Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
integrate individuals into cohesive groups that take responsibility for the welfare of each in
dividual. Hofstede suggests that the focus on relationships in collectivist societies plays a
critical role in negotiations—negotiations with the same party can continue for years, and
changing a negotiator changes the relationship, which may take a long time to rebuild. Con
trast this with individualistic societies, in which negotiators are considered interchangeable
and competency (rather than relationship) is an important consideration when choosing a
negotiator. The implication is that negotiators from collectivist cultures will strongly de
pend on cultivating and sustaining a long-term relationship, whereas negotiators from indi
vidualistic cultures may be more likely to swap negotiators, using whatever short-term
criteria seem appropriate.
2. Power Distance The power distance dimension describes “the extent to which the less
powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that
power is distributed unequally.”46 According to Hofstede, cultures with greater power dis
tance will be more likely to concentrate decision making at the top, and all important deci
sions will have to be finalized by the leader. Cultures with low power distance are more
likely to spread the decision making throughout the organization, and while leaders are re
spected, it is also possible to question their decisions. The consequences for international
negotiations are that negotiators from comparatively high power distance cultures may
need to seek approval from their supervisors more frequently, and for more issues, leading
to a slower negotiation process.
3. Career Success/Quality of Life Hofstede found that cultures differed in the extent to
which they held values that promoted career success or quality of life. Cultures promoting
career success were characterized by “the acquisition of money and things, and not caring
for others, the quality of life, or people.”47 Cultures promoting quality of life were char
acterized by concern for relationships and nurturing. According to Hofstede, this dimension
influences negotiation by increasing the competitiveness when negotiators from career
success cultures meet; negotiators from quality of life cultures are more likely to have
empathy for the other party and to seek compromise.48
4. Uncertainty Avoidance Uncertainty avoidance “indicates to what extent a culture pro
grams its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.”49
Unstructured situations are characterized by rapid change and new situations, whereas
structured situations are stable and secure. Negotiators from high uncertainty avoidance
cultures are less comfortable with ambiguous situations and are more likely to seek stable
rules and procedures when they negotiate. Negotiators from low uncertainty avoidance cul
tures are likely to adapt to quickly changing situations and will be less uncomfortable when
the rules of the negotiation are ambiguous or shifting.
Hofstede’s model has become a dominant force in cross-cultural research in interna
tional business, although the model is not without its skeptics.50 The most important criti
cism of the model is that the research was conducted with a sample of participants that was
not truly representative of the richness of different cultures because there were proportion
ally too many males, members of the middle class were overrepresented, the education lev
els were higher than average, and the participants came from one company (IBM). In other
Conceptualizing Culture and Negotiation 239
words, there is some concern that Hofstede’s model underestimates the true richness of value
differences across cultures.
Schwartz’s 10 Cultural Values The work of Shalom Schwartz and his colleagues provides
a very comprehensive example of the culture-as-values perspective (see Figure 11.2).51
Schwartz concentrated on identifying the motivational goal underlying cultural values and
found 10 fundamental values (see the values within the circle in Figure 11.2). These 10 val
ues may conflict or be compatible with each other, and the values on the opposite side of the
circle from a given value are most likely to be in conflict. Schwartz also proposed that the
10 values may be represented in two bipolar dimensions: openness to change/conservatism
and self-transcendence/self-enhancement (see the outer wheel in Figure 11.2). Schwartz’s
cultural values and the two bipolar dimensions provide the most comprehensive exploration
of cultural values to date, and they have been validated with extensive research. While this
work has been slow to appear in the study of cross-cultural negotiation, references to it have
started to appear.52 The advantage of Schwartz’s 10 values is the richness with which they can
be used to describe a culture. The disadvantage is while this richness may increase cultural
understanding, it does not provide clear managerial advice about negotiating across cultures.
FIGURE 11.2 I Schwartz’s 10 Cultural Values
Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
The presumption is that negotiators who better understand another culture will be more suc
cessful negotiating within that culture.
Section Summary
The culture-as-shared-value perspective provides explanations for why cross-cultural ne
gotiations are difficult and have a tendency to break down. For example, a central value in
the United States is individualism. Americans are expected to make individual decisions,
defend their points of view, and take strong stands on issues that are important to them.
Contrast this with a central value of the Chinese—collectivism.53 Chinese negotiators are
expected to make group decisions, defend the group above the individual, and take strong
stands on issues important to the group. When Americans and Chinese negotiate, differ
ences in the individualism/collectivism cultural value may influence negotiation in many
ways. For instance, (1) the Chinese will likely take more time when negotiating because
they have to gain the consensus of their group before they strike a deal; (2) Chinese use of
multiple lines of authority will lead to mixed signals about the true needs of the group, and
no single individual may understand all the requirements; and (3) because power is shared
by many different people and offices, it may be difficult for foreigners to identify their ap
propriate counterpart in the Chinese bureaucracy.54
Culture as Dialectic
The third approach to using culture to understand international negotiation identified by
Janosik recognizes that all cultures contain dimensions or tensions that are called dialec
tics,55 These tensions are nicely illustrated in parables from the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Consider the following examples: “too many cooks spoil the broth” and “two heads are bet
ter than one.” These adages offer conflicting guidance for those considering whether to
work on a task alone or in a group. This reflects a dialectic, or tension, within the Judeo-
Christian tradition regarding the values of independence and teamwork. Neither complete
independence nor complete teamwork works all the time; each has advantages and disad
vantages that vary as a function of the circumstances (e.g., the type of decision to be made
or task to be addressed). According to Janosik, the culture-as-dialectic approach has
advantages over the culture-as-shared-values approach because it can explain variations
within cultures (i.e., not every person in the same culture shares the same values to the
same extent).56 The culture-as-dialectic approach does not provide international negotiators
with simple advice about how to behave in a given negotiation. Rather, it suggests that ne
gotiators who want to have successful international negotiations need to appreciate the rich
ness of the cultures in which they will be operating.
The culture as dialectic perspective starts with a deep understanding of a culture and
uses that understanding to create negotiation metaphors to have a rich understanding of
how negotiations unfold within a culture. Negotiators with stronger understanding of the
negotiation metaphor within a culture are more likely to succeed in negotiations.
Culture in Context
Proponents of the fourth approach to using culture to understand international negotiations
recognize that human behavior is not determined by a single cause. Rather, all behavior may
The Influence of Culture on Negotiation: Managerial Perspectives
be understood at many different levels simultaneously, and a social behavior as complex as
negotiation is determined by many different factors, one of which is culture. Other factors that
may be important determinants of negotiation behavior include personality, social context,
and environmental factors. 57 Proponents of the culture-in-context approach recognize that ne
gotiation behavior is multiply determined, and using culture as the sole explanation of behav
ior is oversimplifying a complex social process. Kumar and Worm make this point succinctly:
“while negotiations are always in the present they are influenced by what looms in the past
and are constrained by the shadow of the future.”58
Recent theory and research in international negotiation has taken a culture-in-context
approach. For instance, Tinsley, Brett, Shapiro, and Okumura proposed a cultural complex
ity theory in which they suggest that cultural values will have a direct effect on negotiations
in some circumstances and a moderated effect in others.59 Values are proposed to have a di
rect effect when they have strong effects across several different contexts (e.g., American
individuality), whereas values that have a moderated effect are those that have different
contextual instigators in the culture. For example, France has both monarchical and demo
cratic traditions, both of which can influence negotiation behavior depending on the con
text.60 Fang suggests that traditions of Mao, Confucius, and Sun Tzu provide multiple
influence on Chinese negotiators that can vary by context. Another example of the culture-
in-context approach comes from Adair and Brett,61 who found that communication patterns
were different for negotiators from high- and low-context cultures at different stages of the
negotiation.62
The culture-in-context models are becoming more and more complex in order to ex
plain nuanced differences in cross-cultural negotiations. As this complexity increases, how
ever, they become less useful for practitioners of cross-cultural negotiation to put into
practice.63 Their strength, however, is in forging a deeper understanding of how cross-
cultural negotiations work and using that understanding to prepare and engage more effec
tively in international negotiation.
The Influence of Culture on Negotiation: Managerial Perspectives
Cultural differences have been suggested to influence negotiation in several different ways.
In this section we discuss 10 different ways that culture can influence negotiations.64
Definition of Negotiation
The fundamental definition of negotiation, what is negotiable, and what occurs when we
negotiate can differ greatly across cultures.65 For instance, “Americans tend to view negoti
ating as a competitive process of offers and counteroffers, while the Japanese tend to view
the negotiation as an opportunity for information-sharing.”66
Negotiation Opportunity
Culture influences the way negotiators perceive an opportunity as distributive versus inte
grative. Negotiators in North America are predisposed to perceive negotiation as being
fundamentally distributive.67 This is not the case outside North America, however, as there
appears to be a great deal of variation across cultures in the extent to which negotiation
Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
situations are initially perceived as distributive or integrative.68 Cross-cultural negotiations
are influenced by the extent that negotiators in different cultures have fundamental agree
ment or disagreement about whether or not the situation is distributive or integrative.
Selection of Negotiators
The criteria used to select who will participate in a negotiation is different across cultures.
These criteria can include knowledge of the subject matter being negotiated, seniority, family
connections, gender, age, experience, and status. Different cultures weigh these criteria
differently, leading to varying expectations about what is appropriate in different types of
negotiations. For instance, in China it is important to establish relationship connections
early in the negotiation process, and selection of the appropriate negotiators can help
with this.69
Protocol
Cultures differ in the degree to which protocol, or the formality of the relations between the
two negotiating parties, is important. American culture is among the least formal cultures in
the world. A familiar communication style is quite common; first names are used, for ex
ample, while titles are ignored. Contrast this with other cultures. Many European countries
(e.g., France, Germany, England) are very formal, and not using the proper title when ad
dressing someone (e.g., Mr., Dr., Professor, Lord) is considered insulting.70The formal call
ing cards or business cards used in many countries in the Pacific Rim (e.g., China, Japan)
are essential for introductions there. Negotiators who forget to bring business cards or who
write messages on them are frequently breaching protocol and insulting their counterpart.71
Even the way that business cards are presented, hands are shaken, and dress codes are
observed are subject to interpretation by negotiators and can be the foundation of attribu
tions about a person’s background and personality.
Communication
Cultures influence how people communicate, both verbally and nonverbally. There are also
differences in body language across cultures; a behavior that may be highly insulting in one
culture may be completely innocuous in another.72 To avoid offending the other party in ne
gotiations, the international negotiator needs to observe cultural rules of communication care
fully. For example, placing feet on a desk in the United States signals power or relaxation; in
Thailand, it is considered very insulting. Clearly, there is a lot of information about how to
communicate that an international negotiator must remember in order not to insult, anger,
or embarrass the other party during negotiations. Culture-specific books and articles can
provide considerable advice to international negotiators about how to communicate in
various cultures; seeking such advice is an essential aspect of planning for international
negotiations.73
Time Sensitivity
Cultures largely determine what time means and how it affects negotiations.74 In the United
States, people tend to respect time by appearing for meetings at an appointed hour, being
sensitive to not wasting the time of other people, and generally holding that “faster” is
The Influence of Culture on Negotiation: Managerial Perspectives
better than “slower” because it symbolizes high productivity. Other cultures have quite dif
ferent views about time. In more traditional societies, especially in hot climates, the pace is
slower than in the United States. This tends to reduce the focus on time, at least in the short
term. Arab-speaking Islamic cultures appear to focus more on event-time than clock-time
w'here “in clock-time cultures people schedule events according to the clock; in event-time
cultures, events schedule people.”75 Americans are perceived by other cultures as enslaved
by their clocks because they watch time carefully and guard it as a valuable resource. In
some cultures, such as China and Latin America, time per se is not important. The focus of
negotiations is on the task, regardless of the amount of time it takes. The opportunity for
misunderstandings because of different perceptions of time is great during cross-cultural
negotiations. Americans may be perceived as always being in a hurry and as flitting from
one task to another, while Chinese or Latin American negotiators may appear to Americans
to be doing nothing and wasting time.
Risk Propensity
Cultures vary in the extent to which they are willing to take risks. Some cultures tend to pro
duce bureaucratic, conservative decision makers who want a great deal of information before
making decisions. Other cultures produce negotiators who are more entrepreneurial and who
are willing to act and take risks when they have incomplete information (e.g., “nothing ven
tured, nothing gained”). According to Foster, Americans fall on the risk-taking end of the con
tinuum, as do some Asian cultures, while some European cultures are quite conservative (e.g.,
Greece).76 The orientation of a culture toward risk will have a large effect on what is negotiated
and the content of the negotiated outcome. Negotiators in risk-oriented cultures will be more
willing to move early on a deal and will generally take more chances. Those in risk-avoiding
cultures are more likely to seek further information and take a wait-and-see stance.
Groups versus Individuals
Cultures differ according to whether they emphasize the individual or the group. The
United States is very much an individual-oriented culture, where being independent and as
sertive is valued and praised. Group-oriented cultures, in contrast, favor the superiority of
the group and see individual needs as second to the group’s needs. Group-oriented cultures
value fitting in and reward loyal team players; those who dare to be different are socially
ostracized—a large price to pay in a group-oriented society. This cultural difference can
have a variety of effects on negotiation. Americans are more likely to have one individual
who is responsible for the final decision, whereas group-oriented cultures like the Japanese
are more likely to have a group responsible for the decision. Decision making in group-
oriented cultures involves consensus and may take considerably more time than American
negotiators are used to. In addition, because so many people can be involved in the negoti
ations in group-oriented cultures, and because their participation may be sequential rather
than simultaneous, American negotiators may be faced with a series of discussions over the
same issues and materials with many different people. In a negotiation in China, one of the
authors of this book met with more than six different people on successive days, going over
the same ground with different negotiators and interpreters, until the negotiation was
concluded.
Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
Nature of Agreements
Culture also has an important effect both on concluding agreements and on what form the
negotiated agreement takes. In the United States, agreements are typically based on logic
(e.g., the low-cost producer gets the deal), are often formalized, and are enforced through
the legal system if such standards are not honored. In other cultures, however, obtaining the
deal may be based on who you are (e.g., your family or political connections) rather than
on what you can do. In addition, agreements do not mean the same thing in all cultures.
Foster notes that the Chinese frequently use memorandums of agreement to formalize a
relationship and to signal the start of negotiations (mutual favors and compromise).77
Frequently, however, Americans will interpret the same memorandum of agreement as the
completion of the negotiations that is enforceable in a court of law. Again, cultural differ
ences in how to close an agreement and what exactly that agreement means can lead to
confusion and misunderstandings.
Emotionalism
Culture appears to influence the extent to which negotiators display emotions.78 These emo
tions may be used as tactics, or they may be a natural response to positive and negative cir
cumstances during the negotiation.79 While personality likely also plays a role in the
expression of emotions, there also appears to be considerable cross-cultural differences,
and the rules that govern general emotional displays in a culture are likely to be present
during negotiation.80
In summary, a great deal of practical advice has been written about the importance of
culture in international negotiations. Although the word culture has been used to mean sev
eral different things, it is clearly a critical aspect of international negotiation that can have
a broad influence on many aspects of the process and outcome of international negotiation.
We now turn to examining research perspectives on how culture influences negotiation.
Culturally Responsive Negotiation Strategies
Although a great deal has been written about the challenge of international and cross-
cultural negotiations, far less attention has been paid to what negotiators should do when
faced with negotiating with someone from another culture. The advice by many theorists in
this area, either explicitly or implicitly, has been, “When in Rome, act as the Romans do.”81
In other words, negotiators are advised to be aware of the effects of cultural differences
on negotiation and to take them into account when they negotiate. Many theorists appear
to assume implicitly that the best way to manage cross-cultural negotiations is to be sensi
tive to the cultural norms of the other negotiator and to modify one’s strategy to be consis
tent with behaviors that occur in that culture.
Several factors suggest that negotiators should not make large modifications to their
approach when negotiating cross-culturally, however:
1. Negotiators may not be able to modify their approach effectively. It takes years to
understand another culture deeply, and negotiators typically do not have the time
necessary to gain this understanding before beginning a negotiation. Although a lit
tle understanding of another culture is clearly better than ignorance, it may not be
Culturally Responsive Negotiation Strategics
enough to enable negotiators to make effective adjustments to their negotiation
strategy. Attempting to match the strategies and tactics used by negotiators in an
other culture is a daunting task that requires fluency in their language as well as
deep cultural understanding. Even simple words may be translated in several differ
ent ways with different nuances, making the challenge of communicating in differ
ent languages overwhelming.82
2. Even if negotiators can modify their approach effectively, it does not mean that this
will translate automatically into a better negotiation outcome. It is quite possible that
the other party will modify his or her approach too. The results in this situation can be
disasterous, with each side trying to act like the other “should” be acting, and both
sides not really understanding what the other party is doing. Consider the following
example contrasting typical American and Japanese negotiation styles. Americans are
more likely to start negotiations with an extreme offer in order to leave room for con
cessions. Japanese are more likely to start negotiations with gathering information in
order to understand with whom they are dealing and what the relationship will be. As
sume that both parties understand their own and the other party’s cultural tendencies
(this is a large assumption that frequently is not met). Now assume that each party,
acting out of respect for the other, decides to “act like the Romans do” and to adopt
the approach of the other party. The possibilities for confusion are endless. When the
Americans gather information about the Japanese, are they truly interested or are they
playing a role? It will be clear that they are not acting like Americans, but the strategy
that they are using may not be readily identified. How will the Americans interpret the
Japanese behavior? The Americans have prepared well for their negotiations and un
derstand that the Japanese do not present extreme positions early in negotiations.
When the Japanese do present an extreme position early in negotiations (in order to
adapt to the American negotiation style), how should the Americans interpret this be
havior? The Americans likely will think, “That must be what they really want, because
they don’t typically open with extreme offers.” Adopting the other party’s approach
does not guarantee success, and in fact it may lead to more confusion than acting like
yourself (where at least your behavior is understood within your own cultural context).
3. Research suggests that negotiators may naturally negotiate differently when they are
with people from their own culture than when they are with people from other cul
tures.83 The implications of this research are that a deep understanding of how people
in other cultures negotiate, such as Costa Ricans negotiating with each other, may not
help an American negotiating with a Costa Rican.84
4. Research by Francis suggests that moderate adaptation may be more effective than
“acting as the Romans do.”85 In a simulation study of Americans’ responses to nego
tiators from other countries, Francis found that negotiators from a familiar culture
(Japan) who made moderate adaptations to American ways were perceived more pos
itively than negotiators who made no changes or those who made large adaptations.
Although these findings did not replicate for negotiators from a less familiar culture
(Korea), more research needs to be conducted to understand why. At the very least,
the results of this study suggest that large adaptations by international negotiators
will not always be effective.
Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
Recent research findings have provided some specific advice about how to negotiate
cross-culturally. Rubin and Sander suggest that during preparation, negotiators should con
centrate on understanding three things: (1) their own biases, strengths, and weaknesses; (2) the
other negotiator as an individual; and (3) the other negotiator’s cultural context.86 Brett and
her colleagues suggest that cross-cultural negotiators should go further and ask themselves a
series of questions about how culture may influence information sharing and the negotiation
process (e.g., Does this culture share information directly or indirectly?87 Is it monochronic
or polychronic?). Learning about how another culture shares information and structures the
negotiation process may help negotiators plan more strategically for the negotiation.88 Finally,
Adair, Okumura, and Brett suggest that both parties in a cross-cultural negotiation need to be
prepared to communicate in the other party’s culturally preferred method of direct or indirect
communication in order to increase the chances of a successful negotiation outcome.89
Stephen Weiss has proposed a useful way of thinking about the options we have when ne
gotiating with someone from another culture.90 Weiss observes that negotiators may choose from
among eight different culturally responsive strategies. These strategies may be used individually
or sequentially, and the strategies can be switched as the negotiation progresses. When choosing
a strategy, negotiators should be aware of their own and the other party’s culture in general, un
derstand the specific factors in the current relationship, and predict or try to influence the other
party’s approach.91 Weiss’s culturally responsive strategies may be arranged into three groups,
based on the level of familiarity (low, moderate, high) that a negotiator has with the other party’s
culture. Within each group there are some strategies that the negotiator may use individually
(unilateral strategies) and others that involve the participation of the other party (joint strategies).
Low Familiarity
Employ Agents or Advisers (Unilateral Strategy) One approach for negotiators who
have very low familiarity with the other party’s culture is to hire an agent or adviser who is
familiar with the cultures of both parties. This relationship may range from having the other
party conduct the negotiations under supervision (agent) to receiving regular or occasional
advice during the negotiations (adviser). Although agents or advisers may create other chal
lenges, they may be quite useful for negotiators who have little awareness of the other
party’s culture and little time to prepare.
Bring in a Mediator (Joint Strategy) Many types of mediators may be used in cross-
cultural negotiations, ranging from someone who conducts introductions and then with
draws to someone who is present throughout the negotiation and takes responsibility for
managing the negotiation process. Interpreters will often play this role, providing both
parties with more information than the mere translation of words during negotiations.
Mediators may encourage one side or the other to adopt one culture’s approaches or a third
cultural approach (the mediator’s home culture).
Induce the Other Negotiator to Use Your Approach (Joint Strategy) Another option is
to persuade the other party to use your approach. There are many ways to do this, ranging
from making a polite request to asserting rudely that your way is best. More subtly, negotia
tors can continue to respond to the other party’s requests in their own language because they
Culturally Responsive Negotiation Strategics
“cannot express themselves well enough” in the other’s language. Although this strategy has
many advantages for the negotiator with low familiarity, there are also some disadvantages.
For instance, a Japanese party may become irritated or insulted by having to make the extra
effort to deal with a Canadian negotiator on Canadian cultural terms. In addition, the other
negotiator may also have a strategic advantage because he or she may now attempt more ex
treme tactics and excuse their use on the basis of his or her “cultural ignorance” (after all,
negotiators can’t expect the other party to understand everything about how they negotiate).
Moderate Familiarity
Adapt to the Other Negotiator’s Approach (Unilateral Strategy) This strategy involves
negotiators making conscious changes to their approach so that it is more appealing to the
other party. Rather than trying to act like the other party, negotiators using this strategy main
tain a firm grasp on their own approach but make modifications to help relations with the
other party. These modifications may include acting in a less extreme manner, eliminating
some behaviors, and adopting some of the other party’s behaviors. The challenge in using this
strategy is to know which behaviors to modify, eliminate, or adopt. In addition, it is not clear
that the other party will interpret modifications in the way that negotiators have intended.
Coordinate Adjustment (Joint Strategy) This strategy involves both parties making mu
tual adjustments to find a common process for negotiation. Although this can be done im
plicitly, it is more likely to occur explicitly (“How would you like to proceed?”), and it can be
thought of as a special instance of negotiating the process of negotiation. This strategy
requires a moderate amount of knowledge about the other party’s culture and at least some
facility with his or her language (comprehension, if not the ability to speak). Coordinate
adjustment occurs on a daily basis in Montreal, the most bilingual city in North America
(85 percent of Montrealers understand both English and French). It is standard practice for
businesspeople in Montreal to negotiate the process of negotiation before the substantive
discussion begins. The outcomes of this discussion are variations on the theme of whether the
negotiations will occur in English or French, with a typical outcome being that either party
may speak either language. Negotiations often occur in both languages, and frequently the
person with the best second-language skills will switch languages to facilitate the discussion.
Another outcome that occasionally occurs has both parties speaking in their second language
(i.e., the French speaker will negotiate in English while the English speaker will negotiate in
French) to demonstrate respect for the other party. Another type of coordinate adjustment
occurs when the two negotiating parties adopt aspects of a third culture to facilitate their
negotiations. For instance, during a trip to Latin America, one of the authors of this book con
ducted discussions in French with a Latin American colleague who spoke Spanish and French,
but not English. On a subsequent trip to China, negotiations were conducted in French,
English, and Chinese because each of the six participants spoke two of the three languages.
High Familiarity
Embrace the Other Negotiator’s Approach (Unilateral Strategy) This strategy involves
completely adopting the approach of the other negotiator. To be used successfully, the ne
gotiator needs to be completely bilingual and bicultural. In essence, the negotiator using
248 Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
this strategy doesn’t act like a Roman; he or she is a Roman. This strategy is costly in prepa
ration time and expense, and it places the negotiator using it under considerable stress be
cause it is difficult to switch back and forth rapidly between cultures. However, there is
much to gain by using this strategy because the other negotiator can be approached and un
derstood completely on his or her own terms.
Improvise an Approach (Joint Strategy) This strategy involves crafting an approach that
is specifically tailored to the negotiation situation, other negotiator, and circumstances. To
use this approach, both parties to the negotiation need to have high familiarity with the other
party’s culture and a strong understanding of the individual characteristics of the other ne
gotiator. The negotiation that emerges with this approach can be crafted by adopting aspects
from both cultures when they will be useful. This approach is the most flexible of the eight
strategies, which is both its strength and weakness. Flexibility is a strength because it allows
the approach to be crafted to the circumstances at hand, but it is a weakness because there
are few general prescriptive statements that can be made about how to use this strategy.
Effect Symphony (Joint Strategy) This strategy allows negotiators to create a new ap
proach that may include aspects of either home culture or adopt practices from a third cul
ture. Professional diplomats use such an approach when the customs, norms, and language
they use transcend national borders and form their own culture (diplomacy). Use of this
strategy is complex and involves a great deal of time and effort. It works best when the par
ties are familiar with each other and with both home cultures and have a common structure
(like that of professional diplomats) for the negotiation. Risks of using this strategy include
costs due to confusion, lost time, and the overall effort required to make it work.
Chapter Summary
This chapter examined various aspects of a growing Habib’s five immediate context factors were discussed
field of negotiation that explores the complexities of in next: (1) relative bargaining power, (2) levels of conflict,
ternational and cross-cultural negotiation. We began the (3) relationship between negotiators, (4) desired out
chapter with a discussion of the art and science of nego comes, and (5) immediate stakeholders. Each of these
tiation. Next we considered some of the factors that environmental and immediate context factors acts to
make international negotiations different. Phatak and make international negotiations more difficult, and ef
Habib suggest that both the environmental and the im fective international negotiators need to understand how
mediate context have important effects on international to manage them.
negotiations.92 We then discussed Salacuse’s description
of the environmental factors that influence international Next, we turned to a discussion of how to conceptu
negotiations: (1) political and legal pluralism, (2) inter alize culture. Robert Janosik suggests that researchers and
national economics, (3) foreign governments and bureau practitioners of negotiation use culture in at least four dif
cracies, (4) instability, (5) ideology, and (6) culture.93 ferent ways: ( 1 ) culture as learned behavior, (2) culture as
We added one more environmental factor—external shared values, (3) culture as dialectics, and (4) culture in
stakeholders—from Phatak and Habib.94 Phatak and context.95 We then examined two perspectives on how
cultural differences can influence negotiations. From the
Endnotes 249
managerial perspective, we discussed 10 ways that culture culture. Some of these strategies may be used individ
can influence negotiation: (1) the definition of negotia ually, w'hereas others are used jointly with the other ne
tion, (2) the negotiation opportunity, (3) the selection of gotiator. Weiss indicates that one critical aspect of
negotiators, (4) protocol, (5) communication, (6) time choosing the correct strategy for a given negotiation is
sensitivity, (7) risk propensity, (8) groups versus individu the degree of familiarity (low, moderate, or high) that a
als, (9) the nature of agreements, and (10) emotionalism. negotiator has with the other culture. However, even
those with high familiarity with another culture are
The chapter concluded with a discussion of how' to faced with a daunting task if they want to modify their
manage cultural differences in negotiation. Weiss pre strategy completely when they deal with the other
sents eight different culturally responsive strategies that culture.
negotiators can use with a negotiator from a different
Endnotes
1 Hopmann, 1995; Weiss, 2006. 15 For example Graham and Mintu-Wimsat, 1997; Metcalf,
Bird, Shankarmahcsh, Aycan, Larmio. and Valdelamar,
2 Sebenius, 2002a. 2006; Metcalf, Bird, Peterson, Shankarmahcsh, and
Lituchy, 2007.
3 It is important to reeognizc that this book has been written
from a North American perspective, and that this cultural 16 Palich, C'arini, and Livingstone, 2002; Xing, 1995.
filter has influenced how wc think about negotiation 17 See Tinsley, 1997.
(Brett and Gelfand, 2004), both in our choices about what
wc discuss and bccausc wc use Americans as the base 18 Tinsley, 1997, 1998,2001.
from which to make comparisons to other cultures. That 19 Phatak and Habib, 1996, p. 34.
is not to say that all Americans share the same culture. 20 See Sebenius, 2002a.
Descriptions of the American negotiation style may be
found in Druckman, 1996; Koh, 1996; Le Poole, 1989; 21 Phatak and Habib, 1996; also see Lin and Miller, 2003.
and McDonald, 1996. At some level, however, Americans 22 Sec Yan and Gray, 1994, for a review.
do share (more or less) a common culture that is different 23 Ibid.
from that of other countries. While recognizing the differ 24 Sec Agha and Mallcy, 2002; lsajiw, 2000; Ross, 2000;
ences within the United States, we will use some com
mon aspects of American culture in our discussion of Rubinstein, 2003; Stein, 1999; andZartman, 1997.
international and cross-cultural negotiation. 25 Hartzell, 1999.
26Abu-Nimer, 1996.
4 For more examples see Acuff, 1993; Hendon and Hendon,
1990; and Kennedy, 1985. 27 Ohbuchi and Takahashi, 1994; Tinsley, 1998; and sec
Weldon and Jchn, 1995, for a review.
5 Rubin and Sander, 1991; Sebenius, 2002b; Weiss, 2003.
28 Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991.
6 Dialdin, Kopclman, Adair, Brett, Okumura, and Lytle, 1999; 29 Wanis-St. John, 2006.
also sec Huang and van dc Vlicrt, 2004; Matsumoto and 30 Phatak and Habib, 1996.
Yoo, 2006. 31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
7 Phatak and Habib, 1996. 33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
8 Salacuse, 1988. 35 See Stark, Fam, Waller, and Tian, 2005; Yan and Gray, 1994.
36 For reviews of this work see Brett, 2001; and Gelfand and
9 Phatak and Habib, 1996.
Dyer, 2000.
"»Salacuse, 1988.
11 See Brouthcrs and Bamossy, 1997; Dcrong and Faurc, 1995;
Pfouts, 1994.
12 Salacuse, 1988.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
250 Chapter 11 International and Cross-Cultural Negotiation
37 See Avruch, 2000. 65 See Ohanyan, 1999; Yook and Albert, 1998.
38 Janosik, 1987. “ Foster, 1992, p. 272.
67 Thompson and Hastic, 1990b.
39 Ibid. 68 Salacuse, 1998.
69 Sec Zhu, McKenna, and Sun, 2007.
40 Solomon, 1987. 70 Sec Braganti and Devine, 1992.
71 Foster, 1992.
41 George, Jones, and Gonzalez, 1998. 72 Axtell, 1990, 1991, 1993.
73 For example, see Binncndijk, 1987; Graham and
42Ogawa, 1999; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998.
Sano, 1989; Pye, 1992; and Tung, 1991.
43 Faure, 1999; Sebenius, 2002a. 74 Sec Macduff, 2006; Mayfield, Mayfield, Martin, and
44 Hofstede, 1980a, 1980b, 1989, 1991. Herbig, 1997.
45 Hofstede labeled career success/quality of life as 75 Alon and Brett, 2007, p. 58.
76 Foster, 1992.
masculine-feminine, but we have adopted gender neutral 77 Ibid.
labels for this dimension (Adler, 2002). Subsequent 78 Salacuse, 1998.
research by Hofstede and Bond (1988) suggested that a 79 Sec Kumar, 2004.
fifth dimension, labeled Confucian Dynamism, be 80 Salacuse, 1998.
added. Confucian Dynamism contains three elements: 81 See Francis, 1991; and Weiss, 1994, for reviews of the
work ethic, time, and commitment to traditional
Confucian values. The dimension has received little oversimplification of this advice.
attention in the negotiation literature (cf„ Chan, 1998). 82SeeAdachi, 1998.
46 Hofstede, 1989, p. 195. 83 Adler and Graham, 1989; Natlandsmyr and Rognes, 1995
84 See Drake, 1995; Weldon and Jehn, 1995.
47 Hofstede, 1980a, p. 46. 85 Francis, 1991.
86 Rubin and Sander, 1991.
48 Hofstede, 1989. 87 Brett et al., 1998.
49 Ibid., p. 196. 88 Adair et al., 2004.
89 Adair, Okumura, and Brett, 2001.
50 See, for example, Kale and Barnes, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; 90 Weiss, 1994.
Triandis, 1982. 91 Ibid.
92 Phatak and Habib, 1996.
51 Sec Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990; and 93 Salacuse, 1988.
Smith and Schwartz, 1997. 94 Phatak and Habib, 1996.
95 Janosik, 1987.
52 See Gelfand and Dyer, 2000; Kozan and Ergin, 1999.
53 See Faure, 1999, for systematic analysis of the effects of
culture on the Chinese negotiation style.
54 Pye, 1992.
55 Janosik, 1987.
56 Ibid.
57 Rubin and Sander, 1991.
58 Kumar and Worm, 2004, p. 305.
59 Tinsley, Brett, Shapiro, and Okumura, 2004.
t,° Brett et al., 1998.
61 Fang, 2006.
62 Adair and Brett, 2003.
63 Janosik, 1987.
64 The discussion that follows is based on the work of Foster,
1992; Hendon and Hendon, 1990; Moran and Stripp,
1991; Salacuse, 1998; and Weiss and Stripp, 1985.
CHAPTER
Best Practices in Negotiations
Objectives
1. Appreciate the extent to which negotiation is both an art and a science.
2. Explore the 10 best practices that all negotiators can follow to achieve a successful
negotiation.
Negotiation is an integral part of daily life and the opportunities to negotiate surround us.
While some people may look like born negotiators, negotiation is fundamentally a skill in
volving analysis and communication that everyone can learn. The purpose of this book is
to provide students of negotiation with an overview of the field of negotiation, perspective
on the breadth and depth of the subprocesses of negotiation, and an appreciation for the art
and science of negotiation. In this final chapter we reflect on negotiation at a broad level by
providing 10 best practices for negotiators who wish to continue to improve their negotia
tion skills (see Table 12.1).
1. Be Prepared
We cannot overemphasize the importance of preparation, and we strongly encourage all
negotiators to prepare properly for their negotiations (see Chapter 4). Preparation does not
have to be a time-consuming or arduous activity, but it should be right at the top of the
best practices list of every negotiator. Negotiators who are better prepared have numerous
TABLE 12.1 I 10 Best Practices for Negotiators
1. Be prepared.
2. Diagnose the fundamental structure of the negotiation.
3. Work the BATNA.
4. Be willing to walk away.
5. Master paradoxes.
6. Remember the intangibles.
7. Actively manage coalitions.
8. Savor and protect your reputation.
9. Remember that rationality and fairness are relative.
10. Continue to learn from the experience.
251
Chapter 12 Best Practices in Negotiations
advantages, including the ability to analyze the other party’s offers more effectively and
efficiently, to understand the nuances of the concession-making process, and to achieve
their negotiation goals. Preparation should occur before the negotiation begins so that the
time spent negotiating is more productive. Good preparation means understanding one’s
own goals and interests as well as possible and being able to articulate them to the other
party skillfully. It also includes being ready to understand the other party’s communication
in order to find an agreement that meets the needs of both parties. Few negotiations are
going to conclude successfully without both parties achieving at least some of their goals,
and solid work up front to identify your needs and to understand the needs of the other
party is a critical step to increasing the odds of success.
Good preparation also means setting aspirations for negotiation outcomes that are high but
achievable. Negotiators who set their sights too low are virtually guaranteed to reach an agree
ment that is suboptimal, while those who set them too high are more likely to stalemate and
end the negotiation in frustration. Negotiators also need to plan their opening statements and
positions carefully so they are especially well prepared at the start of negotiations. It is
important to avoid preplanning the complete negotiation sequence, however, because while
negotiations do follow broad stages, they also ebb and flow at irregular rates. Overplanning the
tactics for each negotiation stage in advance of the negotiation is not a good use of preparation
time. It is far better that negotiators prepare by understanding their own strengths and weak
nesses, their needs and interests, the situation, and the other party as well as possible so that
they can adjust promptly and effectively as the negotiation proceeds.
2. Diagnose the Fundamental Structure of the Negotiation
Negotiators should make a conscious decision about whether they are facing a fundamen
tally distributive negotiation, an integrative negotiation, or a blend of the two, and choose
their strategies and tactics accordingly. Using strategies and tactics that are mismatched will
lead to suboptimal negotiation outcomes. For instance, using overly distributive tactics in a
fundamentally integrative situation will likely result in reaching agreements that leave
integrative potential untapped because negotiators tend not to readily share the information
needed to succeed in integrative negotiations when confronted with distributive tactics. In
these situations, money and opportunity are often left on the table.
Similarly, using integrative tactics in a distributive situation may not lead to optimal
outcomes either. For instance, one of the authors of this book was recently shopping for a
new car and the salesman spent a great deal of time and effort asking questions about the
author’s family and assuring him that he was working hard to get the highest possible value
for his trade-in. Unfortunately, the salesman met the author’s requests for clarification about
the list price of the car and information about recently advertised manufacturer incentives with
silence or by changing the topic of conversation. This was a purely distributive situation for the
author, who was not fooled by the salesman’s attempt to bargain “integratively.” The author
bought a car from a different dealer who was able to provide the requested information in
a straightforward manner—and whose price was $1,500 lower than the first dealer for the
same car!
Negotiators also need to remember that many negotiations will consist of a blend of in
tegrative and distributive elements and that there will be distributive and integrative phases
Be Willing to Walk Away
to these negotiations. It is especially important to be careful when transitioning between
these phases within the broader negotiation because missteps in these transitions can con
fuse the other party and lead to impasse.
Finally, there are also times when accommodation, avoidance, and compromise may be
appropriate strategies (see Chapter 1). Strong negotiators will identify these situations and
adopt appropriate strategies and tactics.
3. Identify and Work the BATNA
One of the most important sources of power in a negotiation is the alternatives available to
a negotiator if an agreement is not reached. One alternative, the best alternative to a nego
tiated agreement (BATNA), is especially important because this is the option that likely
will be chosen should an agreement not be reached. Negotiators need to be vigilant about
their BATNA. They need to know what their BATNA is relative to a possible agreement and
consciously work to improve the BATNA so as to improve the deal. Negotiators without a
strong BATNA may find it difficult to achieve a good agreement because the other party
may try to push them aggressively, and hence they may be forced to accept a settlement that
is later seen as unsatisfying.
For instance, purchasers who need to buy items from sole suppliers are acutely aware
of how the lack of a positive BATNA makes it difficult to achieve positive negotiation out
comes. Even in this situation, however, negotiators can work to improve their BATNA in
the long term. For instance, organizations in a sole-supplier relationship have often verti
cally integrated their production and started to build comparable components inside the
company, or they have redesigned their products so they are less vulnerable to the sole sup
plier. These are clearly long-term options and would not be available in a current negotia
tion. However, it may be possible to refer to these plans when negotiating with a sole
supplier in order to remind them that you will not be dependent forever.
Negotiators also need to be aware of the other negotiator’s BATNA and to identify how
it compares to what you are offering. Negotiators have more power in a negotiation when
their potential terms of agreement are significantly better than what the other negotiator can
obtain with his or her BATNA. On the other hand, when the difference between your terms
and the other negotiator’s BATNA is small, then negotiators have less room to maneuver.
There are three things negotiators should do with respect to the other negotiator’s BATNA:
(1) monitor it carefully in order to understand and retain your competitive advantage
over the other negotiator’s alternatives; (2) remind the other negotiator of the advantages
your offer has relative to her BATNA; and (3) in a subtle way, suggest that the other ne
gotiator’s BATNA may not be as strong as he or she thinks it is (this can be done in a
positive way by stressing your strengths or in a negative way by highlighting competitors’
weaknesses).
4. Be Willing to Walk Away
The goal of most negotiations is achieving a valued outcome, not reaching an agreement
per se. Strong negotiators remember this and are willing to walk away from a negotiation
when no agreement is better than a poor agreement or when the process is so offensive that
Chapter 12 Best Practices in Negotiations
the deal isn’t worth the work. While this advice sounds easy enough to take in principle, in
practice, negotiators can become so focused on reaching an agreement that they lose sight
of the real goal, which is to reach a good outcome (and not necessarily an agreement). Ne
gotiators can ensure that they don’t take their eyes off the goal by making regular compar
isons with the targets they set during the planning stage and by comparing their progress
during their negotiation against their walkaway and BATNA. While negotiators are often
optimistic about goal achievement at the outset, they may need to reevaluate these goals
during the negotiation. It is important to continue to compare progress in the current nego
tiation with the target, walkaway, and BATNA and to be willing to walk away from the cur
rent negotiation if their walkaway or BATNA becomes the truly better choice.
5. Master the Key Paradoxes of Negotiation
Excellent negotiators understand that negotiation embodies a set of paradoxes—seemingly
contradictory elements that actually occur together. We discuss five common paradoxes that
negotiators face. The challenge for negotiators in handling these paradoxes is to strive for
balance in these situations. There is a natural tension in choosing between one or the other
alternative in the paradox, but the best way to manage paradox is to achieve a balance
between the opposing forces. Strong negotiators know how to manage this tension.
Claiming Value versus Creating Value
All negotiations have a value-claiming stage, where parties decide who gets how much of
what, but many negotiations also have a value-creation stage, where parties work together
to expand the resources under negotiation. The skills and strategies appropriate to each
stage are quite different; in general terms, distributive skills are called for in the value-
claiming stage and integrative skills are useful in value creation. Typically, the value-
creation stage will precede the value-claiming stage, and a challenge for negotiators is to
balance the emphasis on the two stages and the transition from creating to claiming value.
There is no signpost to mark this transition, however, and negotiators need to manage it
tactfully to avoid undermining the open brainstorming and option-inventing relationship
that has developed during value creation. One approach to manage this transition is to pub
licly label it. For instance, negotiators could say something like, “It looks like we have a
good foundation of ideas and alternatives to work from. How can we move on to decide
what is a fair distribution of the expected outcomes?” In addition, research shows that most
negotiators are overly biased toward thinking that a negotiation is more about claiming
value rather than creating value, so managing this paradox will likely require an overem
phasis on discussing the creating value dynamics.
Sticking by Your Principles versus Being Resilient to the Flow
The pace and flow of negotiations can move from an intense haggle over financial issues
to an equally intense debate over deeply held principles about what is right or fair or just.
These transitions often create a second paradox for negotiators. On the one hand, effective
negotiation requires flexible thinking and an understanding that an assessment of a situa
tion may need to be adjusted as new information comes to light; achieving any deal will
Master the Key Paradoxes of Negotiation
probably require both parties to make concessions. On the other hand, core principles are
not something to back away from easily in the service of doing a deal. Effective negotia
tors are thoughtful about the distinction between issues of principle, where firmness is es
sential, and other issues where compromise or accommodation are the best route to a
mutually acceptable outcome.
Sticking with the Strategy versus Opportunistic Pursuit of New Options
New information will frequently come to light during a negotiation, and negotiators need
to manage the paradox between sticking with their prepared strategy and pursuing a new
opportunity that arises during the process. This is a challenging paradox for negotiators to
manage because new “opportunities” may in fact be Trojan horses harboring unpleasant
surprises. On the other hand, circumstances do change and legitimate one-time, seize-the-
moment deals do occur. The challenge for negotiators is to distinguish phantom opportuni
ties from real ones; developing the capacity to recognize the distinction is another hallmark
of the experienced negotiator.
Strong preparation is critical to being able to manage the “strategy versus opportunism”
paradox. Negotiators who have prepared well for the negotiation and who understand the cir
cumstances are well positioned to make this judgment. We also suggest that negotiators pay
close attention to their intuition. If a deal doesn’t feel right, if it seems too good to be true,
then it probably is too good to be true and is not a viable opportunity. If negotiators feel un
easy about the direction the negotiation is taking, then it is best to take a break and consult
with others about the circumstances. Often explaining the “opportunity” to a colleague,
friend, or constituent will help distinguish real opportunities from Trojan horses.
We are not suggesting that negotiators become overly cautious, however. Frequently,
there are genuinely good opportunities that occur during a negotiation, legitimately caused
by changes in business strategy, market opportunities, excess inventory, or a short-term
cash flow challenge. Negotiators who have prepared well will be able to take full advantage
of real opportunities when they arise and reduce the risk presented by Trojan horses.
Honest and Open versus Closed and Opaque
Negotiators face the dilemma of honesty: how open and honest should 1 be with the other
party? Negotiators who are completely open and tell the other party everything expose
themselves to the risk that the other party will take advantage of them. In fact, research sug
gests that too much knowledge about the other party’s needs can actually lead to subopti
mal negotiation outcomes. On the other hand, being completely closed will not only have a
negative effect on your reputation (discussed later), but it is also an ineffective negotiation
strategy because you don’t disclose enough information to create the groundwork for
agreement. The challenge of this paradox is deciding how much information to reveal and
how much to conceal—both for pragmatic and ethical reasons.
Strong negotiators have considered this paradox and understand their comfort zone,
which will likely vary depending on the other party. We suggest that negotiators should re
member that negotiation is an ongoing process. As the negotiators make positive progress,
they should be building trust and hopefully feeling more comfortable about revealing more
information to the other party. That said, there is some information that should probably not
256 Chapter 12 Best Practices in Negotiations
be revealed (e.g., the bottom line in a distributive negotiation) regardless of how well the
negotiation is progressing.
Trust versus Distrust
As a mirror image of the dilemma of honesty, negotiators also face the dilemma of trust :
how much to trust what the other party tells them. Negotiators who believe everything the
other party tells them make themselves vulnerable to being taken advantage of by the other
party. On the other hand, negotiators who do not believe anything the other party tells them
will have a very difficult time reaching an agreement. As with the dilemma of honesty, we
suggest that negotiators remember that negotiation is a process that evolves over time. First,
as we noted, trust can be built by being honest and sharing information with the other side,
which hopefully will lead to reciprocal trust and credible disclosure by the other side.
Moreover, there will be individual differences in trust. Some negotiators will start off by
being more trusting, but become less trusting if information comes to light showing that the
other party is not trustworthy. Other negotiators will be more comfortable having the other
party earn their trust and will be more skeptical early in negotiations. There is no right or
wrong approach to managing this dilemma. Strong negotiators are aware of this dilemma,
however, and consciously monitor how they are managing this challenge.
6. Remember the Intangibles
It is important that negotiators remember the intangible factors while negotiating and re
main aware of their potential effects. Intangibles frequently affect negotiation in a negative
way, and they often operate out of the negotiator’s awareness. As noted in Chapter 1, intan
gibles are deep psychological factors that motivate negotiators and they include winning,
avoiding loss, looking tough or strong to others, not looking weak, being fair, and so on.
For instance, if the other party is vying with his archrival at the next desk for a promotion,
he may be especially difficult when negotiating with you in front of his boss in order to
look tough and impress his boss. It is unlikely that the other negotiator will tell you this is
what he is doing, and in fact he may not even be aware of it himself. The best way to iden
tify the existence of intangible factors is to try to see what is not there. In other words, if
your careful preparation and analysis of the situation reveals no tangible explanation for the
other negotiator’s behavior—adamant advocacy of a certain point, refusal to yield another
one, or behavior that just doesn’t make sense—then it is time to start looking for the intan
gibles driving his behavior.
For example, several years ago one of the authors of this book was helping a friend buy
a new car, and the price offered from the dealer was $2,000 less than any other dealer in
town. The only catch was that the car had to be sold that day. On the surface this looked like
a trick (see “Strategy versus Opportunism”), but there was no obvious tangible factor that
explained this special price. The friend had never purchased from the dealer before, the car
was new and fully covered by a good warranty, and the friend had price shopped at several
dealers and knew this price was substantially lower. As they continued to discuss the po
tential deal, the salesman became more and more agitated. Sweat was literally falling from
his brow. The friend decided to purchase the car, and as soon as he signed, the salesman was
Actively Manage Coalitions
simultaneously relieved and excited. He asked for a moment to telephone his wife to share
with her some good news. It turned out that the salesman had just won a complicated in
centive package offered by the dealer which included a two-week all expenses paid
Caribbean vacation for his family of four. The incentive package required that a total of
10 vehicles, one from each category of vehicle at the dealership, be sold in a month. The
salesman, who specialized in selling trucks, felt immense pressure when the friend hesitated
because he had given the friend a huge discount on a sports car to close the deal.
The intangible factor of trying to win the vacation package explained the salesman’s ag
itated behavior in the preceding example. The buyer learned of this only when the salesman
could no longer contain his excitement and shared the good news with his family. Often, ne
gotiators do not learn what intangible factors are influencing the other negotiator unless the
other chooses to disclose them. Negotiators can see evidence of their existence, however, by
looking for changes in the other negotiator’s behavior from one negotiation to another, as well
as by gathering information about the other party before negotiation begins. For instance, if
you find out that the other party has a new boss that she doesn’t like and she is subsequently
more difficult to deal with in the negotiation, the intangible of the new boss may be to blame.
There are at least two more ways to discover intangibles that might be affecting the
other. One way to surface the other party’s intangibles is to ask questions. These questions
should try to get the other party to reveal why he or she is sticking so strongly to a given
point. It is important to remember that strong emotions and/or values are the root of many
intangibles, so surfacing intangibles may result in the discussion of various fears and anxi
eties. The question-asking process should also be gentle and informal; if the questioning is
aggressive, it may only make the other defensive, adding another intangible to the mix and
stifling effective negotiations! A second way is to take an observer or listener with you to
the negotiation. Listeners may be able to read the other’s emotional tone or nonverbal be
havior, focus on roadblock issues, or try to take the other’s perspective and put themselves
in the other’s shoes (role reversal). A caucus with this listener may then help refocus the
discussion so as to surface the intangibles and develop a new line of questions or offers.
Negotiators also need to remember that intangible factors influence their own behav
ior (and that it is not uncommon for us to not recognize what is making us angry, defensive,
or zealously committed to some idea). Are you being particularly difficult with the other
party because he does not respect you, are you trying to teach a subordinate a lesson, or do
you want to win this negotiation to look better than another manager? Without passing
judgment on the legitimacy of these goals, we strongly urge negotiators to be aware of the
effect of intangible factors on their own aspirations and behavior. Often talking to another
person—a sympathetic listener—can help the negotiator figure these out. Strong negotia
tors are aware of how both tangible and intangible factors influence negotiation, and they
weigh both factors when evaluating a negotiation outcome.
7. Actively Manage Coalitions
Coalitions can have very significant effects on the negotiation process and outcome.
Negotiators should recognize three types of coalitions and their potential effects: (1) coalitions
against you; (2) coalitions that support you; and (3) loose, undefined coalitions that may
materialize either for or against you. Strong negotiators assess the presence and strength of
Chapter 12 Best Practices in Negotiations
coalitions and work to capture the strength of the coalition for their benefit. If this is not
possible, negotiators need to work to prevent the other party from capturing a loose coali
tion for their purposes. When negotiators are part of a coalition, communicating with the
coalition is critical to ensuring that the power of the coalition is aligned with their goals.
Similarly, negotiators who are agents or representatives of a coalition must take special care
to manage this process.
Successfully concluding negotiations when a coalition is aligned against a negotiator
is an extremely challenging task. It is important to recognize when coalitions are aligned
against you and to work consciously to counter their influence. Frequently this will involve
a divide-and-conquer strategy, where negotiators try to increase dissent within the coalition
by searching for ways to breed instability.
Coalitions occur in many formal negotiations, such as environmental assessments and
reaching policy decisions in an industry association. Coalitions may also have a strong influence
in less formal settings, such as work teams and families, where different subgroups of people
may not have the same interests. Managing coalitions is especially important when negotiators
need to rely on other people to implement an agreement. It may be possible for negotiators to
forge an agreement when the majority of people influenced are not in favor, but implementing
the outcomes of that agreement will be very challenging. Strong negotiators need to monitor
and manage coalitions proactively, and while this may take considerable time throughout the
negotiation process, it will likely lead to large payoffs at the implementation stage.
8. Savor and Protect Your Reputation
Reputations are like eggs—fragile, important to build, easy to break, and very hard to re
build once broken. Reputations travel fast, and people often know more about you than you
think that they do. Starting negotiations with a positive reputation is essential, and negotia
tors should be vigilant in protecting their reputations. Negotiators who have a reputation for
breaking their word and not negotiating honestly will have a much more difficult time ne
gotiating in the future than those who have a reputation for being honest and fair. Consider
the following contrasting reputations: “tough but fair” versus “tough and underhanded.”
Negotiators prepare differently for others with these contrasting reputations. Negotiating
with a tough but fair negotiator means preparing for potentially difficult negotiations while
being aware that the other party will push hard for her perspective but will also be rational
and fair in her behavior. Negotiating with a tough but underhanded other party means that
negotiators will need to verify what the other says, be vigilant for dirty tricks, and be more
guarded about sharing information.
How are you perceived as a negotiator? What is your reputation with others at this point?
What reputation would you like to have? Think about the negotiators you respect the most and
their reputation. What is it about their behavior that you admire? Also think about the nego
tiators who have a bad reputation. What would it take for them to change your image of them?
Rather than leaving reputation to chance, negotiators can work to shape and enhance their
reputation by acting in a consistent and fair manner. Consistency provides the other party with
a clear set of predictable expectations about how you will behave, which leads to a stable
reputation. Fairness sends the message that you are principled and reasonable. Strong negotia
tors also periodically seek feedback from others about the way they are perceived and use that
information to strengthen their credibility and trustworthiness in the marketplace.
Continue to Learn from Your Experience
9. Remember That Rationality and Fairness Are Relative
Research on negotiator perception and cognition is quite clear (Chapter 5): people tend to
view the world in a self-serving manner and define the rational thing to do or a fair out
come or process in a way that benefits themselves. First, negotiators need to be aware of
this tendency in both themselves and the other party. Negotiators can do three things to
manage these perceptions proactively. First, they can question their own perceptions of fair
ness and ground them in clear principles. Second, they can find external benchmarks and
examples that suggest fair outcomes. Finally, negotiators can illuminate definitions of fair
ness held by the other party and engage in a dialogue to reach consensus on which stan
dards of fairness apply in a given situation.
Moreover, negotiators are often in the position to collectively define what is right or
fair as a part of the negotiation process. In most situations, neither side holds the keys to
w'hat is absolutely right, rational, or fair. Reasonable people can disagree, and often the
most important outcome that negotiators can achieve is a common, agreed-upon perspec
tive, definition of the facts, agreement on the right way to see a problem, or standard for de
termining what is a fair outcome or process. Be prepared to negotiate these principles as
strongly as you prepare for a discussion of the issues.
10. Continue to Learn from Your Experience
Negotiation epitomizes lifelong learning. The best negotiators continue to learn from the
experience—they know there are so many different variables and nuances when negotiat
ing that no two negotiations are identical. These differences mean that for negotiators to re
main sharp, they need to continue to practice the art and science of negotiation regularly. In
addition, the best negotiators take a moment to analyze each negotiation after it has con
cluded, to review what happened and what they learned. We recommend a three-step
process:
• Plan a personal reflection time after each negotiation.
• Periodically take a lesson from a trainer or coach.
• Keep a personal diary on strengths and weaknesses and develop a plan to work on
weaknesses.
This analysis does not have to be extensive or time consuming. It should happen after every
important negotiation, however, and it should focus on what and why questions: what hap
pened during this negotiation, why did it occur, and what can I learn? Negotiators who take
the time to pause and reflect on their negotiations will find that they continue to refine their
skills and that they remain sharp and focused for their future negotiations.
Moreover, even the best athletes—in almost any sport—have one or more coaches on
their staff and stop to take a lesson, when necessary. Negotiators have access to seminars to
enhance their skills, books to read, and coaches who can help refine their skills. This book
should be seen as one step along the way to sharpening and refiningyour negotiation skills,
and we encourage you to continue to learn about the art andscience of negotiation. We
wish you the best of luck in all of your future negotiations!
Bibliography
Aaronson, K.. (1989). Selling on the fast tmck. New York: Putnam. Allred, K.. G. (1999). Anger-driven retaliation: Toward an un
derstanding of impassioned conflict in organizations. In
Abu-Nimer, M. (1996). Conflict resolution approaches: Western R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.),
and Middle Eastern lessons and possibilities. American Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 7),
Journal of Economics and Sociology, 55 (1), 35-52. Greenwich, C'T: JAI Press.
Acuff, F. L. (1993). How to negotiate anything with anyone Allred, K. G„ Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F„ & Raia, C. P. (1997).
anywhere around the world. New York: AMACOM. The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation
performance. Organizational Behavior and Human
Adachi, Y. (1998). The effects of semantic difference on Decision Processes, 70, 175-87.
cross-cultural business negotiation: A Japanese and
American case study. Journal of Language for Alon, I., & Brett, J. M. (2007). Perceptions of time and their
International Business, 9, 43-52. impact on negotiations in the Arabic-spcaking Islamic
world. Negotiation Journal. 23. 55-73.
Adair, W„ Brett, J., Lcmpereur, A., Okumura, T„ Shikhircv,
R, Tinsley, C„ & Lytle, A. (2004). Culture and Aquino, K„ & Beckcr, T. E. (2005). Lying in negotiation: How
negotiation strategy. Negotiation Journal, 20, 87-110. individual and situational factors influence the use of
neutralization strategics. Journal of Organizational
Adair, W. L., & Brett, J. M. (2005). The negotiation dance: Behavior, 26, 661-79.
Time, culture, and behavioral sequences in negotiation.
Organization Science, 16 (1), 33-51. Argyris, C., & Schon, D. (1996). Organizational learning II:
Theory, method, and practice. Reading, MA:
Adair, W. L„ Okumura, T„ & Brett, J. M. (2001). Negotiation Addison-Wesley Longman.
behavior when cultures collide: The United States and
Japan. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 371-85. Ashcrman, I. G„ & Asherman, S. V. (1990). The negotiation
sourcebook. Amherst, MA: Human Resource
Adler, N. J. (2002). International dimensions of organizational Development Press.
behavior (4th cd.). Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.
Avruch, K.. (2000). Culture and negotiation pedagogy.
Adler, N. J., & Graham, J. L. (1989). Cross-cultural interaction: Negotiation Journal. 16. 339-46.
The international comparison fallacy? Journal of
International Business Studies, 20, 515-37. Axtcll, R. E. (1990). Do s and taboos of hosting international
visitors. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Adler, R. S. (2007). Negotiating with liars. MIT Sloan
Management Review, 48 (4), 69-74. Axtcll, R. E. (1991). Gestures: The do s and taboos of body lan
guage around the world. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Adler, R„ Rosen, B., & Silverstcin, E. (1996). Thrust and
parry: The art of tough negotiating. Training and Devel Axtell, R. E. (1993). Do 's and taboos around the world (3rd
opment, 50, 42-48. ed.). New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Adorno, T. W„ Frenkl-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Babcock, L„ & Locwcnstein, G. (1997). Explaining bargain
Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. ing impasse: The role of self-serving biases. Journal of
New York: HarpcrCollins. Economic Perspectives 11 (1) 109-26.
Agha, H„ & Malley, R. (2002). The last negotiation: How to Babcock, L., Wang, X., & Loewenstein, G. (1996). Choosing
end the Middle East peacc proccss. Foreign Affairs, 81 (3), the wrong pond: Social comparisons in negotiations that
10-18. reflect a self-serving bias. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 111 (1), 1-19.
Albin, C. (1993). The role of fairness in negotiation.
Negotiation Journal, 9, 223-43. Ball, S. B., Bazerman, M. H., & Carroll, J. S. (1991). An
evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner’s curse.
Alexander, J. F., Schul, P. L., & Babakus, E. (1991). Analyzing Otganizational Behavior and Human Decision
interpersonal communications in industrial marketing Processes, 48. 1-22.
negotiations. Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 19, 129-39. Baranowski, T. A., & Summers, D. A. (1972). Perceptions of
response alternatives in a prisoner's dilemma game. Jour
Allhoff, F. (2003). Business bluffing reconsidered. Journal of nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 35—40.
Business Ethics, 45, 283-89.
261
262 Bibliography
Barki, H„ & Hartwick, J. (2004). Conceptualizing the Bazerman, M. H., Mannix, E. A., & Thompson, L. L. (1988).
construct of interpersonal conflict. The International Groups as mixed motive negotiations. In E. J. Lawler &
Journal of Conflict Management, 15 (3), 216—44. B. Markovsky (Eds. ), Advances in group processes (Vol.
5, pp. 195-216). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Barnard, C. (1938). The functions of the executive. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press. Bazcrman, M. H„ Moore, D. A., & Gillespie, J. J. (1999).
The human mind as a barrier to wiser environmental
Baron, R. A. (1990). Environmentally induced positive affect: agreements. American Behavioral Scientist, 42,
Its impact on self efficacy and task performance, negoti 1277-1300.
ation and conflict. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
20, 368-84. Bazcrman, M. H., & Neale, M. A. (1992). Negotiating
rationally. New York: Free Press.
Barry, B. (1999). The tactical use of emotion in negotiation.
In R. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), Bazerman, M. H., & Samuelson, W. F. (1983). I won the
Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 7, auction but don’t want the prize. Journal of Conflict
pp. 93-121), Stamford, CT: JAI Press. Resolution, 27, 618-34.
Barry, B., & Fulmer, I. S. (2004). The medium and the Bazcrman, M. H., Tcnbrunsel, A.E., & Wadc-Benzoni, K.
message: The adaptive use of communication media in (1998). Negotiating with yourself and losing: Making
dyadic influence. Academy of Management Review, 2, decisions with competing internal preferences. Academy
272-92. of Management Review, 23 (2), 225-241.
Barry, B., Fulmer, I. S., & Goates, N. (2006). Bargaining with Beckhard, R. (1978, July-September). The dependency
feeling: Emotionality in and around negotiation. In dilemma. Consultants ’ Communique, 6, 1-3.
L.Thompson (Ed.), Negotiation Theory and Research
(pp. 99-127). New York: Psychology Press. Beckman, N. (1977). Negotiations. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books.
Barry, B„ Fulmer, I. S., & Long, A. (2000). Ethically marginal
bargaining tactics: Sanction, efficacy, and performance. Beebe, S. A. (1980). Effects of eye contact, posture, and vocal
Presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of inflection upon credibility and comprehension.
Management, Toronto. Australian SCAN: Journal of Human Communication,
7-8, 57-70.
Barry, B., Fulmer, I. S., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2004). I laughed,
1 cried, I settled: The role of emotion in negotiation. In Bciscckcr, T„ Walker, G„ & Bart, J. (1989). Knowledge versus
M. Gelfand and J. Brett (Eds ), Culture and Negotiation: ignorance in bargaining strategies: The impact of
Integrative Approaches to Theory and Research. knowledge about other’s information level. Social
Stanford University Press, Stanford, C'A. Science Journal. 26, 161-72.
Barry, B., & Oliver, R. L. (1996). Affect in dyadic negotiation: Benton, A. A., & Druckman, D. (1974). Constituent’s bargain
A model and propositions. Organizational Behavior and ing orientation and intcrgroup negotiations. Journal of
Human Decision Processes, 67, 127-43. Applied Social Psychology, 4, 141-50.
Bateson, B. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Berkowitz, L. (1989). The frustration-aggression hypothesis:
Ballantine Books. An examination and reformulation. Psychological
Bulletin, 106, 59-73.
Bazcrman, M. H„ & Carroll, J. S. (1987). Negotiator
cognition. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings. Research Bies, R„ & Moag, J. (1986). Interactional justice:
in organizational behavior (Vol. 9, pp. 247-88), Communication criteria of fairness. In R. J. Lewicki,
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. B. H. Sheppard, and M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), Research
on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 1, pp. 43-55).
Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R„ Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
(2000). Negotiation. Annual Review of Psychology, 51,
279-314. Bies, R„ & Shapiro, D. (1987). Interactional fairness
judgments: The influence of causal accounts. Social
Bazcrman, M. H„ & Gillespie, J. J. (1999). Betting on the Justice Research, 1, 199-218.
future: The virtues of contingent contracts. Harvard
Business Review, Scpt-Oct, 155-60. Bies, R„ & Tripp, T. (1998). Revenge in organizations:
The good, the bad and the ugly. In R. W. Griffin,
Bazerman, M. H., Magliozzi, T., & Neale, M. A. (1985). Integra A. O’ 1 .eary-Kelly. & J. Collins (Eds ), Dysfunctional
tive bargaining in a competitive market. Organizational behavior in organizations, Vol. 1: Violent behavior in
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35, 294-313. organizations (pp. 49-68). Greenwich, C'T: JAI Press.
Bibliography 263
Binncndijk, H. (1987). National negotiating styles. Brockner, J. (1992). The escalation of commitment to a failing
Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, Department course of action: Toward theoretical progress. Academy
of State. of Management Review, 17, 39-61.
Bless, H„ Bohner, G., Schwarz, N„ & Strack, F. (1988). Brodt, S. E. (1994). “Inside information” and negotiator
Happy and mindless: Moods and the processing of decision behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human
persuasive communication. Unpublished manuscript, Decision Processes, 58. 172-202.
Mannheim, GR.
Brodt, S. E., & Tuchinsky, M. (2000). Working together but in
Blumcnstein, R. (1997, December 30). Haggling in opposition: An examination of the “Good-C'op/
cyberspace transforms car sales. The Walt Street Journal. Bad-C’op” negotiating team tactic. Organizational
pp. Bl, B6. Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81 (2), 155-77.
Bok, S. (1978). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. Brooks, E., & Odiorne, G. S. (1984). Managing by
New York: Pantheon. negotiations. New York: Van Nostrand.
Boles, T. L„ Croson, R. T. A., & Murnighan, J. K. (2000). Brouthcrs, K. D., & Bamossy, G. J. (1997). The role of key
Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum stakeholders in international joint venture negotiations:
bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Case studies from Eastern Europe. Journal of
Decision Processes. 83. 235-59. International Business Studies, 28, 285-308.
Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K„ Daniels, S. & Murnighan, J. K. Bruner, J. S., & Tagiuri, R. (1954). The perception of people.
(2002). When talk is not cheap: Substantive penance and In G. Lindzey (Ed.), The handbook of social psychology>
expressions of intent in the reestablishment of (Vol. 2, pp. 634-54). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
cooperation. Organization Science, IS. 497-513.
Bucchlcr, S. M. (2000). Social movements in advanced
Bottom, W. P., & Paese, P. W. (1999). Judgment accuracy and capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
the asymmetric cost of errors in distributive bargaining.
Group Decision and Negotiation, 8, 349-64. Buelcns, M„ & Van Poucke, D. (2004). Determinants of a
negotiator's initial opening offer. Journal of Business
Bowie, N. (1993). Docs it pay to bluff in business? In and Psychology, 19, 23-35.
T. L. Beauchamp & N. E. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical theory
and business (pp. 449-54). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Burgoon, J. K.., Coker, D. A., & Coker, R. A. (1986).
Prentice Hall. Communication of gaze behavior: A test of two
contrasting explanations. Human Communication
Braganti, N. L., & Devine, E. (1992). European customs Research, 12, 495-524.
and manners: How to make friends and do business
in Europe (rev. ed.). New York: Meadowbrook Burnstein, D. (1995). Negotiator pro. Beacon Expert Systems,
Press. 35 Gardner Road, Brookline, MA.
Brass, D. J. (1984). Being in the right place: A structural Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and
analysis of indiv idual influence in an organization. organizational analysis: Elements of the sociology of
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 518-39. corporate life. London: Heinemann.
Brett, J. (1991). Negotiating group decisions. Negotiation Butler, J. K., Jr. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring
Journal, 7, 291-310. conditions of trust: Evolution of a conditions of trust in
ventory. Journal of Management. 17. 643-63.
Brett, J., Adair, W., Lempereur, A., Okumura, T., Shikhirev, P.,
Tinsley, C., & Lytle, A. (1998). Culture and joint gains in Butler, J. K_, Jr. (1995). Behaviors, trust and goal achievement
negotiation. Negotiation Journal, 14 (1), 61-86. in a win-win negotiation role play. Group & Organiza
tion Management, 20, 486-501.
Brett, J., & Gelfand, M. (2004). A cultural analysis of the un
derlying assumptions of negotiation theory. Unpublished Butler, J. K.., Jr. (1996). Two integrative win-win negotiating
paper. Dispute Resolution Research Center, Northwest strategics. Simulation and Gaming, 27, 387-92.
ern University, Evanston, IL.
Butler, J. K„ Jr. (1999). Trust expectations, information sharing,
Brett, J. M. (2001). Negotiating globally. San Francisco: climate of trust, and negotiation effectiveness and effi
Jossey-Bass. ciency. Group and Organization Management, 24, 217-38.
Brett, J. M„ Shapiro, D. L„ & Lytle, A. L. (1998). Breaking Carncvalc, P. J. (2006). Creativity in the outcomes of conflict.
the bonds of reciprocity in negotiation. Academy of In M. Dcutsch et al. (Eds.), The handbook of conflict res
Management Journal, 41, 410-24. olution: Theory and practice. 2nd ed., (pp. 414—35). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
264 Bibliography
Carnevalc, P. J., & Iscn, A. M. (1986). The influence of posi Cohen, H. (1980). You can negotiate anything. Sccaucus, NJ:
tive affect and visual access on the discovery of integra Lyle Stuart.
tive solutions in bilateral negotiation. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 1-13. Cohen, H. (2003). Negotiate this! New York: Warner Books.
Carnevalc, P. J. D., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and C'olcman, P. (1997). Refining ripeness: A social-psychological
mediation. In M. Rosenberg & L. Porter (Eds.), Annual perspective. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace
Review of Psychology (Vol. 43, pp. 531-82). Palo Alto, Psychology, 3. 81-103.
CA: Annual Reviews, Inc.
Coleman, P. (2000). Power and conflict. In M. Deutsch, &
Carnevale, P. J. D„ Pruitt, D. G., & Scilheimer, S. D. (1981). P. Coleman, Handbook of conflict resolution. San
Looking and competing: Accountability and visual Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
access in integrative bargaining. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 40, 111-20. C’onlon, D. E„ & Hunt, C. S. (2002). Dealing with feeling:
The influence of outcome representations on negotiation.
Carr, A. Z. (1968, January-Fcbruary). Is business bluffing International Journal of Conflict Management, 13,
ethical? Harvard Business Review, 46, 143-53. 38-58.
Carroll, J., Bazcrman, M„ & Maury, R. (1988). Negotiator Cooper, W. (1981). Ubiquitous halo. Psychological Bulletin.
cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators’ 90, 218-44.
understanding of their opponents. Organizational Behav
ior and Human Decision Processes, 41, 352-70. C’oser, L. (1956). The functions of social conflict. New York:
Free Press.
Carroll, J., Delquie, P., Halpern, J., & Bazerman, M. (1990).
Improving negotiators cognitive processes. Working C’ronkhite, G„ & Liska, J. (1976). A critique of factor analytic
paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, approaches to the study of credibility. Communication
Cambridge, MA. Monographs, 32, 91-107.
Carver, C. S., & Scheir, M. E. (1990). Origins and foundations C’ronkhite, G„ & Liska, J. (1980). The judgment of communi
of positive and negative affect: A control process view. cant acceptability. In M. E. Roloff & G. R. Miller (Eds.),
Psychological Review, 97, 19-35. Persuasion: New directions in theory> and research
(pp. 101-39). Beverly Hills, C'A: Sage.
Cellich, C. (1997). Closing your business negotiations.
International Trade Forum, 1, 14-17. Croson, R. T. A. (1999). Look at me when you say that: An
electronic negotiation simulation. Simulation & Gaming,
Chan, C. W. (1998). Transfer pricing negotiation outcomes and 30. 23-37.
the impact of negotiator mixed-motives and culture: Em
pirical evidence from the U.S. and Australia. Manage Crumbaugh, C. M„ & Evans, G. W. (1967). Presentation
ment Accounting Research. 9. 139-61. format, other persons’ strategics and cooperative
behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. Psychological
C’haran, R. (1991). How networks reshape organizations—for Reports. 20, 895-902.
results. Harvard Business Review, 69 (5), Sept./Oct.,
pp. 104-15. Curhan, J. R., Neale, M. A., & Ross, L. (2004). Dynamic valu
ation: Preference changes in the context of face-to-face
Chcrtkoff, J. M„ & Conley, M. (1967). Opening offer and negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
frequency of concessions as bargaining strategics. 40. 142-151.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 181-85.
Curhan, J. R„ & Pentland, A. (2007). Thin slides of negotia
Cialdini, R. B. (2001). Influence: Science and practice (4th tion: Predicting outcomes from conversational dynamics
ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. within the first 5 minutes. Journal of Applied Psychol
ogy, 92, 802-811.
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence:
Compliance and conformity. Annual Review of Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of pow er. Behavioral Science,
Psychology, 55, 591-621. 2. 201-15.
Cloke, K„ & Goldsmith, J. (2005). Resolving Conflicts at Daly, J. (1991). The cffects of anger on negotiations over
Work. Second Edition. San Francisco: Josscy-Bass. mergers and acquisitions. Negotiation Journal. 7, 31-39.
Clyman, D. R„ & Tripp, T. M. (2000). Discrepant values and Dant, R. P., & Schul, P. L. (1992). Conflict resolution
measures of negotiator performance. Group Decision processes in contractual channels of distribution. Journal
and Negotiation, 9.251-74. of Marketing, 56, 38-54.
Bibliography 265
dc Drcu, C. K. W. (1995). Coercive power and concession cross-cultural negotiations. DRRC working paper.
making in bilateral negotiation. Journal of Conflict Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.
Resolution, 39, 646-70.
Diekmann, K. A., Tenbrunsel, A. E„ Shah, P. P., Schroth,
de Dreu, C. K.. W. (2003). Time pressure and closing of the H. A., & Bazcrman, M. H. (1996). The descriptive and
mind in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and prescriptive use of previous purchase price in negotia
Human Decision Processes, 91, 280-95. tions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 66, 179-91.
de Dreu, C. K. W„ Carnevalc, P. J. D„ Emans, B. J. M„ &
van dc Vliert, E. (1994). Effects of gain-loss frames in Donohue, W. A. (1981). Analyzing negotiation tactics:
negotiation: Loss aversion, mismatching, and frame Development of a negotiation interact system. Human
adoption. Oiganizational Behavior and Human Decision Communication Research, 7, 273-87.
Processes, 60, 90-107.
Donohue, W. A., & Roberto, A. J. (1996). An empirical
de Dreu, C. K.. W„ Nauta, A., & van dc Vliert, E. (1995). Self examination of three models of integrative and
serving evaluations of conflict behavior and escalation of distributive bargaining. International Journal of Conflict
the dispute. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25, Management, 7, 209-99.
2049-66.
Douglas, A. (1962). Industrial peacemaking. New York:
de Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Klecf, G. A. (2004). The influence Columbia University Press.
of power on the information search, impression forma
tion and demands in negotiation. Journal of Experimen Drake, L. E. (1995). Negotiation styles in intercultural
tal Social Psychology, 40, 303-19. communication. International Journal of Conflict
Management, 6, 72-90.
de Dreu, C. K. W., & van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). The impact
of social value orientation on negotiator cognition and Drolet, A. L„ & Morris, M. W. (2000). Rapport in conflict
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, resolution: Accounting for how face-to-face contact
21. 1178-88. fosters mutual cooperation in mixed-motive conflicts.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 26-50.
Deep, S., & Sussman, L. (1993). What to ask when you don 1
know what to say: 555 powerful questions to use for getting Druckman, D. (1996). Is there a U.S. negotiating style?
your way at work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. International Negotiation, 1, 327- 34.
Dennis, A. R„ & Rcinickc, B. A. (2004). Beta versus VHS and Druckman, D., & Broome, B. (1991). Value difference and
the acceptance of electronic brainstorming technology. conflict resolution: Familiarity or liking? Journal of
MIS Quarterly, 28, 1 -20. Conflict Resolution, 35 (4), 571-93.
Derong, C., & Faurc, G. O. (1995). When Chinese companies Eyuboglu, N., & Buja, A. (1993). Dynamics of channel
negotiate with their government. Organization Studies, negotiations: Contention and reciprocity. Psychology &
16. 27-54. Marketing, 10, 47-65.
Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Fang, T. (2006). Negotiation: The Chinese style. The Journal
Resolution, 2, 265-79. of Business & Industrial Marketing, 21 (1), 50-60.
Deutsch, M. (1962). Cooperation and trust: Some theoretical Faure, G. O. (1999). The cultural dimension of negotiation: The
notes. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on Chinese case. Group Decision and Negotiation, 8, 187-215.
motivation (pp. 275-318). Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press. Felstiner, W. L. F„ Abel, R. L„ & Sarat, A. (1980-81). The
emergence and transformation of disputes: Naming, blam
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict. New Haven, ing, and claiming. Law and Society Review, 15, 631-54.
C'T: Yale University Press.
Ferris, G. R„ Bias, F. R., Douglas, C„ Kolodinsky, R. W., &
Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive justice: A social-psychological Treadway, D. C. (2005). Personal reputation in organiza
perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. tions. In J. Greenberg (Ed.), Organizational behavior: The
state of the science. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their auto
matic and controlled components. Journal of Personality Filley, A. C. (1975). Interpersonal conflict resolution.
and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18. Glenview, IL: Scott Forcsman.
Dialdin, D„ Kopelman, S., Adair, W., Brett, J. M„ Okumura, Fisher, R„ & Ertel, D. (1995). Getting ready to negotiate: The
T„ & Lytle, A. (1999). The distributive outcomes of getting to yes workbook. New York: Penguin.
266 Bibliography
Fisher, R., Ury, W„ & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes: Nego French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social
tiating agreement without giving in (2nd ed.). New York: power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power.
Penguin. Ann Arbor, Ml: Institute for Social Research.
Fiske, S. T„ & Taylor, S. W. E. (1991). Social cognition. Froman, L. A., & Cohen, M. D. (1970). Compromise and
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. logrolling: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining
processes. Behavioral Sciences, 15, 180-83.
Folger, J. P., Poole, M. S., & Stutman, R. K. (1993). Working
through conflict: Strategies for relationships, groups and Frost, P. (1987). Power, politics and influence. In F. M. Jablin,
organizations (2nd ed.). New York: HarperCollins. Handbook of organizational communication., Newbury
Park, CA: Sage., pp. 403-548.
Follett, M. P. (1940). Dynamic administration: The collected
papers of Mary Parker Follett. H. C. Metcalf & Fry, W. R., Firestone, 1. J., & Williams, D. L. (1983).
L. Urwick (Eds.). New York: Harper & Brothers. Negotiation process and outcome of stranger dyads and
dating couplcs: Do lovers lose? Basic and Applied Social
Follett, M. P. (1942). Constructive conflict. In H. C. Metcalf & Psychology, 4, 1-16.
L. Urwick (Eds.), Dynamic administration: The collected
papers of Mary Parker Follett (pp. 30-49). New York: Galinsky, A. D„ Seiden, V. L„ Kim, P H„ & Mcdvcc, V H.
Harper & Brothers. (2002). The dissatisfaction of having your first offer
accepted: The role of counterfactual thinking in
Foo, M. D„ Elfenbein, H. A., Tan, H. H., & Aik, V. C. (2004). negotiations. Personality and Social Psychology
Emotional intelligence and negotiation: The tension Bulletin. 28 (2), 271-83.
between creating and claiming value. International
Journal of Conflict Management, 15, 411-29. Gallupc, R. B„ & Cooper, W. H. (1993). Brainstorming
electronically. Sloan Management Review, J) (I), 27-36.
Foreman, P., & Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Learning to avoid the
winner's curse. Organizational Behavior and Human Ganesan, S. (1993). Negotiation strategics and the nature of
Decision Processes, 67, 170-80. channel relationships. Journal of Marketing Research,
30. 183-203.
Forgas, J. P. (1992). Affect in social judgments and decisions:
A multiproccss model. Advances in Experimental Social Gelfand, M. J., & Dyer, N. (2000). A cultural perspective on
Psychology, 25. 227-75. negotiation: Progress, pitfalls, and prospects. Applied
Psychology: An International Review. 49, 62-99.
Forgas, J. P., & Fiedler, K. (1996). Us and them: Mood effects
on intergroup discrimination. Journal of Personality and Gelfand, M„ Higgins, M„ Nishii, L. H„ Raver, J. L„
Social Psychology, 70, 28 40. Dominguez, A., Murakami, F., Yamaguchi, S., and
Toyama, M. (2002). Culture and egocentric perceptions
Foster, D. A. (1992). Bargaining across borders: How to nego of fairness in conflict and negotiation. Journal of
tiate business successfully anywhere in the world. New Applied Psychology, 87 (5), pp. 833-45.
York: McGraw-Hill.
Gentner, J., Loewenstein, J., & Thompson, L. (2003). Learning
Fragalc, A. R„ & Heath, C. (2004). Evolving informational and transfer: A general role for analogical encoding.
credentials: The (mis)attribution of believable facts to Journal of Educational Psychology, 95, 393—408.
credible sources. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 30, 225-36. George, J. M„ Jones, G. R„ & Gonzalez, J. A. (1998). The role
of affect in cross-cultural negotiations. Journal of
Francis, J. N. P. (1991). When in Rome? The effects of International Business Studies. 29, 749-72.
cultural adaptation on intcrcultural business
negotiations. Journal of International Business Ghosh, D. (1996). Nonstrategic delay in bargaining: An
Studies, 22, 403-28, experimental investigation. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 67, 312-25.
Friedman, Raymond A. (1994). Front Stage, Backstage: The
Diamatic Structure of Labor Negotiations. Cambridge, Gibb, J. (1961). Defensive communication. Journal of
MA: Massachusetts Institute ofTcchnology. Communication, 3, 141—48.
Friedman, R„ Anderson, C'., Brett, J., Olekalns, M„ Goates, Gillespie, J. J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1997). Parasitic
N., & Lisco, C. C. (2004). The positive and negative integration: Win-win agreements containing losers.
effects of anger on dispute resolution: Evidence from Negotiation Journal 13, 271-82.
electronically mediated disputes. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 89, 369-76. Gillespie, J. J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1998, April). Pre
settlement settlement (PreSS): A simple technique for
Bibliography 267
initiating complex negotiations. Negotiation Journal, 14, Greenhalgh, L., & Chapman, D. (1996). Relationships be
149-59. tween disputants: Analysis of their characteristics and
impact. In S. Gleason (Ed.), Frontiers in dispute resolu
Girard J. (1989). How to dose every sale. New York: Warner tion and human resources (pp. 203-28). East Lansing,
Books. MI: Michigan State University Press.
Goatcs, N. (2008, August). Reputation as a basis for trust: Social Greenhalgh, L„ & Gilkey, R. W. (1993). The effect of relation
information, emotional state and trusting behavior. Paper ship orientation on negotiators cognitions and tactics.
presented to the Academy of Management Annual Meetings. Group Decision and Negotiation, 2, 167-86.
Goffinan, E. (1969). Strategic interaction. Philadelphia, PA: Greenhalgh, L., & Kramer, R. M. (1990). Strategic choice in
University of Philadelphia Press. conflicts: The importance of relationships. In K. Zald
(Ed.), Organizations and nation states: New perspectives
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. New York: Harper & Row. on conflict and cooperation (pp. 181 -220). San
Francisco: Josscy-Bass.
Gonzalez, R. M., Lcrner, J. S., Moore, D. A., & Babcock, L. C.
(2004). Mad, mean, and mistaken: The effects of anger Gruder, C. L„ & Duslak, R. J. (1973). Elicitation of cooperation
on strategic social perception and behavior. Paper by retaliatory and nonretaliatory strategies in a mixed mo
presented at the annual meeting of the International tive game. .Journal of Conflict Resolution. 17, 162-174.
Association for Conflict Management, Pittsburgh.
Hall, J. (1969). Conflict management survey: A survey of one's
Gordon, T. (1977). Leader effectiveness training. New York: characteristic reaction to and handling conflict between
Wydcn Books. himself and others. C'onroc, TX: Teleometrics International.
Graham, J. L., & Mintu-Wimsat, A. (1997). Culture’s Harinck, F., de Drcu, C. K. W„ & Van Viancn, A. E. M.
influence on business negotiations in four countries. (2000). The impact of conflict issues on fixcd-pic
Group Decision and Negotiation, 6, 483 502. perceptions, problem solving, and integrative outcomes
in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human
Graham, J. L„ & Sano.Y. (1989). Smart bargaining. New Decision Processes, HI, 329-58.
York: Harper Business.
Hartzcll, C. A. (1999). Explaining the stability of negotiated
Gray, B. (1991). The framing of disputes: Partners, processes settlements to intrastatc wars. Journal of Conflict
and outcomes in different contexts. Paper presented Resolution, 43. 3 -22.
at the annual confercncc of the International
Association of Conflict Management, Den Dolder, The Hegarty, W., & Sims, H. P. (1978). Some determinants of
Netherlands. unethical decision behavior: An experiment. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 63, 451-57.
Gray, B. (1994). The gender-based foundation of negotiation
theory. In B. H. Sheppard, R. J. Lewicki, & R. J. Bies Hcgtvedt, K. A., & Killian, C. (1999). Fairness and emotions:
(Eds.), Research in negotiation in organizations (Vol. 4, Reactions to the process and outcomes of negotiations.
pp. 3-36). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Social Forces, 78, 269-303.
Gray, B. (1997). Framing and rcframing of intractable environ Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations.
mental disputes. In R. J. Lewicki, R. J. Bics & B. Sheppard New York: John Wiley and Sons.
(Eds.), Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 6,
pp. 163-88). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Hendon, D. W., & Hendon, R. A. (1990). World-class negotiat
ing: Dealmaking in the global marketplace. New York:
Gray, B., & Donnellon, A. (1989). An interactive theory of John Wiley and Sons.
reframing in negotiation. Unpublished manuscript.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self discrepancy theory: A theory relating
Green, R. M. (1994). The ethical manager: A new method for self and affect. Psychological Review. 94. 319-40.
business ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hilty, J. A., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Black-hat/white-hat
Greenberg, J. (1990). Organizational justice: Yesterday, today, strategy in bilateral negotiation. Organizational
tomorrow. Journal of Management, 16, 299 432. Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55, 444-69.
Greenberg, J., & Colquitt, J. (2005). Handbook of organizational Hinton, B. L„ Hamncr, W. C„ & Pohlan, N. F. (1974).
justice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrencc Erlbaum Associates. Influence and award of magnitude, opening bid and
concession rate on profit earned in a managerial
Greenhalgh, L. (2001). Managing strategic relationships. negotiating game. Behavioral Science. 19. 197-203.
New York: Free Press.
268 Bibliography
Hitt, W. (1990). Elliics and leadership: Putting theory into Ikle, F. C. (1964). How nations negotiate. New York:
practice. Columbus, OH: Battelle Press. Harper & Row.
Hochberg, A. M„ & Kressel, K. (1996). Determinations of Isajiw, W. W. (2000). Approaches to ethnic conflict resolution:
successful and unsuccessful divorce negotiations. paradigms and principles. International Journal of Inter-
Journal of Divorce and Remarriage, 25, 1-21. Cultural Relations, 24, 105-24.
Hocker, J. L„ & Wilmot, W. W. (1985). Interpersonal conflict Isen, A. M„ & Baron, R. A. (1991). Positive affect as a factor
(2nd cd.). Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown. in organizational behavior. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cum
mings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol.
Hofstcdc, G. (1980a). Motivation, leadership, and organiza 13, pp. 1-53). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
tion: Do American theories apply abroad? Organiza
tional Dynamics, 9, 42-63. Ivey, A. E„ & Simek-Downing, L. (1980). Counseling and
psychotherapy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hofstede, G. (1980b). Culture 's consequences: International dif
ferences in work related values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Jacobs, A. T. (1951). Some significant factors influencing the
range of indetcrminatcness in collective bargaining ne
Hofstede, G. (1989). Cultural predictors of national negotia gotiations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University
tion styles. In. F. Mautner-Markhof (Ed.), Processes of of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
international negotiations ( p p . 193-201). Boulder, CO:
Westview Press. Janosik, R. J. (1987). Rethinking the culture-negotiation link.
Negotiation Journal 3, 385-95.
Hofstede, G. (1991). Culture and organizations: Software of
the mind. London, UK: McGraw-Hill. Jehn, E„ & Mannix, E. (2001). The dynamic nature of conflict: A
longitudinal study of intragroup conflict and group perfor
Hofstede, G., & Bond, M. H. (1988). Confucius and economic mance. Academy of Management Journal, 44 (2), 238-51.
growth: New trends in culture’s consequences.
Organizational Dynamics, 16, 4-21. Jensen, L. (1995). Issue flexibility in negotiating internal war.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Holaday, L. C. (2002). Stage development theory: A natural Science. 542, 116-30.
framework for understanding the mediation process.
Negotiation Journal, 18 (3), 191-210. Johnson, D. W. (1971). Role reversal: A summary and review
of the research. International Journal of Group Tensions,
Homans, G. C. (1961). Social behavior: Its elementary forms. 1. 318-34.
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Co.
Johnston, R. W. (1982, March-April). Negotiation strategics:
Hopmann, P. T. (1995). Two paradigms of negotiation: Different strokes for different folks. Personnel, 59, 36-45.
Bargaining and problem solving. Annals of the American
Academy. 542, 24-47. Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1976). The actor and the
observer: Divergent perceptions of causality. In
Hosmer, L. T. (2003). The ethics of management (4th ed.). J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. Carson (Eds.),
Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. Contemporary topics in social psychology (pp. 37-52).
Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Howard, E. S., Gardner, W. L„ & Thompson, L. (2007). The role
of the self-concept and the social context in determining Jones, M„ & Worchel, S. (1992). Representatives in negotiation:
the behavior of power holders: Self-construal in intcr- “Internal” variables that affect "external’’ negotiations.
group versus dyadic dispute resolution negotiations. Jour Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 13 (3), 323-36.
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 614-31.
Kahneman, D„ Knctsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990).
Huang, X., & van de Vliert, E. (2004). A multilevel approach Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the C'oasc
to investigating cross-national differences in negotiation Theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325—48.
processes. International Negotiation, 9, 471—484.
Kahneman, D„ & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An
Hunt, C. S., & Kernan, M. C. (2005). Framing negotiations in analysis of decisions under risk. Econometrica, 47,
affcctivc terms: Methodological and preliminary 263-91.
theoretical findings. International Journal of Conflict
Management, 16, 128-156. Kale, S. H„ & Barnes, J. W. (1992). Understanding the domain
of cross-national buyer-seller interactions. Journal of
Ibarra, H„ & Andrews, S. (1993). Power, social influence and International Business Studies, 23, 101-32.
sense making: Effects of network centrality and
proximity on employee perceptions. Administrative Kaplan, Robert. (1984, Spring). Trade routes: The manager’s net
Science Quarterly, 38, 277-303. work of relationships. Organizational Dynamics, 12, 37-52.
Bibliography 269
Karrass, C. L. (1974). Give and take. New York: Thomas Y. Kolb, D. M„ & Putnam, L. L. (1997). Through the looking
Crowell. glass: Negotiation theory refracted through the lens of
gender. In S. Gleason (Ed ), Frontiers in dispute resolution
Karrass, G. (1985). Negotiate to close: How to make more in labor relations and human resources (pp. 231-57). East
successful deals. New York: Simon & Schuster. Lansing, Ml: Michigan State University Press.
Kellerman, J. L., Lewis, J., & Laird, J. D. (1989). Looking and Komorita, S. S., & Brenner, A. R. (1968). Bargaining and con
loving: The effects of mutual gaze on feelings of roman cessions under bilateral monopoly. Journal of Personal
tic love. Journal of Research in Personality. 23, 145-61. ity and Social Psychology, 9, 15-20.
Kelley, H. H. (1966). A classroom study of the dilemmas in Kopclman, S., Rosette, A. S., & Thompson, L. (2006). The three
interpersonal negotiation. In K. Archibald (Ed.), Strategic faces of Eve: Strategic display of positive, negative, and
interaction and conflict: Original papers and discussion neutral emotions in negotiations. Organizational Behavior
(pp. 49-73). Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies. and Human Decision Processes, 99, 81-101.
Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. (1969). Group problem solving. In Kotter, J. (1979). Power in management. New York: AMACOM.
G. Lindzcy & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social
psychology (2nd ed.), (Vol. 4, pp. 1101). Reading, MA: Kozan, M. K„ & Ergin, C. (1999). The influence of intra-cultural
Addison-Wesley. value differences on conflict management processes. Inter
national Journal of Conflict Management, 10, 249-67.
Kemp, K. E., & Smith, W. P. (1994). Information exchange,
toughness, and integrative bargaining: The roles of Krackhardt, D., & Hanson, J. R. (1993, July-August).
explicit cues and perspective-taking. International Informal networks: The company behind the chart.
Journal of Con flict Management, 5, 5-21. Harvard Business Review, 71, 104-11.
Kennedy, G. (1985). Doing business abroad. New York: Kramer, R. (1994). The sinister attribution error: Paranoid
Simon & Schuster. cognition and collective distrust in organizations.
Motivation and Emotion, 18, 199-203.
Kim, P. H. (1997). Strategic timing in group negotiations: The
implications of forced entry and forced exit for negotia Kramer, R. M. (1991). The more the merrier? Social
tors with unequal power. Organizational Behavior and psychological aspects of multiparty negotiations in
Human Decision Processes, 71. 263-86. organizations. In M. H. Bazerman, R. J. Lewicki, &
B. H. Sheppard, Research on negotiation in organiza
Kim, 1’ H„ Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). tions (Vol. 3, pp. 307-32). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
When more blame is better than less; The implications of
internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a Kramer, R. M., Pommcrenke, P., & Newton, B. (1993). The
competcncc- vs. integrity-based trust violation. Organiza social context of negotiation: Effects of trust, aspiration
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99,49-65. and gender on negotiation tactics. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 38 (1), 9-22.
Kim, P. H., Pinklcy, R. L. & Fragale, A. R. (2005). Power
dynamics in negotiation. Academy of Management Kristensen, H„ & Garling, T. (1997). The effects of anchor
Review, 30, (4), 799-822. points and reference points on negotiation process and
outcome. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Kimmcl, M. J., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J. M„ Konar-Goldband, Processes, 71, 85-94.
E„ & Carnevalc, P. J. D. (1980). Effects of trust aspiration
and gender on negotiation tactics. Journal of Personality Kristensen, H„ & Garling, T. (2000). Anchor points, reference
and Social Psychology, 38, 9-23. points, and counteroffers in negotiations. Group Deci
sion and Negotiation, 9, 493-505.
Kleinke, C. L. (1986). Gaze and eye contact: A research
review. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 78-100. Ku, G. (2008). Learning to de-escalate: The effects of regret in
escalation of commitment. Organizational Behavior and
Koehn, D. (1997). Business and game playing: The false Human Decision Processes, 105, 221-232.
analogy. Journal of Business Ethics, 16, 1447-52.
Kumar, R. (1997). The role of affect in negotiations: An inte
Koeszegi, S. (2004). Trust building strategics in inter- grative overview. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science,
organizational negotiations. Journal of Managerial 5(1), 84-100.
Psychology, 19, (6), 640-660.
Kumar, R. (2004). Brahmanical idealism, anarchical
Koh, T. T. B. (1996). American strengths and weaknesses. individualism, and the dynamics of Indian negotiating
Negotiation Journal, 12, 313-17. behavior. International Journal of Cross Cultural
Management. 4, 39-58.
Kolb, D. (1985). The mediators. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
270 Bibliography
Kumar, R„ & Worm, V. (2004). Institutional dynamics and the Lewicki, R. J., Hiam, A., & Olander, K. (1996). Think before
negotiation process: comparing India and China. Interna you speak: The complete guide to strategic negotiation.
tional Journal of Conflict Management, 15 (3), 304-334. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Kwon, S., & Weingart, L. R. (2004). Unilateral concessions Lewicki, R. J., & Robinson, R. (1998). A factor-analytic study of
from the other party: Concession behavior, attributions, negotiator ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 18, 211-28.
and negotiations judgments. Journal of Applied Psychol
ogy, 89, 263-278. Lewicki, R. J., & Spcncer, G. (1990, June). Lies and dirty
tricks. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
LaFasto, F. M. J., & Larson, C. E. (2001). When teams work International Association for Conflict Management,
best. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Vancouver, B. C., Canada.
Landon, E. L., Jr. (1997). For the most fitting deal, tailor Lewicki, R. J., & Spencer, G. (1991, August). Ethical
negotiating strategy to each borrower. Commercial relativism and negotiating tactics: Factors affecting their
Lending Review, 12, 5-14. perceived ethicality. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Academy of Management, Miami, FL.
Larrick, R. P., & Wu, G. (2007). Claiming a large slice of a small
pie: Asymmetric disconfirmation in negotiation. Journal of Lewicki, R. J., & Stark, N. (1995). What’s ethically appropriate
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 212-233. in negotiations: An empirical examination of bargaining
tactics. Social Justice Research. 9. 69-95.
Lax, D„ & Sebenius, J. (1986). The manager as negotiator:
Bargaining for cooperation and competitive gain. New Lewicki, R. J., Weiss, S., & Lewin, D. (1992). Models of con
York: Free Press. flict, negotiation and third-party intervention: A review and
synthesis. Journal of Organizational Behavior. 13, 209-52.
Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (2002). Dealcrafting: The
substance of three-dimensional negotiations. Negotiation Liebert, R. M„ Smith, W. P., & Hill, J. H. (1968). The effccts
Journal. 18, 5-28. of information and magnitude of initial offer on
interpersonal negotiation. Journal of Experimental
Lc Poole, S. (1989). Negotiating with Clint Eastwood in Social Psychology, 4, 431-41.
Brussels. Management Review, 78. 58-60.
Lim, R. G. (1997). Overconfidcncc in negotiation revisited.
Leung, K., Tong, K., & Ho, S. S. (2004). Effects of interac International Journal of Conflict Management, 8, 52-70.
tional justice on egocentric bias in resource allocation
decisions. Journal of Applied Psychology. 89 (3), 405-15. Lim, R. G., & Murnighan, J. K. (1994). Phases, deadlines, and
the bargaining process. Organizational Behavior and
Levinson, J. C„ Smith, M. S. A., & Wilson, O. R. (1999). Human Decision Processes, 58, 153-71.
Guerilla negotiating. New York: John Wiley.
Lin, X., & Miller, S. J. (2003). Negotiation approaches: Direct
Lewicki, R., Wiethoff, C., & Tomlinson, E. (2005). What is the and indirect effccts of national culture. International
role of trust in organizational justice? In Greenberg, J. Marketing Review, 20, 286-303.
and Colquitt, J. Handbook of organizational justice
(pp. 247-72). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Lindskold, S., Bentz, B., & Walters, P. D. (1986). Trust
development, the GRIT proposal and the effects of
Lewicki, R. J. (1983). Lying and deception: A behavioral model. conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation. Psycholog
In M. H. Bazcrman & R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in ical Bulletin, 85, 772-93.
organizations (pp. 68-90). Beverly Hills, C'A: Sage.
Locke, E., & Latham, G. (1984). Goal setting: A motivational
Lewicki, R. J. (1992). Negotiating strategically. In A. Cohen technique that works\ Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
(Ed.), The portable MBA in management (pp. 147-89).
New York: John Wiley and Sons. Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989).
Social utility and decision making in interpersonal
Lewicki, R. J„ & Dineen, B. R. (2002). Negotiating in virtual contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
organizations. In Hcncman, R. L. & Grecnbergcr, 57 (3), 426^11.
D. B. Human resource management in virtual organiza
tions. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Loewenstein, J., Morris, M.W., Chakravarti, A., Thompson, L„ &
Kopclman, S. (2005). At a loss for words: Dominating the
Lewicki, R. J., Gray, B„ & Elliott, M. (2003). Making sense of conversation and the outcome in negotiation as a function of
intractable environmental disputes. Washington, DC: intricate arguments and communication media. Organiza
Island Press. tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 98, 28-38.
Lewicki, R. J., & Hiam, A. (1999). The fast forward MBA in ne Loewenstein, J., & Thompson, L. (2000). The challenge of
gotiation and dealmaking. New York: John Wiley and Sons. learning. Negotiation Journal, 16, 399-408.
Bibliography 271
Loewenstein, J„ Thompson, L„ & Gentner, D. (1999). Analog McDonald, J. W. (1996). An American’s view of a U.S. negoti
ical encoding facilitates knowledge transfer in organiza ating style. International Negotiation, I, 323-26.
tions. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 6, 586-97.
McGraw, D. (1997, October 20). Will he own the road? U.S.
Loewenstein, J„ Thompson, L„ & Gentner, D. (2003). Analog News & World Report, pp. 45-54.
ical learning in negotiation teams: Comparing cases
promotes learning and transfer. Academy of Management Metcalf, L. E„ Bird, A„ Peterson, M. F„ Shankarmahesh,
Learning and Education, 2, 119-27. M„ & Lituchy, T. R. (2007). Cultural influences in
negotiations: A four country comparative analysis.
Macduff, I. (2006). Your pace or mine? Culture, time, and International Journal of Cross Cultural Management,
negotiation. Negotiation Journal, 22 (1), 31 -45. 7(2), 147-68.
Macneil, I. R. (1980). The new social contract. New Haven, Metcalf, L. E„ Bird, A., Shankarmahesh, M., Aycan, Z., Larimo, J.,
CT: Yale University Press. & Valdelamar, D. D. (2006). Cultural tendencies in negotia
tion: A comparison of Finland, India, Mexico, Turkey, and
Malhotra, D. K. (2003). Reciprocity in the context of trust: the United States. Journal of World Business, 41, 382-94.
The differing perspective of trustors and trusted parties.
Dissertation Abstracts, 63, 11-18. Midgaard, K.., & Underal, A. (1977). Multiparty conferences.
In D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations: Social psychologi
Malhotra, D. K. (2004). Trust and reciprocity decisions: The cal perspectives (pp. 329-45). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
differing perspectives of trustors and trusted parties.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving bias in the
Processes. 94 (2), 61-73. attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological
Bulletin. 82, 213-25.
Malhotra, D„ & Bazerman, M. H. (2007). Investigative
negotiation. Harvard Business Review, 85, 72-78. Mintzberg, H„ & Quinn, J. B. (1991). The strategy process:
Concepts, contexts, cases (2nd cd.). Englewood Cliffs,
Manz, C. C., Neck, C. P., Mancuso, J., & Manz, K. P. (1997). NJ: Prentice Hall.
For team members only. New York: AMACOM.
Missner, M. (1980). Ethics of the business system. Sherman
Matsumoto, D„ & Yoo, S. H. (2006). Toward a new generation Oaks, CA: Alfred Publishing Company.
of cross-cultural research. Perspectives on Psychological
Science, I (3), 234-250. Molm, L., Takahashi, N„ & Peterson, G. (2003). In the eye of
the beholder: Procedural justice in social exchange.
Maxwell, S., Nye, P., & Maxwell, N. (1999). Less pain, some American Sociological Review, 68 (1), pp. 128-52.
gain: The effects of priming fairness in price negotia
tions. Psychology and Marketing, 16 (7), pp. 545-62. Moran, R. T„ & Stripp, W. G. (1991). Dynamics of successful
international business negotiations. Houston, TX: Gulf
Maxwell, S., Nye, P., & Maxwell, N. (2003). The wrath of the Publishing.
fairness-primed negotiator when the reciprocity is violated.
Journal of Business Research, 56 (5), pp. 399-409. Moran, S., & Ritov, I. (2002). Initial perceptions in negotia
tions: Evaluation and response to “logrolling" offers.
Mayer, J. D„ Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. (2000). Emotional intel Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15, 101-24.
ligence. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of intelligence
(pp. 396-420). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morlcy, I., & Stephenson, G. (1977). The social psychology of
bargaining. London: Allen and Unwin.
Mayfield, M., Mayfield, J., Martin, D., & Herbig, P. (1997).
Time perspectives of the cross-cultural negotiations Morris, M„ Nadler, J., Kurtzbcrg, T„ & Thompson, L. (2000).
process. American Business Review, 15, 78-85. Schmooze or lose: Social friction and lubrication in
e-mail negotiations. Group Dynamics-Theory Research
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as and Practice, 6, 89-100.
foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organiza
tions. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 24-59. Mosterd, 1„ & Ruttc, C. G. (2000). Effects of time pressure and
accountability to constituents on negotiation. International
McClelland, D. C. (1975). Power: The inner experience. New Journal of Conflict Management, II (3), 227-47.
York: Irvington.
Mouzas, S. (2006). Negotiating umbrella agreements.
McClelland, D. C„ & Burnham, D. H. (1976). Power is the great Negotiation Journal, 22 (3), 279-301.
motivator. Harvard Business Re\’iew, 43 (2), 100-110.
Murnighan, J. K. (1986). Organizational coalitions: Structural
McComack, S. A., & Levine, T. R. (1990). When lies are contingencies and the formation process. In
uncovered: Emotional and relational outcomes of discovered R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, & M. H. Bazerman
deception. Communication Monographs, 57. 119-38.
272 Bibliography
(Eds.), Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 1, In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in orga
pp. 155-73). Greenwich, CT: JA1 Press. nizational behavior (Vol. 13, pp. 147-90). Greenwich, CT:
JAI Press.
Myerson, D., Weick, K. E., & Kramer, R. M. (1996). Swift trust
and temporary groups. In R. M. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), Nelson, D., & Wheeler, M. (2004). Rocks and hard places:
Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research Managing two tensions in negotiation. Negotiation Jour
(pp. 166-95). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. nal, 20, 113-125.
Nadler, J., Thompson, L., & Van Boven, L. (2003). Learning Nemeth, C. J. (1986). Differential contributions to majority and
negotiation skills: Four models of knowledge creation minority influence. Psychological Review. 93, 23-32.
and transfer. Management Science, 49, 529-40.
Nemeth, C. J. (1989). The stimulating properties of dissent.
Naquin, C. E. (2002). The agony of opportunity in negotiation: Paper presented at the first annual Conference on Group
Number of negotiable issues, counterfactual thinking, Process and Productivity, Texas A & M University,
and feelings of satisfaction. Organizational Behavior College Station, TX.
and Human Decision Processes. 91, 97-107.
Nierenbcrg, G. (1976). The complete negotiator. New York:
Naquin, C. E., & Paulson, G. D. (2003). Online bargaining Niercnbcrg & Zeif Publishers.
and interpersonal trust. Journal of Applied Psychology,
8 8 ( 1 ) , 113-20. Nicrcnberg, G„ & Calero, H. (1971). How to read a person
tike a book. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18,
155-62. Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs,
and real estate: An anchoring and adjustment perspective
Natlandsmyr, J. H„ & Rognes, J. (1995). Culture, behavior, on property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior
and negotiation outcomes: A comparative and cross- and Human Decision Processes, 39, 228—41.
cultural study of Mexican and Norwegian negotiators.
International Journal of Conflict Management, 6, 5-29. Novcmsky, N., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2004). What makes
negotiators happy? The differential effects of internal
Neale, M., & Bazcrman, M. H. (1983). The role of perspective- and external social comparisons on negotiator satisfac
taking ability in negotiating under different forms of arbi tion. Organization Behavior and Human Decision
tration. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 36, 378-88. Processes, 95, 186-97.
Neale, M„ & Bazcrman, M. H. (1985). The effects of framing O’Connor, K. M. (1997). Motives and cognitions in negotia
and negotiator ovcrconfidcncc on bargaining behaviors and tion: A theoretical integration and an empirical test. In
outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 28, 34-49. ternational Journal of Conflict Management, 8, 114—31.
Neale, M., & Bazerman, M. H. (1991). Cognition and O’Connor, K. M„ & Arnold, J. A. (2001). Distributive spirals:
rationality in negotiation. New York: Free Press. Negotiation impasses and the moderating role of
disputant sclf-cfficacy. Organizational Behavior and
Neale, M. A., & Bazcrman, M. H. (1992a). Negotiator Human Decision Processes, 84, 148-76.
cognition and rationality: A behavioral decision theory
perspective. Organizational Behavior and Human O’Connor, K. M„ & Carnevale, P. J. (1997). A nasty but
Decision Processes, 51, 157-75. effective negotiation strategy: Misrepresentation of a
common-value issue. Personality and Social Psychology
Neale, M„ & Bazerman, M. H. (1992b). Negotiating ratio Bulletin, 23, 504-15.
nally: The power and impact of the negotiator’s frame.
Academy of Management Executive, 6 (3), 42-51. Ogawa, N. (1999). The concept of faccwork: Its function in the
Hawaii model of mediation. Mediation Quarterly, 17, 5-20.
Neale, M„ Huber, V., &Northcraft, G. (1987). The framing of
negotiations: Contextual vs. task frames. Organizational Ohanyan, A. (1999). Negotiation culture in a post-Soviet con
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 228—41. text: An interdisciplinary perspective. Mediation Quar
terly, 17, 83-104.
Neale, M. A., & Northcraft, G. B. (1986). Experts, amateurs,
and refrigerators: Comparing expert and amateur Ohbuchi, K„ & Takahashi, Y. (1994). Cultural styles of con
negotiators in a novel task. Organizational Behavior and flict management in Japanese and Americans: Passivity,
Human Decision Processes, 38. 305-17. covcrtncss, and effectiveness of strategies. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 24, 1345-66.
Neale, M. A., & Northcraft, G. B. (1991). Behavioral negotiation
theory: A framework for conceptualizing dyadic bargaining. Olekalns, M. (2002). Negotiation as social interaction.
Australian Journal of Management. 27, 39-46.
Bibliography 273
Olckalns, M., Lau, F., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Resolving the empty during divorce mediation. Conflict Resolution Quarterly,
core: Trust as a determinant of outcomes in three-party ne 2 0 ( 1 ) , 23-50.
gotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation, 16, 527-538.
Pinkley, R. L. (1992). Dimensions of conflict frame: Relation
Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. (2001). Mctacognition in negotia to disputant perceptions and expectations. International
tion: The identification of critical events and their role in Journal of Conflict Management, 3, 95—113.
shaping trust and outcomes. Melbourne Business School
Working Paper 2001-15. Pinkley, R. L. (1995). Impact of knowledge regarding alterna
tives to settlement in dyadic negotiations: Whose knowl
Olekalns, M„ & Smith, P. (2005). Moments in time: edge counts? Journal of Applied Psychology, 80, 403-17.
Metacognitions, trust and outcomes in dyadic
negotiations. Personality and Social Psychology Pinkley, R. L„ Griffith, T. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1995).
Bulletin, 31 (12), 1696-707. “Fixed pie" a la mode: Information availability, informa
tion processing, and the negotiation of suboptimal agree
Olekalns, M., Smith, P. L., & Walsh, T. (1996). The process of ments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
negotiating: Strategy and timing as predictors of Processes, 62, 101-12.
outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 68, 68-77. Pinkley, R. L., Neale, M. A., & Bennett, R. J. (1994). The im
pact of alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiation.
Oliver, R. L., Balakrishnan, R V., & Barry, B. (1994). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Outcome satisfaction in negotiation: A test of expectancy Processes, 57. 97-116.
disconfirmation. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 60, 252-75. Pinkley, R. L„ & Northcraft, G. B. (1994). Cognitive interpreta
tions of conflict: Implications for dispute processes and
Palich, L. E., C'arini, G. R., & Livingstone, L. P. (2002). outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 193-205.
Comparing American and Chinese negotiating styles:
The influence of logic paradigms. Thunderhird Polzer, J. T„ Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (1995). Multiparty
International Business Review, 44, 777-98. negotiations in a social context. In R. Kramer &
D. Messick (Eds.), Negotiation as a social process
Parrott W. (1994). Beyond hedonism: Motives for inhibiting good (pp. 123—42). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
moods and for maintaining bad moods. In D. M. Wegner &
J. W Pennebaker (Eds.), Handbook of mental control Polzer, J. T„ Mannix, E. A„ & Neale, M. A. (1998). Interest
(pp. 278-305). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. alignment and coalitions in multiparty negotiation.
Academy of Management Journal. 41 (1), 42-54.
Parrott, W. G. (2001). Emotions in social psychology: Volume
overview. In W. G. Parrott (Ed.), Emotions in social psy Provis, C. (1996). Interests vs. positions: A critique of the
chology (pp. 1-19). Philadelphia: Psychology Press. distinction. Negotiation Journal. 12, 305-23.
Patterson, J„ & Kim, P. (1991). The day America told the Pruitt, D. G. (1981). Negotiation behavior. New York:
truth. New York: Prentice Hall. Academic Press.
Pfcffer, J. (1992). Managing with power. Boston, MA: Harvard Pruitt, D. G. (1983). Strategic choice in negotiation. American
Business School Press. Behavioral Scientist, 27, 167-94.
Pfcffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1974). Organizational decision Pruitt, D. G„ & Carnevale, P. J. D. (1993). Negotiation in so
making as a political process: The case of a university cial conflict. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-C’ole.
budget. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19, 135-51.
Pruitt, D. G„ & Lewis, S. A. (1975). Development of integra
Pfouts, R. W. (1994). Buying a pig when both buyer and seller tive solutions in bilateral negotiation. Journal of Person
are in a poke. Atlantic Economic Journal, 22, 80-85. ality and Social Psychology, 31, 621-33.
Phatak, A. V., & Habib, M. H. (1996). The dynamics of interna Pruitt, D. G., & Rubin, J. Z. (1986). Social conflict: Escalation,
tional business negotiations. Business Horizons, 39, 30-38. stalemate and settlement. New York: Random House.
Pillutla, M. M„ & Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Unfairness, anger Pruitt, D. G„ & Syna, H. (1985). Mismatching the opponent’s
and spite: Emotional rejections of ultimatum offers. Or offers in negotiation. Journal of Experimented Social
ganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Psychology. 21, 103-13.
68 (3), 208-24.
Putnam, L. L. (1994). Productive conflict: Negotiation as im
Pines, A. M., Gat, H., & Tal, Y. (2002). Gender differences plicit coordination. International Journal of Conflict
and content and style of argument between couples Management, 5, 284-98.
274 Bibliography
Putnam, L. L„ & Holmer, M. (1992). Framing, refraining, and bargaining tactics: The SINS scalc. Journal of
issue development. In L. Putnam & M. Roloff (Eds.), Organizational Behavior, 21. 649-64.
Communication and negotiation (pp. 128-55). Newbury
Park, CA: Sage. Rogers, C. R. (1957). Active listening. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Putnam, L. L„ & Jones, T. S. (1982). Reciprocity in negotia
tions: An analysis of bargaining interaction. Communica Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist's
tion Monographs, 49, 171-91. view of psychotherapy. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Putnam, L. L„ & Wilson, S. R. (1989). Argumentation and Ross, L., Green, D„ & House, P. (1977). The false consensus
bargaining strategies as discriminators of integrative phenomenon: An attributional bias in self-pcrccption and
outcomes. In M. A. Rahim (Ed.), Managing conflict: An in social-perccption processes. Journal of Experimental
terdisciplinary approach (pp. 121-31). New York: Praeger. Social Psychology, 13, 279-301.
Putnam, L., Wilson, S., & Turner, D. (1990). The evolution of Ross, M. H. (2000). “Good-enough" isn’t so bad: Thinking about
policy arguments in teachers’ negotiations. success and failure in ethnic conflict management. Peace
Argumentation, 4, 129-52. and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6, 21-27.
Pye, L. W. (1992). Chinese negotiating style. New York: Roth, A., & Malouf, M. (1979). Game-theoretic models and
Quorum Books. the role of information in bargaining. Psychological
Review, 86, 574-94.
Quinn, J. B. (1991). Strategies for changc. In H. Mintzberg &
J. B. Quinn (Eds.), The strategy process: Concepts, Roth, A. E., Murnighan, J. K., & Schoumakcr, F. (1988). The
contexts, cases (2nd cd., pp. 4-12). Englewood Cliffs, deadline effect in bargaining: Some empirical evidence.
NJ: Prcnticc Hall. American Economic Review, 78, 806-23.
Rahim, M. A. (1983). A measure of styles of handling inter Roth, J., & Sheppard, B. H. (1995). Opening the black box of
personal conflict. Academy of Management Journal, 26, framing research: The relationship between frames,
368-76. communication, and outcomes. Academy of Management
Proceedings.
Rahim, M. A. (1992). Managing conflict in organizations (2nd
cd.). Westport, CT: Praeger. Rubin, J., Pruitt, D., & Kim, S. H. (1994). Social conflict:
Escalation, stalemate and settlement (2nd ed.). New
Raiffa, H. (1982). The art and science of negotiation. Cambridge, York: McGraw-Hill.
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). The social psychology of
Rapoport, A. (1964). Strategy and conscience. New York: bargaining and negotiation. New York: Academic Press.
Harper & Row.
Rubin, J. Z., & Sander, F. E. A. (1991). Culture, negotiation, and
Rapoport, A., Erev, I., & Zwick, R. (1995). An experimental the eye of the beholder. Negotiation Journal. 7 (3), 249-54.
study of buyer-sellcr negotiation with one-sided incom
plete information and time discounting. Management Rubinstein, R. A. (2003). Cross cultural considerations in com
Science, 41, 377-94. plex peace operations. Negotiation Journal. 19 (1), 29-49.
Raven, B. (1993). The bases of power: Origins and recent Russo, J. E., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1989). Decision traps:
developments. Journal of Social Issues, 49 (4), 227 51. The ten barriers to brilliant decision making and how to
overcome them. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Raven, B„ Schwartzwald, J. & Koslowski, M. (1998).
Conceptualizing and measuring a power/interaction Salacusc, J. (1998). So, what’s the deal anyway? Contracts and
model of interpersonal influence. Journal of Applied relationships as negotiating goals. Negotiation Journal,
Social Psychology, 28 (4), 297-332. 14 (1), pp. 5-12.
Raven, B. H„ & Rubin, J. Z. (1976). Social psychology: Salacusc, J. W. (1988). Making deals in strange places: A
People in groups. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Seginner's guide to international business negotiations.
Negotiation Journal 4, 5-13.
Richardson, R. C. (1977). Collective bargaining by objectives.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1977). Who gets power and how
they hold on to it: A strategic-contingency model of
Ritov, I. (1996). Anchoring in simulated competitive market power. Organizational Dynamics, 5, 3-21.
negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes. 67, 16-25. Saorin-Iborra, M. C. (2006). A review of negotiation outcome:
A proposal on delimitation and subsequent assessment in
Robinson, R, Lcwicki, R. J., & Donahue, E. (2000). Extending joint venture negotiation. Canadian Journal of
and testing a five factor model of cthical and unethical Administrative Sciences, 23 (3), 237-52.
Bibliography 275
Savage, G. T„ Blair, J. D„ & Sorenson, R. L. (1989). Consider Schweitzer, M. E„ Brodt, S. E., & Croson, R. T. A. (2002).
both relationships and substance when negotiating strate Seeing and believing: Visual access and the strategic use
gically. Academy of Management Executive, 3(1), 37—48. of deception. International Journal of Conflict Manage
ment, 13, 258-75.
Schatzski, M. (1981). Negotiation: The art of getting what you
want. New York: Signet Books. Schwcitzcr, M. E„ Hcrshcy, J. C. & Bradlow, E. T. (2006).
Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust. Organizational
Schein, E. (1988). Organisational Culture and Leadership. Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101, 1-19.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schwcitzcr, M. E„ & Kerr, J. L. (2000). Bargaining under the
Schelling.T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, influence: The role of alcohol in negotiations. Academy
MA: Harvard University Press. of Management Executive. 14, 47-57.
Schlenker, B. R., Helm, B„ & Tedeschi, J. T. (1973). The Sebenius, J. K. (1983). Negotiation arithmetic: Adding and
effects of personality and situational variables on subtracting issues and parties. International Organiza
behavioral trust. Journal of Personality and Social Psy tion, 37, 1-34.
chology, 25 (3), 419-27.
Sebenius, J. K. (1992). Negotiation analysis: A characteriza
Schneider, A. K. (2002). Shattering negotiation myths: Empir tion and review. Management Science, 38, 18-38.
ical evidence on the effectiveness of negotiation style.
Harvard Law Review, 7, 143-233. Sebenius, J. K. (2002a, March). The hidden challenge of cross
border negotiations. Harvard Business Review, 80. 76-85.
Schreisheim, C., & Hinkin, T. R. (1990). Influence strategies
used by subordinates: A theoretical and empirical analysis Sebenius, J. K. (2002b). Caveats for cross-border negotiations.
and refinement of the Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson Negotiation Journal. 18(2.), 121-33.
subscales. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 246-57.
Sclckman, B. M„ Fuller, S. H„ Kennedy, T„ & Baitsel,
Schroth, H. A., Bain-Chekal, J., Caldwell, D. F. (2005). Sticks J. M. (1964). Problems in labor relations. New York:
and stones may break bones and words can hurt me: McGraw-Hill.
Words and phrases that trigger emotions in negotiations
and their effects. International Journal of Conflict Sen, A. K. (1970). Collective choice and individual values.
Management, 16, 102-127. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
Schurr, P. H. (1987). Effects of gain and loss decision frames Senge, P. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the
on risky purchase negotiations. Journal of Applied teaming organization. New York: Doublcday Currency.
Psychology, 72 (3), 351-58.
Shah, P P., & Jehn, K. A. (1993). Do friends perform better than
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Univcrsals in the content and structure acquaintances? The interaction of friendship, conflict and
of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in task. Group Decision and Negotiation, 2, 149-65.
20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimen
tal social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1-65). Orlando, Shapiro, D. L. (1991). The effects of explanations on negative
FL: Acadcmic Press. reactions to deceit. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36,
614-30.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism and collectivism:
New cultural dimensions of values. In U. Kim, H. C. Trian- Shapiro, D. L„ & Bies, R. J. (1994). Threats, bluffs and
dis, C. Kagitcibasi, S-C. Choi, & G. Yoom (eds.). Individu disclaimers in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and
alism and collectivism: Theory, method and application Human Decision Processes, 60, 14-35.
(pp. 85-122). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Shea, G. F. (1983). Creative negotiating. Boston, MA: C'BI
Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of Publishing Co.
universal content and structure of values: Extensions and
cross-cultural replications. Journal of Personality and Sheppard, B. H„ Lewicki, R. J., & Minton, J. W. (1992).
Social Psychology, 58, 878-91. Organizational justice: The search for fairness in the
workplace. New York: Lexington Books.
Schweitzer, M. E. (1997). Omission, friendship and fraud:
Lies about material facts in negotiation. Unpublished Sheppard, B. H„ & Tuchinsky, M. (1996a). Micro-OB and the
manuscript. network organization. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.),
Trust in organizations (pp. 140-65). Thousand Oaks,
Schweitzer, M. E., & Croson, R. (1999). Curtailing decep CA: Sage.
tion: The impact of direct questions on lies and omis
sions. International Journal of Conflict Management, Sheppard, B. H„ & Tuchinsky, M. (1996b). Intcrfirm relations:
10 (3), 225-48. A grammar of pairs. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings
(Eds.), Research on organizational behavior (Vol. 18,
pp. 331-73). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
276 Bibliography
Sherif, M„ Harvey, L„ White, B„ Hood, W„ & Sherif, C. Spitzberg, B. H., & C'upach, W. R . (1984). Interpersonal
(1988). The Robbers’ Cave experiment: Intergroup communication competence. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
conflict and cooperation. Middletown, C’T: Wesleyan
University Press. (Original work published 1961.) Sproull, L., & Kiesler, S. (1986). Reducing social context
cues: Electronic mail in organizational communication.
Short, J„ Williams, E., & Christie, B. (1976). The social psychol Management Science, 32, 1492-512.
ogy of telecommunications. London: John Wiley and Sons.
Stacks, D. W„ & Burgoon, J. K. (1981). The role of non-verbal
Siegel, S. R., & Fouraker, L. E. (1960). Bargaining and group behaviors as distractors in resistance to persuasion in
decision making: Experiments in bilateral monopoly. interpersonal contexts. Central States Speech Journal,
New York: McGraw-Hill. 32. 61-80.
Sims, R. L. (2002). Support for the use of deception within the Stark, A., Fam, K.. S., Waller, D. S., & Tian, Z. (2005). Chinese
work environment: A comparison of Israeli and United negotiation practice: A perspective from New Zealand
States employee attitudes. Journal of Business Ethics, exporters. Cross Cultural Management, 12 (3), 85-102.
35, 27-34.
Staw, B. M. (1981). The escalation of commitment to a course
Simons, T. (1993). Speech patterns and the concept of utility of action. Academy of Management Review, 6, 577-87.
in cognitive maps: The case of integrative bargaining.
Academy of Management Journal, 36, 139-56. Stein, J. (1996). The art of real estate negotiations. Real Estate
Review. 25, 48-53.
Simons, T., & Tripp, T. M. (1997). “The Negotiation Check
list.” The Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Administrative Stein, J. G. (1999). Problem solving as metaphor: Negotiation
Quarterly, 38, 14-23. In R. J. Lewicki, David M. and identity conflict. Peace and Conflict: Journal of
Saunders, & Bruce Barry, Negotiation (5th ed.), Burr Peace Psychology. 5. 225-35.
Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Stillengcr, C., Epclbaum, M., Kehner, D., & Ross, L. (1990).
Sinaceur, M„ & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Get mad and get more The “reactive devaluation” barrier to conflict resolution.
than even: When and why anger expression is effective Working paper, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.
in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology. 42. 314-22. Swaab, R. I., Phillips, K. W„ Dicrmeier, D. & Mcdvec, V. H.
(2008). The pros and eons of dyadic side conversations
Sitkin, S. B., & Bies, R. J. (1993). Social accounts in conflict in small groups. Small Group Research. In press.
situations: Using explanations to manage conflict.
Human Relations. 46, 349-70. Tajima, M., & Fraser, N. M. (2001). Logrolling procedure for
multi-issue negotiation. Group Decision and Negotia
Skarlicki, D. P., & Folger, R. (1997). Retaliation in the workplace: tion. 10, 217-35.
The roles of distributive, procedural and interactive justice.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 82 (3), 434 43. Taylor, P. J., & Donald, I. (2003). Foundations and evidence for
an interaction based approach to conflict negotiation. Inter
Smith, P., & Schwartz, S. H. (1997). Values. In J. W. Berry, national Journal of Conflict Management, 14, 213-32.
M. H. Segall., and C. Kagitcibashi (Eds.), Handbook of
cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 77-118). Needham Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being:
Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. A social-psychological perspective on mental health.
Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.
Smith, T. H. (2005). Metaphors for navigating negotiations.
Negotiation Journal. 21. 343-64. Tedeschi, J. T., Heistcr, D. S., & Gahagan, J. P. (1969). Trust
and the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Social
Solomon, R. H. (1987). China: Friendship and obligation in Psychology, 79, 43-50.
Chinese negotiating style. In H. Binnendijk (Ed.),
National negotiating styles (pp. 1-16). Washington, DC: Tcnbrunsel, A. E. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations
Foreign Service Institute. of misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of
incentives and temptation. Academy of Management
Sondak, H„ Neale, M. A., & Pinkley, R. (1995). The negotiated Journal, 4 (3), 330-39.
allocation of benefits and burdens: The impact of outcome
valence, contribution and relationship. Organizational Be Tcnbrunsel, A. E. (1999). Trust as an obstacle in environmen
havior and Human Decision Processes, 64 (3), 249-60. tal-economic disputes. American Behavioral Scientist.
42. 1350-67.
Song, F. (2004). Trust and reciprocity: The differing norms of
individuals and group representatives. Unpublished paper. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
(3rd ed.), (1992). Houghton Mifflin.
Bibliography 277
Thomas, K. W. (1992). Conflict and negotiation processes in Thompson, L. L., Nadler, J., & Kim, P. H. (1999). Some
organizations. In M. D. Dunnette and L. H. Hough, like it hot: The case for the emotional negotiator. In
Handbook of industrial & organizational psychology L. L. Thompson, J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick (Eds.),
(2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 651-718). Palo Alto, CA: Shared cognition in organizations: The management of
Consulting Psychologists Press. knowledge (pp. 139-61). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Thomas, K. W., & Kilmann, R. H. (1974). Thomas-Kilmann Ting-Toomcy, S., & Kurogi, A. (1998). Faccwork competcncc
conflict mode survey. Tuxedo, NY: Xicom. in intcrcultural conflict: An updated face-ncgotiation
theory. International Journal of Intel-cultural Relations,
Thompson, L. (1990a). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: 22. 187-225.
Empirical evidence and theoretical issues. Psychological
Bulletin, 108, 515-32. Tinsley, C. H. (1997). Understanding conflict in a Chinese
cultural context. In R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, &
Thompson, L. (1990b). An examination of naive and B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on negotiation in orga
experienced negotiators. Journal of Personality and nizations (Vol. 6: 209-25). Greenwich, C'T: JAI Press.
Social Psychology. 59, 82-90.
Tinsley, C. H. (1998). Models of conflict resolution in Japanese,
Thompson, L. (1991). Information exchange in negotiation. German, and American cultures. Journal of Applied
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 161—79. Psychology, 83. 316-23.
Thompson, L. (1995). They saw a negotiation: Partnership and Tinsley, C. H. (2001). How negotiators get to yes: Predicting
involvement. Journal of Personality and Social the constellation of strategies used across cultures to ne
Psychology, 68. 839-53. gotiate conflict. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86,
583-93.
Thompson, L. (1998). The mind and heart of the negotiator.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Tinsley, C. H„ Brett, J. M„ Shapiro, S. L„ & Okumura, T.
(2004). When do cultural values explain cross-cultural
Thompson, L., & DcHarpport, T. (1994). Social judgment, phenomena? An introduction and test of cultural com
feedback, and interpersonal learning in negotiation. plexity theory. Unpublished paper. Dispute Resolution
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Research Center, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
Processes, 58, 327-45.
Tjosvold, D. (1997). The leadership relationship in Hong Kong:
Thompson, L., Gentner, J. & Locwenstcin, J. (2000). Avoiding Power, interdependence and controversy, ln K. Leung,
missed opportunities in managerial life: Analogical U. Kim, S. Yamaguchi, & Y. Kashima (Eds.), Progress in
training more powerful than individual case training. Asian social psychology (Vol. 1). New York: John Wiley.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 82, 60-75. Tomlinson, E., Dinccn, B„ & Lcwicki, R. (2004). The road to
reconciliation: Antecedents of victim willingness to
Thompson, L., & Hastie, R. (1990a). Social perception in reconcile following a broken promise. Journal of
negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Management, 30, 165-187.
Decision Processes. 47. 98-123.
Tompkins, P. K. (1993). Organizational communication
Thompson, L., & Hastie, R. (1990b). Judgment tasks and bi imperatives: Lessons of the space program. Los Angeles:
ases in negotiation. In B. H. Sheppard, M. H. Bazcrman, & Roxbury Publishing Company.
R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Research on negotiation in organi
zations (Vol. 2, pp. 31-54). Greenwich, C'T: JAI Press. Touval, S. (1988). Multilateral negotiation: An analytical
approach. Negotiation Journal, 5 (2), 159-73.
Thompson, L„ & Hrebcc, D. (1996). Lose-lose agreements in
interdependent decision making. Psychological Bulletin, Triandis, H. C. (1982). Review of culture's consequences:
120, 396^*09. International differences in work values. Human
Organization, 41, 86-90.
Thompson, L., Peterson, E., & Brodt, S. E. (1996). Team ne
gotiations: An examination of integrative and distributive Tripp, T. M., Sondak, H., & Bies, R. J. (1995). Justice as ratio
bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol nality: A relational perspective on fairness in negotia
ogy, 70, 66-78. tions. In R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, & R. J. Bies
(Ed.), Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 5,
Thompson, L., Valley, K. L., & Kramer, R. M. (1995). The bit pp. 45-64). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
tersweet feeling of success: An examination of social
perception in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Tuchinsky, M. (1998). Negotiation approaches in close relation
Social Psychology, 31, 467-92. ships. Duke University. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
278 Bibliography
Tuchinsky, M. B., Edson Escalas, J., Moore, M. C., & in negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social
Sheppard, B. H. (1994). Beyond name, rank and Psychology. 86, 57-76.
function: Construals of relationships in business. In
D. P. Moore, Proceedings of the Academy of Van Kleef, G. A., de Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R.
Management, 79-83. (2006). Supplication and appeasement in conflict and
negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment,
Tung, R. L. (1991). Handshakes across the sea: Cross-cultural worry, guilt, and regret. Journal of Personality and So
negotiating for business success. Organizational cial Psychology. 91, 124-42.
Dynamics, 19. Winter. 30-40.
Van Poucke, D., & Buelens, M. (2002). Predicting the out
Tutzauer, F. (1991). Bargaining outcome, bargaining process, come of a two-party price negotiation: Contribution of
and the role of communication. Progress in reservation price, aspiration price, and opening offer.
Communication Science, 10, 257-300. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 67-76.
Tutzauer, F. (1992). The communication of offers in dyadic Veitch, R„ & Griffith, W. (1976). Good news-bad news:
bargaining. In L. Putnam & M. Roloff (Eds.), Affective and interpersonal affects. Journal of Applied
Communication and negotiation (pp. 67-82). Newbury Social Psychology, 6, 69-75.
Park, CA: Sage.
Volkema, R. J., & Fleury, M. T. L. (2002). Alternative negoti
Tvcrsky, A., & Kahncman, D. (1982). Judgment under ating conditions and the choice of negotiation tactics: A
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. In D. Kahneman, cross-cultural comparison. Journal of Business Ethics,
P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncer 36, 381-98.
tainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 3-22). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Walcott, C., Hopmann, P. T., & King, T. D. (1977). The role of
debate in negotiation. In D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations:
Tyler, T„ & Bladcr, S. R. (2004). Justice and negotiation. In Social-psychological perspectives (pp. 193-211).
M. Gelfand & J. Brett, The handbook of negotiation and Beverly Hills, C'A: Sage.
culture (pp. 295-312). Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press. Walton, R. E„ & McKersie, R. B. (1965). A behavioral theory
of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social interaction
Tyler, T., & Hastic, R. (1991). The social consequences of cog system. New York: McGraw-Hill.
nitive illusions. In M. H. Bazerman, R. J. Lewicki, and
B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on negotiation in oiga- Wanis-St. John, A. (2006). Back-channel negotiation: Interna
nizations (Vol. 3, pp. 69-98). Greenwich, C'T: JAI Press. tional bargaining in the shadows. Negotiation Journal.
2 2 ( 2 ) , 119-44.
Ury, W. (1991). Getting past no: Negotiating with difficult
people. New York: Bantam Books. Watkins, M. (2002). Breakthrough business negotiations. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Ury, W. L„ Brett, J. M„ & Goldberg, S. B. (1988). Getting
disputes resolved. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Weeks, H. (2001). Taking the stress out of stressful conver
sations. Harvard Business Review, July August, 112-19.
Valley, K. L„ Moag, J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1998). A matter
of trust: Effects of communication on the efficiency and Weingart, L. R„ Bennett, R. J., & Brett, J. M. (1993). The im
distribution of outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior pact of consideration of issues and motivational orienta
and Organization, 34, 211-38. tion group negotiation process and outcome. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 78 (3), 504-17.
Van Boven, L., Gilovich, T„ & Medvcc, V H. (2003). The
illusion of transparency in negotiations. Negotiation Weingart, L. R„ Hyder, E. B„ & Prietula, M. J. (1996).
Journal. 19, 117-131. Knowledge matters: The effect of tactical descriptions on
negotiation behavior and outcome. Journal of Personal
van de Vliert, E. (1985). Escalative intervention in small group ity and Social Psychology, 70, 1205-17.
conflicts. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 21, 19-36.
Weingart, L. R„ Prietula, M. J., Hyder, E. B„ & Genovese, C.
van Dijk, E„ Van Kleef, G., Steinel, W., & van Beest, I. R. (1999). Knowledge and the sequential processes of
(2008). A social functional approach to emotions in bar negotiation: A Markov Chain analysis of response-in-
gaining: When communicating anger pays and when it kind. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35,
backfires. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 366-93.
94, 600-614.
Weingart, L. R„ Thompson, L. L., Bazerman, M. H„ &
Van Kleef, G. A., de Dreu, C. K. W„ & Manstead, A. S. R. Carroll, J. S. (1990). Tactical behaviors and negotiation
(2004). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness
Bibliography 279
outcomes. International Journal of Conflict Yan, A., & Gray, B. (1994). Bargaining power, management
Management, 1,7-31. control, and performance in United States-China joint
ventures: A comparative case study. Academy of
Weiss, J. (2003). Trajectories toward peace: Mediator Management Journal, 37, 1478-517.
sequencing strategies in intractable communal disputes.
Negotiation Journal, 109-15. Yankclovich, D. (1982, August). Lying well is the best
revenge. Psychology Today, 71, 5-6, 71.
Weiss, S. E. (1994). Negotiating with “Romans”: A range of
culturally-responsivc strategics. Sloan Management Yook, E. L., & Albert, R. D. (1998). Perceptions of the
Review. i5 (1), 51-61; (2), 1-16. appropriateness of negotiation in educational settings:
A cross-cultural comparison among Koreans and
Weiss, S. E. (1997). Explaining outcomes of negotiation: To Americans. Communication Education, 47, 18-29.
ward a grounded model for negotiations between organi
zations. In R. J. Lewicki, R. J. Bies, & B. H. Sheppard Yukl, G. (1974). Effects of the opponent’s initial offer, conces
(Eds.), Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 6, sion magnitude, and concession frequency on bargaining
pp. 247-333). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
30, 323-35.
Weiss, S. E. (2006). International business negotiation in a
globalizing world: Reflections on the contributions and Yukl, G., & Tracey, J. A. B. (1992). Consequences of influence
future of a (sub) field. International Negotiation. II, tactics used with subordinates, peers and the boss.
287-316. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 525-35.
Weiss, S. E„ & Stripp, W. (1985). Negotiating with foreign Zand, D. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving.
business persons: An introduction for Americans with Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 229-39.
propositions on six cultures. New York: New York
University Graduate School of Business Administration, Zand, D. (1997). The leadership triad: Knowledge, trust and
Working Paper 85-6. power. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weldon, E., & Jehn, K. A. (1995). Examining cross-cultural Zartman, I. W. (1977). Negotiation as a joint decision making
differences in conflict management behavior: A strategy process. In I. Zartman (Ed.), The negotiation process:
for future research. The International Journal of Conflict Theories and applications (pp. 67-86). Beverly Hills,
Management. 6. 387—403. CA: Sage.
Wheeler, M. (2004). Anxious moments: Openings in negotia Zartman, I. W. (1997). Conflict and order: Justice in negotia
tion. Negotiation Journal. 20. 153-169. tion. International Political Science Review, IS, 121-38.
Xing, F. (1995). The Chinese cultural system: Implications for Zartman, I. W„ & Berman, M. (1982). The practical
cross-cultural management. SAM Advanced Management negotiator. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Journal, 60, 14-20.
Zhu, Y„ McKenna, B„ & Sun, Z. (2007). Negotiating with Chi
Yama, E. (2004). Buying hardball, playing price. Business nese: Success of initial meetings is the key. Cmss Cultural
Horizons. 47 (5), 62-66. Management: An International Journal, 14 (4), 354—64.
Aaronson, K.., 6In in closing deals, 51 Bargaining range, 13, 30, 31, 100
Abandoning commitments, 49-51 communication of, 137 Barki, H., 88n
Abel, R. L., 134n of other party, 106-107 Barnard, C., 169n
Abundance mentality, in integrative role of, 31-32 Barnes, J. W., 250n
Alternative situational strategies model, Baron, R. A., 135n
negotiation, 63 Barry, B., 26n, 135n, 150n, 180n, 192n, 209n
Abu-Nimer, M., 249n 92-93 Bart, J., 26n
Academy of Management, 180n Ambiguous tactics; see also Ethics Bateson, B., 134n
Acceptability, in solution evaluation, 79 BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated
Accommodation strategy, 23, 92-95 consequences of, 183-185
Acknowledgment, as listening, 145-146 ethics versus. 176-180 agreement)
Active deception, 176; see also Ethics justifications for, 185-187 communication of, 137
Active engagement strategy, 93-95 Analogical learning, 86 contextual power and, 155, 166-167
Active listening, 91, 148 Anchoring, 55, 124, 127 description of, 12
Acuff, F. L., 249n Anderson, C., 135n in distributive bargaining, 32
Adachi, Y., 250n Andrews, S., 169n fairness and, 205
Adair, W. L., 150n, 231, 246, 250n AOL (America Online), 9 identification of, 253
Adaptation, from conflict, 20 Aquino K., 192n “idiosyncratic deal” and, 206
Adaptive nature, of negotiators, 138-139 Arbitration decisions, 79 leverage increased by, 152
Adjustment Argyris, C., 209n in multiparty negotiation, 216, 219
Arnold, J. A., 135n in negotiation planning, 97, 100-101
as cognitive bias, 124 Asherman, I. G., 11 In Bazerman, M. H„ 26n, 61 n, 81, 85, 88n, 127,
coordinate, 247 Asherman, S. V., 111 n
mutual, 12-15 Asking price, 29, 101-103, 124 134n, 135n, 150n, 209n, 229n
Adler, R., 6In Aspiration, target point as, 29 Becker, T. E., 192n
Adler, N. J., 250n Aspiration frames, 116 Beebe, S. A., 150n
Adler, R. S., 189, 192n Assertiveness dimension, in Dual Concerns Beisecker, T., 26n
Adorno, T. W., 169n Benne, K. D., 219n
Advocacy skills, 198 Model, 22 Bennett, R. J., 150n, 229n
Agenda, 109, 220-222 Attending behaviors, 141 Benton, A. A., 209n
Agents, 166-167,246 Attorneys, presence of, 9 Bentz, B., 209n
Aggressive behavior, as hardball tactic, 58-59 Audiences, external, 166-167 Berkowritz, L., 135n
Agna, H., 249n Authoritarian personality, 158 Berman, M., 134n
Agreement; see also BATNA Avoidance strategy, 23, 25, 92-93 Best possible case, 121
Avruch, K., 250n Best practices, 251-259
(best alternative to a negotiated Awareness, from conflict, 20
agreement) Axtell, R. E., 250n BATNA identification, 253
costs of no, 219 Aycah, Z., 249n coalition management, 257-258
good, 110 diagnosis of structure, 252-253
implementing, 97 B feedback and learning, 259
in international negotiations, 244 honesty versus close-mindedness, 255-256
in multiparty negotiation, 226-228 Babakus, E., 26n, 150n intangible factors, 256-257
umbrella, 84-85 Babcock, L. C., 134n, 135n preparation, 251-252
zone of potential, 30 Bad faith, acting in, 7 principles versus resiliency, 254-255
Agreement Circumplex (Camevale), 72-76 Baitsel, J. M., 26n rationality and fairness, 259
Aik, V. C., 88n Balakrishnan, P. V., 26n reputation, 258
Air Line Pilots Association, 1 Ball, J. B., 134n strategy versus opportunism, 255
Albert, R. D., 250n Bamossy, G. J., 249n trust versus distrust, 256
Albin, C., 209n Barada, P. W., 162 value claiming and value creating, 254
Alexander, J. F., 26n, 150n Baranowski, T. A., 61 n walkaway point, 253-254
Allhoff, F., 192n Bargaining; see also Distributive Better Business Bureau, 41
Alliances with outsiders, to delay Bias; see also Cognition: Perception
negotiations, 40-41 bargaining cognitive, 122-128
Allred, K. G., 135n competitive tactics of, 179-180 in conflicts, 19
Alon, 1., 250n definition, 3 in distributive situations, 16
Alternative point; see also BATNA (best hard, 68 managing cognitive, 128-129
alternative to a negotiated agreement) in international negotiation, 234 in multiparty negotiation, 219
in multiparty negotiation, 213 Bidding stage of negotiations, 96, 106
280 relational bargaining frame for, 119 Bies, R. J., 6In, 119n, 150n, 209n
Bargaining mix, 33, 99-100, 102, 106
Bilateral negotiation strategy, 92 Career success, in Hofstede s Model of Index
Bilsky, W., 250n Cultural Dimensions, 238
Bird, A., 249n Colloquial language, 140
Blader, S. R., 209n Carini, G. R., 249n Colquitt, J., 209n
Blair, J. D., 92, 11 In Carnegie Mellon University, 206 Commission, lies of, 176, 180-181
Blaming, in disputes, 120 Camevale, P. J. D., 26n, 61n, 72, 88n, 134n, Commitments
Blass, F. R., 209n
Bless, H., 135n 135n, 150n, 192n, 209n in distributive bargaining, 46-51
Bluffing, 177, 180, 183, 186, 188, 191 Carr, A. Z., 177, 191n, 192n irrational escalation of, 123
Blumenstein, R., 169n Carroll, J. S., 26n, 6In, 134n, 135n motivation for, 84
Blurred issues, 19 Caruso, D., 135n rigid, 19
Blythe, Bruce, 208 Carver, C. S., 135n tentative and conditional, 81-82
Body position, as nonverbal Cellich, C., 61n Commonalities, emphasizing, 65
Cenovese, C. R., 6In Common goals, 82
communication, 142 Centrality, in relational power Communal relationships, 197-199
Bogey, as hardball tactic, 55-56 Communication, 136-150
Bohner, G., 135n networks, 165 conflict and, 19
Bok, S., 192n Chairing multiparty negotiations, 221-222, improving, 144-148
Boles, T. L., 192n in integrative negotiation, 85-86
Bond, M. H., 250n 227-228 in international negotiations, 242
Boston Scientific, Inc., 9 Chakravarti, A., 15()n during negotiation, 136-139
Bottom, W. P., 134n, 209n Chan, C. W., 250n at negotiation close, 149
Bowie, N., 192n Channels, communication, 142-144 process of, 139-144
Bradac, J. J., 140 Chapman, D., 209n Communication and Negotiation
Bradlow, E. T., 192n, 209n Characterization frames, 117-118
Braganti, N. L., 250n Charan, R., 169n (Putnam and Roloff), 140n
Brainstorming, 76-78, 224-225, 254 '‘Cheap shots,” 217 Communities, fragmented, 18
Brass, D. J., 169n Chekal, J., 135n Competition
Brenner, A. R., 60n Chertkoff, J. M., 60n
Brett, J. M., 134n, 135n, 150n, 153, 229n, Chicken, as hardball tactic, 56-57 bargaining tactics in, 179-180
China, negotiation frames of, 119 in brainstorming, 77
231, 241, 246, 249n, 250n “Chinks in the defense," 188 definition, 3
Bridge solution, 75, 77 Choice to negotiate, 9 as disposition, 158
Brockner, J., 134n Christie, B., 150n in Dual Concerns Model, 23
Brodt, S. E., 60n, 6In, 192n, 209n Cialdini, R. B., 11 In, 169n in goals, 19
Brooks, E., 6In Claiming value; see Value claiming and value to leverage power, 167
Broome, B., 135n misrepresentation used in, 183
Brouthers, K. D., 249n creation negative emotions and, 130, 132
Brown, B. R., 6ln, 11 In, 192n Claims, in disputes, 120 as negotiation strategy, 92-95
Brown, J. D„ 229n Clinton, Bill, 57 negotiator bias toward, 16
Brown, R. R., 43-44 Cloke, K., 229n Compliance costs, cutting, 75-77
Buechler, S. M., I34n Closing deals, 51-52, 96, 149 Compromise
Buelens, M., 6In, 209n Clyman, D. R., 88n in Agreement Circumplex, 74
Building Effective One-on-One Work Coalitions definition, 8
in Dual Concerns Model, 24-25
Relationships (Hill), 198n management of, 257-258 in multiparty negotiation, 214
Buja, A., 26n, 6In in multiparty negotiation, 214-215, overconfidence preventing, 126
Bundling, 74, 81 Concealment, 37-38, Ml, see also Ethics
Burgoon, J. K., 150n 218,225 Concessions
Burnham, D. H., 169n in relational power networks, 165-166 in abundance mentality, 63
Burnstein, D., 11 In Coercive power strategy, 153-154 aggressive behavior for, 59
Burrell, G., 169n Cognition; see also Emotion; Perception bogey hardball tactic in, 55
Busch, J. D., 140 biases in, 122-128 initial, 42-43
Bush, George W., 57 managing biases in, 128-129 making, 13-14
Business Horizons, 232n in personal sources of power, 157-158 margin reduction by, 30
Business negotiations, teams in, 37 Cohen, H., 56, 60n, 61 n misrepresentation to obtain, 180
Butler, J. K„ 88n, 209n Cohen, M. D., 6In in opening offers, 42
Coker, D. A., 150n pattern of, 44-45
C Coker, R. A., 150n risks in making, 44
Coleman, P., 168n, 169n role of, 43-44
Calculated incompetence, 37 Collaboration written, for commitments, 48
Caldwell, D. F., 135n definition, 11 Conciliation, 197
Calero, H., 150n in Dual Concerns Model, 24 Conflict
in integrative negotiation, 83 escalating, 130
as negotiation strategy, 92-95 example of, 4, 6
Collectivist cultures, 119, 237-238
Collins, M. A., 190n
282 Index Cupach, W. R., 169n symphony in, 248
Curhan, J. R., 134n, 150n team negotiations in, 37
frame mismatch and, 117-118 Crumbaugh, C. M., 6In Direct assessment, 36
functions and benefits of, 20-22 Direct reputations, 200
in goals, 10 D Dirks, K. T., 209n
in international negotiation, 235 Disclosure, 256
levels of, 18-20 Dahl, R. A., 168n Discussion norms and dynamics, 220
in multiparty negotiations, 223-225 Daly, J., 135n Disruptive action, to delay negotiations, 40
in relationships, 198-199 '“Dancing with elephants” (Watkins), 167 Dissolution, marriage, 198
role reversal and, 148 Daniels, S., 209n Distortion, in perception, 113-115
Conflict Diagnostic Model (Greenhalgh), 21 Dant, R. P., 209n Distributive bargaining, 27-61
Confucian Dynamism, 250n Deadlines closing deals in, 51-52
Confucius, 241 commitment in, 46-51
Conley, M., 60n in exploding offers, 51-52 description, 15-16
Conlon, D. E., 118, 134n manipulating, 39-41 example situation, 29-35
Connect Model, 220 unreasonable, 147 hardball tactics in, 52-59
Consensus, 214, 217, 225 Deal closing; see Closing deals hard-bargaining phase of, 68
Consequences, in commitments, 47 Dean, James, 56 ignoring others’ cognitions in, 127
Consistency, of negotiators, 138-139 Deception; see also Ethics negative emotions in, 130
Constituencies in bogey hardball tactic, 56 overconfidence in, 126
in contextual sources of power, 166-167 consequences of, 183-185 positions in, 41 -46
dynamics of, 226 dealing with, 187-191 relationships and, 195-196
in negotiation planning, 103-105, 107 ethics versus, 180-181 self-fulfilling prophecy and, 126
Contending strategy, in Dual Concerns justifications for, 185-187 situations of, 15-16
power motive for, 181 -183 tactical tasks in, 35-41
Model, 23 Decision rules, 225 trust in, 201-202
Context, culture as, 240-241 Decision theory, 126 “we-they” strategies of, 94-95
Contextual sources of power, 155, 166-167 de Dreu, C. K. W., 60n, 6In, 134n, 135n, 169n Distributive justice, 203
Contradictions, 188 Deep, S., 147n, 150n Distributive situations, 10, 15-16
Convergent goals, 10 Defensiveness, 85 Dominating strategy, in Dual Concerns
Cooper, C. D., 209n Definitions, return to, 79
Cooper, W., 134n DeHarpport, T., 135n Model, 23, 25
Cooperative dispositions, 158, 213 Delaying negotiations, costs of, 39-41 Donahue, E., 180n, 192n
Cooperativeness dimension, in Dual Delphi Technique, 224 Donald I., 150n
Delquie, P., 135n Donnellon, A., 134n
Concerns Model, 22 Dependence, 9, 152, 160 Donohue, W. A., 26n, 60n
Co-opting, in hardball tactics, 53 Derong, C., 249n Douglas, A., 11 In, 209n
Coordinate adjustment, 247 Detail, in formula-detail model, 121 Douglas, C., 209n
Coser, L., 26n Deutsch, M., 26n, 6In, 168n, 169n, 209n Drake, L. E., 250n
Costs Devaluation, reactive, 128 Drolet, A. L., 150n
Development, from conflict, 20 Druckman, D., 135n, 209n, 249n
compliance, 75-77 Devine, E., 250n Dual Concerns Model (Pruitt, Rubin,
of no agreement, 219 Devine, P. G., 134n
of terminating negotiations, 35-37, 39-41 Diagnosis, in formula-detail model, 121 and Kim), 22-24, 92-95
Counteroffers, 44, 137 Dialdin, D., 231 Duslak, R. J., 6In
Covey, Stephen, 63 Dialectic, culture as, 240 Duty ethics, 172-173, 175
Creating value; see Value claiming and value Dictatorship, decisions made by, 225 Dyer, N., 249n, 250n
Diekmann, K. A., 134n Dynamics of International Business
creation Diermeier, D., 229n
Crisis Management International, 208 Differences Negotiations. The (Phalak and
Criticality, in relational power networks, 165 conflict magnification of, 19 Habib), 232n
Cronkhite, G., 169n in expectations, 81 Dysfunctional anchor point, 127
Croson, R. T. A., I50n, 192n in integrative negotiation, 65
Cross-cultural negotiation; see International negotiator bias toward, 17 E
Dilemma of honesty, 14, 64, 178, 255
negotiation Dilemma of trust, 14, 64, 177 Edson Escalas, J., 209n
Cultural attribution error (Dialdin et al.), 231 Dineen, B. R., 144n, 150n, 209n Electronic brainstorming, 78
Cultural complexity theory Diplomacy; see also International negotiation Electronic channels of communication, 142
abandoning commitments in, 50-51 Elfenbein, H. A., 88n
(Tinsley et al.), 241 agenda for, 109 Elliott, M., 134n
Culture; see also International negotiation ’’back-channel” negotiations in, 235 E-mail, 142-144
Emans, B. J. M., 134n
collectivist, 119 Emoticons, 143
colloquial language and, 140
in contextual sources of power, 166
egocentric biases in, 205
ethical constraints and, 180, 183
Culture and Organizations: Software of
the Mind (Hofstede), 237n
Emotion; see also Cognition; Perception outcome, 203-205 Index
in conflict, 19 relative nature of, 259
defusing, 224 reputation for, 258 Franklin, Benjamin, 84
in international negotiations, 244 trust signaled by, 14 Fraser, N. M., 88n
manipulation of, 179-180 False consensus effect, 127 Fraud, 178, 189
mood in negotiation, 129-133 Falsification, 183 Free-wheeling, 225
Fam, K. S., 249n French, J. R. P., 154, 168n, 169n
“End game," 195 Familiarity, in international negotiations, Frenkl-Brunswick, E., 169n
Endowment effect, 127 Friedman, R. A., 135n, 209n
End-result ethics, 172-173, 175 246-248 Frost, P., 169n
e-negotiation, 142 Families, feuds in, 18 Fry, W. R„ 209n
Environmental context, of international Fang, T., 241, 250n Fuller, S. H., 26n
Fast Company, 208n Fulmer, I. S., 135n, 150n, 180n, 192n
negotiation, 231-234 “Fast-tempo" medium, instant Functional Roles o f Group Members
Epelbaum, M., 135n
Erev, I., 6In messaging as, 143-144 (Benne and Sheats)., 219n
Ergin, C., 250n Faure, G. O., 249n, 250n Fundamentals of Negotiating
Ertel, D„ 60n, 11 In, 207, 209n Felstiner, W. L. F., 134n
Escalation of conflict, 19 Ferrin, D. L., 209n (Nierenberg), 146n
Ethically Marginal Bargaining Tactics: Ferris, G. R., 209n Futility portrayal, 188
Fiedler, K., 134n
Sanction, Efficacy, and Performance Fifth Discipline: The Art and Politics of G
(Barry, Fulmer, and Long), 180n
Ethics, 7, 170-192 the Learning Organization, The Gaf, H., 209n
ambiguous tactics versus, 176-180 (Senge), 198n Gahagan, J. P., 209n
applying, 175 Filley, A. C., 26n, 88n Gains, joint, 64, 73
common and acceptable practice, 104 Finality, in commitments, 47 Galinsky, A. D., 61 n
deception versus, 180-181, 187-191 Final offers, 46, 81 -82 Gallupe, R. B., 88n
defined, 172-174 Firestone, I. J., 209n Gambits, in negotiation, 133
distributive bargaining versus, 28 Fisher, R„ 10, 53, 60n, 6In, 69, 79, 88n, Ganesan, S., 209n
justifications for ambiguous tactics, 185-187 11 In, 207, 209n, 235, 249n Gaotes, N., 135n
power motive for deception, 181-183 Fiske, S. T., 209n Gardner, W. L., 169n
prudence, practicality, and legality versus, Fixed-pie beliefs, 123 Garling, T., 134n
“Flaming,” 144 Gatekeepers, in multiparty
175-176 Fleury, M. T. L., 192n
quandary examples in, 170-172 Flexibility, in relational power negotiations, 222
unethical conduct consequences, 183-185 networks, 165 Gelfand, M. J., 209n, 249n, 250n
Ethics and Leadership: Putting Theory into Flexible positions, 43 Generalizations, 19
Folger, J. P., 26n Genovese, C. R., 88n
Practice (Hitt), 174n Folger, R., 209n Gentner, J., 86, 88n
Ethics of Management, The (Hosmer), 175n Follett, M. R, 26n, 88n, 115, 134n, 168n George, J. M., 250n
Ethnic groups, conflict between, 18 Foo, M. D., 88n Georgetown University, 119
Evans, G. W., 61 n Foreman, P., 134n, 135n Getting to Jfes; Negotiating Agreement
Exaggeration, 177, 186 Forgas, J. P., 134n, 135n
Exchange rates, of currencies, 233 Formuia-detail model, 121 without Giving In (Fisher, Ury,
Exonerating circumstances, For Team Members Only (Manz, Neck, and Patton), 10, 69
Mancuso, and Manz), 225n Ghosh, D., 61n
communicating, 138 Fortune magazine, 9 Gibb, J.., 88n
Expectations, 36, 81 Foster, D. A., 243,250n Gibbons. P., 140
Expert powrer, 154-156 Fouraker, L. E., 150n Gibson, K., 209n
Exploding offers, to close deals, 51-52 Fragale, A. R„ 134n, 169n Gilkey, R. W„ 209n
Extending and Testing a Five Factor Mode! Framing, 115-122 Gillespie, J. J., 88n, 134n
biases in, 202 Gilovich, T., 134n
of Ethical and Unethical Bargaining changes in, 120-122 Girard, J., 61n
Tactics: The SINS Scale (Robinson, defined, 112 “Give-and-take” process, negotiation
Lewicki, and Donahue), 180n interests, rights, and power as, 7, 14
Eye contact, as nonverbal communication, Goals
141-142 approach to, 118-120 competitive, 19
Eyuboglu, N., 26n, 6In in multiparty negotiation, 220 conflicts in, 10
in negotiation, 117-118 in integrative negotiation, 68, 82-83
F in personal sources of power, interdependent, 162
in negotiation strategy, 89-91
Face, saving, 19, 119, 123,214, 237 157-158 as performance management tools, 101
Facts, legal definition of, 178 types of, 116-117 Goates, N., 135n, 209n
Fairness Francis, J. N. P, 245, 250n Goffman, E., 26n, 134n
Goldberg, S. B„ 134n, 153
definition, 8
as intangible goal, 90
284 Index Healthcare Executive, 63 Ikle, F. C., 134n
Hearsay reputations, 200 Immediate context, of international negotia
Goldsmith, J., 229n Heath, C., 134n
Goldstein, N. J., 169n Hegarty, W., 192n tion, 231,234-236
Gonzalez, J. A., 250n Hegtvedt, K. A., 135n Immediate gratification, 81
Gonzalez, R. M., 135n Heider, F., 134n Impasse rates, 118, 132, 147, 219
Good cop/bad cop, as hardball tactic, 54 Heister, D. S., 209n Implementing agreements, as stage
Gordon, T„ 150n Helm, B., 209n
Gottman, J., 199 Hendon, D. W., 6In, 249n, 250n of negotiation, 97
Government instability, 233 Hendon, R. A., 6In, 249n, 250n Impressions, managing, 37-39
Graham, J. L„ 249n, 250n Heneman, R., I44n Inaction strategy, in Dual
Gratification, immediate, 81 Herbig, R, 250n
Gray, B., 26n, 131, 134n, 234, 249n Hershey, J. C, 192n, 209n Concerns Model, 23
Green, R. M., 191n Hiam, A., 11 In Incompetence, calculated, 37
Greenberg, J., 209n Higgins, E. T., 135n Indirect assessment, 35-37
Greenberger, D., 144n Highball/lowball hardball tactics, Individualistic cultures, 237-238
Greene, D., 134n Industry standards, 79
Greenhalgh, L., 2In, 96-97, 11 In, 209n 54-55, 147 Inflection, invoice, 142
Griffith, T. L., 134n High-power language style, 140 Influence tactics, to alter impressions, 38
Griffith, W., 135n Hill, J. H., 60n Informational sources of power, 154-157
Groups Hill, L.A., 198n Information-gathering stage of negotiations, 96
Hilty, J. A.,61n Initial offer, 29
conflict in, 18 Ilinkin,T. R., 169n Innovative potential, in joint ventures, 16
culture of, 236 Hinton, B. L., 60n Inquiry skills, 198
in international negotiations, 243 Hitt, W., 174n, 191 n Instability, government, 233
in multiparty negotiation, 215-219 Ho, S. S., 209n Instant messaging (IM), 142-144
in solution evaluation, 80 Hochberg, A. M., 26n Instrumental interests, in negotiation, 70
Gruder, C. L., 61 n Hocker, J. L., 26n Intangible factors
Guerrilla Negotiating: Unconventional Hofstede, G., 237, 250n
Hofstede s Model of Cultural goals as, 90
Weapons and Tactics to Get What You importance of, 256-257
Want (Levinson, Smith, and Wilson), Dimensions, 237-239 in negotiation, 8-9, 44
In, 35n Holaday, L. C., 88n in solution evaluation, 80
Guidant, Inc., 9 Holmer, M., 134n Integrating, in Dual Concerns Model, 24-25
Guilt, in intimidation tactics, 58 Homans, G. C., 11 In Integrative negotiation, 62-88
Honesty alternative solution evaluation in, 78-82
H alternative solution generation in, 72-78
close-mindedness versus, 255-256 differences in, 62-63
Habib, M. H., 231, 232n, 234-235, dilemma of, 14, 64, 178 facilitating, 82-87
249n, 250n erosion of, 186 interests and needs identification in, 69-72
“honest face,” 190 overview, 15, 63-66
Haggling, definition of, 3 in integrative negotiation, 63 people-problem separation in, 196
Hall, J., 26n Hood, W„ 134n problem identification in, 67-69
Halo effects, 113-114 Hopmann, R T., 150n, 249n trust in, 201-202
Halpern, J., 135n Hosmer, L. T., I75n, 176, 191n, 192n Integrative situations, 10, 15
Hamner, W. C., 60n House, P., 134n Integrative strategies, 91
Hanson, J. R., 169n Howard, E. S., 169n Integrity, 63; see also Ethics; Reputation
Hardball tactics, 52-59; see also Ethics Hrebec, D., 60n Intensity, language, 140
Huang, X., 249n Interactional justice, 203
aggressive behavior, 58-59 Human Resource Management in the Interdependence
bogey, 55-56 distributive, 28
chicken, 56-57 \rirtual Organization (Heneman in joint problem solving, 14
dealing with, 52-53 and Greenberger), 144n overview, 4, 9-12
good cop/bad cop, 54 Hunt, C. S., 118, 134n relationship, 194
intimidation, 57-58 Hyder, E. B„ 6In, 86, 88n, 150n in relationship-based power, 155, 162
kitchen sink, 38 trust versus. 85
lowball/highball, 54-55, 147 Ibarra, H., 169n Interests
nibble, 56 Identity frames, 117 in Agreement Circumplex, 72, 75-76
snow job, 38, 59 Ideological frames of reference, 157 differences in, 17
Harinck, F., 134n Idioms, 140 framing of, 118-120, 153
Harmony, as negotiation frame, 119 Idiosyncratic deal: Flexibility vj. Fairness, in integrative negotiation, 69-72
Hartwick, J., 88n in multiparty negotiation, 216, 222
Hartzell, C. A., 249n The (Rousseau), 206n in negotiation strategy, 100
Harvard Business Review, 9, 177, 199 of other party, 106
Harvey, L., 134n
Hastie, R., 134n, 135n, 229n, 250n
Index 285
Intergroup conflict, 18 Kennedy, T., 26n Leverage tactics, 151; see also Power
International negotiation, 230-250 Kernan, M. C., 118, 134n Levine, T. R., 192n
Kerr. J. L., 60n Levinson, D. J., 169n
culture as context in, 240-241 Kiesler, S., 150n Levinson, J. C., 7n, 35n, 61n
culture as dialectic in, 240 Killian, C., 135n Lewicki, R. J., 26n, 88n, 11 In, 119n, 134n,
culture as learned behavior in, 236-237 Kilmann, R. H., 26n
culture as shared values in, 237-240 Kim, P. H., 6In, 135n, 169n, 192n, 209n, 229n 144n, 150n, 180n, 192n,209n
differences in, 231-236 Kim, S. H., 22, 24 Lewin, D., 26n
managerial perspectives on, 241-244 Kimmei, M. J., 26n, 88n, 209n Lewis, J., 150n
strategies for, 244-248 King, T. D., 150n Lewis, S. A., 88n
Interpersonal conflict, 18 Kitchen sink hardball tactic, 38 Lexical diversity, 140
Intimidation, as hardball tactic, 57-58, 188 Kleinke, C. L., 150n Liebert, R. M., 60n
Intragroup conflict, 18 Knetsch, J. L., 134n Lim, R. G., 60n, 134n
Intrapersonal or intrapsychic conflict, 18 Koehn, D., 192n Limits identification, 100-101
Intrinsic interests, in negotiation, 70 Koeszegi, S., 209n Lin, X., 249n
Isajiw, W. W., 249n Koh, T. T. B., 249n Lindskold, S., 209n
Is Business Bluffing Ethical? (Carr ), 177 Kolb, D. M„ 26n Lisco, C. C., 135n
Isen, A. M., 135n Kolodinsky, R. W., 209n Liska, J., 169n
Issue-based strategies, 73 Komorita, S. S., 60n Listening
Issues, blurred, 19 Konar-Goldband, E., 26n, 88n, 209n
Ivey, A. E., 150n Kopelman, S., 135n, 150n, 231 active, 91
Koslowski, M., 169n communication improved by, 145-148
J Kotter, J., 168n eye contact as cue of, 141
Kozan, M. K., 250n in integrative negotiation, 63
Jacobs, A. T., 60n Krackhardt, D., 169n passive, 145
Janosik, R. J., 236, 240, 250n Kramer, R. M., 135n, 150n, 209n, 229n Lituchy, T. R., 249n
Jehn, E„ 229n Kressel, K., 26n Livingstone, L. P., 249n
Jehn, K. A., 209n, 249n, 250n Kristensen, H., 134n Locke, E., 11 In
Jensen, L., 134n Ku, G., 9, 134n Loewenstein, G. F., 134n, 135n, 209n
JetBlue Airlines, Inc., 208 Kumar, R„ 135n, 241,250n Loewenstein, J., 86, 88n, 150n
Johnson, Lyndon B., 161 Kurogi, A., 250n Logical level, of language, 139
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 9 Kurtzberg, T„ 150n Logrolling, 74-75, 77, 81
Johnston, R. W., 11 In, 150n Kwon, S., 61 n Long, A., 180n, 192n
Joint gains, 64, 73, 85 Losing face, 19; see also Saving face
Joint goals, 83 L Loss-gain frames, 117
Joint strategy, in international negotiations, LowbalL'highball hardball tactic, 54-55, 147
Labor-management negotiations, 37, 109, Lytle, A. L., 150n, 153,231
246-248 193; see also Union negotiations
Joint ventures, 16 M
Jones, G. R., 250n LaFasto, F. M. I., 220n, 229n
Jones, M., 134n, 209n Laird, J. D., 150n Macduff, I., 250n
Jones, T. S., 26n, 61 n Landon, E. L., 56, 61 n Macneil, 1. R., 209n
Journal of Language and Social Language characteristics, 139-141 Magenau, J. M., 26n, 88n, 209n
Language of Detecting Deceit, The Magliozzi, T., 26n, 134n
Psychology. 189n Majority, decisions made by, 225
Journal of Organizational Behavior. 180n (Kalbfleisch), 189n Making Deals in Strange Places: A Begin
Journal of Social Issues. 219n Larick, R. P., 60n
Judgments, differences in, 17 Larmio, J.V., 249n ner s Guide to International Business
Justice, in negotiation relationships, 204-207 Larson, C. E., 220n, 229n Negotiations (Salacuse), 232n
Latham, G., 11 In Making Relationships Work: A Conversation
K Lau, F., 209n with Psychologist John Gottman
Laubach, C., 63 (Gottman), 199
Kahneman, D., 134n Law of small numbers, 126 Malhotra, D. K„ 9, 85, 88n, 209n
Kalbfleisch, P. J., 189n Lax, D., 26n, 60n, 70-71, 88n, 11 In Malley, R., 249n
Kale, S. H., 250n Learned behavior, culture as, 236-237 Mallozzi, J. S., 135n
Kaplan, R., 169n Legality, ethics versus. 175-176, 178 Malouf, M., 150n
Karrass, C. L., 60n Legitimacy, in intimidation tactics, 58 Management theory, 115
Karrass, G., 149, 150n Legitimate power, 154-155, 158-161 Managerial perspectives, on international
Kellerman, J. L., 150n Le Poole, S., 249n negotiation, 241-244
Kelley, H. H., 14, 26n, 64, 88n, 192n Lerner, J. S., 135n Managing Conflict (Greenhalgh), 21 n
Keltner, D., 135n Lessons from the Tarmac (Salter), 208n Managing Strategic Relationships
Kemp, K. E., 83-84, 88n Leung, K., 209n (Greenhalgh), 96n
Kennedy, G., 249n Managing with Power (Pfeffer), 161
286 Index in personal sources of power, 158 issue definition in, 97-99
psychological, 8 limit identification in, 100-101
Mancuso, J., 225n, 229n Mouzas, S., 84, 88n other party assessment in, 105-108
Mannix, E. A., 229n Multi-issue negotiation, 45, 83 presenting issues in, 108-109
Manstead, A. S. R., 135n Multiparty negotiation, 210-229 protocol in, 109-110
Manz, C. C., 225n, 229n agreement in, 227-228 social context of, 103-105
Manz, K. P., 225n, 229n effective group in, 215-217 targets and asking prices in, 101-103
Mao Zedong, 241 formal negotiation stage in, 221-226 stages and phases of, 96-97
Marriage dissolution, 198 prenegotiation stage in, 218-220 tactics versus, 91
Martin, D., 250n two-party negotiation versus, 211-215 unilateral versus bilateral, 92
Material facts, legal definition of, 178 Multiple agenda items, in frames, 121 Nelson, D., 88n
Matsui, F., 135n Murnighan, J. K., 9, 60n, 134n, 135n, Nemeth, C. J., 229n
Matsumoto, D., 249n Networks, for relational power, 163-166
Maturity, for integrative negotiations, 63 192n, 209n, 229n Newton, B., 135n
Maury, R., 135n Mutual adjustment, 12-15 Nibble hardball tactic, 56
Maxwell, N., 209n Mutual-gains situation, 10 Nierenberg, G., 88n, 146n, 150n
Maxwell, S., 209n Myerson, D., 209n Nisbett, R. E., 134n
Mayer, J. D., 135n Nominal Group Technique, 224
Mayfield, J., 250n N Nonengagement strategy, 93
Mayf ield, M., 250n Nonspecific compensation strategy,
McAllister, D. J., 201, 209n Nadler, J., X8n. 135n, 150n
McClelland, D. C., 169n Naming, in disputes, 120 72, 75-77
McComack, S. A., 192n Naquin, C. E., 88n, 209n Nonverbal communication, 141-142
McDonald, J. W., 249n Nash, J. F., 26n Non-zero-sum situations, 10, 15
McGraw, D., 169n Nations, warring, 18 Northcraft, G. B., 26n, 83, 134n
McKenna, B., 250n Natlandsmyr, J. H., 250n Novemsky, N., 135n, 150n
McKersie, R. B., 26n, 60n, 6In, 88n Nauta, A, 134n Nye, P., 209n
Mediation, 197-198, 246 Neale, M. A., 26n, 6In, 81, 83, 88n,
Medvec, V H„ 6In, 134n, 229n O
Metaphors, 86, 141 134n, 135n, 150n, 209n, 229n
Metcalf, L. E., 249n Neck, C. P., 225n, 229n Objective standards, 79
Midgaard, K., 229n Neeleman, David, 208 Obliging strategy, in Dual Concerns
Military-style organizations, 160 Negative bargaining range, 31
Miller, D.T., 19In Negative characterization frames, 118 Model, 23, 25
Miller, S. J., 249n Negative referent power, 163 O'Connor, K. M., 135n, 150n, 192n
Minton, J. W., 88n, 209n Negative reputations, 200 Odiorne, G. S., 61 n
Mintu-Wimsat, A., 249n Negative settlement range, 33 Offers
Mintzberg, H., 11 In Negotiating a Gain-Gain Agreement
Misperception, 19, 128-129 "anchoring,” 55
Misrepresentation, 178, 180-181, 183; (Laubach), 63 communication of, 137
Negotiating in Virtual Organizations counter, 44, 137
see also Ethics exploding, 51-52
Mitigating circumstances, 138 (Lewicki and Dineen), 144n final, 46, 81-82
Moag, J., 150n, 209n Negotiating with Your Nemesis (Gray), 131 n opening, 41-42
Molm, L., 209n Negotiation, overview of, 1-26 questions about, 147
Monster.com, 162 written, for commitments, 48
Mood, in negotiation, 129-133 approach to, 3-4 Ogawa, N., 250n
Moore, D. A., 134n, 135n, 150n conflict in, 18-26 Ohanyan, A., 250n
Moore, M. C., 209n functions and benefits of, 20-22 Ohbuchi, K., 249n
Moral orientation, in personal sources levels of, 18-20 Okumura, T., 231, 241, 246, 250n
management of, 22-26 Olander, K., 111 n
of power, 158 examples of, 4-6 Olekalns, M., 26n, 6In, 88n,
Moral problems, resolving, 175 interdependence in, 9-12
Moral relativism, 186 mutual adjustment in, 12-15 135n, 150n, 209n
Moran, R. T., 250n situation characteristics for, 6-9 Oligarchy, decisions made by, 225
Moran, S., 88n value claiming and value creation in, Oliver. R. L., 26n, 135n, 209n
Morgan, G., 169n Omission, lies of, 176, 180-181
Morley, L., Ill n 15-17 Open-ended questions, 91
Morris, M. W., 150n Negotiation Journal 131, 153n, 197n, 232n Opening bids, 106
Moses, Robert, 161 Negotiation strategy, 89-111 Opening offers, 41-42
Mosterd, I., 60n Opening stance, 42
Motivation Dual Concerns Model, 92-95 Organizational change, from conflict, 20
goals in, 89-91 Organizational Dynamics, 206n
communication of, 137 planning, 97-110 Outcome frames, 116, 118
in multiparty negotiation, 213 alternative identification in, 101
bargaining mix definition in, 99-100
interest definition in, 100
Outcomes, communication of, 137-138 Poinmerenke, P., 135n Index 287
Outsiders, alliances with, 40-41 Poole, M. S., 26n
Overconfidence, 125-126 Positions “Prospect theory,“ 124
Protocol, 109-110, 242
P in Agreement Circumplex, 72, 74-75 Provis, C., 72, 88n
distributive bargaining, 41-46 Prudence, ethics versus. 175-176
Paese, P. W., 134n in interest definition, 100 Pruitt, D. G., 22-24, 26n, 60n, 6In, 88n,
Pal ich, L. E., 249n in multiparty negotiation, 213, 216
Paraphrasing, to summarize, 222 screening, 37-38 11 In, 135n, 150n, 209n
Pareto efficient frontier, 66-67 validity of, 83-84 Psychological motivations, 8
Parrott, W. G., 135n Position sources of power, 155, 158-162 Public pronouncement, of
Passive deception, 176; see also Ethics Positive bargaining range, 31
Passive listening, 145 Positive settlement range, 33 commitments, 47-48
Patterson,!, 192n Postmortem discussion, 228 Putnam, L. L., 26n, 6In, 121, 134n, 140n
Patton, B., 10, 53, 60n, 6In, 69, 79, 88n, Power, 151-169 Pye, L. W., 250n
contextual sources of, 155, 166-167
209n, 235, 249n defined, 152-154 Q
Paulson, G. D., 209n framing of, 118-120
Pentland,A., 150n importance of, 151-152 Quality of life, in Hofstede’s Model of
Perception; see also Cognition; Emotion informational sources of, 154-157 Cultural Dimensions, 238
in international negotiation, 234
defined, 113 as motive for deception, 181-183 Quasi-consensus, decisions made by, 225
distortion in, 113-115 in multiparty negotiation, 219 Questions
framing in, 115-122 others with more, 167-168
misperception management, 128-129 personal sources of, 154-155, 157-158 in best practices, 257
Persistence, positive emotions and, 130 position sources of, 155, 158-162 in negotiation, 145-147, 168
Personalistic ethics, 172, 174-175 relationship sources of, 155, 162-166 open-ended, 91
Personality and Social Psychology’ in tactics to alter impressions, 38 to uncover deception, 187-189
Power distance, 238 Quinn. J. B., 11 In
Bulletin. 190n Power Relationships and Negotiation
Personality theories, 158 R
Personal preferences, justifying, 80 (Barada), 162
Personal sources of power, 154-155, Practicality, ethics versus, 175-176 Radical ideological frames of
Pragmatic level, of language, 139 reference, 157
157-158 Precedents, in solution evaluation, 79
Person-based strategies, 73 Premature commitments, 49 Rahim, M. A., 25n, 26n
“Person-is-the-problem” negotiation, 196 Prenegotiation, 197,218-220 Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventories:
Peterson, E., 209n Preparation stage of negotiations, 96
Peterson, G., 209n Presentation, selective, 38 Professional Manual (Rahim ), 25n
Peterson, M. F., 249n Presettlement settlements, 84 Raia, C. P., 135n
Pfeffer, J., 161, 168n, I69n Prices, asking, 101-103 Raiffa, H„ 26n, 60n
Phatak, A. V., 231, 232n, 234-235, Price Waterhouse, 194 “Railroading,” 213
Prietula, M. J., 6In, 86, 88n, 150n Rapoport, A., 6In, 150n
249n, 250n Principle, interests in, 71 Raven, B. H., 26n, 154, 168n, 169n
Philliips, K. L. J., 229n Problem solving Reactive devaluation, 128
Pillutia, M. M., 209n Reactive strategies, 102
Pines, A. M., 209n in Dual Concerns Model, 24 Reality checks, 220
Pinkley, R. L„ 26n, 88n, 134n, give-and-take pattern for, 14 Rebel without a Cause (film), 56
in integrative negotiation, 83 Reciprocal concessions, 44
150n, 169n, 209n joint approach to, 91 Reciprocal obligations, as negotiation
Planning negotiation strategy, 97-110 moral, 175
negotiations for, 2 frame, 119
alternative identification in, 101 Procedural complexity, in multiparty Reciprocity, 14, 85
bargaining mix definition in, 99-100 Referent power, 154, 162-163
interest definition in, 100 negotiation, 213 Reframing, 121, 138
issue definition in, 97-99 Procedural goals, 90 Rejoinders, 13
limit identification in, 100-101 Procedural justice, 203-204 Relational bargaining frame, 119
other party assessment in, 105-108 Process frames, 117 Relationships
presenting issues in, 108-109 Process interests, in negotiation, 70
protocol in, 109-110 Procter & Gamble Co., Inc., 194-195 as building stage of negotiation, 96
social context of, 103-105 Productive aspects of conflict, 20 interests in, 70
targets and asking prices in, 101-103 Projection, 113, 115 in international negotiation, 235
Plea bargain, 8 Proman, L. A., 61 n as multiparty negotiation role, 218-219
Pluralist ideological frames of reference, 158 Promises, in commitments, 48 in negotiation, 193-209
Pohlan, W. F., 60n justice in, 204-207
Polarized language, 140 option-inventing, 254
Polzer, J. T., 229n repairing, 207-208
reputation in, 199-200
research approaches to, 193-199
trust in, 201-204
The words you are searching are inside this book. To get more targeted content, please make full-text search by clicking here.
vdocuments.mx_essentials-of-negotiation-ocr
Discover the best professional documents and content resources in AnyFlip Document Base.
Search