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Tamar Wyte-Lake, DPT, MPH, Veterans Emergency Management tration. Available at https://www.va.gov/health/. Accessed February
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Hills, California. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8449-7701. 13. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Robert T. Stafford
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Center (VEMEC), US Department of Veterans Affairs, North Hills, www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/15271. Accessed
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14. Saldana J: The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers.
Cosme Torres-Sabater, RN, MEP, CHCM, VHA Office of Emergency London: Sage, 2009.
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California; Division of Health Systems Management and Policy, Hurricane Maria: Kaiser family foundation. 2017. Available at
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after-hurricane-maria/. Accessed February 8, 2021.
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26. de Ville de Goyet C, Sarmiento J, Grünewald F: Health Response
to the Earthquake in Haiti. Geneva: World Health Organization,
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JEM Exploring frames of environmental crises
on Twitter and Weibo: Crisis communication
about Hurricane Maria and haze
Xianlin Jin, PhD
ABSTRACT there is inadequate research on comparing crisis
frames in Western and Eastern cultural contexts.
There is limited knowledge about how crises are With the growth of technology, social media has
framed on different social media platforms specifically shown to be a platform where people search for crisis
in a non-Western cultural context. This study com- information, express emotions, build networks, and
pares how extreme environmental crises—Hurricane facilitate interactive crisis communication.1 Although
Maria and haze—were framed on Twitter and Weibo. increased attention has been paid to the communica-
Through word-cloud, co-occurrence, and thematic tion patterns of a single crisis on Twitter, few studies
analyses with Hurricane Maria-related tweets, this have simultaneously compared multiple crises’ social-
study identified two major frames of this crisis: a mediated communication patterns. Moreover, little is
disaster frame and a political frame. Similarly, by known about the crisis framing on other social media
analyzing haze-related posts on Sina Weibo, two major platforms in a non-English culture context. Being
frames emerged: an environmental frame and a health aware of these gaps, this study compared the frames
frame. Both crises were largely framed as environ- of two crises that emerged on American and Chinese
mental issues rather than health risks or crises. Such social media platforms with a particular focus on cul-
framing helps shape the existence of Hurricane Maria tural variances in framing.
and haze as legitimate facts. The findings also reveal
that cultural variances, eg, power distance, collectiv- Understanding how culture influences the fram-
ist-individualist culture, and uncertainty avoidance, ing of crisis will help crisis communication scholars
impact crisis framing. This study indicates the impor- further theory building and guide emergency man-
tance of designing culture-fit messages and incorpo- agement organizations to develop effective communi-
rating social media strategies in crisis communication cation that better fits the targeted community’s cul-
while developing emergency management plans and ture. To achieve this goal, this study concentrated on
adds knowledge to the limited literature on social- crisis framing on both American and Chinese social
mediated crisis communication in different cultural media. By quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing
contexts. Such knowledge will provide theoretical and 331 tweets sounding Hurricane Maria and 317 haze-
practical implications for crisis scholars, emergency related Weibo posts, this study aims to discover any
management practitioners, and policymakers. similarities and differences regarding crisis frames
that emerged on American and Chinese social media.
Key words: framing, social-mediated crisis Specifically, word-cloud, co-occurrence, and thematic
communication, comparative approach, Hurricane analyses were used to understand the crisis com-
Maria, haze munication patterns of each crisis. Findings reveal
that framing both crises as environmental issues can
INTRODUCTION impact risk interpretation and, hence, influence crisis
management strategies. Cultural differences appear
Much of the existing research has examined
how crises are framed in Western culture. However,
DOI:10.5055/jem.0554 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8 201
to influence how social media users respond to each how crises are framed on social media platforms and
crisis, define the responsibility of the crisis, and frame how these frames may impact crisis communica-
critiques. These findings illustrate the importance of tion despite that social media and technology have
exploring crisis frames, understanding the public’s changed the communication ecology that was used to
interpretation of crises, and building cultural-fit crisis be controlled by news media.11
communication and management strategies.
Framing crisis and risk on social media
Framing and frames Recent literature highlights the importance of
People interpret the world and events around
engaging stakeholders with social media to facilitate
them through their primary frame.2 The essence of crisis communication.12 With the growth of social
framing processes is selection and salience.3 Previous media that allows ordinary users to create and share
research defined framing as “to select some aspects information, news media may not be the only infor-
of perceived reality and make them more salient in mation resource; instead, information influencers who
the communicating text, . . . to promote a particu- have a large number of followers and tweets tend to
lar problem definition, causal interpretation, moral control crisis information flow on social media.13 Many
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the studies have shown that Twitter was used not only for
item described.”3p52 Specifically, framing occurs at emotional expression but also for information seek-
four levels: framing in culture, framing in the elite ing during crises and disasters.13-15 Previous research
and professional political communication, framing discovered that Twitter users were actively engaged
in communication texts, and framing in individu- in sharing information and experience, expressing
als’ minds.3-5 The culture level framing is the stock concerns, request for mutual aid, and spreading
of frames rooted in the system’s communications, political discussions after a disaster.16 While crisis
eg, literature, news, and conversations. Framing in develops, emergency management organizations need
communication texts shaped by the communicator’s to consistently make crisis assessments and evaluate
network, eg, elites and media, is defined as “selecting the public’s interpretation of and responses to crises.
some aspects of perceived reality and constructing Based on these evaluations, emergency management
messages that highlight connections among them in organizations should promptly design and place mes-
ways that promote a particular interpretation.”5(p176) sages to clarify rumors, update emergency informa-
Communicators engage in framing crises and disas- tion, and reduce risk and the public’s uncertainty.17
ters strategically. Studying how crises and disasters have been framed
on social media can enrich scholars’ and emergency
By highlighting certain frames that are “struc- management practitioners’ understanding of crisis
tured understandings of the way aspects of the world communication patterns and then provide implica-
function,”6p5 a specific interpretation and moral evalu- tions for emergency management and policymaking.
ation are promoted to obtain a desirable response.3
How crises and disasters are framed can impact the One study on disaster framing on Twitter showed
stakeholders’ interpretation and acceptance of such that disaster was framed as a political issue—a frame
crises. Inspired by the framing theory, this study aims that individual users actively promoted; short-term
to understand the public’s interpretation of crises, disaster destruction was highlighted by media, while
which is the first assignment for building effective long-term recovery efforts were prioritized by indi-
crisis communication.7-9 vidual Twitter users.18 These findings shed light on
how western communities frame crises and disasters
Particularly, this study explored crisis framing on social media. Regarding crisis communication
in a social media context. Even though much of the patterns in a non-Western context, Takahashi et
current literature on news coverage frames of crises al. explored crisis communication surrounding the
suggests that crisis framing influences stakehold- Philippines’ Typhoon Haiyan by analyzing tweets
ers’ interpretation of crises,9,10 little is known about
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202 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
posted during the disaster and found that some and Chinese social media and explored the potential
aspects of Typhoon Haiyan were emphasized, such as similarities or differences in terms of the public’s
the causes of the disaster, critiques on governments, interpretation of crises and disasters. Specifically, this
and reconnecting communities.19 study focused on two crises that have brought chaos
to local communities: Hurricane Maria and haze. Both
However, these studies merely explored social- crises have significantly impacted local communities’
mediated crisis communication on English social well-beings. Unfortunately, communities in hurricane-
media, whereas they paid limited attention to such affected regions and people in polluted areas remain
crisis communication on non-English social media vulnerable to the same or at least similar risks. Each
platforms or in non-Western cultural contexts.20 Even year, hurricanes have caused life and economic loss,
though some crisis communication research started even though the degree of such loss varies. Similar
focusing on crises in non-Western cultures, many to hurricanes, haze consistently impacts the life-span
studies largely lacked a comparative logic.21 One of and living quality of people in polluted areas and cre-
the recent studies explored crisis communication in ates economic burdens.24-26 Thus, it becomes vitally
diverse cultural contexts by comparing the usage of important to understand the communication patterns
Chinese Weibo during a 2013 smog emergency with of crises that repeatedly create burdens in our life.
the usage of Twitter during the 2013 winter storm Examining how these continuing crises are framed
Nemo in North America. These authors found that on social media will help researchers and practition-
Weibo and Twitter contained a similar degree of ers cope with similar crises and generate effective
information and affective content regarding these cri- precrisis planning.27
ses, while the humorous reposts were less on Weibo.
More organization accounts communicated about Furthermore, there were wide-spread discussion
the smog crisis on Weibo, whereas most retweets and information about Hurricane Maria and haze on
about Nemo were posted by common citizens.20 These social media. For instance, recent research suggests
findings suggest that cultural and political factors that a total of 20 topics surrounding Hurricane Maria,
may explain these differences, while not providing a eg, food support, health, fatalities, and government
further explanation, which may because their quan- responses to the crisis, emerged on Twitter in the ini-
titative approach of analyzing content types cannot tiation event stage, maintenance stage, and resolution
illustrate more insights into these crises’ communica- phase.28 Haze has also spurred a large-scale discus-
tion patterns. sion on Weibo, which leads to massive reports on air
pollution issues and then facilitated policy changes,
It remains unclear whether crisis frames vary such as reporting PM2.5 (particulate matter with a
in different cultural contexts and how cultural dif- diameter of 2.5 μm or less) and extending the national
ferences in communities may impact people’s inter- wide air quality monitor system.24,29
pretation of and responses to crises. As some crisis
scholars noted, applying intercultural concepts and By exploring and comparing the social-mediated
cultural variables to crisis communication permits frames of Hurricane Maria and haze, this study aims
researchers to examine research findings at an inter- to understand how each crisis has been framed on its
national level.22,23 Cultural differences in uncertainty local social media and if there are any similarities or
avoidance and power distance can shape the pub- differences between these crisis frames. Moreover, as
lic’s crisis interpretations and evaluation of related previous research suggests, cultural interpretation of
organizations’ responses to the crisis.22 However, cur- crises impacts emotional and remedial responses to
rent literature has offered limited knowledge of crisis risk and crises.30 Comparing two crises in American
frames at the cultural framing level, due to the lack and Chinese cultural contexts can assist scholars
of comparative studies on different cultural contexts. and practitioners in identifying crisis framing at a
cultural level, which builds the foundation for under-
Being aware of these research gaps, this study con- standing different communities’ risk assessment and
centrated on crisis frames that emerged on American
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 203
Vol. 19, No. 8
developing effective communication. A close examina- have been extensively discussed on social media.
tion of such continuing crises will also offer valuable Understanding social-mediated frames of such crises
insights for future precrisis planning. The findings will aid researchers and practitioners to understand
can aid crisis research to further explore how cultural how the public interprets similar crises in the future,
characteristics, political characteristics, or media sys- develop effective cultural-fit communication, and
tems impact social-mediated crisis communication. implement precrisis management plans. To achieve
these goals, this study explored and compared the
The following sections briefly introduced Hurricane social-mediated crisis frames of Hurricane Maria and
Maria and haze. Hurricane Maria, last from September haze in its local cultural and social media contexts.
16 to October 3, 2017, has caused 2,975 fatalities The following research questions were proposed:
in Puerto Rico and a great economic loss.31,32 Such
extreme environmental event has caused considerable RQ1: What are the major frames of the
loss and brought concerns as well as uncertainties. crisis of Hurricane Maria?
Moreover, hurricanes continue impacting these com-
munities, which suggests the urgency and necessity of RQ2: What are the major frames of haze-
improving crisis communication to respond to similar related messages?
crises in the future.
RQ3: How did the crisis frames differ from
Likewise, air pollution has been a significant each other?
problem in developing countries, such as India and
China. Haze, a severe particulate matter air pollution METHODS
in China, was believed to reduce the life of people liv-
ing in the affected areas.25,26 Although the haze crisis By conducting word-cloud, co-occurrence, and the-
has impacted humans’ well-beings for multiple years, matic analyses, this study identified and compared
2012 was the important year when the public’s dis- the social-mediated crisis frames of Hurricane Maria
cussion surrounding this crisis so widely spread that and haze. The following sections described details
related policy changes were implemented. The dis- about data collection, sampling procedures, and data
cussion about whether the concentration readings of analyses.
PM2.5 should be reported in the daily air quality index
(AQI) first started on Sina Weibo that is the largest Data collection and sampling procedures
Chinese microblog social media.24 At the moment, only This study included two social media datasets
PM10 was the most widely reported pollutant even
though PM2.5 was also suggested by the World Health in analyses. The sample size of each crisis’s social
Organization to be considered as an indicator of air media posts was similar to each other: 331 tweets on
quality. The discussion that emerged on social media Hurricane Maria and 317 Weibo posts on haze, which
eventually impacted relevant organizations’ policy help the author ensure a fair comparison on each
changing. For instance, the Beijing Environmental crisis’s frames.
Protection Bureau started reporting PM2.5 concentra-
tion data to the public in 2012.24,29 Thus, this study First, tweets related to Hurricane Maria were
particularly focused on the frames of haze by examin- collected using NodeXL Pro,33 which connects to the
ing the Sina Weibo messages that were posted in 2012. public Application Programing Interface of Twitter.
By searching keywords “Hurricane Maria” and
Both crises have significantly impacted local “HurricaneMaria,” a total of 34,189 tweets (original
communities that remain vulnerable to similar risks. tweets and retweets) about Hurricane Maria were
To mitigate losses and reduce uncertainties, emer- collected. This study only included English tweets
gency management institutions need to promptly on Hurricane Maria into analyses. To capture the
offer effective communication and efficient infor- social-mediated crisis communication patterns of
mation to the targeted community.1 Both crises Hurricane Maria during the crisis and postcrisis
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
204 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
periods, the author randomly selected a total of 331 themes with the coding and node framework func-
Hurricane Maria-related tweets from the 34,189 tions of NVIVO11 Pro. To ensure the reliability of cod-
tweets. Specifically, this study included a random ing, the author carefully reviewed the NVIVO coding
sample of 161 (49 percent) tweets that were posted summary and framework reports. If any nodes were
from September 16 to September 30, 2017, as well as miscoded or linked to the inappropriate framework,
a random sample of 170 (51 percent) tweets that were the author repeated the above procedures to ensure
posted from October 3 to October 19, 2017. reliable coding results. As recommended by the quali-
tative method literature,37 the author also checked
Second, this study selected haze-related Weibo themes against each other and reviewed original
posts from a Sina Weibo dataset including more social media posts during the thematic analysis pro-
than 226 million Weibo messages that were collected cess. With this approach, the author generated coher-
through the public Application Program Interface.34 ent comparative analyses of social media posts on
After reviewing the 2012 AQI data of Beijing that the two crises. Integrating thematic, word-cloud, and
were recorded by the US Department of State Air co-occurrence analyses further allows this study to
Quality Monitoring Program,35 the author narrowed explore the details of crisis communication patterns
two periods when air pollution levels were high to col- and understand how crises were framed on English
lect Sina Weibo data: January 16 to January 22, 2012, and Chinese social media.
and December 17 to December 31, 2012. Overall,
3,145,715 Weibo messages were posted during the RESULTS
timeline. After searching keywords “air pollution,”
“haze,” “smog,” and “pm2.5,” the author found 1,027 This study identified that Hurricane Maria was
haze-related Weibo posts including one or more key- largely framed as a disaster and then as a politi-
words listed earlier.24 This author randomly selected cal issue on Twitter. Similarly, haze was primarily
a total of 317 Weibo messages for data analyses. framed as an environmental issue and then gradually
Precisely, 147 (46 percent) haze-related Weibo mes- framed as a health concern. Social media users also
sages were posted from January 16 to January 22, requested further actions to cope with these crises.
2012. Moreover, 170 (54 percent) messages were
posted from December 17 to December 31, 2012. Hurricane Maria crisis
Before conducting quantitative analyses, a stop
Keywords searching allows this study to
include social media posts with different hashtags. list was created to exclude regular expressions and
Additionally, even though the crisis period of the two websites from analyses, such as “in addition,” “but,”
crises varies, this study selected a similar sample size and “http.” After data clean, a word-cloud was con-
for data analysis. Moreover, the author used consistent ducted to visualize the word frequency of Hurricane
data analysis strategies to ensure a fair comparison. Maria tweets (Figure 1). The following words were
frequently mentioned in the 331 tweets: #hurri-
Data analyses canemaria, #puertorico, help, relief, @fema, @uscg,
To identify and compare the major frames of power, support, people, water, efforts, rebuilding, and
recovery. This word-cloud offered a general viewpoint
each crisis, the author analyzed the post-content regarding the frames of Hurricane Maria.
and embedded repost content of 331 tweets about
Hurricane Maria and 317 Weibo posts related to The co-occurrence analysis further illustrated
haze. The author conducted thematic, word-cloud, the keywords associated with this crisis. The author
and co-occurrence analyses using the NVIVO11 Pro– conducted a co-occurrence analysis by searching “hur-
a qualitative data analysis software designed by QSR ricane” with the text search query function in NVIVO
International Pty Ltd in 2020. Specifically, the author, 11 Pro. The result showed that “hurricane” was sur-
as a single coder, conducted open coding, axial cod- rounded by the context of “Puerto Rico,” “donation,”
ing, and selective coding36 to identify the emergent “clean up,” and “relief efforts.”
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 205
Vol. 19, No. 8
Figure 1. Word-cloud of Hurricane Maria-related impacted by #HurricaneMaria,” “RT @markpoloncarz:
tweets. Please donate to help those in Puerto Rico affected
by #HurricaneMaria. Drop boxes located in most
To further explore the crisis frames of Hurricane county buildings,” “RT @sundarpichai: Our hearts
Maria, the author conducted thematic analyses and are with those affected by #HurricaneMaria. We’re
identified two major frames: a disaster frame and a committing $1M to support relief & recovery efforts,”
political frame. Particularly, the disaster frame was and “On behalf of Alabama is donating $3 million in
the dominant frame. The thematic analysis results #PuertoRico #HurricaneMaria.”
echoed the word-cloud analysis, which further con-
firms the coding reliability. The subtheme of “food and water supplies” con-
centrated on the shortage of food and clean water in
Disaster frame. The disaster frame involved two themes: Puerto Rico. Specifically, information regarding food
“relief efforts” and “impacts of Hurricane Maria.” and water supplies was often retweeted: “In market
Specifically, the theme of “relief efforts” emerged as ‘Amigo’ half shelves r empty in Caguas, Puerto Rico &
the major theme with a coverage ratio of 25 percent. food is being rationed to customers #hurricanemaria,”
Specifically, “relief efforts” included five subthemes: and “RT @fema: @USNationalGuard troops distribute
“donation,” “food and water supplies,” “power and sig- food & water after #Maria. For more imagery on @
nal repair,” “hospital, school, and airport rebuilding,” DeptofDefense response efforts.”
and “search and rescue.” The following paragraphs
described these five subthemes in detail. The subtheme of “power and signal repair”
described the efforts to fix electricity damages caused
The subtheme of “donation” focused on encourag- by Hurricane Maria. The following tweets described
ing the public to make donations to affected areas, eg, the progress to rebuild electricity in Puerto Rico:
Puerto Rico and Dominica, and updating information “@USACEHQ has 86 generators in PR & St. Thomas
on donations received. For instance, the following with 186+ en route, supporting temporary power
tweets have been shared: “#FDNY is still accept- installations after #HurricaneMaria” and “RT
ing specific donations to help Puerto Rico residents @ClimateReality: #Tesla is sending battery packs to
help re-power #PuertoRico after #HurricaneMaria.”
The fourth subtheme of the disaster frame con-
centrated on the facility rebuilding, such as rebuild-
ing hospitals, schools, and airports: “RT @DLAMIL:
Medical equipment sent to Puerto Rico for hurricane
relief efforts #HurricaneMaria,” “RT @marianaaten-
cio: Airports, docks and hospitals in #PuertoRico
are priority to rebuild,” and “RT @DeptofDefense:
Shoring up. @USMC #Marines work to reinforce a
spillway hard hit by erosion at Guajataca Dam after
#HurricaneMaria.”
The subtheme of “search and rescue” was about
the discourse of rescue work. For example, Twitter
users shared how emergency organizations helped
and protected the affected communities: “@fema: Nine
of our search & rescue teams are working around the
clock to support #HurricaneMaria response in Puerto
Rico & the US Virgin” and “RT @Interior: Surviving
the storm: @USFWS protects endangered parrots in
#PuertoRico.”
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Besides these subthemes, several tweets showed the island of #PuertoRico.” Moreover, many Twitter
that some colleges started offering tuition deduction users shared a story of a dog being rescued: “RT @
for students: “@MDCollege: After #HurricaneMaria, LOLBOOKcom: Mother dog courageously rescues her
MDC will offer in-state tuition to displaced college drowning puppy.” The hashtag “rescue dog” was one of
students from #PuertoRico” and “RT @RosLehtinen: the keywords in the word-cloud (Figure 1).
Proud of my alma mater, @MDCollege, 4 offer-
ing in-state tuition 2 #PuertoRicans displaced by Hurricane Maria was framed as a political issue
#HurricaneMaria!” as well. The next section described the findings asso-
ciated with the political frame.
“Impacts of Hurricane Maria” was another major
theme under the disaster frame. This theme was cov- Political frame. The political frame was the second
ered in 11 percent of coding references. It largely con- frame that emerged on Twitter. This frame included
centrated on Hurricane Maria’s impacts on humans two themes: politics and critiques. The theme of
(8 percent) and animals (1 percent). A general descrip- “politics” was primarily about petition about sus-
tion of Hurricane Maria’s impacts was the least sub- pending the Jones Act and the lack of recovery
stantial subtheme (2 percent). When a Twitter user efforts of the government and/or President Trump:
described the affected areas, the user used the fol- “Debt relief for the islands struck by hurricanes–
lowing metaphor: “An island on pause… My impres- sign the petition here,” “Let’s get #SuspendJonesAct
sions of the first six days after #HurricaneMaria in trending. Laws shouldn’t block #PuertoRico relief/
Puerto Rico.” It is worth mentioning that the theme rebuild #HurricaneMaria,” and “#PuertoRicoRelief–It
“impacts on humans” echoed the subtheme of “food is appalling, to say the least, that #TrumpAmerica
and water supplies” under “relief efforts.” “Impacts instead of jumping into helping its citizens.”
of Hurricane Maria” emerged from the discussions
about food, water, shelter, injuries, loss, deaths, bro- The theme of “critiques” was identified in around
ken power, poor signal, the damages to hospitals, 9 percent of coding references. This theme focused
schools, and medical facilities. Twitter users dissemi- on the government’s or President Trump’s inability
nated information about the dilemma of victims and to provide efficient supports to affected populations
affected areas with tweets and retweets. For exam- and areas: “Trump insisted that his administration
ple, many tweets mentioned the damage to water is doing an ‘amazing job’ helping Puerto Rico recover
and power supplies: “Millions of people in Puerto from #HurricaneMaria,” “Trump’s golf course in Puerto
Rico are without power, water, and basic needs after Rico went bankrupt. He’s got no business insulting the
#HurricaneMaria,” “On St. John, USVI, no power island after #HurricaneMaria,” and “It’s been nearly a
for 37 days,” and “80 percent of #Dominica requires month since #HurricaneMaria. Basic essentials are still
urgent water & shelter.” Moreover, news coverages not fully restored.” Particularly, the critique regarding
of the hospital and school damages in the affected the Jones Act was well shared on Twitter: “Appalling:
areas have been often retweeted: “RT @CBCFInc: Five Admin says it will *not* extend Harvey/Irma Jones Act
schools, two hospitals and the utility system has been suspension for #HurricaneMaria #PuertoRico.” Part of
completely obliterated.” the critiques also echoed the discourse in the political
theme about the Jones Act petition.
The subtheme of “impacts on animals” also
emerged. In addition to discussing Hurricane Maria’s Besides identifying two major frames of social-
impacts on community members’ living, some Twitter mediated communication patterns of Hurricane Maria,
users also showed their cares and concerns about ani- this study also discovered that Twitter users have
mals that have been impacted by Hurricane Maria: requested media, emergency management institutions,
“Disastrous hurricanes displace turtles, monkeys” and governments to support affected communities.
and “This is just one of the heartbreaking images
of animals in need after #HurricaneMaria ravaged Public request. Facing Hurricane Maria, the public
asked for more attention to the affected communities.
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For instance, during the postcrisis period, Twitter Figure 2. Word-cloud of haze-related Weibo posts.24
users asked for more media coverage about Hurricane
Maria: “@CNN @FoxNews @NBCNews Please put risks.” Moreover, “health” was frequently discussed
focus back on #PuertoRico!” There were some concerns in the following contexts: “cancer,” “heart disease,”
about Puerto Rico being forgotten: “May we remember “respiratory disease,” “protection,” and “PM2.5 warn-
#PuertoRico not just when it is advantageous - but ing system.”24
when our family needs help” and “PUERTO RICO
NEEDS HELP NOW! PLEASE DON’T FORGET US. The word-cloud and co-occurrence analyses
#HurricaneMaria.” showed a broad picture of the crisis communication
patterns of haze. Thematic analyses allowed this
The public also requested the emergency manage- study to provide a close examination of the crisis
ment institutions to offer more support to the affected frames of haze. This study identified that haze was
community especially to the vulnerable populations: largely framed as an environmental issue and later
“RT @SavetheChildren: #HurricaneMaria left massive framed as a health issue on Sina Weibo. Specifically,
devastation in #PuertoRico & #DominicanRepublic. compared to the health frame (13.3 percent), the
Help provide urgent aid for children” and “A stag- dominant frame was the environmental frame (22.8
gering 20K children affected by #HurricaneMaria in percent).24
Dominica. They need our support.”
Environmental frame. The environmental frame of
These findings revealed how Hurricane Maria the haze crisis emerged in 137 messages. Precisely,
was framed on Twitter, how this crisis was perceived, this environmental frame showed up in 63 Weibo
and how Twitter users evaluated crisis responses. To messages posted during the crisis period (January 16
make a fair comparison, the word-cloud, co-occurrence, to January 22, 2012) and 73 messages posted during
and thematic analyses were repeated while analyzing the post-crisis period (December 17 to December 31,
the Weibo data of the haze crisis. The following sec- 2012). Under the environmental frame, four themes
tions described the analysis results in detail. stood out: “air pollution level,” “factors that cause
haze,” “how to reduce haze,” and “PM2.5 readings
Haze crisis release and monitor installment.”24
Similarly, the author conducted word-cloud, co-
occurrence, and thematic analyses with Sina Weibo
posts on haze. After removing stop words, a word-
cloud was generated to visualize the word frequency
of Weibo posts using NVIVO 11 Pro (Figure 2). The
following words were frequently mentioned in these
317 Weibo posts: “air,” “pollution,” “quality,” “index,”
“PM2.5,” “Beijing,” “monitor,” “weather,” “environment,”
“data,” “health,” “influence,” and “safe.” As suggested
by the word-cloud, Weibo posts on haze were largely
associated with air pollution and health-related
issues.24
To further explore the major frames of haze, this
study also developed a series of co-occurrence analy-
ses by searching “air pollution” and “health” using
NVIVO 11 Pro. According to the co-occurrence analy-
ses, “air pollution” was often discussed along with the
following terms: “index,” “air,” “pollution level,” “pollu-
tion control,” “API” (air pollution index), and “health
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The first theme under the environmental frame wearing face masks, using air cleaners, and having
was “PM2.5 readings release and monitor installment,” more vitamins. “Governments’ actions or plans to pre-
which appeared in 12 percent of the Weibo posts. Most vent health risks” appeared in less than 2 percent of
of the discussion showed that more air quality moni- texts and usually concentrated on the following issues:
tors are available and PM2.5 concentration reports (1) building a PM2.5 monitor system and creating a
would be published. More and more cities started warning map of haze and (2) conducting and publish-
sharing hourly PM2.5 concentrations online. The sec- ing more research to examine health impacts of haze.
ond theme “how to reduce haze” was identified in
about 7 percent of the Weibo posts. These posts often Besides these two major frames, this study also
concentrated on reducing traffic jams, decreasing identified that public requests regarding haze informa-
carbon emission, diminishing firework combustion, tion changed across the crisis and postcrisis periods.
and increasing the usage of green energy. “Air pollu-
tion level,” which was covered in about 4 percent of Public requests
the posts, largely emerged in online weather forecast As suggested by this study’s Weibo sample, the
reports, haze warning messages, and posts complain-
ing about poor air quality.24 For instance, the Weibo public expressed requests to governmental organiza-
account of the Beijing weather forecast published tions. These public requests included releasing PM2.5
that Fangshan Liangxiang areas showed heavy haze: concentration data to the public, increasing efforts in
“The air pollution index reported by the air quality pollution control, and mitigating health risks of haze.
monitor station at Fangshan Liangxiang reached For example, one Weibo message called for develop-
430.” The theme of “factors that cause haze” was ing and releasing research on loss due to air pollu-
identified in less than 2 percent of the Weibo posts. tion: “China’s pollution has caused threats to human
This theme largely focused on vehicle exhaust, coal health, which is a fact. Nevertheless, almost nobody
combustion, and fireworks. As a side note, display- within China has ever done quantitative research on
ing fireworks is very popular on the Chinese Spring the loss caused by pollution.”24
Festival Eve (January 22, 2012) and this customer
of fireworks combustion is believed to increase PM2.5 More importantly, “citizens’ right to know” was
concentration.24 highlighted in these public requests. For instance,
the following Weibo message emphasized that citi-
Health frame. The health frame described the haze zens have the right to know what happened regard-
crisis as a health threat. This health frame that ing the haze issue: “2012 is the PM2.5 year. In recent
emerged in the overall 72 Weibo posts was equally days, municipalities and provincial capital cities
covered across the crisis and postcrisis periods. The started announcing daily PM2.5 monitoring results.
health frame included three themes: “health risks of The public does not expect that haze will be rapidly
haze,” “advice for citizens to prevent health risks,” and reduced after a new air quality standard is adopted.
“governments’ action to prevent health risks.”24 Air pollution control cannot be achieved in one step.
However, the priority is to maintain the citizens’ right
The theme of “health risks of haze” was the to know.” These results illustrate some similarities
dominant theme with a coverage ratio of 10 per- and differences in framing Hurricane Maria and haze
cent and particularly prevalent during the postcrisis on Twitter and Weibo. The discussion section offered
period. Reaffirmed the co-occurrence analysis results interpretations of findings, provided implications for
of “health,” “health risks of haze” theme largely con- research and practice, acknowledge limitations of this
centrated on how haze may increase the likelihood current study, outlined the future research directions,
of developing lung cancer and how haze may shorten and summarized the key takeaways of this article.
lifespan. “Advice for citizens to prevent health risks”
included staying indoors, reducing outdoor activities, Similarities and differences between crisis frames
To answer RQ3, this study compared how
Hurricane Maria and haze were framed on its local
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Vol. 19, No. 8
social media. This study’s findings reveal that both Communication Model.38 Framing Hurricane Maria
crises were largely framed as environmental extreme as an unpredictable natural disaster and framing
events. The dominant frame of Hurricane Maria was haze as an environmental issue both promote a desir-
a disaster frame. Similarly, the major frame of haze able interpretation of each crisis. This similar framing
on Sina Weibo was an environmental frame. A big helps shift the public’s focus from precrisis manage-
difference between Hurricane Maria frames and haze ment, eg, warnings and preparations, to crisis resolu-
frames is that Hurricane Maria was also framed as a tion management. Such framing can become the com-
political issue. Moreover, although both Twitter and munication text that will impact future discourses of
Weibo users had some requests to address each cri- similar crises and disasters and hence influence the
sis, the public’s requests regarding how to cope with public’s interpretation of crises.
Hurricane Maria were not as logical as the requests
expressed by Weibo users. Twitter users mainly called Nevertheless, precrisis management is very
for more support to the affected communities without important for the community that often experi-
proposing constructive advice. The interpretation of ences crises and disasters.27 Framing both crises as
these findings and implications for theory develop- environmental issues as unpredictable or unavoid-
ment and practice were offered in the “Discussion” able shapes their existence as legitimate facts. This
section. framing will impact the public’s acceptance of crises.
Consequently, people have more tolerance for the
DISCUSSION hazardous impacts of these environmental crises
and emergency management institutions’ responses,
Implications which, in turn, may make stakeholders ignore pre-
Crises or legitimate facts. Most of the previous research crisis planning and lead to more loss. To mitigate
largely focused on how a crisis is framed on Western the loss of similar crises in the future, practitioners
social media or in a Western cultural context. This should identify the possible crisis communication
study adds more knowledge to the limited literature patterns by exploring the crisis frames of previous
on comparing frames of multiple crises on multiple crises and utilize the knowledge to design precrisis
social media platforms and in different cultural con- management plans. This study further illustrates the
texts. With word-cloud, co-occurrence, and thematic importance of exploring crisis frames with a focus on
analyses, this study compared how Hurricane Maria cultural variances in frames.
and haze were framed on its local social media. This
study’s findings reveal that both crises were largely Cultural variances and framing. Many previous stud-
framed as legitimate facts. Hurricane Maria was ies on crisis framing primarily explore crisis fram-
mainly framed as a disaster rather than a crisis on ing on news coverage or Twitter while paying little
Twitter; haze was primarily framed as an environ- attention to crisis frames that emerge on non-English
mental issue instead of a health concern on Sina social media. Indeed, these studies demonstrate that
Weibo. exploring crisis framing is the key to understand the
stakeholders’ crisis interpretation and assessment of
As suggested by this study’s findings, most dis- crisis responses, which will impact emergency man-
cussions on Twitter were about the cause, blame, agement. Nevertheless, these findings have limited
responsibility, and inadequate responses to Hurricane reliability in being applied at an intercultural level
Maria. Likewise, the discourse related to haze primar- because of a lack of research on examining crisis
ily concentered on factors that cause haze, actions to framing in multiple cultural contexts with a compara-
reduce haze, and requesting governments to build tive approach.
more PM2.5 monitors. Focusing on causes, blame,
responsibilities, or responses to crises are typical As highlighted earlier in the literature review,
communication patterns of the crisis resolution stage although it is recommended to embrace cultural
as described by the Crisis and Emergency Risk variables in examining crisis communication, little
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research has examined how cultural variances may did not blame their president; instead, Weibo users
impact crisis interpretation and responses.22,23 To tend to treat the responsibility of the haze crisis as
fill this gap, this study explores cultural variances a social responsibility; that is, governmental institu-
in crisis framing by comparing the crisis frames of tions, researchers, and citizens are all responsible
Hurricane Maria and haze on Twitter and Weibo. for resolving this problem. These findings illustrate
This study reveals that the crisis frames of Hurricane how individualist and collectivist cultures differ in
Maria and haze are different from each other due to framing crisis responsibility, which will impact how
American and Chinese cultural variances, such as stakeholders evaluate emergency management insti-
power distance, collectivist–individualist culture, and/ tutions’ performance. In an individualist culture, a
or uncertainty avoidance. specific emergency management institution or the
head of the governmental organization is expected to
Consistent with previous research on crisis and take responsibility for the crisis and will be blamed
disaster frames on Twitter, Hurricane Maria was also for the lack of support or delayed crisis management
framed as a political issue.16,18 The finding reveals responses.
that Twitter users actively criticized governments’
responses to this crisis and publicly expressed their This study also identified that the public’s
political opinions on social media, which echoes previ- requests that emerged on Twitter and Weibo differ
ous studies’ conclusion.16,19 More interestingly, in this across the two crises. In the Hurricane Maria crisis,
study’s sample, only crisis communication surround- although the public calls for more attention and sup-
ing Hurricane Maria on Twitter includes a political port to the affected communities, there is no clear
frame; in contrast, discourses about haze on Chinese rationality or step-by-step instructions behind these
social media do not involve discussions about politics. requests. On the contrary, Weibo users concentrated
on factors causing haze, proposed multiple ways to
These frame differences indicate the cultural reduce haze, and would like to see more studies on
differences in terms of power distance between the haze’s health impacts to be conducted. Scientific
United States and China. Power distance indexes rationality appears to be dominant in the discourse
how community members accept inequality of power of public requests in the haze crisis. The differences
distribution.22,39 As a low-power distance culture, in rationality may indicate that the public feels more
American culture is more open to sharing critiques uncertain and perceives less lotus of control over the
on political issues and having political discussions situation while encountering a crisis that has imme-
on social media. In contrast, in a high-power dis- diate hazard outcomes, like Hurricane Maria. The
tance culture like Chinese culture, Weibo users did differences in the public’s requests may also illustrate
not frame the discourse with a political frame even Gudykunst’s argument about culture’s tolerance of
when they criticized the relevant organizations’ lack uncertainty impacting crisis management: “people [in
of responses to the crisis. This finding indicates that a high uncertainty avoidance country, like China] try
different power distance of these two countries influ- to avoid ambiguity and therefore develop rules and
ences the way people express their opinions and rituals for virtually every possible situation” while
interpret crisis. low uncertainty avoidance cultures, eg, American cul-
ture, “accept dissent and taking risks.”40(p330) Future
Moreover, in the individualistic culture, Twitter research needs to further examine such differences.
users are more likely to attribute the responsibil-
ity of the Hurricane Maria crisis to a single person The above findings suggest that framing at the
or a specific emergency management institution. As cultural level is rooted in a system’s communication
shown in this study’s sample, many Twitter users and has a profound impact on the social-mediated
blamed the president or a single emergency manage- crisis communication, which is consistent with the
ment institution for the inefficient support to the com- previous framing research.3-5 These implications echo
munities impacted by Hurricane Maria. Nevertheless, Hofstede’s argument that culture as “the collective
as members of a collectivist culture, Weibo users
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Vol. 19, No. 8
programing of the mind which distinguishes the tend to publicly express emotional responses to crises,
members of one human group from another” impacts which is consistent with previous research.19 Twitter
business communication and practice.41(p21) users complained about inadequate support and were
concerned that the affected communities and areas
In practice, crisis and emergency management are ignored while the crisis continues. Many tweets
institutions should be aware of the affected commu- included capitalized words, multiple exclamation
nity’s cultural dimensions, such as the extent to which marks, ironies, eg, “doing an ‘amazing job’ helping,
community members treat power distribution, how Puerto Rico,” metaphors, and emotional expression
close community members relate to each other and phases, such as “heartbreaking.”
see themselves as a group, and the degree to which
the affected community tolerate uncertainty and In contrast, even though Weibo users posted some
risk. This study indicates that social media users in a critiques about the government’s responses to haze,
low-power distance culture openly criticize the head these critiques and complaints were largely rational
of emergency management institutions or the gov- appeals and lack strong emotional expressions. These
ernment for their lack of support to the community. findings indicate that different communities may vary
While communicating with the communities with in their ways to express emotions while discussing
a low-power distance culture, crisis and emergency and sharing crisis information on social media, which
practitioners should effectively respond to community is impacted by their cultural norms. Therefore, con-
members’ critiques while developing interactive crisis sistent with previous research,43 this study indicates
communication. As suggested by Hofstede’s cultural that if the affected community embraces a culture of
model,41 for communities with high-power distance freely expressing emotions, emergency management
and low tolerance of uncertainty, mistakes or delayed practitioners need to legitimize the community’s
responses are less likely to be tolerated. In this case, psychological responses to crises and show empathy
emergency management should involve community in crisis communication. Practitioners should offer
leaders and experts while updating crisis informa- prompt and accurate information to address the
tion; there will be higher expectations for crisis and public’s concerns about support and remediation
emergency management to reduce risk, reduce the responses to the affected community. Interactive cri-
public’s uncertainty, and resolve problems. As sug- sis communication should also focus on helping the
gested by this study, in American culture which is public to recover emotionally from the crisis.
an example of the individualist culture, a specific
emergency management leader will be expected to Particularly, many communities, such as Puerto
take full responsibility for addressing the crisis and is Rico and Florida, remain to be susceptible to hur-
more likely to be blamed for irresponsible responses, ricanes, which makes it vitally important to learn
while the crisis responsibility is more likely to be lessons from previous crisis communication’s success
shared among stakeholders in a collectivist culture. and failure. Similarly, air pollution still significantly
Besides the differences in crisis framing, this study impacts the well-being of residents in many develop-
also identified that emotional responses to each crisis ing countries, eg, China and India. These vulnerable
vary between Twitter and Weibo users. communities need support from emergency manage-
ment organizations and federal and local govern-
Cultural differences in emotional expression. The ments. This study suggests that social media users
author embraced previous research’s argument on cri- are actively engaged in sharing crisis information and
sis outrage; outrage to crises including emotional and providing critiques and advice. Particularly, the large-
remedial reactions to risk, in its nature, is a cultural scale discussion surrounding haze on Weibo leads to a
assessment of crises and hazards.30,42 In this study’s national wide response to the crisis, which illustrates
samples, the comparison of crisis frames of Hurricane the potential power of the affected community mem-
Maria and haze further illustrates that Twitter users bers in influencing crisis communication. To miti-
gate future risks, crisis and emergency management
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212 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
institutions should spend more effort in collaborating Limitations
with communities to develop precrisis planning.27 This study has several limitations that prevent
Moreover, this study suggests that Twitter and Weibo
users share their crisis perceptions and evalua- it from generalizing its findings. First, this study’s
tions of the governments and related institutions’ samples are not large. Some communication patterns
responses to crises. Crisis and emergency manage- of these two crises may not be fully identified and
ment practitioners should value social media users’ interpreted. Furthermore, for ethical considerations,
opinions and incorporate such feedback while outlin- the 2012 Weibo dataset does not contain Weibo users’
ing response assessment strategies. Furthermore, this handles unless such information is embedded in
study reveals that cultural differences in attributing reposts. As a result, this study is not able to identify
responsibility, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, who is responsible for the message dissemination and
and emotional expressions impact the perception of who created these frames. This study explores crisis
crisis and evaluation of crisis response. To build effec- frames in an amalgamated manner. To make a fair
tive crisis communication, practitioners should devote comparison, this study does not analyze the Twitter
more effort to designing messages that fit the targeted handles of the Hurricane Maria data. Hence, this
community’s culture and reduce the emotional stress study also does not distinguish different stakeholders’
caused by the crisis.42 Last, this study’s findings discourses about these two crises. Further research
echo previous research’s suggestion on monitoring needs to be conducted to address these limitations.
crisis communication patterns on social media.12,13
Exploring the crisis frames on multiple social media Additionally, although most Twitter accounts in
platforms illustrates the importance of incorporating this study’s sample showed that they locate in the
social media strategies in crisis communication and United States, some Twitter accounts did not share
emergency management. location in their file, which prevents the author from
verifying that all the tweets were posted by American
With a comparative approach, this study enriches users. Even though future scholars can confirm
the literature on crisis communication, cultural vari- the geographic location of all social media users, it
ances in framing, and emergency management by remains difficult to learn every user’s cultural iden-
comparing the crisis frames and the social-mediated tity without further interventions. Since this study
crisis communication patterns of Hurricane Maria is built on thematic analyses of the content of social
and haze. This study indicates that identifying crisis media posts, the issue associated with self-identity is
frames can help scholars and emergency management less concerned.
institutions understand the public’s interpretation
of crises. Furthermore, this study illustrates that Moreover, given that the original Weibo dataset
advancing social media strategies in crisis manage- does not include the repost frequency, this study can-
ment is important in understanding crisis interpreta- not further examine what types of Weibo messages
tion, monitoring perceived emergency management were more frequently reposted. To ensure a fair com-
effectiveness, and facilitating the development of parison, this study does not include retweet frequency
precrisis management plans in the future. With in the analysis. Exploring the relationship between
such knowledge, future researchers and practitioners post-theme and repost frequency may help future
can design effective communication interventions to scholars and practitioners to better understand the
reduce the public’s uncertainty and provide prompt social-mediated crisis communication patterns.
emergency responses. This study’s findings will build
a foundation for future scholars to advance framing Future directions
theory, examine crisis communication with intercul- As discussed earlier, a plural of research on crisis
tural concepts, and provide implications for crisis and
emergency management practice. communication is conducted in a Western context,
while limited research compares crisis and risk com-
munication in both Western and non-Western cultural
contexts.20 Such unbalanced knowledge prevents us
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Journal of Emergency Management 213
Vol. 19, No. 8
from understanding how cultural differences in fram- management organizations should be aware of cul-
ing impact stakeholders’ interpretation and responses
to the crisis. This study indicates that communica- tural differences in risk and crisis interpretation,
tion scholars need to devote more effort to examining
how crises are framed in both Western and Eastern design unique culture-fit messages for affected com-
cultural contexts. More comparative studies explor-
ing how cultural factors, political characteristics, and munities, use a culture-sensitive approach in collabo-
media systems influence social-mediated crisis com-
munication are needed. ration with intercultural stakeholders, and incorpo-
Although communication scholars value the rate social media strategies in crisis communication.
media’s significant impacts on crisis and emergency
management,44 current literature primarily focuses ACKNOWLEDGMENT
on one social media platform—Twitter. In the future, Part of this study’s results was presented at the Research
crisis communication researchers can explore how the Summit on Health-Related Emergency and Disaster Risk
public creates and consumes information about crises Management (H-EDRM) on July 2018 in Hong Kong, China.
on different social media platforms in different cul-
tures. It will also be helpful to compare crisis frames Xianlin Jin, PhD, College of Communication and Information, University
that emerged on mass media and social media. of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
7691-2984.
Furthermore, researching various stakeholders’
discourse of crises will be meaningful. Future scholars REFERENCES
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Notes
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216 Journal of Emergency Management
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JEM Multisectoral perspectives toward a sustainable
energy transition in Puerto Rico: Implications for the
post-2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season
Glorynel Ojeda-Matos, MP, MS
Marla Pérez-Lugo, PhD
Cecilio Ortiz-García, PhD
Elvia J. Meléndez-Ackerman, PhD
ABSTRACT processes. The semistructured interviews were conducted
as part of an NSF-Critical Resilient Infrastructure
Puerto Rico experienced the most prolonged power Systems and Processes project investigating stakehold-
outage in US history after two hurricanes hit the ers’ perspectives on the electrical system.
Archipelago in September 2017. Hurricane Irma
left over one million people without electricity, and Participants: Thirty-one stakeholders partici-
Hurricane Maria left Puerto Rico in a total blackout pated in face-to-face semistructured interviews using
when it hit. The damages to 80 percent of the electrical purposive and snowball sampling. The ESF’s meetings
grid opened the possibility to the Puerto Rico Electric not only gathered up to 60 key stakeholders but also
Power Authority to explore options beyond merely were open to the public.
reconstructing and keeping the grid centralized. Prior
to these events, an active public discussion on how to Results: This study suggests that stakeholders’
transform the electrical system had been occurring perspectives were consistent with the prerequisites
regarding a new energy policy passed in 2014 that cre- for a transition to renewable energy before the 2017
ated Puerto Rico’s first Energy Commission and con- Atlantic Hurricane Season. However, even though the
cerning the first Integrated Resource Plan approved conditions of vision and values were present, there
in 2016. was also predisaster inertia from nontechnical bar-
riers preventing the sustainable transition that still
Objective: This study aimed to examine stake- prevails in post-disaster Puerto Rico.
holders’ visions, values, perceived barriers, and oppor-
tunities for a sustainable energy transition before the Conclusion: This paper provides an empirical
2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season and how the stake- reflection that ponders Puerto Rico’s post-disaster
holders’ perspectives have been manifesting during scenario through predisaster stakeholders’ perspec-
post-disaster efforts. tives. Emergency management professionals should
reflect on why understanding predisaster conditions is
Design: This study examined working documents critical in order to promote recovery efforts that meet
generated by an Energy Stakeholders Forum (ESF) the long-term needs of society and support sustain-
and semistructured interviews with key stakeholders able development for future generations. The analysis
in the energy decision-making arena. may also reinforce planning for disaster recovery via
governance approaches that consider stakeholders’
Setting: The data analyzed in this study were col- perspectives before disasters strike.
lected for 2 years (2015-2016) before Hurricanes Irma
and Maria hit Puerto Rico. The ESF had a series of Key words: Energy transition, recovery plan-
meetings to generate multisectoral dialog and pursue ning, stakeholder perspective, public participation,
more public participation in energy policy and planning Hurricane Maria, disaster recovery
DOI:10.5055/jem.0657 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8 217
INTRODUCTION that could be seized.19 Sectoral perspectives of what
are barriers or opportunities rely on stakehold-
Societies of the Anthropocene are increasingly ers’ roles in the energy transition, their impacts,
facing complex energy sustainability challenges and interest in the expected outcomes.11 Thus, the
resulting from extreme atmospheric events and their importance of exploring whether there is a collective
associated disruptions to their combined social, eco- understanding of what the sustainable energy transi-
logical, and technical systems.1 After Hurricanes tion implies and what is at stake. Energy transitions
Irma and Maria made landfall in September 2017, are better accepted when considering stakeholders’
Puerto Rico experienced the largest power outage in visions, their underlying values, and anticipating
US history.2-5 The blackout compromised all essential the implications of the new system arrangement.20-23
services in a cascade effect and turned the central- Stakeholder involvement is a pivotal facet of sustain-
ized energy dependency into a humanitarian crisis.2-5 able development and a recommended approach to
Approximately 80 percent of the electrical grid went accelerate proposed changes.24,25
down, and on the record, its restoration lasted as long
as 7 months.3,6 The first two recovery phases of emer- Public deliberation on energy systems’ transfor-
gency response and restoration overlapped due to the mations should be more of a process than an outcome,
devastating damage and the institutional failure in and it is more effective without time constraints.8
disaster response.2 Although such electric system col- Likewise, predisaster recovery planning is the ideal
lapse is undesirable, post-disaster major reconstruc- process to prepare for recovery in advance of a dis-
tion could be a unique opportunity to leverage social aster.9 According to the FEMA’s National Disaster
awareness and technology to transition from current Recovery Framework (NDRF), predisaster planning
energy fossil to renewable energy and to create a is essential to accelerate the recovery process where
thriving and more sustainable future.4,7 A disaster- “resilient and sustainable recovery encompasses more
recovery window of opportunity might be seized if a than the restoration of a community’s physical struc-
vision is in place when the economic investment is tures to predisaster conditions.”9(pi) Given the lack of
available.7-9 Therefore, understanding stakeholders’ such predisaster planning, and the fact that Puerto
perspectives on energy planning and transition pro- Rico’s energy transition to renewable resources was
cess during predisaster or normal times may acceler- in public discussion when the Hurricanes hit, we
ate the ability of institutions and recovery managers argue that analyzing the predisaster perspectives can
to make timely decisions to maximize recovery efforts provide insights on how the predisaster context might
toward sustainability.7-9 have paved the way for the post-disaster recovery pro-
cess. Considering that decision-makers must account
Stakeholders’ perspectives on for stakeholders’ perspectives when setting goals
sustainable energy transition for an energy transition and post-disaster recovery,
this study aimed to address the following research
Energy transitions may be challenging because of questions: what were the stakeholders’ perspectives
the diverse motivations and objectives of the different on the electrical system transformation before the
stakeholders.10 Stakeholders are the public who are 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season? The stakeholders’
affected by or could affect decision-making, and their perspectives include how they visualized the system
participation and perspectives are needed to compre- transformation, what were the guiding public values,
hend the social dimensions of the energy system.11-13 and the barriers and opportunities for the transition
Several studies found that challenges to energy based on discussions on energy transitions actively
transitions may arise from issues of scale (spatial or taking place over 2 years (2015-2016). Then, we dis-
temporal), uncertainties about the future, the exist- cuss the results of predisaster data to answer the
ing socio-technical system, and contested governance question: How well were stakeholder perspectives
perspectives.14-18 These challenges could slow down aligned with the response and recovery processes?
energy transitions,15 but there are also opportunities
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218 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
The before and after analysis was guided by the sought to elevate the degree of public participation
hypothesis that stakeholders’ perspectives would pro- from mere consultation of already-taken decisions to
vide insights on how predisaster conditions influence citizen power partnership and delegated power.30
post-disaster efforts.
METHODS
Predisaster Puerto Rico’s energy context
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a US The present study employed a qualitative
research design to examine working documents gen-
unincorporated territory. Puerto Rico experienced a erated by an Energy Stakeholders Forum (ESF) and
shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy 31 semistructured interviews with stakeholders in
where local policies promoted the establishment of Puerto Rico’s energy arena. The ESF had a series
US corporations (including fossil fuel industries) of meetings to promote multisectoral dialog about
that benefited from tax exemptions.26 Therefore, the Puerto Rico’s energy affairs and identify research
existing electrical infrastructure and technological needs for decision-making. The ESF was created in
capabilities were built around fossil fuels. Since 1941, 2014 by the National Institute of Energy and Island
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) Sustainability (INESI, for its Spanish acronym) of the
has been a natural monopoly controlled by the public University of Puerto Rico’s Central Administration.
sector, with only 20 percent of the electricity currently INESI is a platform for interdisciplinary and multi-
generated by the private sector. Since its creation, campus research and collaboration that seeks to inte-
PREPA has been deciding its rates without supervi- grate Academia in energy policy development. The
sion, incurring in operational and management inef- ESF officially started in partnership between INESI,
ficiencies, and maintaining energy governance that the Puerto Rico State Office of Energy Public Policy
lacked transparency and citizen participation.27-29 (OEPPE, for its Spanish acronym), and the Fundación
PREPA remained a self-regulating monopoly that Agenda Ciudadana (FAC). OEPPE was a relatively
favored electricity based on fossil fuel for decades new government agency created by Act No. 57 of May
until Act No. 57 of 2014, known as the Puerto Rico 2014 to develop energy public policy and conservation
Energy Transformation and RELIEF Act (Ley de plans to reduce electricity consumption for all public
Transformación y ALIVIO Energético), was enacted, entities and levels. FAC is a nonprofit organization
prompting changes in the energy policy landscape. with more than 10 years of experience facilitating
national deliberative dialogs about sectoral issues in
The Act No. 57 of 2014 aimed to stabilize electric- Puerto Rico.
ity tariffs, establish a transparent operation of energy
production and supply, and promote renewable energy The semistructured interviews were part of
generation, efficiency, and service quality. Following the Critical Resilient Infrastructure Systems and
the approval of Act No. 57, regulatory structures were Processes (CRISP) Project sponsored by the National
created (Puerto Rico State Office of Energy Public Science Foundation. The CRISP Project gathered a
Policy, Puerto Rico’s first Energy Commission, and the team of transdisciplinary researchers to develop a
Independent Consumer Protection Office). In 2016, smart grid system where the power utility opens its
the first Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) was devel- electric grid infrastructure at the distribution level to
oped to meet between 20 percent and 25 percent of the allow an open-access eBay style market. The objective
generation from renewable sources by 2023. Also, in of these interviews was to identify stakeholders’ per-
that year, additional legislation (Act. No 133 of 2016) spectives on the electrical system transformation. The
was passed to promote “community solar,” which main questions analyzed from the interview protocol
meant citizens could pursue access to renewable were as follows: “How do you visualize the transfor-
energy as groups or communities. The changing policy mation of the Puerto Rican electrical system over the
landscape prompted a stakeholders’ participation next 20 years?,” “What values should guide this trans-
process that aimed to follow a governance model that formation?,” “Which are the barriers to achieving that
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Journal of Emergency Management 219
Vol. 19, No. 8
20-year vision?,” and “Which are the opportunities for the privileged position of deciding who is awarded
achieving that 20-year vision?” stakeholder status.25 The ESF participants included
academia, electric power industry, nongovernmental
Stakeholders’ identification organizations (NGOs), private sector, professional
The identification of ESF stakeholders began in the organizations, political parties, labor unions, envi-
ronmental organizations, civil society, and municipal,
summer of 2016 by INESI’s researchers. Stakeholders state, and federal government. Table 1 presents the
were identified by searching the Internet, online number of individuals by sector who attended dif-
databases, professional journals, and local news- ferent ESF meetings. The ESF’s working documents
papers. Over 100 stakeholders were identified in analyzed in this study were titled Declaraciones de
the initial list, and invitations were sent via email, Visión para Puerto Rico y su Sistema Energético and
phone calls, and social media. Indeed, the criteria to Resumen Ejecutivo de Encuentro de Constituyentes de
identify stakeholders can be contentious,25 given that Energía (Vision Statements for Puerto Rico and the
the entire community stands to be affected by energy Energy System, and Executive Summary of Energy
transitions.11 Therefore, ESF’s meetings were open to Constituent Meeting).
the public, and participants were encouraged to invite
other individuals or organizations that could be inter- The CRISP Project’s Governance Team led the
ested. The first calls were purposely followed by word- stakeholder identification process for the semis-
of-mouth invitations to encourage snowball participa- tructured interviews in the summer 2015. INESI’s
tion, diminishing what practitioners understand is Steering Committee members were also Co-PI of the
Table 1. Number of individuals per sector from the first to fifth ESF’s meetings
Sector First Second Individuals VC* Fifth
Third
Academia 62414
Electric power industry 17 4 5 4 2
PR’s energy regulator 00000
Municipal government 20000
State government 11 3 2 0 1
Federal government 00000
NGOs 14 8 10 3 10
Private sector 31000
Civil society 31110
Professional organizations 1 1 1 1 1
Political parties 12100
Workers union 21100
Total of individuals 60 23 25 10 18
*VC—vision committee met for 6 weeks to review the crafted vision and developed the document on Vision Statements
a nalyzed in this study.
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CRISP Project; therefore, they included additional does not attempt to adhere stakeholders or sectors
stakeholders based on their experiences working to specific results; instead, the intention is to analyze
with energy stakeholders in previous studies and ini- and interpret how post-disaster efforts aligned with
tiatives. The CRISP Project’s Governance Team con- predisaster stakeholders’ perspectives.
tacted 50 stakeholders to participate in anonymous
and voluntary interviews and gathered information RESULTS
from September 2015 to September 2016. The 31
semistructured interviews included individuals from Five visions emerged from the analysis of the
the following sectors: academia, legislature (House semistructured interviews focused on “energy diver-
of representative and senate), executive branch of sification,” “community microgrids,” “distributed gen-
government, PR’s energy regulator, electric power eration,” “technological advancement,” and “PREPA’s
industry, renewable energy industry, NGOs, and transformation.” Table 3 presents the frequency distri-
communities leaders. Stakeholders were identified bution of these emergent visions that emerged across
by their role in the decision-making process and stakeholder sectors. Each sector is distinguished by a
implementation of the public energy policy in Puerto different color, and each row represents a vision and
Rico.11,25 Table 2 presents the rate of response from the frequency of individuals within each sector.
stakeholders invited to participate in the semis-
tructured interviews. All interviews were recorded, Energy diversification
transcribed, and imported into NVivo 12 for content Overlapping visions showed a strong dominance
analysis. The interviews were codified to keep the
data anonymous as required by the University of of stakeholders looking forward to Puerto Rico’s
Puerto Rico’s Institutional Review Board. energy diversification. Interviewees widely suggested
that transitioning away from current energy fossil
Data analysis sources is vital for the energy sector’s sustainability.
The working documents generated by the ESF The central vision for energy diversification includes
two scenarios. Interviewees of the Senate and Electric
were structured with vision and values, and it served Power Industry mentioned that it could be done by
as the first node structure in NVivo 12 to follow both transitioning to natural gas as a fossil phase-out
deductive and inductive analysis in the semistruc- source. In contrast, the Academia and PR’s Energy
tured interviews. The initial coding structure for val- Regulator interviewees believed the transition should
ues was established using the values described in the leapfrog natural gas and arrive directly at renewa-
document titled “Vision Statements for Puerto Rico bles. A significant number of interviewees found that
and the Energy System.”31 This previous structure Puerto Rico should depend less on fossil fuel resources
of codes allowed us to determine which values were and greater use of local renewable resources, particu-
repeated in the semistructured interviews. If a new larly the abundant sunlight.
value emerged inductively from the interviews’ analy-
sis, it was added with a brief description, as explained Community microgrids
by the interviewees. The coding structures of vision, More than half of the interviewees favored com-
barriers, and opportunities were created using an open
codification approach. Following Painuly’s framework, munity microgrids. Five interviewees of diverse sec-
this study presents barriers and opportunities at sev- tors converged toward microgrids interconnected with
eral levels ranging from a broad category to detailed each other, and where everyone can be prosumers and
remarks that clarify the causes for its presence.16 consumers of the electrical system. One interviewee of
We emphasize that the resulting node structures the Academia specified that prosumer communities
should not be viewed as mutually exclusive or have could provide services to each other to increase the
rigid, definitive boundaries. The following summary electrical system’s reliability. A substantial number of
interviewees suggested that energy could be produced
in the roofs of residences, commerce, and government
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Vol. 19, No. 8
Table 2. Rate of response from stakeholders invited to participate in the semistructured interviews
Sector Invited to participate Interviewed individuals Rate of response
Academia 4 3 75.0 percent
Legislature 6 5 83.3 percent
Renewable energy industry 6 3 50.0 percent
Electric power industry 5 4 80.0 percent
PR’s energy regulator 3 3 100.0 percent
Executive branch of government 9 3 33.3 percent
NGO 6 4 66.7 percent
Communities leaders 11 6 54.5 percent
Summary 50 31 62.0 percent
Table 3. Visions for an energy transition by sectors
Vision Freq. Aca- Legislature RE Electric Energy Executive NGO’s Communities
demia industry power regulator branch leaders
industry
Energy diver- 29
sification 17
16
Community 12
microgrids 12
Distributed
generation
Technological
advances
PREPA’s
transforma-
tion
facilities to be then distributed to nearby consumers. in clusters or regions where production is closer to
Interviewees of the academia, legislature, and com- places of use. One interviewee of the NGO sector
munities leaders said that communities could operate stressed that solar energy microgrids should occur
their own energy storage systems. on surfaces that are already impacted and do not
interfere with other population needs, such as agri-
Distributed generation cultural land use. One interviewee of the Academia
Most participants believed that distributed mentioned that the government could have less to
do with the electrical system’s operation and main-
energy generation is the best pathway to introduc- tenance. In contrast, an Electric Power Industry
ing renewable energy in Puerto Rico. Some men- interviewee suggested that PREPA must become
tioned that distributed energy projects could start
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222 Journal of Emergency Management
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a facilitator and sell microgrids and communities’ be a transition process, but it is hard to predict if it
maintenance services. will be organized or disorganized, fair or unfair.
Technological advances One interviewee of the federal government
Some interviewees emphasized the technical expressed that changing the operations of PREPA
is an issue to resolve. Interviewees of the PR’s
aspects of transforming the electrical service and Energy Regulator and Federal Government stated
mentioned that Puerto Rico might even participate in that PREPA’s human resources need to be retrained
technology innovation. An interviewee of the Electric to increase their capacity to take the reins of what
Power Industry highlighted that those modern tech- may be a new public corporation. An interviewee of
nologies would provide low costs and high reliability to the Electric Power Industry stressed that PREPA’s
customers. Interviewees of the PR’s Energy Regulator Executive Director, Governing Board members, and
and Academia asserted that energy savings could employees must be selected for being professional
result in changing luminaires, efficient appliances, and or experts, not for political appointment or nepo-
LED bulbs. An interviewee of the Local Government tism; they should act in the interest of Puerto Rico.
shared a personal experience of installing a residen- Interviewees of the Academia and Local Government
tial solar water heater that reduced 30 percent of rejected PREPA’s privatization. In contrast, one inter-
the electricity bill. Interviewees of the Electric Power viewee of the Electric Power Industry said that
Industry mentioned the use of smart grids and smart PREPA’s privatization might be the driving force to
metering. An interviewee of the legislature expressed transform it because of the inability to change govern-
the need to build new modern generation facilities. An ment and labor unions’ inefficiencies.
interviewee of the Academia stated that the impor-
tance of pursuing technological changes for the wellbe- Vision statement of the ESF
ing of all was, in the first place, the reason why PREPA The ESF’s vision for the energy system was
electrified the whole island. An interviewee of the PR’s
Energy Regulator said that Puerto Rico should discard “Puerto Rico’s energy system is transparent, accessi-
old technologies that undermine environmental value, ble, fair and clean, and it is based primarily on energy
think about future generations, and be a self-sufficient conservation, efficiency, and use of systems based on
island focusing on climate change mitigation. renewable and local resources.” The ESF’s vision was
mostly written to express the values that should lead
PREPA’s transformation the energy transition, and the vision committee sub-
The possibility of PREPA’s transformation emerged sequently defined these values. The ESF defined val-
ues as “a set of fundamental beliefs that are socially
as a vision and an opportunity. Interviewees described reproduced or modeled and help to prefer, appreciate
how PREPA must open to new energy markets, eg, and choose things or some behaviors over others.”31
renewable energy, smart grid, fiber optic lease, com- An interesting finding is that the ESF’s vision com-
munications, Internet, and community microgrids mittee opted to define the value of “sustainability” as
maintenance, to make the enterprise sustainable. strong sustainability, meaning that “economic activi-
PREPA must transform to manage renewable energy ties are part of the social domain, and both economic
generation in Puerto Rico and quit the coal, natural and social actions are constrained by the environ-
gas, and oil dependencies, as mentioned by interview- ment.”32 A description of these values is detailed in
ees of the Legislature and PR’s Energy Regulator. A Table 4, along with an asterisk to denote if the value
community leader and an NGO’s representative speci- emerged from the inductive analysis of interviews.
fied that a transition must be planned with temporal
projections that overcome the immediateness. One Values
interviewee of the Academia stated that PREPA has a Values represent preferences on specific aspects
grid and a financial debt that must be paid; there will
of the energy system and underpin stakeholders’
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Table 4. Description of values from the ESF and interviews data
Values Freq. Description
Renewable
Sustainability 28 Energy sources continuously present in nature and that practically never run out
Responsibility
Cooperation* 17 Natural systems are healthy to meet the needs of the present generations without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs
Awareness*
16 Citizens consciously act and decide, assuming the omissions and results of the acts of
Clean governing authorities
Reliable*
Accessibility 16 Understand neighbors and community needs and resources to serve each other. Have open
Transparency and transparent communication and collaboration to ensure the common good
Efficiency
Democracy Raise a generation of Puerto Ricans aware of the value of conservation and protection of the
Willpower* 16 natural environment, energy use, governance systems, and the implications of the electric
Conservation
Justice system privatization
Flexible*
Well-being* 15 Minimize energy system environmental emissions, residues, and discharges on all processes
Local such as materials extraction, processing, and electricity generation facilities
Accountability*
Solidarity 15 The electrical system is robust, stable, reliable, and redundant; electricity can be transferred
Professionalism* from one location to another
Empowerment* 14 Ensure the right for all to have access to electricity, allowing them to achieve a dignified
standard of living
13 Ensure the right to know while making accessible information about actions taken and
assessing consequences to make decision-makers accountable for their actions
11 Achieve goals using the minimum amount of resources or more goals with the same or fewer
resources
10 Ensure that empowered, educated, and fully informed people participate effectively and
actively in decision-making
10 Willingness and enthusiasm to collaborate and do the homework required to have an informed
opinion about what should occur. The political will to do things by self-will and consensus
10 Behavior that results in reducing the amount of energy used for different purposes
Legitimize and satisfy inhabitants’ needs and purposes without limiting other countries,
9 beings, and members of the Earth to meet their needs and purposes. Equitable access to all
material and social goods is guaranteed to reduce the wealth gap
9 Ability to adjust to changes
7 Technological changes must be driven by the pursuit of greater common wellbeing—the
human dimension before the electrification project
6 Resources located within the Puerto Rico Archipelago
6 PREPA cannot be self-regulated and must be held accountable for providing all the information
about governance and finance
5 Recognize and meet the collective needs in an altruistic way, increasing the likelihood of
survival and wellbeing for all
5 PREPA’s human resources and governing board must be professional, trained, and capable in
various disciplines
Self-protection and self-management spirit to meet the essential needs for human life. Take
4 actions toward an energy system transformation and achieve autonomy for communities that
have been overburdened with environmental injustice
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Table 4. Description of values from the ESF and interviews data (continued)
Values Freq. Description
Happiness 2 Self-realized people are enjoying all the material and social goods of the country and reaching
a state of emotional, spiritual, and physical wellbeing
Excellence* 2 Move forward to achieve results
Stewardship* 1 Stewards take care of everything
*Value emerged from the inductive analysis of interviews.
perspectives of alternative pathways. The values could transition is essential to address them. Tables 5 and 6
be distinctively assigned to the technical and nontech- show stakeholders’ perspectives on barriers and oppor-
nical aspects of the energy system. For instance, some tunities for an energy transition before Hurricane
values such as renewable, clean, reliable, efficient, Maria hit. Results support the role that nontechnical
and accessible were used to describe technical aspects. aspects play in the sustainable energy transition. The
Some nontechnical values mentioned were responsi- nontechnical barriers most emphasized by stakehold-
bility, cooperation, awareness, transparency, democ- ers were related to governance, mentality and behav-
racy, political will, and justice. Renewable emerged ior patterns, and obstacles from major economic inter-
as the overall value to guide Puerto Rico’s energy est. Barriers from top-down processes included lack
transition. The stakeholders’ perspectives on energy of planning, follow-up and political will, transparency,
diversification show that the energy transition must bureaucracy, and innovation resistance. Barriers from
include clean and renewable sources on the pathway bottom-up processes included lack of a shared vision,
toward sustainability and power system reliability. lack of citizen involvement, and fear of change. The
Values such as “responsibility,” “cooperation,” “aware- main perceived opportunities were also mostly non-
ness,” “clean,” and “reliable” emerged as the normative technical, such as community empowerment, resource
basis to guide the vision on “distributed energy gen- management, economic opportunities, and education.
eration” and “community-based grids.” Stakeholders Simultaneously, the opportunities for community
expressed that they must raise collective awareness empowerment and education emerged from the nar-
of energy use and conservation, natural environment rative of several stakeholders’ groups.
protection, community spirit, governance processes,
and the implications to achieve these visions. The Although stakeholders recognized that PREPA
main values expressed by stakeholders show the need gave Puerto Rico what many countries do not have—
to prioritize cooperation and make conscious decisions infrastructure that reaches the whole island and a
assuming responsibility for the results and the elected reasonably reliable system, they also emphasized
leaders’ actions. Values linked to the potential of PREPA’s governance and corporate culture as the
PREPA’s transformation are transparency, efficiency, major barriers leading to resource mismanagement
democracy, willpower, and accountability. However, the and the preservation of the status quo. They also
Electric Power Industry’s narrative lacked values such stressed that the decision-making process could not
as sustainability, cooperation, awareness, transpar- be subjected to the swings of political changes every
ency, democracy, and conservation. 4 years. On the contrary, it must have continuity,
transparency, and accountability. Another barrier
Barriers and opportunities preventing the transition is how the media influence
Understanding the nature of the predisaster public opinion, as an interviewee of the NGO sector
stated: “AES Puerto Rico [a private company that
barriers and opportunities for a sustainable energy generates electricity from coal] has been influencing
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Table 5. Barriers to the sustainable energy transition
Barriers Frequency Remarks
Governance
Political power shifts Decisions and initiatives change every 4 years because of changes in
administration and personnel in the government and PREPA
Lack of planning A National Plan involving all sectors’ commitment to long-term
continuity has not been established
Lack of follow-up Reports on Puerto Rico’s transition to renewable energy and
technology innovation are not tracked
Lack of political will PREPA has not agreed on solutions presented by the community to
Lack of transparency avoid pollution and environmental injustices. Even during the crisis,
there is no political will for the transition to renewable energy sources
23
Information is not disseminated to all stakeholders, and such
transparency is key for informed decision-making
Bureaucracy The executive branch manipulates PREPA’s matters and advances
energy projects that are questioned by the Energy Commission The
application process for installing renewable energy is not agile
Lack of a shared vision There is no vision on the energy sector in which all sectors agree.
Therefore, each new administration set its own vision
Representative democracy Citizens see themselves as passive actors in the political processes,
and many are unaware of the possibility of participatory democracy
Mindset and behavior patterns
Fear of change Many [sectors] resist change and put common interests before
Lack of identity individual interests
16
Political transitions have not allowed the maturity of the national
identity, affecting the achievement of country goals
Major economic interests
Influence on public opinion Use of media to influence public opinion on the benefits of energy
generation from fossil fuels
Preserve the status quo People with economic and political power who benefit from the
Energy as a lucrative market status quo are a barrier because their interests are created based on
15 the existing electrical system
Major economic interests behind companies selling fossil fuels
prevent the electrical system transformation because stopping
buying 2,000-2,500 billion in fuels will affect them. Renewable energy
companies see a new market opportunity to make more money over
the consumers’ real needs
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
Fear of change Resistance to regulatory bodies and a new energy infrastructure
15 arrangement that will change the current business model, eg, from a
centralized system to distributed solar energy generation
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Table 5. Barriers to the sustainable energy transition (continued)
Barriers Frequency Remarks
Labor unions Labor unions and managerial employees benefit from the status of the
electrical system, and they promote inefficiency, eg, six employees do
the work of three employees
Corporate culture PREPA’s organizational culture has hindered the transformation
Installed capacity toward a more sustainable electrical system. PREPA became a
government place for nepotism, and it has so much power that it can
be considered the fourth branch of government
15 PREPA has limited capacity to incorporate renewable energy
PREPA’s debt PREPA has a substantial amount of daily operational expenses and a
long-term debt constraining budget to invest in infrastructure
Lack of maintenance PREPA’s fiscal crisis has impacted the maintenance expenses for
the electrical system, eg, power lines, transformers, and stations,
Therefore, the energy system is not robust, modern, reliable, cost-
effective, or competitive
Resource mismanagement
Territorial size Puerto Rico does not have enough territorial extension to do both
energy farms and agricultural land for food
Electrification of remote areas from It is not feasible to send power transmission lines from a centralized
centralized system 11 system to remote areas where few people or a single person lives
Energy demand The electrical system is operated under the assumption that energy
demand must always be satisfied, and there are no incentives for
reducing energy consumption during peak hours
the public opinion by continuously publishing in the economic context preceding the electrical grid col-
media about the benefits of generating energy burn- lapse, which could be timely information to leverage
ing coal, while completely ignoring the public health recovery resources to incorporate climate adaptation.9
impacts and penalties the company has paid for ille- When Hurricanes Irma and Maria hit, the electrical
gal pollution.” system was already weakened by inadequate mainte-
nance—still driven by the austerity measures brought
DISCUSSION by the PREPA Debt Restructuring Agreement and the
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Electricity is generally the first critical ser- Stability Act (PROMESA).35
vice that fails during disasters, triggering cascading
effects.33 Countries worldwide are transitioning to As a community leader imagined Puerto Rico
diversify their electricity mix and relying on renew- being impacted by a storm:
able energy to reduce CO2 emissions, increase system
resilience, and adapt to climate change.1,34 Puerto We will be without electricity for around
Rico is not exempted from these transition dialogs. three or four months because of the poor
This study examined stakeholders’ perspectives for maintenance of the [power] lines. May God
an energy transition 2 years before the catastrophic help us to [this does not happen]. But if [a
2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season. The data shed light storm comes], it will take a long time to
on the pre-existing technical, political, social, and restore the [electric] service.
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Table 6. Opportunities for the sustainable energy transition
Opportunities Frequency Remarks
Community empowerment
Be the change People empowered as agents of change to transform Puerto Rico
Awareness More citizens are aware and interested in clean, efficient, and affordable electricity
Mobilization Communities and individuals mobilize toward a sustainable energy transition
Energy sharing against the status quo established by the government and PREPA
19
Communities or regions could generate their own energy and benefit from
selling energy surpluses to each other. Decisions on how to share energy can be
collectively made, avoiding government bureaucracy
Shared vision People must understand that they do not need to agree 100 percent to work
together on issues affecting them; they can learn from each other
Resources management
Local resources Sun is the local energy source, and it is necessary to adjust to that renewables and
fossil sources are managed differently Puerto Rico has sunny days most of the year,
and the fluctuations [in solar irradiance] can be optimized. Puerto Rico does not
have much land but has many [building] roofs [to allocate solar energy]
Integrated resource plan The Integrated Resource Plan already includes transitioning to more renewable
16 energy, and it will be reviewed every 3 years
Regulatory bodies Puerto Rico Energy Commission should not let PREPA impose its criterion. PREPA
must be responsible for plans already drawn
Energy demand A program for energy demand management can be implemented. People’s
management conceptualization of energy generation and consumption must change
Economic opportunities
Private sector investment Private sector investment is critical to provide capital for PREPA. The industrial sector
can generate its own energy and sell the surplus to neighboring communities
Cost drop of renewable The cost of renewable technologies has dropped, including batteries
technologies
PREPA’s market expansion PREPA could establish a Solar Energy Division and retrain engineers and personnel.
15 PREPA could change its business model to sell and finance solar panels, energy-
efficient appliances, and supply energy to other countries in the Caribbean region
Fiscal crisis The fiscal crisis can be an opportunity to eliminate inefficiencies and anything
impeding PREPA’s transformation
Free energy sources Aside from the initial cost, the advantage of renewable energy is that sun and wind
are free sources compared to volatile fossil fuel prices
Education
Energy education People can be educated to be active participants in the political system about the
14 importance of energy sovereignty and the basic fundamentals of electricity and its
use
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Table 6. Opportunities for the sustainable energy transition (continued)
Opportunities Frequency Remarks
Role of academia Academia has the unique role of helping people of all ages to understand the
state of the art of energy systems. Universities and community colleges must have
an active role in training future professionals on an integrated vision to manage
energy utility
Investment in education Investment in the education system is the first step to transform the energy
system. Budget cuts to the public education system show a lack of vision. The
University of Puerto Rico contributes by offering technical and social assistance
PREPA’s infrastructure 9
Existing infrastructure Puerto Rico’s infrastructure is aging, but it could be renewed. PREPA can offer a
variety of services and has an intrinsic value for owning all the infrastructure, such
as irrigation channels, the best fiber optic and wireless network on the island, a
fleet of vehicles
For stakeholders, PREPA’s fiscal crisis and the institutional inertia and major economic interest as
austerity measures were impacting the reliability barriers preventing an energy transition. Those bar-
and robustness of the electrical system to the point riers may have prevailed during the post-disaster
that it became a barrier to the energy transition in recovery. Several authors have studied how Puerto
the face of a weather event. An interviewee from Rico’s colonial relationship with the US impacted
Academia said on the economic investment needed response and recovery efforts. For instance, research
on the electrical system that it “must be weighed if it on colonial power relations outlines several policies
is worth paying two or three more cents per kilowatt imposed by the US on Puerto Rico that perpetuate the
to have an improved [electrical] system [because] if fossil fuel dependency and hinder the possibility for
a Hurricane comes, the system may be up two hours agile disaster response, eg, the Operation Bootstrap,
after the Hurricane has passed.” While the stake- PROMESA, and Jones Act.26 Additionally, research
holders’ interviews were in progress, PROMESA on disaster response demonstrated that compared to
was approved on July 1, 2016. The extent to which hurricanes that affected states in the continental US
PROMESA could steer Puerto Rico’s energy context in 2017, the federal government responded to Puerto
was not clear at that time; only two interviewees Rico with less urgency and human and material
mentioned it. An interviewee of the renewable energy resources for the restoration process.36 The colonial
industry highlighted that “Before PROMESA, politics relationship may also prevent the energy system
was fundamentally the most important [barrier to transformation because power structures are in place
achieve a transition vision]. Now, politics is not so to serve US interest more than Puerto Rican people’s
important, and [the barrier] is more tied with econom- interest, eg, keeping Puerto Rico’s dependency on US
ics.” Another interviewee of the Executive Branch of fossil energy sources.26
Government expressed that “PROMESA comes to do
what we did not achieve by our own will and consen- While the recovery process was still lagging, public
sus. We had nothing to do with [PROMESA]; it will discussion on energy transition to renewable sources
be imposed.” strengthened.4 Meanwhile, PREPA was focused on
getting back to the previous status quo prevent-
Before the hurricanes, results showed that stake- ing the pursuit of an energy transition to renewa-
holders’ vision and values aligned in support of tran- bles. Additionally, the short-term recovery approach
sitioning to renewable energy but also recognized and emergency response efforts were “plagued by
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Vol. 19, No. 8
corruption and mismanagement scandals.”2(p4) As an privatizing PREPA did not ensure that all stakehold-
example of the identified barriers to transitioning to ers’ perspectives were considered in the decision.9
renewables, a member of Puerto Rico’s Legislature
expressed that decentralized community microgrids, Ten months after Hurricane Maria, the Puerto
where people are prosumers, to be operational and Rico State Office of Energy Public Policy was changed
functional: “This might not occur within [PREPA]. from an independent agency to a program under the
Both the unionists and managers are unwilling Puerto Rico Department of Economic Development
because if there is no [electricity] generation from and Commerce under Act No. 141 of 2018. This new
PREPA, fewer union members pay [membership] governance structure refocused the energy policy on
fees.” Another member of Puerto Rico’s Legislature economic aspects. Once again, Puerto Rico’s energy
also pointed out: decision-making was refocused on technical and
financial factors rather than broadly and explicitly
It is possible if [PREPA’s] governance incorporating the social dimension.21,29,35 The deci-
changes. If it does not change—[and] does sions about the future of the electrical system, such as
not allow the integration of community policy changes and PREPA’s privatization announce-
systems within its network—there is no ment, were made when most citizens were still incom-
way you can be effective. You could then municable and struggling to cover their basic needs.
fall into the wild struggle between private Echoing what a community leader expressed in an
sectors to grab a market once the system interview, “the service is not administered to defend
is privatized. underserved and most vulnerable communities but
to benefit the interest of the large corporations.” The
Three years before Hurricane Maria, Act No. 57 speedy decisions without consensus hinder the poten-
was enacted to increase energy diversification, public tial of the whole community approach to leverage
participation, and transparency on PREPA’s affairs. A opportunities to increase resilience and mitigation.8,9
new regulatory structure was created to make PREPA
accountable. As far as the analyses show, almost The results show that more than half of stake-
half of the interviewees perceived opportunities in holders hold visions on “distributed energy gen-
PREPA’s transformation through better governance eration” and “community-based grids” portraying the
processes and resources management. However, as an customers as prosumers at the local level. During
interviewee of the renewable energy industry high- post-disaster, the energy transition arena made way
lighted, “there is resistance to any regulatory body and for these visions, and lacking a large-scale, top-down
implementing changes, and there is a carelessness energy transition,38 many stakeholders set in motion
in doing things.” Even an interviewee of the Electric small bottom-up initiatives.34,39 For instance, two
Power Industry expressed that to improve PREPA’s rural communities were documented on how pre- and
inefficiencies: “my strict conclusion is that [PREPA] post-Hurricanes’ actions helped them seize opportuni-
must be privatized. Why? Because if [PREPA] remains ties for change.40 Before the hurricanes, communities
to be part of the government, it will not change.” Four at Corcovada in Añasco and Mariana in Humacao
months after Hurricane Maria hit, the governor of “had established shared values and visions around
Puerto Rico announced the contested privatization renewable energy.”40(p18) This enabled them to seize
of the PREPA.37 Although private sector involvement windows of opportunity from post-disaster aid to
could step forward institutional inertia for change install solar panels to operate a small water system
and economic efficiency, the role of PREPA to provide and community facilities.7,40 Likewise, over 230 solar
long-term public goods is not. PREPA’s privatization and storage projects were installed in Puerto Rico,
process is in progress, and the implications on the elec- funded by humanitarian and philanthropic organi-
trical system remain to be seen. Mirroring the results, zations.39 Responsibility, cooperation, and solidarity
are values that emerged from the analysis and mani-
fested during post-disaster efforts. Coinciding with
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Vol. 19, No. 8
predisaster data, empowered leaders and communi- self-sustaining island where we can gen-
ties actively implemented and are operating renew- erate energy with our own resources and
able energy infrastructure challenging the status quo. not depend on a third party. Instead, we
can self-generate what we really need and
In January 2018, a coalition of grassroots and envi- discard this [fossil fuels] technology now.
ronmental organizations presented the We Want Sun
(Queremos Sol) proposal to promote 100 percent renew- In addition, interviewees from the NGOs sector
able energy penetration and suggested actions to over- expressed the need to reimagine the energy system
come barriers related to governance and avoid PREPA’s in the face of sea-level rise. One interviewee said, “in
privatization.41 On April 11, 2019, new goals to reduce terms of a sustainable project, we should start decen-
fossil fuel enacted by Act No. 17, known as Puerto Rico’s tralizing the electrical system, thinking carefully
Energy Public Policy Act, were approved to reduce 20 about where new [energy] infrastructure is placed
percent of fossil fuel dependency by 2022, 40 percent because the land has to be used consciously.” Another
to 2025, 60 percent by 2040, and 100 percent by 2050. interviewee emphasized:
Even though Act No. 17 of 2019 promises to reach
100 percent use of renewable energy by 2050, the US Considering climate change, many of these
Department of Energy sponsored a feasibility study for [power] plants are at risk of becoming inop-
nuclear power generation in Puerto Rico.42 This path- erable in the future. When I say the future,
way has been previously rejected. Also, PREPA Debt I am not thinking about the next century
Restructuring Agreement with its creditors proposed but in the next 25-30 years. However,
a “sun tax” that disincentivize solar energy generation, microgrids, especially community-based
contradicting Act No. 17 of 2019, which prohibits penal- microgrids—producing electricity and con-
izing the use of renewable sources. nected to the main grid—are one [solution].
Furthermore, the IRP was reviewed in 2019, as To promote sustainable recovery, a paradigm shift
required by Act No. 57 of 2014 every 3 years, but under from short-term to long-term recovery is required to
a highly contested process, especially by grassroots avoid the future failures of systems designed under
and environmental organizations. The main com- old assumptions about weather events.5 Energy sys-
plaints were that the revised IRP does not mention cli- tems are increasingly at risk of exposure to rising
mate change or incentivize clients to install renewable ambient temperature, sea-level rise, and extreme
energy in their properties. Also, because renewable weather events that could disrupt the operations
energy deployment is planned through large-scale of power plants, transmission lines, and pipelines.1
projects, many of which are proposed on lands with Maintaining Puerto Rico’s dependency on fossil fuel
high agricultural or natural value. All of these con- energy generation is unsustainable.1,43 Failure to
trast with the main stakeholder visions, which were cut back on CO2 emissions from the energy sector is
“energy diversification,” “community microgrids,” and expected to worsen the effects of climate change and
“distributed generation,” and with concerns expressed increase the frequency and intensity of extreme tropi-
by some about the future of the electrical system in cal storms in the Caribbean.44 Therefore, transition-
the face of climate change. For instance, an inter- ing away from current energy fossil sources is urgent
viewee from PR’s Energy Regulator stressed about the to mitigate climate change effects, including those
environment being the most important value: on the energy sector (and related cascading effects),
which lead to costly disaster recovery.1,45
We must focus on climate change. We
must think about future generations as In the United States, FEMA’s NDRF advises on
one of the pillars. What are we going to inclusive and collaborative predisaster planning and
leave to our children, to our future gen- community engagement in setting priorities as the
erations? I hope that the main value is a
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Vol. 19, No. 8
efficient way to accelerate post-disaster recovery and approach focused on short-term recovery hindered
leverage resources.9 Lack of predisaster plans and the possibility to recover focused on the long-term
priorities in Puerto Rico’s electric system has produce needs and the sustainable development of Puerto
a cumbersome recovery process that is moving away Rico, hence, the importance of understanding the pre-
from resilient and sustainable recovery pathways. disaster context and multisectoral stakeholders’ per-
We argue that using the information on predisaster spectives to shed light on timely decisions that can be
perspectives on Puerto Rico’s energy transition shown taken to maximize recovery efforts toward a resilient
here might have gone a long way in guiding successful and sustainable recovery.
post-disaster recovery and reconstruction in the spirit
of FEMA’s NDFR. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The National Science Foundation under Grant No. ACI-
CONCLUSION 1541106 funded the CRISP project and the semistructured inter-
views. The ESF was financed by the National Institute of Energy
Disaster recovery processes can be leveraged to and Island Sustainability of the University of Puerto Rico. The
increase infrastructure resiliency and sustainabil- Puerto Rico Science, Technology and Research Trust provided finan-
ity, solve long-standing problems, and move forward cial support through the Post Hurricane Maria Aid for Researchers
agendas that were difficult to accept and implement Grant Program in partnership with the Caribbean Division of
before a disaster.7-9 Puerto Rico’s energy transition the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Ciencia
from fossil fuels to renewable sources was in public Puerto Rico, and Society of Neuroscience.
discussion before the electrical system collapsed in
2017. We studied the implications of predisaster con- Glorynel Ojeda-Matos, MP, MS, Department of Environmental Sciences,
text on recovery analyzing data sources on stakehold- University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico; PhD candidate,
ers’ perspectives over 2 years before the disaster. Most School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.
stakeholders expressed that renewable energy was the ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2562-8112.
pathway for energy system sustainability. Yet, they
recognized that major governance changes are needed Marla Pérez-Lugo, PhD, Department of Social Sciences, University
to pursue that transition. There are long-lasting and of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico; Professor, Department of
very resilient barriers at the national level that have Sociology, University of Texas at Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg, Texas.
prevented taking advantage of post-disaster windows
of opportunity for the electrical system transformation Cecilio Ortiz-García, PhD, Department of Social Sciences, University of
from fossil to renewable energy sources. Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico; Professor and Chair, Department
of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg,
The window of opportunity toward sustainability Texas.
is closing because of the shortsighted, short-term
profit-seeking investments associated with existing Elvia J. Meléndez-Ackerman, PhD, Department of Environmental
fossil-fuel-based infrastructure, moving forward the Sciences, University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico. ORCID:
path to natural gas as the transition energy source, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0925-7916.
and the allocation of post-disaster funding to other
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234 Journal of Emergency Management
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JEM Equity, participation, and planning
for recovery in Puerto Rico
Karl Kim, PhD
Roberto Porro, MURP
Jiwnath Ghimire, PhD
Lillian Ramirez Durand, MS
Ruperto Chaparro Serrano, MS
Bernardo Gonzalez, MURP
Eric Yamashita, MURP
ABSTRACT struck the island as a Category 4 (almost Category 5)
storm with maximum sustained winds of 135 knots
Based on a survey of stakeholders from 34 munici- and a storm surge of over 9 feet, just two weeks after
palities in Puerto Rico 1 year following Hurricane Hurricane Irma.1 The combined effect of the two
Maria, this study reports on progress and priorities storms had severe impacts on the built environment
for longer-term recovery. Following a description of and natural and social systems.2 Communities and
the storm and its impacts and an overview of recovery homes were destroyed, infrastructure was crippled,
principles, initial insights expressed after the storm and beaches were swept away. Approximately 3,000
are studied. Over 56 percent of respondents ranked people lost their lives as a result of Hurricane Maria.3
the need for equity considerations as the top recovery As of 2020, Hurricane Maria stands as the third cost-
priority, while 23 percent ranked building back faster, liest hurricane in US history.4
and 11 percent supported building back stronger as the
top priority. Building back greener was the top recovery Recovery from disaster is a complex process
goal for 10 percent of the respondents. In addition to with unclear trajectories,5 made increasingly ardu-
broad recovery goals, specific actions and initiatives to ous by existing conditions6 and the isolation of
support recovery are also investigated. While the needs islands limiting the transport of supplies and person-
for more robust data collection and information shar- nel.7 Hurricane Maria produced a debilitating blow
ing emerged, gaps in training and capacity building to aging infrastructure, a struggling economy, and
were also reported. The analysis sheds light on the need already fragile ecosystems. The electrical system was
for more participatory, deliberative processes, and the completely incapacitated, resulting in months-long
challenges of leadership, management, and inclusive power outages for many.2,8 With the island already
governance following large-scale disasters. The find- in a debt crisis,8 the hurricane further exacerbated
ings are relevant to other island communities and the financial and economic problems. Over 77 percent
development of effective systems for disaster recovery. of small businesses reported direct losses from the
hurricane,9 and the workforce decreased due to mass
Key words: Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico, recovery, migration to the mainland.2 The storm also damaged
planning reef systems10 and accelerated erosion of receding
shorelines, wiping out beaches, destroying coastal
INTRODUCTION properties, and putting those remaining at higher
risk.11,12 The local immediate response to the storm
In September 2017, Hurricane Maria, one of the
strongest hurricanes to make landfall in Puerto Rico,
DOI:10.5055/jem.0656 Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8 235
demonstrated a community-driven resilience to col- territorial/commonwealth/state-level government and
lectively overcome obstacles through compassion for municipal government. In other places, county gov-
others and love for the island.13 However, three years ernments serve to bridge less urbanized and devel-
after the storm, long-term island recovery is slowly oped regions. There are 78 municipalities across
progressing, with just $17B of the $64B in federal the island, ranging in geographic area, population,
funds allocated for Hurricane Maria distributed so and autonomy. The “Código Municipal de Puerto
far.14 Relief and local recovery plans are still being Rico” (Municipal Code of Puerto Rico) establishes
developed,15 with local government funding shortfalls municipal authorities and defines relationships with
increasing the reliance on federal resources for plan- the commonwealth government.22 Some municipali-
ning and reconstruction. ties are “autonomous” municipalities, having the
authority over specific functions, such as planning,
The challenges in Puerto Rico highlight the while remaining accountable to the commonwealth.
complexities of recovery that have been well docu- Other municipalities without this autonomy rely on
mented. While recovery is the least understood state-level entities for these functions. For example,
phase of disasters,16 more research on recovery will autonomous municipalities are authorized to develop
serve to improve efforts to restore communities. their plans and issue permits, while the Puerto Rico
Several key considerations of recovery emerge from Planning Board, or Junta de Planificación (JP), serves
the literature and inform this research, including this function for others. With the number of munici-
the importance of local context and capacity, trade- palities and varying connections to the state-level
offs between goals and strategic actions, and the government, planning for and managing local recov-
vital role that planning can play to facilitate positive ery on the island are distinct among recovery efforts
recovery outcomes. in the United States. It should also be noted that
some local jurisdictions seek further autonomy and
Recovery as a local endeavor greater independence from state-level government.
Recovery is predominantly a locally driven pro- The US Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) modified the standard structure for recovery,
cess.5,17 The trajectory of a community’s recovery is known as Recovery Support Functions, to include a
dependent on local conditions pre- and post-disaster, dedicated unit for “Municipalities” for the Hurricane
decisions made by local governments and stakehold- Maria recovery effort.23 In highlighting the shortfalls
ers, and capacities to make and implement decisions. of response and recovery from the 2017 Hurricane
Local organizational and planning capacity has been Season, FEMA acknowledged the need to better
shown to influence recovery.16,18 In an influential understand the local context to facilitate response
study, Rubin et al.17 characterized local recovery and recovery, particularly in coordinating logistical
capacity as driven by three factors—leadership, the relief.23 The local context is important for long-term
ability to act, and knowledge of what to do. Leadership recovery as well, with local fiscal conditions and plan-
is particularly important, as it can influence other ning capacity having a major influence on recovery
factors.17 Local capacity may also be influenced by progress.
state and federal recovery policies, mandates, and
assistance.19,20 The massive influx of resources and Recovery tradeoffs: goals and strategies
assistance post-disaster presents opportunities to The local recovery process generates tradeoffs
build local capacity to achieve desirable recovery
outcomes.16,21 associated with divergent recovery paths. This trade-
off has been characterized as a decision between
The need to understand the local context for recovery speed versus the deliberation of recovery
recovery and the relationships with state and fed- objectives.6,24 These tradeoffs pertain both to broad,
eral partners is highlighted in Puerto Rico. Puerto direction setting goals, and specific actions and
Rico’s governance systems operate with just two
government levels below the federal government: the
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236 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
strategies to be implemented. Recovery has been attainment of recovery goals. The content and design
highlighted as an opportunity to make improve- of recovery plans varies. Plans can be physically ori-
ments, such as hazard mitigation or addressing ented, much like a comprehensive land-use plan, or
inequities.16,17 Making these improvements must be more process-oriented with procedures and respon-
considered amid pressures to recover as quickly as sibilities and tactics for engagement and securing
possible. Because of these pressures, the window of resource commitments.5 The recovery plan could be
opportunity is short. If deliberation takes too long, designed as a stand-alone recovery plan or embed-
recovery suffers, or reconstruction may occur ad hoc ded in existing emergency management or land use
based on private interests.17,24 plans.19 In evaluating 87 recovery plans, Berke et
al.19 found that the existence and overall quality of
A common goal for recovery is often described as recovery plans were low; however, stand-alone recov-
building back better.25,26 This includes incorporating ery plans with high participation levels were most
hazard mitigation into rebuilding efforts, reducing successful. Other factors influencing recovery plan
pre-existing inequities or achieving progress toward quality include state mandates and funding19 and the
sustainability objectives.6,16,21,27 The tradeoffs involve pre-existing capacities of local planning mechanisms
choices among building back faster, stronger, greener, and organizations.16,18
and more equitably.25,28 Equity is particularly impor-
tant, as disasters not only exacerbate existing ineq- Purpose of the study
uities6 but also offer a means to achieve more equi- Although the literature on recovery and recovery
table outcomes.6,16,17,27,29 The attention on equity in
recovery and resilience planning has grown in recent planning is growing, there is need to better under-
years,30-33 particularly after Hurricane Katrina.34,35 A stand the processes and conditions that support
community’s recovery path is a function of external successful recovery and to build the capacity of recov-
and contextual factors, including leadership and par- ery planners and stakeholders. This is particularly
ticipation,16,36 state and federal disaster governance important as the number and severity of disasters
mechanisms,20 and planning.19,21 is increasing.40 Research gaps include the need to
understand local recovery processes, the tradeoffs
Recovery planning local decision-makers consider during recovery,17,18
The importance of robust, effective planning to and local planning capacities.5,41
recovery has been widely recognized.5,18-20,25 Since This exploratory study contributes to the under-
recovery resembles a development process16 com- standing of these key considerations of recovery by
pressed in time,6 planning approaches, tools, and examining the presence, progress, and awareness
systems for addressing tradeoffs, generating alterna- of recovery plans and initiatives at the local level
tives, and supporting decision-making and implemen- in Puerto Rico one year after Hurricane Maria, as
tation of actions help facilitate recovery. Community well as the goals and training needs of stakeholders.
participation is key for successful recovery18,19,37 and Follow-up surveys and correspondence with stake-
hazards planning more broadly.38,39 Long-established holders conducted since the initial survey enables
planning mechanisms and processes can help com- further understanding over time. As a result of a
munities formulate a common vision and goals for collaboration between researchers from the Pacific
recovery. Having a collective vision and identified Urban Resilience Lab and the National Disaster
goals affects both the success of recovery17 and quality Preparedness Training Center (NDPTC) at the
of recovery planning.19 University of Hawaii, and the Puerto Rico Sea Grant
College Program at the University of Puerto Rico,
Recognizing the importance of recovery plan- this study provides takeaways for planners and
ning, evaluations of recovery plans have increased. their communities, particularly in vulnerable island
This serves to share knowledge and best practices settings.
to support the development of recovery plans and
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Vol. 19, No. 8
DATA AND METHODS Maria. This study used a nonprobability sampling
approach, using a combination of convenience, pur-
Data posive, and snowball sampling. This study targeted
This study uses an inductive mixed-methods those involved with recovery at the municipality level,
including public, private, academic, and community
approach leveraging data from a web-based survey organizations, to include diverse perspectives and
administered to recovery stakeholders to identify recovery experiences. The survey was distributed via
emergent themes and lessons from the Puerto Rico established hazards and planning networks across
recovery experience. The protocol and instruments Puerto Rico, including FEMA and state agencies.
were reviewed and approved by the University of Participants were contacted via email and encouraged
Hawaii Human Studies Program. The survey con- to share the survey with colleagues.
sisted of 19 questions—seven open-ended questions
and 12 close-ended questions (Appendix A). These The open-ended questions were analyzed quali-
questions aimed to explore the above-mentioned tatively using NVivo 12 (a qualitative analysis soft-
considerations in the context of Puerto Rico. The ware). Qualitative responses were translated into
open-ended questions were related to the municipal- English for the analysis. Word frequencies were
ity of respondents, the individuals, and organizations determined for each open-ended question. The mini-
involved in recovery, and awareness of projects or mum word size of four letters was set up to avoid
programs in their jurisdiction. The close-ended ques- prominent words and prepositions in the word count.
tions focused on the damages and recovery progress Word clouds were generated for stakeholder-related
in their municipality, the existence of plans (master questions (Q2-3) and project-related questions (Q4-7)
plans, emergency plans, recovery plans, and resilience to highlight commonly used terms in responses.
plans), and recovery priorities and processes. The The qualitative responses were also categorized into
options for recovery priorities were based on the four groups based on the recovery goals (faster, stronger,
categories of recovery objectives—faster, stronger, greener, and equitably) to interpret the qualitative
greener, and more equitably—described above. Third- responses from priorities.
party data were also used in the analysis includ-
ing FEMA damage assessment data and the Social The closed-ended questions were numerically
Vulnerability Index (SVI) data from the US Census coded and analyzed quantitatively using SPSS
Bureau. Members of the team traveled to Puerto Statistics (statistical analysis software). Based on
Rico on multiple occasions and worked closely with frequencies of responses, descriptive statistics were
researchers and colleagues in Puerto Rico, provid- compiled for each question. The relationship among
ing contextual understanding and depth to findings. questions was assessed using a Chi-Square Test of
A brief follow-up survey (five close-ended and two Independence to gauge the significance of relation-
open-ended questions) was administered in December ships between variables (responses). The Chi-Square
2020 to respondents who agreed to follow-up ques- Test is denoted by χ2 as in equation (1), where oij is the
tions in the first survey. This second survey solicited observed cell count in the i-th row and j-th column of
additional information regarding recovery progress, the table and eij is the expected cell count in the i-th
priorities, projects, and lessons learned to date. This row and j-th column of the table. This test uses a con-
additional input (n = 16) supported clarification and tingency table where the responses for one categori-
further understanding of recovery processes over cal variable are in the rows and the other categorical
time. variable in the columns. Each cell includes the total
count of cases for a specific pair of categories.
Sampling and analysis
The 2018 survey was administered online in X2 = R C (oij − eij )2
∑ ∑ i=1 eij (1)
both English and Spanish languages in October j=1
and November 2018, roughly 1 year after Hurricane
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
238 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
Various combinations of pairs of close-ended ques- questions related to leadership and stakeholders is
tions were tested to identify significant relationships shown in Figure 2, with the most common terms being
between groups of responses, if any. The responses for “churches,” “office,” “community,” and “management.”
Q8 (rating of damage) were grouped into moderate
damage (scores 4-7) and high damage (scores 8-10) to The responses to questions related to recovery
convert responses from an ordinal to a nominal scale initiatives (Q4-7) showed an overall low awareness
to facilitate comparison of categorical variables. of specific recovery programs or projects. Very few
respondents provided specific details, while many
RESULTS participants responded with “I don’t know” or “none.”
The combined word cloud for these questions is shown
Qualitative (open-ended) results in Figure 3. Common phrases such as “I don’t know”
The survey generated 65 responses, representing or “I’m not sure” were converted to “unknown,” the
most common term. This was surprising given the
34 of the 78 municipalities in Puerto Rico, as shown targeted respondents in the survey.
in Figure 1. The open-ended responses reveal a wide
spectrum of knowledge related to recovery stakehold- Grouping respondents according to recovery goals
ers and projects at the local level. When asked who led (Q14) yielded interesting changes to the word counts
recovery planning (Q2), the most common answer was for questions related to leadership and stakeholders.
the municipal office of emergency management or the Respondents were divided into two groups—those
mayor of the municipality. When asked what other who preferred building back “faster” and those who
organizations are involved in recovery planning (Q3), preferred building back “stronger,” “greener,” or “more
the most common response was churches or faith- equitably” (consolidated as “better”). The most common
based organizations. The combined word cloud for term used by the “faster” group was “office,” whereas
Figure 1. Map of Puerto Rico highlighting the municipalities represented in the survey responses.
Special Issue on Puerto Rico
Journal of Emergency Management 239
Vol. 19, No. 8
Figure 2. Word cloud for open-ended questions, Q2 Figure 3. Word cloud for open-ended questions, Q4
and Q3 combined [Q2—who in your office leads through Q7 combined. Q4-7 ask respondents to give
recovery planning? Q3—what organizations (outside examples of funded and unfunded recovery projects
of government) are involved in recovery planning?]. in their community and municipality.
the most common term used by the “better” group a low awareness of plan existence, with over 40 per-
was “community,” as shown in Figure 4. Notably, cent of respondents unsure whether their municipal-
“churches” were also prominent in both groups. ity had a master plan, resilience plan, or stand-alone
recovery plan. An emergency plan was the most com-
Quantitative (close-ended) results mon plan, with 60 percent of respondents indicating
Descriptive statistics for the close-ended responses their municipality had an emergency plan. Only 30
percent of respondents indicated a stand-alone recov-
are shown in Table 1, highlighting the frequencies for ery plan in their municipality, whereas roughly 60
each question. These questions solicit information as percent of respondents indicated a recovery plan did
to the perceived damage in the respondent’s munici- not exist or were unaware.
pality, recovery progress, the existence of municipal
plans, recovery goals, participation, and training needs. As to recovery goals (Q14), recovering “more
Hurricane Maria affected every municipality in Puerto equitably” was the overwhelming preference, with 56
Rico, many severely. This is confirmed in the responses, percent of respondents choosing that option. In com-
with over half of respondents rating damage in their parison, 23 percent ranked building back “faster” and
municipality as severe (score of 9 or 10). It is notewor- 11 percent reported that building back “stronger” as
thy that no respondent rated damage in their munici- the top priorities. Recovering “greener” was the prior-
pality less than four on a scale from 1 to 10. ity for 10 percent of respondents. While 47.5 percent
of respondents indicated that there were examples of
One year after the storm, 83 percent of respond- recovery projects in their municipality that exhibit
ents indicated that recovery was in progress, with 7 these priorities (Q15), few provided specific details in
percent indicating that it had not started and 9 per- the open-ended follow-up to this question. There does
cent reporting it was complete. Questions 10-13 show
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240 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 19, No. 8
Figure 4. Word clouds for Q2-3 (who leads/involved in recovery planning?) for respondents who preferred to
build back “better” (left) and respondents who preferred building back “faster” (right).
seem to be some level of participation (Q16), with 41 the damage level (high/moderate) compared to pre-
percent reporting that projects include participatory ferred recovery goals (faster/other, more strongly/
processes, while 19 percent reported a lack of partici- other, more sustainably/other, and more equitably/
pation and 41 percent not sure. Results for Question other) produced no significant association at the 95
18 (training needs) showed that disaster recovery percent confidence interval. This indicates no signifi-
planning (36 percent), disaster awareness for commu- cant association between damage levels and preferred
nity leaders (15 percent), and climate change adapta- recovery goals. When comparing participatory process
tion (10 percent) were the most identified training inclusion (yes/no) to the existence of recovery plans
needs. (yes/no), the association was significant at 95 percent
confidence interval with a probability value of 0.008
The Chi-Square Test results, as shown in Table 2, (Chi-Square value of 11.852), as well as when compar-
highlight the significant (or nonsignificant) relation- ing the participatory process inclusion with the pro-
ships between question responses. The tests of vari- gress of the recovery process (complete/not complete).
ous combinations of questions revealed very little dif- The association was significant at the 95 percent
ferences between the means of the grouped responses. confidence interval with a probability value of 0.020
In Table 2, “Chi-Square Analysis of 2018 Survey (Chi-Square value of 5.396). This indicates there is a
Results,” both the nonsignificant and significant statistically significant association between includ-
p-values associated with comparing two groups of ing a participatory process and having an existing
responses to questions are displayed. The table shows recovery plan and the progress in the recovery process
three sets of analyses comparing the means between after Hurricane Maria.
damage level (Q8) and preferred recovery goals
(Q14), participatory process inclusion (Q16) and the DISCUSSION
existence of a recovery plan (Q13), and participa-
tory process inclusion (Q16) and the progress in the The analysis highlights general takeaways. First,
recovery process (Q9). Table 2 shows that comparing the severity of the hurricane and its impact on the
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Vol. 19, No. 8
Table 1. 2018 survey results summary, close-ended questions
Q8. Rate Hurricane Maria damage in Q9. Progress of recovery in Q11. Does your municipality have an
your municipality (n = 63) municipalities (n = 66) emergency plan? (n = 65)
Percent Percent Percent
4—less severe 1.6 Not started 7.6 Yes 60
5 1.6 In progress/ongoing 83.3 No 4.6
6 12.7 Complete 9.1 No, but embedded in master 4.6
plan
7 11.1 I don’t know/unsure 30.8
8 19.1
9 30.2 Q10. Does your municipalities have a Q12. Does your municipalities have a
master plan? (n = 65) resilience plan? (n = 65)
10—most severe 23.8 Percent Percent
Yes 41.5 Yes 21.5
No 9.2 No 23.1
I don’t know/unsure 49.2 No, but embedded in master 7.7
plan
No, but embedded in 6.2
emergency plan
I don’t know/unsure 41.5
Q13. Does your municipality have a Q14. Priority recovery goals in your Q18. Priority training needs your
stand-alone recovery plan? (n = 62) municipality (n = 62) municipality (n = 59)
Percent Percent Percent
Yes 30.7 Recover faster 22.6 Disaster recovery planning 35.6
No 14.5 Recover stronger 11.3 Disaster awareness for 15.3
community leaders
No, but embedded in 9.7 Recover greener 9.7 Climate change adaptation 10.2
emergency plan
I don’t know/unsure 45.2 Recover more equitably 56.5 Coastal hazards assessment 6.8
and planning
Small business continuity 6.8
Community resilience 5.1
Q15. Are there good examples of Q16. Do these recovery projects include Hurricane awareness 5.1
recovery projects that exhibit participatory processes? (n = 59)
theses priorities? (n = 59)
Percent Percent Disaster debris management 3.4
Yes 47.5 Yes 40.7 Tsunami awareness 1.7
No 11.9 No 18.6 Other 10.2
I don’t know/unsure 40.7 I don’t know/unsure 40.7
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242 Journal of Emergency Management
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Table 2. Chi-square analysis of 2018 survey responses
Q8. How would you rate the extent of damage to your municipality
from Hurricane Maria? (high/moderate)
Q14. Recovery preference Moderate High Total Chi-square p-Value
Faster
Other 3 10 13 0.048 0.826
Total
More strongly 12 34 46
Other
Total 15 44 59
More sustainably
Other 3 3 6 2.128 0.145
Total
More equitably 12 41 53
Other
Total 15 44 59
Q13. Recovery plan? 2 4 6 0.22 0.639
Yes
No 13 40 53
Embedded in emergency
Unsure 15 44 59
Total
7 27 34 0.99 0.32
Q9. Recovery status
Complete 8 17 25
Complete
Total 15 44 59
Q16. Do these recovery projects include participatory processes? (Yes/No)
No Yes Total Chi-square p-Value
6 12 18 11.852 0.008
729
246
21 6 27
36 24 60
Q16. Do these recovery projects include participatory processes? (Yes/No)
No Yes Total Chi-square p-Value
1 5 6 5.396 0.020
36 19 55
37 24 61
entirety of the island are apparent. This is under- most respondents (90 percent) reporting that recovery
scored by the level of damage and the status of was in progress or not started 1 year after the storm,
recovery reported by the respondents. The majority of recovery is shown to be a complex, long-term process,
respondents reported severe damage in their munici- as has been reported in the literature.5 This is also
pality, and no respondents reported low damages. With supported by the 2020 follow-up survey, where 81
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Vol. 19, No. 8
percent of respondents reported that recovery was not a balance between meeting short-term needs and
yet started (18 percent) or in early stages (62 percent), reducing long-term vulnerability27 and is driven by
three years after the hurricane. One respondent to the local priorities and tradeoffs. The survey results show
follow-up survey stressed this point: “It has been a very that recovering more equitably was the overwhelm-
complex and time-consuming process…” ing priority for respondents, as shown in Table 1. This
could be influenced by the existing socioeconomic con-
Another general finding is the overall low level ditions and social vulnerabilities on the island. With
of awareness of recovery programs, plans, and stake- a median household income of USD$12,914 and 43
holders among the respondents. This is evident in percent of its population in poverty, Puerto Rico has
responses to open-ended questions soliciting examples the highest poverty rate in the United States.50 San
of recovery programs/projects and close-ended ques- Juan also has the highest levels of income inequality
tions gauging the existence of plans at the local level. among US cities.51 The economic inequities and vul-
The most common response regarding projects was nerabilities have been partially fueled by the existing
“I don’t know,” and roughly half of respondents were fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico, and the resulting austerity
unsure of the existence of a recovery plan. This could measures reducing public sector income and services.8
be reflective of the roles of respondents (not involved With this backdrop of inequality and poverty, coupled
in recovery), the lack of participation in recovery deci- with inadequate housing, the hurricane had the worst
sions, or the lack of recovery initiatives at the time impacts in socially vulnerable communities,2,8 as
of the survey. The low awareness highlights the need shown in Figure 5.
for engaged, deliberative recovery planning, and that
increasing awareness and ownership of recovery pro- Beyond contextual inequities, the equity of exter-
cesses through meaningful participation should be an nal assistance and funding can also have conse-
objective of planning efforts. quences on local recovery. Recent studies have found
disparities in post-disaster assistance based on socio-
Specific takeaways emerge from the analysis economic characteristics, suggesting inequities in
related to recovery goals and equity, leadership and both the procedural32,52,53 and distributional33,48,49,53,54
participation, and recovery planning challenges. aspects of disaster aid. Inequities have been noted in
Implications of the study for recovery and planning the federal response to Puerto Rico as compared to
are expanded upon in the following sections. Texas and Florida the same year, in spite of greater
impacts and needs.8,55 Although this could be due to
Recovery goals and equity several reasons, such as distance and concurrence of
Disaster impacts are often unevenly distributed, disasters, it may also be influenced by Puerto Rico’s
limited political influence and representation at the
with vulnerable communities most affected.6,8,27 federal level, highlighting the inequity of Puerto Rico
Historical planning practices and development pat- as a whole.8
terns have at times fostered inequity and coalesced
vulnerable populations,42,43 often in hazardous areas. Matching the response to the scale of need applies
This often results in the most disadvantaged bear- a Rawlsian conceptualization of “justice as fairness”
ing the brunt of disasters and requiring the most to disaster assistance, where equity requires that
assistance. Indeed, a community’s resilience and benefits accrue to those most disadvantaged.56 Equity
ability to recover from disaster are largely a function may not be realized in post-disaster actions if it is not
of socioeconomic factors and the location of the most the central objective.27,32 Explicitly addressing pre-
vulnerable.32,44,45 In this sense, equity is linked to existing vulnerabilities in recovery can drive more
pre-existing vulnerability and the mechanisms that equitable recovery paths and planning processes.27
foster or reduce that vulnerability during disasters.27 While recovery planning has been recognized as an
Recent disasters have exacerbated existing inequali- opportunity to address inequities,6,16 it is depend-
ties and highlighted the need to consider equity in ent on institutional capacities and integration.16,20
recovery.8,35,46-49 Recovering more equitably requires
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244 Journal of Emergency Management
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Figure 5. Image showing a destroyed home in the municipality of Loiza in the northeast of Puerto Rico. Loiza
is one of the most socially vulnerable municipalities on the island. Source: FEMA.76
Housing equity is especially needed in recovery,29,57 participation in recovery planning efforts. In assess-
including in Puerto Rico.2 Researchers have identi- ing post-disaster actions in Puerto Rico, Finucane et
fied ways to address these inequities in recovery, such al. highlight the need for “inclusive deliberation” to
as the integration of disaster provisions in afford- formulate recovery policy that reduces not increases
able housing policy,29 dedicated planning entities to inequities and vulnerability.27 Garcia et al. report on
coordinate recovery priorities and plans,57 addressing current opportunities for community-based bottom-
vulnerability at all phases of disaster,58 integrating up planning in Puerto Rico.15 Indeed, participation
equity impact assessments in recovery processes,27 and bottom-up planning are key to facilitating more
leveraging environmental justice indicators in recov- equitable recovery16,34 and building back “better.”26
ery decision-making,59 reforming insurance and dis-
aster relief to assist the most needy,8,49,53 or increasing Leadership and participation in recovery
participation in recovery decision-making.15,27,34,35,37 Leadership and participation define who is
Recovering more equitably is just one of several involved in recovery decision-making and shaping
recovery paths, based on the priorities and prefer- priorities and processes for recovery. Research has
ences of the community. This decision seems to be shown the importance of leadership17 and participa-
community specific. The 2018 survey results show tion16,18,19 to the speed and quality of recovery. Federal
little correlation between recovery goals or levels of recovery guidance has also stressed participation of
damage (Table 2). Other statistical tests found no sig- the “whole community” in recovery.60 The level of lead-
nificant relationships between respondents’ selected ership and participation characterizes a spectrum of
recovery goals and other variables—eg, SVI, recovery top-down (government-centric) to bottom-up (com-
progress, and the existence of plans—indicating that munity-based) recovery, where top-down recovery
recovery preferences are not influenced by broad social prioritizes speed and control and bottom-up recovery
categories but are highly personal and local. This prioritizes deliberation and integrating community
emphasizes the importance of meaningful community preferences.24 This relationship between recovery
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Vol. 19, No. 8
governance and the tradeoff between speed and political web of disaster resources after an event.17
deliberation is evident in the survey results. When The importance of leadership exists at all levels.
describing those who lead or are involved in recov- The political context in Puerto Rico undoubtedly has
ery, respondents who preferred to build back “better” affected recovery progress, with the resignation of the
most often used the word “community,” whereas those governor during recovery amid scandal and public
who preferred to build back “faster” most often used protest. Follow-up survey responses have emphasized
the word “office.” This seems to be a reflection of how the failures of government in leading recovery efforts
community preferences are translated through top- and the need for community capacity and involve-
down and bottom-up recovery and is similar to other ment. This requires building the capacity of commu-
studies.24,61 nity members and recovery stakeholders. Training
priorities of respondents (Table 1) suggest a desire
In general, the meaningful engagement of com- and need to train community leaders. Follow-up sur-
munity in recovery processes is beneficial to recov- veys also reiterated the desire for training within the
ery. Reardon highlights the benefits of collaborative community. Training is seen as crucial for individual
community-based planning for equity in New Orleans’ and organizational readiness and to ensure actions
Ninth Ward after Katrina.34 This is supported by sur- during recovery.37
vey findings, as Table 2 shows a significant relation-
ship between the existence of participatory processes Recovery planning and challenges
and both recovery status (complete) and the existence Survey participants and discussions with stake-
of recovery plans. The desire for community-based
recovery also emerges in follow-up survey responses, holders have pointed to community successes related
with many of the participants stressing the need for to local response in Puerto Rico. This has also been
community capacity and involvement in recovery. found in recent studies of local emergency manage-
Community members and organizations often are first ment experiences.15 This may be due to tradition,
to respond and fill gaps in government capabilities and empathy, training, and a survival culture among
relief, a fact that is evident in survey responses. When island residents. Long-term recovery is more complex
asked what organizations outside of government are and requires funding and planning capacity. This
involved in recovery planning, respondents pointed to is where the fiscal crisis has its biggest impact and
faith-based organizations, nonprofits, and community where the dependence on federal assistance is appar-
organizations (Figure 2) often involved in relief efforts. ent. Federal funding has been slow to trickle in, and
This may be evident of an overlap of response and public sector capacity has been impacted by auster-
recovery efforts, confusion between the two phases, or ity measures related to the debt crisis.8 This, along
the murky transition between the two phases.62 When with the extent of reconstruction and redevelopment
highlighting successes of recovery, several follow-up needed, represents an enormous challenge to local
respondents also noted the response of community planning capacity. The survey responses and review
members and organizations. This supports anecdotal of existing planning hurdles help to understand the
accounts, which often touted community efforts after extent and quality of planning progress.
the storm in Puerto Rico. This is characteristic of the
community culture in Puerto Rico, where close-knit The planning-related survey responses (Table 1)
relationships among neighbors and communities are show that the existence of types of plans varies among
common. The importance of social cohesion to commu- municipalities. The most common was an emergency
nity recovery in Puerto Rico was also found by urban plan, which is reflective of the greater attention on
planning students at the University of Hawaii as part response rather than recovery. Few municipalities
of a planning practicum inspired by this study.63 reported having a recovery plan. The lack of recov-
ery plans at both state and local levels has been
Leadership influences the ability to act in recov- reported.19,64 Berke et al. found that both the exist-
ery, coalesce community visions, and navigate the ence and quality of recovery plans are influenced by
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246 Journal of Emergency Management
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state policies.19 The existence of plans in Puerto Rico Program69 and the Whole Community Resilience
could be reflective of the broader planning struc- Planning Program15 aim to assist municipal recovery
tures and mechanisms on the island. The autonomy planning efforts. The JP with support from FEMA is
of municipalities influences planning capacities and coordinating the update of hazard mitigation plans
efforts at the local level and the dependence on the JP. for all 78 municipalities.70
Horizontal/vertical integration among levels of gov-
ernment influences recovery capacity, with stronger These efforts highlight federal and state-level
integration facilitating successful recovery.16,20 Others planning initiatives that influence or assist local
also point to the influence of existing planning insti- (municipal) recovery planning efforts. Although these
tutions on recovery planning.5,18 The planning capac- efforts may steer resources toward and could increase
ity of municipalities in Puerto Rico is affected by the planning at the municipal level, more research is
nature and strength of their relationship with the JP, needed to examine how these efforts engage local
while post-disaster planning capacity is also heavily communities and planners, achieve local priorities,
influenced by state and federal recovery planning and support local planning capacity to foster bottom-
programs, summarized here. up planning processes. An analysis of municipal-
ity services and capacities pre- and post-hurricane
In accordance with the Bipartisan Budget Act highlights the need to increase municipality capacity
of 2018, the Government of Puerto Rico Office of to guide local recovery.68 The 2018 survey responses
Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resilience (COR3) pub- showed recovery planning as the most pressing
lished a recovery plan, Transformation and Innovation training need (Table 1). How existing capacities and
in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and Disaster planning mechanisms affect current efforts, and the
Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, in August 2018.2 achievement of local recovery objectives needs further
The plan was developed through FEMA-contracted research and understanding. For example, regulatory
support from the Homeland Security Operational changes proposed by the new Reglamento Conjunto
Analysis Center (HSOAC) but is to be implemented 2020 (Puerto Rico’s land use ordinance) would allow
by the Government of Puerto Rico.65,66 The process development in previously protected areas and poten-
for developing the plan is described in detail in tially hazardous zones, eg, coastal areas, without tak-
HSOAC reports.66-68 COR3 was established per fed- ing future climatic hazards into account.71 This may
eral grant conditions to coordinate and oversee all affect municipal objectives to reduce vulnerability
recovery efforts on the island. The COR3 recovery through recovery planning efforts.
plan is a state-level plan that employed a “top-down”
approach to define an island wide recovery vision Additional recovery planning efforts have been
and goals, and a “bottom-up” approach driven by initiated post-disaster. It is unclear how many (if any)
subject matter experts and stakeholder teams to predisaster recovery plans existed in Puerto Rico
identify sector-specific courses of action to achieve prior to Hurricane Maria. In conjunction with current
those goals.66 The plan identifies short-term actions, recovery efforts, considerations for recovery from the
capital investments, and long-term strategies guiding next disaster should be made. Predisaster recovery
recovery of the island as a whole; however, coordina- planning is generally rare,19,64 but it has benefits in
tion is needed to align with other targeted recovery facilitating successful recovery. These benefits include
efforts.65 Some of these targeted recovery efforts the following: reducing decisions that constrain future
include the US Department of Housing and Urban alternatives, reducing the likelihood of officials suc-
Development (HUD) Community Development Block cumbing to post-disaster pressures, coalescing com-
Grant-Disaster Recovery program and FEMA hazard munity goals and relationships through the planning
mitigation planning efforts. As part of the CDBG-DR process itself, and facilitating access to post-disaster
activities managed by the Puerto Rico Department of funding.18,72 Other benefits of predisaster planning
Housing (PRDOH), the Municipal Recovery Planning include aligning the delivery of recovery assistance
with local needs, through the integration of recovery
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stakeholders and understanding the rules and tim- Including responses from other municipalities may
ing of recovery assistance ahead of a disaster.20 The reveal additional recovery objectives and capacity
Hurricane Maria experience should serve to further needs. Second, the sampling approach targeted those
both local and federal understanding of the rules involved in recovery at the municipal level including
and mechanisms for recovery assistance in an island government planners. This may have led to bias for
setting. certain responses. Interestingly, however, responses
neither seem to minimize recovery challenges nor
Whether pre- or post-disaster, planning itself does exaggerate recovery progress. Future analyses would
not guarantee equitable outcomes. Planning outcomes benefit from distinguishing between respondent
may further inequities or negatively affect the already groups (government levels, sectors, etc.) to better
vulnerable. Anguelovski et al. highlight that land use understand diverse recovery perspectives. Third, the
planning actions for resilience and climate adapta- survey questionnaire was translated from English to
tion have intentionally or unintentionally prioritized Spanish, and responses were translated from Spanish
wealthy communities through land use regulations, to English for analysis. Although multiple reviewers
mistargeted flood protection structures, and insuf- were used to confirm the accuracy of translations,
ficient participation in planning processes.73 This there is potential for intents to be misconstrued
bias can be addressed through explicit prioritization in the translation process. Future work might be
of equity and participation in planning, considering conducted solely in one language (Spanish) or with
both distributional and procedural justice. Lessons additional reviewers. Finally, although the instru-
for planning in depopulated areas can be drawn from ment was pretested, survey responses and analysis
Hurricane Katrina, as New Orleans faced similar revealed potential improvements to the survey design.
out-migration as Puerto Rico post-Maria but lacked For example, more nuanced options for certain ques-
tools to achieve optimal equity outcomes in recovery.35 tions, eg, recovery status, Q9, may reveal additional
Lessons include the need to strategically align infra- insights. Also, brief definitions of key terms (recovery,
structure investment with targeted recovery areas, response, recovery plans, etc.) may avoid participant
while ensuring community participation throughout confusion. Including role of respondents in the original
the process.35 survey would also provide insight as to the technical
knowledge of planning processes and recovery efforts.
The survey found a statistically significant asso- Future work may include further investigation of
ciation between communities having a stand-alone planning processes and capacities (beyond plan exist-
recovery plan and also investing in participatory ence), levels of participation, and specific strategies
planning processes for recovery. Five of the six com- employed to achieve recovery goals. There is also a
munities with completed plans also reported having need to focus more on disadvantaged communities
participatory processes, whereas only 19 of the 55 and to better integrate concerns related to equity in
with “not completed” recovery status reported having the analysis of recovery plans and outcomes. There
participatory processes. These findings elevate the are significant differences between the municipali-
role of participation and engagement in successful ties, which need to be accounted for in the design and
recovery planning. implementation of recovery strategies. Deeper analy-
sis of the inner-workings of recovery planning and
Study limitations and future work implementation may also help identify specific strate-
This study provides insight into the processes, gies and tactics for the achievement of recovery goals.
preferences, and capacities of recovery in Puerto Rico; CONCLUSION
however, there is a need for more data and research.
Several limitations to this study present opportu- Recovery is a complex process, which unfolds over
nities for future work. First, the survey responses time. It is the most challenging aspect of emergency
represented samples from 34 municipalities, just less
than half of the 78 municipalities across the island.
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