PERSONHOOD
ourselves better. Regarding ourselves as animals, or instance through
the lens o evolutionary psychology, has allowed much progress in
the understanding o human behaviour. C omparing our brains to
computers has also allowed new philosophical and cognitive theories
to develop, and has boosted both brain science and computer science.
Philosophically, we can still become immobilized by our desire to
keep humanity special. This can result in logical inconsistencies. I
characteristics such as sel-consciousness, agency or rationality are
what make a person, then some animals are persons, and some people
j ust arent. This is the most logical conclusion, yet we seem to fnd it
very difcult to accept.
As we saw in this section, this leaves us with a difcult dilemma:
either we accept that there are conditions o personhood and that
some human beings do not ulfl them while some animals do,
or we claim that human beings are all persons, regardless o the
characteristics they possess. This second option may or may not
include animals and other beings as persons, but the same criteria
clearly do not apply to human and non-human beings, hence the
logical inconsistency. While this may be sustainable i this is backed up
by religious arguments (i.e. the sanctity o human lie above all other
lie) , there is clearly a philosophical problem that needs resolving:
maintaining the special status o human beings has become more and
more difcult, and a new paradigm might well be emerging.
Personhood and non-human animals
There is an obvious sense in which non-human animals are not human,
by defnition, because they do not belong to the species Homo sapiens. So,
asking whether other animals are human is either an imprecise or a not
very interesting question. However, it is still instructive to think about non-
human animals in relation to human beings, as the comparison raises a
number o interesting philosophical questions. The concept o personhood
is a particularly helpul way o approaching the problem o how we should
understand other animals and how they in turn help us understand
ourselves as human beings. Could non-human animals be persons? How
would we defne their personhood? Why would this matter? We can begin
this discussion simply by looking at the concepts already encountered.
Are animals persons? Are they If so, how do they compare with humans?
sel-conscious? Do they have higher or lower consciousness?
ree agents? Do they deserve similar reedoms?
authentic, individual? Do they have the rights o human individuals?
morally responsible? Do they have equal moral value, dignity?
creative, expressive, emotional? Do they have signifcant eelings?
rational? Do they think like humans?
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3 BEING HUMAN
EXERCISE
1. Write down the names o three very dierent types o non-human animal. Which o these is
the most similar and which most dierent rom human beings? In what sense? What animal
characteristics do you regard undamentally as: Important? Controversial? Morally signicant?
Ambiguous? Distinctive? Common? (Written answer/discussion.)
2. Identiy media reports concerning a recent animal rights/status controversy (e.g. testing,
hunting, etc.) . Analyse these reports or philosophical concepts or assumptions. Is the concept o
personhood used implicitly or explicitly in the articles?
3 . Look at the quotes below. Write a brie explanation and response to two o them.
Man is the only animal or whom his own The animal is ignorant o the act that he knows. The man is
existence is a problem which he has to aware o the act that he is ignorant. Victor Hugo
solve. Eric Fromm
Human language appears to be a unique Man is an animal that makes bargains: no other animal does
phenomenon, without signicant analogue this no dog exchanges bones with another. Adam Smith
in the animal world. Noam Chomsky
People speak sometimes about the bestial Answer me, you who believe that animals are only
cruelty oman, but that is terribly unjust and machines. Has nature arranged or this animal to have all
ofensive to beasts, no animal could ever be the machinery o eelings only in order or it not to have any
so cruel as a man, so artully, so artistically at all? Voltaire
cruel. Fyodor Dostoevsky
Animals are my riends and I dont eat The greatness oa nation and its moral progress can be
my riends. George Bernard Shaw judged by the way its animals are treated. Mahatma Gandhi
Anthropocentrism: the human monopoly on personhood
Beore entering in depth into the problem o whether animals could
possess the qualities o personhood, and o what this would mean or
humans i they did, we should rst consider the standard view that
has dominated philosophy or centuries. That is, the presumed centrality
o the human species as the most important, advanced, and powerul
species has kept animals out o the picture philosophically speaking.
The theory that humans are o central importance to the universe as
we know it is called anthropocentrism, and it refects the tendency
to think in human terms and rom a human perspective. Remember all
the books you read as a young child. Were they about animals? Were
they really about animals? In the way that authors anthropomorphize
animal characters and make their problems into human problems, they
show the seemingly universal tendency to see things rom a human
perspective. Are animals not just another eature o the human world?
What is a dog, i not mans best riend?
There are a number o sources o and arguments or anthropocentrism,
and all roughly assume that signicant personhood is a unique
characteristic o the human species. Ancient Greek philosophy elevated
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PERSONHOOD
the rational and linguistic capabilities o humans as a way o setting
them apart rom other living creatures. Aristotle, or example, sets
humanity apart on the grounds that humans are politically sociable and
intelligent. The classic statement o this in the Nicomachean Ethics ( I.1 3 )
attempts to make a clear division between dierent orms o lie, with
humans having the highest ability o reason, beyond animal instincts
and plant-like nutrition. This orms a hierarchy o lie, thus:
Rational
(Humans only)
I n sti n cti ve
(Animals only)
N u tri ti ve
(All life, including plants)
What is the evidence or this? Humans can plan and execute projects.
They can think teleologically, in terms o end results, and see
intelligibility in nature. Humans build huge social institutions and
advanced technologies. I you regard such observations as putting
humans at the top o the pyramid, then you would tend to agree with
Aristotle. There are o course some obvious objections to this and we
will develop these in detail later on: certain non-human animals may
be more intelligent and sociable than Aristotle realized, and some might
object to rationality being used as a criterion o value in the rst place
(what about people with mental disabilities?) . Nevertheless, we can or
now observe that Aristotles arguments have been infuential and part o
a dominant paradigm or how we see animals in relation to humans.
Just as infuential has been religious anthropocentrism, which has
advanced some dierent arguments rom those o Aristotle. For example, in
the Judeo-Christian tradition, the doctrine o Creation takes central place,
arguing rom the concept o God as the benevolent Creator o heaven and
earth to the theory that humans are the pinnacle o that Creation: Let
us make mankind in our image, in our likeness, so that they may rule
over the sh in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all
the wild animals, and over all the creatures that move along the ground
(Genesis 1 :26) . The idea o God is in itsel somewhat anthropic, in the sense
that God uses human language and proesses to have a unique bond with
humans as their Father. Religious anthropocentrism also puts orward
the argument that humans belong to a moral community in a way that is
distinct rom animals. For example, biblical commandments bind humans
in a relationship, a covenant, with God, and, although right treatment
o animals is mandatory (or example, do not muzzle an ox while it is
treading out the grain (Deuteronomy 25:4) , it is clear that only humans
bear personal moral responsibility, as in the commandments to Israel (or
example, Exodus 20) . There are also objections to these arguments or their
theological oundations and moral assumptions. Still, we can note or the
time being that these ideas have been highly infuential.
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3 BEING HUMAN
FIND OUT MORE Questions
Investigate the status o animals in non- Western religions, 1. Considering
including the concepts o rebirth and reincarnation in Buddhism the concepts of
and Hinduism. What connections can be made with the concept o personhood discussed
personhood? earlier in this chapter,
how convincing are the
Descartes: the mental distinction between humans arguments in favour of
and animals anthropocentrism? Do
concepts of personhood
Anthropocentrism implicitly denies animals the quality o personhood, support or undermine
but the traditional arguments and assumptions have generally not anthropocentrism?
oered a sustained theory supporting the ineriority o non-human
lie. The supposition that humans have superiority on many levels is 2. How popular are the
oten held at the level o assumption, seemingly being a sel-evident arguments from Aristotle
part o the natural order . However, the status o personhood in and religion today?
non-human animals rose to the level o a signifcant philosophical Ifthese arguments
problem in the work o Descartes, who sought to identiy the rational endure, why is this?
human soul as a unique entity within the world. As seen in the
discussion o mind and body in Chapter 4, Descartes attempted to 3. Is it even possible for a
prove the distinct, non-physical and immortal nature o the human human being to think
mind. In thus elevating the human mind, he raised the question o in a way that does not
whether this was a singular entity within nature and set himsel the place central importance
task o proving that other animals could not in any way compare with on human beings?
human intelligence. Some o his arguments are amiliar rom those o
Aristotle, but the extended argument he makes linking intelligence to
language shows how Descartes wished to oer something much more
detailed and persuasive.
Read the ollowing extract rom Part V o D escartes Discourse on the
Meth o d:
Biography: Ren Descartes intensively on mathematical
(15961650) and philosophical problems,
his main aim being the
Descartes was a French philosopher and discovery of a foundation
mathematician, widely regarded as the founder for knowledge and a
of modern, Western philosophy. Initially, he sure basis for physics
trained as a lawyer, but his interests became more and other natural sciences.
intellectual and philosophical, and his life became His main contribution to the
dominated by reading and travel. Descartes signed philosophy of mind comes in his work of 1641,
up for military service with the Dutch Republic and Meditations on First Philosophy, which has become
spent most of his life in the Netherlands, though a classic text for philosophy students. His initial
he was not a distinguished soldier. Life in the scepticism about sense perception and focus on
Netherlands suited Descartes well, as it was at this self-conscious thinking leads Descartes to the
time the academic centre of Europe and allowed conclusion that man is fundamentally a mind, res
its citizens intellectual freedom. Descartes worked cogitans, a thinking thing.
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PERSONHOOD
Again, by means o these two tests we may their thoughts to those who, being usually in their
likewise know the dierence between men and company, have leisure to learn their language.
brutes [animals] . For it is highly deserving o
remark, that there are no men so dull and stupid, It is also very worthy o remark, that, though
not even idiots, as to be incapable o joining there are many animals which maniest more
together dierent words, and thereby constructing industry than we in certain o their actions, the
a declaration by which to make their thoughts same animals are yet observed to show none at
understood; and that on the other hand, there all in many others: so that the circumstance that
is no other animal, however perect or happily they do better than we does not prove that they
circumstanced, which can do the like. Nor does are endowed with mind, or it would thence
this inability arise rom want o organs: or we ollow that they possessed greater reason than
observe that magpies and parrots can utter words any o us, and could surpass us in all things;
like ourselves, and are yet unable to speak as we on the contrary, it rather proves that they are
do, that is, so as to show that they understand destitute o reason, and that it is nature which
what they say; in place o which men born dea acts in them according to the disposition o their
and dumb, and thus not less, but rather more than organs: thus it is seen, that a clock composed
the brutes, destitute o the organs which others only o wheels and weights can number the
use in speaking, are in the habit o spontaneously hours and measure time more exactly than we
inventing certain signs by which they discover with all our skin.20
Studying this passage, it is clear that Descartes denies personhood to
non-human animals through a range o related actors you can identiy
these in the text. Firstly, there is reason and intelligence, ollowing in
the tradition o Aristotle. I we value reason above other qualities, it
seemingly ollows that we will use this eature to judge other orms o
lie; what possesses less reason would by denition be less valuable.
Descartes claims that animals have some seemingly intelligent abilities,
but that the overall evidence o their behaviour separates them markedly
rom humans. Clocks are better at calculating time than humans, but
that one narrow ability does not make them intelligent. What matters is
the fexible and adaptable nature o the human mind, and its readiness
to solve new problems. This also then opens the door to discussion o
agency and ree will. Humans can have very great physical limitations
they can be dea and dumb and yet still possess the spontaneity,
creativity, and power to choose some other solution, be it sign language,
writing, or any other ingenious medium o the human mind. The parrot
provides a perect contrast or Descartes, because it has an apparent
ability to use language but in act can only mechanically repeat sounds.
Think about art, poetry, and the richness o human creative output;
even i non-human animals could match the physical capabilities o
humans, they would not even begin to compare in terms o the qualities
o their actions. Then, nally, all o this links to his wider argument
about human sel-consciousness. As seen in the Mind and B ody chapter,
humans are identied or their ability to think and also to recognize their
own thoughts. Language and intelligence are necessary oundations
or sel-consciousness; I cannot acknowledge my own existence unless
I have the words to do so. For Descartes, thereore, the animal that
20 Ren Descartes, Discourse on the Method ofRightly Conducting Ones Reason and Seeking Truth in the
Sciences (Leiden, 1637) ; English translation available at http://www.gutenberg.org/fles/59/59-h/59-h.
htm#part5 (accessed 21 October 2014).
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3 BEING HUMAN
lacks vocabulary, grammar, syntax, etc. has no recognition o its own
existence; no non-human could conceivably be a person.
From the moment he put orward these arguments, however, D escartes
caused controversy, particularly among those who wish to give moral
consideration to animals. It seems challenging to suppose that animals
do not experience the world in the way that we do or have qualities that
we value. Would this not lead to maltreatment o animals? C ontrary
to Descartes, is there not some way that personhood could be ound
among animals, even i just in part? One popular response has been
the argument that animals do possess conscious awareness in a way that
is similar to human beings, even i they cannot express their own sel-
consciousness as acutely as humans do. The argument goes that animals
are aware and have experiences, and that there is such a thing as what it
is like to be a dog or a cat, just as there is an experience o being human.
We reason to this conclusion by analogy. Animals have body parts like
humans have body parts (legs, brains, etc.) . They behave like humans
behave (eat ood, avoid pain, etc.) . They respond to sensory stimuli like
humans do (react to noise, sight, etc.) . Thereore, it seems to be not a
great leap o imagination to suppose that animals are aware o having
real experiences, that they are conscious.
Cartesian argument: Objection to Descartes:
Animals lack personhood By analogy, animals are conscious
Non-human animals lack the qualities: Non-human animals, like humans, have:
Language Distinct body structure/parts
Reason Behaviour (individual, social)
Agency Responses to stimuli
Consciousness Therefore, they probably are conscious
Does the analogy argument show conclusively that animals are
conscious? Should they urther be considered in light o concepts such
as personhood? Not necessarily, although this is a popular conclusion.
Consider pain, or example. Is responding to pain actually the same
thing as experiencing pain? On frst inspection it seems obvious:
whatever responds to pain must be experiencing pain. However, it could
be argued that externally observable behaviour does not prove that there
is an internal state o feeling the pain stimulus. Taking arguments put
orward by Peter Harrison (1 991 ) , we could build robots that respond
to pain without them having the subjective eeling o what pain is like.
The simplest organisms (amoebas) respond to pain, even though we
are airly certain that they do not experience it. So, how do we know
that an animal has experiences like human experiences? Are we really
justifed in supposing that animal consciousness is even broadly the same
as human? Such questions remain controversial. They have an obvious
ethical dimension, though they are also simply part o the wider issue o
how we understand non-human animals.
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PERSONHOOD
Evolutionary perspective: humans as animals
The origins o human beings were something o a mystery even
in early modern times, in the time o Descartes, in the sense that
there seemed to be no academic way to look beyond established
philosophical arguments and the biblical text. The dominant role o
human beings in the natural order seemed to be a given thing (it still
is to many) , with humans enjoying power over domesticated animals
and observing a tradition o interpreting themselves as possessing the
divine image. Descartes built upon this with rationalism, trying to
refne distinctions between human and non-human through mental
aculties. However, part o his argument was doomed to ailure in
the long run, in that natural science would come to undermine the
categorical distinctions between human and other animals. That is, the
theory o evolution clearly links the emergence o the human species
to more primitive ancestor species, and to the cousins o Homo
sapiens other primates.
p Hominidae skeletons
FIND OUT MORE
Research the details o Darwins theory o evolution and the way
it was frst received by the public. Find out the reasons or the
controversy that surrounded D arwins theory.
You could start by reading the sections on Darwin in Chapters 2 and 6.
The central argument presented by D arwin in his key work On the p A cartoon from Punch
Origin of Species ( 1 85 9) was that organisms develop over time ( they magazine illustrating
evolve) through their adaptation to their surroundings. Those Darwins theory of evolution
organisms that are best suited to their environment are more likely
to survive and reproduce, and thus by means o this natural selection
the most advantageous characteristics are passed down. In the case o
humans, previous generations o primates became biologically successul
particularly through the development o language, problem solving,
and social skills, and thus the very advanced primates Homo sapiens
(humans) emerged.
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3 BEING HUMAN
How does this aect the concept o personhood? It could be argued that Questions
humans, since Darwin, can no longer identiy themselves exclusively
as persons, at the expense o other animals. The argument would go 1. Does human evolution
something like this: undermine the mental
distinctions made by
Human characteristics are related to and derived rom animal Descartes?
characteristics.
2. Could humans have
Humans cannot literally support creation myths about their own evolved to become
special status. something very
diferent rom animals?
The characteristics o all animals have developed and will develop
over time. 3. Is humanity the
pinnacle o evolution,
Personhood thus becomes an evolved aspect o human beings and would or is that an arrogant
be derived rom a spectrum o eatures and abilities, rather than anything perspective?
absolute. But does this entail that personhood no longer sets humans apart?
4. Does evolution morally
Bentham and Singer: sentience and sufering equalize humans and
other animals?
Another distinctive development o the modern world, alongside the
natural scientifc view o humans exemplifed by Darwin, was the
concept o social progress. Politicians, philosophers, and writers hailed
the emergence o an enlightened era rom the primitive customs o
previous generations. Many o the ethical norms that are widely taken
or granted today emerged rom the rapid changes o the 1 8th and 1 9th
centuries: the abolition o slavery, child labour, and corporal punishment,
the extension o the popular vote, o legal protections, and so orth. This
put moral emphasis upon the welare o human beings, seeing their
long-term happiness as a central consideration o society. Putting the
interests o a wider group o humans into consideration (slaves, women,
children) , there seemed to be an expanded view o personhood that went
beyond the intellectualism o an elite minority. Politically and ethically,
modern society has become inclusive, meaning that it has recognized
the distinct value o a diverse range o persons in dierent ethnic groups,
classes, sexual orientations, abilities, disabilities, and so on. With a wider
view o the persons who have an interest in our society, the status o
animals could come under renewed scrutiny. Should we not also include
animals among those who receive our care and consideration?
A key theorist who brought a resh perspective on the status o animals
was the English legal reormer and philosopher Jeremy Bentham. He
is amed or his development o utilitarianism, an ethical theory that
equates goodness with the maximization o pleasure or the greatest
number o people. Bentham argued accordingly that social and legal
decisions should be taken in light o utilitarian principles, leading to
policies that would bring the greatest beneft or the majority o all.
Human values thereore are traced back to hedonism, in that all humans
act in a way that will bring about pleasure and avoid what is painul.
Dispensing with previous historical, mythological, and philosophical views
o the human condition, Bentham put new emphasis on this seemingly
simple and scientifc principle. His central consideration was neither the
mental prowess nor the divine origins o human beings, but instead their
ability to eel, have experiences, and suer. B entham set aside traditional
notions o personhood and instead evaluated humans in light o sentience.
104
PERSONHOOD
But how does this aect animals? Bentham deals with other animals and
their share in sentience in a amous passage rom his key utilitarian text,
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation ( 1 789) :
But is there any reason why we should be suered to torment them
[animals] ? Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should
not be suered to torment them? Yes, several. The day has been, I
grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater
part o the species, under the denomination o slaves, have been
treated by the law exactly upon the same ooting as, in England or
example, the inerior races o animals are still. The day may come,
when the rest o the animal creation may acquire those rights which
never could have been withholden rom them but by the hand o
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness
o the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned
without redress to the caprice o a tormentor. It may come one day
to be recognized, that the number o the legs, the villosity o the skin,
or the termination o the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufcient
or abandoning a sensitive being to the same ate. What else is it
that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the aculty o reason, or,
perhaps, the aculty o discourse? But a ull-grown horse or dog is
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable
animal, than an inant o a day, or a week, or even a month, old. B ut
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is
not, C an they reason? nor, C an they talk? but, C an they suffer?21
Biography: Jeremy Bentham maximizing the happiness o
(17481832) the majority. Throughout his
career, Bentham considered
Bentham grew up the child o a wealthy London himsel orward thinking
amily, gaining a reputation or academic brilliance and a man oscience, and
at a young age, and entered Oxord University at the nothing typied this better
age o 12! He studied but did not practise the law, than the arrangements he
investing his energies into reorming and radical made to dispose o his p The auto-icon o
causes, and the publication o various political, corpse ater death. Having Jeremy Bentham, with
legal, and ethical proposals. One such idea was let his body to science, his his mummied head
the construction o a Panopticon: a new orm o remains were preserved in a beore it was removed
prison designed to give guards constant supervision glass box (the auto-icon) , or separate storage.
o all prisoners, cutting costs and the danger o including his mummied
disturbance. Such radical and practical plans give head, and put on display in University College
a favour o Benthams thinking; he advocated or London. The icon can still be visited today, though
the organization o society along utilitarian lines, the head is stored separately.
21 Jeremy Bentham, Chapter XVII: The Boundary around Penal Jurisprudence, in An Introduction to the Principles
ofMorals and Legislation (Privately printed, 1789/Oxord: Oxord University Press, 1907) ; now available at
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pds/bentham1780.pd (accessed 21 October 2014) .
105
3 BEING HUMAN
EXERCISE
1. Rank the ollowing organisms in terms o the consideration we
should give to their suering. Explain your approach. O r, is it
impossible to rank them? (Explain.)
Earthworm
Chimpanzee
Cockroach
Rabbit
Shark
Rat
2. Examine the arguments in avour o vegetarianism put orward
by a campaign group. (Research.) How important is sentience in
such discussions? Is a ocus on sentience rational/justied?
3. Research the current legal status o non-human animals in your
country and produce a brieng document or chart. Do they have
legal protections, etc.? Does the rationale or such laws connect
with Bentham? (Refections.)
In recent years, the arguments o Bentham have fourished and been
reramed by utilitarian philosophers taking subtly dierent approaches.
One such gure is the Australian ethicist Peter Singer, who advocates
preference utilitarianism. That is, while B entham had advocated
hedonism or the majority, Singer emphasizes the satisaction o
preerences; goodness is not simple pleasure, but is the possibility o
choosing things and having ones interests ullled. These interests are
not narrowly dened, however, and one o the key components or the
state o having interests is sentience, the capacity to eel, which played
such a strong role in B enthams assessment o animals. Other actors also
contribute to ones possession o signicant interests that are worthy o
being valued, such as reason or planning or the uture, but sentience is at
the core. The limitation o moral thinking to humans alone would be an
example o mistaken prejudice that Singer terms speciesism. Previous
discussions o personhood in philosophy thus by implication have taken
wrong approaches (or example, Descartes) in drawing hard distinctions
between humans and animals that, on closer inspection, seem arbitrary.
We can look at the ideas o personhood as sitting on a spectrum, as
opposed to being absolute qualities that only humans have. For example,
humans exercise rational thought, so do chimpanzees to a lesser extent,
and dogs to a lesser extent still, and so on, but at no point is there a
hard boundary between the rational and the non-rational, as Aristotle
and Descartes had suggested. As Singer points out in his classic work
Animal Liberation ( 1 975 ) , some adult non- human animals make a better
t with concepts o personhood than inant humans. An adult orang-
utan would be a better problem-solver and more socially aware than an
inant human, and thus surely would be closer to being a person.22
22 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, new edition (New York: HarperCollins, 2002) .
106
PERSONHOOD
Meanwhile, the religious absolute that is known as the Sanctity o
Lie doctrine ( namely, God made man in his image, human dignity is
inviolable) is dismissed by Singer and others as mythological, as there is
no evidence or this special creation o humans. So, with its oundations
seemingly demolished, how could human exceptionalism be justied?
FIND OUT MORE
What are the ethical implications o Singers arguments? Research
his ideas or putting preerence utilitarianism into practice, in respect
o animals.
Read Singers article in the New York Review of Books on Animal
Liberation at 30. How does he contend with his critics?
http ://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2 003 /may/1 5 /
anim al- lib eratio n- at- 3 0/
Does a diference remain?
At rst sight, the various concepts o personhood seem to oer some
airly strict borderlines between human and non-human animals:
humans are thinkers, planners, agents, moralists, sel-aware, individual,
and expressive. What other animal could produce the Sistine Chapel or
travel into space? However, on closer inspection the strict and precise
distinctions break down, and the distinctions between humans and
animals seem quite loose and general. We could choose to shit our ocus
to sentience, which seems to apply strongly to non-human animals. We
could also look at personhood characteristics on a spectrum, matching
dierent animals at dierent developmental stages to varying degrees.
D oes it ollow, thereore, that philosophers should abandon the practice
o making distinctions along these lines?
It could be counter-argued that signicant dierences remain in terms
o identiying humans as distinct in respect o personhood, even though
these may not be absolute or rule out the moral consideration o
animals. For example, contemporary American philosopher Christine
Korsgaard supports a Kantian approach by putting aside the utilitarian
concerns o pleasure and welare, and instead ocuses on the unique
human concern or normativity. O nly humans refectively consider the
general rightness or wrongness o their actions, or consider whether
their impulses t with the behaviour they would like to exhibit. It is not
just a matter o thinking, but o humans developing a strong sel-identity
or practical identity that is concerned with morality. O nly humans can
act in a certain way because they are trying to do what is good; other
animals may do something that is intelligent or even compassionate, but
not because they have rst considered the morality o their choices.
However, Korsgaard emphatically is not arguing or an absolute
distinction in terms o mental characteristics (think o the brain-
damaged, or example) and nor is she arguing against the moral
consideration o animals. O n the contrary, the similarities are as
important as dierences, and humans oten give great value to basic
needs such as avoiding pain: needs shared in common with other
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3 BEING HUMAN
animals. The interests of non-persons will need to be considered.
Humans could still be the only persons, even if they do not make
absolute distinctions in the way they treat other life forms.
Questions
1. How accurate is the term speciesism as a characterization of human
(mis-) understanding of other animals?
2. If you killed an adult dog to save a human baby, would you be
speciesist? Is that the moral equivalent of racism?
3. To what extent does sentience unite humans with other animals?
4. What evidence is there that humans have moral identities and think
normatively?
FIND OUT MORE
Read the essay on Fellow Creatures by Christine Korsgaard here:
http ://www.p eop le.fas.harvard.edu/~ korsgaar/C MK.
FellowCreatures.pdf
Another type of counter-argument, re-establishing some of the distinctions
between humans and animals, comes from the English philosopher Roger
Scruton. In his work Animal Rights and Wrongs he addresses what he sees
as the fundamental imbalance in some liberal views of the status of
animals. That is, there has developed a strong focus on rights and the
claims animals have, for example, to live pain-free lives. However, the idea
of rights for animals takes the moral concepts out of the setting in which
they normally apply. Thus, a right would usually apply to someone who
could have a respective obligation. You have a right to have your property
protected because you have an obligation to refrain from stealing from
others. Meanwhile, if we said that an animal had a right to be protected
from harm, it would be a nonsense to say that animals had obligations of
non-harm. The idea of moral status comes from dialogue and interpersonal
relations; it comes from the possibility of having a meaningful discussion
with the interested parties. In this respect, the lack of linguistic and
intellectual ability among animals seems to prevent them from entering
a moral community. Animals may have something like personal qualities
in some respects, but in this important area of moral equality they are not
personal enough. Scruton does not deny the possibility of there being non-
human persons, but claims that the current evidence weighs against it.23
Equally problematic for Scruton is the sentimentality of our thinking
about animals, which emphasizes the protection of domesticated animals
and those that feature in childrens literature (cats, badgers) . Animal
rights groups may focus on certain species to capture public attention,
even though such animals often cause great destruction to other species.
This can infect our thinking about the status of animals, thinking in an
emotive, empathetic, but perhaps also anthropomorphic way about the
animals involved. Scruton argues that this confuses our understanding
23 See Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs, 3rd edition (New York: Continuum, 2007) .
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PERSONHOOD
o the status o animals, as notions o personhood become blurred by Assessment tip
our emotional attachment to bunny rabbits, or example. But should we
not think with equal avour o rabbits and o rats? O r o all animals? O r, I discussing the status o
should we not rather abandon the simplistic equalizing o the value and animals and the problem
nature o animal and human lie? o personhood, be sure to
keep a ocus on the core
We worry about the status o animals. Animals do not worry about the theme issue: being human.
status o animals. Could there be a substantive distinction rom humans This is diferent rom an
ater all? ethics essay concerned
specically with the
FIND OUT MORE treatment o animals.
Read the interview and extract rom Roger Scrutons book in the
j ournal Antennae:
http ://www.antennae.org.uk/ANTE NNAE % 2 0IS S UE % 2 01 9.
docx.pdf
Personhood and machines
Personhood is controversial in how it is dened, in terms o what
characteristics are necessary or sucient or the acknowledgement o
something/someone as a person. It is also controversial in its application,
in terms o how ar the status may be extended. Could it include non-
human animals? Could there be any such thing as a non-human
person? We could think o extra-terrestrial lie orms, which would
correspond to the concepts o personhood. There is a long tradition
o this in philosophy; Kant speculated that there would be intelligent
lie on other planets. In the realm o science ction and imagination,
the Vulcans and Klingons o Star Trek obviously seem to be persons.
However, it will not escape any careul viewer o such lms that these
creatures are also strongly anthropomorphic. They are basically humans
with peculiar eatures. It seems thereore that we are good at imagining
a universe ull o persons, but not so good at seeing them as non-
human persons. Another interesting development along these lines in
ction is the imagined emergence o machine
intelligences that resemble persons: intelligent,
language-using, autonomous machines. The
dierence here, however, is that our real- world
technology seems to be bringing us increasingly
sophisticated machines that resemble more
closely those o Star Trek ( or example,
Commander Data) , while we are as yet no
closer to our rst encounter with intelligent
alien lie orms.
So, are we on the threshold o making and
encountering genuine personal machines?
Not exactly, though the speed o development p Star Treks Commander Data. Machine? Human?
in computing technology is encouraging Human machine? Person? Non-human person?
serious philosophical refection about what N o n - p e rs o n ?
such machines could be in principle. S uch
conversations are driven by imagination, by
the technological revolution o recent years,
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3 BEING HUMAN
and by the way in which technology is saturating society and being
integrated into every conceivable product. Perhaps the starting point
or the idea o a machine person as a philosophical possibility is the
emergence specically o machine intelligence. We are accustomed
today to reerring to any number o machines as smart or intelligent.
We impute personal motives to computers. D oes your mobile phone
recommend things to you? Does the opponent in your video game
think about what it is doing? Our common use o language is
accepting o the idea o intelligent machines, but philosophers naturally
will want to pick these ideas apart.
CASE STUDY Was D eep B lue intelligent?
Did Deep Blue understand the game?
The Kasparov versus Deep Blue Chess Match Was D eep B lue in any sense aware?
Does Deep Blue show us anything about
In 1 997, IBMs Deep Blue became the rst
computer to deeat a world champion at chess, where technology will lead in the uture?
beating Garry Kasparov by a score o 3.5 to
2.5. This extraordinary eat became world p Garry Kasparov contemplating his next move
news. While many celebrated this landmark in against Deep Blue
the development o articial intelligence (AI) ,
Kasparov was urious, accusing IBM o cheating
and demanding a re-match. IBM reused and
dismantled its computer. D eep B lue was capable
o evaluating 200 dierent chess positions
per second, and was progressively improved
(reprogrammed) during junctures in the match,
to enable it to avoid the traps that Kasparov had
set or the weaker versions o its AI. Deep Blue
represents a major technical achievement, but it
is questionable whether this takes us nearer to
the production o an articial mind.
Is it signicant that machines can outperorm
humans in some mental tasks?
Intelligence and imitation: Descartes and Turing
Let us suppose that our interest in machine persons is centred on
intelligence: could machines be intelligent in the way that humans are
intelligent? At rst glance this seems like a airly simple question. We
could just see whether we can get machines to do the intelligent things
that humans do, such as play chess. However, on urther refection the
problem is much murkier than it initially appears. What is this quality?
How do we know that humans are intelligent in the rst place? One
approach is to think o ways o modelling human intelligence, making
machines that copy intelligent behaviours and processes. That is in a
sense what articial intelligence is: a model. It is an attempt to replicate
something that is ound organically in humans, though, intriguingly,
the possibility is open according to some that such models could surpass
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PERSONHOOD
the original orm. But what kind o model is AI? Philosophers have
drawn a distinction between strong and weak theories o AI, with
some advocating that a machine could actually be a mind in matching
the human orm o intelligence exactly (strong AI) , and others
countering that a machine could achieve no such thing in its partial
replications and representations o the human (weak AI) . But to make
any progress in this debate, some steps must frst be taken to unpack
the idea o how this elusive intelligence could be airly identifed and
understood.
This problem has an older origin than one might expect. Going back
to Descartes, we already fnd a hypothetical discussion o attempts to
make intelligent machines, which according to Descartes were doomed
to ailure. In his Discourse on the Method he claims that there are two tests
that show that machines, even i seemingly human, obviously would
remain distinguishable in their lack o intelligence:
They could not use words or signs arranged in a way that declared
thoughts to others; they could make speech sounds, but not reply
coherently in conversation.
They could perorm very well in certain specifc tasks, but would be
ound lacking in others; they would lack the reason to have human
mental agility.
Descartes acknowledges that these are the same objections he has to
regarding non-human animals as being intelligent in the ull human
sense o the word. The standard he sets, thereore, is the sophisticated
manipulation o symbols that is language and the adaptability o
perorming multiple (and new) tasks. By implication, i machines
appeared to do such things, D escartes would have to admit that they
had intelligence in the orm he suggests. Looking at his wider theory
o mind (see Chapter 4: Mind and Body) , this fts with his contention
that the mind is a non- reducible entity, separate rom the body. The
intelligence in the mind cannot be explained or replicated, he claims,
because it is an invisible and completely basic aspect o human beings.
So, it would only be possible or machines weakly to ape human
actions, without there being a genuine parallel. Naturally, there are
obj ections to his position. We could reject his theory o mind and
see this as part o the biological machine o the brain. We could
claim that computing technology will enable machines to perorm
sophisticated actions that Descartes could not have anticipated.
Nevertheless, he has still set a high benchmark. Could any machine
meet the two tests? Are these not airly reasonable identifers o
uniquely human intelligence?
In the modern era, this Cartesian approach has been developed
and challenged through the work o the English mathematician
Alan Turing, who also took an interest in the external appearance
o machine capabilities. Without a simple way o defning the
process o human thought, Turing instead pointed to a test o the
phenomenon o intelligence in what has become known as the
imitation game.
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3 BEING HUMAN
Biography: Alan Turing (19121954) analytical machinery naturally
led Turing towards research
Turing was a mathematician and pioneer o computer in the emerging eld o
science. Born in London, he rapidly progressed in his computing, running the
academic career as a mathematician at Cambridge Manchester University
and then Princeton, and was then recruited by laboratory. However, Turings
the UK government as part o preparations or lie had a tragic end. In the
war against Germany. With the outbreak o war 1950s homosexuality was still
in 1939, Turing was committed to the intensive illegal in the UK, and Turing was convicted or gross
work o cracking the German codes. To achieve indecency. He was punished in 1952 with chemical
this goal, Turing and his colleagues produced an castration and died rom apparent suicide in 1954. In
electromechanical decryption machine known as 2009 the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown issued
the bombe, which analysed intercepted German an apology on behal o the government or the way
messages and tested hypotheses or how the Turing was treated, recognizing his contributions to
codes could be deciphered. Such eforts met with the nation and to the world.
considerable success. Ater the war, his expertise in
I propose to consider the question, Can machines Now suppose X is actually A, then A must
think? This should begin with denitions o the answer. It is As obj ect in the game to try and
meaning o the terms machine and think. cause C to make the wrong identication. His
The denitions might be ramed so as to refect answer might thereore be:
so ar as possible the normal use o the words,
but this attitude is dangerous. I the meaning o My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are
the words machine and think are to be ound about nine inches long.
by examining how they are commonly used it is
dicult to escape the conclusion that the meaning In order that tones o voice may not help the
and the answer to the question, Can machines interrogator the answers should be written, or
think? is to be sought in a statistical survey such better still, typewritten. The ideal arrangement
as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead o is to have a teleprinter communicating between
attempting such a denition I shall replace the the two rooms. Alternatively the question and
question by another, which is closely related to it answers can be repeated by an intermediary. The
and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. object o the game or the third player (B) is to
help the interrogator. The best strategy or her is
The new orm o the problem can be described probably to give truthul answers. She can add
in terms o a game which we call the imitation such things as I am the woman, dont listen to
game. It is played with three people, a man (A) , him! to her answers, but it will avail nothing as
a woman (B) , and an interrogator (C) who may the man can make similar remarks.
be o either sex. The interrogator stays in a room
apart rom the other two. The object o the game We now ask the question, What will happen
or the interrogator is to determine which o the when a machine takes the part o A in this
other two is the man and which is the woman. game? Will the interrogator decide wrongly as
He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end oten when the game is played like this as he
o the game he says either X is A and Y is B or does when the game is played between a man
X is B and Y is A. The interrogator is allowed to and a woman? These questions replace our
put questions to A and B thus: original, Can machines think?
C: Will X please tell me the length o his or her hair? Alan Turing24
24 Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind 49 (1950) : 433.
112
PERSONHOOD
With the idea o thinking being unclear, it is difcult to say what
we would be looking or i we were to investigate the possibility o
thinking machines. C an we defne thinking at all? Turing suggests that
a more ruitul investigation lies in the comparison o machine and
human dialogue, or it is only through our conversations with others
that we seem to recognize the act o thinking among our ellow human
beings. In a sense, Turing is reerring us back to the experience o being
human, our observation o plausible language use, and then asks us
to consider the question o whether a machine could attain such a
level. C ertainly, in Turings own lietime no machine was developed
that could hold any kind o conversation with a human being. To this
day, the most advanced computers have ailed to meet the standard.
However, some would argue that a successul attempt at the imitation
game may not be so ar away. That would raise the urther and
interesting question o whether machines would to some degree take
on the character o being persons.
EXERCISE
1. Investigate the Loebner Prize, which is an annual competition or
computer scientists attempting to crack Turings imitation game.
Read transcripts o previous conversations and consider the
challenges aced in reproducing human language ( http://www.
loebner.net/Prize/loebner- prize.html) .
2. The 201 3 winner Mitsuku is available or conversations online.
See whether you can catch her out. Or should that be it?
( http://www.mitsuku. com/.)
3. Interview Mitsuku and other chatbots about machine
intelligence. What do they have to say?
What is understanding? The big problem for AI
We are concerned with the question o whether machines could be
personal and, or that purpose, are ocused on the question o whether
they are intelligent. B ut what do we mean by that? We are looking or
rational processes, but surely also something more than that. When
we think about human intelligence, it is not simply a matter o some
number crunching ability. We think o rational abilities as bound up
with a number o aculties: language, memory, emotion, creativity,
sel-awareness. Can we look or something narrowly defned, or is
that not misrepresenting the whole nature o the problem? Here arise
some basic criticisms o Turing and the imitation game. O n the one
hand, the simple nature o this approach and the strong ocus on our
external experiences o intelligence make Turings proposal attractive at
frst. On the other hand, is passing an intelligence test really the same
thing as being intelligent? Having a statistical reason to say the right
thing (which is how chat computers work) seems not to match with the
deliberative sel-conscious nature o human thinking. There seems to be
a distinction between accurate output and genuine understanding.
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3 BEING HUMAN
At least, that is what John S earle, a contemporary philosopher, argues
in the ollowing extract:
Suppose that Im locked in a room and given English case, I produce answers by manipulating
a large batch o Chinese writing. Suppose uninterpreted symbols. As ar as the Chinese
urthermore that I know no Chinese, either written is concerned, I simply behave like a computer;
or spoken, and that Im not even confdent that I I perorm operations on ormally specifed
could recognize C hinese writing. To me, C hinese elements. For the purposes o the Chinese, I am
writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. simply an instantiation o the computer program.
Now the claims made by strong AI are that the
Now suppose that ater this frst batch o Chinese programmed computer understands the stories
writing I am given a second batch together with and that the program in some sense explains
a set o rules or correlating the second batch human understanding. But we are now in a
with the frst. The rules are in English, and position to examine these claims in light o our
I understand these rules. They enable me to thought experiment.
correlate one set o symbols with another; I can 1. As regards the frst claim, it seems to
identiy the symbols entirely by their shapes.
Now suppose also that I am given a third batch me obvious in the example that I do
o Chinese symbols together with instructions in not understand a word o the Chinese
English that enable me to correlate elements o stories. I have inputs and outputs that are
this third batch with the frst two, and these rules indistinguishable rom those o the native
instruct me how to give back certain Chinese C hinese speaker, and I can have any ormal
symbols with certain sorts o shapes in response program you like, but I still understand
to certain sorts o shapes given me in the third nothing. In the Chinese case the computer is
batch. Unknown to me, the people who are me and in cases where the computer is not
giving me all o these symbols call the frst batch me, the computer has nothing more than I
a script, the second batch a story and the third have in the case where I understand nothing.
batch questions. Furthermore, they call the 2. As regards the second claim, that the program
symbols I give them back in response to the third explains human understanding, we can see
batch answers to the questions and the set o that the computer and its program do not
rules in English they call the program. provide sufcient conditions o understanding
since the computer and the program are
Now to complicate the story, imagine that these unctioning, and there is no understanding.
people also give me stories in English, which I
understand, and they then ask me questions in John Searle25
English about these stories, and I give them answers
in English. Suppose also that ater a while I get so p The Turing Test by Darren Goossens
good at ollowing the instructions that, rom the
external point o view, my answers to the questions
are absolutely indistinguishable rom those o
native Chinese speakers. Nobody just looking at my
answers can tell that I dont speak Chinese.
Let us also suppose that my answers to the
English questions are indistinguishable rom
those o other native English speakers, or the
simple reason that I am a native speaker. From
the external point o view rom the point o
view o someone reading my answers the
answers to the Chinese and English questions are
equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the
25 John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3, No. 3 (1980) : 418419.
114
PERSONHOOD
Questions
1. Does Turings test lack ambition? Should computer scientists try to
replicate how the mind works? (Strong AI.)
2. How strong is the analogy between computers and human minds?
Why do we make these analogies?
3. Does Searles thought experiment fairly characterize what is going on
inside intelligent machines?
4. Should we accept the distinction between apparent and real
understanding? What makes understanding real?
S eemingly, Searle knocks down the idea that genuine intelligence and
understanding can simply be reproduced by computational processes.
In the story o the Chinese room, the answers given to the questions
could be fawless, and yet the automatic nature o the process seems
to lack the qualities that we associate with understanding: no context,
no memory, no imagination, no sel- conscious awareness o what is
happening. The statistical methods used in computing are worlds away
rom what it is like or us to think.
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to counter-argue against
Searles dismissal o thinking machines. One o the strongest objections
is the claim that S earle takes a narrow view o agency, ocusing on
whether the man working in the Chinese room understands the
language. However, could not the room itsel be an intelligent system?
Could the combination o the room, the books, the man, add up to a
system that acts intelligently and understands Chinese? Searle counters
by claiming that this argument produces an absurdity, that mind
is everywhere, because it could be ound in any system producing
intelligible results. But the whole point o investigating the mind is
to look or something discrete and identiable. A second objection is
that we could hypothetically build a robot that did not learn language
through written instructions only, but which gathered data about the
world through sensory equipment, like a camera. The robot could
then work out how language works on the basis o experiences. This
argument has the advantage o matching more closely the process o
human language acquisition. However, S earle remains unconvinced;
merely adding the perormance o operations (movement, speech) does
not get around the central problem that the robot only does the right
actions or sayings on the basis o ormal instructions (or how else could
it understand what it encountered?) . It would still be a Chinese room
on wheels.
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3 BEING HUMAN
Summary
Alan Turing: John Searle:
Answering is not understanding
Machines can think in
imitation
Proposal: Proposal:
A orm o weak AI can stand as Correct output cannot be equated
thinking i it replicates the with understanding, as it is possible
appearance o thinking through to envisage a system that gives
a blind language test. Any other correct outputs without appreciating
account o thinking lacks a clear the meaning.
defnition.
Criticisms: Criticisms:
Surely real thinking should be The systems objection: the man
linked to strong AI, thinking in in the Chinese room does not
the way humans think. understand, but the system o the
room does.
In practice, machines
have ared very poorly in We could build a robot that had
attempting to pass the experiences and then learned
imitation game. language rom those experiences.
Minds, machines, and the problem o consciousness
As we have seen, the question o whether machines could count as
rational or intelligent is a contentious one. A lot depends on our starting
defnitions and assumptions, and then there is the wider issue o how
reason connects with other human attributes. Would a rational
machine approximate in any way to being human? Are humans not
intelligent persons in rather a broad sense, encompassing an array o
emotions, dispositions, and creative capabilities that do not correspond
very well to a computer program? Perhaps, although it also seems unwise
to place limitations on what computers could come to be in the uture.
Another way o approaching the problem o machines as persons
is to reverse the question. Instead o examining the ways in which
machines can be constructed to model human personalities, we could
instead ask whether computing helps us to analyse the workings o
the human mind. In this way, the philosophy o artifcial intelligence
becomes linked with the philosophy o mind. S pecifcally, the theory o
unctionalism (see Chapter 4: Mind and Body) asserts that the human
mind can be ully explained by what it does (i.e. its unctions) , rather
than what it is, so that it could in theory be replicated by other means.
The mind perorms a huge variety o unctions and calculations at
great speed, to the extent that we might best understand it as a orm
o biological, evolved supercomputer. Ater all, we have learned that
computation can be used in a very basic way to control movement, give
responses, and so orth, in the case o robots. This is not to say that we
116
PERSONHOOD
are on the threshold o building computers that really are as capable as
human brains (ar rom it) , but the example o the computer is seen as a
useul way o explaining the mind. Thinking in terms o personhood, we
might say that the personal human mind is defned by very high levels
o unctioning, and the less personal computer minds are (currently)
defned by more basic levels o unctioning.
In oering a reductive view o consciousness, unctionalism also
implicitly oers a reductive view o personhood. That is, in claiming
that the human mind can be thoroughly and completely explained in
terms o what it does, all o the higher unctions o personhood would
also in principle be parts o that explanation. I we are unctionalists,
we say that we could (one day) work out the systems that give rise to
sel-consciousness, reason, agency, morality, and so orth. In principle,
however ar o that may be, we should be able to get there in the end.
That at least is the starting premise o a number o great works o science
fction, which take the uture mapping o the personality in machine
orm to be an important stimulus or storytelling. Consider the opening
scene rom the classic flm AI: Artifcial Intelligence.
Hobby ( a leading robotics scientist) : Tell me, what Team Member No.4: And how exactly do we pull
is love? this o?
Sheila ( a robot) : Love is frst widening my eyes a Female Team Member: You know, it occurs to me
little bit and quickening my breathing a little and um with all this animus existing against mechas
warming my skin and touching with my today, it isnt simply a question o creating a robot
who can love, but isnt the real conundrum can
Hobby: And so on. Exactly so. Thank you, S heila. you get a human to love them back?
But I wasnt reerring to sensuality simulators.
The word that I used was love. Love like the Hobby: O urs will be a perect child caught in a
love o a child or its parents. I propose that we reeze-rame always loving, never ill, never
build a robot child, who can love. A robot child changing. With all the childless couples yearning
who will genuinely love the parent or parents it in vain or a license, our little mecha would not
imprints on, with a love that will never end. only open an entirely new market, it will fll a
great human need.
Team Member No.3: A child substitute mecha?
Female Team Member: B ut you havent answered
Hobby: B ut a mecha with a mind, with neuronal my question. I a robot could genuinely love
eedback. You see what Im suggesting is that a person, what responsibility does that person
love will be the key by which they acquire a kind hold toward that mecha in return? Its a moral
o subconscious never beore achieved. An inner question, isnt it?
world o metaphor, o intuition, o sel-motivated
reasoning. O dreams. Hobby: The oldest one o all. B ut in the beginning,
didnt God create Adam to love him?26
Team Member No.4: A robot that dreams?
Hobby: Yes.
26 AI: Artifcial Intelligence, 2001, directed by Steven Spielberg, distributed by DreamWorks.
117
3 BEING HUMAN
As AI: Artifcial Intelligence so beautiully illustrates, the unctionalist
view o personhood is at once beguiling and also rightening, as it points
towards a world in which humans can pick apart their most treasured
characteristics and recreate them, synthetically. C an we create love? I
we did, what then? Are humans ready or synthetic personhood, ready
or the God-like power o creating lie in our own image? As the flm
points out, this problem takes us back to a moral question.
However, the antasy o flm leans rather heavily on the assumed
strength o unctionalism as a way o understanding the potential o
machines. I unctionalists are wrong about the mind, they will also be
wrong about the possibility o machine minds. The obvious criticism is
that replicating human behaviour cannot be equated with the state o
being a human or having the experiences o what that is like. It could
be said that creating a mind artifcially is sel-deeating because it
is by its nature only a simulation: the mind is specifcally brought about
by the biology o the brain. For example, it could also be said that an
entirely accurate computer model o a plumbing system is distinct rom
something that carries real water. S imilarly, it could be urther argued
that consciousness is subjective in its nature and the eel o what it
is like to be human cannot be recreated, even i all human actions
and language are successully simulated (see the argument o David
C halmers in C hapter 4: Mind and B ody) . Finally, there is the claim
that some questions are simply closed o rom humans and there are
mysteries that we are not mentally equipped to answer. The problem
o human consciousness, the experience o being human, could be
one such mystery. Thus, the practical problem o making the smartest
possible machines rubs up against a undamental metaphysical problem:
what is the real essence o human existence?
Questions FIND OUT MORE
1. I unctionalism is true, how can we know that it is true? Investigate the concept
2. I machines could be persons, does it ollow that other animals could o transhumanism.
How does this link to
be too? machines? What are the
3. Is personhood a set o unctions? I it isnt, what is it? implications o this or
4. Is it ethically justiable or humans to create synthetic persons? personhood?
Assessment tip
Think about the diferent stimuli that could be used to connect with core
theme topics. Thinking o your own ideas or a stimulus will help you
develop the skill o identiying issues in the material. Look out or texts
and images that will help you to do this. For example, in this topic think
about: machines, technology, computers, intelligence, the internet, etc.
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PERSONHOOD
FINAL REFLECTION
Looking at the concept o personhood, the problem remains o
whether we can defne human beings and the experience o being
human through certain qualities and criteria. Are humans defned
through sel- consciousness, agency, morality, authenticity, and so
orth? Can this concept o personhood be seen as the exclusive
property o humans? Do humans defne and shape the world around
them, in light o these concepts? Philosophers have had much to say
about these problems and our rapidly changing world will continue
to provoke new issues and debates.
Link with the Core Theme - Personhood and Being Human
By traditional and established ways o thinking, being a person
is being human. We recognise the exceptional nature o human
lie and experience through ideas and symbols, be they religious
(God created man in his image) , philosophical (Aristotles
man, the rational animal) , or poetic, artistic, and creative.
Thus, the concepts o personhood this chapter has explored
( sel- consciousness, agency, morality, authenticity) have all been
used to defne the human condition and identiy humans in an
exclusive way. Anthropocentrism has been a dominant paradigm
or interpreting human experience because only humans have
been seen as sel- conscious, only humans have been attributed
with agency, morality and authenticity. Personhood seems to have
been a conceptual way o bolstering human status, reinorcing
the moral order, and giving meaning to the human condition.
A person has a purpose.
Nevertheless, the established ways o thinking have been questioned
and the simple equation o being human with personhood could
be challenged on a number o levels. The concepts and criteria
themselves are open or debate. What is sel- consciousness, agency,
morality, authenticity? Are these real human properties or are
they more dubious concepts, legacies o our language and culture?
And can they be exclusively attributed to humans anyway? The
dierentiation between humans and non-human animals is subject
to a strong and developing debate. The growth o smart technology
also threatens to throw the status o being human into urther
controversy. Perhaps the idea o personhood now challenges the
idea o the human, rather than clariying it.
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3 BEING HUMAN
Personhood: assessment tips
Below are two stimuli taken from past papers, that can be related to the
key concept of personhood:
Stimulus 3:
(November 2002)
Stimulus 4:
Human beings are animals with a peculiar character and role. They
are alert to the values of personhood, life, order, and existence
as such, to his or her community, to his or her environment, to
the cosmos. As a member of the community of nature, the human
being may be regarded as guardian of respect for it, to exercise
reverence towards it and, if it has a maker, towards its maker.
Source: Extract from David Braine,
The Human Person: Animal and Spirit
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press)
(November 201 0)
ACTIVITIES:
1. Match each stimulus with one of the topics covered in this chapter:
Consciousness and self-consciousness
Agency
Morality and moral responsibility
Responsibility and authenticity
Personhood and non-human animals
Personhood and machines
2. Why do you think the match you chose is a good one? How
would you justify your choice of topic in your introduction?
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PERSONHOOD
Your main task in the introduction is to identiy the philosophical issue Assessment tip
you will be discussing and establish its link with three key elements:
your own knowledge (the theories and philosophers you will be The Core Theme assessment
discussing) , the stimulus and the general core theme o being human. asks you to do the following:
None o these important elements must be lost along the essay, and
establishing them frmly in the introduction will help you remember With explicit reference
them as you develop your arguments. to the stimulus and your
own knowledge, discuss a
The core o you essay is the philosophical issue, because it will direct philosophical issue related
you argumentation and discussion. The philosophical issue must be to the question ofwhat it
identifed clearly. Its scope must be appropriate to the length o an essay means to be human.
you will write under one hour. Personhood in general is probably too
broad. Equally, you need to know enough about an issue beore you
choose it as your ocus or an entire essay.
Another thing to keep in mind is that the philosophical issue needs to be
discussed. Presenting your philosophical issue as a source o debate and
showing that it can be viewed rom dierent perspectives will help you
make sure you go beyond mere description in your essay. A good way to
present your philosophical issue, or instance, is to use an open question
that can clearly be answered in dierent ways.
Here is an example or the ollowing stimulus:
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3 BEING HUMAN
Introduction written by a student:
The stimulus is an image o a man and a monkey touching each others
fngers. A philosophical theme depicted in this image is that o personhood.
The monkeys action has a certain quality to it that many would describe as
human. By pointing and sharing a moment with the human, the question
begged is: can a non- human animal be a person? And urthermore, what
constitutes a person? There are numerous approaches to the issue o
personhood dating as ar back as Aristotle (and also arguably Plato). This
issue as an ever- growing importance as in recent years the question o how
humans should treat animals has become central to numerous debates.
Comments: This is a good introduction, that clearly identifes a key
concept (personhood) and narrows it down to a specifc philosophical
issue (can a non-human animal be a person?) The stimulus is clearly
used as a basis or the philosophical issue, and the core theme Being
Human is also present through the broader question: what constitutes
a person?
It is a good idea to explain why the issue is important and it is done here
in the last sentence. However, the writer would need to be careul not
to be too side-tracked by this last point, as it could turn the essay into an
ethics essay instead o ocusing in personhood.
Finally, the writer could improve this introduction by making her
own knowledge a little clearer. Although she writes that there
are numerous approaches to this issue, it would be a good idea to
explicitly state what approaches she is going to analyse in the essay. A
thesis could also be added, although this is not always necessary i the
central issue and question have been stated clearly.
ACTIVITIES:
3. Practise turning some o the topics listed in activity 1 (page 1 20)
into good philosophical issues. You can combine topics and make
reerence to broader ideas such as the key concept o personhood
and being human.
4. Practise writing an introduction or stimulus 3 and 4, making
sure the philosophical issue you identiy is clearly linked to the
stimulus, Being Human, and to the knowledge you will bring to
the essay (theories and scholars) .
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PERSONHOOD
References Cited Patterson, Francine, and Wendy Gordon. The C ase
or the Personhood o Gorillas. In The Great
Anderson, D avid L. What Is a Person?. Consortium Ape Project. Edited by Paola C avalieri and Peter
on Cognitive Science Instruction, 2 000. Available at S inger. New York: S t Martins Grifn, 1 993 ,
http : / / w w w. m ind. ils tu . e du / cu rricu lu m / w ha t_ pp. 5 877. Also available at http://www.animal-
is_a_person/what_is_a_person.php (accessed 21 rights- library.com/texts- m/patterson01 .htm
October 201 4) . (accessed 21 October 201 4) .
B entham, Jeremy. C hapter XVII: The B oundary Penal Reorm International. The Minimum Age
around Penal Jurisprudence. In An Introduction o Criminal Responsibility. Justice or Children
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Privately B riefng No. 4, 2 01 3 . Available at http://www.
printed, 1 789/Oxord: Oxord University penalreorm.org/wp-content/uploads/201 3/05/
Press, 1 907. Now available at http: //www. j ustice-or-children-briefng-4-v6-web_0.pd
earlymoderntexts.com/pds/bentham1 780.pd (accessed 21 October 201 4) .
(accessed 21 October 201 4).
Rochat, Philippe. Five Levels o S el- Awareness
de Waal, Frans. The Evolution o Empathy. as They Unold Early in Lie. Consciousness and
Greater Good, 1 S eptember 2 005 . Available at Cognition 1 2 ( 2 003 ) : 71 773 1 .
http: //greatergood. berkeley. edu/article/item/
the_evolution_o_empathy (accessed Scruton, Roger. Animal Rights and Wrongs, 3 rd
21 October 201 4) . edition. New York: C ontinuum, 2 007.
D escartes, Ren. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Searle, John. Minds, Brains, and Programs.
Conducting Ones Reason and Seeking Truth in Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 , No. 3 ( 1 980) :
the Sciences. Leiden, 1 63 7. English translation 41 7457.
available at http://www.gutenberg. org/
e b oo ks/ 5 9 ? msg= we lco me _strange r# p art5 Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation, new edition. New
(accessed 21 October 201 4). York: HarperC ollins, 2 002 .
Frankurt, Harry G. Freedom o the Will and the Taylor, Richard. Action and Purpose. Englewood
C oncept o a Person. The Journal of Philosophy Clis, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1 966. Also available
LXVIII, No. 1 (1 4 January 1 971 ) : 520. at http://www.inormationphilosopher.com/
solutions/philosophers/taylorr/ (accessed 21
Guignon, Charles, and Derk Pereboom (eds) . October 201 4) .
Existentialism: Basic Writings, 2nd edition.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing C ompany, 2001 . Turing, Alan. C omputing Machinery and
Intelligence. Mind 49 ( 1 95 0) : 43 3 460.
Honderich, Ted (ed.) . The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy. Oxord: Oxord University Press, 1 995 . Walker, Joseph. S tate Parole B oards Use S otware
to D ecide Which Inmates to Release. The Wall
Millican, Peter. Persons, Humans and Brains. Street Journal, 1 1 O ctober 2 01 3 . Available at
Lecture delivered to frst-year Philosophy students. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1 0001
Oxord: Oxord University, 2009. Available at 4240527023046261 045791 21 251 595240852
http: / / www. youtub e. com/ watch? v= 9 HhWqB JtPP8 (accessed 21 October 201 4) .
(accessed 21 October 201 4) .
Nagel, Thomas. What Is It Like to B e a B at?. The
Philosophical Review LXXXIII, No. 4 ( O ctober
1 974) : 435450.
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BEING HUMAN
4 Mind and Body
Concepts of mind and body
The mindbody problem
The problem of other minds
Consciousness
Some essential questions:
What does philosophy tell us about the nature of mind and body?
What, if any, are the relationships between mind and body?
Why do we believe that other people have minds like ours?
What do recent advances in neuroscience tell us about how the
mind works?
Stimulus 1
Craig: Theres a tiny door in that empty ofce. Its a portal, Maxine.
It takes you inside John Malkovich. You see the world through
John Malkovichs eyes, then, ater about fteen minutes, youre
spit out into a ditch on the side o the New Jersey Turnpike.
Maxine: S ounds delightul. . . .
Craig: Hes an actor. O ne o the great American actors o the 2 0th
c e n tu r y.
Maxine: Whats he been in?
Craig: Lots o things. Hes very well respected. That j ewel thie
movie, or example. The point is that this is a very odd thing,
supernatural, or lack o a better word. It raises all sorts o
philosophical questions about the nature o sel, about the existence
o the soul. Am I me? Is Malkovich Malkovich? Was the B uddha
right, is duality an illusion? Do you realize what a metaphysical can
o worms this portal is? I dont think I can go on living my lie as
I have lived it.
Being John Malkovich, screenplay by C harlie Kauman
(Propaganda Films, 1 999)
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4 BEING HUMAN
Stimulus 2
p I, Robot (2004, directed by Alex Proyas, distributed by 20th Century Fox)
One o the greatest and most recurrent themes o literature is that o Questions
a mystical j ourney. Imagine that you are transported ar rom your
own land, or time, or culture, or even rom your own body. You 1. Is it possible to think
could imagine that you let your physical sel ar behind, while your of you without also
conscious awareness foated above. Perhaps you could journey into thinking of your body?
somebody elses body and see the world through their eyes, as in
the cult lm Being John Malkovich. I you did, would you still be you? 2. What could account
Would Malkovich be Malkovich? Would a human still be human? This for the common
scenario may seem to be a antasy, but such stories are an important idea of out-of-body
part o philosophy; they provide alternate worlds in which we can try experiences?
out our ideas.
3. Is the human brain what
Would you enter the portal into John Malkovichs head? Would makes a human being?
you keep your identity i you did? D o you have a soul? Would it be
corrupted, by stealing somebody elses body? And, is there any such 4. If you could replicate
thing as you to begin with? Craig, the hapless protagonist and victim what the mind does
o the lm, stumbles across these philosophical questions, much to with a machine, would it
his distress. be a mind?
Now imagine a dierent kind o antasy: a science ction world. It is
a world ull o machines, autonomous machines, those that can do
things or themselves. The machines here move around unaided, pick
and complete tasks, and even use language to interact with humans.
We could imagine that such machines, or the sake o convenience
and understanding, have a strong resemblance to human beings: our
bodily shape, our way o moving, our acial gestures. The question
is posed starkly in the lm I, Robot ( adapted rom an Isaac Asimov
novel) : how should we treat and interact with such beings? We
should engage with them on the right level, but what are these
machines? They have bodies copied rom our bodies. They can do
what we do. They have systems replicating the work o our brains.
They have the same functions as our minds. Are they not, then, simply
human beings?
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MIND AND BODY
Philosophical terms Mindbody problem the philosophical
problem o dening the relationship between the
Body the physical component and extent o an mind and the body
organism or object
Monism a theory o the mindbody
Brain the most complex organ o a human relationship, which sees them as a unity
being, located in the head, and the central
part o the nervous system; the brain controls Problem of other minds the problem o
the sensory organs and has a decisive role in knowing whether or proving that other human
behaviour beings also have minds, like yours
Consciousness the state o being awake or Soul the enduring essence or non-physical
aware, or o having experiences part o a human being, oten associated with
traditional or religious belie systems
Dualism a theory o the mindbody
relationship, which sees mind and body as S p irit either a non- physical, invisible being
distinct, perhaps even as two separate entities or orce, oten associated with traditional or
religious belie systems; or the inherent drive
Mind the aculty o thought, awareness and or character o a human being
consciousness
EXERCISE
1. Find images, videos, art, and poetry representing our concepts o
body and mind. How does our imagination aect what we think
o our minds and bodies?
2. Write down some initial refections on an ancient problem: is
it possible to know what happens to you when you die? Is the
death o your body the end o you? Try to ocus on reasons
and counter-points.
3. Think about modern virtual communication. I you chat to
somebody online who is not bodily present, is that any less real
than ace-to-ace interaction? Find examples to illuminate this
question.
What is the core part o a human being? There is an obvious sense in
which we are more than mere physical bodies. We understand humans
as being dierent rom other objects it is considered immoral to treat
humans as objects and so it seems to be a common assumption
that there is something o special value inside humans. Humans use
language to express complex emotions, they establish bonds with one
another, and they can conceive o their past, present, and uture. S uch
concepts link to another chapter o this book: personhood. However,
here we are concerned with the composition o humans: the parts,
eatures, and aculties dening them. So, the question arises, what is
that part o us which expresses our unique awareness o ourselves?
We tend to think o the answer to that question in airly mental terms:
our thinking and awareness contain the real us. Seeing the body as
secondary is quite a common habit. For example, imagine that you lost
a leg in an accident. You would have lost something in your body, but
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4 BEING HUMAN
would you be any less o a human being? Indeed, we sometimes think o
people with very damaged or limited bodies as having strong character
or identity. The almost completely physically paralysed physicist S tephen
Hawking (who has motor neurone disease) is a good example o this: his
greatness lies in his thoughts and perseverance. What we value is not
just the body itsel, but the mind.
That may be a common way o thinking and one that is quite
unphilosophical in its own right. However, such habits and uses o
language give birth to enduring philosophical problems. One o the
greatest and oldest is the mindbody problem. Are we able to defne
the dierence between and the relationship between these two things?
Is it air to say that they are separate, or united? Do they exist distinctly?
The apparent distinction between our physical bodies and our thinking
minds can seem very convincing and it aects the way we see ourselves.
However, philosophers are concerned to tackle this problem precisely
and rigorously. They want to fnd out whether we can show that there is
a distinction or, on the contrary, that there is not one. They want to fnd
out whether some combination o reason, evidence, and contemplation
could uncover the actual relationship.
Perhaps the simplest way to see this problem is in the distinction
between two basic positions. Dualism proposes that the mind and the
body are distinct things; perhaps they even exist distinctly. Monism,
meanwhile, proposes that the mind and the body are a unity; they are
aspects o the same thing. As this chapter progresses, however, you will
see that there are many and varied possibilities that stretch beyond the
two basic options.
Dualism Monism Questions
We are two things a mind and a We are one thing united mind/ 1. Are most non-
body. body. philosophers dualists or
monists? What reasons
Makes distinctions between the Makes links between the physical do they have?
physical and the mental aspects and the mental aspects of humans.
of humans. 2. What makes the
Traditional support from empiricist mindbody problem a
Traditional support from philosophers, who emphasize the philosophy problem?
rationalist philosophers, who primacy of physical evidence.
emphasize the primacy of
thinking or mental experience.
There probably is no civilization or culture in history that has not given
at least some thought to the question o what human beings are and,
more specifcally, whether they are j ust physical bodies. Prehistoric
cultures show evidence o humans having been buried with grave goods,
suggesting that some non-physical part (soul) would progress to a orm
o aterlie and enjoy those objects. Its not exactly a ormal philosophy
o mind, but it implies a theory about humans as something other than
physical and assumes some kind o reasoning process. Its not difcult
to think o arguments or this simple orm o dualism. When humans
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MIND AND BODY
die, their physical bodies remain, but something important about them p In ancient times, people were
goes away. When humans dream, they see and hear, and do things, often buried with grave goods,
but apparently without the use o their bodies. On this level, humans to take with them to the afterlife
have been philosophers, considering the mind, or millennia. Anybody
who refects upon such matters is doing philosophy, participating in a
tradition as old as the human race itsel.
Our questions about minds and bodies may be ancient, but they are
also completely cutting- edge in terms o todays philosophy. These
questions are socially and morally important right now. Let us say,
or example, that we need to decide the ate o a patient who has
suered brain death: her vital organs continue to unction and her
body lives, but all o her higher brain unctions are no longer present.
Minimal activity can be detected in scans. The patient cannot and will
never speak again, or look someone in the eye, and so orth. Is this still
a human being? In some respects obviously she is: her body clearly
belongs to the human species and her outward appearance may not
have changed dramatically. B ut is the real her trapped inside there?
There could be a soul within, the divine spark o a human being. There
could be the mind thoughts and awareness hampered by a damaged
brain. O n the contrary, though, it could well be argued that the real
person was only ever a product o the brain and, with the physical
brain severely damaged, there is no mind let to consider. Thus, we
are dealing with questions that unite the neurosurgeons o today
with the gravediggers o the Bronze Age: what are our minds and
our bodies?
However, the modern problem o how we understand the mind and
the body also calls into question the relationship between philosophy
and science. Philosophy is interested in what humans are: it is a deep
problem, concerned with the undamental nature o things. Yet,
looking at the traditional philosophical concept o the mind, we must
be aware o how developments in other elds could impinge on our
conversations. A hundred years ago, it would be air to say that scientists
knew almost nothing about the working o the brain. Now, with an
increasingly complex array o equipment and methods, scientists are
seeing progress that touches upon concepts with a traditional connection
to the philosophy o mind: decision-making, aesthetic judgment,
dreaming, and so orth. I scientists increasingly think they can explain
these matters, it challenges the role o philosophy. It also challenges
ancient philosophy, developed centuries beore the modern scientic
revolutions. Has it anything relevant to tell us today? Can philosophy
become outdated? O r, will enduring questions about the mind always
arise and remain relevant, no matter how sophisticated scientic
methods become?
FIND OUT MORE
Investigate the eld o neuroaesthetics. What are some recent
discoveries? Could this kind o brain science replace the need or
philosophy in some respects? What does this tell us about the
relationship between scientic and artistic knowledge?
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4 BEING HUMAN
p Neuro imaging at UCLA and Martinos Center or Biomedical Imaging at Questions
Massachusetts General Hospital
1. The mindbody
Regardless o how we conceive o the mind and the body, whether we problem is an ancient
view them philosophically, scientifcally, or by some other method, the problem. Does that
questions we have identifed here are likely to have a continuing impact make it more or
upon the popular imagination. Science fction gives us the idea o a less likely to be an
synthetic mind, as already mentioned, be it in a supercomputer, a robot, important problem?
or in some orm o organic- machine hybrid. Various spiritual revivals,
meanwhile, emphasize the value o higher states o consciousness and 2. How confdent are you
mindulness, evoking the possibility o connecting to universal truth. that philosophers can
These approaches draw deeply rom traditions o ancient wisdom and solve the mindbody
religion, but they also make connections with current science and problem?
philosophy. Finally, there are also the numerous antasies o flm, music,
and wider pop culture, witnessed in the mindbody displacement o 3. Why do so many
Being John Malkovich and in the mind- reading skills o D r Xavier in popular flms present
X-Men. O ur interest in the mind and the body seems unquenchable, antasies o the mind
but will philosophy ultimately help us in illuminating what they mean (mind control, telepathy,
or being human? switching minds, dream
travel, etc.)?
Ancient views of mind and body
Ancient India: body and mind as riends and oes
Ancient Greece: the nature o soul
Abrahamic religions: raising a spiritual body
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MIND AND BODY
EXERCISE
1 . Look at the ollowing quotations concerning mind and body, rom ancient and traditional sources,
rom various cultures. Identiy views that you agree or disagree with, and consider the reasons or
your judgment.
Mind is everything. What we think, we When the mind is thinking it is talking to
become. Buddha itsel. Plato
The energy o the mind is the essence o lie. Diculties strengthen the mind as labour
Aristotle does the body. S eneca
Oh my mind, the treasure is deep within you. The body is mortal, but the person dwelling
Do not search or it outside. Guru Nanak in the body is immortal. Bhagavad Gita
What we love is not the body, but what You are dust, and to dust you shall return.
makes the body live. Conucius Holy Bible: Genesis
The mind commands the body and it obeys. The fesh endures the storms o the present
The mind orders itsel and meets resistance. alone, the mind those o the past and uture as
Saint Augustine well. Epicurus
NB in some cases these are abridged or simplied quotations.
2 . Try to nd two sources rom ancient and/or traditional cultures that seem to present contrasting
views o the mind and the body. C an you explain the dierences in perspective?
Ancient India: body and mind as friends and foes
As mentioned above, there is an obvious way in which traditional
cultures have considered the nature o human beings through the
categories o body, mind, consciousness, and soul. There is the question
o what becomes o humans at death, raising the prospect o an aterlie
in some orm, in the body or out o it. There are also the memories we
have o dreaming: non-physical and vivid experiences that are universal
eatures o human experience. E ven more strikingly, all humans seem
to be aware o their bodies, through eeling sensory inputs and being
able to control what the body does. For example, you could have a
conscious intention to read a book, say you will do it, and then go and
do it. At rst sight at least, it seems to be that we (in the inner sel)
are in charge o our bodies. The executive part o us is the mind and the
obedient part is the body.
This type o reasoning seems air enough on rst inspection because it is
built upon experiences we can all relate to. However, thinking in this way
is more strongly philosophical than people realize, as it brings in a whole
series o ideas about the undamental nature o humans and o reality.
There is a tendency to see the body as a kind o object: a tool or vehicle
or carrying the mind along. Implicitly, this values the mind above the
body and suggests that they have a relationship with one another, rather
than being something identical or united. But is this justied?
Some o the earliest philosophical discussion o mind and body can be
traced back to ancient India, a culture in which the perpetual cycle o
lie and death was subj ect to continuous scrutiny. India has given birth
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4 BEING HUMAN
to some o the worlds oldest and most distinguished belie systems:
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, as well as more modern aiths
such as Sikhism (1 5th century) . One o the uniying elements o
Indian religions has been the concern to address the seemingly endless
process o lie, suering, and death, without humanity managing to
comprehend, let alone overcome, the mental turmoil this produces.
The Sanskrit word Samsara reers to such a cycle in the constant fow
o lie rom the body, to death, and to new lie again in the orm o
reincarnation or rebirth. Naturally enough, the traditional way to depict
this in art has been in a great Wheel o Lie, showing the journey
through the dierent realms o the universe.
p The Wheel of Life
But what keeps the Wheel o Lie turning? According to Hinduism, it is the
ocus upon the body as the centre o awareness, being driven by sensations
and the desire or things that please and preserve our physical state. This is
a state o ignorance (Avidya) , as a lie ocused on the body ails to perceive
the wider truth that Samsara is happening and that the illusions o lie need
to be overcome. Essentially, thereore, the Hindu tradition presents the
argument that the body needs to be subject to the discipline o the mind;
the constant cravings o the body are evidence o this. The categories o
mind and body, thereore, belong to an inner spiritual confict in which a
human is striving or an enlightened state or liberation (Moksha) .
The Hindu concept o the body is ethical and spiritual in its ormulation,
but it also draws simply on common experience. All humans experience
cravings and desires very sharply, can become conscious o these, and
may struggle with what the body suggests. It could be counter-argued
rom a scientic perspective that such desires simply refect physiological
needs that can be understood, or example, through the science o
nutrition. There could be no such thing as a confict o mind and body,
just a need or sensible diet and exercise. Nevertheless, Hinduism still
oers a powerul narrative that attempts to make sense o the human
condition: not just what we need, but how it eels to need things.
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MIND AND BODY
One answer to the problem o how we are to live with our bodies is Questions
asceticism. This is the practice o subduing the body by denying the
things it desires: ood, drink, sleep, sex, and so on. O bviously, its not 1. What evidence is there
possible to remove these things completely (we would die) , but there that lie is dominated by
are traditions, particularly in India and Europe, o strictly limiting and Samsara?
managing such gratifcations. One can see this in the chastity o
Christian monks or in the emaciated appearance o some Hindu holy 2. In what ways have you
men. But why practise asceticism in the frst place? One answer is that tried to discipline your
our bodily desires pollute our thoughts: they can be distracting, arise body?
involuntarily, and are difcult to shake o. They can lead to vices, such
as gluttony and lust, and in giving in to our desires we weaken our will 3. Could indulging the
or character. It could be argued that the body acts as a barrier to a body also be seen as
concentrated mind and so the practice o asceticism enables one to good?
experience discipline and clarity. Yet, on the contrary, some might say
that satisying bodily needs helps rather than hinders our thinking. 4. Does science replace
This moderate view o the body was advanced by the Buddha, the need or a concept
Siddhartha Gautama. o spiritual struggle?
Biography: Buddha (Siddhartha is sufering, there are causes
Gautama) o sufering, there is an end
to sufering, and there is
Siddhartha Gautama probably lived in the 6th a way to end sufering.
and 5th centuries BCE, though the precise years Deeper spiritual awareness
o his lie are disputed. He was a prince in the opens up the possibility o
Shakya clan rom north-eastern India, the son o Nirvana: the complete peace
the king Suddhodana, and yet renounced his royal o mind that comes through
lineage or a lietime o meditation. His ultimate knowledge and liberation. Ater his enlightenment,
achievement according to Buddhism is reaching Gautama Buddha spent the remainder o his years
the status o one who is awakened (Buddha in teaching his insights and spreading what has
Sanskrit) , which led him away rom the royal court. become known as Buddhism. In doing so, he had
This included his perception o the nature and an enduring impact upon how the relationship
causes o sufering (Dukkha) , and the possibility o between body and mind is understood.
overcoming it through the Four Noble Truths: there
The narratives o the lie o the Buddha rame the major ideas o
his teaching, including concepts o being human, the nature o
mind, and an ethic o compassion. The problems and limitations o
our physical existence as humans are undeniable acts about our
nature and condition: we know that we were children, have grown,
experience sickness and suering, will age, and must conront our
own deaths. These existential acts are some o the key stimuli o
philosophical thinking. However, or the young prince S iddhartha
they were strangely unknown. Fearul that his son would abandon
his royal ambitions, the king Suddhodana attempted to make his lie
into a gilded cage o pleasure and luxury. S iddhartha was confned to
the palace, rom which all sick and elderly people were banished, and
in which the phenomenon o death was disguised. Not knowing the
weakness o the body, it was hoped that S iddhartha could grow to be a
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4 BEING HUMAN
king, rather than ollowing his destiny to be enlightened. However, as
the story goes, in journeying out rom the palace he eventually caught
sight o an old man and, in urther journeys, he also ound a diseased
man, a corpse, and an ascetic (the Four Sights) . The harsh reality o
physical weakness hit home and Siddhartha aced the philosophical
problem we all ace: how to live with this knowledge. These Four Sights
provide a symbol or the way in which our minds must conront our
limited and mortal bodies.
Deciding to fee rom his royal palace and prison, Siddhartha journeyed
out into the country and joined a group o ve wandering ascetics. He is
said to have practised severe asceticism and punished his body, though
without experiencing the spiritual realization that he was hoping or.
Hal starved, Siddhartha came to the conclusion that he would have to
nourish his body to gain the strength or meditation; the body would
need to be at peace with itsel or the necessary mental equilibrium.
Thereore, he turned his back on asceticism and, according to the
legend, accepted rice pudding rom a young woman (Sujata) beore
journeying on to more ruitul and decisive meditation beneath the
Bodhi tree.
The importance o this story or our purposes is the way it calls into
question the ascetic view o the mindbody relationship. One could
think in terms o the metaphor o the master (mind) trying to gain
authority over a disobedient servant (body) , requiring a strict regime
o punishment to bend the will. Asceticism thinks in terms o striving
against wayward infuences, which has the strengths o demanding
sel- discipline and creating genuine scope or refection. However,
working with that same metaphor, one could question whether this
kind o dominance and harsh discipline is conducive to sustained and
deep refection. Perhaps the mind and the body should have a more
harmonious and collaborative relationship; perhaps a well-treated
servant would be o greater use and productivity in supporting the
master. O r, is the body so important to our thoughts that it should not
be considered the servant at all?
This leads to an important B uddhist concept, the Middle Way, which
the Buddha proceeded to teach to the ascetics he had once travelled
with. On the one hand, personal gratication obviously does not lead
to enlightenment because, as the ascetics supposed, it ocuses the mind
on the changing world o appearances and illusions, physical sensations
and desires that cloud our thinking. However, on the other hand, are
extreme denial and asceticism counter-productive in the quest or truth
because they cause urther suering what meditation is supposed
to overcome and so are themselves a orm o distraction? Instead o
teaching the struggle o the mind against the body, the B uddha taught
the Noble Eightold Path:
Right view
Right thought
Right speech
Right action
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MIND AND BODY
Right livelihood
Right eort
Right mindulness
Right concentration
This encompasses the practices o knowledge, ethics, and meditation.
The path set out by the Buddha implies that it is possible to control our
desires through mental eort without denying them altogether. B y this
view, a good lie supports the body without giving in to its every craving.
The problems o Samsara and Dukkha are not denied; on the contrary,
the Buddha claims that the body needs to be treated gently i the painul
cycle o rebirth is to be overcome.
FIND OUT MORE
Research Buddhas meditation beneath the Bodhi tree and his
conrontation with Mara. What does this story tell us about the
Buddhist view o mind and meditation? How could you evaluate,
support, or critique this perspective?
Finally, its important to observe that B uddha not only challenged the TOK link
ascetic view o the mind and the body, but also contributed urther
to the philosophical discussion o mind with the concept o Anatta In what ways does the ego
(no-sel) . In accordance with Hindu culture, the Buddha armed or self hamper our ways
that lie and consciousness continue into another body ater death. of knowing? What is the
However, by contrast with Hindu reincarnation, the B uddha suggested importance of personal
that there is no xed sel or eternal element to be reborn into another knowledge in Buddhism?
body. Instead, what we regard as us is a constantly changing stream
o consciousness. The mind is not equivalent to an immortal soul; it
is not a permanent and essential sel. The mind is a fuctuating series
o impressions and, indeed, the idea o a xed notion o sel could be
another orm o attachment: a mental chain that ties us to the world.
To think, thereore, that the mind drives the body like a machine would
be an oversimplication or Buddhism, because the mind is just as
changeable and impermanent as the body it is supposed to direct.
There are a number o arguments in avour o Anatta:
I everything else is impermanent, then so is the sel impermanent.
Maniestly, our thoughts and characters change over time.
We can become attached to or egoistic about our own spiritual quests.
It can also be said to be a orm o nondualism because the sharp
distinctions made between mind/body, internal/external, sel/other,
and so orth are based on the illusion o ones own enduring identity.
Buddhism, or example, would deny that the mindbody problem is
a real problem, because the terms themselves (mind, body) are
uncertain and impermanent eatures o our experience. An important
part o philosophical wisdom according to Buddhism, thereore, is
learning to appreciate how pervasive illusion can be, even within ones
own mind.
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4 BEING HUMAN
EXERCISE Assessment tip
1. Write an imaginary dialogue between the Buddha and the ve If you are writing about the
ascetics, in which the B uddha argues or the Middle Way, while Buddha in an essay, avoid
the ascetics argue or asceticism. Incorporate arguments or and simply telling the stories:
against their views on the mindbody relationship. this shows you have
knowledge, but little else.
2. Research the Wheel o Lie and produce your own diagram o Make sure you discuss and
it. Analyse: what are the implications o Samsara or the way we analyse the concepts, think
view the physical body? about criticisms of Buddhist
teachings, and think how
3. Analyse and explain: how could the Noble Eightold Path be you could compare this
used to discipline the body, without hurting it? perspective with other
views. Be sure to give your
4. Investigate ways in which modern theories or knowledge could comments and evaluation.
be used in a critique o Buddhism. Is there lasting value in this
philosophy?
Ancient Greece: the nature of soul
Western philosophy rst fourished in ancient Greece and within that
fourishing was the rst philosophical discussion o mind and body.
Greek civilization was dominated by rival city-states with their own
subtly dierent dialects, cultures, and ideas. There was at times confict
and tension, as was elt particularly strongly in the 5th century BCE in
the great war between Sparta and Athens. That same century saw the
emergence o two ounders o Western philosophy in the city o Athens:
Socrates and his student Plato. Not by accident, philosophy and critical
questioning emerged against a background o political rivalries, suspicion,
and intrigue, and both Socrates and Plato became controversial gures
within the city. Ultimately, the constant challenging, questioning, and
doubting received wisdom put Socrates in great trouble. He was accused
o corrupting the youth o Athens, was ound guilty by the court, and
was orced to commit suicide by poisoning.
This was an unortunate end or so distinguished a gure, but Socrates is
said to have aced death with courage and equanimity. Ideally, according to
the Greeks, a philosopher is supposed to be virtuous and wise, and Socrates
was no exception. He was said to be bold and light-hearted at his trial,
reused to beg or mercy, accepted the sentence without grie, and behaved
well with his riends in his nal hours. Famously, his last words are said
to have been We owe a cock to Asclepius, presumably meaning that the
Greek god o healing should be thanked or this end to the hardship o lie.
There is no sentimental attachment to lie, to the body, and this could be
said to be a classic case o the supposed virtue o emotional detachment.
A true philosopher remains calm. At least, that is the impression given by
the author recording this scene, Plato. As a pupil o Socrates, he records
these events as a witness and riend o the deceased, but also very much
as a philosopher in his own right. Plato constructed a dialogue around
this moment, named the Phaedo, which takes the nal conversations o
Socrates as a springboard or philosophy. This is precisely what a dialogue
is: a record o a real or imagined conversation between two or more
parties, which advances discussion and ideas. In this case, Plato explores
lie and death, and the possibility o the soul living on ater the body dies.
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MIND AND BODY
Biography: Socrates (c. 469399 Plato ollowed his teacher
BCE) and Plato (c. 427347 BCE) Socrates in the path o
philosophy and responded
Socrates was an Athenian philosopher and social to his death energetically.
commentator who created a lineage o thinkers, He was descended rom an
including Plato and Aristotle. Socrates himsel aristocratic amily in Athens
let no writings behind, but is a well-known igure and grew up during the war
rom the works o Xenophon, Aristophanes, with Sparta. A young man when
and (most importantly) Plato. He was the Socrates died, Plato went on to a productive literary
son o a sculptor ather and midwie mother, career (nearly 50 works by traditional reckoning)
perhaps working or a while as a stonecutter but and ounded an enduring philosophical school:
then devoting his lie to philosophy. Because the Academy. The impact o Socrates upon Plato
our records are second-hand, we cannot be is striking, in that Socrates is always the central
completely sure what are the genuine ideas o character o the dialogues and always appears
Socrates or what the later authors have imposed in a positive light. The trial and death o Socrates
upon him. However, with some conidence we eature in a number o works: the Euthyphro,
may say that he was known or a method o Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. These combine
asking persistent diicult questions, particularly the agenda o deending the virtue o Socrates
concerning ethical and political matters, and with clear advancement o Platos ideas. Platos
he gathered a strong ollowing as a teacher. He philosophical concerns include the defnition o
seems to have denied his own authority, rather justice, o virtue, and a theory that knowledge
emphasizing his ignorance and his desire to may be understood in terms o eternal truths. The
gain wisdom rom others. His popularity and death o Socrates brings a number o these themes
the politically awkward nature o his questions together, including the all-important claim that the
may have led to his downall in the courts and soul survives death and that human lie continues
subsequent death. beyond the body.
In the Phaedo we hear o the fnal conversations o Socrates in prison.
He asserts to his visitor Simmias that a philosopher should not kill
himsel except when it is completely necessary (as in his own case) , but
still a philosopher certainly should not ear death. Indeed, philosophers
have a unique appreciation o death and should take comort as it
approaches. His argument is striking and even shocking.
Other people may well be unaware that all they deserve. Anyway, lets discuss it amongst
who actually engage in philosophy aright are ourselves, disregarding them: do we suppose
practising nothing other than dying and being that death is a reality? And that it is nothing
dead. Now i this is true, it would be odd indeed but the separation o the soul rom the body?
or them to be eager in their whole lie or And that being dead is this: the bodys having
nothing but that, and yet to be resentul when come to be apart, separate rom the soul, alone
it comes, the very thing theyd long been eager by itsel, and the souls being apart, alone by
or and practised they arent aware in what itsel, separated rom the body? Death cant be
sense genuine philosophers are longing or death anything else but that, can it?
and deserving o it, and what kind o death
[Simmias agrees]
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4 BEING HUMAN
Now look, my riend, and see i maybe you with the body And now, what about the actual
agree with me on these points; because through gaining o wisdom? Is the body a hindrance or not
them I think well improve our knowledge o i one enlists it as a partner in the quest? This is the
what were examining. Do you think it befts a sort o thing I mean: do sight and hearing aord
philosophical man to be keen about the so-called mankind any truth, or arent even the poets always
pleasures o, or example, ood and drink? harping on such themes, telling us that we neither
see nor hear anything accurately? [the soul]
[Simmias says not] reasons best, presumably, whenever none o these
things bothers it, neither hearing nor sight nor pain,
Do you think in general, then, that such a persons nor any pleasure either, but whenever it comes
[a philosophers] concern is not or the body, but to be alone by itsel as ar as possible, disregarding
so ar as he can stand aside rom it, is directed the body, and whenever, having the least possible
towards the soul? In such matters as these the communion and contact with it, it strives or reality.
philosopher diers rom other people in releasing
his soul, as ar as possible, rom its communion Plato1
The word that is used over and over again in this dialogue is the Greek Questions
term psyche, which may be translated as lie, breath, or soul. The
translation soul is chosen in English because it conveys what Socrates 1. Why does Socrates
is talking about: some immortal and immaterial essence in the human claim that philosophers
being that will even survive death. C learly, S ocrates regards it as being practise dying and
distinct rom the body, to the extent that he speaks o separating the being dead?
two: dualism. The soul is the awareness and consciousness o a human,
but it is more than that; it also contains the rational element and 2. What could Socrates
thoughts, like the mind. It reasons best when it is alone. mean by separating
the mind and the body?
As the dialogue proceeds, Plato gives a number o other arguments
(via Socrates) to prove the immortality o the soul and its distinction 3. What is Socrates
rom the body. For our purposes, they also show that the Platonic view argument that the body
o the mind is the same thing: it is the rational soul, continuing ater hinders the gaining of
death. The arguments can be summarized as ollows: wisdom?
Argument rom opposites and cycles: lie and death are opposites, like
many opposites in nature (large and small, hot and cold, awake and
asleep) . One state emerges rom the other in a cycle. Lie comes rom
death, death comes rom lie, and the process goes on. Since the living
are born rom the dead, the souls o the dead must still exist ater
death. The soul is immortal.
The recollection argument: knowledge is derived rom what we
already have known in a previous lie it is to be recollected. The
knowledge thus gained is evidence that the soul has lived beore and
is immortal ( see a uller explanation o this theory, below) .
The afnity argument: the soul has closest resemblance to things
invisible, unchanging, uniorm, intelligible, and things that do not
die. The body by contrast has closest resemblance to things visible,
changing, varied, non-intelligible, and mortal. Thereore, the body
will die but the soul will not.
1 Plato, Phaedo, translated with an introduction and notes by David Gallop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) ,
pp. 911.
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MIND AND BODY
The middle o these, the argument rom recollection, needs more TOK link
explanation, being based on Platos theory o knowledge. Philosophers
have long been concerned with the question o what should be Is it really possible for the
considered the most real or true. Platos answer to this problem is that mind to know things by
ideas are most real, they exist, and everything else is j ust a shadow reason alone? What does
o their reality. This is oten called the theory of the forms, as this Plato teach about the ways
is another possible translation o the Greek word or ideas. Since of knowing?
the ideas are eternal and abstract, they can be grasped in the mind
eternally also, without input rom the senses and the world around FIND OUT MORE
us. The soul always knows that the ideas are true but orgets them
on the journey rom one lie to the next, and so the task o gaining Research the theory o
knowledge is the task o the soul remembering what it really eternally ideas or orms in Platos
knows. This may seem like a strange theory but, i correct, it would wider philosophical
support the notion that the soul is immortal and non-physical. In the works. Look at the simile
Phaedo Plato puts Socrates to work in explaining and proving o the Cave rom the
the theory. Republic and the paradox
o learning rom the
The argument or the eternal ideas, known by the soul, goes like this. Meno. Putting the various
We recognize common qualities in obj ects in ways that are clear and arguments together,
intelligible. For example, we know what equality is (things being o how convincing is Platos
the very same value or proportion) and we can see this in stones o theory?
equal weight or sticks o equal length. But how do we know equality?
We will not have learned it rom objects that are truly equal, because
they never are; no two stones will ever be exactly the same. Indeed,
without seeing true equality in the physical world, we recognize things
that are nearly equal because we already know the idea. Pure equality in
act is completely abstract and can never be ound in the world, but it is
understood by the mind. The rational soul, the mind, is in possession o
ideas such as equality, j ustice, beauty, and so orth, even though it never
sees perect examples. It would only be possible to recognize abstract
qualities in objects i the knowledge were there all along, i the soul had
always known these things even rom beore birth. Thereore, the soul
must be immortal.
In these brie arguments, Plato puts orward some o the most
infuential ideas rom the history o philosophy. B ut should we be
persuaded? On the one hand, there is a clear logic to the arguments,
and they relate to each other and hang together as a collective proo
or the immaterial, immortal soul. Our thoughts really do seem to
direct our bodies and seem to cause the various activities o our lives.
I thought about typing this sentence beore I got my ngers to do it.
So, in that sense, the mind or soul really appears to be energizing and
animating the body. The mind also deals with the abstract and timeless
truths, such as mathematics, and it is able to see through illusions and
ever-changing nature. It is non-physical. It apprehends truths that are
not lost with death.
However, as appealing as Platos arguments may seem, they have not
convinced everybody. Indeed, ew philosophers today would identiy
themselves as Platonists or accept his proos or the immortal, rational
soul. Opposition to Platos arguments probably arose within his own
lietime, and certainly in the next generation he was rmly criticized
by his own pupil (another one o the ounders o Western philosophy) ,
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4 BEING HUMAN
Aristotle. The key criticisms rom the younger philosopher can roughly
be divided into two points, directed against the theory o ideas:
1. The problem o object and idea connection: Plato said that the ideas
explain universal qualities in objects, so that there is such a thing as
equality and obj ects strive to be equal or participate in the idea o
equality. For Aristotle, the problem arises when you try to explain
how this actually works. How does an object attempt to be like an
idea? This seems obscure and unexplained.
2. The problem o the third man: Plato claims that the existence o
the ideal quality explains the objects possessing the quality (or
example, the idea o a man explains why we can identiy numerous
beings as men) . However, we now have two things with
something in common (a man and the idea o a man) , so we need to
explain what these two things have in common. For that, we would
need a third man to explain that link, but that would itsel raise
the question o what the three things had in common. Thus, there
would be no end to these explanations, and they would not get us
anywhere.
There are a number o other general criticisms we could make o the
arguments or the immortality o the soul.
Firstly, the claim that lie and death are opposites, locked in a cyclical
process, is questionable. In what sense are they really opposite?
What proo is there that this orms an unbroken cycle?
S econdly, even i we accept the theory o ideas, does recollection
really show that the soul is immortal and has experienced a previous
lie? These ideas could be implanted into the mind at birth by a god,
genetic coding, or some other mysterious process, and would then
disappear with the deaths o our bodies.
Thirdly, although the soul can contemplate abstract and immaterial
ideas, it can also contemplate worldly and physical matters, the body,
death, etc. So, does it really have an afnity with immortality?
Biography: Aristotle (384322 BCE) Macedonia after the death of
Alexander and Aristotle was
Aristotle was one of the greatest all-round banished from the city. He
intellectuals of all time: a philosopher, scientist, chose to live in exile rather
legalist, and educator. He grew up in the semi- than face execution. A
Greek kingdom of Macedonia, the son of the court distinct feature of Aristotles
physician Nicomachus. He was wealthy and well works is his great interest in
connected, and even served as tutor to the most recording and cataloguing nature,
famous Macedonian king, Alexander the Great. with a kind of reverence towards the natural world.
Aristotle studied at Platos Academy in Athens, This led Aristotle towards a natural view of the soul
though eventually came to disagree with many as part of the physical human being, by contrast
Platonic teachings. He founded his own school in with the metaphysical Platonic idea of an immortal
Athens, the Lyceum, where he taught for some presence.
years. Ultimately, the Athenians turned against
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MIND AND BODY
Aristotle sets out his own theories, which contrast strongly with those
o Plato, in his obviously titled work On the Soul ( widely reerred to
by its Latin title, De Anima) . Aristotles approach to writing is much
less artistic than that o Plato; he does not use the method o dramatic
dialogue and instead we have technical, dense, and analytical texts. This
also gives a favour o his work on the soul, which proceeds by making
careul and precise distinctions in the properties and unctions o the
soul, its appearance in dierent organisms, and the varying levels o its
complexity and completeness. The most important point to understand
is that, while Aristotle also uses the Greek word psyche ( lie, soul)
to reer to an important aspect o being human, his concept o what this
is diers signicantly rom Platos and rom the meaning o soul in
modern English. C hiefy, it is not an independent, distinct, non-physical
substance or entity within a human. O n the contrary, Aristotles soul is
a part o and a way o understanding a physical organism; it is the orm,
scheme, or principle that shapes a living being.
A couple o simple arguments or methods support what Aristotle is saying.
Firstly, he suggests that the best way to determine the nature o the soul
is to study what it does or how it unctions. The soul is the thing that is
commonly held to give the body lie, and so the task is to look or the
most characteristic orm o lie or a creature. The simplest lie orms have
souls that are merely concerned with nutrition and reproduction. More
complex lie orms experience sensations. Finally, the most advanced
(human) lie has a rational component to the soul. The soul is simply the
ability o the organism to do these things and so is not a thing in its own
right. Aristotles other argument or his approach is that the soul must
be a orm o lie rather than matter (a thing itsel) because the soul is
needed to explain what the body is putting into eect; the body obviously
is material substance, brought about by some principle that is the soul.
Simply, the body is the subject, the soul what is attributed to it.2
By contrast with the dualism o Plato, Aristotle could be said to be the
rst philosopher oering a monistic theory o mind and body. He does
Plato Aristotle
Key work on mind/body: Phaedo Key work on mind/body: On the Soul
Literary approach: dialogue Literary approach: treatise
Philosophical approach: rational/abstract Philosophical approach: rational/empirical
Key argument: dualism soul deals with abstract Key argument: monism soul is not a thing in its own
matters, including eternal ideas, which suggests it right, because it is the form that makes the physical
is immortal/non-physical body alive, a unity
Criticism: Plato cannot explain how the theory of Criticism: in saying that the soul is just the form of
ideas works; proof for the cycle of life and death is the body, Aristotle doesnt explain where this form
debatable comes from
2 Aristotle, On the Soul (written c. 350 BCE as treatise De Anima) , Book II, Chapter 1; English translation by
J. A. Smith available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.html (accessed 22 October 2014) .
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4 BEING HUMAN
not distinguish the conscious or rational component o a human being
rom the physical, but instead suggests that reason and awareness are
natural capabilities o physical beings. There is one, unied human
organism. Aristotle could also be said to take an empirical view o
being human, which means that he used the observations o the senses
to decide what the soul is, as opposed to purely abstract reasoning.
However, although his criticisms o Plato may seem satisying at rst
sight, Aristotles own explanation runs into diculties: i orm is not
matter, nor an eternal idea, then what is it? Who or what produced it?
EXERCISE
1 . C ompare ancient Greek and Indian philosophy. How might Plato
and Aristotle criticize the ideas o the Buddha? How might the
B uddha criticize the ideas o the Greeks? Turn these points into
lists, or write a dialogue between these thinkers.
2. Research concepts o mind and boy rom other ancient Greek
schools o philosophy: Stoicism and Epicureanism. Redraw the
table above with our columns, comparing the our approaches to
m in d/ b o dy.
3 . Look up the texts o the Phaedo and On the Soul. C ompare
the literary methods what are the relative advantages or
disadvantages o writing a dialogue or a treatise?
Abrahamic religions: raising a spiritual body
While Greece was the birthplace o Western philosophy, the dominant
religions o Western and Middle E astern civilizations arose in the Near
E ast, in ancient Israel/Palestine and Arabia. Judaism, C hristianity,
and Islam are commonly reerred to as the Abrahamic aiths because
they all claim lineage rom the gure attributed with discovering
monotheism (belie in one God) in the Bronze Age: Abraham.
Although it might be argued that these religions are examples o belie
systems rather than philosophies, their impact upon concepts o
body and mind in culture and popular imagination has been huge.
Consider heaven and hell, or sin and redemption, in addition to the
well- known rituals and rites o passage o birth, lie, and death. Take,
or example, the ubiquitous Western phrase on tombstones: rest in
peace. Think about it. In what sense is death a orm o rest? What
does this tell us about human lie? This is just one o innumerable
ways in which religion infuences our thinking about mind and body.
Indeed, a lot o philosophy takes place within belie systems, taking
a concept o being human rom a tradition, text or ritual, and then
subj ecting it to systematic scrutiny.
Some o the oundational ideas concerning mind and body in Judeo-
Christian culture can be traced back to the story o Creation in the
book o Genesis rom the Hebrew Bible (what Christians call the Old
Testament) . This narrative describes the process by which God creates
the heavens and the earth, and all o the creatures inhabiting them. It
is worth taking the time to read through the rst three chapters, to get
a sense or how humans are understood as a part o Gods handiwork.
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MIND AND BODY
Their relation to their divine C reator, to each other, and to their
environment is explored. Picking out key points or our purposes here,
note that:
Everything God makes is very good, including human beings.
God shapes the man rom the earth; man is and will return to dust.
God breathes lie into the frst humans to make them live.
God names the man and the woman; they are his possessions.
Humans are superior to other animals but must care or them.
Humans are like God in having knowledge o good and evil.
EXERCISE
1. Look at Michelangelos painting o the Creation o Adam. What is the artist trying to convey about
the human body and human beings?
2 . Work through the frst three chapters o Genesis and make a list o quotations that have direct
relevance to the nature o humans/body/mind. Compare these with the Indian and Greek
concepts discussed earlier.
In accordance with the Genesis story, Judaism traditionally teaches a
monistic view o humans as essentially physical beings created by God.
The Hebrew word nefesh ( lie, breath) has sometimes been translated
as soul, but most Jews through history have not distinguished a
non-physical essence rom the body (contrast Plato) and so this could
be said to be misleading as a translation. The physical Creation o the
world has such a dominant role within Judeo-Christian and Islamic
thinking that the idea o an abstract or mental world has not held the
kind o appeal that it did or some Greek philosophers. Instead, when
Judaism came to consider the possibility o lie ater death and an ideal
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4 BEING HUMAN
orm o lie, it ocused upon the renewal o the body and the re-creation
o the physical world in a perected orm. This can be summed up in the
concept o resurrection (rom Latin, stand up again) , which is the
idea o the C reation coming to new lie through Gods will. In Judaism
today the ideal o renewal is ound in prayer and liturgy in the concept
o Ha Olam Ha Ba ( the world that is coming) , which stands in place o
individualistic aterlie or the soul.
But how have Jews justied the idea that new lie will come to the
body and to the whole o C reation? Primarily, they have argued rom
the concept o God as the Creator o the Earth, using theology to
illuminate the state o being human. Perhaps the rst reerence to
resurrection in the Holy Bible is ound in the book o Ezekiel, in which
the prophet Ezekiel is given a vision o a valley ull o dry bones. Read
the ollowing extract:
The hand o the Lord was on me, and he brought Then he said to me, Prophesy to the breath;
me out by the Spirit o the Lord and set me in the prophesy, son o man, and say to it, This is what
middle o a valley; it was ull o bones. He led me the Sovereign Lord says: Come, breath, rom the
back and orth among them, and I saw a great our winds and breathe into these slain, that they
many bones on the foor o the valley, bones that may live. So I prophesied as he commanded
were very dry. He asked me, S on o man, can me, and breath entered them; they came to lie
these bones live? and stood up on their eeta vast army.
I said, S overeign Lord, you alone know. Then he said to me: Son o man, these bones
are the people o Israel. They say, O ur bones
Then he said to me, Prophesy to these bones and are dried up and our hope is gone; we are cut
say to them, Dry bones, hear the word o the o. Thereore prophesy and say to them: This
Lord! This is what the Sovereign Lord says to these is what the Sovereign Lord says: My people,
bones: I will make breath enter you, and you will I am going to open your graves and bring you
come to lie. I will attach tendons to you and make up rom them; I will bring you back to the land
fesh come upon you and cover you with skin; o Israel. Then you, my people, will know that
I will put breath in you, and you will come to lie. I am the Lord, when I open your graves and
Then you will know that I am the Lord. bring you up rom them. I will put my Spirit in
you and you will live, and I will settle you in
So I prophesied as I was commanded. And as I your own land. Then you will know that I the
was prophesying, there was a noise, a rattling Lord have spoken, and I have done it, declares
sound, and the bones came together, bone to the Lord.
bone. I looked, and tendons and fesh appeared
on them and skin covered them, but there was Ezekiel 37:114 (NIV)
no breath in them.
An important premise o the text is that lie must inhabit a body, a orm
that is puried and dedicated to God. The logic supporting this can be
unpicked rom the text:
God knows everything, including everything about lie and Creation.
God possesses the breath o lie: the ability to make things live or die.
God has control over all o nature (the our winds) .
God cares or the people o Israel and wants Israel to settle the land.
144
MIND AND BODY
In other words, Judaism argues rom a monistic view o nature that TOK link
it is a unity, is good, is Gods one unique C reation to the idea that
the ideal orm o human lie is monistic also, inhabiting a pure body in How does the Christian
accordance with Gods will. belie in resurrection draw
on the ways o knowing
Developing out o Judaism, Christianity has partially kept and partially (aith, sense perception,
modied Jewish belies and arguments about the body, soul, and mind. emotion) ? How would this
Perhaps the most important development is the Christian opinion that belie be treated in diferent
the resurrection o the dead, though still a uture event, is represented areas o knowledge
in and proven by the resurrection o Jesus. The spiritual ounder o (history, religion, natural
C hristianity, Jesus o Nazareth, was a Jewish teacher and leader o the science) ?
rst century who was executed (crucied) by the Romans. Shortly ater
his death, however, a number o his ollowers claimed to have witnessed
the risen Lord, i.e. the resurrected orm o Jesus. The Gospels (the
narratives o the lie o Jesus) contain a number o accounts o post-
resurrection appearances, and give the impression that the resurrection
o Jesus was widely attested by the rst Christians. This builds on the
theological reasoning o Judaism ound in Ezekiel ( God is the C reator,
has power over lie, can puriy the body) by adding physical proos
that the body o Jesus was raised: he appeared to many disciples, his
wounds were inspected, he ate and drank, and he ascended to heaven
in bodily orm (so there ultimately was no corpse o Jesus) .
Despite their strong emphasis on the bodily resurrection o Jesus,
however, the rst C hristians also took an interest in the concepts o soul,
spirit, and mind. Saint Paul warns against the weaknesses o the fesh,
the negative aspect o lie in the body, and specically criticizes adultery
and sexual sin, uncleanness, drunkenness, greed, etc. In this sense, there
is a parallel with the Indian ascetic tradition (see above) and the concern
that bodily indulgence could pollute or distract the mind. For Paul,
bodily gratications could prevent someone rom receiving the Spirit o
God, or the fesh desires what is contrary to the Spirit, and the Spirit
what is contrary to the fesh (Galatians 5:1 7) . Paul also urges mental
renewal on his ollowers and emphasizes the importance o thinking
in accordance with Gods will: Do not conorm to the pattern o this
world, but be transormed by the renewing o your mind. Then you
But someone will ask, How are the dead raised? bodies is one kind, and the splendour o the
With what kind o body will they come? How earthly bodies is another. The sun has one kind
oolish! What you sow does not come to lie o splendour, the moon another and the stars
unless it dies. When you sow, you do not plant another; and star diers rom star in splendour.
the body that will be, but just a seed, perhaps o
wheat or o something else. But God gives it a So will it be with the resurrection o the dead.
body as he has determined, and to each kind o The body that is sown is perishable, it is raised
seed he gives its own body. Not all fesh is the imperishable; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised
same: People have one kind o fesh, animals in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in
have another, birds another and sh another. power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a
There are also heavenly bodies and there are spiritual body.
earthly bodies; but the splendour o the heavenly
1 Corinthians 15:3544
145
4 BEING HUMAN
will be able to test and approve what Gods will ishis good, pleasing
and perfect will (Romans 1 2:2) . Nevertheless, Paul still maintains the
fundamentally Jewish opinion that the body must be raised and the
true self is found in physical form. He gets around the problem of bodily
distractions and impurity by arguing for a transformed, spiritual body.
Questions
1. In what ways does Paul put orward Jewish monistic arguments or
the unity o Creation and o the body?
2. In what ways does Paul agree or disagree with ancient Greek
philosophers?
3. What could Paul mean by spiritual body?
4. What is the role o God in Pauls argument?
Biography: Saint Paul (c. 567 CE) organizer o the Church. He
ounded many Churches
Paul o Tarsus (also known as Saint Paul, Paul the around the Roman Empire
Apostle) was a Jew rom Asia Minor (modern-day and is perhaps best
Turkey) and originally was called Saul; he changed known or the letters he
his name ater conversion to Christianity. His early wrote (which orm part
lie was dominated by study o Judaism and he o the New Testament) ,
lived in Jerusalem as a young man at the time o which give an important basis
the death o Jesus. Although he probably never to Christian teaching. Ultimately, he was arrested
met Jesus himsel, the young Saul quickly became or undermining Judaism and stirring up trouble
a persecutor o the Church and attempted to stife among the Jewish populace in Jerusalem; he was
the new religious movement in its early years. sent or trial to Rome and there was executed,
However, a vision o the risen Jesus changed his according to legend, by beheading.
mind, and he became Paul: a great teacher and
Jewish arguments for resurrection Christian developments
God is the all-powerul Creator Gods power is shown through Jesus
God gives lie God restored lie to Jesus
God made humans God saves humans through Jesus
Nature is good, under Gods will All nature is subject to God/Jesus
God can renew lie in the body God renewed the body o Jesus
Gods people will inhabit the earth God will raise up spiritual bodies
Jews and Christians, therefore, have argued for a form of
transformational monism: on the one hand, they acknowledge the
weakness and impurity of the body and accept the need for self-
discipline, yet on the other hand, they see the solution to those problems
in the transformation of the body by the creative power of God, as
146
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Philosophy (Being Human) - Course Companion - Oxford 2014
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