Family friends and country Nguyen Thi Binh

In early 1974, a startling and major incident took place. On January 19,
China sent warships and aircraft to occupy the Hoàng Sa (Paracel) Islands,
which lie within the sovereign territory of Việt Nam and which at that time
were under the jurisdiction of the Sài Gòn administration. Fierce battles
broke out. The forces were unequal, with the United States as a silent
accomplice to the Chinese. In the end, the Chinese occupied the islands.
[13]

On January 26, 1974, the PRG issued a three-point statement, in which
we affirmed Việt Nam’s national sovereignty over Hoàng Sa, asserting that
any maritime territorial disputes must be solved through negotiations. We
reaffirmed our position on February 14. We agreed to discuss the issue
with all concerned stakeholders. Here was the beginning of a complex
dispute between China and Việt Nam over sovereignty in the East Sea. The
dispute continues even today.

*

**

In June 1974, I received an invitation to attend the Afro-Asian
Conference in Cairo. While en route, I stopped off in Kabul, the capital of
Afghanistan, to lobby for official diplomatic recognition of the PRG.
Today, the entire world knows about the tragedies that have occurred in
Afghanistan during recent years, but by 1974 very few delegations from
Việt Nam had visited Kabul. Afghanistan, a country in central Asia, is
located between Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. It has vast mountains, with
even the capital situated on hilltops.

Afghanistan had just become a republic under President Mohamed
Daoud.[14] The Afghan Foreign Ministry gave me and my two PRG
comrades a warm welcome. We were delighted to find that our Afghan
friends had closely followed the situation in Việt Nam; they knew we had
signed the Paris Agreement the previous year. I explained our wish to
establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Our discussions revealed
no difficulties, but our friends explained that the Afghan National
Assembly had to affirm formal diplomatic recognition. They were sure the
National Assembly would make an affirmative decision, but nevertheless
this was a formality, which they could not overlook.

I entreated, emphasizing that we needed positive and timely support.
Our friends were sympathetic but unable to meet the delegation’s request
immediately.

Nevertheless, I did leave with our friends’ promise that they would
work for an early decision. At the end of June 1974, the government of
Afghanistan announced its official recognition of the PRG.

*

**

Around September 1974, Defense Minister Trần Nam Trung[15] and I
were members of a PRG delegation, headed by PRG President of
Government Huỳnh Tấn Phát, on a visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia. Our
CP72 Division also sent Comrades Trường Tùng (a journalist), Lương
Xuân Tâm (a documentary filmmaker), and Dr. Nhung (who was
responsible for our health). Even though traveling to the South was much
easier than before because the United States was no longer bombing

ceaselessly, the trip nevertheless took twelve days by military jeep. We
drove at night and rested during the day. For me, traveling the famous Hồ
Chí Minh Trail was a historic and emotional event. I was so moved to see
at the start of the Trail a huge inscription—“Carve a route through the
Trường Sơn Mountain Range to save our country.”

Indeed, building that system of tracks and roads had been a
monumental achievement, requiring that engineers and laborers cut down
mountains and fill in valleys. Only the extraordinary level of our people’s
patriotism could have achieved such a heroic feat! I have no idea how
many forests, mountains, and streams we crossed during our twelve days
and nights on the legendary Trail.

During that journey, I was most deeply impressed by the volunteer
youth. Each unit had several hundred young women. After the terrible
bombing attacks, these volunteer regiments repaired the dirt tracks, filled
in the bomb craters, and removed bombing debris so that transport trucks
and other military vehicles could keep moving. My heart went out to those
roughly clad young women in their twenties. They chatted and laughed as
they dug and hauled dirt, seemingly unaware of their great danger. Only
later did I learn that most of these young women were middle-aged by the
time they returned from the war. Many had no other skills to support
themselves and were beyond marriageable age. Those brave, anonymous
young women made an extraordinary contribution to our country. Their
plight is still heart-rending. How many sacrifices like theirs went
unnoticed during years of intense resistance and hardship? Indeed, until
now, we have not fully recognized their contribution. We have left many of
them deprived of deserved support and recognition.

At times while on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail, we would travel half a day
without seeing anyone. We had two jeeps. Sometimes, the track was so
rough we had to stop. I kept asking whether we’d lost our way. However,
each day, we would eventually reach our destination, even on time. The
comrades at each transit camp received us warmly. They would provide a
drum of water for bathing and a meal of rice with meat from wild game
and vegetables they had grown at the camp. At night, we would drink a cup
of tonic made from alaliacea (a kind of Vietnamese ginseng) mixed with
sugar. Weary, we would quickly fall into a delicious sleep.

One night we had to cross a river, but the enemy had destroyed the
makeshift bridge, causing huge traffic jams on both banks. The military
engineering corps arrived; some troops worked underwater, while others
carried materials, all of them working without a pause. I felt overwhelmed
with affection for these warriors. They were so young. Without war, they
would surely have been students, workers, or farmers studying or working
in their ancestral villages.

Near Bù Đốp, now a district adjacent to Lộc Ninh, I met with a logistics
unit at the front. I was amazed and delighted to see orchids blooming
everywhere and to realize that, in the midst of such a fierce war, our
soldiers took pleasure in growing flowers. Yet I will remember always that
a number of the comrades I met at that time died the following year,
during the Spring 1975 Campaign.

The Kingdom of Cambodia was both a neighbor and a familial country.
Our two peoples had cooperated in fighting French colonialism and then
US imperialism. Each nation had provided the other with valuable
assistance and support. Even though Cambodia shares a border with Việt

Nam, the road leading to the offices of the Cambodian Government was
torturous. That leg of the trip took a day and a night through deserted
rubber forests. Eventually, we reached a post crowded with Cambodian
guards and were taken to a spacious guesthouse made of wood.

Before leaving for Cambodia, we knew that our signing the Paris
Agreement on Việt Nam had raised questions among our Cambodian
friends, who worried that the Agreement would work against the
Cambodian struggle. Our mission’s purpose was to clarify issues in the
relationship between our two countries. During the Paris negotiations, the
United States had wanted to combine Cambodian questions with
Vietnamese issues, but Việt Nam was resolute in refusing. We held firm to
our position that the Cambodian people must decide any issues regarding
Cambodia. Our delegation traveling to Cambodia wanted to state clearly
that we felt the Paris Agreement created favorable conditions for
Cambodia. In truth, Việt Nam made concrete contributions to Cambodia’s
liberation, which occurred on April 17, 1975, even before the liberation of
South Việt Nam on April 30, 1975.

As soon as we set foot in Cambodia, we sensed we were receiving a
rather cool reception, which made us feel uneasy. Later, I learned that
Cambodian leaders had already begun to adopt a position opposing Việt
Nam. The tragic events that ensued after 1975 made this all too clear.
Already, we were experiencing disturbing symptoms in our own country’s
southwest flank.[16]

After spending a short time in the Central Office of the South
(COSVN), in early 1975, I received urgent orders to return to the North for
an overseas mission. This time, the journey back to the North was much

quicker, although the Sài Gòn administration’s airplanes shot at us twice.
The Hồ Chí Minh Trail was much busier. Day and night, armored vehicles
and trucks carrying ammunition poured down the Trail. Waves of army
units followed one another. Young soldiers from northern provinces
marched to the battlefield as if in a procession. Preparations were
underway for the 1975 Spring Campaign, the final battle of the American
War, which by then had lasted twenty-one years, counting from the
division of our country in 1954.

*

**

The balance of forces on the battlefield rapidly tilted in our favor. On
our side, the PRG stepped up its political forces inside the zones the Sài
Gòn administration temporarily occupied. We concentrated on the middle-
class intelligentsia and religious groups and even included those close to
the Sài Gòn administration in order to expand our nationwide solidarity
and divide our opponents. After the Paris Agreement, many Sài Gòn
politicians, including a number of retired ministers of state, used the name
“Third Force” for zealous activities. By appropriating that term, they
sought to insert themselves into the non-partisan third group defined by
the Paris Agreement and, thereby, undermine the clause, “The United
States must withdraw all troops and set up a Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord with three components.”

The military and political situation in the country was tilting in our
favor.

Reactionaries in the United States faced the Sài Gòn army’s consecutive
defeats on various fronts. They advocated sending American troops back
to Việt Nam to rescue the Sài Gòn administration. We had to denounce
these deceitful intentions and the Sài Gòn administration’s concomitant
refusal to implement the Paris Agreement. The United States continued
providing assistance, thereby prolonging the war.

For us, mobilizing world opinion was crucial. I left the South and
traveled the Trail back out to Hà Nội in February 1975. I immediately
received an assignment along with three other comrades to visit European
and African countries and explain our views.

At that time, we could not know for sure the Nixon administration’s
scheme. I knew only that, in accordance with our leaders’ directive, I must
update the loyal friends who had supported our struggle for so long. I
needed to ask them to watch the situation carefully and speak out
immediately if the Americans intervened.

Through documents now open and particularly through Larry Berman’s
No Peace, No Honor,[17] we know that the Nixon administration intended
to deploy B-52 bombers against the North to rescue the Sài Gòn army,
which was disintegrating. However, the Nixon administration did not carry
out its plan. Instead, the Watergate scandal[18] threw the White House
into turmoil. Even more important, the majority of Americans expressed
their opposition through the representatives they had elected to the US
Congress. Many senators insisted the United States abandon the failed
war, which the entire world condemned and which had been so costly in
human and material losses.

I arrived in France, where I met with a number of journalists. While in
France, I contacted friends in the United States, Canada, Sweden, and
other countries. Then I went on to Algeria, where I met with friends, who
were exuberant because our Spring Offensive had begun and our
Liberation Army was advancing with irresistible, unconquerable force.
Our friends said they had seen maps showing how our Liberation Army
liberated a new province every day. Progress was so rapid our friends
could not keep track!

Our army launched the 1975 Spring Campaign by attacking Buôn Ma
Thuột. I knew the Politburo had set its goal of liberating South Việt Nam
within two years (1975 and 1976). However, after the victory of Phước
Long[19] and particularly following the liberation of Buôn Ma Thuột,[20]
the Politburo decided to seize its opportunity. In early 1975, the Politburo
formally opened the General Offensive to liberate the South.

On the diplomatic front, the PRG continued achieving major victories.
Other governments watching our army’s massive victories saw that our
struggle would soon end in victory. They quickly announced diplomatic
recognition of the PRG. By the time the North and South were re-united in
July 1976, sixty-five countries had recognized the Provisional
Revolutionary Government.

As a result of our visit to Algeria in early 1975, we knew the summit
for the Organization of African Unity (OUA)[21] was about to begin in
Tanzania. We flew there and asked our friends if I might speak to the
assembly and inform the membership about an important situation.
However, the OUA statutes allowed only representatives of African

countries to speak; in addition, speakers could address only issues about
Africa.

I entreated our friends in Tanzania, the host country. In the end, the
conference organizers agreed to give me fifteen minutes at the end of the
conference, once the members had completed their program.

Lê Mai and I sat from 6 p.m. until 5 a.m. without eating or drinking,
waiting to speak. When my turn came, my throat felt dry. I worried I could
not utter a word. But we achieved our goal. We described the situation
developing in Việt Nam and called on the international community to
prevent the United States from sending troops back to Việt Nam.

On April 15, Hà Nội cabled us to return immediately. We had no money
to buy air tickets, and Tanzania did not have a Vietnamese Embassy. We
decided to ask for help from the Chinese Embassy, which provided
assistance at once.

By the time I returned to Hà Nội, we had liberated Đà Nẵng. Our armed
forces were advancing toward Sài Gòn. I received orders to go to Đà Nẵng,
where Government Council President Nguyễn Hữu Thọ and many other
PRG officials had already gathered.

During that period, the PRG issued important statements and received
foreign delegations as well as journalists. Since our troops had just
liberated Đà Nẵng, people from Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên, and Quảng Ngãi
Provinces were converging on the city, but we established order within
only a few days. Our new administrative system began to take effect.

*

**

On the evening of April 29, 1975, I was hosting American historians
Gabriel and Joyce Kolko[22] when we heard Liberation Radio broadcast
an appeal to the Sài Gòn administration and the Sài Gòn military to
surrender. This deeply stirring news moved the American historians and
me to tears. We held hands.

The next day, on April 30, what had to happen did finally, at long last,
happen. Sài Gòn was liberated! This news brought boundless joy! Radio
stations and other international media announced this news: “Sài Gòn has
collapsed! The ‘Việt Cộng’ are victorious!” People across our country
poured into the streets, embracing one another and weeping but with tears
of joy!

The common endeavor and sacrifice of all our people had brought about
the inevitable. So many people working overtly and covertly had
contributed—from the armed forces to political forces; from the children
who had directed us along local paths to our compatriots from all strata of
society; from the heroes whose names are known, to the millions upon
millions of heroes whose names we do not know. No one can say, “Your
contribution was this, mine was that.”

At that moment, I thought of our large rear area in the socialist North.
This was our rearguard but also our vanguard. I remembered once when I
had visited Palestinian friends in refugee camps and when I’d met the
Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat.[23] Everyone asked us where and how
Việt Nam had drawn its strength for struggle and victory. We answered:
“There are three factors: We have Hồ Chí Minh, an outstanding

Vietnamese leader, who gave his entire life in service to our struggle for
independence and freedom. We have our people’s intense, strong
solidarity. And we have the North, the socialist half of our country as our
huge, stable rearguard.” Our Palestinian friends compared our situation
with theirs and saw that, unfortunately, they did not have our strong points.

Việt Nam’s final victory, which had been achieved in the end with such
speed, astounded and elated the world. As I understood the situation, even
the Soviet Union and China—two of Việt Nam’s staunchest friends—were
somewhat taken aback. China had persistently advised us to “prolong
guerrilla ambush attacks” because the enemy was too powerful. The Soviet
Union worried we were not strong enough to win and feared the war would
spread, complicating the world situation. The Vietnamese people’s tenacity
and heroism and our final victory enhanced the position of the socialist
camp in the international arena.

We were also proud that we had boosted the confidence and
determination of people in other countries fighting against imperialism
(particularly against US imperialism) and struggling for peace,
independence, and social progress. We can never forget that behind Việt
Nam’s great victory stood the immense, invaluable, and essential
contribution of the people in socialist countries as well as the world’s
people who esteem peace and justice. Since we had been able to begin and
conduct the war courageously and cleverly, we knew we could also
conclude it properly.

[1] On-going role of the NLF after formation of the PRG: After formation of the

Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam in June 1969, the
National Liberation Front of South Việt Nam no longer played a quasi-governmental role but
continued to function as a coordinating body for people’s mass organizations. The National
Liberation Front of South Việt Nam and the Fatherland Front of North Việt Nam (the
coordinating body for mass organizations) were formally united into the Vietnamese Fatherland
Front on July 31, 1977.

[2] “CP72” was a code name for the PRG Foreign Ministry.

[3] Hoàng Bích Sơn: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States to Save

the Nation,” footnote 15, p. 125.

[4] Võ Đông Giang: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States to Save the

Nation,” footnote 16, p. 126.

[5] Lê Quang Chánh headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department in Hồ Chí Minh

City from 1977 to 1981. He also served as vice president of the Hồ Chí Minh City People’s
Committee and was a member of the city’s Party Committee. He appears in the photograph of the
NLF delegation taken with President Hồ Chí Minh on October 20, 1962, in the back of this book.
Lê Quang Chánh is standing in the top middle, between the two diplomats at the very top of the
photo.

[6] Lộc Ninh District in Bình Phước Province is 135 kilometers due north of Sài Gòn and

about twenty kilometers from the Cambodian border. It was the site of the military headquarters
for the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s Liberation Army and a crucial endpoint of the
Hồ Chí Minh Trail. After the signing of the Paris Agreement, Lộc Ninh became the seat of
government for the PRG.

[7] Georges Marchais (1920-1997) was general secretary of the French Communist Party

from 1972 until 1994.

[8] Mujibur Rahman (1920-1975) was president of Bangladesh from April 11, 1972 to

January 12, 1972 and from January 25, 1975 until August 5, 1975. In between those tenures, he
served as the premier of Bangladesh.

[9] Trần Văn Trà (1919-1996) came from Quảng Ngãi Province in the Central Region south

of the DMZ, which later divided Việt Nam. He joined the Communist Party in 1938. From early

on, he held military command positions in many regions of the South and was deputy minister of
defense from 1978 until 1982.

[10] Hoàng Anh Tuấn later served as Việt Nam’s ambassador to India.

[11] Norodom Sihanouk (1922-2012) was the ruler of Cambodia until 1970, when the US-

backed coup led by Lon Nol toppled the Cambodian monarchy while Sihanouk was in Beijing.

[12] Although Lưu Hữu Phước’s song was used for the national anthem of the Republic of

Việt Nam (“South Việt Nam”), he was actually an activist in the PRG-DRVN Resistance. A few
years after this incident, Lưu Hữu Phước was a member of the first National Assembly of re-
united Việt Nam. See Chapter 2, “Childhood,” footnote 8, p. 49.

[13] Battle for Hoàng Sa, January 19-20, 1974: US State Department documents in the

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS, Vietnam) revealed what the Vietnamese consider
as the beginning of collusion and barter between US President Nixon and China regarding Việt
Nam, dating from the Shanghai Communique in February 1972. Following Chinese military
actions against Hoàng Sa (the Paracels) in March 1972, the United States sent the Chinese
government an undated cable: “In the interest of U.S.–Chinese relations the U.S. side has issued
instructions that henceforth a distance of at least twelve nautical miles should be maintained from
the Paracel Islands. This is without prejudice to the U.S. positions either on the territorial sea
question or the various claims to the Paracel Islands.”

Although the cable’s second sentence is clear, some Vietnamese perceive that cable as the
first step on a slippery slope of US-Chinese collusion regarding the Hoàng Sa Islands.

Then, on January 19, 1974, China achieved an early step in what by 2009 would become the
Nine-Point Line (the “Cow’s Tongue”) through the Battle for the Hoàng Sa Islands (then territory
under the Sài Gòn administration). The United States did not take sides in defense of its ally, the
Sài Gòn army. Again, according to FRUS, on January 25, 1974 in “Minutes of Washington
Special Actions Group,” Admiral Thomas Moorer (chair, US joint chiefs-of-staff) responded to
questions from Henry Kissinger (by then secretary of state): “We (the U.S.) have stayed far clear
of the matter. … That whole area is a problem. … We have given orders to stay clear of the area.”

For many Vietnamese, that step in 1974 signaled further US-Chinese collusion.

[14] Mohamed Daoud Khan (1909-1978) was prime minister of Afghanistan from 1953 to

1965 and president of Afghanistan from 1973 to 1978.

[15] Trần Nam Trung (1912-2009), who came from Quảng Ngãi Province in the Central

Region south of what later became the DMZ, joined the Communist Party in 1931 and, just after
the August 1945 Revolution, was elected to the Party Committee for Việt Nam’s Central Region,
with responsibility for military affairs. When the Provisional Revolutionary Government was
established in June 1969, Trần Nam Trung was selected to serve as minister of defense.

[16] Disturbing symptoms in our country’s southwest flank: At this time, the genocidal

Khmer Rouge, which was later politically supported by the United States and actively supported
by China, was already staging repeated incursions into the southwest of Việt Nam. Their strikes
included massacres of Vietnamese civilians. By United Nations estimates, the Khmer Rouge
subsequently killed between one and three million people, that is, between 10 and 30 percent of
Cambodia’s population.

[17] Larry Berman, No peace, No honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).

[18] Watergate scandal: On June 17, 1972, during the run-up to the US presidential

election, four men broke into the Democratic Party’s headquarters in the Watergate building in
Washington, D.C. Investigations uncovered both the involvement of President Nixon’s senior
staff in the break-in and their attempts as well as President Nixon’s to cover up the involvement.
President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974 rather than face impeachment.

[19] The Battle of Phước Long, a district north of Sài Gòn and near the Cambodian border

in what is now Bình Phước Province, lasted from December 13, 1974 until January 6, 1975 and
set the groundwork for the opening of the Spring 1975 Offensive.

[20] The Battle of Buôn Ma Thuột: In the spring of 1973, the military’s strategic planning

team had looked at four possible initial strike sites in the South—Pleiku, Kontum, Sài Gòn, and
Buôn Ma Thuột. Plan 305 TGI, which the Politburo accepted, identified Buôn Ma Thuột in the
Central Highlands as the weakest yet essential Sài Gòn administration stronghold among the four
appraised sites. The DRVN leaders planned for an offensive that would begin in the spring of
1975 and last two years. However, the Battle of Buôn Ma Thuột from March 10 to 12, 1975
precipitated the collapse of the Sài Gòn administration. Instead of two years, the offensive took
two months.

[21] The Organisation de l’Unité Africaine / Organization of African Unity was

established in Addis Ababa in 1963 with thirty-two member governments. It disbanded in 2002,
when the African Union was formed.

[22] Gabriel Kolko (1932-2014) and Joyce Manning Kolko (1933-2012) cooperated on

many books, with some of them published under one name and some of them under both names.
Their works include The Roots of American Foreign Policy; Anatomy of a War; and Restructuring
the World Economy.

[23] Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) was chair of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

from 1969 until 2004. During that time, he made a number of visits to Hà Nội.

8.

Memories and Deeply Held Thoughts

For fourteen years (1962-1976), I was active in foreign relations for the
National Liberation Front of South Việt Nam (NLF) / Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG). As I look across my life, those years
comprise the period most worthy of note, for they cover some of our
country’s major events, which I witnessed and in which I had the very
good fortune to participate. I will always hold dear the deep impressions
and many priceless lessons from that time.

I can say that our leaders gave deep thought to Việt Nam’s political
policies and provided careful direction during the Paris Conference in
particular and during our struggle in general.

First, I want to mention the guideline to establish the National
Liberation Front of South Việt Nam on December 20, 1960.[1] This wise
policy was both strategic and tactical. Through that step, we created a
united national front involving all social strata. We included not only the
patriotic forces of the NLF with Lawyer Nguyễn Hữu Thọ (a major
southern intellectual) as president but also the National Alliance for
Democracy and Peace led by Lawyer Trịnh Đình Thảo (another famous

southern intellectual) as well as two large groups: the people who really
were the “Third Force” and the patriotic overseas Vietnamese.

In addition to that guideline, we took advantage of the prestige of the
Democratic Republic of Việt Nam (DRVN, the socialist “North”) and, in
particular, the great prestige and respect accorded to the DRVN leader,
President Hồ Chí Minh. This allowed us to leverage widespread support
and solidarity with world-wide forces working for peace, independence,
freedom, and justice.

We can say that voices from everywhere—from large cities to remote
villages, including even those close to the North Pole—announced
“solidarity with Việt Nam.” Everyone agrees today that the international
solidarity movement with Việt Nam, which formed in opposition to the
American War of Aggression, was the largest and longest such movement
in world history. That world-wide movement of people who cherish peace
was extremely important in contributing to Việt Nam’s eventual victory.

To understand the NLF’s value and significance, we must look at the
circumstances that led to its establishment. The period from 1956 until
1959 was a terribly bleak time in the South. The US-Diệm regime
instituted merciless repression of the southern peace movement, which
was demanding implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. Then the
US-Diệm regime organized a campaign to denounce and eradicate
“communists,” including everyone from the old Resistance Movement
Against France, as well as anyone who opposed the Sài Gòn regime. To do
this, the regime’s police hauled guillotines into villages throughout the
South.

Prisons sprouted up everywhere. They were brimming with people—old
and young, men and women. Tens of thousands of people in the
countryside were held in colossal camps called “strategic hamlets.” Many
international journalists concluded, “The South is one giant prison.”

For a long time, activists in the South followed the Party’s directive to
resist through peaceful demonstrations and reconciliation, but the enemy
pushed us to the end of our patience. Armed to the teeth, the enemy
terrorized and executed our people en masse, yet we had only our empty
hands. We could not stand silently with our arms folded while the enemy
waged its one-sided war. Our people asked to take up arms. The Party
heard our people’s mournful pleas and, just in time, changed the guidelines
for our Resistance Movement. In 1959, the Party implemented its historic
Decision 15,[2] which accelerated the political struggle and
simultaneously expedited military action, thereby opening the route
through which the people of the South could achieve victory.

Decision 15 was a turning point in our nation’s modern history and
particularly in our struggle against the United States. Like a flood
breaking a dike, our people in many localities responded to the Party’s new
guidelines with uprisings. In the midst of this ebullience, the Party guided
the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Việt Nam to unite
the various strata of southerners in struggle against the United States. The
goal was our country’s independence and re-unification.

In this special context, the NLF served not only as a political
organization uniting all people in political and armed struggle but also as a
de facto political administration. From 1960 until 1969, the Front

established committees at various levels to lead our people in political,
military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic affairs.

Another political victory worthy of note is the formation of the
Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces of Việt Nam with
lawyer Trịnh Đình Thảo,[3] a great intellectual in the South, as president.
The Alliance, which was established on April 20, 1968 a few months after
the Tết 1968 Offensive, included many patriots, intellectuals, and religious
leaders, whose views were patriotic and whose members were organizing
more openly in the cities. With this step, our Front opposing the United
States to save the nation expanded.

When describing the Vietnamese struggle, especially during the
Resistance Against France and the Resistance Against the United States,
we should remember that most of the major Vietnamese intellectuals
participated alongside the farmers and the workers. Similarly, when
describing the international movement united with Việt Nam, we should
remember that many key intellectuals in other nations were also active
participants. Everyone who was of sufficient age at that time remembers
the Bertrand Russell Tribunal[4] established by Bertrand Russell,[5] the
famous British philosopher-mathematician. Participants included other
famous intellectuals, such as Jean-Paul Sartre[6] and Laurent Schwartz.[7]

We know that, most of all, intellectuals understand the value of the
individual, and they understand the meaning of freedom and justice.

The 1968 Tết General Offensive burst forth eight years after the Front’s
founding and reverberated across the South. This event was a core victory
and another key turning point in the Vietnamese people’s revolutionary

war. Eleven years later, in September 1979, the IVth Congress of the
Communist Party affirmed, “Only with the Spring of 1968 could we have
had the Spring of 1975.”[8]

Up until now, a number of authors who were American officials,
particularly in the military, have held that the “Việt Cộng” suffered a
heavy defeat during the Tết Offensive of 1968, the Year of the Monkey.
They have also believed that, had the Americans “plunged headlong” by
using their full military strength, the United States probably would have
“achieved victory.” These are the shallow and blind views of those who
saw apparent facts but not the essence of the issue. They saw the temporal
unfold before their eyes, but they did not see the whole. Therefore, they
could neither perceive nor foresee the underlying, inevitable, and ultimate
conclusion.

Our losses during the Tết General Offensive were certainly not small,
but that heroic offensive did shake the aggressive will of the United States.
Previously, our Liberation Army had achieved only small victories in rural
areas. However, with the Tết Offensive, our troops struck in unison across
the South and achieved victories inside the capital and at the enemy’s
headquarters.[9] The meaning was clear: In no place could the enemy be
secure. The 1968 Tết Offensive forced the United States to reach a very
important decision—the need to search for a way to de-escalate the war. It
compelled the Johnson administration to enter into negotiations, even
though the United States held tenaciously to the goal of finding a “solution
from a position of strength.”

For years, we in the South had been struggling against US escalation of
the war:

On June 26, 1954, three weeks before the signing of the Geneva
Agreement, the United States brought Ngô Đình Diệm from New York to
Sài Gòn to serve as prime minister of the Republic of Việt Nam. Ngô Đình
Diệm had spent the previous three years outside New York City in a
Catholic seminary.

On January 20, 1960, President Kennedy decided to use Việt Nam as a
site for “special war.”

On May 11, 1961, the United States sent to Việt Nam four hundred
special-forces soldiers and one hundred advisors to set up “strategic
hamlets,” which incarcerated millions of Vietnamese. Then, in December,
the number of advisors increased to thirty-two hundred. Yet the “special
war” failed.

In August 1964, the Johnson administration staged the “Tonkin Gulf
Incident” in order to expand the war.

On March 8, 1965, twenty-five hundred US marines landed at Đà Nẵng
and Chu Lai, beginning the “localized war.”

On July 30, 1965, the United States sent masses of troops to increase its
forces for “localized war.”

By the end of 1967, the number of US and allied troops (excluding the
Sài Gòn army - ARVN) had reached six hundred thousand.

Indeed, by the time the Paris Conference began in 1968, we in the South
were facing an occupying US army.

Our guideline for the four-party conference in Paris was to “fight
through negotiations,” thereby opening the struggle’s new diplomatic front
to increase our strength in battle. This policy was both correct and wise.
During the five years of the four-party conference, we in the South
increased our military strength through assistance from the North. We on
the political and diplomatic fronts took advantage of widespread
international world opinion to weaken the enemy’s rearguard.

We can view the Paris negotiating table as a new, effective battlefield
with continuing offensives first from the NLF and then from the PRG,
beginning with the Ten Points, then the Eight Points, then the Seven
Points, and finally the Two Points.[10] These successive proposals
increasingly cornered the enemy.

In particular, we can view the Seven-Point Plan, which we presented in
July 1971, as our diplomatic equivalent to the “1968 Tết Offensive.” We
concentrated on our demand that the United States remove all its military
forces from South Việt Nam; we set aside our desire for an immediate
political solution in the South. This final blow forced the United States to
follow the direction of eventually accepting the Draft Paris Agreement,
which Việt Nam had presented.

After the signing of the Paris Agreement in late January 1973, our
leaders predicted that two outcomes were possible in early 1973. In the
first case, the Sài Gòn administration would continue the war with US
support and assistance. In the second case, the situation between the Sài
Gòn administration and the PRG with the Third Force would become very
complicated and turn into a morass, but in the end we would surely
achieve victory.

Not long after the actual signing, we saw that the first possibility was
more likely and that the balance of forces increasingly favored us. In 1975,
the Party decided that we must strike quickly, defeat the puppet troops, and
liberate the South. This was a correct and timely policy. Thus, our troops
and supportive civilians launched the 1975 Spring General Offensive,
bringing total victory.

*

**

We can draw important lessons from our Resistance War Against the
United States and from our struggle to assure the nation’s independence
and sovereignty. I think particularly about these major strategic
guidelines:

We knew how to coordinate our national strength, using the power of
timing. With that overall guideline, we relied on political advantages and
resources from the Soviet Union, China, and the socialist bloc at the same
time that we took advantage of world-wide sympathy and the call for
justice. The result was multiplied strength. Here, I feel I must record
accurately the NLF’s important contribution through its flexible policy
combined with wise, dynamic action. Using this approach, we elicited
sympathy and won over people with differing political views, thereby
creating a strong, widespread, international movement of support. In
addition, we always followed our own principles of independence and self-
reliance on the battlefield and in the negotiations. We took advantage of
our friends’ advice, yet we always made our own decisions to insure our
own national interest.

We had a great need in the southern battlefield for weapons during this
cruel stage of the war, yet the transport distance from the North along the
Hồ Chí Minh Trail to the South was long and fraught with difficulties.
Some countries allied with us suggested they send personnel to drive
vehicles and weapons to the South. Our Vietnamese leaders expressed their
thanks but refused these offers. We asked to receive the weapons, but the
transport and use of those weapons was our work and our responsibility.

We refused to allow the war to spread into an international conflict, for
this would have been complicated and would have caused us to lose the
initiative. Equally, we refused to allow the on-going division of our
country. The 1954 Geneva Conference had brought us many valuable
insights. We were determined to fight, and we knew how to fight. We knew
how to begin a war, and we knew how to conclude a war.

Now, after nearly forty years, many political activists across the world
still claim to have been completely surprised at the victory of the people
of Việt Nam (such a small country), which dared to fight against the
world’s largest imperialist power. To understand the sources of this heroic
outcome, we must remember Việt Nam’s recorded history of two thousand
years, during which our ancestors established and defended our nation. It
is imperative to research the materials, signed documents, and summaries
(probably incomplete) of the comrades who were the historical
participants.

Many other comrades and I usually make this additional point:
President Hồ Chí Minh was the father and soul of our country and of our
people’s formidable Resistance War Against the United States. The Party’s
directives followed Hồ Chí Minh’s substantive ideology regarding

domestic and international unity. Alongside President Hồ, the Politburo
led by Comrade Lê Đuẩn was the supreme political command as well as
the general tactical headquarters for steering the country during the war’s
dangerous and decisive stages.

I remember 1956 and 1957, when the enemy launched its white terror in
the South. Many people were very worried and did not understand what
might come with future struggle in the South. At that time, Comrade Lê
Duẩn declared, “It’s not that the enemy is strong; instead, the enemy is
weakening. He must resort to savage means in order to crush the masses.”
Reality has decisively proven this lucid, sharp-witted point, for the
enemy’s savage, white terror increased the southerners’ anger and desire
for action. Based on this understanding and the design for the Southern
Revolution, in 1959, the Party instituted its historic Decision 15.

The letter Comrade Lê Duẩn sent to Comrade Phạm Hùng in 1975
regarding the major points of a Politburo meeting allows us to understand
more clearly the Politburo’s purpose, intelligence, skill, and spirit in
guiding the conclusion of the war, which had lasted nearly thirty years,
when counting from 1945.

During these last decisive moments, Comrade Lê Duẩn’s directive was
perceptive and precise: “This is the most favorable opportunity. No other
opportunity will be comparable. If we wait another ten or fifteen years, the
situation will become complicated, endlessly complicated. We must work
fast, completely, and thoroughly but wisely and skillfully.”

I think we should continue to remember the huge contribution of
Comrade Lê Duẩn. However, to cover the whole effort requires speaking
of all the contributions from all the leaders of the Workers’ Party (now the

Vietnamese.Communist Party), for they were very close to our people.
Today, the international communist movement is in a period of setbacks.
However, we Vietnamese certainly could not have liberated our country
without the sound and skilled leadership of the Party.

Even though the contributions of senior Party leaders were significant,
it is essential to remember the millions of Party members and the brave
masses of people who followed the Party and protected the Party. They
fought with all their strength and courage, and they were indomitable. Tens
of thousands, even millions of people from one generation to the next, lost
their lives for our nation’s sacred cause while fighting under the Party’s
flag.

*

**

During the War of Resistance Against the United States, I was assigned
to work in foreign relations. In addition to taking part in the Paris
Conference, my other primary work was mobilizing international support
for our Resistance Movement. Perhaps I can say that the chance to meet
people everywhere helped me gain important understandings. We have
often spoken of the great support we received from people in countries
across the world. To be fair, I must also speak about the important role of
governments.

Many Western countries had special-interest relationships and could
not support us. Some even followed the United States in opposing Việt
Nam. At the same time, other countries—especially Sweden—were

completely different. Those countries—from their people to their
governments—became close and tireless friends of Việt Nam.

From the beginning, the Swedish government publicized and opposed
the US policy of aggression against Việt Nam and was faithful to the end.
We often speak about the Swedish people, the major political and cultural
Swedish leaders, and the details of their closeness to Việt Nam. In Sweden,
people say there was the “Việt Nam generation” and that Việt Nam entered
their lives. Large numbers of Swedish youth as well as youth in many
other countries became political “converts” to our people’s struggle. Việt
Nam brought them a fresh reason to live. I think the strength of what is
right and just per se conquered their hearts.

Sweden, like other countries of northern Europe, is a “cousin” of the
United States, but the Swedes could not accept the Americans’ cruel
actions. Many Americans who refused to fight left the United States and
received asylum in Sweden. The Bertrand Russell Tribunal and many other
international meetings in support of Việt Nam occurred there. The Swedes
were empathetic, and their voluntary actions were evidence of a truly
civilized country with a deep tradition of compassion. Yet in addition to
the pacific attitudes of the Swedish public, we must also speak of the role
and actions of the Swedish government and of the nation’s leaders, in
particular Premier Olof Palme. I wanted to speak clearly about this
because many people in our country do not yet know about the
tremendously helpful role Sweden played during our time of need.

I had occasion to visit nearly all the socialist countries, from the Soviet
Union and China to the countries of Eastern Europe and Cuba. These days,
the socialist bloc no longer remains, the Soviet Union has disbanded, and

many other countries have changed their orientation or have become more
complicated. However, we must nevertheless say that the support and
closeness of the governments in the socialist countries during our
Resistance War Against the United States were hugely significant. In
particular, the Soviet Union and China were the stable support for the
Vietnamese front lines. Of course, varieties of national interest motivated
each of the countries that offered assistance; nevertheless, their support
was extremely important.

We all know Soviet and Chinese aid came in stages, and we know there
were serious conflicts between the two nations. However, Uncle Hồ and
the Party offered sincerity, seriousness, care, and perhaps we can even say
great skill to find a clear, flexible path to secure support from these
important “older-sibling” countries and from other socialist nations as
well. Political activists from other countries have described this as
implementation of traditional Vietnamese “political wisdom.”

While I was traveling overseas as a representative for the NFL, I had an
opportunity to attend an international conference in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”). Here was an unusual nation,
where the people venerated their leader and where the leader’s words were
orders for the populace. North Korea shared with us the plight of a nation
divided because of an earlier American-led war. As such, North Korea was
a dedicated supporter of Việt Nam’s struggle to oppose the United States
and one of the first countries to recognize the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Việt Nam.

Several comrades in our delegation and I went to Hungary many times
to work or to rest at Balaton Lake, a famous resort. Everyone we met in

Hungary, from the senior-level leaders to ordinary people, supported Việt
Nam, but particularly Foreign Minister János Péter. He would say to me,
“Whatever you Vietnamese friends need, we’re ready to help.”

In addition, many Vietnamese comrades and I went to visit the German
Democratic Republic (“East Germany”). At that time, Germany was
divided into two countries. Comrades in East Germany, from the Party
leaders and the government to the mass organizations, all felt strong
connections to Việt Nam and were zealously supportive in spirit and
through shipments of material goods. Many Vietnamese cadres, including
those wounded on the battlefield in the South, were brought first to the
North and then traveled to East Germany for medical treatment by
excellent doctors.

At that time, the authorities in West Germany did not support our
people’s struggle. Nevertheless, the solidarity movement with Việt Nam in
West Germany was dynamic. Mme. Weber, a textile engineer, organized
Aid to Việt Nam. Through her efforts, many patriotic intellectuals and
important social activists in West Germany came to understand the
Vietnamese people’s struggle. They helped us with medical equipment and
medicines. This assistance continued after the liberation of the South.
Mme. Weber’s empathy with Việt Nam was very deep. In her Last Will
and Testament, she stated her wish that Việt Nam be her permanent resting
place, for that was where her heart had been. This gesture moved us
deeply. We implemented her wish.

*

**

The Paris Conference gave me the opportunity to live in France for
many years and observe French society. I met many French intellectuals,
communist laborers, and progressives. They were upstanding,
straightforward, and ready to support people facing difficulties and
oppression, even though their own lives were not always easy. I came to
understand more about French history and the glorious French cultural
heritage of such great thinkers and writers as Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Victor Hugo, and others. In addition, we were near the heart of the 1789
Democratic Proletarian Revolution, the Paris Commune, and the motto
—“Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.”

Indeed, the French people have a democratic tradition. I witnessed
many demonstrations as well as workers and students’ strikes. I also came
to understand in part capitalist “consumer society.” If a person had a job,
he could borrow money from a bank to buy a house and pay off the loan
every month at ordinary interest rates. However, if he lost his job and had
no money to pay the bank, then the bank would take back the house and he
would be out on the street.

During the negotiations in France, the DRVN and NLF-PRG delegations
received whole-hearted assistance from the French Communist Party and
the overseas Vietnamese community. We will always remember the images
of our French security guards and drivers, whom the French Communist
Party assigned to help us. They worked with complete dedication for
years. So many Vietnamese living in France set aside their own work to
come to our houses to make repairs and assist our delegations whenever
we had a need. We had special friends and comrades, who were very close
to us. They stood alongside us throughout the long march of two Wars of

Resistance, first against France and then against the United States. Even
now, they stand with us in our struggle to build and develop our country.

Our people will always remember Henri Martin[11] and Raymonde
Dien,[12] the husband and wife who opposed French colonialism’s re-
invasion of Việt Nam and were imprisoned and suffered many other losses.
Another especially close friend is Madeleine Riffaud,[13] a hero during
the French Resistance against the German Nazis. She supported Việt
Nam’s struggle to secure independence. We know she sacrificed her
individual happiness to help our struggle. These days, although she is
elderly, frail, and blind, she still follows the situation in Việt Nam. Her
meetings with Vietnamese friends, including “Bình,” are her happiest
moments. She will talk continuously for hours, forgetting illness and pain.

Many overseas Vietnamese intellectuals in France made huge
contributions to our two delegations in Paris. These include Huỳnh Trung
Đồng, Lâm Bá Châu, Phạm Ngọc Tới, and Dr. Therèse Phan. The list goes
on. After liberation, Nguyễn Vĩnh Mỹ returned to Việt Nam and served as
chief justice in the Hồ Chí Minh City Court. Dr. Nguyễn Ngọc Hà and
Professor Nguyễn Ngọc Trân also returned home and participated in the
National Assembly. And there were others. Some had to remain in France
because of family circumstances. These include Brother Trần Hữu Nghiệp,
who made many personal sacrifices for our shared work.

*

**

I also had the chance to visit many Asian countries in addition to
socialist China. India made a deep impression on me. Hồ Chí Minh and

Việt Nam enjoyed considerable prestige in India, particularly in
Calcutta/Kolkata and Bengal, where the Communist Party was influential.
Indians felt a special empathy with the Vietnamese struggle. However,
while there, I witnessed the stark separation between rich and poor. A
provincial governor would have a beautiful palace surrounded by a park
with prancing deer. But not far away were people who were desperately
poor and living on the streets.

I wondered: Why do they have this situation? Is it the drawn-out legacy
of the caste system? Is it religion? Political trends? Negative
consequences from nearly a century of British domination?

India has an ancient and glorious culture. Today, Indians rank among
the world’s greatest experts in many fields. It’s unusual, but they have two
communist parties. It seems to me that if the Indians unify their people
even more strongly and take full advantage of the potential of their
citizenry and their natural resources, they will create a major political and
economic power.

During the war, people from the NLF could not secure visas to Japan.
At that time, the Japanese government stood alongside the United States,
which had many military bases in Japan. The largest of these was
Okinawa, from which US airplanes left every day to bomb Việt Nam.
However, we knew that Japan had a citizens’ movement in strong support
of our struggle. The progressive forces in Japan included organizations of
youth, women, workers, the Peace Committee, the Vietnamese-Japanese
Friendship Committee, the Beheiren Organization (Citizens’ League for
Peace in Việt Nam), and representatives of the Japanese Communist Party.
They organized many activities to oppose the US War of Aggression.

Thousands of people held sit-ins at Japanese ports to prevent the United
States from sending war materiel to Việt Nam. They organized a
movement, “A yen for Vietnamese women and children.” The Japanese
had been victims of the two US nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. These friends could easily feel sympathy with the people of Việt
Nam.

Many countries in Africa and Latin America viewed Việt Nam as a
model. Their governments’ support and help was great, with results in
many areas. By the time we liberated the South on April 30, 1975, the PRG
had received official diplomatic recognition from sixty-five countries,
with the number of African countries second to the number of socialist
countries. I visited many countries in Africa, that huge continent. We
know that Africa was the cradle of human beings, yet the level of
economic development and living standards remains “young” in
comparison with other continents. The thirst of each person everywhere is
the same. And so, whether Africans at that time knew a little or a lot about
politics, they sympathized with the struggle of Vietnamese, who had been
oppressed and exploited like them. I took part in many international
gatherings—from international solidarity conferences to governmental
meetings. Việt Nam’s position received a consistently warm response from
many African governments, particularly Algeria, Guinea, Mali,
Madagascar, and Tanzania.

Throughout his life, Algerian President Houari Boumédiènne[14] and
Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika,[15] currently the president of
Algeria, strongly supported the Vietnamese struggle and regarded it as
their own people’s struggle. President Boumédiènne paid close attention to
my travels to build international relations. Once, he said to me, “I invite

you to travel free of charge whenever you are on a mission to a country
covered by our airline.” Even now and even though our two countries have
developed differently, Algerians speaking of Việt Nam will place their
hands over their hearts and say, “Hồ Chí Minh, Điện Biên Phủ, Võ Nguyên
Giáp!”[16]

Our African friends’ empathy and admiration for Việt Nam remain.
After we achieved independence, many African nations also developed
along the lines of socialism, but most of those nations lost direction after
the socialist bloc disintegrated. Many currently face difficulties, including
increased divisions among religious, racial, and ethnic groups. They look
toward Việt Nam in hopes of drawing from our experience.

As for the Americas, at that time, I was able to visit only Cuba.
Comrade Fidel Castro[17] and the Cuban people left a deep impression on
me. Melba Hernandez,[18] president of the Committee for Solidarity with
Việt Nam, retained a special feeling for Vietnamese and was a particularly
close Cuban sister. Several thousand Cuban youths volunteered to join the
struggle in Việt Nam. Our Cuban friends showed their deepest feelings
when encouraging the Vietnamese people during our cruel Resistance War.

In speaking of Cuba, we always remember the revolutionary, Che
Guevara.[19] I’d had occasion to read a number of the letters that Che
Guevara had sent to Fidel Castro and to friends in Bolivia. It is rare to find
such ardent revolutionary feelings and thoughts! Those revolutionaries’
greatest happiness was to serve the cause of justice. This point explains
why the revolutionary warriors in Latin America and even as far away as
Venezuela were so moved by Vietnamese hero Nguyễn Văn Trỗi.[20]
Guerrillas in Venezuela captured an American officer and offered to

exchange the officer for Nguyễn Văn Trỗi. Even though their initiative
failed, we prized the effort of these friends far away in South America.

Only recently have we learned details of that story:

Early in August 1964, Commander Luis Correa of the Unidales Tácticas
de Combate (UTC, a leftist, tactical combat unit) announced that in Việt
Nam an electrician named Nguyễn Văn Trỗi had attempted to assassinate
US Secretary of Defense McNamara. Luis Correa reported that the attempt
had failed, Trỗi had been arrested, and the Sài Gòn administration would
execute Trỗi. Mr. Correa assigned a UTC action unit with twelve members
to capture an American, whom the UTC would exchange for Trỗi.

The twelve-man unit divided into four sub-groups, with each assigned
to one of four tasks: capture the American, transport him, guard him, and
negotiate. The sub-group that captured US Air Force Colonel Michael
Smolen included five men: Noel Quintero (leader), Carlos Rey,[21] David
Salazar, Raúl Rodriguez, and Carlos Argenis Martinez. The attempted
exchange of the American prisoner to rescue Nguyễn Văn Trỗi failed.
Nevertheless, we so value the feelings of these friends from South
American, who joined us in the struggle.

In Chile, on November 4, 1970, the Marxists achieved victory in the
elections. Salvador Allende[22] came to power. Although his cause was
short-lived (he was assassinated by Pinochet),[23] his government
expanded the revolution and, in particular, made clear its support for the
Vietnamese people’s struggle. Shortly after Allende took office, he
announced on March 25, 1971 the establishment of diplomatic relations
with the Democratic Republic of Việt Nam and the Provisional

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Việt Nam. President
Allende even covered the expenses for the two Vietnamese offices.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, a leftist movement began
to flourish in Latin America, the “backyard” of American imperialism.
Today, these countries understand US neo-colonialism and search for ways
to benefit their own people and create world-wide peace and justice.

*

**

Of course, I could not visit the United States during the war years, but I
did meet Americans at gatherings organized by US groups opposed to the
war. Many US delegations came to Paris to visit us, including
Congressional representatives, families of American prisoners, women,
and youth opposed to the war. They made a beautiful impression on us,
particularly the American women, who wanted the war to end and to have
peace so their husbands and sons could avoid the draft and an early death.
They were filled with sorrow and embarrassment after they learned that
their husbands and sons had perpetrated extreme acts of cruelty on the
Vietnamese people.

In 1971, Women Strike for Peace organized a meeting in Canada, where
American women met with women from the three countries of Indochina.

Some of the US women announced, “They (the Vietnamese women) are
not the enemy. They are our sisters.”

There were many demonstrations, often with women as the majority of
the participants. A photograph[24] from a demonstration in Miami,

Florida in 1972 contains a detail particularly moving to me. One of the
sisters is wearing a T-shirt with an image of Mme. Bình and the slogan,
“LIVE LIKE HER.” I’ve recently learned that many women wore “Mme.
Bình T-shirts” at demonstrations across the United States. Those American
women were supporting a Việt Cộng woman leader, yet at that same time,
in South Việt Nam, American soldiers were being ordered to kill any “Việt
Cộng” they saw. Those American women were truly courageous!

Many Americans from different strata of society ardently opposed the
US war and supported Việt Nam.

I want our people always to remember the names of ten Americans,[25]
among them five youth, who immolated themselves to give voice to the
American people’s choking anger about the meaningless American War in
Việt Nam. They were peace warriors and “war martyrs,” just as President
Hồ Chí Minh said.[26]

*

**

In speaking about the friends in the US anti-war movement, Dave
Dellinger[27] is the person I want to emphasize the most. I could say he
was the “president” of the American peace movement demanding an end
to the war in Việt Nam. He was one of the first Americans to visit North
Việt Nam and also someone who held firmly to his positions on peace and
justice.

Tom Hayden,[28] an anti-war movement leader, loved Jane Fonda; their
sense of purpose was the struggle to demand an end to the American War

in Việt Nam. They named their son Troy in memory of Nguyễn Văn Trỗi.
Cora Weiss[29] is a famous and tireless woman activist. Many women in
the peace movement, such as Carol Brightman,[30] named their children
“Bình” (“Peace”) out of their love for Việt Nam. By now, there may be a
dozen American women named “Bình.” And, of course, it is impossible to
forget the great humanitarians, Dr. Benjamin Spock and Jane Cheney
Spock.[31]

I have an adopted son, Rennie Davis,[32] an American youth who used
all his strength in the movement to support Việt Nam. Davis was a very
sensitive young man, who worked tirelessly in the US anti-war movement.
At the end of 1969, Davis came to Paris, where we met and where he asked
me to accept him as an adopted son, although “mother” and “son” had not
yet had the occasion to know each other well. The following year, Davis
met me again and asked why, after so lengthy a struggle, the war had not
ended. I explained and encouraged Davis to believe in our ultimate victory,
but perhaps I was unable to persuade him. After that, I never met Davis
again, but I heard from a number of American friends that he had moved
to India and entered a monastery.

In fact, that wasn’t the truth at all!

In 2013, Rennie Davis and his wife were on the list of Americans
visiting Việt Nam to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the signing
of the Paris Agreement. I was so delighted to meet Davis again. He had not
entered a monastery in India as rumors had led me to believe but, instead,
had continued his activism in the United States. Only during this recent
meeting did I come to understand more fully his anti-war
accomplishments. This increased my affection for him. Rennie was among

the “Chicago Seven” and had been selected by The New York Times as one
of the most important political figures in US history. He had organized
large anti-war demonstrations, including the one at the Democratic Party’s
national convention in 1968. These days, Rennie works in technology and
leadership-training. Rennie has an idea to assist Việt Nam with many
projects. In particular, he wants to help produce inexpensive computer
hardware of high quality because he knows Việt Nam still has many
challenges. The sentiments of my close American friends remain deep.

Some people are especially precious to me. Even now, they remain
faithful to the cause of Việt Nam’s struggle. I think, for example, of Merle
Ratner[33] (Older Sister “Mơ,” the wife of Professor Ngô Thanh
Nhàn[34]). Even though Merle has no personal wealth, she is there with
help whenever Việt Nam has a request. These international friends are
people who live according to political and humane ideals; their happiness
comes from following those ideals.

It would take a long time to tell all the stories of our friends on the five
continents. The points I want to record here are not only from my own
personal experience but also perhaps from the common experience of all
of us. During the struggle, we suffered losses and savored our gains
against the enemy.

We always kept in mind the Party’s crucial guideline: “We must unify
all our own people and, after that, unify internationally.” In truth, this
directive was ingenious. Suppose we had not taken full advantage of the
assistance from the Soviet Union, China, and the socialist bloc. Suppose
we had let ourselves be stopped by the conflicts and by the crossed
purposes between those countries. If so, we would surely not have received

their political support and military and financial assistance. Taken
together, that aid gave us the means to secure victory.

Suppose Việt Nam had not enjoyed an international solidarity
movement, particularly in the United States. If so, we could not have
shaken Washington’s aggressive will. The memoirs of many politicians
from the American administrations at that time also make this point. The
US administrations had to address the widespread public opinion opposing
the meaningless war they had created in Việt Nam. The US anti-war
movement in solidarity with Việt Nam drew from many forces—
communists, leftists, progressive people, those who simply love peace and
justice, and others. This political and material strength shook the most
stubborn, conservative, and warlike minds in the US political leadership.

The Vietnamese people have great appreciation for the peace and anti-
war movements in the United States and view those movements’
contributions as important in shortening the war and re-establishing peace
in Việt Nam. Not long ago, an American film team visiting Việt Nam
asked me, “Is it true that Việt Nam profited from the divisions within the
United States?”

“No,” I answered. “We don’t think that way. The work that we did took
advantage of the American people’s spirit, which prizes peace and justice,
to oppose again and again the useless and destructive war in Việt Nam,
which provided no benefit for the American people.”

It is fortunate that many Americans, particularly the women,
understood this point and stood on the side of common sense and peace.
That made possible the path leading to later reconciliation between the
people of our two nations.

The press and mass media also played a major role. At times, people
called the press and mass media the second authority, after the
administrative authority. Journalists dared to speak the truth and, despite
intimidation and punishment, accurately portrayed our suffering and the
demands of the anti-war movement. Their work affected the US
government’s attitudes and policies.

Most of all, I must speak about the progressive journalists who dared to
visit the NLF-PRG liberated areas to report on our soldiers and on our
people’s war. They were prepared to accept every sacrifice and endure
every imaginable difficulty. We will always remember Madeleine Riffaud,
who spoke from her heart, saying, “Việt Nam is a part of my life.” Along
with her were many other journalists from l’Humanité (the newspaper of
the French Communist Party).

Wilfred Burchett[35] was always jovial and smiling. Burchett
published interviews, which had a huge effect on public opinion, so much
so that although he was an Australian citizen, he was not allowed to return
to Australia. Then there was the Bulgarian woman writer Dimitrova[36]
and Older Sister Vanessa (who was Polish).

We are also indebted to the hundreds of journalists who “stuck” to the
Paris Conference from beginning to end in order to distribute news about
the seemingly endless negotiations. We must recognize the American
journalists from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CBS
television as well as the AP and UPI news agencies. They were dedicated
to capturing the situation and the news. In time, they helped Americans
and other peoples follow the war and see clearly the frightfully violent

rain of bombs, the ghastly massacres, the imprisonment of ordinary
citizens, and the painful loss of American soldiers.

We must recognize journalists Seymour Hersh[37] and Don Luce,[38]
as well as many other international journalists, who courageously exposed
the truth. Through their efforts, public opinion—particularly in the United
States—learned about the Mỹ Lai massacre and the notorious “tiger
cages” in the prison on Côn Đảo Island.

The world heard about so many other cruelties perpetrated by the US
aggressors. After the war, I had the chance to see documentary films of
tremendous value by filmmakers from Canada, Belgium, and other
countries. I came to understand more about what was known on “this side”
and “that side” during the long and endlessly cruel war in Việt Nam.

Finally, I want to say that all of us active in the diplomatic front can
affirm this point: “The battlefield decides the results at the negotiating
table.” The struggle and sacrifice of our troops and our people in every
victorious step during decades of struggle conquered “the hearts and
minds” of progressive peoples across the world and eventually forced the
enemy to submit. Endlessly important to the southern battlefield was this
—our stable rearguard in the socialist North, where for years every person
truly lived and worked every day with the spirit of “Everything for the
South, everything for our kin.”

Việt Nam’s struggle for independence and freedom lasted for more than
twenty years filled with excruciating sacrifices requiring endless heroism
from our people. Our struggle has become a symbol receiving the world’s
esteem. Yet the strong “spirit of international unity” has not yet reached

the millions and millions of the world’s deserving people who are still
struggling.

I am extremely proud of my country, of our people, and of our friends.

[1] For the guidelines establishing the National Liberation Front, see the same link as

presented in Chapter 5: see http://openrevolt.info/2011/12/20/program-of-the-nlf/.

[2] Party Decision 15, promulgated in July 1959, addressed the topic of liberation of the

South by prioritizing the toppling of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and its US supporters through a
shift to “revolutionary violence” and coordination of political struggle with armed struggle.

[3] Trịnh Đình Thảo had served on the Supreme Court of the French-backed regime,

beginning in 1946. A nationalist but not a communist, he attracted and drew together a group of
nationalists different from those affiliated with the NLF. See Chapter 4, “Forged during the
Resistance War Against France,” footnote 53, p. 108.

[4] The Bertrand Russell Tribunal or International Tribunal on War Crimes (1967) drew

the attention of international journalists, who published their stories about the US military’s
atrocities and US use of defoliant chemicals, exposing these issues widely for the first time. The
Tribunal included participants from Việt Nam and featured prominent European intellectuals,
among them: Wofgang Abendroth (German professor of political science), Simone de Beauvoir
(French writer and philosopher), Lázaro Cárdenas (former president of Mexico), Vladimir Dedijer
(Yugoslavian historian and lawyer), Amado V. Hernandez (Filipino poet), Sara Lidman (Swedish
writer), Kinju Morikawa (Japanese social activist), Bertrand Russell (British philosopher and
mathematician), Jean-Paul Sartre (French philosopher), and Peter Weiss (Swedish writer and
artist).

[5] Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was a famous British philosopher, mathematician,

logician, and activist.

[6] Jean-Paul Sartre: See Chapter 6, “The Longest Peace Negotiation in History,” footnote

35, p. 187.

[7] Laurent Schwartz: See Chapter 6, “The Longest Peace Negotiation in History,” footnote

36, p. 187.

[8] “Spring of 1968” … “Spring of 1975”: “Spring of 1968” refers to the 1968 Tết General

Offensive, while “Spring of 1975” refers to the Hồ Chí Minh Campaign leading to the end of the
war on April 30, 1975.

[9] “Inside the capital and at the enemy’s headquarters”: During the 1968 Tết Offensive,

NLF troops penetrated the US Embassy in Sài Gòn.

[10] NLF-PRG Plans presented at the Paris Conference: The NLF presented its Ten-Point

Plan on May 8, 1969, its Eight-Point Plan on September 17, 1970, its Seven-Point Plan on July 1,
1971, and its Two-Point Plan on January 11, 1972. For Web links to the contents of the plans in
Vietnamese and summaries in English, see notes in Chapter 6, “The Longest Peace Negotiation in
History.”

[11] Henri Martin (1927-) was sentenced to five years in prison (he served three) for

distributing pamphlets opposing the French War in Indochina. At that time, he was a sailor in the
French navy.

[12] Raymonde Dien (1929-), a French communist, lay across railroad tracks in France in

1950 to protest the French War in Việt Nam.

[13] Madeleine Riffaud (1924-), a French poet and journalist, visited liberated areas under

NLF-PRG control during the war.

[14] Houari Boumédiènne: See Chapter 6, “The Longest Peace Negotiation in History,”

footnote 44, p. 193.

[15] Abdelaziz Bouteflika: See Chapter 6, “The Longest Peace Negotiation in History,”

footnote 45, p. 193.

[16] Algerian support: Algeria had been a French colony, with many Algerians serving

with the French Far-East Expeditionary Corps in Việt Nam during the French War. Through Hồ
Chí Minh’s guidance, the DRVN had a program to educate North African POWs in nationalism
and then release those converted to revolutionary ideology back into the French posts. The
French caught onto this ruse and sent the released North African POWs back home. Some
Algerian veterans say that Algeria’s war of independence (1954-1962) began with the French

Sétif Massacre on May 8, 1954, the day after Việt Nam’s victory over France at Điện Biên Phủ.
However, the official starting date of the French War in Algeria is November 1, 1954.

[17] Fidel Castro: See Chapter 6, “The Longest Peace Negotiation in History,” footnote 62,

p. 202.

[18] Melba Hernandez (1921-), a revolutionary Cuban hero, served as Cuba’s ambassador

to Việt Nam and Cambodia.

[19] Che Guevara (1928-1967), an Argentine Marxist and revolutionary, played a

prominent role in the Cuban Revolution. He carried out revolutionary activities in other countries,
was captured in Bolivia, and executed.

[20] Nguyễn Văn Trỗi (1940-1964), a revolutionary activist, tried to assassinate US

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during McNamara’s visit to Sài Gòn in May 1963.
International journalists covered Nguyễn Văn Trỗi’s public execution on October 15, 1964.
Nguyễn Văn Trỗi spoke out in defiance against the “Americans who have sinned” and shouted,
“Long live Việt Nam!”

[21] Carlos Rey: All five members of this UTC team are deceased with the exception of

Carlos Rey, who visited Việt Nam and met Mme. Nguyễn Thị Bình in January 2013 on the
occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement.

[22] Salvador Allende (1908-1973), a medical doctor and president of Chile from 1970 to

1973, was the first Marxist elected president of a Latin American country. The United States
sponsored a military coup led by General Pinochet, who killed or “disappeared” many of
Allende’s supporters.

[23] Augusto Pinochet (1915-2006, a.k.a. Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte) led the

US-sponsored coup against President Salvador Allende. General Pinochet was dictator of Chile
from 1973 to 1990.

[24] This photograph introduces the photo section, “With International Friends,” at the

back of this book.

[25] Ten Americans who immolated themselves:

1. On November 2, 1965, Norman Morrison (age thirty-two), a Quaker, took his eleven-
month-old daughter and a can of gasoline to the Pentagon in northern Virginia. He handed his

daughter to a bystander and set himself afire. Three months before that, he had sent a letter to The
Baltimore Sun, saying: “Our American youth have no reason to respond to the so-called
‘patriotism.’”

2. One week after Morrison’s death, on November 9, 1965, Roger Allen LaPorte (age twenty-
one), an American member of the Christian Workers’ Organization, sat in meditation before the
UN Headquarters in New York City and burned himself with gasoline. Father Daniel Berrigan,
one of the first Americans to speak out against the war, said: “LaPorte died so others could live.”

3. Before Morrison and LaPorte, on May 16, 1965, Alice Herz (age eighty-two) immolated
herself to protest the war in Việt Nam, but her sacrifice received less attention because it
happened on a back street of Detroit, Michigan.

4. On April 10, 1966, Arthur Zinner, a student, started to immolate himself in front of the
White House in Washington, D.C., but the police rescued him. William Racolin, his roommate,
said that Zinner had once said, “This is an unjust war” and “The people of South Việt Nam
should solve their problems themselves without American intervention.”

5. On August 18, 1967, John Kopping (age thirty-three) immolated himself in Panorama
Township outside Los Angeles. The police found a nearby note saying he was protesting
American policy in Việt Nam.

6. On October 12, 1967, Hiroko Hayaski set herself afire in San Diego at an airbase from
which American troops left for Việt Nam. She died in the hospital one hour later. Her elder sister,
Mrs. Kay, said Hiroko Kayaski had acted in protest against the war in Việt Nam.

7. Three days later, on October 15, 1967, Florence Beaumont immolated herself. She died in
the hospital. Her husband, George Beaumont, said that she had acted in opposition to the
American “dirty war” in Việt Nam.

8. In late November 1967, the burnt body of an American youth was discovered in Tijuana
near the US-Mexican border. Identification papers showed he was James Thornton (age twenty-
four) from California. A pilot, James Thornton had received orders to leave for Việt Nam on
December 6, 1967. Instead, he immolated himself.

9. Some days later, in early December 1967, Kenneth Zilya (age twenty) immolated himself
in front of the United Nations headquarters in New York City in protest against the American War
in Việt Nam.

10. On May 10, 1970, George Winne, Jr., an American Navy captain’s son and a student at
the University of California, immolated himself. He was to receive his masters in history that

June. Before his death, George Winne, Jr. had written a letter to President Nixon, demanding an
end to the war in Việt Nam.

[26] Hồ Chí Minh, “Trả lời nhà báo Anh Phêlích Gơrin” (Answers for British Journalist

Felix Greene), Toàn Tập (Collected Works), vol. 14 (Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính Trị Quốc Gia [National
Political Publishers], 2011, 664-70.

[27] David Dellinger (1915-2004), a pacifist, was one of the Chicago Seven arrested during

demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic Party Convention.

[28] Tom Hayden (1939-), a socio-political activist, took part in the anti-war movement and

in the struggle for human rights during the 1960s.

[29] Cora Weiss: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States to Save the

Nation,” footnote 34, p. 144.

[30] Carol Brightman has written about her visits to Việt Nam.

[31] Benjamin Spock (1903-1998) is famous for his Dr. Spock’s Baby and Child Care and

other writings with assistance from his wife, Jane Cheney Spock (1907-1989). Both were famous
American activists in support of Việt Nam.

[32] Rennie Davis (1941-) is a human-resources business consultant.

[33] Merle Ratner continues to be active on the issue of Agent Orange as co-chair of the

Agent Orange Relief and Responsibility Campaign. She provided assistance to delegations from
the Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange (VAVA) traveling to New York for VAVA’s
legal case against American chemical companies.

[34] Ngô Thanh Nhàn is one of about a hundred scholars world-wide who can read Nôm,

the ancient Vietnamese ideographic script used in early Vietnamese literature and historical and
administrative documents. Professor Nhàn has translated poetry written in Nôm and has created
computer programs to translate the script. He works with Việt Nam’s National Library on
preservation of ancient Nôm documents.

[35] Wilfred Burchett (1911-1983) was the first journalist to cover the bombing of

Hiroshima. He visited both North Việt Nam and liberated areas of South Việt Nam during the
American War and wrote the sentient books in English about wartime life in both those regions.

[36] Blaga Nikolova Dimitrova (1922-2003) visited Việt Nam several times and adopted a

Vietnamese girl in 1967.

[37] Seymour Hersh (1937-) received a Pulitzer prize in 1970 for his coverage in 1969 of

the Mỹ Lai (Sơn Mỹ) massacre, which had occurred in 1968, and the cover-up of the massacre.
On March 30, 2015, he published “The Scene of the Crime” in The New Yorker, where he quoted
Mme. Bình: “‘I’ll be honest with you,’ she said. ‘My Lai became important in America only after
it was reported by an American.’ Within weeks of the massacre, a spokesman for the North
Vietnamese in Paris had publicly described the events, but the story was assumed to be
propaganda. ‘I remember it well, because the antiwar movement in America grew because of it,’
Madame Binh added, speaking in French. ‘But in Vietnam there was not only one My Lai—there
were many.’”

[38] Don Luce was head of the International Voluntary Services Program in the Republic of

Việt Nam (“South Việt Nam”) during the American War but resigned in protest against US
government use of voluntary organizations to support its policies in the South. He then worked as
a free-lance journalist in Sài Gòn and is best known for exposing the Côn Đảo (Côn Sơn) Island
“tiger cages,” where the US - Sài Gòn regime kept political prisoners. Mme. Bình describes the
cages later in this memoir.

9.

Re-Unification of the Country

April 30, 1975 is memorable in our country’s history and, for me, a day
I can never forget.

For twenty years, our people in both the South and the North had
earnestly wished for re-unification of our Homeland. For twenty years, our
country was divided; for twenty years, families were separated; for twenty
years, wives and husbands waited for each other. For the first time, after
twenty years, some twenty-year-old adults finally saw their fathers’ faces.
[1]

Some of my friends standing amidst this indescribable exuberance
faced equally indescribable sorrow. They’d been unable to find their father
or mother, or a bomb had killed their husband or wife and their children.
For them, joy lay buried beneath bombs and military mopping-up
operations.

A few days before May 13, 1975, I traveled from Hà Nội to Sài Gòn
with comrades in the leadership. Even though I had lived in Sài Gòn and
had been an activist there, I could no longer recognize areas of the city.
Our troops’ general offensive and the people’s uprising had liberated Sài

Gòn, but in many places it seemed as if everything were still intact. This
was marvelous!

During the Resistance War Against France, I had lived with my family
at the memorial to Elder Phan Châu Trinh, my maternal grandfather, near
Đa Kao Market in Ward 5, District 3. On returning in 1975, I was surprised
to find still standing the memorial to Grandfather Phan. The surrounding
neighborhoods where we had tacked up our propaganda posters and held
our demonstrations so many years before were still there. Yet everything
was in disorder, chaotic, and confused. Perhaps this was one of the
negative after-effects of the war. So many people had abandoned their
homes in the rural areas and fled to the city to avoid bombs and mortars as
well as to earn a living. They had crowded into Sài Gòn and into my
former neighborhood.

In other areas, the Sài Gòn authorities had widened the streets, and the
buildings were far grander, with imposing villas, tall buildings, and
elegant shops displaying a surfeit of foreign goods. The American military
had dominated some areas of the city for twenty years, investing billions
of dollars. The most symbolic trace of the former Sài Gòn administration
was Independence Palace. The new administration immediately changed
its name to Unification Palace.

The Americans and the Sài Gòn administration had fled the city during
the recent turbulence, but by now, the streets were peaceful under our new
administration. The people were exuberant. Surely, some people associated
with the previous administration remained worried. However, their
worries abated when they saw that the Liberation Army soldiers were not
“barbaric,” as the local citizenry had been told.