. Elsewhere,
the link between reservoirs of the northeast having
After Hurricane Maria, most of the Puerto Rico the highest sedimentation rates on the island and the
was without power, but there were still small pock- highest use of water for irrigation in Puerto Rico is
ets in rural areas that had functional microgrids, not coincidental.33
a poignant endorsement for replacement of fossil-
based centralized power generation with a distributed Annual rainfall in Puerto Rico has alternated
microgrid system of green infrastructure, especially between excess and drought (Figure 2). Although the
solar.31,32 With strong community support and par- island experiences wet and dry seasons, the contribu-
ticipation, Casa Pueblo in Adjuntas municipality tion of hurricanes like Irene and Maria Hurricane
developed a solar-powered microgrid and did not lose clearly dictated overall annual precipitation through
electricity as a result of Hurricane Maria. Patients short-term events. Maria passed over the main res-
requiring electric-powered medical devices continued ervoirs serving San Juan increasing sedimentation
protection uninterrupted, while an estimated 2,975 and overwhelming the water holding capacity of all
medical deaths across Puerto Rico were attributed to reservoirs. Rainfall from Maria broke a major drought
in Puerto Rico, but an inability to store the excess
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 15
Vol. 19, No. 8
Figure 2. Annual precipitation for Puerto Rico for the period 2000-2020 showing drought periods and major hur-
ricanes (A) and path of Hurricane Maria relative to the major reservoirs of Puerto Rico (B). Data from National
Drought Mitigation Center, US Department of Agriculture, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
and Puerto Rico Department of Natural and Environmental Resources.
water failed to buffer the impact of the most seri- and reduce flooding downstream, but were quickly
ous drought of the past 20 years that spanned most overwhelmed.36 Discharges from the seven largest
of 2019. Reservoirs were pre-emptively drawn prior reservoirs in the 24-hour period during the Maria’s
to Maria to handle massive influx of storm water passage were 827 times average annual mean flow,
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
16 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
and Lago Loiza, the principal reservoir for San Juan, them following Hurricane Maria. In addition, only 59
turned over its entire volume 24 times in 24 hours. percent of the population is served by a wastewater
utility, with the remainder on septic tanks or pits.
Overall, reservoirs of Puerto Rico are of marginal
quality and functionality. Fourteen of 16 reservoirs HUMAN SOCIETY
studied in 1996 were eutrophic and often plagued
by blooms of noxious cyanobacteria that impart In the aftermath of the damage caused by
taste and odor to drinking water.33 Water quality Hurricane Maria, communities quickly realized
of reservoirs likely worsened after Irene, Irma, and that they could not count on a rapid governmental
Maria associated with increased leaching of nutrients response. For instance, Valle42 interviewed a group
and chemical contaminants37 from croplands, urban of people displaced by Hurricane Maria in Orlando,
development, and abandoned landfills.38 In addition, Florida. The findings indicated the lack of aid and
the food web of many reservoirs has been totally relief that respondents experienced after the storm.
disrupted by the flushing out of fish downstream dur- There was inconsistent support to access water, food,
ing hurricanes and will take a long time to recover.36 and fuel to operate power generators due to the lack
Water resources in Puerto Rico are tuned to extremes of electricity. People experienced long lines to access
of wet and dry seasons and are highly resilient, while basic necessities. Communities tended to rely on each
infrastructure has developed a new normal condition other and took upon themselves to act together to
of lower quality following each storm, slowly decreas- clear debris, share supplies, and resources.
ing its ability to function over time and lacking long-
term sustainability. Other reports indicate the same experience, as
Ficek43 argued that “….everything went wrong at the
Koks et al.39 estimated that 27 percent of global same time and for an extended period of time.” In the
roads and railways are exposed to one hazard category, absence of an adequate emergency infrastructure,
but Puerto Rico is threatened by two frequent hurri- there were instances of help received by communities
canes and occasional earthquakes. A great concern is through grassroot organizations, community ties, and
current and potential damage to bridges. There are support from the Puerto Rican diaspora.
2,325 bridges in Puerto Rico with the majority built
between 1963 and 2006. The average age is 45 years, Past research has demonstrated the importance
and by 2030, 60 percent will be over 50 years old.23,40 of self-organized community efforts to prepare for
Approximately 1,377 bridges were damaged in 2017, disasters and build resilience, particularly in rural
84 percent from hurricanes. ASCEPRS23 classified communities.44,45 There are several examples of these
bridges on the island as 19 percent good, 69 percent efforts in communities in Puerto Rico after Hurricane
fair, and 12 percent in poor condition. Bridge scour is Maria. Delilah Roque et al.46 interviewed community
the main cause of bridge failure in Puerto Rico, but leaders to analyze the use of social capital in post-
Berrios-Soto41 suggested that the 495 bridges classi- disaster response. The authors found that neighbors
fied as scour critical may be an overestimate needing practiced different forms of social capital. These forms
re-evaluation given that damage from Hurricane was included bonding social capital exemplified by how
not as bad as predicted. communities united to solve community needs such
as removing debris to clear roads, house reconstruc-
Waste disposal infrastructure is woefully inad- tion, and gathering donations and resources. Bridging
equate and mostly in disrepair.23 Implementation of social capital included linkages between groups, pri-
post-closure activities at 30 landfills closed in 1990 is marily multidisciplinary and faith-based networks.
mostly lacking in spite of evidence that they are leaking These groups had access to networks that were able
contaminants into local waterways,38 and the United to provide services and resources including food,
States Environmental Protection Agency estimated clothing, health, and social services. Finally, linking
that currently operating landfills will reach capacity social capital included relationships with outside
in 5 years, in part due to the volume of debris entering groups, eg, political institutions, private business,
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 17
Vol. 19, No. 8
and nonprofit organizations, to bring resources to the crumbling infrastructure, and unstable governmental
local community. Activities included formal collabora- leadership.
tions to address issues such as fuel shortages, water
treatment, and solar energy infrastructure. The study GOVERNANCE
findings showed how community-based organizations
can work on predisaster social organization, commu- Puerto Rico’s WEF nexus vulnerabilities are
nity planning, and interactions to create post-disaster directly tied to governance issues. Puerto Rico’s
community resilience. convoluted political status, which some not inac-
curately conclude is colonial, prevents any one gov-
Nonprofit organizations47 and churches48 were also ernment body or any individual leader from taking
at the forefront of providing services and resources to responsibility for the decision-making process. While
the community. everyone is ultimately blameworthy for governance
shortcomings, everyone is also able with justification
While, on the surface, it seems that communi- to reassign blame to other parties; the buck does not
ties were able to organize and self-respond to the stop anywhere. This lack of accountability resulted in
devastation of the storm, significant challenges were a situation prior to Hurricanes Irma and Maria, in
identified. For instance, some nonprofit organizations which Puerto Rico had already endured a prolonged
lacked the organizational capacity to secure funding, economic downturn, bankruptcy, deterioration of criti-
access information and data, and training in recovery cal infrastructure, loss of population, and a shrinking
issues.47 The destroyed electric power system created tax base, with no viable path to recovery. Thus, prior
significant interruptions in healthcare that tested the to Irma and Maria, Puerto Rico was extremely vulner-
capacity of community-based organizations to respond. ability to natural disasters and the effects of climate
change.
There were also regional differences affecting
community’s recovery responses. Households in At the time the Treaty of Paris was signed in
large urban areas tended to have access to financial 1898, Puerto Rico had a largely agrarian economy.
resources that allowed them to evacuate to other While Spain allowed some local governance and
locales while their destroyed facilities and infra- even experimented with limited Puerto Rican rep-
structure were repaired. Smaller urban communities, resentation in Madrid, it was colony in the clas-
while lacking access to socioeconomic resources, were sic sense. The United States deemed Puerto Rico
able to self-organize and took on the responsibility an “un-incorporated territory”—read colony—that
of accessing resources and repairing damaged facili- was led by American generals and later civil gover-
ties. Granted, their recovery was slower than those in nors appointed by Washington. Puerto Ricans were
large urban areas.49 granted citizenship in 1917.50 Since that time, Puerto
Ricans have had a unique status in which they are
For the most part, after Hurricane Maria, com- full citizens on the mainland, but lack the full ben-
munity-based organizations were able to deliver post- efits of citizenship while residing in Puerto Rico itself.
storm aid and ensured that the community continued It should also be noted that Puerto Ricans residing
to function for the Nexus, even with the challenges in Puerto Rico were not granted the right to man-
noted. This sector was able to be resilient as it showed age their own affairs until 1950, and even then with
short-term instability to the disturbances caused by limitations and gray areas. In governance, gray areas
the storm but returned to a somewhat stable state. often are problematic because responsibility has not
been clearly defined.
It is still needed to be noted that its resilience
is facing major challenges that can put in at risk In the midst of the Great Depression, prices for
of an alternative stable state or complete collapse. sugar and tobacco, the chief crops of Puerto Rico,
Communities in Puerto Rico continue to be affected dropped swiftly. This effectively killed the agrarian
by issues they have few control over, such as access economy.51 Under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal,
to an unreliable electrical system, economic and
financial struggles, massive population exodus, a
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18 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
Washington attempted to “build the island in the The central government itself was $70 billion
image of the US.”52 The efforts focused on investments in debt by 2016, when Congress passed Puerto Rico
in modern infrastructure and economic development, Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act,
including industrialization.52 While Franklin Delano which essentially oversaw Puerto Rico’s finances.54
Roosevelt ally and appointed Governor Rexford Financial distress forced budget cuts in public work
Tugwell were committed to Puerto Rico’s develop- programs, deferring maintenance on critical infra-
ment, the motives were sometimes suspect. Tugwell, structure—energy, communication, transportation,
for example, lobbied for money for development by and water systems—even though the Puerto Rican
bluntly stating that an economically developed Puerto climate tends to degrade equipment much more rap-
Rico would reduce migration to the mainland.52 idly than on the US mainland.55 Blackouts were more
frequent, roads crumbled, pipes leaked and drinking
Luis Muñoz Marín, head of the Popular Democratic water systems routinely were in violation of federal
Party, was elected as governor in 1948. In 1950, safety standards. Emergency services were vulner-
the US Congress passed the Puerto Rico Federal able long before Irma and Maria hit Puerto Rico.
Relations Act, which was quickly followed by the
drafting of a Puerto Rican constitution in 1952. The On Puerto Rico itself, several structural govern-
result was the creation of the “Commonwealth”—a ance weaknesses have been identified and, while they
unique system in which Puerto Rico is neither inde- have been addressed to varying degrees, have not
pendent nor a state. Commonwealth was not intended been properly fixed. Puerto Rico has two levels of gov-
to permanent status, but a convenient and temporary ernment: the central commonwealth government and
configuration that would only hold until such time as 78 municipalities. Unlike continental United States,
the island decided that it wanted to either become a there are neither counties that administer services to
state or pursue independence.50 It is noteworthy that regions nor many regional bodies that are dedicated
the United States attempted to wash its hands of any to provide certain services such as transportation.56
taint of colonialism in 1953, when with Washington’s Between the central government and municipalities,
backing the United Nations ruled that Puerto Rico there has often been confusion as to whom is respon-
was “sufficiently self-governing.” sible for providing certain services, leading to dupli-
cative services provided in some areas, and shortages
Washington also supported development plans in others. Responsibility for investing in and main-
by passing tax incentives that encouraged industrial taining infrastructure is a common problem, which
development in Puerto Rico. Still, the island has long has been identified by Puerto Rican stakeholders.57
been subject to protectionist policies such Jones Act, Coordination is often lacking, hindering efforts to
which requires shipments to Puerto Rico to be deliv- address pressing infrastructure needs and naturally
ered on US ships from US ports. making response to disaster more difficult.
Puerto Rico’s economy faced serious problems Development plans originating in San Juan and
when Washington began to phase out tax incentives Washington have come and gone, with results vary-
in the late 1990s. From 1997 to 2017, Puerto Rico ing. The common denominator, however, is that nei-
lost 83,000 manufacturing jobs—an astounding 50 ther San Juan nor Washington is fully responsible for
percent of the total.53 Puerto Rico suffered through the success or failure of any scheme. Recovery con-
the Great Recession of 2008. With high unemploy- tinues, but is hindered by governance issues on the
ment—usually double rates on the mainland—and a island, and Washington’s delay is in releasing fund. It
contracting economy, Puerto Ricans left the island in is also obvious that Puerto Rico’s economic develop-
droves, resulting in a population loss of 11.8 percent. ment options hindered the recovery. It is clear that
The population loss was all the more severe because it Puerto Rican political leaders made poor decisions
was often young, working-age people who left, which that dug a deep financial hole. But the US Supreme
resulted in the median age rising from 37 in 2010 to Court has ruled that ultimate political power over the
41.4 in 2017.53
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 19
Vol. 19, No. 8
island rests with the US Congress.50 Thus, ultimate Table 2. Resilience of environment,
responsibility for Puerto Rico—under the current infrastructure, community, and governance in
commonwealth configuration—lies with Washington. Puerto Rico to long-term change and disasters
The political status question is paramount.
Sector Resilience
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Environment
The sustainability of human societies can be
contextualized most appropriately with the water- Geology Resilient
energy-food Nexus, a three-legged stool of factors that
must be maintained in balance or system sustainabil- Landscape Alternative stable state
ity is lost. The intersect of these three factors control
human health, and in turn, the entire nexus is under Water Resilient
the control of economics. In the broadest sense, com-
munity and governance issues dictate both economies Agriculture Resilient/alternative stable state
and resource utilization but are often left out of
Nexus discussions. Infrastructure
Recognizing the interrelationship of environmen- Energy Collapse/resilient
tal and human factors, we proposed a resilience model
that evaluates both on the same scale based on broad Dams/reservoirs Collapse
principles that govern responses of ecosystems to
disturbance (Table 1). Our evaluation of the resil- Transportation Collapse
ience of environment, infrastructure, community, and
governance in Puerto Rico to natural disasters, with Sewage and solid waste Collapse
Hurricane Maria as a case history, and implications
for long-term sustainability of the water-energy-food Community Resilient
Nexus is presented in Table 2.
Governance Resistant/collapse
Geology is the ultimate environmental factor
controlling soil development, groundwater, and agri- Even the best management practices for forests are
culture productivity. Erosion is a problem in Puerto insufficient to offset the progressive negative impacts
Rico; the rate of which is controlled by soil water of urbanization.
saturation and slope. Shifts in land use to favor ero-
sion via agriculture and urbanization have led to Water is an extremely resilient environmen-
landslides closing roads and reduced reservoir water tal factor. Although precipitation varies seasonally
storage capacity in the recent past. Geology is a con- (wet and dry) and interannually and punctuated by
stant resilient variable and potential problem, whose unpredictable natural disasters with massive rainfall
negative impact can be mitigated through effective in a short period, Puerto Rican ecosystems are resil-
legislation and adaptive management. ient with structure and functions that can adaptive
to changing conditions, including projected climate
Landscape management is the ultimate control impacts. The problem with water in Puerto Rico is
over erosion and watershed hydrology and deter- not the resource itself, but an inability to store suf-
mines the ability of watersheds to reduce pulsed ficient supply to meet current and projected societal
discharge downstream, instead promoting short- or demands because of chronic mismanagement of reser-
long-term storage in soils and vegetation. Historically, voirs and watersheds.
Puerto Rican landscapes have shifted alternative
stable states from initial forest clearance, inten- Agriculture could be highly resilient with proper
sive agriculture, reforestation, and now urbanization. management and governance. Government policy
promoted emigration of rural populations to cities as
part of a push for industrialization in the twentieth
century as well as promotion of agriculture for export.
The result was land abandonment and a fragile agri-
culture economy as the majority of food consumed on
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
20 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
the island has shifted to imports. Interestingly, local projected needs. The solid waste situation is even
farmers observed that traditional root crops were not worse as post-closure management of sites is lack-
destroyed by Maria, while those above ground and ing, and currently, active sites have rapidly reached
mostly for export were. Together with more urban capacity with post-Maria debris or will do so within
agriculture, Puerto Rico is on the cusp of an alternate the next 5 years. There is an opportunity to increase
stable state for agriculture favoring sustainability. resilience of these situations via green infrastructure,
including constructed wetlands, but there has been
Total energy failure during Hurricane Maria and little action to date.
an inordinately long time for recovery to pre-hurri-
cane conditions was the result of an antiquated power Human society has the ultimate control over
distribution system and nearly total reliance on fos- long-term sustainability in Puerto Rico. Governments
sil fuel generation. Puerto Rico has a long history of tend to be driven by economics, while communities
patching the existing electrical network and failing to are action centers because of intimate familiarity
anticipate future needs and the importance of alter- with threats to sustainability. The downward spiral
native energy sources. Initial efforts at implementa- of all infrastructure over decades is directly related a
tion of an alternative energy source with microgrids government strategy to patch rather than strengthen
for distribution have started, but unfortunately, most or embrace innovation. Hurricane Maria did profound
of these projects have been undertaken at the com- damage to infrastructure, but, in many cases, because
munity level, while government has lacked a vision. negligence and government failure led to a tipping
point in sustainability.
The situation for dams and associated reservoirs
in Puerto Rico is a disaster waiting to happen. Dams Puerto Ricans have shown an incredible resilience
are old, with water storage capacity decreasing pro- to the compounding effects of cascading social, eco-
gressively through sedimentation related mostly to nomic, and weather-related disasters, and the effects
land use changes and lesser so to Hurricane Maria. of climate change. While their resilience is commend-
While mostly used for drinking water supply for most able, there cannot be further resilience without sig-
of the island, water quality is threatened from agri- nificant investment to empower local communities for
cultural chemicals and leaking landfills. This is one self-sufficiency.
of the least resilient sectors of Puerto Rico because of
the finite number of potential sites for constructing Lessons learned by the Maria disaster must be
dams and an inability of government to develop effec- taken to heart and addressed immediately. The physi-
tive management scenarios. cal and mental disconnects between urban and rural
became a chasm as centralized electric and water
The land transportation system in Puerto Rico is networks broke, denying basic services to rural com-
near collapse. Although roads experience landslides munities, and road blockages denied urban dwellers
with hurricanes, this is considered an ongoing prob- food from rural growers. Decentralization of services
lem due to local geology, and a new normal condition and increased ownership by local communities, both
is established after each storm. The situation with rural and urban, are essential. In addition to a return
bridges is dire with most old and in poor or critical to traditional agriculture, urban agriculture, and the
condition. Again, the current situation reflects a his- community and household levels should be encour-
torical inability of the government to maintain and aged to buffer potential isolation from major disasters.
build bridges to ensure that urban and rural areas
are not isolated during major disasters. Traditional engineering approaches to infrastruc-
ture are totally unable to keep up with societal
Both sewage and solid waste treatment are in needs. Planning time, construction costs, mainte-
a state of collapse. Approximately 40 percent of the nance, centralized services and distribution systems,
population relies on septic systems for waste treat- and planned effective life expectancy of engineered
ment, and the government has not constructed tra- infrastructure negate use of adaptive management to
ditional waste treatment plants to meet current or modify systems rapidly to meet unexpected changes
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 21
Vol. 19, No. 8
in population demographics, disasters, and long-term 8. Feng Y, Negron-Juarez RI, Patricola CM, et al.: Rapid remote
climate change. sensing assessment of impacts from Hurricane Maria on forests
of Puerto Rico. Peerj Preprints 26597v1, 2018. DOI: 10.7287/peerj.
Decentralized, nature-based solutions with com- preprints.26597v1.
munity ownership are key to maximizing infra- 9. Hall J, Muscarella R, Quebbeman A, et al.: Hurricane-induced
structure resilience leading to a sustainable water- rainfall is a stronger predictor of tropical Forest damage in Puerto
energy-food Nexus in Puerto Rico. The two most Rico than maximum wind speeds. Sci Rep. 2020; 10: 4318.
resilient sectors in Puerto Rico are the environment 10. Hu T, Smith RB: The impact of Hurricane Maria on the vegeta-
and community. The linkage between the two must tion of Dominica and Puerto Rico using multispectral remote sens-
be maximized to develop innovative systems lead- ing. Remote Sens. 2018; 10: 827.
ing to sustainability. Green infrastructure such as 11. Feng Y, Negron-Juarez RI, Chambers JQ: Remote sensing and
constructed wetlands has been developed by local statistical analysis of the effects of Hurricane Maria on the forests
communities globally to treat local waste water, while of Puerto Rico. Remote Sens Environ. 2020; 247: 111940.
providing additional services in return including eco- 12. Miller PW, Kumar A, Mote TL, et al.: Persistent hydrological
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government programs embrace this new approach 13. Gellis A: The effects of Hurricane Hugo on suspended-sediment
and promote innovation over patch work approaches loads, Lago Loiza basin, Puerto Rico. Earth Surf. Processes and
to infrastructure. Landforms. 1993; 18: 505-517.
14. Grande A, Schmidt AH, Bierman PR, et al.: Landslides, hurri-
Thomas L. Crisman, PhD, Professor Emeritus, School of Geosciences, canes, and sediment sourcing impact basin-scale erosion estimates
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4. Winters ZS: Current and projected sustainability of the water- 21. Gould WA, Wadsworth FH, Quinones M, et al.: Land use, con-
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5. Bessette-Kirton EK, Cerovski-Darriau C, Schulz WH, et al.: 22. Rodriguez-Cruz LA, Niles MT: Awareness of climate change’s
Landslides triggered by Hurricane Maria: Assessment of an impacts and motivation to adapt are not enough to drive action:
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GSATG383A.1. 2021; 16: E0244512. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0244512.
6. Bessette-Kirton EK, Cole JA, Schulz WH, et al.: Mobility charac- 23. American Society of Civil Engineers Puerto Rico Section
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Puerto Rico. Landslides. 2020; 17: 2795-2809. 24. Aros-Vera F, Gillian S, Rehmar A, et al.: Increasing the resil-
7. Cerovski-Darriau C, Bessette-Kirton E, Schulz WH, et al.: ience of critical infrastructure networks through the strategic loca-
Does geology matter? Post-Hurricane Maria landslide distribution tion of microgrids: A case study of hurricane maria in Puerto Rico.
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# NH34B-02, Fall Meeting 2017. Washington, DC: American 25. Shermeyer J: Assessment of electrical and infrastructure recov-
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26. Kwasinski A, Andrade F, Castro-Sitiriche MJ, et al.: Hurricane
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28. Knapp KR, Kruk MC, Levinson DH, et al.: The international 44. Kapucu N, Rivera FI: Rural resilience: Disaster prepared-
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363-376. rural-resilience-disaster-preparedness-for-communities-off-the-
29. Knapp KR, Diamond HJ, Kossin JP, et al.: International best beaten-path. Accessed May 10, 2021.
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30. Kwasinski A: Effects of Hurricane Maria on renewable energy 46. Roque AD, Pijawka D, Wutich A: The role of social capital in
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32. O’Neill-Carrillo E, Rivera-Quinones MA: Energy policies in 32(3): 67-88.
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Puerto Rico. Departamento de Recurcos Naturales y Ambientales, 49. Yabe T, Rao PSC, Ukkusuri SV: Regional differences in resil-
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 2004: 191. ience of social and physical systems: Case study of Puerto Rico
34. Gellis AC: Factors influencing storm-generated suspended-sed- after Hurricane Maria. Environ Plann B Urban Anal City Sci. 2021;
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Effects on reservoir water quality and fish community structure and 51. Pico F: History of Puerto Rico: A Panorama of Its People.
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38. Hunter JM, Arbona SI: Paradise lost: An introduction to the vices in Puerto Rico before and after Hurricane Maria. Homeland
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2019; 10: 2677. restructuring. Congressional research service. 2021. Available at
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2028 Puerto Rico Transportation Asset Management Plan. 2019: 302. 1, 2021.
41. Berrios Soto C: Analysis of estimated scour vs inspected scour 55. Fischbach J, May LW, Whipkey K, et al.: After Hurricane Maria:
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Narratives of Struggle, Resilience, and Migration. Natural Hazards 56. Rosas E: Assessing the impact of municipal government capac-
Center Quick Response Grant Report Series, 279. Boulder, CO: ity on recovery from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. Int J Disaster
Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado Boulder, 2018. Risk Reduct. 2021; 61: 102340. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102340.
Available at https://hazards.colorado.edu/quick-response-report/ 57. Blas Nunez-Neto B, Lauland A, Aguirre J: Beyond recovery:
puerto-rico-se-levanta-hurricane-maria-and-narratives-of-struggle- Transforming Puerto Rico’s water sector in the wake of Hurricanes
resilience-and-migration. Accessed May 10, 2021. Irma and Maria. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center.
43. Ficek RE: Infrastructure and colonial difference in Puerto Rico 2020. Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
after Hurricane María. Transf Anthropol. 2018; 26(2): 102-117. RR2604.html. Accessed May 1, 2021.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 23
Vol. 19, No. 8
Notes
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
24 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
JEM Restoration versus transformative adaptation
of community drinking water systems after
Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico
Victor Dionel Ruiz-Aviles, PhD student
David Pijawka
David Manuel-Navarrete
Dave White
Cecilio Ortiz-Garcia
ABSTRACT including community aqueducts representatives in
decision-making and policy-making.
Hurricane Irma then Maria hit Puerto Rico in
September 2017, exposing the heightened vulnerability Data collection included interviews with water
of the island’s Critical Infrastructure Systems and system managers, government, and nongovernmen-
Processes (CRISPs) and putting the resilience of some tal organization (NGO) representatives who regulate
of the most impoverished communities to the test. these systems or assisted communities in recovering
Being one of these CRISPs, the island’s centralized their systems. We also surveyed water systems that
drinking water system operated by the Puerto Rico had operational problems within the first 3 weeks.
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority suffered heavy dam- The data revealed a diversity of actions along the
age leaving over 200,000 people off-grid for months. disaster cycle through which communities prepared
Decentralized community aqueducts were also affected. for, restored, recovered, and cocreated transformative
However, most were able to sustain operations, with adaptations to their systems. Findings reflect that
only 15 percent incapacitated during the first few despite economic deficiencies and lack of emergency
weeks after Maria. plans, many communities were able to improvise and
restore their water systems soon after the disaster. As
Of the 205 community aqueducts serving low- part of their post-disaster organization, communities
income communities in the island’s central mountain- increased their collaborative networks with govern-
ous areas, only 35 failed. This article explores how and mental and NGOs to cocreate improvement projects to
why these systems failed and what actions the commu- enhance resiliency. Adaptations included (1) increased
nities should take to recover in a relatively short time community autonomy, (2) system redundancy, and
in comparison to the centralized system. It defines the (3) improved capacity to participate in government
factors that account for the differences, the systems’ discussion forums related to their systems.
capacity to meet water quality requirements, and
potentially transformative adaptations generated to Key words: critical infrastructure, resiliency,
face future disturbances. We were interested in under- impoverished communities, Puerto Rico, transforma-
standing (a) how system capacity was affected by the tive adaptation, drinking community water systems
restoration process, (b) if adaptation resulted in signif-
icant operational changes, and (c) community member INTRODUCTION
engagement. Finally, we explored governance trans-
formations that increased stakeholder’s participation, In September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria
hit Puerto Rico, causing extensive damage estimated
DOI:10.5055/jem.0590 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8 25
at approximately USD 100 billion.1 The economic water quality requirements, (3) ensuring energy
impacts exacerbated the island’s ongoing public debt provision to the systems, (4) resilience and adapta-
crisis resulting from its colonial history.2 The hurri- tion, and (5) collaborations with governmental and
canes virtually destroyed the national electrical grid, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, we
operated by Puerto Rico Energy and Power Authority conducted follow-up semistructured interviews with
(PREPA), initially resulting in 100 percent disruption selected managers, government officials, and NGOs.
and leaving parts of the island in the dark for a year.1
The centralized water distribution network, oper- Specifically, this article explores the factors that
ated by Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority contributed to system failures and the actions taken
(PRASA), was also seriously impaired. Moreover, it to recover from the disaster in a relatively short time
discontinued water provision for up to a year in some compared to the centralized system. In particular, we
communities due to the power outage. Distribution question whether some of the recovery actions were
systems were affected by landslides, falling trees, transformational adaptions that led to significant
and failed dams as well. For instance, a compromised changes in how these systems resumed their opera-
dam in the northwest area of the island impacted the tion.5 In addition to examining these community
PRASA system and delivery. It took 2 years to restore systems’ resilience—ie, capacity to rapidly restore
the dam and reinstate delivery to some affected operation—and adaptation, this article discusses the
communities.2 systems’ ability to meet water quality requirements.
We were interested in how this capacity was affected
Despite the island-wide system failure, 205 rural by the restoration process and whether the overall
communities continued providing drinking water process resulted in the transformative adaptation
through community aqueducts.3 These rural systems that generated significant operational changes. We
are primarily located in the island’s central moun- also sought to understand how community members
tainous areas and operated by low-income communi- engaged in the process.5 Finally, we explored possible
ties. The little-to-no financial investment, simple and political process transformations if regulatory institu-
outdated technology, and insufficient redundancy tions were to increase participation of all impacted
in these systems should, in principle, result in high actors, including community aqueducts in decision-
vulnerability.4 Yet, evidence from this study suggests making and policy-making.6
that these simple systems were less vulnerable and
more resilient than PRASA’s centralized, complex SMALL COMMUNITY DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS
infrastructure. About 85 percent of community sys-
tems continued operating during and immediately The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
after the disaster. The other 15 percent were able to defines small water systems as systems that supply
rapidly recover and, in some cases, transform their water to populations equal to or less than 3,300 peo-
operations to become better adapted. ple.7 We center this article on community aqueducts
in Puerto Rico8 that meet the EPA definition. These
Of the 35 community aqueducts that failed during systems are typically located in rural areas, operate
the first 3 weeks after the storms hit, 29 were failed with simple or rustic technology, and managed at the
due to lack of electricity and six due to infrastructure community level.9 These systems must meet stand-
damage.3 We applied a mixed-methods approach to ards for two criteria for safe operation: turbidity and
analyze water managers’ experiences after the two bacteriology.8
hurricanes and assess their community drinking
water systems’ resiliency and adaptation. We also Turbidity measures suspended solid materials,
surveyed those systems that did not operate during which can harbor bacteria, viruses, and metals harm-
the first weeks after the storms, asking about actions ful to human health.10 Bacteriology refers to the level
taken before, during, and after concerning (1) the of bacteria or viruses in water, such as coliforms.10 In
systems’ physical infrastructure, (2) compliance with Puerto Rico, 68 percent of community drinking water
comes from groundwater.11 For these systems, the
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
26 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
soil naturally filters the water-removing suspended providing support for emergency plans, and establish-
metals. Thus, the water is extracted (by gravity ing safe water criteria. Of particular importance is
or with pumps) with low turbidity. It undergoes a ensuring that the small water systems meet regula-
chlorine treatment before being stored in cisterns to tory compliance for water quality. These agencies are
disinfect it. Homes access the potable water using a also the training and operations licensing organiza-
gravity-based piping system. For systems that obtain tions for the water systems. The water system manag-
water from a surface source, filtration is necessary to ers maintain the system with support and financing
remove suspended solids before chlorination. from the community. Nongovernmental agencies and
organizations assist both regulatory agencies and sys-
The organizational model (Figure 1) differs across tem operators. As the study will show, the Puerto Rico
communities, but, in general, a community board Community Foundation, Rural Community Assistance
that is also responsible for managing the system Partnership (RCAP), and University Institute for
decides internal governance rules. Community man- Community Development NGOs supported the com-
agers must ensure that water systems comply with munities in building social capital, especially in finan-
internal regulations and regulatory agencies’ require- cial support for solar energy systems.
ments. Requirements include EPA’s and Puerto Rico’s
Department of Health water quality regulations Conditions before the disaster
and the Department of Environment and Natural Community aqueduct systems serve approxi-
Resources water resources protection policies.12 As a
result, staying in compliance can require assistance mately 200,000 people (about 6 percent of the total
from NGOs for some systems. population) in 45 of Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities11
(Figure 2). Most of these systems are located in the
As shown in Figure 1, Puerto Rico’s community central mountainous area of Puerto Rico and serve
water systems institutional relationships involve small, rural, isolated communities. Due to poverty
communities, community water system managers, and elevation, these systems are typically simple
regulatory agencies, and NGOs, such as social organi- and not well structured as it is difficult to obtain and
zations, the church, and the private sector. The regu- transport materials. Thus, many do not comply with
latory agencies are the central bodies developing envi- the water quality regulations. During intense storms
ronmental quality standards, training requirements,
Figure 1. Diagram of the institutional relationship of the community water systems organizational model.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 27
Vol. 19, No. 8
Figure 2. Map of the community aqueduct locations and topography. Data sources: gis.pr.gov and Puerto Rico
EPA Office of Small Water Systems.
such as Irma and Maria, these systems are a cause for considered the most serious by the EPA. Therefore, it
concern as they are highly vulnerable. requires immediate action by the relevant authorities,
in this case, the Department of Health of Puerto Rico
According to the Department of State of Puerto as established by Law 93 of 1997.13
Rico, these systems extract about 30.7 million lit-
ers (153.5 L per person) per day. In 2015, 50 per- Many of the systems listed as Level 1 offenders
cent of these systems did not meet the Puerto Rico also failed to meet notification requirements intended
Department of Health water quality requirements, to safeguard consumer health. For Level 1 designa-
and 8.1 percent did not have certified trained opera- tions, the Department of Health must notify system
tors.11 The State Department found that 23 schools operators within 24 hours.7 The operators must,
received water from these systems and that about in turn, notify community members that receive
23,000 people received unsafe water.11 water services.7 According to the EPA, neither the
Department of Health nor the infringing systems
The EPA reported that 55 percent of the systems always follow this mandatory procedure.
did not comply with any water quality requirement
in 2015.7 They also designated approximately 175 From a resilience perspective, it is essential to
systems as water quality violators. Another 24 were know how the hurricanes affected the aqueduct sys-
declared Level 1 offenders.*7 This type of infraction is tem’s capacity to comply with water quality regula-
tions. One of the most significant factors for noncom-
*For the EPA, systems at Level 1 show: “inability to maintain micro- pliance before the storms was high energy costs for
bial treatment; excess fecal coliforms, according to health standards; operating water systems. A 2016 investigation by the
inability to perform fecal contamination tests after a positive result in National Institute of Energy and Island Sustainability
a fecal coliform analysis; excess nitrate, according to health standards; looked at 32 water systems in communities classified
or inability to obtain a sample that confirms the presence of nitrate.”8 as having low economic resources. Researchers found
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
28 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
that energy expenditures accounted for 80 percent of environmental, safety, security, and natu-
the total available resources.8 ral threats to the system. It has conducted
a vulnerability assessment for safety, nat-
An extreme case was the Bayamoncito com- ural disasters, and other environmental
munity system in the Aguas Buenas municipality threats, and has prepared an emergency
(Figure 3), which had a monthly collection of $2,700 response plan for these hazards.19
and paid $2,600 for energy.7 These costs make operat-
ing the system unsustainable and decrease resiliency Resilience also includes a system’s ability to adapt
by limiting physical infrastructure improvements or transform to reduce vulnerability to future events
and repairs. As a result, low-income water systems and hazards.20,21 Factors that increase small commu-
are barely operational and easily impaired, which nity water systems’ adaptive capacity include access
explains why experts categorize them as highly vul- to economic capital for recovery and improvements,
nerable, high risk, and low preparedness.5 and social capital in the form of “citizen participa-
tion, place attachment and sense of community.”22 For
Resilience and adaptation of drinking water systems this study, we define resilience as a small community
Authors from different disciplines allude to the drinking water systems’ capacity to maintain or
restore operations quickly after a disaster, meet water
difficulty in defining, applying, and evaluating resil- quality regulations, and make adaptations and reduce
iency due to its multidisciplinary complexity.14-16 For vulnerability to future events.15,16,23 For this to occur, a
instance, resilience occurs at multiple scales (social, community must have human, political, cultural, eco-
economic, technological, geographical, etc.) and can nomic, and environmental capital that facilitates its
apply to an individual, a community, a population, a ability to face a disaster.17 Four resilience domains—
geographical area, or a system.14,17,18 There are also technical (physical assets), organizational structures,
differences regarding its use as a quality, process, or social, eg, living conditions and human capital, and
outcome.14 According to the EPA, water system resil- economic (financial assets)—are vital in facilitating
ience is when: recovery and restoration.24,25 Each of these domains
is critical to the system’s ability to resist or absorb
The system ensures that its leadership impacts, promote rapid recovery, initiate adaptation,
and staff members work together to antici- and reduce vulnerability to future threats.25
pate and avoid problems. It proactively
identifies legal, financial, non-compliance,
Figure 3. Map depicting Puerto Rico municipalities. Red star indicates the approximate location of Bayamoncito.
Source: adjusted from Wikimedia commons.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 29
Vol. 19, No. 8
Recovery and restoration, phase I after a disaster, community action plans and raise emergency funds
often involve “patching” technical systems to continue during the disaster.25 In the context of climate change,
operating until repaired,26 protection of lives and government agencies are struggling to quickly and
property, and preventing social disruption.27 The next effectively respond to emergencies.2,37 Therefore, com-
phase, adaptation, can be incremental or transforma- munities must diversify their collaborations with
tive depending on the nature of the improvements external organizations at different scales, local,
made.6,28 This phase should include disaster prepara- regional, national, and international. Research is
tion planning to reduce vulnerability and allow rapid studying this type of adaptive capacity through
response,22,29,30 Despite their simple infrastructure, low Collaborative Aid Networks.35
redundancy, and meager financial investment,5 there
are factors discussed in adaptive capacity literature These networks help communities develop logis-
that explain the community aqueduct systems’ higher tics and set up effective supply delivery chains when a
resilience to the two hurricanes in comparison to the disaster occurs.38 Logistics include defining clear roles
centralized system. These factors include community and responsibilities for the network’s actors.39 Thus,
organizational capacity, human resources, infrastruc- our data evaluated relations between community
ture status, external financial support, access to tech- aqueducts and NGOs active in Puerto Rico during the
nology, and decentralized decision-making.4,31 hurricanes. We considered whether these relation-
ships grew weaker or more robust and did not result
This study builds on research exploring the path in new dependencies. Overall, we looked for evidence
dependencies of resiliency factors before, during, or indicating that communities developed “collaborative
after a disaster.17 Using surveys and interviews, we autonomy” as an adaptive capacity.
assess the preparation, restoration, recovery, and
adaptation to future disasters32 in community water METHODS
systems that failed during and after the two hur-
ricanes. Our assessment explored changes in social, This article reports the results of an exploratory
economic, and environmental capacity related to a case study of Puerto Rican community aqueducts from
system’s optimal functioning and the communities’ June to October 2019 using a mixed-methods design.40
relationship to government agencies and NGOs dur- The methods consisted of largely qualitative surveys
ing and after the disaster.31,33 These assessments and interviews. Recruitment materials, surveys, and
helped evaluate if communities have the potential to interview questions were written in Spanish and
transform their water systems. included open- and closed-ended questions. Questions
focused on discovering recovery and resiliency activ-
Collaborative autonomy ity for community aqueduct systems that had failed
Autonomy is a critical adaptive capacity, empow- because of Hurricanes Irma and Maria.
ering communities’ self-organization and resource Five stakeholders from government and NGOs,
development.34,35 Local autonomy becomes particu- and 10 community managers participated in semis-
larly important in a context like Puerto Rico, where tructured, in-depth interviews.41 Questions covered
government institutions are experiencing internal all recovery phases, including predisaster emergency
crises. Furthermore, climate change demands a level plans, repair and restoration, recovery, and trans-
of response from governments that far exceeds its formative adaptation. Transformative adaptions are
capacities.36 Various authors argue that communities long-term changes made to protect systems from
need to partner with public agencies and nonprofit future disasters. We particularly wanted to know if
organizations to effectively work toward recovery and they involved new social capital relationships or other
adaptation.35,37 means of support. In-depth interviews covered two
areas. First, we interviewed five external organiza-
Autonomy does not preclude relationships with tion representatives. The governmental representa-
NGOs and government agencies that can help develop tives included staff from Puerto Rico’s EPA and the
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
30 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
island’s Department of Health, as they directly influ- and other factors related to rural and low-income
ence water quality activities. The three NGO inter- communities. Survey responses included communi-
viewees included representatives from the Puerto ties from the major regions of the island and the most
Rico Community Foundation, RCAP, and University rural mountainous areas. Questions included the
Institute for Community Development, as they sup- following:
port and assist the community water systems.
nnWhat was the nature of compliance with
We completed 10 additional in-depth interviews water quality requirements before, dur-
with community water system managers from five ing, and after the hurricane?
regions in Puerto Rico: two per region representing
the highest and lowest poverty rates. The interviews nnWhat parts of the water system in your
sought to discover what activities the water manag- community were damaged?
ers undertook, decisions they made in each recovery
phase (emergency response, restoration, and recov- nnWhat was the source of energy used for
ery), and if they needed financial and organizational your system before, during, 1 year after
support (training or developing plans to prepare for the hurricane, and presently?
future hazards). A significant question in the research
was discovering how social capital helped recovery nnWhat were the external organizations
and expand adaptive capacity. Ultimately, we sought that brought assistance to your commu-
to explore transformative adaptations aimed at build- nity regarding water systems functioning
ing resiliency for future disasters. For example, sev- before the disaster, 1 year after the hur-
eral NGOs helped finance energy projects for running ricane, and presently?
the water systems, financing disaster preparation
plans, and a coalition involving 20 water systems nnWhat were the investments and changes
started after the disaster. made to your systems to protect them
in the future, and how was that accom-
For analysis of the survey, we used the Qualtrics plished?
platform. For the interviews and literature analysis,
we used inductive coding.40,41 The goal was to deter- nnWhat adaptations were made to reduce
mine how the damaged systems managed to get water any negative impacts to the systems from
to their populations, what factors were crucial for future events, and how was that done
their resilience, and what adaptations took place. An (transformative adaptations)?
analysis of government reports and news stories of
the hurricanes supplemented this information. The questions explored several resiliency factors.
First, we asked about system characteristics, such as
Data collection the production and storage capacity compared with
We sent surveys42 to the managers of 35 sys- the population that it supplies or income generation
related to operational cost. Second, we gathered infor-
tems that had difficulties operating during the first mation about managers, such as whether they are
weeks after the hurricanes. Surveys were sent via an certified and trained. Third, we sought to understand
email or mailed to managers who did not have email the water system conditions before, during, and after
accounts. The researchers were assisted in completing the disaster. Conditions included water service and
the surveys as needed through telephone conversa- quality, infrastructure conditions, energy sources,
tions. We received 20 responses, or 57.1 percent, by assistance from external organizations, the type of
emails and telephone conversations. This response institutional support, and what was successful.
rate is considered adequate given possible water man-
ager turnover between the storms and the survey, dif-
ficulties in getting approval from some communities,
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 31
Vol. 19, No. 8
In addition to the survey, 15 interviews with The project engaged managers from two distinct
stakeholders provided further details about actions types of municipalities: one with the highest percent-
and interventions. The questions were the same for age of poverty and the other with the lowest. This
each recorded interview. Interviewees included a gov- distinction allowed us to understand intraregional
ernment official from the EPA office in Puerto Rico and inter-regional differences, determine if and, if yes,
and the Department of Health, two nonprofit organi- how local government assistance differed for these
zations, and one university representative from the communities, and discern whether poverty resulted
University of Puerto Rico Institute for Community in differential adaptation or the need for partnerships
Development. These stakeholders represent organiza- in planning or implementing resiliency strategies.
tions that regulate or work with the study communi- These stakeholders provided important information
ties. Organizations selected representatives by the based on their experience before, during, and after
organization based on their role in the community the disaster.41
aqueduct projects. Interviewees also consisted of 10
water system managers (identified by red stars): two Manager interviews provided accounts of the
from each of the five regions shown in Figure 4. challenges and actions involved in each phase of a dis-
aster planning: preparedness, restoration and recov-
For this study, we classified the regions as north, ery, and mitigation/adaptation.32 Interviews explored
south, east, west, and central. The northern region activities, the assistance received in each disaster
comprises alluvial valleys and limestone rock systems phase, and how critical this assistance was in keep-
with abundant aquifers and underground rivers.43 ing the system operational. For organizations that
The southern part also has limestone and alluvial assisted the communities, we asked how about their
valleys but in smaller quantities. The area also has collaboration. Interviews were transcribed verbatim
the least rainfall.44 The central region is a chain of and tabulated using inductive coding extracted from
mountains known as “The Central Mountain Range,” participants’ narratives.41
composed mainly of volcanic rocks. This mountain
range significantly impacts the island’s rainfall. In Finally, we reviewed and analyzed newspaper
the eastern area, the mountain range acts as the first articles related to the Puerto Rican community aque-
barrier against the Atlantic winds generating a rain ducts, PRASA, and hurricane recovery to ensure that
forest and the most precipitation. In the western part the case study leveraged multiple sources of informa-
of the island, the mountain range supports alluvial tion.40 Reports on community drinking water systems
valleys with moderate rainfall.43,44 As a result, Puerto were also reviewed, including the “Expert Assessment
Rico’s diverse geology means that the water resources of the Resilience of the Drinking Water and Sanitation
vary widely and require disparate adaptive manage- Systems to Climate-Related Hazards,”45 which meas-
ment across communities. ured the resilience of various physical infrastructure
aspects to different natural events.
Figure 4. Five regional case studies of Puerto Rico's community water systems.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
32 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
RESULTS Below are the most significant changes related to
water quality and the internal and external factors
Survey results that caused service disruptions before, during the
We received survey responses from 20 of the 35 first 3 weeks after the emergency, and ongoing.
communities that experienced discontinuity in their Water quality. Remarkably, the two hurricanes caused
operations during the first 3 weeks after the hurri- only a 5 percent decrease (65-60 percent) in non-
canes. Figure 5 indicates the location of those commu- compliance with EPA’s water quality requirements
nities with services disrupted for long periods (dots) (Table 1). Even more remarkable is that 1 year after
and those whose managers responded to the survey the hurricane, the percentage of systems meeting
(stars). For instance, there were 14 systems suffer- requirements had soared by 20 percent (up to 85
ing extended disruption the eastern region of Puerto percent) compared to prehurricane conditions. EPA
Rico—eight in Caguas (red dot), one each in San policies and disaster training for water sampling
Lorenzo and Patillas (yellow dots), and four in Yabucoa linked recovery aid to compliance with water quality
(green dot). In the eastern region, five Caguas area requirements and likely incentivized water quality
managers responded to the survey (red stars), three improvements.
from San Lorenzo, one from Patillas, four from Yaucoa,
and two each from Las Piedras and Nagüabo.
Figure 5. Rural community water systems experiencing service disruption after Hurricanes Irma and Maria
(dots) and the locations of the water system managers responding to the survey (stars).
Table 1. Compliance with water quality requirements before, during, and after the disaster
Compliance with water Met all requirements Partially met Not met
q uality regulations
Before (6 months to event) 65 percent 25 percent 10 percent
(13/15) (5/20) (2/20)
During (event to 1 year) 60 percent 25 percent 15 percent
(12/15) (5/20) (3/20)
After (1-2 years) 85 percent 10 percent 5 percent
(17/20) (2/20) (1/20)
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 33
Vol. 19, No. 8
Of the eight systems that failed to comply in the obstacle to recovery, according to 88 percent of the
first year after the hurricanes, seven reported that survey responders.
they could not perform water quality tests during the
disaster emergency phase. Three of these were due Energy disruption. According to managers who par-
to the high cost of lab tests, three due to laboratories ticipated in the survey, energy availability and costs
were not operating, and one resulted from a lack of were undoubtedly the dominant factors that affected
means and training to take water samples. The last most of the water systems. In addition to disrupted
system was noncompliant due to the presence of service, energy costs increased by around 102 percent
coliform. during the disaster and 30 percent after the hurri-
cane. Nineteen of the 20 systems surveyed depend on
Service interruption. Of the 20 surveyed systems, 18 energy to operate. Forty-five percent of these systems
were inoperative during the first days following the had an electric generator before the storms hit. After
hurricane. Only two managed to continue operating. the hurricane, an additional 30 percent acquired gen-
However, one lost its electric generator a few days erators to guarantee continued water service, and 37
later, and the other eventually lost its chlorinator, percent installed solar energy (Table 2).
causing service disruption. Thirty percent of par-
ticipants reported that they managed to recover in a Advantages of solar-run systems include reduced
week or less, 10 percent from 3 weeks to a month, and dependence on PREPA energy, cost savings resulting
50 percent took a month or more. Sixty-five percent from consuming less energy, and redundancy. Under
indicated that they had no alternative energy source, the PREPA system, energy-related expenses averaged
eg, generator or renewable energy systems, to operate approximately 65 percent of a community’s income.
the water system after the hurricane impact in the Thus, a water system earning $900 was paying
absence of PREPA energy. around $600 in energy. Integration of solar systems
reduced energy-related expenses by 64 percent. This
The percentage of water systems with distribu- substantial saving translates to communities paying
tion infrastructure problems increased from 20 to 35 about $100 to maintain a connection to PREPA for
after the hurricane. Eighteen percent of the systems additional redundancy.
recovered the damage to their infrastructure within
2 weeks and 12 percent from 3 weeks to a month. Support from external organizations is vital
The remaining 53 percent recovered after a month for operating water systems in communities living
between 3 and 6 months, and 18 percent continue the below poverty levels. After the hurricane, the num-
recovery process. The lack of finance was the principal ber of communities that received assistance from an
external organization increased by 35 percent. This
Table 2. Energy sources for community water systems before, during, and after the two hurricanes
Source of energy to operate the water systems
Puerto Rico Energy and Electric generator Renewable energy Work by gravity
Power Authority systems (solar)
Before 95 percent 45 percent 0 percent 5 percent
(6 months to event) (19/20) (9/20) (0/20) (1/20)
During (1 year) Breakdown of system 70 percent 0 percent 5 percent
(14/20) (0-20) (1/20)
After (1-2 years) 90 percent 75 percent 35 percent 5 percent
(18/20) (15/20) (8/20) (1/20)
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
34 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
disaster diversified external support sources from landslides and fallen trees. Ruptured pipes were the
primarily governmental organizations to more non- first repaired by the majority of communities. Those
profits (Table 3). that required more repair time reported a lack of
parts or economic resources. The systems managers
Results from stakeholder interviews who resumed operations relatively quickly reminded
their users to boil the water. This action was neces-
Preparedness phase. Half of the 10 managers inter- sary because of possible contamination from the
viewed indicated that they did not have disaster decomposition of dead animals and vegetation. Other
emergency plans. Two of them had taken preventive communities used spring water for drinking after
actions 1 or 2 days before the event, such as stor- boiling. Only two communities did not receive assis-
ing extra fuel for generators and building chlorine tance during the restoration period. The rest received
reserves for several weeks or months. The communi- help from NGOs and government agencies to test
ties that had emergency plans reported that these water quality. They also received FEMA assistance to
plans were nonstructured. Some communities had acquire fuel and NGOs to acquire electric generators
fuel and chlorine reserves and filled cisterns before and water filters for homes.
the hurricanes hit. They also warehoused spare parts
for repairs. Recovery. Three of the managers interviewed reported
that their systems worked solely by gravity. Two
Additionally, volunteers cleared community roads recovered rapidly because their infrastructure did not
and access areas. Some communities indicated they sustain significant damages. The third required 2.5
had received assistance for disaster preparedness months to become functional due to severe damage
planning from outside organizations (university, to a primary pipeline. This repair cost for each family
NGOs, and government agencies). The type of aid is $50 ($500 in total), a significant amount for this
varied according to the organization and the needs small community of 13 families. For the systems that
of each community. The majority received workshops depended on PREPA, it took 3-7 months before they
or consultancies to develop their emergency response received energy.
plans, prepare for emergencies, and improve infra-
structure, technical, and economic factors. Adaptation: preventing and reducing impacts from
futures events. All systems that suffered damage
Restoration. Of the 10 managers interviewed, two made changes to strengthen their pipelines and pro-
were able to continue services immediately after tect the system from future collapse due to landslides
the hurricanes using generators. The remainder suf- or fallen trees. Adaptions consisted of changing pipe
fered damages in the distribution pipe systems from
Table 3. External organization assistance before, during, and after the two hurricanes
External organization that brought assistance to community water systems
Government Nonprofits Private Religious Universities Other None
Before (6 months 35 percent 20 percent 0 percent 0 percent 10 percent 0 percent 50 percent
to event) (7/20) (4/20) (0/20) (0/20) (2/20) (0/20) (10/20)
During (event to 55 percent 30 percent 0 percent 5 percent 0 percent 0 percent 15 percent
1 year) (11/20) (6/20) (0/20) (1/20) (0/20) (0/20) (3/20)
After (1-2 years) 40 percent 60 percent 0 percent 5 percent 0 percent 5 percent 15 percent
(8/20) (12/20) (0/20) (1/20) (0/20) (1/20) (3/20)
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 35
Vol. 19, No. 8
routes and improving access to pipes. The majority of access to the Emergency Operations Center (COE
the communities also improved their stocks of spare [Spanish acronym]). The majority of organizations
parts to improve the restoration process. Other adap- assisted communities with filling out the paperwork
tations undertaken included acquired generators as to request aid during the disaster response phase.
backups to PRE energy source. Some changed their However, one representative indicated that COE
principal energy source from PREPA to solar panels bureaucracy delayed the recovery.
while remaining connected to PREPA as a backup.
One community had a project funded to install their Representatives of the university organiza-
solar panels, creating redundancy to maintain the tion and nonprofits reported assisting communities
systems operations. Two communities will likely build with energy generators. The government organiza-
a second cistern. One is in the southern area of Puerto tion interviewees indicated that their organizations
Rico, a site that receives less rainfall. One interviewee helped with water quality sampling for 3 months to
indicated that hurricanes are not the most significant ensure that water was suitable for human consump-
risk to their infrastructure. Instead, drought presents tion. Three of the organizations provided home water
a considerable threat as the systems do not have suf- filters to eliminate water turbidity from systems that
ficient pressure to serve houses at higher elevations. were not working. Organizations also brought bottled
A second water system has plans to build a cistern water, chlorine tablets, and other supplies such as
because the current one is vulnerable to landslides. food and medicine to the communities. These efforts
did not reach all areas.
External organization interview results
Researchers interviewed representatives from Recovery. According to government organization
interviewees, some systems are still not meeting
five external organizations—the EPA, Puerto Rico water quality requirements. For instance, 22 percent
Department of Health, Puerto Rico Community of the systems do not meet bacteriology standards.
Foundation, RCAP, and the University Institute for This estimate is lower than the data provided by the
Community Development. Department of State of Puerto Rico in 2015, which
showed that 50 percent of the 240 aqueduct systems
Preparedness phase. All organizations provided gen- did not comply with the water quality requirements.12
eral financial, organizational support, or manage-
ment training to various communities. Government Adaptation: preventing and reducing impacts from
agencies reported supporting preparation plans and future disaster events. A notable adaptation is the
actions to improve community drinking water sys- creation of regional collaborations among communi-
tems before the hurricane. While some communities ties with aqueduct systems. This network enables
had a response plan related to a bioterrorism attack these systems to support one another and be less
or sabotage, the managers interviewed stated that dependent on external organizations. The university
most did not have a natural disaster response plan. institute and nonprofit organizations are working
This disparity resulted because the federal agen- with communities to generate emergency plans. A
cies required a plan against human-made threats in new Water Coalition consisting of 20 organizations,
response to 9/11. including the government and the NGOs in this study,
and communities with aqueduct systems emerged
Restoration. The government and nonprofit organiza- after the disaster. The coalition is coordinating new
tions carried out system damage assessments. These adaptation projects.
include landslides, collapsed bridges, debris, etc., cut
off many communities. This work was vital as organi- Among the projects offered, there are construction
zations could channel help from other agencies to or energy projects. Construction projects include fab-
resolve them. Some of these organizations had direct ricating parts of the systems, building cisterns, buy-
ing and installing a water pump, or other measures
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
36 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
that improve the system’s operation. Energy projects approved to install a solar system but did not have a
include integrating solar energy systems, developing place to install the solar panels and is in danger of
strategies that make energy sources more abundant, losing the project. Some study participants said they
and reducing fuel costs. Nonprofit organizations and had to wait for aid from government agencies like
the university institute are assisting communities in FEMA to repair their systems or buy generators and
developing and submitting mitigation proposals for fuel. Having a financial reserve would go a long way
these projects. to overcoming financial barriers to recovery. As one of
the participants belonging to an external organiza-
DISCUSSION tion noted, government agencies prioritize service to
urban centers and reserve rural and small community
In the wake of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the funding until these systems are fully functional. Thus,
lack of detailed disaster response plans, financial decreasing community dependence on government
resources, alternate energy sources, and government agencies, the PREPA electrical system, and increasing
response timing greatly limited Puerto Rico’s com- autonomy, redundancy, and social capital35 are critical.
munity water system resilience. Economic factors
were critical as they kept some systems from buy- Some communities had the organizational capac-
ing parts, making repairs, or purchasing alternate ity to restore their water service relatively and
energy or fuel. Dependence on PREPA and external quickly without external intervention. Importantly,
energy sources made the aqueduct communities vul- interviewees revealed that community members not
nerable to disasters. Energy instability significantly part of the management board were involved in this
prolonged the recovery process as it took more than recovery. Thus, demonstrating a potential transfor-
2 weeks for the resource to stabilize. Energy costs mation4 in work related to system operations. They
from the centralized system nearly doubled during also increased their support network to include
this time, making it cost-prohibitive for many commu- local, national, and international organizations. For
nities. Based on our findings, community adaptations instance, the emergence of a Water Coalition46 has
have made community aqueduct systems less vulner- created an opportunity for horizontal decision-mak-
able to these events and the uncertainty generated by ing. It also generates radically new ways of col-
climate change.4 laborating between government agencies, nonprofit
organizations, and communities. This collective sug-
A study done before the hurricanes identified gests a potential governance transformation, consid-
limited redundancy as a contributing factor to sys- ering that this group is not bringing humanitarian
tem failure.5 One of the most promising resiliency aid but rather data sharing and active community
strategies adapted after the hurricanes, based on the engagement.35,46
small sample of water systems we studied, builds
redundancy into the system. For these communi- Coalition members recognize the need for greater
ties, redundancy primarily consisted of adding solar community autonomy to operate systems and man-
energy systems and generators as alternative energy age future emergencies, engaging community actors
sources. These alternatives enable communities to in decision-making processes and greater participa-
continue providing water to their communities if the tion by different community actors in water resource
PREPA system fails. matters. In this case study, autonomy was evident in
how some communities recovered and adapted their
Energy resource redundancy can substantially aqueducts. Their organizational structure and simple
reduce vulnerability,3,5 For instance, solar systems systems enabled them to respond quickly and lever-
also decrease operational costs and generate greater age local knowledge and experience. For example,
financial viability. Savings enable system improve- many communities repaired their pipelines and made
ments or the development of emergency relief funds. changes in the system to reduce the risk of dam-
However, becoming energy self-sufficient is not always age from landslides or falling trees. This adaptation
easy. One interviewee said that he currently had been
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 37
Vol. 19, No. 8
helped to reduce uncertainty and the risk of future community aqueducts serve low-income communities,
events causing damage. community manager participation in the economic
and political space, the ability to influence deci-
This study clearly shows that the restoration, sions, and improving autonomy suggests a critical
recovery, and adaptation phases of disaster response transformation.
do not adhere to specific time boundaries.32 Some
communities were able to recover quickly, while oth- Most community aqueduct systems demonstrated
ers are still struggling to be fully operational. It also the ability to stabilize and continue providing drink-
demonstrates the importance of collaboration. NGOs ing water after the hurricanes, despite not having
have been crucial in enabling transformative adap- robust physical infrastructure. Their main strength
tation by training community managers and mem- lies in their ability to improvise and stabilize the
bers, assisting them in obtaining solar systems and systems during times of disaster. With the escala-
generators, and help complete monetary assistance tion of global climate change, such systemic failures
proposals. However, numerous community, govern- are likely to become more common. This study shows
ment, and NGO participants expressed the need for that, in Puerto Rico, resilience does not necessarily lie
improved regional collaboration between communi- in the robustness of complex infrastructure systems
ties with water systems. In response, NGOs such as with high redundancy, such as in the centralized sys-
RCAP support the Puerto Rico Community Aqueducts tem, but rather in their simplicity.
Network.47,48 The group meets in different regions to
enable broader participation of rural communities. A considerable barrier to rural community recov-
While this is a step forward, quicker development of ery and adaptation is financial. Despite most commu-
the network is needed, so that communities can con- nities’ limited economic resources, these communities
tinue to make strides in developing a regional emer- have years of organizational experience operating
gency response plan. relatively simple community water systems in their
favor. This experience was a critical factor in their
CONCLUSIONS quick recovery. However, they could be more robust if
they work together. The development of an intercom-
Overall, our findings reflect that transformative munity Community Aqueducts Regional Network
adaptation (long-term modifications made to protect that facilitates preparation, restoration, recovery, and
systems from future disasters) requires changes in generation of adaptive capacities of water systems
how community water systems operate and organi- based on their collective knowledge experience is
zational change (broad collaboration). Given that an essential resource for community autonomy and
Puerto Rico’s rural water systems are tradition- successful adaptation. External NGOs are proving
ally simple systems with minimal infrastructure invaluable for enabling networks, autonomy, and
often located in low-income areas, building resiliency adaptation as well.
against future disasters through innovative new
approaches is potentially transformational. This arti- NGOs have been vital in creating projects to
cle discusses two seemingly contradictory responses strengthen drinking water system resilience through
to resiliency—external organization assistance and renewable energy projects. This adaptation creates
community autonomy. more redundancy in energy and generates financial
autonomy by reducing operational costs. Reduced cost
In our case studies, external support provided sali- open opportunities for communities to invest in other
ent opportunities for increased community autonomy areas such as water quality, improve infrastructure,
in operating their water systems after Hurricanes create an emergency budget, etc. In addition to these
Irma and Maria. The inclusion of community water efforts, there is a need to engage these communities
system managers in the decision-making process is in creating intervention protocols at the regional and
a change in governance that allows for more effec- national levels to reduce Puerto Rico’s rural popula-
tive interventions and decisions. Considering that tions’ vulnerability. To meet this need, NGOs train
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
38 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
communities to develop disaster plans and apply for de la tercera opción económica desde la teoría de recursos de uso
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reconstruction. In Hass J, Kates R, Bowden M (eds.): Disaster and www.recursosaguapuertorico.com/Geologia_de_PR_por_ST_y_FQ_
Reconstruction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977: 1-23. Rev_9Jan12.pdf. Accessed December 28, 2020.
34. Preston BL, Dow K, Berkhout F: The climate adaptation fron- 45. Luh J, Royster S, Sebastian D, et al.: Expert assessment of the
tier. Sustainability. 2013; 5(3): 1011-1035. DOI: 10.3390/su5031011. resilience of drinking water and sanitation systems to climate-
35. Bealt J, Mansouri SA: From disaster to development: A system- related hazards. Sci Total Environ. 2017; 592: 334-344. DOI:
atic review of community-driven humanitarian logistics. Disasters. 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.03.084.
2018; 42(1): 124-148. DOI: 10.1111/disa.12232. 46. Federal Emergency Management Administration [FEMA]:
36. Chen J, Hsuan T, Chen Y, et al.: Public–private partner- The water coalition: A multisectoral effort to support community
ships for the development of disaster resilient communities. aqueducts in Puerto Rico. 2019. Available at https://www.fema.gov/
J Contingen Crisis Man. 2013; 21(3): 130-143. DOI: 10.1111/1468- news-release/20200220/la-coalicion-del-agua-un-esfuerzo-multisec
5973.12021. torial-para-respaldar-los. Accessed March 6, 2021.
37. Speranza CI, Wiesmann U, Rist S: An indicator framework for 47. Ohle N: Puerto Rico: The overlooked communities and their
assessing livelihood resilience in the context of social–ecological struggle for safe drinking water. 2018. Available at https://www.
dynamics. Glob Environ Chang. 2014; 28: 109-119. DOI: 10.1016/j. rcap.org/puerto-rico-the-overlooked-communities/. Accessed March 6,
gloenvcha.2014.06.005. 2021.
38. Benach J, Díaz M, Muñoz N, et al.: What the Puerto Rican hur- 48. Becoña E: Resiliencia: Definición, Características y Utilidad del
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Soc Sci Med. 2019; 238: 112367. Concept]. Revista Psicopatol Psicol Clín. 2006; 11(3): 125-146.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
40 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
JEM Principles for collaborative risk communication:
Reducing landslide losses in Puerto Rico
Jocelyn West, PhD student
Lindsay Davis, MS
Raquel Lugo Bendezú, BSc
Yahaira D. Álvarez Gandía, BSc
K. Stephen Hughes, PhD
Jonathan Godt, PhD
Lori Peek, PhD
ABSTRACT mentoring, adaptability, and reciprocity. This article
contributes to the field of risk communication and
Landslides are frequent and damaging natural emergency management by detailing these principles
hazards that threaten the people and the natural and and the associated process in order to motivate col-
built environments of Puerto Rico. In 2017, more than laborative risk communication efforts in different
70,000 landslides were triggered across the island geographic and cultural contexts. While the work
by heavy rainfall from Hurricane María, prompting described here focuses on addressing landslides, the
requests by local professionals for landslide education principles and process are transferable to other natu-
and outreach materials. This article describes a novel ral, technological, and willful human-caused hazards.
collaborative risk communication framework that was They may also serve as a roadmap for future part-
developed to meet those requests and shaped the crea- nerships among government agencies and university
tion of a Spanish- and English-language Landslide researchers to inform the cocreation of science educa-
Guide for Residents of Puerto Rico. Collaborative risk tion and outreach tools.
communication is defined here as an iterative process
guided by a set of principles for the interdisciplinary Key words: Hurricane María, natural hazards,
coproduction of hazards information and communica- landslides, collaborative risk communication, science
tion products by local and external stakeholders. The education, public outreach, convergence, interdiscipli-
process that supports this form of risk communication nary teamwork
involves mapping out the risk communication stake-
holders in the at-risk or disaster-affected location—in INTRODUCTION
this case Puerto Rico—and collaborating over time to
address a shared challenge, such as landslide hazards. Hurricane María made landfall in Puerto Rico
The approach described in this article involved the as a Category 4 hurricane on September 20, 2017.
formation of a core team of government and university Following on the heels of Hurricane Irma, Hurricane
partners that expanded in membership to conduct col- María was the archipelago’s deadliest hurricane in
laborative work with an informal network of hazards more than a century.1 High-intensity rainfall triggered
professionals from diverse sectors in Puerto Rico. The more than 70,000 landslides, damaging infrastruc-
following principles guided this process: cultural com- ture and disrupting lives.2 The highest concentration
petence, ethical engagement, listening, inclusive deci- of landslides occurred in the island’s mountainous
sion m aking, empathy, convergence research, nested interior,3 where many roads were blocked, imped-
ing search and rescue efforts and the distribution of
DOI:10.5055/jem.0547 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8 41
postdisaster aid. In rural areas, many of the residents create these educational materials. Researchers and
impacted by landslides were elderly and had to clean students who were involved in the scientific assessment
up dirt and debris without family support because also worked on the collaborative risk communication
members of the younger generation had previously project described in this article to develop Spanish- and
moved away from rural communities.4 English-language versions of the Landslide Guide for
Residents of Puerto Rico (Figure 1).
The widespread impact from the hurricane and
landslides prompted requests by local professionals The core team from the USGS, Natural Hazards
responding to Hurricane María for improved landslide Center, and UPRM collaborated with planners, emer-
hazard assessments for the island as well as better gency managers, geologists, and meteorologists from
science education and outreach materials describing Puerto Rico. These collaborators were in dialogue
residential landslide risk. The US Geological Survey with the core team over the course of a year and
(USGS) responded to those requests by launching contributed written content, photos, and constructive
new science efforts with the University of Puerto Rico feedback to improve the risk communication materi-
Mayagüez (UPRM) to better understand the hazards als. The core team and collaborators operated within
posed by landslides, including a digital database of an even broader ecosystem of risk communication
landslides from Hurricane María and a high-resolution stakeholders in a variety of relevant disciplines, many
landslide susceptibility map of Puerto Rico.2,5 The of whom shared local knowledge or were involved with
USGS also leveraged a longstanding academic partner- distributing the landslide educational materials. (See
ship with the Natural Hazards Center at the University Appendix table for a list of collaborators and stake-
of Colorado Boulder to create education and outreach holders.) Importantly, UPRM’s role on the core team
materials about landslides. The USGS and Natural shifted a significant portion of project ownership from
Hazards Center, in turn, partnered with faculty and a group of researchers located on the US mainland to
students from the Department of Geology at UPRM to a faculty member and students in Puerto Rico. This
Figure 1. Covers of the Landslide Guide for Residents of Puerto Rico, in Spanish and English.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
42 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
ultimately helped to ensure the educational products Over time, risk communication research and prac-
were culturally and linguistically aligned with the tice has moved from a focus on risk assessment and
needs of our audience and partners in Puerto Rico. improving public understanding of risk to a focus on
engaging at-risk populations as partners in more dem-
This article describes a novel collaborative risk ocratic educational and decision-making processes.13,14
communication framework that our team developed Components of this type of risk communication include
in the process of completing this project. Collaborative symmetric communication, mutual benefit for all par-
risk communication is defined here as an iterative ties,15 and a strong emphasis on participatory pro-
process guided by principles for the interdisciplinary cesses and two-way exchange between information
coproduction of hazards information and communica- providers and receivers.6,16 In these instances, risk
tion products by both local and external stakeholders. communication is defined as “a dialog conducted to
This approach to risk communication uses a cyclical help facilitate a more accurate understanding of risks
process of collaboration, cocreation, and feedback on among people and, related, the decisions they may
risk communication materials and activities over an make to manage them.”14pp1245-1246
extended period of time. Collaborative risk commu-
nication builds upon several existing frameworks for Recent scholarship has encouraged shifting the
risk communication,6-9 while emphasizing adaptabil- emphasis from communicating risk itself to communi-
ity and convergence research to address compound cating about preparedness actions—what Wood et al.9
hazards and disasters.10 This article contributes to call “communicating actionable risk.” This work also
the literature on risk communication and stakeholder emphasizes the dual value of information observed
engagement by: (1) defining and illustrating the such as seeing preparedness actions taken by those
key tenets of collaborative risk communication and around you, and information received such as guid-
(2) describing the nine principles that guided our ance about a particular hazard and preparedness
work as we coproduced landslide education and out- actions one can take.9p601
reach materials with and for residents of Puerto Rico.
Although we focused on collaboration with emergency For risk communication involving the general
managers, mitigation practitioners, disaster research- public and vulnerable populations, Campbell et
ers, landslide hazard experts, and risk communicators al.17p2 underscore the need to adhere to three com-
in Puerto Rico, we argue that the principles and pro- mon and long-standing principles: “Communicate
cess explained here can serve as a roadmap for future through familiar and trusted messengers; provide
partnerships among those working to reduce hazards clear, actionable information; and tailor messages
risk in many different contexts. and information pathways for target audiences.”
Best practices recommended by others include: max-
Risk communication imizing the use of trusted local media channels,
Risk communication is integral to effective emer- developing risk communication products through
collaborative partnerships with local organiza-
gency management. The initial motivation for risk tions,18 understanding the needs and priorities of
communication research arose in response to research partners,18,19 and ensuring the risk communication
on risk perception in the field of psychology in the process and products are context-specific.13,20 Risk
1960s and 1970s, which distinguished between per- communication research has also demonstrated that
ceptions of risk held by scientists and nonscientists.11 effective disaster preparedness campaigns require
Risk communication was seen as a mechanism for multiple vectors of credible and consistent informa-
closing the gap between rational, scientific assess- tion delivered by trusted messengers.9,21-23 Moreover,
ments of risk and common heuristics used by the such strong and trusting relationships between
public.6,11,12 For this reason, early conceptions of risk multiple local and external partners are vital to
communication involved a one-way transfer of knowl- establishing and maintaining effective risk commu-
edge from experts to the public.13 nication channels.16,24
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Journal of Emergency Management 43
Vol. 19, No. 8
Despite growing use of the label “two-way” to deadly San Ciriaco Hurricane, which made landfall
describe risk communication, skepticism remains in Puerto Rico on August 8, 1899, caused landsliding
among some scholars regarding whether certain in Utuado and the mountainous interior of Puerto
initiatives have invested the required time and Rico.1 More recently, intense rainfall associated with
effort necessary to develop trust and most effectively Hurricane Hugo in 1989 triggered hundreds of land-
communicate risk.13,14 Indeed, multidirectional risk slides in the eastern part of the island.33 The more
communication has been touted for more than three than 70,000 landslides that occurred during Hurricane
decades,25 but it remains difficult to carry out suc- María stand as the most ever recorded on the island.
cessfully, perhaps because the field of risk communi-
cation has lacked clear models and guidance for how Effective household response to landslides, hur-
to do so. Such multidirectional risk communication ricanes, flooding, earthquakes, and other natural
is particularly challenging in the context of scarce hazards in Puerto Rico is dependent on the level of
resources, limited budgets, compound disasters, politi- awareness of potential threats, available resources,
cal division, and rising public mistrust of officials and actions that can be taken to reduce the associ-
and scientists.14,24,26 As the United States grows more ated risk.28 Research examining the effectiveness of
ethnically diverse and more socially and economically risk communication campaigns in Puerto Rico has
stratified, it is ever more urgent to understand how noted that the provision of flood hazard information
different populations who are exposed to a range of through pamphlets is not sufficient to mitigate such
hazard threats may receive, respond, and contribute risk,34 and the success of public health messaging
to risk communication.17 was increased by delivering information through
many forms of media to reach larger audiences.35
Landslides in Puerto Rico Recommendations for landslide risk communication
Landslide risk in Puerto Rico is a function of focus on education targeted towards children, in
particular.32 Among adults, risk perception of land-
high landslide susceptibility5 and frequent intense slides in Puerto Rico has often been overshadowed by
rainfall27 exacerbated by certain building and land concern for other natural hazards such as hurricane
use practices, such as construction on steep slopes winds, flooding, and earthquakes, which are often con-
or historical deforestation.28 The spatial distribution sidered less predictable or more destructive.28
of exposure to landslides in Puerto Rico has roots in
the historical, social, political, and economic arrange- Landslide hazards and collaborative
ments that limited access to land and housing and risk communication
perpetuated poverty in the interior mountains.29 This
has left poorer, rural residents of Puerto Rico with In this section, we elaborate on a project designed
greater landslide risk. to increase focus on landslides as a prevalent but
sometimes underestimated hazard in Puerto Rico.
The single deadliest landslide in US history, We proceed by describing the process for creating the
the Barrio Mameyes landslide near Ponce, occurred first product, the Landslide Guide for Residents of
on October 7, 1985 during a three-day period of Puerto Rico, which is an illustrated booklet available
heavy rainfall.30,31 The slide, which happened prior in print and digital formats in English and Spanish;
to widespread public awareness campaigns about it also serves as the foundation for a suite of related
landslide hazards, killed an estimated 130 people landslide risk communication products, such as vid-
and destroyed 120 homes built on a hillside without eos and online interactive story maps (https://hazards.
planning or regulation.30 Subsequent research found colorado.edu/puertorico).
that improper septic collection and water distribution
operation likely contributed to the slide movement.32 In establishing the process for collaborative risk
communication, our core team relied on a set of prin-
Rainfall associated with tropical cyclones has ciples for stakeholder engagement and envisioning,
caused extensive landslide occurrence as well. The coproducing, and distributing these education and
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44 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
outreach materials. As elaborated below, a broad This allowed us to assess what other landslide risk
range of literature in emergency management, risk communicators found most important, and to identify
communication, and disaster research provides the creative methods for sharing information. This initial
foundation for each of the principles. In addition, we review helped us to identify major landslide-related
turned to the growing body of research on disaster issues to discuss in subsequent informal interviews.
research ethics36-38 as well as cultural competence
in disaster research and practice39,40 to inform our In order to create useful landslide education
process. The principles underpin a relationship-based and outreach materials, we needed to develop rela-
and collaborative approach to risk communication, tionships with a diverse array of professionals who
informed by tenets of environmental education that had expertise in landside science, risk communica-
have been advocated for by Indigenous scholars.41 tion, emergency management, land-use planning, and
Further, our work is grounded in respect for the other allied fields. Because the goal of our project was
social, historical, and geographic context of Puerto not academic research and we did not want our col-
Rico and seeks to advance landslide risk reduction laborators to feel like research subjects, we chose to
efforts on the island. take a less formal approach to information gathering.
We began building a network by having conversa-
THE PROCESS tions and conducting informal interviews, drawing
upon referrals within participants’ social networks.
This project relied on three initial approaches to Colleagues at the USGS provided our first intro-
inform the creation of the Landslide Guide. First, we ductions to people with whom they had established
developed an annotated bibliography of risk commu- contact during the response to Hurricane María,
nication research related to landslides in Puerto Rico. including the Puerto Rico Seismic Network. Those
Second, we conducted a systematic review of existing participants introduced us to other professionals they
landslide education and outreach materials. Finally, believed had relevant knowledge, and so on. In the
we cocreated an engagement strategy based on rela- process, we learned about the concerns of the local
tionship building and informal interviews with risk population related to landslides, including informa-
communication professionals and residents of Puerto tion about the culture, language, and behavior that
Rico who live in areas of high landslide susceptibility. could inform the content and presentation of the edu-
Through a combination of these three information- cational materials we were developing.
gathering methods, we combined and refined our
inputs for a first draft of the Landslide Guide. Although the seeds for this project were planted
in October of 2017, we began engaging with profes-
The annotated bibliography and our review of sionals and formally building our network in October
existing landslide education and outreach materials 2018. Follow-on trips were made in December 2018
helped us identify key scientific insights and mitiga- and February 2019 to expand the network. Often, we
tion recommendations (Appendix). Available informa- received help coordinating focus groups or meetings
tion about landslides is voluminous, and no single from a local collaborator. Through these early interac-
education and outreach booklet could cover the full tions, we developed partnerships, learned about previ-
range of topics. In order to identify the most critical ous and ongoing efforts to address landslide hazards,
issues to be covered in the educational materials we visited recent landslide sites around the island, and
planned to develop, we identified and analyzed exam- came to understand the complexity of landslide miti-
ples of existing landslide communication products gation and preparedness in Puerto Rico.
that addressed issues similar to our needs. We used a
spreadsheet to cross reference the information gleaned Throughout the next year of the project, we
from each existing product, such as format, target invested substantial time and effort in engaging with
audiences, phases of the disaster cycle addressed, eg, the network of stakeholders to inform the content and
preparedness, mitigation, etc., and recommendations. format of the guide and other related risk communica-
tion products. To do so, the four members of the core
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 45
Vol. 19, No. 8
team who are not based in Puerto Rico made many could reach older populations who regularly listen to
trips to the island, spending a total of 123 person-days the radio. In addition to the invaluable feedback pro-
in Puerto Rico between October 2017 and February vided, we anticipated that the professionals we met
2020. Informational interviews with planners, emer- as part of our networking activities would serve as
gency managers, and other risk communicators that vectors for sharing the Landslide Guide. For that to
were conducted during those trips and by the three happen, we needed to provide material that could be
members of our core team who live in Puerto Rico incorporated into their existing risk communication
highlighted the need to expand beyond the creation activities.
of a risk communication pamphlet in order to reach a
broader audience. This insight is consistent with rec- Creating the Landslide Guide
ommendations of related risk communication efforts The Landslide Guide is distinct from other avail-
in Puerto Rico.36 Additional feedback from the grow-
ing network helped us see that the guide would need able landslide communication tools in that it is visual,
to function in two ways: (1) as a vetted repository of created in Spanish and translated to English, tailored
coproduced information and advice about landslides, to Puerto Rico, grounded in the latest science, and
and (2) as a starting point for the risk communication designed to emphasize actions individuals can take to
process. Even so, we recognized that the guide was reduce risk. We incorporated content from standout
merely a first step for communicating about landslide examples of existing landslide guides, publications
hazards through additional channels and formats. about previous landslides and risk communication
in Puerto Rico, USGS reports about the island’s geol-
As the project progressed, our core team also ogy and previous landslide events, and educational
spoke with residents and homeowners, some of whose materials about other hazards affecting Puerto Rico.
homes were impacted or threatened by landslides. Some of the best landslide guides we found from
Their perspectives were gathered through informal other projects had graphics that were engaging and
conversations, nonresearch informational interviews, easy to understand, and we wanted to follow that
and group meetings, informing the practical informa- model. When reviewing other landslide guides, it also
tion ultimately included in the guide. We also spoke became apparent that we needed to be explicit about
with approximately 60 individuals through house our audience and selective about the information
visits, community engagement events, and stake- included. There is simply too much information about
holder meetings. Our team captured the conversa- landslides, much of which is highly technical, to com-
tions by taking detailed meeting notes or writing municate everything relevant through a single guide.
postmeeting summaries when it felt inappropriate
to take substantial notes during conversations. We The process of collaborative risk communication
would subsequently debrief on key themes that were helped us to narrow down the information included in
emerging. When we began to hear similar responses the guide in a systematic way while seeking feedback
from many different stakeholders, we felt comfortable regularly. The development of the Landslide Guide
that we had sufficient information to move forward, a was therefore highly iterative and involved frequent
point that qualitative researchers describe as reach- interactions with our collaborators across Puerto Rico
ing “saturation.”42 during each stage of the project. It involved regular
meetings and a series of 18 drafts of the guide pro-
Maintaining relationships and continuing to duced over the course of 14 months. Work among the
gather information was time-intensive but ensured core team was organized via weekly meetings, which
the Landslide Guide and any subsequent products allowed us to develop a plan for creating the guide.
would ultimately be aligned with stakeholder needs. Two project collaborators, the Puerto Rico Seismic
For example, many people we spoke with identified Network and Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program,
specific landslide education products they could use in provided our UPRM undergraduate student team
their existing activities, such as audio recordings that members access to office space and digital media
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
46 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
editing software. Not only were these resources key accessibility and to make it more visually engag-
to the creation of the guide, but the frequent personal ing for readers. The evolution of the guide’s content
interactions also provided additional pathways for and the final publication reflects a consensus view
stakeholder input. on the most effective way to present information on
landslide risk and cost-effective mitigative actions for
Continuing to engage stakeholders from multiple Puerto Rico (Figure 2).
organizations across the island, we invited reviews
from members of our extended network. Input from We also utilized input from the network of risk
physical and social scientists, planners, government communication professionals to identify the land-
employees, emergency managers, and residents of slide information that would be of greatest use to
at-risk communities was incorporated into a complete those professionals in their work managing earth-
draft through a stepwise review process that involved quakes, tsunami, extreme weather, and other haz-
the review of multiple versions of the guide. Each ards. Reviewers contributed information that helped
new reviewer, or set of reviewers, therefore received shape the content of the guide as well as images and
a more polished draft. Reviewers described the need professional and personal experiences with landslide
to broaden the audience of the guide by replacing hazards. Final technical review was completed by
as much text as possible with graphics to improve university faculty and landslide scientists from the
Figure 2. First version and final version of the Landslide Guide. Left panel depicts a first draft of the
“Preparedness Measures” page with heavy use of text. Right panel shows the graphics created for the final ver-
sion in response to suggestions and requests from stakeholders.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 47
Vol. 19, No. 8
USGS to ensure the scientific integrity of the informa- the mainland United States via a FEMA-supported
tion provided. The time needed to employ this itera- webinar series. We have also presented the guide at
tive process of review and revision was substantial, workshops and conferences, and the undergraduate
but the approach provided a means to engage the research assistants were hosted by the television
network of professionals in cocreation of the guide network Univision to discuss the guide and landslide
without demanding a burdensome commitment from hazards in Puerto Rico.
any one person.
Creating derivative products
Developing a communications plan After finalizing the Landslide Guide, our team
and distributing the guide
began creating derivative products to address the
In order to effectively reach the broadest audi- requests of risk communication professionals and
ence with available resources, the team developed a reach a broader audience. The full range of open
communications plan to inform the print and digital access landslide risk communication products devel-
distribution of the guide. The objectives were to maxi- oped in addition to the guide—available in both
mize electronic distribution of the guide through the Spanish and English—includes:
existing network of reviewers and collaborators and
to identify key audiences of additional stakehold- nnA presentation slide deck, including
ers potentially willing to share the guide through speaker notes for each slide;
their networks. One thousand copies of the Spanish-
language guide were also printed in Puerto Rico for nnAn illustrated animation with a voiceover
distribution to audiences that preferred or required a for use on social media;
physical copy.
nnA story map explaining the context behind
We identified several “disaster risk reduction the Landslide Guide, including visualiza-
champions,”22,43 and their efforts greatly expanded tions of landslide density in Puerto Rico
the reach of the guide. For example, about a month based on USGS data;
prior to publication and release, a notable Puerto
Rican meteorologist gave our team an opportunity to nnRecorded webinars explaining the Land-
present the guide to her television and online audi- slide Guide;
ences. This interview allowed us to test the reception
of the guide and provided another opportunity for nnWritten scripts that can be read on radio
feedback from a different audience. She has continued or television; and
to promote the project, reaching millions of followers
through her social media accounts with posts about nnK-12 educational materials including a
the Landslide Guide after it was released. slide deck, worksheets, and guided science
experiment.
Many other stakeholder groups provided outlets
and championed the education and outreach materi- These products were generally developed in Puerto
als. For example, a project collaborator and consultant Rican Spanish and later translated to English, as was
at the Puerto Rico Planning Board requested materi- done with the Landslide Guide. We understood from
als to train inspectors on landslide hazard identifica- our interviews that younger generations in Puerto
tion. We also participated in webinars and a youth Rico prefer to consume information from social media,
science camp delivered by the Puerto Rican science whereas older residents often listen to the radio or rely
museum EcoExploratorio. The Federal Emergency on local presentations from NGOs, emergency manag-
Management Agency (FEMA) requested presenta- ers, and others. As such, we tried to ensure that the
tions by our team to engage emergency managers
in municipalities around the island and throughout
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48 Journal of Emergency Management
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