Family friends and country Nguyen Thi Binh

news internationally. We could distribute many important news stories
very fast from our delegations in Paris to the rest of the world.

Those stories included US expansion of the war to Laos and Cambodia,
the US escalation of the war to the North, the US destruction in the North,
and the US army’s massacres at Mỹ Lai (Sơn Mỹ) and other sites. Within a
day, people in many countries would take to the streets to oppose the
United States and support Việt Nam. These news releases also quickly
opposed the heavy-handed actions in the urban centers of South Việt Nam.
Many Vietnamese from the South who visited Paris told us that it was
primarily through the news from other countries that they could
understand clearly the situation in the South. In this way, they also came to
understand the National Liberation Front and, later, the Provisional
Revolutionary Government. Through daily press and television briefings,
people could follow closely the battles of Vietnamese regular troops and
guerrillas against American marines.

Politicians wanted to watch how the diplomatic arguments played out
in Paris between the two warring sides. One side in Paris was allied with
communism and socialism, with “representatives” connected to the North
Vietnamese Army and the Liberation Army of South Việt Nam. The other
side was allied with the Western imperialists led by the United States, with
“representatives” connected to the US Army and the ARVN (Army of the
Republic of Việt Nam). Along with the televised scenes of bloody battles
and deaths on the battlefield in Việt Nam, the maneuvering at the Paris
Conference involved complicated arguments between the sides as they
pursued complex, opposing national and individual interests.

Some people tried to use the Soviet Union and China, two of our major
allies, to pressure Việt Nam. Through quick-minded observation, we could
perceive these dynamics from both our adversaries’ public actions and
their clandestine behavior around the edges of the Paris Conference. We
were conscious of this situation and of the need for careful discipline in
our public statements. Indeed, at times we would say something in public,
but then the newspapers would unintentionally or sometimes with direct
intention print completely different contents. We constantly had to screen
every point and learn from experience.

We met many political leaders as well as journalists at various embassy
festivities for different countries’ national days. Guests would chat about
the news. We brothers and sisters were skillful in picking up information,
which gave us insight into the issues and the opinions of the various
guests.

The home of Mme. Geneviève Tabouis,[32] a politician and famous
French journalist, was a favorite gathering place. Many well-known
French political leaders, political activists, retired generals, and eminent
journalists came to discuss current affairs. Surely, the guests also included
people working in strategic intelligence. I was often invited to “Saturday
afternoon tea,” along with Comrade Nguyễn Minh Vỹ[33] and lawyer Trần
Công Tường[34] (both from the DRVN delegation).

From the discussions, we understood that the other guests really did
want to understand our intentions and to learn where we were headed and
when there would be real negotiations. Many people also made the
observation common in French political circles that “the United States

will surely be defeated because, before, the French were wiser in military
strategy and tactics but nevertheless met defeat.”

The French political authorities probably would have been willing to
serve as mediators between the United States and the DRVN-PRG. The
French sought clarity about whether the “peace cabinet” about to appear in
Sài Gòn would have people who were close to France. Individual French
people who knew us tried to sound out political issues involving a possible
new administration in the South, while they simultaneously tried to sound
out the US side. In general, though, the French government was respectful
and strove to maintain its neutral role as the “host country.”

During the negotiations, we had many methods to preserve our secrecy
and security. One aspect of our success was the political environment in
France. We managed to keep all our diplomatic offensives secret to the
very last moment, creating the element of surprise that perplexed and
disconcerted our opponents.

*

**

During our nearly five years in Paris, in addition to our work directly
relating to the negotiations, my comrades and I in the NLF-PRG
delegation would visit other countries to attend conferences and solidarity
meetings. We took advantage of any invitation from any organization in
any country, whether in France, Italy, Africa, or the Americas. Our goal
was to maximize the opportunities to explain our position and to mobilize
the various strata of people, political parties, and governments.

In France, ordinary people were very sympathetic with Việt Nam. The
French Communist Party had substantial political influence at that time
and was a solid support, helping in particular with the solidarity
movement by drawing in people from every segment of society. Especially
important was the support from a number of world-renown intellectuals.
These included writer and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre;[35] the famous
mathematician, Laurent Schwartz;[36] and the venerable lawyer, Joe
Norman, the French president of the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers.[37] These famous people held opposing political
views and would often challenge one another, but they agreed on the issue
of Việt Nam. Each one spoke out in strong support of Việt Nam’s struggle.

Việt Nam’s indomitable, heroic efforts were a source of inspiration for
many French writers and poets. There were those who said, “I wish, when
waking up in the morning, to be Vietnamese.”

The women in the Union of French Women (UFF)[38] were especially
constructive; they organized many initiatives in support of Việt Nam.
These sisters would joke with me. “Bình,” they would say, “the French
people know more about you than about our French president!” The
General Confederation of Workers (CGT)[39] was also enthusiastic.

I think we need to help our Vietnamese people understand everything
our friends did to help us before and afterwards and especially during the
time of the negotiations in Paris. To them we owe a huge debt of gratitude,
which we must never forget.

Traveling from France to Italy required very little effort. The Italian
people’s movement supporting Việt Nam was very strong, particularly

among the youth and trade-union members. Many communist activists and
representatives from other political parties in the Parliament spoke up in
support of us, demanding that the United States stop the war. We went
many times to Bologna, where the Italian Communist Party had a great
deal of influence. I was invited to the Parliament to speak about the war. A
movement developed to support the health of the Vietnamese by donating
blood. Whenever our delegations went to visit, we felt like special guests,
with the police escorting us as if we were heads of state. Comrades Trương
Tùng and Hà Đăng still refer to our “historic” visits to Bologna.

For me, the deepest and most emotional memories are from Sweden.
The Swedish people—in particular the youth—loved and supported Việt
Nam. Many youth called themselves “Swedish Việt Cộng.” One time we
had just landed at the airport when we saw two rows of Swedish youth
with blue-and-red NLF flags. They sang, “Liberate the South” in Swedish
to welcome us. Some young friends in the movement came from wealthy
families. At first, their parents were angry, but then they noticed that their
children became better behaved and more dignified through their political
activities. In the end, the parents shifted to supporting us and encouraging
their children’s work for Việt Nam.

Here is one special case: Some youth, who called themselves FNL (the
letters abbreviating the National Liberation Front in Swedish), had
established a “Việt Cộng Liberated Area” in an abandoned building in the
center of the capital. There, the FNL youth set up a printing press and
published a newsletter, which they distributed across the various strata of
Swedish society.

The two Swedes whom I especially esteemed were Prime Minister Olof
Palme[40] and writer Sara Lidman.[41] At the beginning of 1970, Prime
Minister Palme instructed Mr. Christophe öberg[42] to invite me to take
part in the Swedish Social Democratic Party Congress and to speak about
the American War in Việt Nam. I was the only foreign representative at the
congress. During that same visit, a huge demonstration had been organized
in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, in support of the Vietnamese people’s
struggle. I joined the prime minister in leading that demonstration.

Writer Sara Lidman was famous in Northern Europe. She had written
many books protecting the interests of farmers in remote areas. Here was a
person with a heart of gold. She felt great admiration and sympathy for
Việt Nam, a small and impoverished nation standing up in heroic valor
against the United States, a colossal and imperialistic country. She viewed
Việt Nam as the symbol for ethical choices and as the heart of humanity.
Perhaps there are no words more beautiful than Sara Lidman’s to describe
Việt Nam.

Sara Lidman visited Việt Nam in the midst of the war and became even
more admiring and sympathetic when she saw the women and children
living under the Americans’ cruel bombs. Yet she also saw that these
people remained calm and optimistic about the struggle, for they believed
we would be victorious in the end. Sara Lidman was also attentive to the
relationship between people within our families and our society.

“Older Sister Bình,” she said, “Việt Nam has a culture that is endlessly
precious. People live together with feeling and meaning in a beautiful way.
In Europe, we’ve become uncivilized and know only about living to please
ourselves. We’re bent on winning for ourselves at any cost…”

These days, in truth, the words of this dear Swedish friend are worth a
great deal of thought. Indeed, during those years of war, we Vietnamese
truly did live in a society, which was good and strong. I believe that we
Vietnamese today can draw from our wartime society a deep source of
strength, which we must always preserve. In truth, the return of peace
brings difficulties greater than in war! I know many close friends have
worried about us with respect to this very point. Sara Lidman was among
them. She was not a communist, and she did not speak about class struggle
or socialism. She had a soul, which was clear and noble, and so she placed
a high value on equality and compassion while hating injustice,
oppression, and exploitation. When I would share confidences with her
about the weaknesses that remained in our society, she would always find a
way to defend us and cover this up.

Sara passed away several years ago in her home village, a tranquil rural
area in the south of Sweden. She was a marvelous friend, whom we can
never forget.

I also often think of Algeria, a place where people would refer to Việt
Nam as their “older brother” and “older sister.” Việt Nam and Algeria were
close through a special, shared history. In 1954, we had just finished our
War of Resistance Against France with the glorious victory in the Battle of
Điện Biên Phủ when the Algerians began their military struggle, which
lasted until 1962. Only then, after the Évian Agreement,[43] did Algeria
secure independence and freedom from the French colonialists. Algerians
regarded Việt Nam with gratitude and felt the Vietnamese people had
opened the way for Algeria’s struggle as well as for the world-wide
national independence movement. Starting from this special relationship,
the Algerian government, the Algerian FNL (Front for National

Liberation) Party, and the Algerian people continuously supported Việt
Nam when we were forced to fight the United States.

Paris and Algiers are not far apart. We had many chances to travel to
Algiers and discuss with our friends the situation of the struggle inside our
country and the negotiations in Paris. President Boumédiènne[44] and
Foreign Minister Bouteflika[45] considered me a close friend and reserved
for me in Algiers a private villa, which our friends called “Mme. Bình’s
villa.” At the time, Algeria played an important role in the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM)[46] and was central in helping the NLF- PRG take part.
Their help came at the time when the countries in NAM that had a strong
relationship with the United States and the Sài Gòn administration looked
for ways to hamper us.

In the middle of 1970, I went to visit Yugoslavia. As soon as I set foot
there, I remembered the books I had read during the beginning of my
efforts to oppose French colonialism. Those texts described the anti-
fascist war and Yugoslavia’s guerrilla movement, in which President
Tito[47] was the iconic image and for which he was subsequently honored
as a national hero. After World War II, Yugoslavia backed the Bandung
spirit[48] and joined the Non-Aligned Movement. Later, splits in the labor
movement and in international communism made it difficult for
Yugoslavia; as a result, the country’s international importance declined.

Nevertheless, President Tito and the Yugoslav government were
consistent in their warm support for the Vietnamese people’s struggle
during our two Wars of Resistance. After we had signed the Paris
Agreement, I visited Yugoslavia once again along with PRG President
Nguyễn Hữu Thọ. President Tito personally drove the car and took us to

visit Bruny Island in the Adriatic, where the blue of the sea has a special
hue.

In the middle of 1970, the battlefield forces between the enemy and us
were relatively even. When the negotiations in Paris stalled, I took
advantage of the hiatus to visit other countries and attend international
conferences. Comrade Đinh Bá Thi, deputy head of our delegation,
replaced me every Thursday at the Kléber Conference Center.

In July, we paid an official visit to India at the invitation of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi[49] and then traveled on to Sri Lanka at the
invitation of Prime Minister Bandaranaike.[50]

At this time, Delhi had two Vietnamese consulates, one for the DRVN
and one for the Sài Gòn administration. The Sài Gòn consul objected when
he heard about our delegation’s arrival; he left India for home. His action
was a defeat for the Sài Gòn administration because I had come through an
official invitation from the Indian government. The Indian government
replied to his objection, saying, “Whomever we invite is our right!”

Indian political circles were divided. Traveling along the road, we
could see two kinds of signs, “Welcome Mme. Bình!” and “Mme. Bình,
Go home!”

When journalists asked my impressions, I said, “The Indian people
support us, for which we are very thankful. After this visit, we’ll return
home.” India was very hot in July, but wherever we went, people poured
out onto the streets, particularly in Calcutta (now Kolkata). Many people
approached us to grasp our hands, while others kissed the hems of my áo
dài. At the time, the Indians had a famous slogan, “You are Việt Nam. I am

Việt Nam. We are Việt Nam!” Many people supported us, but some did
not. In quite a few places, Indians argued with each other about red flags
or black flags. We were pleased that there were always more red flags.

This visit was the first time I met Mme. Indira Gandhi, about whom I
had heard so much praise. She was the daughter of Elder Nehru,[51] the
first prime minister of India, a huge country, which had achieved
independence after nearly a hundred years of imperialist British
domination. Mme. Indira Gandhi had taken the name of her husband,
Feroze Gandhi,[52] also a politician and a famous journalist. When Indira
Gandhi was young, she accompanied her father, who conscientiously
trained her to become a high-level politician. She was proud to be a “niece
of Uncle Hồ.”[53]

I had a deep and positive impression of Indira Gandhi not only because
of her dignified, serious appearance and her noble bearing but also from
her political acumen. During that visit to India, I came to understand more
about one of the oldest and greatest cultures in Asia. At the same time, I
was deeply impressed by the warm feelings of the Indian people toward
Uncle Hồ and Việt Nam.

My visit to India created a positive effect on Indian public opinion,
with the result that, subsequently, the Indian government made an
important decision, which enhanced our prestige. Previously, India and
Poland had been two of the countries on the International Commission for
Supervision and Control of the Implementation of the 1954 Geneva
Agreements on Việt Nam and Laos. To maintain neutrality, India had
established a general consulate in Hà Nội and another in Sài Gòn. Then in

the beginning of 1972, India established formal diplomatic relations with
the DRVN and opened an embassy in Hà Nội.

*

**

On September 17, 1970, we at the Paris negotiations began another
“diplomatic offensive” with the PRG’s Eight Points.[54] We demanded
that the United States withdraw all its troops before June 30, 1971, set
aside the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm administration, and establish a provisional
coalition government in the South. The Eight Points created
reverberations, which resounded throughout the urban areas of the South.
Those points received world-wide acclaim as part of a flexible and
reasonable proposal.

In addition to my responsibilities as foreign minister and delegation
head at the Paris Conference, I had an assignment as traveling diplomatic
representative for the PRG State. My task was to encourage other
governments to establish official diplomatic relations with the PRG. By
1970, twenty-four governments had diplomatic relations with the
Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Our official participation in the Non-Aligned Movement became a
major goal for expanding the PRG’s international position. At that time,
the Non-Aligned Movement included more than a hundred Third World
member nations from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. NAM’s guidelines
were to struggle for independence and non-alignment, that is, not to follow
the side of socialism but also not to follow the side of Western capitalism.

The NLF-PRG platform with its position regarding peaceful foreign
affairs and neutrality conformed appropriately to NAM’s guiding
principles. Although we had many friends in NAM, admission was not
easy. In September 1970, I received directions along with Comrades Ngọc
Dung, Bình Thanh, Lý Văn Sáu, and Lê Mai[55] to go to Lusaka, the
capital of Zambia, to lobby in this important campaign.

We arrived in Tanzania and expected to travel from there to Zambia, but
we couldn’t find any way to fly to Zambia from Tanzania’s largest city,
Dar es Salaam. The date for the meeting of NAM heads of state was
imminent. It was all very confusing. We were fortunate to meet Older
Sister Maria, the private secretary of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere,
[56] a major African politician, who was sympathetic to Việt Nam’s
struggle. Older Sister Maria suggested we ask if we could travel on the
president’s special airplane.

I went to see the president and presented our problem. He was delighted
to receive our request, and so, the five of us boarded the president’s special
plane. We were even more delighted that Ugandan President Obote[57]
traveled with us. While on the airplane, I sat between the two presidents.
The trip gave us time to talk. When our delegation landed at the airport,
the Zambians greeted me formally as if I were a head of state.

The foreign ministers met first; the meeting of heads of state would
follow. At the foreign ministers’ meeting, comrades from Cuba and
Algeria suggested admitting the PRG. Hectic activity ensued. Some
African countries maintained close relations with the United States and the
Sài Gòn administration. They objected, while other countries had no

position. In the end, the meeting decided that, as a first step, the PRG
could have observer status. This was an important victory.

From that point forward, the PRG’s diplomatic status changed. I was
invited to speak at the meeting of heads of state. Everyone was attentive.
The next day, I went to give my greetings to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
and to President Nyerere to thank them for the support of India and
Tanzania. Many heads of state wanted to meet the Madame Foreign
Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Việt Nam. Notable among them was President Bokassa[58] of the
Central African Republic. He had served as a French legionnaire in Việt
Nam.

The head of state for Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie,[59] was
elegantly dressed as would befit a royal personage. He moved forward in
the midst of a large and obsequious entourage of junior officials. The
appearance of a woman as the foreign minister from a struggling country,
which was the center of world attention, caused the emperor and his
delegation to take notice and even to show some sympathy.

During subsequent years, I always received support from Asian and
African delegations at international conferences. I worked in close
coordination with them, especially on matters related to Việt Nam, anti-
imperialism, and opposition to wars of aggression. Many foreign ministers
whom I knew during those years later became heads of state, for example,
in Algeria, Madagascar, and Mali. These leaders retain good feelings
toward Việt Nam and toward me personally.

In October 1970, I visited Bulgaria, the country of roses. Bulgaria is a
prosperous agricultural country, which produces flowers and fruits said to
be the best in Europe. Comrade Todor Zhivkov,[60] the general secretary
of the Bulgarian Communist Party, welcomed me with great enthusiasm.
During a consultative meeting with the Bulgarian foreign minister, we
received news of the death of former French President Charles de Gaulle.
[61] I returned to Paris in order to represent the PRG at President de
Gaulle’s state funeral. This was a very solemn affair with many heads-of-
state delegations from all continents. After the funeral, I returned to
Bulgaria.

In early 1971, I visited Cuba. Comrade Fidel Castro[62] called that year
the “Year of Solidarity with Việt Nam.” My visit opened with a huge rally
in José Marti Square. I had the feeling that all of Havana was present.
There, Comrade Fidel promulgated his famous, fiery slogan: “Cuba is
ready to dedicate all her blood for Việt Nam!” The atmosphere was
intensely emotional, with everyone shouting: “Việt Nam – Cuba!” and
“Americans out of Việt Nam!” Later, the Vietnamese embassy reported
that it had received thousands of letters from Cuban citizens volunteering
to fight alongside their comrades in Việt Nam. Solidarity with Việt Nam
penetrated every family and every Cuban from senior citizens to children.
The children of Comrade Raúl Castro[63] and Vilma Espín were young,
about eleven or twelve years old. The older son came with his mother to
visit me. He was startled to see my long hair.

He asked: “May I go to Việt Nam and fight?”

I was so touched. “Aren’t you afraid of dying?” I asked.

“If I die,” he answered with pride, “I’ll be a martyr!”

In 1972, the foreign ministers from countries in the Non-Aligned
Movement met in Georgetown (Guyana). Comrade Hoàng Bích Sơn,[64]
the PRG deputy foreign minister, led our delegation to lobby for the PRG’s
full membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. The delegation’s efforts
were such that a majority of nations approved our application at the
conference the following year. In June 1973, at the meeting of heads of
state in Algeria, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Việt Nam was recognized as an official member of the
Non-Aligned Movement.

*

**

It would be a major oversight if I did not mention my visits to the
Soviet Union and China during the years of the Paris Conference.

I cannot remember how many official visits I made to the Soviet Union,
China, and most of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The
governments and the people there consistently expressed tremendous good
will toward Việt Nam. The assistance from the Soviet and Chinese peoples
during our struggle was enormous. I attended rallies held by the
Communist Party, the State, and the people of China at Beijing’s Great
Hall with tens of thousands in attendance, and I joined solemn meetings
with Soviet leaders at the grand Kremlin Palace. Every time we returned
from France to Việt Nam, we stopped off in Moscow and Beijing. We felt
safe and welcomed there, as if we were at home. In those years, the
empathy between us was deep and sincere.

In 1971, the situation on the battlefield became very tense. The mental
battle at the conference table was also tense. By late 1971 and early 1972,
the balance of forces was precarious. The Paris Conference continued, but
as the journalists wrote, our discussions were like “verbal jousts between
deaf people.” Perhaps I can say that this was the worst time for us. At
times, we became especially homesick. I read and reread my daughter
Mai’s squiggly lines. By then, she was eleven years old. She wasn’t even
eight when I left for Paris.

She wrote, “When will you return to us children?”

My husband was still teaching at the Army Engineering School, but his
health had begun to decline. This added to my worries and left me feeling
helpless because I could not be nearby to care for him.

That was my personal mood. I knew that each person in our delegation
had his or her own personal challenges, anxieties, and mood swings.
However, through all this, we always held on to this special point: We
never thought Việt Nam could be defeated. We were determined to achieve
victory. The only question was “When?”

In February 1971, the United States launched an offensive on Route 9 in
Southern Laos to cut off the North-South supply route, thereby hoping to
isolate and encircle our Liberation Army. The Americans’ efforts ended in
miserable failure. From Paris, we sent our reports to Stockholm, Rome,
Montreal, and New York; we described clearly the US expansion of
aggression into Laos. The news spread immediately from those sites to
other countries. At meetings and demonstrations, countless participants
condemned the United States and demanded that the United States stop
escalating the war.

During those days, our two delegations from the North and the South
were terribly busy. We quickly implemented what we called our
“diplomacy coordinated with the battlefield.” More than a month later, the
American and puppet troops were forced to withdraw from Southern Laos
after they had suffered huge military and political losses. Our position was
visibly strengthened. On reflection, I think perhaps it can be said that the
“warriors” in Paris at that time also contributed their small and indirect
part to the victory in Laos that year.

On July 1, 1971, the PRG delegation announced its Seven-Point
Program.[65] The points included withdrawal of all US troops in concert
with the release of political prisoners and the Sài Gòn administration’s
acceptance of a new administration ready to discuss with the PRG the
establishment of a National Reconciliation Government. In this way, we
separated the contentious aspects of US withdrawal from the political
issues involving the South. Here was another wise step.

Diplomacy can work that way. Flexibility can be an offensive. This
initiative had a huge effect by generating positive world opinion and
support from many governments. Washington searched for other schemes.
Kissinger and then Nixon visited Beijing. They wanted to make everyone
think the major powers would resolve the war among themselves; they
hoped to drive a wedge between the USSR and China.

Foreign media covered in detail the secret meetings in Shanghai[66]
between the United States and China as well as China’s public statement to
the effect of, “If you don’t touch us, then we won’t touch you.” I believe
history will remember this “unusual” secret meeting.

Yet nothing could deter our people in Việt Nam’s two sectors, the North
and the South. Indeed, our determination on the military, political, and
diplomatic fronts grew even stronger.

I returned to Hà Nội in the middle of 1971, when we had large floods in
the North. The army and the people struggled to combat the new US air
war and to protect the Red River dikes. The army had to destroy some
embankments protecting Hà Nội’s Gia Lâm District in order to keep the
center of Hà Nội from flooding.

In March 1972, our army and people began a large offensive in three
important directions—the eastern sector of the South, the Central
Highlands, and Quảng Tri - Thừa Thiên Provinces in the northern part of
South Việt Nam. The Quảng Trị Campaign, which lasted until September
1972, was among the war’s fiercest battles.

By early 1972, I was back in Paris and continued attending the meetings
at Kléber Conference Center every Thursday morning. At this time, as
before, the battlefield was tense, while the conference table was also tense.
Our feelings of discontent continued. We did not know when we would
overcome the deadlock; nevertheless, we continued publicizing the
deceptions and endless cruelties of the US-Thiệu administration. We
continued to demand that the United States completely withdraw its
troops.

On January 11, 1972, I received a directive to announce our Two
Points[67]—withdraw American troops and form in the South a National
Government of Concord drawn from three sectors—the PRG, the Sài Gòn
administration, and the Third Force.[68]

By this time, our army was launching a counter-offensive on the
battlefield, while the United States was in a presidential election year. The
American people were demanding that Nixon bring US troops home. I can
say that the PRG’s Seven-Point Plan along with the two additional points
—including the withdrawal of US troops so that the Vietnamese in the
South could solve their own internal issues—were both insightful and
timely as strategic policies. World public opinion and particularly US
public opinion supported this view, whereas our new initiative seemed to
disconcert the Sài Gòn administration. Internal conflict among the Sài Gòn
authorities increased as did the citizens’ hatred for them.

To deceive the American public before the election, the Nixon
administration arranged a so-called political solution for the war in Việt
Nam. The United States agreed with the DRVN to enter into “secret talks”
in Paris. The historic battle of wits between Lê Đức Thọ and Henry
Kissinger[69] began. It could be said that this was the decisive season on
two fronts—military and diplomatic.

Simultaneously, the American Air Force intended to bomb the Red
River dikes during the rainy season’s peak. At that time, the DRVN
delegation spoke out at the Paris Conference against the Americans’ cruel
scheme. We had invited many international delegations to visit and
examine the sites. During that time, Jane Fonda[70] visited the PRG
delegation in Paris and shared a meal with me before leaving for Việt
Nam.

Ramsey Clark[71] traveled with Jane Fonda to Hà Nội. He had resigned
his cabinet position as President Johnson’s attorney general in 1969 in
protest against the US war policy. After returning to the United States

from visiting Việt Nam in 1972, both Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark spoke
with the authority of those who could say, “Our eyes have seen, our ears
have heard.” They said clearly that the dikes protecting the Red River
Delta were not military emplacements, as the US government had
deceptively said in the public media. Mr. Raymond Aubrac,[72] a close
friend of ours in France, encouraged the Vatican and the United Nations to
speak out and stop the vicious US plan to bomb our protective dikes.

The war in our country reached a high point of intensity both in the
North and in the South. The United States bombed the Hồ Chí Minh Trail
twenty-four hours a day. The USA mined ports in the North and blocked
our shipping lanes.

In Paris, we followed the news from Quảng Trị hour by hour,
particularly the battle for the famous Quảng Trị Citadel. We did not
receive specific and timely news, but whatever was announced made our
hearts pound. We knew our warriors were very young, yet we also knew
our troops understood that taking “the land” at that site created the
essential image of taking back freedom and independence for our
Homeland. For that, our soldiers were willing to sacrifice their lives. After
eighty-one destructive days and nights, our troops could no longer hold the
Quảng Trị Citadel, but our troops’ combat spirit showed Việt Nam’s
unwavering determination. We in Paris understood that this spirit was an
important contribution to our struggle at the conference table.

During those days, many American groups—mothers, wives of pilots,
religious leaders, women, and young activists—visited our two
delegations. I remember in particular Martin Fenryder, the leader of a

group with twenty-four American youth. He presented me with a poem,
which he had just composed.

By the end of September 1972, only two months remained before the
US presidential elections, creating an opportunity for us to pressure the
United States into substantive negotiations. Comrade Lê Đức Thọ, special
advisor to the DRVN delegation, brought from home the Paris Draft
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Việt Nam. We
announced the contents of the Draft Agreement, which the Politburo in Hà
Nội had carefully examined.

*

**

From the beginning of negotiations until September 1972, Việt Nam’s
stance had consistently stressed that any “whole-package” solution must
fulfill two basic requirements—complete and unconditional withdrawal of
all US troops from the South and the removal of the Sài Gòn
administration set up by the United States. These two requirements were
inter-linked. However, the Draft Agreement emphasized only the
requirement for complete withdrawal of US forces from the South but
relaxed our demands about political issues in the South.

After examining the Draft Agreement, some comrades in the PRG
delegation raised questions: If the political issues were left to the South,
would we be able to achieve complete liberation? Could we end the war?
Experience in Laos after the 1962 Geneva Agreement had shown that a
multi-sided coalition government led to civil war. Would that same
dynamic play out in Việt Nam? What would happen to the tens of

thousands of our brothers and sisters who were political prisoners? Could
we guarantee their safe release? What would be the appearance and
situation in the South after the American troops left?

We spent several days in discussions. Yet ultimately we all agreed that
total American withdrawal from the South was the crucial issue.

For more than two months, DRVN Adviser Lê Đức Thọ and Minister
Xuân Thủy engaged in “fiery” debates with Henry Kissinger, President
Nixon’s national security adviser, regarding the Draft Paris Agreement. At
that time, international public opinion, especially in Paris, described
National Security Adviser Kissinger as a wise diplomat with experience in
political negotiations. People often ask if I ever met with Kissinger. The
truth is that I met him many times but only “indirectly” during the debate
between the two special advisers (Kissinger and Lê Đức Thọ) in reference
to the PRG’s positions. Kissinger and I spoke directly with each other only
once, after the Paris Agreement had been signed. We lifted our champagne
glasses and toasted each other, celebrating peace!

By early October 1972, the two sides (the DRVN and the United States)
had agreed on a basic draft. They set October 30 as the date for signing the
Paris Peace Agreement on Ending the War. Our two delegations were
frantically busy during those days. Our delegation from the South
increased its external relations and press releases in order to clarify our
position and foil the enemy’s diehard efforts to prolong the war.
Representatives from many countries were anxious to know the outcome
of the “secret” talks. We were both excited and worried.

As anticipated, in early November 1972, Nixon won the election. In
successive, deceitful moves, he demanded changes to the Agreement’s

content. In an effort to force Việt Nam to accept his changes, Nixon
instigated vicious bombing of Hà Nội and Hải Phòng for twelve days and
nights, from December 18 until December 29, 1972.[73]

We were terribly worried when we heard the Americans were using B-
52 strategic bombers in raids against our capital and our major cities. The
B-52s were the Americans’ most modern carpet bombers. They flew at a
height of ten kilometers and in the company of a phalanx of fighter jets.
Their radar-jamming equipment made them difficult to detect and,
therefore, made it harder for our missiles to hit their targets. Our friends in
France and other countries all worried about us. They wondered: This
time, could we resist? This was the Americans’ most decisive and
treacherous thrashing. On December 21, in protest, we announced
cessation of the negotiations.

Those were incredibly stressful days.

We followed the situation at home very closely. We heard that our
troops had shot down a B-52 at Hải Phòng, and then we heard they had
shot one down at Hà Nội, and then the list continued: Our soldiers shot
down one, two, three, and more B-52s. We were beside ourselves with joy.
We were convinced our courageous army and people would defeat the
enemy’s savage bombardment.

In addition to our general anxiety, all of us in the delegation,
particularly the women, followed the Americans’ assault ever so closely to
know the sites where the enemy poured its B-52 bombs. Did the bombs hit
our loved ones? Were our children still alive? I was beside myself with
anxiety when I heard the Americans had bombed Hưng Yên, a provincial
capital about thirty kilometers from Hà Nội. Had my children survived? I

was so fortunate. Several days later, comrades inside the country informed
me that my children were safe. I breathed a deep sigh of relief!

When I first left Hà Nội for Paris to take part in the negotiations, my
daughter was eight years old, while my son was eleven. I missed them so
much. Every now and then, someone would arrive from home, and I would
receive letters from Khang and our children. Every one of the letters from
Mai, my daughter, would ask, “Mother, when are you coming home?” So
many families were separated during the nine years of evacuation of Việt
Nam’s cities to avoid losses to civilians from US bombs. The deepest wish
of Vietnamese children during that time was to live with their fathers and
mothers.

I was called home on urgent business. En route, arriving in China, I met
Chairman Mao Zedong and a number of other Chinese leaders. Chairman
Mao said: “Why do you Vietnamese comrades react so strongly? At some
point, the Americans will leave.” Since I did not quite understand
Chairman Mao’s point, I made no comment.

In the middle of the night of December 30, I arrived in Hà Nội and
heard the news that the United States had stopped the bombing.

The Americans were bitter when they saw that even all their B-52s
could not dampen our people’s will. The bombing was a US military defeat
with heavy losses of B-52 airplanes, but the political disaster for the
United States was even greater. The whole world condemned the United
States. Even the British government, the closest US ally in Europe, issued
a statement about British “regret” in the face of this US action.

Years later, I learned that in the 1960s President Hồ Chí Minh had said:
“Experience from the Korean War teaches us that the United States will
eventually use their B-52s to threaten us.”[74] From that point, our
military under the direction of the Ministry of Defense, began to research
ways to shoot down B-52s. Indeed, Uncle Hồ was forward looking, and our
army was truly courageous and smart.

On January 21, 1973, I returned to Paris, where the weather was brisk,
sunny, and beautiful. On January 23, 1973, Comrade Lê Đức Thọ and
Henry Kissinger initialed the text of the Agreement. And then, several
days later, on January 27, we four foreign ministers signed the Paris
Agreement. The Americans’ initial demands—“both sides would withdraw
their troops,” that is, American troops and troops from the North would
withdraw in what the Americans called “reciprocity”—met defeat. The
United States was forced to sign a peace agreement with the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Việt Nam. It was
clear that the United States had no other alternative. We had achieved a
momentous victory. The United States had to withdraw completely, while
Vietnamese troops remained on Vietnamese land.

I had a deep feeling of ferocity alongside an equally deep feeling of
serenity, for I assumed that whatever must occur would occur.

*

**

The day of the Paris Agreement signing, January 27, 1973, holds great
historic significance for our nation. Each member of our delegation can
never forget that day.

All the world’s newspapers placed this major event on their first pages.
Across the world, people who loved peace and justice were in a festive
mood as if they were the victors.

On the night of January 26, no one in our two delegations could sleep.
We were all preparing for the work we would do the next day.

On the morning of January 27, 1973, the Kléber conference room was
bright with lights. Outside, thousands of people—our overseas Vietnamese
compatriots, French friends, and friends from other countries—stood
waiting amidst a forest of flags. I felt apprehensive as I walked into the
conference room. At exactly at 10 o’clock, four foreign ministers sat down
at the table. We were the foreign ministers of the Democratic Republic of
Việt Nam (Nguyễn Duy Trinh), [75] the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Việt Nam (Nguyễn Thị Bình), the
United States of America (William P. Rogers),[76] and the Republic of
Việt Nam (Trần Văn Lắm).[77] Each of us signed the thirty-two
documents in the Paris Agreement.[78]

I felt deeply moved as I added my signature to the historic Agreement.
It was as if I represented the southern revolutionary people and warriors
who had accepted responsibility for struggling on the front lines and in the
prisons to raise our flag in dazzling victory. I felt immeasurably honored. I
do not have enough words to describe the endless gratitude I was feeling
for our compatriots and our warriors from North to South. They had
endured every courageous sacrifice in the struggle so that we could
achieve victory that day.

I was remembering Uncle Hồ and feeling thankful to comrades from
the Party leadership, from the National Liberation Front, and from the
Provisional Revolutionary Government. They had believed they could
count on me for this difficult and honorable responsibility. I was feeling
particularly grateful to our Vietnamese cousins in France and neighboring
countries as well as to our international friends, who gave their full hearts
to our struggle. I was feeling indebted to the brothers and sisters in both
our negotiating delegations and to our office-and-support personnel in
Paris. And, yes, as I signed those thirty-two documents, I was thinking
about my family—about my husband and my children.

*

**

In truth, things did not flow perfectly after we signed the Agreement.
The United States still refused to accept defeat. As soon as the American
secretary of state affixed his signature, the United States embarked on its
next scheme. We knew and expected this. Nevertheless, for us, the signed
Paris Agreement was a great victory, a decisive step toward the ultimate
victory that would return to us our re-united nation. The Agreement
reinforced and enhanced the PRG’s prestige among other nations in the
international community.

A month later, on March 2, 1973, an international conference held at
Kléber International Conference Center affirmed the legality of the Paris
Agreement on Việt Nam.

The DRVN and American delegations organizing the International
Conference had argued about the venue. Should the conference be in Paris,

New York, or Geneva? Who would attend? What would be the conference
formalities? Some of those meetings ran until the wee hours of the
morning. In the end, the two sides reached this consensus:

The International Conference on Việt Nam would have twelve
participating government delegations led by their foreign ministers, with
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim[79] as an invited guest. Among the
twelve delegations, our side invited representatives of Hungary and
Poland, while the United States invited Canada and Indonesia. The two
sides—the United States and the DRVN—jointly invited China, France,
the USSR, and the United Kingdom.

A few days before the international conference, I received news that
Mr. Kurt Waldheim, on his own initiative, was traveling to Paris to meet
the DRVN and PRG delegations. He wanted to have an important role as an
individual both at the International Conference on Việt Nam and
subsequently. Our comrades in the DRVN delegation let it be known that
this issue was a decision for the PRG delegation. And so, Mr. Waldheim
came to meet me at our delegation’s headquarters in Verrières-le-Buisson.

During our discussion, Mr. Waldheim told me that the United Nations
recognized the reality in Việt Nam of three governments—the Democratic
Republic of Việt Nam, the Republic of Việt Nam, and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Việt Nam. He suggested
that, afterwards, the DRVN and the PRG could perhaps request observer
status like that of the Sài Gòn administration at the United Nations. He
wanted to know if the United Nations could perhaps assist Việt Nam in
rebuilding the country.

We knew the secretary general of the United Nations had sided with the
United States during the American War in Việt Nam. Surely, his intentions
were not simple. Given that context, we could not possibly accept the
United Nations as a member of the International Conference on Việt Nam
or agree to allow the UN secretary general to serve as the meeting’s
chairperson. Yet to reassure the United Nations, our two delegations
agreed to invite Mr. Waldheim as a special guest at the conference.

When I spoke at the International Conference on Việt Nam, I thanked
the French government for hosting the four-party conference on Việt Nam
and, now, for hosting the International Conference on Việt Nam. With that,
I challenged the American-puppet regime for not seriously implementing
the ceasefire we had signed a month before and for pushing its forces to
occupy our liberated areas. (At that time, we had a great deal of
information about the Sài Gòn army’s plan “to flood territory.”)

Many delegations spoke in agreement. There was one short discussion
about a suggestion from the Sài Gòn administration’s representative to
include his speech as an official conference document, but everyone cast
that idea aside. In the end, the twelve foreign ministers were unanimous in
their agreement to sign the Act on the International Conference on Việt
Nam, which provided international affirmation of the Paris Agreement.

A month before, immediately after signing the Paris Agreement, our
PRG delegation sent Comrade Đặng Văn Thu[80] and Comrade Lê Mai to
Sài Gòn to join the PRG military delegation in the bilateral and
quadrilateral Joint Military Commissions at Tân Sơn Nhất Airport. This
step was in direct accordance with the road map for implementing the
Agreement’s military provisions.

A week after signing the Paris Agreement, we joined the Paris overseas
Vietnamese community in greeting Tết, the Year of the Water Buffalo, for
our delegations’ fifth and last Tết in France. It is impossible to describe
everyone’s joy and pleasure.

Immediately after the International Conference on Việt Nam, in
accordance with Article 12 of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and
Restoring Peace in Việt Nam, the two sides from the South agreed to
“meet to discuss and sign an agreement on the internal affairs of the
South.” Trần Văn Lắm, foreign minister of the Sài Gòn administration,
and I met to prepare for that consultative conference between the two
sides. The first bi-lateral consultative meeting opened on March 19, 1974
at La Celle-Saint-Cloud Palace southwest of Paris. Professor and Minister
Nguyễn Văn Hiếu led the PRG delegation, while Deputy Prime Minister
Nguyễn Lưu Viên[81] led the Sài Gòn administration’s delegation.

Those bilateral talks lasted until their dissolution in April 1974. At the
same time, a fierce war continued between the Liberation Armed Forces
and the Army of the Republic of Việt Nam (ARVN). Bombs continued
their death blows; blood continued to flow. Initially, the enemy occupied
quite a few of our liberated areas, but after a while, we were able to
counter-attack. We had anticipated the enemy’s offensive strategy in
Region 9.[82] We retained our battlefield position and fought with valor.
When I returned home from Paris and went to visit a number of localities
and units, the comrades in the South would tease me: “You comrades
signed the Peace Agreement. We’re delighted with the ‘shreds’!”

During those years in Paris, in addition to other tasks, we—in
particular, Sister Nguyễn Thị Chơn and Brother Phan Nhẫn[83]—received

directives to mobilize the overseas Vietnamese in surrounding countries
and the people who had come from the South to visit France. Brothers and
sisters belonging to organizations of patriotic overseas Vietnamese in
Germany, Canada, Belgium, Italy, etc., met with the DRVN and PRG
delegations to secure reports on the situation in their Homeland and to
help mobilize their friends. We placed great importance on this work.

These days, now and then in my free time, I read my notebooks from
that period, when I kept brief notes on the activities of the NLF-PRG
negotiating delegation in Paris. Unfortunately, I cannot decipher some
words written in my own shorthand and other words written in haste. Still,
I am amazed at the enormous volume of work we accomplished during
those years!

Our delegation held regular meetings with Comrades Lê Đức Thọ and
Xuân Thủy, when we would hear briefings about the military and political
situation at home as well as appraisals of the world situation. We would
also hear new directives from our leaders at home. We were always having
discussions between our two delegations about the direction of our
specific struggle and the content of the presentations we would make at
the negotiating table. We would try to predict our opponents’ responses
and formulate our responses in turn. Of course, we heard reports on our
opponents’ moves and accounts of public opinion in the media,
particularly in the American and Western press. Then we would divide the
tasks for joining various activities of solidarity with Việt Nam in the wider
community. We would attend international conferences, visit other
countries, meet with foreign delegations, host Vietnamese overseas, plan
our interviews with journalists from newspapers and television, and keep
supportive international organizations informed.

Looking back, I find it extraordinary how such a small group of highly
motivated people working closely together managed to accomplish all
these assigned tasks. I increasingly understand the importance of
diplomatic action. Perhaps a wise diplomatic policy had assisted and
expanded the battlefield’s victories in a way that was most advantageous
to our country.

*

**

I left Paris and returned home in early April 1973. The farewell
gathering at Le Bourget Airport, the same airport where I had landed more
than four years before, was an emotional occasion. Overseas Vietnamese,
French friends, the French press, and representatives of countries with
which we had close relationships arrived in great numbers. The UFF
French women embraced me with emotion: “Bình, we’ll miss you,” they
said. “From now on, we won’t be able to see you standing there every
Thursday in front of the journalists at the Kléber International Conference
Center. We won’t be able to call out, ‘Mme. Bình, smile!’”

Surely these friends also knew that I would miss France and my dear
friends. I would miss so many people, in particular the French comrades—
Pierre, Toto, Alain, and others—who were our French security guards and
drivers. The French Communist Party had assigned them to care for our
delegation through all those years of negotiations. I would miss the
overseas Vietnamese who did not spare their efforts and precious time to
improve our situation, people like Uncle Ty, Uncle Khải, Sister Hoàng
Anh, and Dr. Phan. The list could go on and on.

On my way home, I stopped off in Moscow, where three of the Soviet
Union’s highest placed comrades—Podgorny,[84] Suslov,[85] and
Brezhnev[86]—hosted me with great warmth. They conferred on me their
Peace Medal, the Soviet Union’s noblest accolade. Then I stopped over in
China, where I was also received with great consideration. Prime Minister
Zhou Enlai[87] and other Chinese comrades convened a congratulatory
banquet.

At last, our delegation’s greatest happiness was to return home to our
compatriots and comrades. Comrades Lê Duẩn,[88] Phạm Văn Đồng,[89]
and others congratulated us on the successful completion of our mission.
Finally, I could return to my smallest and most intimate group. Once
again, I could be with my husband and children amid feelings of
indescribable joy.

[1] Dương Đình Thảo: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front,” footnote 29, p. 140.

[2] Lý Văn Sáu: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front,” footnote 31, p. 140.

[3] Nguyễn Thị Ngọc Dung: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front,” footnote 28, p. 139.

[4] “Valuable Advice” contains brief comments Hồ Chí Minh made when speaking with

medical personnel on February 27, 1955. President Hồ emphasized the importance of unity, the
responsibility of service, and the need to build an organizational structure appropriate for the
Vietnamese people.

[5] “Retain immutable principles during myriad changes”: Elder Huỳnh Thúc Kháng

served as acting president of the DRVN while President Hồ was in France in 1946 in an effort to
secure membership for the DRVN as a fully independent nation within the French Union. This

quotation, which comes from President Hồ’s parting advice to Elder Kháng, is so famous that
Vietnamese often do not quote the second line: “Take the people’s will as your will.”

[6] Nguyễn Bình Thanh: See Chapter 4, “Forged during the Resistance Against France,”

footnote 22, p. 82.

[7] Phan Bá (Võ Đông Giang): See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States

to Save the Nation,” footnote 16, p. 126.

[8] Xuân Thủy: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States to Save the

Nation,” footnote 37, p. 147.

[9] Official interpreter: Mme. Nguyễn Thị Bình is fluent in French. However, it is common

practice for diplomats fluent in a language to use an interpreter for official situations.

[10] Trần Bửu Kiếm (1921-) was born in Cần Thơ in the deep south of the Southern Region

and trained as a lawyer in Hà Nội. He participated in the seizure of power in Sài Gòn during the
August 1945 Revolution. Trần Bửu Kiếm was a member of both the Communist Party and the
Democratic Party. He took part in the establishment of the NLF in 1969, represented the NLF at
Paris, and then returned to South Việt Nam in 1969 to serve as a minister in the newly formed
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Việt Nam. He held senior
leadership positions in the Fatherland Front (umbrella organization for Party mass organizations)
until his retirement in 1988.

[11] US intervention in Việt Nam: As intended, only France and Việt Nam were signatories

to the Geneva Agreement. However, before the signing, the United States facilitated the return of
Ngô Đình Diệm from three years in the United States to serve as prime minister of South Việt
Nam. On the military side, again before the signing, US General John W. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel
supervised importation of large shipments of military materiel and took over the training of the
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).

[12] “One source inside the country” refers to the senior leadership of the Vietnamese

Workers’ Party, that is, to the Politburo and its chair, Party General Secretary Lê Duẩn.

[13] US heads of delegation at the Paris Conference: Averell Harriman (1891-1986) from

May 10, 1968 to January 1969; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1902-1985) from January to November
1969; Philip Habib (1920-1992), acting head from November 1969 to July 1970; David

Kirkpatrick Este Bruce (1898-1977) from July 1970 to July 1971; William J. Porter (1914-1988)
from September 1971 to February 2, 1973.

[14] Phạm Đăng Lâm (1918-1975), who came from Bến Tre in the Southern Region, had

been foreign minister in the cabinet established by Premier Trần Văn Hương on November 4,
1964 after the murder of Ngô Đình Diệm. When Phạm Đăng Lâm first represented the ROVN at
the Paris Conference, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ (1930-2011) joined him as special advisor. After the Paris
Conference, Phạm Đăng Lâm served as ambassador from the Republic of Việt Nam to Great
Britain and the Netherlands. In that role, Phạm Đăng Lâm occasionally met Võ Văn Sung, the
DRVN ambassador in Paris, at official gatherings in Holland. The two ambassadors were in
phone contact on April 30, 1975.

[15] Bến Tre Province is famous as the origin of the 1960 Uprising described in Chapter 5,

“A Special Front Opposing the United States to Save the Nation,” footnote 13, p. 124.

[16] Phạm Huy Thông: See Chapter 4, “Forged During the Resistance War Against

France,” footnote 34, p. 89.

[17] The National Liberation Front’s Ten-Point Solution: A scan of the Vietnamese

version of “The Complete Ten-Point Solution of the National Liberation Front Regarding a
Political Solution to the South Vietnam Question” with a hand-written date of May 8, 1969 is
available on the web page of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington,
D.C., at this address: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114436. That site includes
the following summary in English: “Announcement of the National Liberation Front’s delegate at
the 16th session of the Paris Conference: The Americans had to unconditionally withdraw their
army, military personnel, weapons, etc. and destroy their bases in Vietnam. The South
Vietnamese would choose their political system through a general election without foreign
intervention. In the meantime, a provisional government including members of all political
groups would be formed. The North and the South would then reestablish normal relations and
negotiate reunification peacefully without foreign intervention. Both would refrain from having
military alliances and foreign military presence in their territories. The North and the South would
discuss the release of POWs. The Americans would have to bear all responsibilities for the
damage incurred in Vietnam during the war.”

[18] “Good weather…”: These are the three elements that, according to Confucian

philosophy, are required for success.

[19] Phù Đổng (Thanh Gióng) is a legendary figure born about 2000 BCE in a village

outside Hà Nội. For three years, he could neither sit nor stand, could neither speak nor smile.

Then he heard the king’s herald announce that the Ân Chinese were invading. Phù Đổng sat up
and ate and ate, growing to a prodigious size. The king outfitted him with an iron horse, iron
armor, and an iron staff. When the iron staff broke, Phù Đổng used a copse of bamboo to defeat
the invaders and then flew off into the sky on his iron horse.

[20] Twelve domestic and foreign policies: The PRG was officially neutral. Unlike the

DRVN, which was clearly allied with the socialist bloc, the officially neutral PRG was eligible for
membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. A scan of “The Action Agenda of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam” with a hand-written date of June
10, 1969 is available on the web page of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington, D.C., at this address: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114437. The
site includes the following summary in English: “The Twelve-Point Action Agenda of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The points include
continuing the war against the Americans and forcing the US to withdraw from Vietnam,
eliminating the government of South Vietnam, creating an inclusive provisional government with
the participation of other political groups, guaranteeing human rights and equality, improving
workers’ lives, guaranteeing the rights of students, intellectuals, businesses, increasing
production, improving cultural life and education, granting amnesty for people working for the
former regime, alleviating the consequences of war, reestablishing normal relations with the
North, negotiating reunification peacefully, establishing diplomatic relations with all countries,
refraining from having military alliances, supporting the independence movement in Asia, Africa
and Latin America.”

[21] Nguyễn Hữu Thọ: See Chapter 4, “Forged During the Resistance Against France,”

footnote 25, p. 84.

[22] Trịnh Đình Thảo: See Chapter 4, “Forged During the Resistance Against France,”

footnote 53, p. 108.

[23] Huỳnh Tấn Phát: See Chapter 4, “Forged During the Resistance Against France,”

footnote 29, p. 85.

[24] Lê Đức Thọ: See Chapter 4, “Forged During the Resistance Against France,” footnote

44, p. 98.

[25] Đinh Bá Thi (1921-1978, given name: Hồ Đản) came from the Central Region’s

Quảng Nam Province, which was later part of South Việt Nam. He became an active
revolutionary before the August 1945 Revolution and regrouped to the North in 1954 in
accordance with the Geneva Agreement. Đinh Bá Thi began working in the NLF diplomatic

corps in 1962. He was deputy head of the PRG delegation and, later, Việt Nam’s first ambassador
to the United Nations.

[26] Nguyễn Văn Tiến was deputy head of the NLF delegation that met with President Hồ

Chí Minh on December 19, 1966. At Paris, he took responsibility for the “meet-and-greet” group
within the NFL-PRG delegation. That group did the day-to-day work in people-to-people
diplomacy, meeting with individuals and organizations in an effort to draw the international
community behind Việt Nam’s cause. Nguyễn Văn Tiến is in the group photograph taken with
President Hồ Chí Minh on October 20, 1962, third row, second from the right. That photo
appears in the back of this book.

[27] Đổ Thị Duy Liên: See Chapter 4, “Forged In the Resistance,” footnote 12, p. 77.

[28] Nguyễn Thị Chơn: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front,” footnote 27, p. 138.

[29] Phan Thị Minh (Lê Thị Kinh): See Chapter 4, “Forged During the Resistance Against

France, footnote 58, p. 111.

[30] Lê Lợi (King Lê Thái Tổ, life: 1385-1433; reign: 1428-1433): In 1418, Lê Lợi and

others, including Nguyễn Trãi, organized a rebellion to liberate Việt Nam from the Ming Chinese
invaders. The struggle lasted ten years until Lê Lợi and his troops achieved victory. Lê Lợi
named his newly liberated country Đại Việt (Great Việt, where “Việt” was the name for the
land’s largest ethnic group) and promulgated his “Proclamation of Victory over the Ngô,” which
Nguyễn Trãi had drafted.

[31] Nguyễn Trãi (1380-1442) is among Việt Nam’s most famous poet strategists. His

“Proclamation of Victory over the Ngô (Ming Chinese),” which Lê Lợi promulgated, is
considered one of Việt Nam’s most important historical documents on political, military, and
diplomatic strategy.

[32] Mme. Geneviève Tabouis (1892-1985) started out as a historian and archeological

researcher. A journalist and newspaper columnist, she moved in the highest social circles of
Great Britain and France.

[33] Nguyễn Minh Vỹ (1914-2002), initially a member of the DRVN delegation and later

one of the deputy heads of the DRVN delegation, studied in Vinh, was expelled for taking part in
student demonstrations, and then was sent by his family to Qui Nhơn on the southern coast to
study. There, he joined up with the Revolutionary Youth in the 1930s. He took part in the August

1945 Revolution and was selected as chair of the People’s Committee of Khánh Hòa Province in
the Southern Region. He regrouped to the North after the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

[34] Trần Công Tường (1915-1990) came from what is now Tiền Giang Province in the

Mekong Delta of the Southern Region. In Sài Gòn, he was consistently at the top of his class. In
1936, Trần Công Tường went out to Hà Nội, where he studied law in the same class with Võ
Nguyên Giáp, later commander-in-chief of the People’s Army. Võ Nguyên Giáp gradually
introduced Trần Công Tường to Party activities. Both men wrote for the communist newspaper,
Le Travail. Trần Công Tường studied law in Paris and then returned in 1940 to defend
revolutionaries in the southern courts. Trần Công Tường was deputy minister of justice in the
DRVN’s first full government. He was a member of the DRVN delegation to the 1954 Geneva
Conference and a member of the DRVN delegation to the Paris Conference. He retired in 1980.

[35] Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was a famous French writer and philosopher, whose

topics of specialty included Marxism but who is probably best known in philosophy for his
theories about existentialism.

[36] Laurent Schwartz (1915-2002) was a famous French mathematician. Initially a

follower of Trotsky, he shifted later in his life toward democratic socialism.

[37] The International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a left-leaning organization,

was founded in Paris in 1946. It has members in fifty nations and territories.

[38] The Union of French Women (l’Union des femmes françaises) is a communist-based

organization established in 1944 out of the French Resistance to advocate for women’s rights and
solidarity.

[39] General Confederation of Workers (Confédération générale du travail), founded in

1895, was a major organizing force for the May 1968 labor demonstrations in France.

[40] Sven Olof Joachim Palme (1927-1986), Swedish prime minister from 1969 to 1976

and from 1982 to 1986, pursued a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War and was often
critical of both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as critical of the apartheid regime
in South Africa. He was murdered on a street in Stockholm.

[41] Sara Lidman (1923-2004), a Swedish novelist, described the lives of the workers and

impoverished families in southern Sweden. She traveled to North Việt Nam during the war and
participated in the Bertrand Russell Tribunal.

[42] Jean-Christophe Öberg (1935-1992) was a writer, diplomat, and Swedish ambassador

to many countries, including North Việt Nam (1972-1974), Singapore, Algeria, and Poland.

[43] The Évian Agreement was signed in March 1962 and took effect four months later,

when the French gave the power of control over Algeria to Algerians, creating conditions for the
establishment of the Republic of Algeria.

[44] Houari Boumédiènne (1932–1978) from the National Liberation Front Party served as

president of the Republic of Algeria from June 19, 1965 until his death on December 27, 1978.

[45] Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1937-) from the National Liberation Front Party has been

president of the Republic of Algeria since 1999.

[46] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) formed in 1961 largely through the efforts of

Yugoslavian President Josip Bzor Tito. The Movement was well-known during the 1960s, when
many former colonies were achieving independence. NAM now has 120 members.

[47] Josip Bzor Tito (1892-1980) was the president of Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1980.

[48] The Bandung Conference: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States

to Save the Nation,” footnote 24, p. 134.

[49] Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi (1917-1984) was the daughter of revolutionary

Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India. She was the third prime minister
of the Republic of India, from 1966 to 1977 and again from 1980 to 1984.

[50] Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (1916-2000) was the first woman to lead a

government. She was premier of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) from 1960 to 1965, from 1970 to 1977, and
from 1994 to 2000.

[51] Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was a key leader of the Indian independence

movement and served as the country’s first prime minister from 1947 to 1964.

[52] Feroze Gandhi (1912-1960) was a journalist, newspaper publisher, politician, and

member of the lower house of the Indian Parliament.

[53] Indira Gandhi, “niece of Uncle Hồ”: After the Vietnamese victory over the French at

Điện Biên Phủ, the DRVN government returned to Hà Nội. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal

Nehru and his daughter, Indira, were the first official visitors hosted by the DRVN government in
Hà Nội. At that time, President Hồ Chí Minh “adopted” Indira Gandhi as his “niece.”

[54] The PRG’s Eight Points: A scan of the Vietnamese version of the “Eight Points” with

a handwritten date of September 17, 1970 is available on the web page of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., at this address:
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114438. The site includes this summary in
English: “Eight points of clarification put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of the Republic of South Vietnam in the 84th session of the Paris Conference: The US had to
withdraw unconditionally from Vietnam. If the US withdrew by June 30, 1971, the revolutionary
forces would not attack American and Allies’ forces and negotiations on guaranteeing safety for
the withdrawing forces and the release of POWs would be commenced immediately. The
Provisional Revolutionary Government would talk to a new government without Thieu-Ky-
Khiem (the three leaders of the government of South Vietnam) about a political solution in South
Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam would choose their political regime through a general
election without foreign intervention. The South and the North would then reestablish normal
relations and negotiate reunification peacefully.”

[55] Lê Mai: (1940-1996), a delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, later played an active

role in the process of normalizing relations between Việt Nam and the United States and served
as deputy minister of foreign affairs.

[56] Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999) was the first president of Tanzania, from

1961 to 1985.

[57] Apolo Milton Obote (1925-2005) led the people of Uganda to independence from

Great Britain in 1962. He served as Uganda’s prime minister from 1962 to 1966 and then as
president from 1966 to 1971 and from 1980 to 1985.

[58] Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1921-1996) was the head of state for Central African Republic

from 1966 to 1979.

[59] Haile Selassie I (1892-1975) was emperor of the kingdom of Ethiopia from 1930 to

1974.

[60] Todor Zhivkov (1911-1988) was general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party

from 1954 until 1989.

[61] General Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970), as provisional president of France, visited the

United States for a state visit with US President Truman in August 1945, several days after the
Việt Minh had seized political power in Hà Nội. Accompanied by US military brass and his own
senior military officers, de Gaulle traveled to the US Naval Academy in Annapolis and then to
the US Military Academy at West Point and then was honored in New York City with a ticker-tape
parade. According to US State Department documents, de Gaulle’s first priority for his visit was
Indochina. During the visit, de Gaulle cemented the political-military partnerships that assured
US support for the French re-invasion of Việt Nam’s Southern Region a month later (September
23, 1945) and the French re-invasion of the Northern Region a year later (November 1946). The
de Gaulle - Truman visit in August 1945 led to US political-military support for the French War
(1945-1954), with financing greater than 75 percent of that war’s costs by its end in July 1954.

[62] Fidel Castro (1926-) led the Cuban communist revolution, which overthrew Fulgencio

Batista in 1959. He served as first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party from July 1961 until
April 2011.

[63] Raúl Castro (1931-, full name: Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz), Fidel Castro’s younger

brother, is first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, president of the Cuban State Council,
president of the Cuban Council of Ministers, and commander-in-chief of the Cuban Armed
Forces. Vilma Éspin (1930-2007) was a Cuban revolutionary and feminist, whose academic
expertise was in chemical engineering.

[64] Hoàng Bích Sơn: See Chapter 5, “A Special Front Opposing the United States to Save

the Nation,” footnote 15, p. 125.

[65] The PRG’s Seven-Point Program: A scan of the Vietnamese version of the “Seven-

Point Declaration of the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Việt Nam” with the
date written by hand as July 1, 1971 is available on the web page of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. at this address:
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114440. This site includes the following
summary in English: “Statement by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam at the 119th session of the Paris Conference: The US had to set a specific date for
troop withdrawal from Vietnam. If the US planned to finish complete withdrawal within 1971,
troop withdrawal and the release of POWs would be started and ended on the same dates. The
Americans had to stop supporting the Thieu administration. A new government would be formed
which supported peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary
Government would talk to this new government about creating a National Conciliatory
Government to carry out a general election. The North and the South would then peacefully

negotiate reunification. South Vietnam would be neutral and establish relations with all countries.
The US would bear all responsibilities for damages incurred in Vietnam.”

[66] The Shanghai Talks between US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou

Enlai ran from February 21 to 28, 1972. Most of the US memoranda from the meetings are now
open (with some sections excised) and available through the National Security Archive, a non-
profit institute, which uses the US Freedom of Information Act and legal pressure to open closed
US government documents. See:
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou/. The “Joint
Statement” (“Shanghai Communique”) is available at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203.

[67] The PRG’s Two Points: A scan of the Vietnamese version of “Clarification of Two

Pivotal Points in the Seven-Point Declaration of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Việt Nam” with the date written by hand as February 2, 1972 is on the web page of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. at this address:
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114444. The site includes the following summary
in English: “The Provisional Revolutionary Government clarified two points in the Seven-Point
Declaration: First, the US had to set a definite date to withdraw unconditionally all of their forces
in South Vietnam. That would also be the date when all POWs and detained civilians (including
the captured American pilots in North Vietnam) would be released. Second, Nguyen Van Thieu
(President of South Vietnam) had to step down immediately. The government of South Vietnam
had to stop the pacification policy, disband the concentration camps, release people detained for
political reasons, etc.”

[68] “Third Force” in this context refers to individual nationalists and nationalistic groups

opposed to the US-backed Sài Gòn administration yet not directly allied with the NLF-PRG.

[69] Henry Kissinger (1923-) served as national security advisor for US President Nixon,

beginning when President Nixon took office on January 20, 1969, and then Henry Kissinger
served as secretary of state from September 22, 1973 until the end of President Ford’s term on
January 20, 1977. (President Nixon had resigned on August 9, 1974 rather than face
impeachment because of the Watergate Scandal. Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded him.) Mr.
Kissinger was the key US negotiator for the private (“secret”) talks between the Democratic
Republic of Việt Nam (“North Việt Nam”) and the United States at the Paris Conference.

[70] Jane Fonda (1937-) is an American actor, writer, and activist.

[71] Ramsey Clark (1927-), a lawyer and US attorney general from 1967 to 1969,

contributed to many of the domestic human-rights milestones during the Johnson administration.
In October 2012, he visited Mme. Nguyễn Thị Bình in Hà Nội and returned to Hà Nội in January
2013 for the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement.

[72] Raymond Aubrac (1914-2012) is famous in France for his daring exploits in the

French Resistance during World War II. In Việt Nam, he is famous for hosting Hồ Chí Minh in
1946, when President Hồ traveled to France for the Fontainebleau Talks.

[73] The bombing for twelve days and nights: By late 1972, Hồ Chí Minh had been

deceased for three years. However, in 1962, President Hồ had alerted the commander of Việt
Nam’s Air Defense to the dangers of B-52s. Through President Hồ’s guidance, Việt Nam’s Air
Defense evacuated children and non-essential workers from Hà Nội to the countryside, where
they lived for nine years. Everyone remaining in the city had access to three bomb shelters—one
at home, man-hole shelters on the streets, and a shelter at work. In July 1966, President Hồ
predicted the United States would send B-52s to bomb Hà Nội and Hải Phòng. US bombing of
Hà Nội (but not yet with B-52s) began a few months later, in December 1966.

Việt Nam’s Air Defense built missile sites with Soviet equipment and developed its own “Red
Handbook” from experiences downing B-52s near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The twelve
days and nights (December 18-29, 1972) is known in the United States as Linebacker II or more
colloquially as the “Christmas Bombing.” The campaign began after colleges and universities
had closed for winter break. Students had dispersed, leaving few anti-war activists to organize
campus protests. Nevertheless, world-wide outrage ensued. The Vietnamese Air Defense – Air
Force shot down or disabled a substantial percentage of the US B-52 fleet plus many of the
accompanying fighter and reconnaissance planes. Thus, the Vietnamese regard the “Christmas
Bombing” as one of their victories during the American War. Their name, which resonates with
Việt Nam’s culminating victory during the French War, is “Điện Biên Phủ in the Air.”

[74] “…use their B52s to threaten us:” In 1962, General Phùng Thế Tài (1920-), who had

just been chosen as Air Defense (AD) commander, had a congratulatory meeting with President
Hồ Chí Minh. President Hồ said, “Tài, have you heard of B-52s? Our current anti-aircraft can’t
touch B-52s. They fly too high. Starting now, as Air Defense commander, you must concentrate
on B-52s.”

“I was stupefied,” General Tài says. “B-52s! I didn’t know what Uncle was talking about.”

Subsequently, General Tài had many conversations with Hồ Chí Minh. In early 1968, shortly
after the Tết Offensive, President Hồ said to General Tài, “Sooner or later, the American

imperialists will send their B-52s to strike Hà Nội. Only when we have defeated the Americans in
that battle will the United States accept defeat.”

[75] Nguyễn Duy Trinh (1910-1985) came from the Central Region’s Nghệ An Province,

which later was north of what became the DMZ dividing the country. He joined Tân Việt (New
Việt) Revolutionary Party, which evolved into one of the three parties that Hồ Chí Minh drew
together to form the Vietnamese Communist Party. At age eighteen, assigned to organize for Tân
Việt in the Southern Region, Nguyễn Duy Trinh arrived in Sài Gòn and, suitcase still in hand,
was caught in the French round-up following the Barbier Affair (1928). He spent the next
eighteen years in prison, including several years on Côn Đảo Prison Island. Nguyễn Duy Trinh
served as the DRVN foreign minister from 1965 until early 1980 and, in that role, was one of the
signatories to the Paris Agreement.

[76] William P. Rogers (1913-2001), a lawyer, had served as attorney general during the

Eisenhower presidency. He was secretary of state from January 22, 1969 to September 3, 1973
during the Nixon presidency. As US secretary of state (equivalent to foreign minister in most
other countries), he was one of the signatories to the Paris Agreement.

[77] Trần Văn Lắm (1913- 2001, a.k.a. Charles Trần Văn Lắm) came from a wealthy

ethnic Chinese family in Chợ Lớn (Big Market), now part of Hồ Chí Minh City. He studied
pharmacy at Hà Nội University and was fluent in French and English. Trần Văn Lắm was elected
to leadership posts in the National Assembly of the Republic of Việt Nam (“South Việt Nam”)
and served as that government’s ambassador to Australia and New Zealand during the regime of
Ngô Đình Diệm. He was foreign minister for the Republic of Việt Nam at the time of the Paris
Conference and, in that role, was one of the signatories to the Paris Agreement. He left Việt Nam
in 1975 and lived in Australia until his death.

[78] Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam: For the text of the

Agreement, see: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/treaty.htm.

[79] Kurt Josef Waldheim (1918-2007), an Austrian politician, was secretary general of the

United Nations from 1972 to 1981.

[80] Đặng Văn Thu (1925-, a.k.a. Đoàn Huyên) came from Quảng Nam Province in Việt

Nam’s Central Region south of the DMZ, which divided Việt Nam after 1954. He was active as a
student revolutionary during the August 1945 Revolution in Huế. He regrouped to the North after
the 1954 Geneva Agreement and served in the army. His 52nd Missile Battalion near Hải Phòng
shot down an A4 Skyhawk attack plane in 1967 and an A7 Corsair II light attack airplane, also

near Hải Phòng that same year. Đặng Văn Thu was the military attaché to the NLF-PRG
delegation at the Paris Conference. He retired with the rank of major general.

[81] Nguyễn Lưu Viên, a medical student in Hà Nội at the time of the French re-invasion,

completed his medical studies during the French War. He was one of the “Caravelle Eighteen,”
whose “Caravelle Declaration” objected to policies of Ngô Đình Diệm. Nguyễn Lưu Viên lives in
Virginia, USA.

[82] Region 9 covered the Mekong Delta and included all the provinces south of Long An.

[83] Phan Nhẫn had taken responsibility for relationships with overseas Vietnamese while

he was a member of the NLF-PRG delegation at the Paris Conference.

[84] Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny (1903-1983) was president of the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet from 1965 to 1977.

[85] Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov (1902-1982) was second secretary of the Soviet

Communist Party.

[86] Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (1906-1982) was general secretary of the Soviet Communist

Party.

[87] Zhou Enlai (1898-1986) had known Hồ Chí Minh in Paris during the early 1920s and

in Canton during the late 1920s. He was foreign minister (and also premier) of China from 1949
to 1958 and, in the role of foreign minister, represented China at the 1954 Geneva Conference on
Indochina. Zhou Enlai served as premier of China from 1949 to 1976.

[88] Lê Duẩn: See Chapter 4, “Forged during the Resistance War Against France,” footnote

43, p. 98.

[89] Phạm Văn Đồng (1906-2000) came from Quảng Ngãi Province in the Central Region

south of the DMZ, which divided Việt Nam in 1954. He studied in the third of Hồ Chí Minh’s
training classes for revolutionaries in Canton during the late 1920s, returned to Việt Nam, was
arrested and sent to Côn Đảo Prison Island. He was released in 1936 during the French Popular
Front. Phạm Văn Đồng went secretly with Võ Nguyên Giáp to Kunming, where they met Hồ Chí
Minh in 1940. All three returned to Việt Nam in early 1941. Phạm Văn Đồng was minister of
finance in the provisional government (August 1945) and vice minister of finance in the first
government (March 1946). He was Việt Nam’s prime minister from 1955 to 1987.

7.

Total Victory

The war raged on, even though the four parties had signed the Paris
Peace Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam.
The National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Việt Nam continued its
work but in a different way.[1] I returned to Hà Nội to continue my
assignment as the PRG’s foreign minister.

Throughout the war, the South was the primary battlefield, while the
North was a huge rearguard. Some years before, Hà Nội had established
CP72[2] to manage and expand the foreign-relations front for the NLF and
particularly to do this after we had established the Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) of the Republic of South Việt Nam.

By the time I returned to Hà Nội, the CP72 office had ten units with
more than two hundred officials and support staff. I was appointed to serve
as the Party general secretary for the staff. We had three comrades as the
deputy foreign ministers: Hoàng Bích Sơn,[3] Võ Đông Giang,[4] and Lê
Quang Chánh.[5] These capable and efficient colleagues were also dear
friends.

The National Liberation Front was located at COSVN (Central Office in
South Việt Nam), our official headquarters at Lộc Ninh.[6] However, we
continued to do the major part of our diplomatic work in the liberated area
of Quảng Trị Province at Cam Lộ, which is ten kilometers north of the
Hiền Lương Bridge over the Bến Hải River (the center of the former
Demilitarized Zone dividing “North Việt Nam” and “South Việt Nam”).
Thus, the headquarters of the PRG Foreign Ministry was only ten
kilometers as the birds fly from the enemy’s military outposts. Were it not
for the occasional, reverberating gunfire, no one would know that we were
right there alongside the enemy. Our military brothers would remind us
that we had nothing to fear. They pointed out that, since we were within
the enemy’s artillery range, the enemy was also within our range.

We built our Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a two-hectare piece of land.
The building, which had been fashioned from painted plywood, had three
rooms in the layout of a traditional Vietnamese house in the countryside.
We used the middle room, the largest, for meeting visitors and receiving
the diplomatic credentials of official guests. To the left of the ministry
building was our “hotel,” where we had housing for guests.

President of the PRG Government Advisory Council, Nguyễn Hữu Thọ,
held official meetings at our Foreign Ministry in Cam Lộ. He met
representatives of the governments that came to present their credentials
as well as other important delegations, among them a delegation led by
Comrade Fidel Castro and another led by Georges Marchais,[7] general
secretary of the French Communist Party.

My colleagues and I in CP72 were very busy with diplomatic work.
Depending on the situation, we would issue statements exposing the

American schemes designed to help the Sài Gòn administration violate the
Paris Agreement. We would use either the name of the National Liberation
Front or the Provisional Revolutionary Government when we described the
cruel effect of these schemes on our people. In addition, we sent
delegations from our mass organizations to take part in international
conferences, where we could mobilize other countries to support the
Vietnamese people and demand that the United States strictly follow the
Paris Agreement. We organized large receptions with performance troups
on anniversaries, in particular on December 20 (the founding of the NLF)
and on June 6 (the founding of the PRG). Our goal was to see that all who
visited the liberated area of Quảng Trị Province received a good
impression of our country and people. Even though our officials and the
local people were very poor, they were rich in personal warmth and
delighted in hosting guests.

My primary work was mobilizing other governments to grant the PRG
formal diplomatic recognition. Before the Paris Agreement, the NLF-PRG
had established diplomatic relations with many governments. By the end
of 1973, thirty-two countries had formal diplomatic relations with the
PRG.

We were extremely active in our efforts to achieve diplomatic
recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic
of South Việt Nam, but we also concentrated on supporting recognition of
governments recently established through their own people’s struggle for
independence.

In January 1972, the government of the Republic of Bangladesh was
formed under the leadership of the great Bangladeshi patriot, Premier

Mujibur Rahman.[8] In January 1973, our Provisional Government
announced its diplomatic recognition and established formal diplomat
relations with the Republic of Bangladesh. Simultaneously, the
government of Bangladesh also recognized and established relations with
the Democratic Republic of Việt Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government. In June 1973, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
Việt Nam opened an embassy in Dacca. The people of Bangladesh were
appreciative of our attitude.

At Sài Gòn’s Tân Sơn Nhất Airport in an area called “Camp David,” the
united military delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of South Việt Nam under the command of Lieutenant General Trần Văn
Trà[9] and, after him, under Major General Hoàng Anh Tuấn[10] engaged
vigorously with our opponents for two full years, until the day of Sài
Gòn’s liberation.

Our brothers and sisters in the united military delegation at Camp
David struggled endlessly to oppose the Sài Gòn authorities’ military
violations of the Paris Agreement. With equal or even greater difficulty,
our comrades (among them my friend Ngọc Dung, by now an army major
in order to carry out her tasks) also had to struggle to their wits’ end to
secure the release of our captured soldiers and two hundred thousand
political prisoners.

In July 1973, the president of our Government Advisory Council,
Nguyễn Hữu Thọ, participated in the Non-Aligned Movement’s IVth
summit in Algiers. I joined the delegation along with several other
ministers and deputy ministers. The summit formally accepted the PRG as
an official member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Many leaders—

including Cuban President Fidel Castro, Algerian President Boumédiènne,
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Cambodian King Norodom
Sihanouk,[11] and other heads of state—came to congratulate President
Nguyễn Hữu Thọ. Representatives from many other countries also
expressed their pleasure in Việt Nam’s victory. They reiterated their
demand that the Paris Agreement be strictly followed, and they affirmed
their continued strong support for our struggle.

After the Algiers conference, President Nguyễn Hữu Thọ and I visited
Senegal, Egypt, and Tanzania to thank our friends for their support during
our struggle. President Thọ received a sincere and warm welcome
wherever he went. At that time, travel conditions for our delegation were
particularly favorable because China had lent us a special airplane.

During our visit to Tanzania, we experienced a minor but amusing faux
pas. When we arrived at the airport, the Tanzanian military band had
intended to welcome our delegation with our national anthem. However,
by mistake, the band played Lưu Hữu Phước’s “Youth Military
March,”[12] which had become the Sài Gòn administration’s “national
anthem.” Our friends were mortified and apologetic. Tanzania and Việt
Nam were so far in physical distance from each other that our friends did
not know which nation used which national anthem. The next day we
visited Zanzibar, a small island off Tanzania. To “rectify” the earlier
situation, our friends organized a military parade. The band played
“Liberate South Việt Nam” with great fanfare.

*

**