Textbook on the Philippine Constitution [Hector S De Leon]

304 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 6

promoting a t least th ree (3) major political parties will, in effect, allow the
format ion of as many political parti es as can win popular support in any
district all over the cou ntry. (see Ar t . II, Sec. 26.}

The pa rty-list m ethod (Sec. 7.) of electing r epresentatives to represent
sectoral interests in Congress is also expected to pave the way for the full
operation of a multi- party system in our country .3 (see Art. VI , Sec. 5[1, 2].)
This system usually exi.sts in the pa rliamentary form of government (e.g.,
Belgium, Switzerla nd ) where there is a sharing ofgovernmental power by a
coalition of parties because no single political party is str ong enough to
exercise control. Coa lition of parties inheres in the multi-party syste m .
British politics is dominated by two parties - the Conservative and t he
Labor.

(2) Experience under the t wo-party system. - The 1935 Constitu t ion
created a n inflexible t wo-party system- the majority party or the party in
power and the dominant minority or opposition party, with the latter
charge d with the t ask of cons tructive "fi~~~J!~~~on:' of the former .4 The
result was a syst em wh ich worked to place political power under the
virtua l monopoly of two pa rties, wh ich were r eally two factions of the same
party, giving rise to wha t has been called a ''.l,ulip~r.f!.Qn.~lr.ul.~' or '!palitics...o£

lle.r.aonalitie.B....an.Q.p.Qt.. cl.id.E1!i.§" in either party which found it unnecessary

to present a distinct political ideology or platform of government.~ By law,
the t.wo par ties monopolized elections and took t urns of governance to the
exclusion of a ll t h e rest. thus per pet uating dynasties on both sides.6

"The very purpo.s~ of the party-lisl is to promote multi-party system. (see Sec. 2, R.A. No.
7941.) The 1987 Constitu tion. however, alth ough it. eli minated the two-party provision of th e
1973 Con:;titution !Art. Xll, C-Secs. 8, 9[2J ther eof.), does not expressly mandate a multi-par ty
system. It merely removes the constraints on a freely evolved party system. Neither does it
prohibit a t.wo-party system. In "a free and open party system ," the people may prefer a two-pa ny
o1· three-pArty system hlter by supporting particular parties and their candida tes. To those who
favor the restoration of the t wo-party syste m, tlw multiple party system is actually a fc1r m of
deception becaus e once the election is over, the variou::; parties which lost or the minor it ies in
Congr ess join t he a dministrat ion party in a coalit ion or a lliance t o stay in power. This ph enom-
enon h as further w~.akened t h e int egrit y of ou r politica l party system and prevented t he growth
of political parties into ideologically-based public institutioM .

There is . therefore, no nP.cd to ame nd the Constitution in order to provide for t he
adoption of a two-party s ys tem. Such system, lis practised in the Un ited States, is not
mandated in the L'S Cons titution. It has evolved ~ the course of time a s a res ul t of a
practica l need and pop u lar preference.

•In a t wo-part.y syst em , t h ere are sma ller parties vying for political power bui th ere are
only t wo big in fluen tial pa r t ies, one being in control oft he political organs of the governme nt,
particularly at least- the executive branch, a nd the other h tiving the second largest share of
political power.

5The principal re ason for party affi lia tion, then and now, is th e personality of t h e
preside n tial standard bearer or party leader a nd his charisma. From t he pra ctical point of
vi ew, i t cou ld likewis e be his win n abilit y and the promise of political p atrona ge.

6F r om t he inaugu r ation of our Republic in 1946 up t o t h e declara t ion of martia l law in
1972, the body politic was alt e rnately u nder the domina nt hold of the t wo existing major
politic~o~l parties, the Nacionalista and the Liberal. Their membership in th e voter~:~' regi s t ra-
tion hoards, etc. (see Sec. 8.1gave them a tremendous built-in advantage over minor poli tical
parties and independent cand idates who did not enjoy t h e same right.

Sec. 6 ART. IX. - CONST£Tt;TIO:-:AL COM:\HSS£0NS
C. The Commission on Election~

The 1973 Constitution adopted a multi-party system but it was amended
in 1981, restoring the constitutional policy under the 1935 Charter of
promoting the establishment of a strong two-party system. Under Section
6, all political parties are given equal opportunities to compete for the
control of the government.

(3) ~;r.j~g.nd demeriJ~. -The two-party system has become a tradi-
tion under the presidential system. If it has worked successfully in ~orne
countries, notably in the United States, there seems to be no reason why it
cannot be made successful in the Philippine~. Our country had become
trained and experienced in the two-party system, making it a formidable
component of our political culture for such a long time.

()!.) On the other hand, the development of more parties makes the
political climate more democratic. This means that political contests
will be open to all groups regardless of ideologies, including the Com-
munist Party heretofore listed as an illegal organization for its advo-
cacy of the violent overthrow of the government. If allowed to compete
in an open constitutional arena, it perhaps would foreswear violence to
capture power. (see Sec. 2l5J.) The greater the number of candidates,
the wider the latitude of choice of the electorate and the less hotly
contested the election than in a two-party system where oftentimes
only two persons vie for the same seat and campaigns become highly
personal, thereby beclouding the real issues involved in the elections.

Cf3·) A multi-party system, howeYer, can lead to ~talemates and
secret arrangements when no single party can obtain a clear majority
in the elections. Worse, the legislature may be so seriously fragmented
that no room for common agreement may be found among the different
pa1·ties. The ] 973 Constitution originally provided for a multi-party

From the declaration of martial law .until th~ ouster of former President Ferdinand

Marcos in February, 1986, the country had a prattically one·party system. The ruling part:•
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), ~:onlrolled almost all elective positions in the go,·ernmer.t

except in 1984 when a number of opposition candidate.;< were elected to t.hc Bat;,;.an;:

Pamban~a.

Tn the May 1:1, 1992 synchronized national and local elections, 10 plllitical p,;,~r;e;.
including two (2) coalitions of fou1· (4) parties fl\'P, LP-PDP, LABAN. KBI.. l.DP. ~PC. PRP.
Lakas-NUCD) present.ed seven (7) presidential teams. over WO senat.orial eanclidat.:,o f(,r 24
seats and numerous bets for congressional and local posit.ion!l- all in all, 87. ~-:-o cana;date;;.

There were 11. candidates (one withdrew on the eve of the election) for Pr..,-:d"nt in the

:vtay 11, 1998 national elections.
In the M~:~y 10, 2004 national elections, the mOl'!:! dominant aili<inr~~. e,;ch of them

composed ofat lea!;t three (3J g1·oups of political parties, included the K·.Jo!i-;\ :.r. ng Katapatan
at Karaha.san para sa Kinabuko.8an lK-4), Alyan..~a. ng Pag·a~<a lPag·a,;a . and Koalisyon ng
Nagka.kaisang Pilipi!lo (K.lllPl. which were rcprcsent.ed by their ;;tand<~rd bearers. namely,

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Raul Roco, and Fernando Poe.•Jr. respectively.
It. is claimed that multi·parties are fit for the parliamentary ~y:Hem where the Prime

Minister is elected by the :-:~embers of Parliament and can only be incompatibly applied to the
p1·esidential system where the President is elected by popular ,·ote. Where there are se\·~ral
p1·esidential candidates, the probability is that the winner may get less than the majority
vote.

:3 0 6 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPI NE CONSTl'rUTlON Sec. 7

system on the theory that with such a system, elections would be
decided on issues and not on personalities. However, the 1980 local
elections spawned several splintered parties. Candidates of several
parties espousing parochial views may draw t he people's attention
away from mor e impor t ant national issues.

(4) Need for a strong opposition party. -In a r eal democracy, th ere is a
need for a strong opposition pa rty to fiscalize effectively the acts of those
who hold the r eins of power a s well as to serve as a channel through which
the people may air their legitimate grievances. Thus, the party system
operates as a means to avoid r esort to violence in order to effect changes
and reforms in government.

SEC. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organiza-
tion,orcoalition shall be valid, exceptforthoseregistered under
the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Party-list system.

(1) Concept. -The part x-.list system is a mechanism of proportional

r£!presentation in the election of representatives in. the House of Repre·
sentatives from marginalized or underrepresent ated national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections. It is part of the electo ral process that enables
!'>mall polit ical pa r ties and m arginalized and un derrepresented sectors t o
obtain possible r epresentation in th e Hou se of Representatives which tra-
ditionally is domi nat ed wit h big political machinery.

(2) Votes cast for political p arties. - Under the party-list system,
people will not vote the name of the nominee of the party-list, hut the party
itself. Political parties which obtain a sufticie nt percentage of votes cast
will be allowed to name th eir r epresentatives to th e House of Representa-
tives. The number of representatives depends on th e total votes obtained
by such pa rt ies. Thus, if a part y r eceived 10% of t he votes cast, it will get
10% of the seats allowed for par ty-list repre::;entatives. The scheme will
give more chances to different parties to be represented in Congress in line
with the constit utional policy to promote a multi- party system.

(3) Sectora.l or functional r ep resentation in stitutionalized. - Votes cast
in favor of a political party, organization or coalition (i.e. , block voting) are
not valid except as provided by t he Constit ut ion under th e party-lis t
system (Sec. 7. ) for the election of t he 20% membership in t he House of
Representative~. The party-list system institution alizes for the first time
sectoral or functional representa tion in the lawmaking body in addition to
territorial r epresentation by congressional districts. (see Art. VI, Sec. 5[1,
2].) The rul e, th er efore, is "no vote cast- no vote count" except on ly votes
cast under th e party-list system.

(4) Voter has two votes. - With t he pa rty-list system, a voter h as two
\'otes; one for the ' district representative and a nother for a pa r ty or or-

Sec. 8 ART. IX. - CONSTITe1'10~AL COl\C\·1TSSICJNS Cl07
C. The Commi:;J<ion on E kctionR

ganization participating in the party-list he wants represented in the
House of Representatives. In the former. he votes for his candidate by
name, while in the latter, he writes th<' name of the political party. The
n ames of the nominees shall not be included in the certified list of regis-
tered participating parties. The nomi nee/s of the parties which qualified by
capturing t.he minimum number of votes will be pror.laimed e lected. 1

(5) Counting o( votes. - The voting shall be at large and not by sector,
hence, all votes obtained by a party regard lb:< Qf constituency shall be
tallied on a nationwide basis. The percentage c,f ,·otes garnered by a party
shall be computed in relati on to the total \ Ote::: ca~t for the par t.y-list.
nationwide.

(6) Allm:ation of party-list seat.<;. -The partiE-s :;ha ll be ranked from
highest. to lowest based on the number and percentagt: of vntes garnered
during the election5. Only a maximum of three' 3 •::c;:,ts may be aHowed per
party. Seat!'i are allocated at the rate of one c 1 · :Oeat pt2r 2<:'r of total votes
obtained. Unallocated seats shall be distributed among the parties which
have not yet obtained the maximum three 1:31 seat:: pro->ided they have
obtainl:!d at least 2<ft, of t he votes. The variance of pE.-rcentage in excess of
2% or 4% (equivalent to 1 or 2 s~ats that ha\"(· already been obtained
respectively) shall be ranked and be the basis for allocating the remaining
5eats.

SF~C. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions regis-
t e re d under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters' registration boards, boardsofelection inspectors, boards
of canvassers, or othe r similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watch ers in accordance with law.

Membership of political parties, etc.
in registration boards, etc.

:-' Under Section 8, it is no longer allowed for political parties, or organi-
zations, including coalitions registered under the party-list system, to be
represented in the registration boards, boards of election inspectors (which
arc in charge of the conduct of elections and the preparation of election
returns), boards of canvassers (which proclaim the winning candidates on
the basis of such returns), or other similar bodies. Such m~m bership is not
deemed necessary to protect their political interest. Political part ies regis-
tered under the party-list'system have no individu al candidates.

The representation of numerous parties in said bodies would lead to
un·~uly proceedings. In view of the constitutional prohibition, such right

' lJnder R.A. ~o. 794: ;Sec. 2. th1m~of ), a party und1!r the party-list system must have
r1:1<:eived "at least two per centum (2<;; J of the total vote;; CH•.,~ for the system" to qualify for a
:<eat for i ts nominee. The minimum thn•::;ho ld prevents th~~ proliferatio n of small political
gr·oup~:; without sub;;tantial support fr(tnl the sector~ they lWek to represe nt. (sec An. VI, Sec.
5.)

308 TEXTBOOK mr THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTfO N Sees. 9-10

cannot be gra nted by law. They a re, however, entit led to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law to protect t heir political interests. All
political parties have thus equal protection. The law shall defi ne t he
prerogatives of the watchers.

SEC. 9. Unless o therwise fixed by the Commission in s pe cial
cases. the e le ction p e riod sb all comme~c-~ uinety dRYs before the
day of election and shall end t.hirty..days thereafter.

Election period.

This section prescribes the election period . l;i shall commence 90 days

befor e the day of election (national or local) a nd shall end 30 days thereaf-

t er. It does n ot, h.o.1~r.. fix. an nn a lter.able .p.eriod..o.f90...dt:J.Y.~ for. .ru:u~.l~

s;ami?aign. 1 ·

The Commission or the Congress, in s pecial cases, may change the ·

duration of t he election period. (Sec. 9.) The limitation is designed t o '

minimize partis an political activities and expensive election contest.

,CJ'_rn.P-~Ig~~~-

The election period is not the sa me a s ca mpaign period. The former
inclu des the 30 days a fte r the e lection while the latter can only be for a
maximum of 9 0 da ys part of which is intended for t.he Commission to
prepar e for t h e elect ion , t he pr inting and distribut ion of formR, appoint-
m ent of mem be rs i n the registra t ion boards, etc. and other preparatory
acts.

tfl'he campa ign period ma y thu s be less t han th e 9 0-day pre-election
p e r i od .2

SEC. J.O. Bona fide candidates for a ny public office s h all be
tree from an y form of harassment and dis crimination.

Protection against harassment
and discrimination.

The Cons ti tution recognizes the right of bona fide candida tes for any
public office to be protected fr om a ny form ofharassment or d iscrimination.
The provision is in li ne with the g uarantee in the Bill of Righ ts that n o
person sh a ll "be denied the equal protection of t he laws ." (Art. III, Sec . 1.)
It is deemed n eceRsary in order to protect th e inter e st of candidates who do

10cceila vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 755, J an. 28 , 1980.
>under th e Omnibus E lection C:ode, the per!od of campaign is as follows: Presidentia l
a n d Vice-Presidential election - 90 days; mt.!mbers of t h e BataRang Pambansa (now Con -
gress) and Local ell'ction - 45 days; and Barangay election - 15 d ays. The campa ign periods
do not include the day before th.: day of the election. (Sec. 3, B.P. Big. 881.}

Sec. 1 ART. IX . ·- CONSTITUTIONAL COMM IS~fONS 309
D. The Commissio n on ,\ud it

not belong to any existing political party. If the State guarantees equal
protection to groupR ofindividuals such as political parties, it is but logical
and a matter of elementary justice that the same protection be made
available to individuals separately, without discrimina tion in any form.'

Congress may, by legislation, provide sanctionHfor this constitutional
provision. It is the duty, particularly, of the executive branch and the
Commission on Elections, to see to it that the above right is implemented.

SEC. 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to
defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections,
plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, sha ll be provided
in the regular or special a ppropriations and, once approved,
shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chair-
man of the Commission.

Automatic release of appropriations.

The rule laid down in the above provision enhances the independence of
t he Commission on Election s. It is obligator y on the pa r t of Congress to
provide in the regular or special appropriations the fun ds cer tified by the
Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding an election,
plebiscite, recall, initiative, or referendum. Once approved. they shall he
released automatically upon certification ofihe Chainna n of the Commission.

D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit com-
posed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be
natural-born citizens ofthe Philippines and, at the time oftheir
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public
accountants with not less than ten years ofauditingexperience,
or members ofthe Philippine Bar who have beenengaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been
c andidatesforany elective position in the elections immediately
prece ding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of
the Commission belong to the same profession.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be ap-
pointedby the President with the consent ofthe Commission on
Appointments for a term ofseven years without r eappointment.
Ofthosefirst appointed,the Chairmanshall hold office for seven
years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commis·
sioner for three years. without reappointment. Appointment to

1Report No. 1, Committee on Political Parties. 1971 Con:;t.itutio nal Convention.

310 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. I

any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Membe r be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Composition of the Commission on Audit.

It is composed of a Chairman a nd two Commissioners. (Sec. 1[11.) The
1935 Constitution provided for the General Auditing Office under the
direction and control of the Auditor Genera l. Its conversion into a three~
man collegiate body in the 1973 Constit ution is designed to make it more
r esistant to pressures from the legislative and executive branches and
other offices of the government than an office headed by a singl e indi-
vidual.

The increase in membership 1s also deemed necessary to enable the
Commission to cope with its ever expanding audit respons ibility which
embraces every agency of the gove rnment a nd encompasses every govern-
mental activity.

Qualifications of members.

They a re the following:

( 1) They must be natural-born citizens of the Philippin es;

(2) They must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age at the ti.ne of
their appointment;

(3) They must be certifi ed public accou ntan ts with not less tha n ten
(10) years of auditing experience or members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years; a nd

(4) They must not have been candidates for any electi ve position in the
elections preceding their appointment.

The r equirement that the members should either be a CPA or a lawyer
is in order to enable them to carry out their functions and duties efficiently
and intelligently without relying merely upon t heir subordina te employ-
ees. The very nature of their functions calls for competence both in the field
of law and accountancy. At no time, therefore, sha11 all members of the
Commission belong to the same profession .

Appointment and terms of office.

The Chairman and the Commissioners a r e appointed by the Pr.esident
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of s even
(7) years without reappointment. The Commissioners first a ppointe d for a
term of less than seven (7) years are likewise ineligible for reappointment.

The Constitution also provides for the rotation of the appointments at
regular and fixed intervals of two (2) years. A member appointed to any
vacancy s hall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.

Sec. 2 ART. IX.·- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISS£0NS 311
D. The Commission on Audit

The. appointment or designation of any member in a tempo1·ary or
acting capacity is similarly prohibited.1(Sec. 1[2].)

Purpose of the Commission.

The .Co.mmission on Audit has been establi..hed ai aR iRd9p91HlQnt--body
~_Sf}_e_ tQi!:.!h.~.:t govern.menU:e.Y.e.Due.s and expenditures are duly account.Qd

lor an.d th.e..publiU.JJD.it'5 .are...not.disposed of except in conformity wjth the..
ilJH'P9Se.fq_r .which s\lcbJ\m.~.have..heen..ap.J:U:Qp.riate.d. It is obvious that

Congress itself is not in a position to oversee and supervise the actual
expenditure of each and every appropriation. (see Art. VI, Sec. 29( 1}.) That

is where the Commission on Audit comes in. Envisioned as the fearless and
efficient guardian of the public treasury, it is this office through which the
people may be able to know whether or not the agencies of the government
have used their money properly and honestly, in accordance with law and
due regard to economy and efficiency.

The overriding objective is to make the accountability of publ~c officers

entrusted with receipt, custody or disposal of public funds a reality. The
importance, therefore, of the Commission on Audit cannot be overesti-

mated.

SEC. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or -controlled corporations with original charters, and on a
post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and
offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (h) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(e) other government-owned or -controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries; and (sl} such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control sys-
tem of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission
may adopt such measures, including temporary or special
pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts ofthe Govern-
ment and, for such period as may be provided by law, pre-
serve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining
thereto.

;See Note 3. under R-SP-rtion 1.

312 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILLPPIN.I<~ CONSTT'J'UTIO!\ Sec. 2

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, sul1ject
to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the techniques and methods re-
quired therefor, and -promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disal-
lowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive , extravagant, or
·· unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties.

Powers and functions of the Commission.

They are the followi ng:

( 1) I .a exam.in.e.. audi:t.... Md.~t.t.k..Q.~9..QJJ../11§. ·-· The Commission on Audit
has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all ac-
counts pertaining to:

(,). The revenue and receipts ofihe government or any of its subdi-
visions, agencies or instrumentalities, including on a post-audit basis
the four (4) classes of entities mentioned; and

(j~l) All expenditu res or us es offunds and property owned or held in
trus{ by, or pertaining to tbe government, etc. 1

Where the 'internal control system of the audited agencies are in-
adequate, the Commission is empowered to adopt measures to correct the
deficiencies. (Sec. 2[1].) There is an auditing unit in every government
office, agency, subdivision, or instrumentality all over the country;

(2) Ta.. a.c.t .as.££n.t.rru..£tr:..c..cu!!?:.~i11:g.9mc.~..Qf the government. -The Com-

mission on Audit keeps the general accounts of the gov~"i-~ment and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other
supporting papers pertaining thereto. (lbid.j Thus, th e Commission is
made the official custodian of all government records of accounts. By this
arrangement, the Commission is able to maintain a system of accounts
that records all the transactions involving the col.lection of public funds ,
their payments into the treasury, and their expenditures and disburse-
ments;2

'Under Pre&idential .D~!l~ree No. 1445 i.Governrnent Audi ting Code of the Philippines ), its
auciting responsibility includes non-gove rnmental entities subsidized by the government
(e.g., firms with outstanding loans from govl'rnment linanci!1g inst it u t ion.;;!, those requi r ed
to pay levies or governmen t ~;hare, t hose which have received coun t.erpa r t funds from the
governm ent, or those partly funded by donations through the gov'!rnment {e.g ., Commission
on Population l POPCOMlJ, th e $;<iu ''ulhority, however, pertaini.ng on ly t.o the audit oftho:-;e
funds or subsidies coming from or through the government. Upon direction of the President.
the Commission shall li.kt'wisa l:lXt'rCit<~:! visit.orial authority O\·er non-gove1·nmenta! entities
whose loans are guaranteed by th e gvve rnmcnt, provided that s uch authori ty shall pertain
only to at::dit of the governmant't~ co ntingeni liability. (Sec. 29 thereof: see Pres. Decree No.
898.}

tv.G. Sinco, op. cit.. p. :399.

Sec. 2 ART. TX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIO:-\S 313
D. The Commission on Audit

(3) l:o.cJ.e[il}e the scope of.its ~ud_U_Q._!J:_d examiT].g_tion.. ~tc. -The Com-
mission has exclusive authority to define the !":cope of its audit and exami-
nation and establish the techniques and methods required thereof. (Sec.
2[2].) This means that Congress is without power to enact laws on the
matter. The aim of the Constitution is to elevate public sector auditing
standards and to make techniques and procedures more effective and
reliable so that they will be at least at par with external auditing in the
private sector. This will require the application of the latest trends and
developments in the auditing profession;

(4) Xo.pmmulga..t_e arcoun~il]g_qi.J...cJ. _g_l!.fl..it_i!.l_g_r.ules anq__rggy.l:illi!l.lHi. -
Such rules and regulations shall include those for the prevention as well as
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive. extravagant or uncon-
scionable expenditures or uses of government funds and p1·operty. (Ibid.)
Under the 1935 Charter, in cases of expenditure;$ of funds or property
which, in the opinion of the Auditor General. were irregular, etc., his duty
was confined to merely bringing "to the attention of the proper administra-
tive officers" such expenditures. So long a~ the transaction was legal, albeit
irregular, etc., unwise or unsound, the Auditor General could not legally
disallow it.

Now, a violation of the rules and regulations empowers the Commis-
sion on Audit to disapprove expenditures of public funds, making it a real
guardian ofthe public treasury. Note that the rule-making authority of the
Commission regarding the matter of preventing and disallowing irregular,
etc., expenditures or uses of public funds is also made exclusive. This is
deemed desirable to remove legislative and executive jnterference in this
atea which may frust.rat~ the very purpose of the Constitution in entrust-
ing the task of preventing such expenditures to the COA;3

(5 J '[Q_submiJ..g_n_an~Italf?ng,_ncig.J.rw...ort _g n.d..~C1ll11111md.m.eaaure.t;. -

It is this function of the Commission on Audit which will enable Congress
to know how faithfully its appropriations laws have been carried out, and
guide it in the enactment of the appropriations law for the following year.
The report to the President will inform him of the manner by which the
departments under him have used the funds allotted to their various
administrative activities and thus enable them to tell whether or not their
administration has been economical and efficient4 (see Art. VIII, Sec. 16.);
and

(6J ];'..Q__p.~rfo.r.rr.J... Qther d_ytie8 and [U1};91iQ!l2t..- Under present law, the
Commission on Audit has .also the function or authority, among others, to
adjust and enforce the settlement of accounts subsisting between agencies
of the governwent; to assist in the collection and enforcement of all debts
and claims, and the restitution of all funds or the replacement or payment

31986 UP Law Constitution Proj~iCt. Constitutional Commis$ions, p. 38.
~v.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 40i.

314 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION S ec. 2

at a r easonable price of pr oper ty, found to be due t he government qr any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities; to compromise or. release
any claims or settle liability to any government agency not exceeding
PlO,OOO.OO; to examine and a udit the books, records and accounts of public
utilities in connection with the fixing of rates of every nature, etc.5 (see A-
Sec. 8.)

l'he Commission on Audit is expressly directed by the Constitution to
~di.t. the books..of.accounts of Congress and publis h annually the itemized
expenditures fox ~?.ch me mber..(Art: VI , Sec. 20 .)

Concept of examination, auditing,
and settlement of accounts.

(1) Congress as the "fund .raising authority"..9f the government raises

money through taxation, bond issues, and other mean s. All the money thus
raised are "covered" or t urned into the government treasury that takes
ch a r ge of their physical custody. The Commission on Audit examines the
r ecords of the treasury sh owing these receipts, checks up the funds paid
into t h at office , and a udits t h e books containing th eir entry.6

(2) T o audit is to adjust; to allow or reject; t o ascert ain; to make a
formal or official examination or verification of a n accou nt or books of
accounts for the purpose of ascertaining their correctnes!'l. They are consid-
ered audited or approved if supported by such writ ten evidence with regard
to t he transaction recorded, as may, in the opinion of the Commission on
Audit, be considered sufficient to establish the correctness of the indi-
vidual entries and the truth of the accounts.

The Commission is not t h e internal audit or of the government. It is
r eally the sole external audit.or of all government depa rt ments and agen -
cies including government-owned or -contr olled corpor ations. · ··

(3) To settle m eans to establish , t o fix, t o free from uncertainty. It
involves the making of a certification of the balances due in favor of or
again st the govE>rnment. Thus, the Commision on Audit is said to settle an
account when after review in audit the same is foun d in order and, hence,
pronounced closed. This is a function which is not performed by private
auditors.

By settling accounts due to or from the government, the COA auditor
r enders a decision on t he legality of claims not unlike t h a t exercised by a
court . His conclusions are not m ere opinion s as in the case where he
conducts an audit.

•s ee Sections :34, 35. :Hi, a n d 38, Presidential Decree N o. 1445 (June 11, 1978J; alRo

Pres idential Der.ree No. 24::! (J uly 9 . 1973) which provides for administrative adjudication of

claims hctween or among government offices.
~. G . Sinco, op. cit., p . 40H.

Sees. 3-4 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 315
D. The Commission on Audit

(4) An account has been defined as detailed statement of the mutual
demands in the nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out of
contract or some fiduciary relation.7 As used in the Constitution, the term
is limited to "something which may be adjusted and liquidated by an
arithmetical process." Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of claims for unliquidated (undetermined) damages.8

SEC. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investmentofpublicfunds, from thejurisdiction ofthe Commis-
sion on Audit.

Exemption of any government entity
or its subsidiary.

All entities of the gover:nm~~t <?r..i_ts ~!!.b§JQ!~ri.~_!? ~·.i.th. i!1vcs.tm..~nt 9f
l!l!.l;>.!i~. funds are subj~ct t.o__a!l~jt a.t:l:Q_~~a.l1}ination by the_.CQ.mmiss!~~_on..
A,!ldit Any law exempting from the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit any such entity or subsidiary in any guise whatever or any invest-
ment of public funds will be unconstitutional and void.1

SEC. 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and
the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report
covering the financial condition ancl operation of the Govern-
ment, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, includ-
ing government-owned or -controlled corporations, and non-
governmentalentitiessubjecttoits audit,andrecommendmeas-
ures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It
shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.

Submission of report to the President
and Congress.

The Commission on Audit is required to submit to the President and
Congress, within the time prescribed by law, an annual report of the
financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions,

7Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 167.
acompania General de Tabacos vs. French and Unson. 39 PhiL :~4: Phil. Operations, Inc.
vs. Auditor General, 94 Phil. 868.

1The late President l!'erdinand Marcos. under hi.> lawmaking power, exempted many
government-owned or -contl·olled entities from COA jurisdiction giving rise to the suspicion
that it was done to facilitate or hide illegal expenditure:> or diversions of their funds and
other assets. Millions ofpesos of government funds from the National Treasury were found to
have been siphoned by the former regime to various corporate subsidiaries which were placed
beyond COA audit.

316 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 4

agencies, etc., including non-government entities, subject to its audit.1 (see
Sec. 2LlJ. )

It is also required to recommend measures to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Government and its s ubdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities, etc. and to submit such other reports as may be required
by law.

- oOo-

1.lt.A. No. 7226 (.March 12, 1992) reqnires the Commission on Audit to submit to Co n-
gress Annual Reports of amounts obligated, warrants issued, and expenditures made in each
municipality, province nnd city by National Government agencies and instrumentalities,
incl uding government.-owncd corporation~; .

Article X

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic ofthePhilippinesare the provinces,cities, municipali-
ties, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as here inafter provided.

Meaning of local government.
The term. loca l g ouernrner:.t r efer s t o a political subdivis ion of a n ation

or s tate which is constituted by la w and has substantial control of local
affairs, with officia ls elected or otherwise locally selected.l

(1) In the Philippines, it refer s tv provinces. cities. municipalities, a nd
b a ra ng a y s . 2

( 2) Congress may, by law, cr eate special rn Nropolitan politi~al subdivi-
sions subject to a plebiscit.e as set forth in Section 10 .

(3) The Cons titution directs the creation of a utonomous regions for
Muslim Mindanao and for the Cordilleras by an organic act to be en acted
by Congress for each autonomous r egion subject to a plebiscite as provided
in Section 18.

Importance of local governments.
A separate article on local governments in the Constitution is a recog-

nition of the value of local governme nts as viable organs for the perform-

1S ee Journal of Local Admi nistration Overseas (July, 19ti2), p. 135.
i!>residential Decr ee No. 557, (Sept. 2, 1974) declar es all t.hen exi;;ting barrio> an d barrioo
t her eafter to be created as barangays. Bar angays, referring to barrios. should no t bE! confused
with barangays, refe r ring to citizens assem blies created unde r J>re>'.iden tial Decree Nos. 86 and
86-A. <see Introduction-E.) The latter wt'lre mere "aggrupations'' tlf n~;; id~·nt5 of a locali ty.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991 <R.A. No. 7160;. tht> barangay, as the ba?oic
p olitical unit, userves as the primary planni n g and implementing unit of governmen t poli·
cies, plans, programs, projects, and activitie~ in t he comm unity. an d as a forum wh erein the
collective views of the people m ay be cr ystallized, expr essed. ttn d ~:onsidered , and wher e
dispu tes may be a micably settled." !Sec. 3R4 t h ereof. ,

3 17

318 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTlON Sec. l

ance of local functions. As local affairs can best be regulated by the people
in the locality rather tha n by the central a uthority, the grant of local
autonomy to local units is considered extreme ly necessary for a more
efficient local government system.3

Territorial and political subdivisions
of the Philippines.

Section 1 defines the territorial and political subdivisions or ty1its of
local government in the Philippines.

Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays are political bodies
corporate endowed wi th power s to be exercised by and through t heir re-
spective local governments conformably with law. Provinces are composed
of several municipalities a nd (in some cases) cities. Cities at·e urban centers
of population. Barangays are units of cities (except a few where there are
no barangays) or municipalities in which they are situated. (see Sec. 4.)

As they are now provided in the Constitution, there must always be
political subdivisions known as provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. The creation of special metropolitan political s ubdivisions and
autonomous regions for Muslim Mindanao and for the Cordilleras by...law
must comply with the provisions of Sections 11 and 18, respectively.

Dual status of local governments.

(1) As pofi ~!g.zL[Jgdies_.CJ.Q.fpgrate. - By statutory provisions, local gov-
ernments are considered political bodies corporate fo r the administration
of the affairs of the community within their territorial boundaries. As
incorporated entities, they are classi fied as municipal or public corpora-
tions and as such possess dual character:

(a).~"!_. th~jr_pub lic .E!'.Bf!Y.~_rn._f!.'l:..e ntg.l~p.e!:.t... - They are agents of the
State, and for that purp~e .~xercise by delegation a part of the soyrrr-
~ty of the State, such as in the impo~ition and collection of taxes,
preservation of peace and order , and the establishment of schools; and

(b) l'Lth? ~t:..P.T'.fiJ.q.,_l,g_pr _c.o.r.J}.tlmlJLJlEPect.. - They are mere legal
entities (similar to a business corporation) performing functions not
strictly governmental. They act as a corporate body for their own
purposes and not as subdivisions of the State. It is in this character
that they operate, for instance, public utilities (e.g., electric, water-
works, etc.) and public markets.

... --(2) U_n..d...e.. ,r.._ly,.,in. -g-"'t-e-·s·-t... - The underlying t est of whether an a ct of a local

government I S a n act in the exercise of a "governmental function" or is a
"corporate act" is whether the act perform ed is for the common good or for

31970 UPLC Constitution Revision Project, p. 700.

Sec. 2 ART. X. - LOCAL GOVERNMENT 319
General Provisions

the special benefit or profit of the corporate entity. 4 For th_e_(i_r~t..i1.C.<!!l.Il.Ql.

~ su e~..~ithout its consent; for the...se~Q nd, it does.ru>.t..e.nj~.immunity frQm

s.u-i··t..5 (sec Art. XVl, Sec. 3.)

SEC. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.

Meaning of local autonomy.

Local auton.<?!!1.X is the exercise of certain basic powers, i.e., police
pow.er~ ·power-of eminent domain, and taxing power (see Art. III, Sec. 9.), by
local govE:rnment units so as to best serve the interest and promote the
general well-being of their inhabitants.1

By express constitutional mandate, enjoyment oflocal autonomy by the
territorial and political subdivisions, i.e., all government units including
the two (2) autonomous regions, is now a basic state policy. (see Art. II, Sec.
25. )

Meaning of decentralization.

& .c:.atrajjzati<?E... is the process of transferring basic powers from the
national to the local government~:; to allow maximum participation of the
citizens in governmental and community activities.2

The degree of local autonomy is dependent upon the extent decen-
tralization is effected.

Reasons for granting local autonomy.

The Philippines remains a unitary State. (see Introduction-B.) How-

•oever, t he State is duty-bound to guarantee and promote the autonomy of

local governments ensure their fullest development as self-reliant com-
~unities and qw~e. them more etfectiye partners in the pursujt of uatj oni;iJ_

devel,o, pment a'hd progress.

The following reasons have been advanced in granting local aut onomy:

(1 ) J.mp_ortg,.nq,~..of..locq,l sq_l.y_(iQ.f!$.. to £q{;ql. pr:.Q.b.lems. - Local res idents
are the persons who can best understand their own problems. They see
their local conditi ons everyday and realize their importance as well as the
urgency of improving them. On the other hand, the national government is
often too involved i.n its own problems to devote its time to local needs;

'A~; a body politic and corporute, every lo c~:~l government unit ~hall exercise its powers as
a political:> ubd~visi nn of the govt~rn mcnt and as a corporat e: ent ity represe nting the inhabit·
ants of it:; territory. (SI!c 15, R ..'\. Xo. i160.'•

'City of Manila v,;. Intermedia.te Appellat~ Court. 179 SC'RA 428 (1989).

'KVoice Primer" l l972 P3mphleu.
2/bid.

320 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHlLIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sac. 3

(2) !Jeedfor orderb.m~JJ.C!ifg_'f!l.gTJ:LO.t:lfJ.r;q./.qffair:l$,..- A hea lthy "division
of labor" and close cooperation betwe en the national and the local govern-
ments result in an orderly management of both national and local affairs.
The national government can devote rnore time to the truly national prob-
lems since the loca l governments are adequa tely empowered to cope with
their own needs and problems;

(3)~esirability of self-reliall!:£4 - Self-reliance is the ability to cope
with one's problems by the use of its own r esources a nd skills. Decentrali-
z ation strength ens this capability of local governments by giving them
greater opportunity to govern themselves. This self-reliance can encourage
civic enthusiasm and initiative for community development with a mini-
mum of assistance from the national government;

(4.l ..jl~ed_for fullest..de.velo_p.me_ut. af.l.oca.l,gou,ernrnents,. - With greater
powers and functions, loca l governments will no longer be restricted in
achieving their goals. They are in fact provided with almost limitless
opportunities to achieve their fullest development. They will obtain for t he
local residents adequate community facilities and services on education,
h ealth, and recreation; and

(5 J L"!-na,t_e..d-~$ire_ fqr. s~tf':gouei,n!!JJll.l:L.- The desire for self-government
has its r oots in the past and has always been a nationa l goal. Filipinos l1sed
to live in s mall, self-t·eliant communities called barangays before the S pan-
ish era. Even the Malolos Constitution stressed the need for local units
functioning "upon the basis ofthe most ample decentralization and admin-
istrative autonomy."J

The purely unitary system was imposed upon us by our colonizers as

politically necessary to have effective control and administration of the

country. While rejecting full federalization, the Constitution has, however,

provided t he maximum local self-rule possibl e, consistent with the policy to

g r a nt genuine and meaningful autonomy to local governments, including

tlle autonomous regions. (see Art. II, Sec. 25.) ....

Note : There is a strong clamor from se veral sectors to amend t he

Constitution to adopt a fed eral system of government. (see Int roducti on-B.)

SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system ofdecentrali-
zation with effective mechanis ms ofrecall, initiative, and refer-
endum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and
all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units.

3lbid.

Sec. :l ART. X. - LOCAL GO\- ER="M ENT 321
G+.~ncral Provisions

Enactment of local government code.

This section requires Congress t o enact a Local Government Code
containing provisions wh ich:

(1) Provide for a more r esponsible a nd accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization (supra_j with
effective m echanisms of r ecall, i nitiative a nd ref~rendum;

(2) Allocate among the differ ent local unit s t heir powers, responsibili-
ties, and resources;

(3) P rovide fo r the qualification s, election. appointment a nd r em oval,
term , salaries, powers, a nd fu nctions, and duties of local offici als; and

(4 ) Provide for a ll other m atters r elating t o the organization and opera-
tion of t he local units.

R.A_ No. 7160, a pproved on October 10, 1991. is pr..:-sently t he Local
Government Code. It took effect on o!l,gnuary 1. 1992.. It applies to a ll local
governm en ts , a n d to the extent therein provided . to ot1icials. offices or
agencies of the national government. '

Mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum.

(1) B.e_call.o[~J; is the legal process by which the registered voters
of a local government unit remove, for loss of confidence. elective local
officials . It is the method of removing persons fr om office by t he subm is sion
of the question as to whether or not they shall be rernC'ved , to the qualified

voters at a n election held for the purpose or at a gener al election.2

The principle u nderlying recall is the ciTecti ,·e and s peedy remedy on
the part of the people to r emove an official who is not performing his
functions to the satisfaction of the people. This reserved power serves as a
constant warning to elected officials against misdemeanor.3 Knowing that
they could be called u pon to face the people and to submit an accounting of
their performance in office, local officials will be expected to d o t heir j obs
with t.h e highest degree of efficiency and in tegrity. (see Art. XI , Sec. 1.)

There are, of course, other modes of terminating the employm ent of a
loca l official.

(2 1tfui.t.ig.JJ.Y.~ is the legal process wher eby the registered votP.rs of a
local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend a ny law or
ordinance4 at polls call ed for t he purpose independently of the regularly
constituted local legislative body.

'Section 4 thereof.
~sec Sections 69-75. Loca l Gon~rn mt>nt Code-.
~The Man ila Times Guide to Con;titutiona l Am ~ndm !!nts 11973 Constitution), pp. 35-37.
•Sec Sec. 120, Local Gove-rnment Cede.

322 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITl.lT10N Sec. 4

(3) JJ~ftr~E:c!.l!:.'!.~ is the legal pro~.;ess whereby the regi:stered voters of
the local governme nt unit concerned may a pprove, amend, or rej ect an
or dinance enacted by a local legi slative body when the question is submit-
ted to them for decision."

All three (3) processes are conducted thr0ugh procedure similar to
election. T ht first two (2) commence with a petition signed by a cer tain
percentage of duly registered voters of the local government unit concerned.
They are then subjected to a poll for approval or dis::tpproval of the voters!'

SEC. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise gen-
eral supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect
to component cities and municipalities, and cities and munici-
palities with respect to compon ent b a rangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.

Supervisory power of President
over local governments.

While the President h as control of all the executive departments, bu-
reaus and offices (Art. VII, Sec. 17.), h e has only the power of general
supervision over all local governments. The President exercises only del-
egated legislative power over local governments .

.Ca.a.tr..ol. has a broader meaning. It implies the power to manage, direct
or govern and includes the power to supervise. Supervision means the
power to oversee the performance of work by a person or gro up of persons
and coordinate their activities in the implementation of one's own or
another's instructions or policies.

The President has no power to interfere in the operation of local gov-
ernments or to set aside decisions of t.heir heads and substitute his own
judgment for the latter except as otherwise provided by law. Note tha t the
power given over local governments is not even "supervision'' but the lesser
power of "general s upervision."

Supervisory power with respect
to component units.

Component cities and municipalities are subordinate to a province
while barangays are subordinate to the city or mu,nici pality of which they
fo rm a part. Section 4 dir ects the provinces (through their provincial
governments) to see to it that the acts of their component units, the cities
a nd municipalities, be within the scope of their prescribed p!•wers and
func tions.

5See Sec. 126, Ib id.
•see Sees. 70, 122, Ibid .

Sec. f> ART. X. - LOCAL GOVERNMENT 323
General Provision;;

Likewise, cities and municipalities (through their city and municipal
governments ) shoulder the same responsibility with respect to their com-
ponent units, the barangays.

This power of s upenision of the superior local units is limited to
insuring that. the acts of the inferior units are within the scope of their
assigned powers and functions as prescribed by law and the Constitution.

SEC. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of r evenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Con-
gress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges s h a ll accrue exclusi-
vely to the local governments.

Taxing power of local governments
constitutionally granted.

(1) f'Jxists _in<J,epen.dently o{..legislatiou - Unlike a sovereign state,
municipal or public corporations (by which local governments are also
known) havelQ.Q..i.D.b~ r~nLPO:\-~L<lLtal'ation. Being mere creatures of the
State, they may exercise the power only if expressly delegated to them by
the national legisla ture or conferred by the Constitution itself.

The above section expressly grants the power to tax to local govern-
men t units. It is in effect a grant of th e power by t he people themselves.
They have now the power, independently of legislation, to create th eir own
sources of revenue (e.g., loans ) and to levy taxes, fees, and charges to
fina nce governmental activities for their localities. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to them. In the past, they could create
them only when authorized to do so by law.

Undoubtedly, this provision enhances the autonomy a nd independence
of local governments. It is quite t rue that the degr ee of freedom possessed
by a local government to determine and implement itl:> own policies depends to
a great extent upon its financ ial dependence on the national government.

(2) ;N.ot a.b.wi.JJ.t.e. -· The t axing power of local governments is not
absolute becaust~ aside froin constitutional restrictions (e.g., taxes m ust be
for a public purpose, uniform, reasonable, etc. ), Congress may still provide
guidelines and ]imitat ions on its exer cise (Sec. 5.) such as prescribing t he
maximum rate of taxes. But such limitations must not dimin ish the au·
tonomy of local government units for it is a basic policy of the Constitution
to ensure their autonomy. 1 (Art. II, Sec. 25.)

:The Local Gove m menl Code delineates a n d limits the t axing powers of the different
local govenun en t un\t(;. It also governs t he appraisal and assessment of real pr operty for
purposes of taxatio n by pro•incc;;, cities, and mt1 n icipal ities as well as the levy, collection
and !idministration of the re al property tax. (Sees. 128·283 thereof.}

324 TBXTllOOK ON THE PHILl PPINE COl'STITUTlUN Sec.c;. 6-7

Other fund sources of local governments are provided in Sections 6
and 7.

SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
detennined by law, in the national taxes which shall be auto-
matically released to them.

Automatic release of share
of national taxes.

The law shall determine what will be the just or equitable share oflocal
government units in the national taxes. Once determined and collected, the
same shall be automatically released to them.

The old system of gra nts allowed local governments to retain a portion
of certain national taxes such as income t ax which were collected in the
local units. This system proved inequitou.<; to rur a l local units where very
little income and sales taxes were coJlected. The grant scheme was later
revised by consolidating a ll internal revenue taxes (i.e., taxes other t han
customs duties) anrt allotting a certain percentage (i.e., 20%) to local
governments. However, the local governments did not rece ive the full
amount allocated by law because the national government through various
presidential decn~es limited the a mount of grants such that they only
received an a verage of a bout 12% from 1975 to 1980.

Section 6 mandates the automatic release of grants to local govera-
ments.1

SEC. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the
national wealth within their respective areast in the manner
provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabit-
ants by way of direct benefits.

Share In proceeds of utilization and
development of national wealth.

It is on ly logical and fa ir to gi ve local governments a share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth (e.g.,
forest, minerals) withi n their respective a reas," including sharing them
with their inhabitants by way of direct benefits (e.g., reduction in the rates
of certain local taxes, fees, or charges by r eason of the consequent increase
oflocal income). The Constitution has in mind local units blessed with rich
natural resources but with little income to meet t heir needs and yet they
were not allowed to participate in the proceeds de rived from the utilization
a nd development of said r esources because they were declared belonging
e ntirely to the national government.

'19H6 L'PL Constitution Revision Projtlct, Local Government, pp. 51-52.

See. 8 AR1'. X . - LOCAL GOVERNMENT 3 <! 5
General Pro\'isions

Now, local governments shall be entitled to receive their equitable
share from the local proceeds as provided in St>ction 7 and they cannot be
deprived of this sharE:! although Congress can provide by law the manner by
which they shall be f>ntitled to receive it.

SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall sen·e for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the fuH term for which he was
elected.

Term of office of elective local officials.

(1) Term limits. - The term of office of barangay officials shall be
determined by law.1 In the case of other elective local officials. their term of
office shall be three (3) years, and they cannot serve for m<.lr~ than three C3)
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not jnterrupt the continuity of the service for tht! fuJi term for which
an elective offici al was elected for the purpose of th e prohibttion again;;t
serving for more than nine (9) years continuously . •::ee Art. Yl. Sees. 4. i:
Art. V11, Sec. 4.)

The three-term limitation refers to term of offict? for the same position
for which the local officials were elected. lt does t~ot include !Succession to
an office. For example, a Vice-Mayor who became Mayor by operation of
law can serve as elected Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms, the first
term by succession not being included for purposes of the limitation.

(2) Reasons. - The prohibition will help eliminate the so-called "politi-
cal wardlordism" in provinces, cities and municipalities which in the past
had been a soun.:e of abuse and, therefore, lawlessness, and give young and
enlightened leaders, who have no formidable political machinery or vested
interests to sp~ak of, a chance t.o be elected. Furthermore, tenure in many
cases has much to do wi.th efficiency of an elective official. Experience has
shown that as the tenure becomes longer, the official becomes more and
.more inefficient because he becomes more isolated from the electorate; and
the knowledge that he will be reelected anyway because he controls the
votes, makes him negleet his duties or indifferent to the needs of his
constituents.

(3) In the case of barangay officials. -The limitation is not imposed by
the Constitution for the reason that the dang1~r that the evil sought to be

1The term was changed from three \3.1years to fi\'e 15> ye!lr~; by R.A. No. 8524 (lo'eh. 14.
1998) which amended Seetion 43 ofR.A. No. 7160, otherwise knl)wn 11!1 the Local Government
Code of 1991.

32 6 TEXTBOOK 0!1< THE PHll..IPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 9-10

avoided will arise is slight. Their powers are very limited and usually their
jurisdiction covers a small area. In the public mind, being a barangay
official is sometimes a sacrifice because he receives no or little compensa-
tion and the position hardly offers opportunities for personal aggrandize-
ment.

SEC. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have
sectoral representa tion as m ay be prescribed by law.

Sectoral representation in local
legislative bodies.

Section 9 seeks to enhance greater participation and representation by
the people in policy-making on the local government level.

The provision is consistent with the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of
Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights) on the role and rights of
people's organizations "to pursue and protect x x x their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means" and
"to participate at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making."

SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or bar a ngay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its b oundary substan-
tially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast .~ a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.

Creation, division, merger, etc.
.. of any local unit.

(1) Conditions. -By legislation or any other act of government having
the force of law, any local government unit may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary s ubstantially altered provided:

(a) The change is in accordance with the criteria (e.g., number of
population, geographical area, income, etc.) established in the Local
Government Code; and

in(b) It is approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite

the "political units directly affected." Where a locel unit (e. g., barangay)
is to be segregated from a parent unit (e.g., municipality), the voters of
both the parent unit a nd the unit to be segregated should be included in
the plebiscite.1

(2) Aim of the provision. - The aim is to avoid the indiscriminate
practice in the past of breaking up provinces into several provinces, merg-

1Padilla, Jr. vs. Commission on .l::lections, 214 SCRA 735.

Stlc. 11 Al-rf. X. - LOCAL GO\'t;H.:-;~tENT 327
General Pro,·i;J·;n:;

ing two or mort; municipalities into one. creati ng new cities, etc., without
any definite criteria. In many cases, the creation or abolition was dictated
less by the economic and social conditions of the loc;ality and more by
political reasons. Since the creation, etc .. art basic to local government, it
is also imperative that these acts be done not on1y by Congress but also be
approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned.

By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will
also eliminate the old practice ofgerrymandering" and minimize legislative
action designed for the benefit of a few politician:;. Hence, it promotes the
autonomy of local government units.

SEC.ll.The Congress may, by law, create special metropoli-
tan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in
Section 10hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall
retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own
local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of
the metropolitan authority that will thereby be cr eated shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.

Creation of special metropolitan
political subdivisions.

(1) Basic autonomy of component citit's and !•:unicipa!iti,•..: r.etaincd.

In view of the criticisms against the inclusion of mt-tropo lit a n gc•wrnm~nts

as a new form of local government, the Constit t:.t~ ·:.'r. . a~ an alternati\·e.

provides for the creation of special metropolitan J:·•.J!itical subdivisions,

subject to approval in a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10. The component

cities and municipahties shall retain their ba.r;ic autonomy and shaH be

entitled to elect their own local executives and !o:-gislative assemblies, ~

jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that wi ll thereby be created

being limited to basic services requiring coordination ; <Sec . 11. l ·

(2) Function limitc~d to coordina ting basic sert,ices. - The metropolitan
authority is not strictly a local government unit but merely an administra-
tive agency to coordinate basic servic~ <e.g., health, hou~ing, water supply
and sewerage, garbage collection, traffic management) of adjoining cities
and municipalities in highly urbanized areas as Metro Manila. Providing
th e basic services together rather than separately will be more cost effec-

··It is the ac t of altering the voting districts !;o that they !lH\ unfairly ar~·an ged for the
benefit of a particular pnrtr or candidate. This practice wa!': supposf:'d to have be~n mitiated

by Elridge Gerry, Governor of Massac huseti:;. lB•1uvier's Low Dictionary..\ In accordance
with this pra<:ticc. if a pro.-inc<:. for instance, were to be given ftvc ,·5 • district.;, they would be
so distributed as to creat(' as many !:lafe dio;trirt~ fnr the ruling pa rty as possible and to crowd
the electorate suspected of minority lea nmg~ in ihe few~.<!'<t po!>~:uble districts without regard
to the requirement~ of gcograph~· and .;:o nv~'ni~nce. '·Taftada and Ft-rnando, op. fit., p. g21. I

.328 TEXTBOOK ON THB PHlLIPPINE CONST11TTION Sees. 12-13

tive because most of them have a mutually r einforcing effect. For example,
improving primary health service and water !'iupply simultaneously will
have greater impact than improving them separately.

SEC. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized , as determined by
law, a nd component cities whose charte r s prohibit their voters
from voting for provinl'.ial elective officials, shall b e independ-
ent of the province. The voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not
be d eprived oftheir right to vote for elective provincial officials.

Component cities and highly urbanized
cities.

(1) A city may be either component or h ighly urbanized. 1 Component
cities form part of the province. Voters of component cities which are under
a province cannot be deprived of thei1· right to vote for elective provincial
officials. (Sec. 12.)

(2) Highly urbanized cities, as determined by law, as well as compo-

nent cities whose charters prohibit the ir voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, are independent of the province (/bid.) in which they are
geographically located. They are not subject to the supervisor y powers of
the province. This is as it should be because of the complex and varied
problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater
economic activity which require greater autonomy. Corollary to independ-
ence is the loss of the right to participate in the election of elective provin-
cial officials since th ese officials do not cease to exercise any governmental
jurisdiction and authority over said city.

SEC. 13. Local government units m ay group themselves,
consolidate or coordinate the ir efforts, services, and resources
for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with

law.

Grouping of local government units.

Section 13 str esses the need for collective action by local government
units for solving common problems economically and effectively. It author-
izes them to: (1 ) group themselves, which in a l~ose sense suggests a
confederation or association of local executives without any diminution of
local powers, or (2) consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and
resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with
law.

1Section 451, Local Gove rnment Code.

See. 14 ART. X. - LOCAL GOVERX:\fF.N'f 329
General Provi.;;ion;;

This provil:ljon stren!:,rthens and promott-s the autonomy and independ·
ence of action of local units in undertaking common activities (concerning
health, flood control, pollution abatement. crime prevention, traffic, and
other services which transcend local boundarieEl) by using economies of
scale for the general welfare of their inhabitants even without assistance
from the national government. The Constitution leaves it to the local units
to decide for themselves the services or functions they can better perform
in concert.

SEC. 14. The President shall pro~;de for regional develop-
ment councilsor othersimilar bodies composed of local govern-
ment officials, regional heads ofdepartments and other govern·
ment offices, and representatives from non·governmental or·
ganizations within the regions for purposes of administrative
decentralizationtostrengthen theautonomy ofthe units therein
and to accelerate the economic and social growth and develop-
ment of the units in the region.

Regional development councils
or other similar bodies.

To further strengthen the local govern~tO-~~=-. :~.t- President is enjoined
by Section 14 to provide for regional developm~r:: council:- or similar bodies
composed of local government officials and h(:,, d,:. _.:- C.t>partments and other
government offices and representatives from th~· r:•:·:1·go\·ernmental org-ani·
zations within the regions. The purpose mu5: ::--:- to effect administrative
decentralization as a means to strengthen tnt- au:.jnomy of the units in the
region and to accelerate their economic anci 5·~·C1al growth and develop-
ment.

In the past; regional or field ag~ncie;;; oft fit- government, created osten-
sibly to facilitate inter·governmental trar. ~ac~ions, served more as instru·
ments of national control, rather than of ~t-:Y:ce to local governments and
communities. Genuine local autonomy r~q·.t!res that the local units con·
cerned should be allowed to participate ir-, the formulation and implemen-
tation of programs and projects admini~tered by regional offices of the
national government which are distinct on each level (barangay, munici-
pality, city or province) of local gove-rnment. For !:!xample, on the municipal
level, the mayor should have a say with respect to proposed services in the
area such as rural health centers, waterworks and irrigation systems,
police and fire protection, schools, and social welfare.

Under certain national guidelines, local executives may be empowered
to appoint field functionaries on each le,·el and to approve programs of a
department as they apply to their respective areas. With greater powe.rs,
the local units can hopefully cope with local problems without being overly
dependent on the services of the national government.

330 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 15

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS*

SEC. 15. There shall he created autonomous regions in Mus-
lim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Creation of autonomous regions.

Section 15 a uthorizes the creation of only two (2) autonomous regions,
one for Muslim Mindanao and anothflr, for the Cordilleras as distinct
territori1ll and political subdivisions of the Republic ofthe Philippines. (see
Sec. 1.) It is intended to meet the demand for autonomy that has been aired
for several years now by Muslims in Southern Philippines and only fairly
recently by some leaders of the Cordilleras in Northern Luzon. 1 It is also
expected to speed up the economic development of the regions.

Section 15 providt~$ the constitutional basis for the existence of autono-
mous regions. Som e quarters have questioned the validity of the creation of
the two (2) autonomous regions (Regions IX and XII.) in &mthern Philippines
for alleged lack of constitut ional basis. The matter is now laid at rest.2

Composition and condition for creation
of autonomous regions.

(1 ) As provided in Section 15, they shall con sist of provinces, cities and
municipalities and geographical areas which share common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social stru<.:tures, and othe r
relevan t <.:haracteri st ic~;;.

*New provisions.

'Muslim Mindanao does not rctcr to the entir" region ()f Mindanao but to areas in the region
which are predominantly populated by Mu!ilims. Only Maguindanao, La nao del Sur, Tawi·Ta wi,
an d Sulu voted "yes" to become an autonomous region . The Cordillera Region is composed of
Benguet, Mountain Province. Baguio City, Jfugao, Kalinga , Apayao and Abra. Kalinga and
Apayao used to be one provinc-~ known as Raling!!·Apayao. RA. No. 48o8. providing for t h e

creation ofthe Cordillera Autonomous Region !CAR). was r~jected !Jy the Cordillera voters in the

plE•biscite hold on March 7, 1998. In the Augus t 14. 2001 plebiscite calleci for by R.A. No. 9140
(June 22, 2001) which amcndl!d R.A. No. 6731 (us amended by R.A. Ko. 9054.), the Organic Act
which crcatod the au tonomous region, only Rasilan and Mara wi CiLy voted to j(,in t.he Autono·
mous Region in Muslim Mindanao tARMMl.

Sec~tions to 14 of Art1cle X are the gt:ner al provisi(l[tS applicable to aU local government
units regar ess ofregions while Sections 15 to 21 pertain only to the two (2) special autonomous
regions. I as only the provincf:' ofifugao t.h1:1t voted for the autonomou;;; region; hence, it bee~:~me
a region f one (1) province. However, since 11 region impliell more t.han one city or province, it is
not constituLionally allow able to constitute 1:1n autonom ous region of only one (1l province.

2 1986 UPL<.: Com;titutio n Revision Project., Local Government, pp. 53·fi4.

Sees. 16-18 ART. X. -LOCAL GOVERNMENT 331
Au t onomous Region::;

(2) Furthermore, the creation of an autonomous region shall be accom-
plished "within the framework of the Constitution'' and subject to the
"national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines." This condition is in effect a declaration prohibiting secession
by any autonomous region from the Philippines or dismemberment of any
territory in derogation of Philippine sovereignty.

SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.

General supervisory power of the President
over autonomous regions.

Section 16 merely reiterates the existing power of general supervision
of the President over local governments. (see Sec. 4. ) This power extends to
autonomous regions and is to be exercised by the President "to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed," consistent with the constitutional policy to
ensure the autonomy of local governments. (Art. II , Sec. 25. )

SEC. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Residual powers vested in the
National Government.

f?.e§idu(ll pQ~,Uers or powers not given by the Constitution or by law to
the autonomous regions are vested in the national government. The reason
for this is that local governments including autonomous regions are mere
creatures of the State operating under the principle of granted powers. In
other words, powers (e.g., national defense, foreign relations, currency,
etc.) not granted to them, either expressly or by implication, are deemed
withheld and cannot be exercised by them.

The retention of residual powers in the national gov~mnwnt is neces·
sary if the "national sovereignty as well as territorial intej?:rity of the
Republic of Philippines" (Sec. 15.} is to be always mainta ined .

SEC. 18. The Cortgress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participationofthe
regional consultative commission composed of representatives

appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi·
sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure
ofgovernmentfor the region consistingofthe executive depart·
ment and legislative assembly. both of which shall be elective
and representative of the constituent political units. The or·
ganic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with per·

332 TEXTBOOK ON THE :PBILTPPJN.t<; CONSTTTUTIO.fli Sec. 18

sonal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority ofthe votes cast by the constituent
unit&in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Enactment and ratification of an organic
act for each autonomous region.

(1) Procedure. - Sect ion 18 states the procedure for th e establishment
of autonomous regions. Congress is mandated to enact an organic act to be
proposed for each autonomous region or the basic law by virtue of which it
shall exist as such, defining its organization and powers. (Sec. 20.)

(a ) In line with the constitutional policy giving recognition to the
right of the people and their organizations to participate at all levels of
social, political and economic decision-making (Art. XIII, Sec. 16.),
Section 18 requires that the organic act mu£>.t be formula ted with the
assil:ltance and participation of a regional consultative commission com -
posed of representatives appointed by the President fro m a list of
nominees from multi-sectoral bodies.

(bl It also requires that both the execu tive department a"'ld legisla-
tive assembly of each region shall be elective and representative ofthe
constituent political units. (Sec. 18, par. 1.)

(c) The intent ion is to insur e t he r epresentative ch a racter of the
regional government whose executive and legislative officials are elected
by popular vote. The proposed organic act shall be submitted to the
constituent units for approval in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective wh en approved by
the majority of t he votes cast in the plebiscite but only th e units votin g
favorably shall be included in the autonomous region. (ibid., par. 2.}

(2) N eed fi>r an organic law. -·There is a need for a charter or organic
law specifically applicable to each particular region, which shall define the
basic structure of government for the autonomou s region . Such law will
allow some f1exibility in the goYernment structure for each autonomous
region, taking into account the peculiar conditions therein and the people's
ethnic, linguistic, r eligious, and other differe nces. It will require some
study and research on the part of Congress in determining the implement-
ing details. Moreover, t he ratification of the organic act, will determine th e
actual commencement of the legal existence of every autonomous r egion
being created.1

1/bid., p . 57 .

Soc.;. 19-20 AHT. X. - LOCAL GOVERNMENT 333
Autonom ouc; Rl·gi «m<;

SEC. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution ·
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Time frame for the passage
of organic acts.

The Constitution directs the first Congress t o be elected under the new
Con stitution after it~ ratification to pass the organic acts for the autono-
mous regions in Muslim ~'lindanao and the Cordiller as (see Sec. 18, par. 1.)
within 18 months from the time of organization of the Senate and the
House of Representativ('s. Thereafter, the organic acts shall be submitted
to a plebiscite called for the purpose for approval by the constituent units.
(see Ibid. , par. 2. I

SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shaD provide for legislative powers
over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of re\'enues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning de velopment;

(6) Economic, social, a nd tourism developme nt;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Legislative powers of autonomous
regions.

The organic act of a n autonomous region sha ll pro,·ide for legislative
powers to be exercised, within its territorial jurisdiction. over the matter s
enumera ted in Section 20. The grant of powers is subject to the provisions
of the Constitution and la ws enacted by Congress. Legislative powers ~r

'.!D~~t.~:t:£)...Q.ther tl:t~!!..t_Q.qs~ em.l.u:ne;rated.. .fr.om_ ~o.s.-ilJ .tQJ.BJ. c.anno.t ~

~.?!:e.t.<.;i-'l~~L~x-~~.Q_t__~'hen authQ.ti~.d._bLLlli as provided in No (9~.

An autonomous re~tion has a lmost complete adminis trative and legisla-
tive autonomy within its jurisdiction owr the ma tters enumerated. For

334 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 21

example, under No . (4), the people can follow their own personal laws and
cu stoms which includo divorce. By making their own educational policie&
(No. 7), they ca n decide on t heir own educational system virtually inde-
pendent from the overall policies laid down by the Department of Educa-
tion, Culture and Sports.

SEC. 2 1. The preserva tion of p~~g~....!P.~-~_rde~. within the
region s shall b e t he responsibility of the lp~.al polic.e...ag~s
which shall be or g anized, maintained, s upervised, a nd utilized
in a ccordance w ith applicable la ws. TheA~~!)~~-~_nd secl,!!jty of

the r egions sh all b e the r espon s ibility of the ~llilnaLG.o.vern.-. .

ID-~~~!..-

Preservation of peace and order
within the regions.

This responsibility is entrusted to the local police agencies to which it
pr operly pertains. To insure its proper dischar ge, such police agencies shall
be organized, maintained, supervised and utilized in accordance with ap-
plicable laws.

The defense and security ofthe regions shall be the responsibility of the
national government. For obvious reasons, only the national government
should have j ur isd iction over such matters.

-oOo-

~rticle XI

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS

(§ECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers ~nd
employees must at all times b e accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and effi•
ciency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Meaning of publi c office and public officer.

t'A public f)fficP. 1-" the right. authority , and du ty created and_sonf~rred

by law1 hy which, for a gi\·en period either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the appointing power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public.

The individual so in\'ested is a public officer.2

Nature of public office.
~ ~_pu})lic.Qffl~~. i.s_g_,eu.bliUc.H,U. <Sec. 1. lIt is not to be understood ag

a position of honor, prestige and powe r but a position of rendering service
to the public.

~~U~11.0L..'.!. prop(?r.ty. The holder of the office may not claim \·ested

right in it which may not be disturbed by legis lation. Any offict' l except
when created by the Constitution ) may be abolished by law unles.r.; the
abolition undermines the security of tenure of me mbers of the judiciary.
(see Art. VIII, Sec. 2, par. 2.)

(3) l!. is_'Y?.t....r:!: ..C...~!~trac[. Consequently, one has no right to 5U€' the

government for the recovery of damages which he may suffer from hi;;
removal from office.3

'The right to hold public office i.- not a natural right . lt. e-;o.;.t;;. "~!~~; :: ~x1 ~t$ at all, only
bEicause and by virtue of .;;orne law expl'e:J>:~ Iy or impli~clly cn·,H ln!J ,)!' •.. n!.-rnng it. 1Aparri vs.

Court of Appeals, 127 SC RA 231, .Tau . :n, 1984; sc(· :Vferhem. P~.:.!'>l:c <)!TicE-" and Office rs; See

64.J
20livcros vs. Vill~tluz , 57 SCRA 163, J\:{ay 30. 197-1.

~v. c. Sinco, op. cit., p. 416.

335

336 TI~XTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINR CONSTITUTION Sec. 1

Meaning of officer and employee.

trf Employee. - when generally used in reference to persons in the

public service, it includes any person in the service of the government or
any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities. This defi-
nition includes officers defined in No. 2.

(2) Officer:

(a) As di~;tinguished from clerk or employee. - it refers to those
officials whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involve
the exercise of discretion in the performance ofthe functions of govern-
ment.

(bl When used with reference to a person with authority to do a
particular act or perform a particular function. - it includes any
government employee, agent, or body having authodty to do the act or
exercise the function in question in the exercise of governmental pow-
ers.4

Public office, a public trust.

The above provision lays stress on the well-known dictum th~t__n~pl.i£
off!_c_~j~_~.e._':_lblic tru~. (/bid,i

(1) fiigttJJjcg,r~.c_e .of (1. constitutio~a{ de,_clcy~a_t}_<!!'-· -Although this basic
concept is already firmly rooted in our system of government and is univc•·-
sally accepted in all democratic go,·ernments, a categorical declaration
thereof in the Constitution is deemed necessary as it will always serve as a
reminder to public officers of the ·'sacred character of their tasks" and a
warning that "violation thereof would be nothing less than a sacrilege."5

(2) §!rJ.!Z!J..a_rrf:.s r<!.quired.!~fplJ:.Qlj~ _s..f'"~--~"TJ.!S- -Any governm(mt office is
a trust tor it is created for the sole purpose of effecting the end for which
the government has been instituted, which is the common good and not for
the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men.6 A public official or employee, therefore, occupies a very delicate
position which exacts from him certain standards which generally are not
demanded from or required of ordinary citizens.

(*) He is, in truth and not merely figuratively, the trustee or
servant ofthe people, and as such. he is enjoined to serve his office with
the highest dE>gree of"responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,''
and at "alJ time1; be accountable to the people." Legality should not be
the sole test of official conduct. The act of a p\1blic official should not

4Arlmini;;tn1tive Code of 1987 (Ext>c Order No. 292.), Introductory Provi$ions, Section
2(14, lfil.

•Report No. J, Committet> on Dutic;; and Obligations of Citizens and Ethics of Public
Otliciah;, 1971 Constitutional Convention.

•sl;!govia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 54;l; Brown v8. Russell, 43 N.E. 160fi; Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-
203R7,Jan. 31,1961.

Sec. 1 ART. XI. - ACCOU~TABILITY 01" PUBLIC 0.1-'FICERS 337

only be legal but moral as we ll. He should be a role m odel of honesty,
competence and h igh standard of morality worthy for emu lation. To a
public officia l who regards public office as a public trust, pover ty with
honor is preferable to riches with dishonor.

(}¥)'As a public servant, he must '"act with patriotis m" having in
mind only t he best interest of the peopl e he ser ves. His love for and
d evotion to coun t ry must be beyond quest ion.

(.e? In the performance of his duties and function s, a nd even in
private life, he must "act with j ustice" by gi,·ing every one his due. H e
must not practice the so-call ed "palakasan ·· system , whereby favor ed
parties are given undue advantage or preference on t he basis of per-
sonal, political and other extraneous considerations.

(p~ In requiring public officers a nd employees to -lea d modest lives,"
the Constitution seeks to make them models of frugality a nd to put a
stop once and for all to the scandalous spectacle in the past when
government officials, especially those occu pying :;ensit ive positions,
practically flaunted their opulence by indu lging in thoughtless wa ste-
fulness a nd extravagance well beyond their known means of income in
the midst of the poverty and want of many of their countrymen.

(3 ) Conflict of inJ:.~.!}fS t .t~ . ~~-·~'!_oiderf:.: - Nor i~ t hi5 a ll. Pub lic interest
demands not only that he keeps fai.th with the tr ust reposed upon him , but
also t hat, like Ceasar's wife , he should be above suspicion. Accordingly. he
should not place himself in a posit ion where his loyalty to the people m ay
clash with his loyalty to hi.s own interest or those of his f amily or his

.1tSSOCi ates.

(4 ) l!n>hibjj(o .~s (!! d.~§_gf.?.i1Ui.fi.!J_ OTL~f.~9:.~fJ. . o{ficiaLs. - It is precisely to
guard the fi duciary natu r e of public office that the Constitu tion places
certain p rohibitions i n the case of the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants u \.rt. VII , Sec. 13.), the
members of Congress (Ar t. VI , Sees. 13, 14.), the member s of t he Const itu-
tional Commissions <Art. IX, Sec. 2.), a nd the Ombudsman and his Depu-
ties. (Sec. 8, par. 2. ) Toget her, th ese pr ohibitions constitute an i mplemen-
tation of t he above pr inciple that a public office is a public trust.

Accountability to the people.

Section 1 enunciates the principle of public accou n tability. It set s down
in unequivocal terms the· mandate that all government officials and em-
ploy-ees , wh ether they be the hi ghest in the land or the lowliest public
servants, s hall at all times be answerable for their miscon duct to the
people from wh om the governme n t derives its powers.:

'Del. A.L. Syjuco, ,Jr.. "Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan," in C.R. Montejo, on the 1973
Consti tution. p. 227.

TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPJNE CONSTITUTION Sec. 1

(I) This mandate more directly refers to those who occupy elective
positions in the government and who are subject to the judgment of the
electorate expressed at periodic elections.

(2) It applies indirectly to those holding appointive positions in the
judiciary. and those who are subject to the supervision and control of the
President 01· his deputies, or the legislature who are in turn accountable to
the electorate.

(3) Aside from direct removal by the electorate and impeachment by
Congress, public officials are held accountable to the people through ad-
ministrative proceedings initiated by administrative superiors and through
criminal prosecutions and civil actions in courts.

The new Constitution in Article XI supplies some of the ways in which
the trust character of a public office may be maintained and upheld. The
princip)e of accountability to the people is also emphasized in the Article on
Local Government. (Art. X, Sec. 3.)

Importance of maintaining public
trust in public officers.

It is essential to the general welfare and necessa.ry to the preservation
of the governmtmt, that public affairs he prope1•ly administered. For this
reason, every effort must be made to insure that the men and women
elected and appointed to discharge its functions are those imbued with a
high sense of puhhc service morality, who consider their positions aR
sacred trusts and not as means for the attainment of power and wealth.

Where the public officers thus chosen are irresponsible, dishonest, of
doubtful loyalty, inefficient or unreasonable, the government itself loses
the faith and confidence of the people. Consequently, the government
becomes ineffective. In such a situation, it is and will be more difficult for
the government to collect taxes, to obtain public cooperation and support,
to secure compliance with its laws and rules, and generally, to respond to
the many, varied, and unending needs and demands of the people. Indeed,
no popular government can survive without the confidence ofthe people. It
is the lone guarantee and justification for· its existence.

In the precise words of a great jurist:

"Popular government is a magnificent three-story building:

the basic foundation is the people;

.sovethreei.gfnirtsyt; story is the Constitution which is the expression of their

the second is the officialdom or a group of caretakers of the edifice;
and in

the third and highest story is found the altar wherein is zealously
kept and guarded the mystic fire which symbolizes the faith of the
people.

Sec. 2 ART. XI.- ACCOUNTABILiTY OF Pt:BLIC OFF'ICF.RS 339

Collapse of the foundation means destruction of the entire building;
collapse of the first story is necessarily the collapse of the second and
third stories and the consequent reversion to the architectonic wisdom
of the people; collapse of the second story - officialdom -because of
the misdeeds or disloyalty, is the demolition of the faith of the people;
and without faith no popular government can ever hope to live and
survive."8

SEC. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members ofthe ConstitutionalCommis-
sions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason1 bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.

Meaning and nature of impeachment.

(1) Impeachmeqt has been defined as a method of national inquest into
the conduct of public men.1

(2) It is essentially in the nature of a criminal prosecution before a
quasi-political court, instituted by a written accusation called -articles of
impeachment,"2 upon a charge of the commission of a crime or some official
misconduct or neglect.3

The trial that follows may or may not result in a con \·ict~on.

Purpose of impeachment.

4~s purpose is to protect the people from official delinqu~ncies or ~1-
feasan~ It 1s, therefore, pr1manly mteuded for the protect!on o th~

State, not for the punishment of the offender. The penalties attached to
impeachment are merely incidental to the primary intention of protecting
the people as a body politic.4

Officials removable by impeachment.

As provided in the Constitution, they are:
~1) The President and the Vice-President;
(2) The members of the Supreme Court;

8Jose P. Laurel, Politico-Social Problems, pp. 23-24.

1The Federalist, No. 65.
2Black's t.aw Dictionary, p. 922.
3Balhmtine's Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 61().
•v.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 374.

340 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 2

r3 l The members of the Constitutional Commissions; and

<4> The OmbudRman.

Removal of other officials.

All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law but not by impeachment. (Sec. 2.)

There are certain constitutional officers who are not subject to im-
peachment because the Constitution has already specified how they may be
removed. The grounds and means for removing the members of Congress
are provided in Section 16(3) of Article VI, of judges of lower courts, in
Section 11 of Article VIII,5 and of officers and employees in the Civil
Service, in B-Section 2(3), Article IX. It is well-settled that members of the
Cabinet are removable at the pleasure of the President.

Grounds for impeachment.

They are asJoHow!'\.:
;') •Ill +i:V\ ' '0\'\c"\

(1) 9uJpg._ble violM~Q_TI:.. 9Lf.IJ:r £o_~Jjtution..:.. - It t•efers to a willful and

intentional breach of the Constitution. Hence, not every violation of the
Constitution constitut!!S an impeachable offense. Violation of the Constitu-
tion committed unintentionally or involuntarily either in good faith or
through an honest mistake ofjudgment is not a ground for impeachment;6

(2) J'.!.:f.a.S.(!n. - It is a crime committed by any person who, owin~
al.tegiance to the Philippines, not being a foreigner, levies war against the
Philippines or adheres to her enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the Philippines or elsewhere;'

(;~) .lkibea.: - I t may be:

(a) Direct bribery. -H_The offense committed by any eublic officer
who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection
with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any
promise or gift received by such officer. It may likewise be committed
by any public officer who shall accept such gift in consideration of the

;By statutory provisions, the Judges (now Justices) of tho Court ofTax Appeals (R.A. No.
1125, Sec. 1. i were likewise removable by impeachment. The~e provisions, however, should
be deemed to have been repeall"d because they conflict with Section 2 above and Article VIII,
Section 11 (supra..) which gives to the Supreme Court the power to discipline judges of lower
courts. Now, the mt>mbers of the CTA are r·emovable in the same manner as the members of
the f:ourt of Apptals. Under Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Dec. 10, 1978), the Presiding
.Jur;ti~:a <tnd Associatl:" Justices oft.he Sandiganbayan shall not be removed from office except
by impea.:hment on the grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution. (now Sees. 2 and 3.) This is contrary to Sections 6 and 7, Article
X of the 1973 Constitution. (now Art. VIII, Sees. '5, 11.)

"Report of Special Committee, House of Representatives on the Impeachment of Pres.
Quirino.

Jv ""l~""''Revised Pt>nal Code, Art. ~l~·d

;-rJr,.w·\;'1:)"~1\1\~ \[\~\a\'~

St>c. 3 ART. XI.- ACCOl:NTAI:liLITY OF P UBLIC OF'FICER:;; 341

non-performance of an official duty or the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime:• or

(b) !!!..direct /;J.J:.ibeil· - The offense commit.ted by a ny public officer
who shall accept gift s offe red to him by reason of his office; 9

(4) Q:._qf!._flnd c_orruption ~ - The phrase cover~ a ll graft and corrupt
practices. (in fra. ) It was not included as ground for irnp f:!achment under the
19:35 Constitution. Its inclusion may be attributPd to tht~ awa reness of t hf:
1971 Constitutional Con,·ention of the widespread graft an d corruption in
th e government at the time:

(5) Qtherl!Jg_!!_ crim e~. -The phrase referg to thnse crimes which, like
treason a nd bribery. are of so serious and enormou::: a natm·e as to affect
the very life or orderly workings of the governmcnt. H> For.i.!PJ?.Ca~b.meni
2!!.Il!Qt>.f1~~ ..".no !.!~.! ma,· be regarded a.s__a_high crime'' Unle.as.. thru:!:.\..~~law
for.Pid.d ~ ng a.nd P.l:!bJ_i~h(n_g it ;.':. and

f6l .fJ.etra::·g_(.q[py!Jfjc:_tiu!}.t. - · This is a new ground for impeachmen t.
It will cover any violation of the oath of office involving loss nf popular
support even if the "iolation may not amount to a criminal offense. Its
inclusion is more of a reaction to past experience t han an exercise in logic.
It was t he consensm in the Constitutional Commission that culpable
violation s of the Constitution. the main ground for impeachment, would
h ardly prosper in Congre;;~ e\'en against an unpopul at President. Official
misdeeds, even of great magnitude (e.g., election frauds, acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth), are sometimE's deemed outside of the coverage of culpable
violations of the Constitution. The new ground serves to s tress the desira-
bl eness of having a President who truly regards publi c office as a public
trust. (see Sec. 1.)

SEC. 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution ofendorse ment by any Member thereof, which
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee. after hearing. and by a major-
ity vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, togeth e r with the

~sec Ibid., Art 210.
~Ibid., Art. 2l1.
tuRcp(•rt of Special Committee. :;upra.
11rv1. Cua derno, The Framing (If the (1935J Constitution of the Philippines, p. 99.

342 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPlm; CONSTITU'I'IO:-;

corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House sha ll be necessary either to affirm a favora ble resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment ofthe Committee, or override
its contra1·y resolution. The vote of each Membe r shall be re·
corded.

(4) In case the vel'ified complaint or resolution ofimpeach·
mentis filed by at least one-third ofall the Members ofthe House,
the same shall constitute the Articles ofImpeachment, and trial
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6 ) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases ofimpeachment. When sittingfor that purpose, the Sena-
tors shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Membet"s of the
Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeac hment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecu-
tion, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeach·
ment to effectively carry out the purpose of thi~ section.

Power to initiate and try impeachment
vested in Congress.

(1) The House of R epresentatives shall haYe the !>ole power to initiate
all cases of impeachment. (Sec. 3[1J. ) Under the 1973 Constitution which
instituted a unicameral legislative body, the process of impeachment was
vested only in the Batasang Pamba nsa. Tt was thus both the initiator and
trier of impeachment cases.

(2) The Senate shall have the sole povter to try all ca!les of impeach-
ment. (Sec. 3r6].) Under the 1935 Charter, t he power to initiate impeach-
ment proceedings was a lso exclus ively vested in the House of Re presenta -
tives, while tho power to try and decide all cases of impeachments, in the
Sen ate. Hence, if the House s hould refuse to initiate or file charges, the
Senate would have no occasion to sit as a court of impeachment. This is also
true under the present Constitutio n.

Sec. 3 ART. XI.- ACCOU~TABILITY OF PUBLIC OFfiCERS 343

Procedure in impeachment cases.

The procedure' is as follows:

(1) Fil_i[!.g.. .oL.v_e.r.ifi.e,d. .C.O!JtP..(Q-.ilJ.t. - To start an impeachment, there

should be a verified complaint (i.e., under oathJ filed against the impeach-

able officer. 'l

(a) If filed by any member of the House or by any citizen, the
requirements provided in subsections 2 and 3 must be observed.

(b) If the verified complaint or resolution is fil ed by at lea..st 1/3 of
all the members of the House, the same shall constitute the -Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall begin immediately. (Sec.

3[4].)

In any case, the Constitution prohib-its the institution of impeachment
proceedings or complaint agains t the same official more than once within a
period of one year iSec. 3(51. '• even for a different ground. The obvious
purpose is to protect the official concemed against harassment for political

reason ~.

( 2) Z:dal b" the Senat_g , -When the Senate sits in impeachment cases,
its members are required to be under oath or affirmation . (Sec. 3[6].) This
is because when the Senate tries an impeachment case, it sits as a court of
justice rather than as a lawwaking body. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the ChiefJustice ofthe Supreme Court shall preside
but shall not vote. ([bid.!

(S) Requirements for condctiqg.. - To convict an officer, the concur-
rence ofa tfe-i1sf2l:faUoTHie 'riie'fiibers ofthe Senate (i.e., 16) is necessary.
(Sec. 7.) Moreover, his guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt
as in a criminal proceeding. If the necessary vote is not obtained, the
judgment shall be an acquittal. The special majority vote is a safeguard
against fal s e conviction.2

Penalty in impeachment cases.

The penalty to be imposed on an officer found guilty of an impeachment

charge i:; limited "to..l~emo.w.fro.DLOffi.c.e ..and. ~.tQ.hold..~

.uffi.c.e...u.n.der_th~. E~1.1.blic.. !?f.the ..J?hilippinu."fi_o pen.al.tY. jQ the fum.. of

.i...~.il?..<?.!E!l_~.!l0.!.Jine_m~y_J>~ iJ!!.Q9_~~~ If a criminal offense has been
committe d, the party convicte d is still liable and subj ect to prosecution,
trial, a nd punishment, in a~cordance with "law," i.e., before the courts.

1Th t! L97:{ C.on,:;tituti on did n ot pr ovide for any spedfic proc~:durt> for impeachment. The

Batasang Pamban,;a had "Rules of Proceduro in Impeachmt>nt Proceedmgs." The House of
Reprcscntariv(•S iElc\·.,nth Con~ress ) has adopted t•n DE'ccmlwr 15. 199o its "Rules ofProce·
durc in Impeachment Pruceedi n~s."

~U nder the 19:~5 C'on;;titution, at least 2 3 \'Cte of all th~ me mbers of the House of
Representatives wa~; required befor e an impeachment proceeding may be initiated and at
lca!'t 314 of all memhers ofthe Senate w a~ necessary before a conviction therein could be had.
Thcl:lc vote pre.;criptions m<~de the im peachment of the President a virtual impossibility.

TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITCTION Sec. 4

Officials who are removable only by impeachment cannot be charged

criminally (or administratively) during their incumbency before any court

with an offense or misbehavior conviction for which carries the penalty of

removal from office. The remedy is to file a complai nt for impeachment,
•~ai. h,lyb!_ffte1J~~ ~!;e~ ~I{~~i~~~~i~~if~·~~~ :J'!i~~~~:i~!~;~~i?-~e,.... ............. ···:r·-c-····-· ·············-·- ·-------- ·-· --·· .... ···-·-····--·-- . . 011
00

_____ ___________ _ ........d.is. bar.m. en..t
pro.c.e-e··d· -in-g··s· ..i..i....n....e.. -i~s...a...l.a. w- .y...e...r_).. for the o.f..fense o r.. _,m. i s b e h a v i o r
,_ ,

nroven to have been committed by him in the impeachment proceeding.

J:... . ..... --· - . - --· ·- - -·····-·· ... ..... . .... - - - -- - - ·-·- - -·-· .-. .. ~ ·------··------

The power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and

pardons does not extend to cases of impeachment. (Art. VII, Sec.•l9. )

Effect of resignation.

:rhe object of impeachment may not only be the removal o(tb&_acp.I_S._(td

_from office bu!_~!~?...l:J:is_.di~~~~ifi.cl1tio_!l_t()_ b.?!~-~~..?£f!.c~ U.nde1· .th~...R~.P.u1b

.lie .of the_Eh_ilippine~. Jle.n.c.e...an HofficiaLwho._ haa_.r.esig_n~.d .before ~.h~­

f.ommE}.lli!.~.ment of or pending th~ imp~~chmen.t ..P.r.o.cee..d.iJ?.gs may_.s.till.Jte

.imp eac~d.

Rules on impeachment.

Section 3(8) empowers Congress to promulgate its rules on impeach-
ment to effectively carry out the purpose of the a bove provisions on im-
peachment.

Congress may adopt any method it deems desirable provided it is
reasonable and gives the accused full opportunity to be heard and to
present his defenses.a In other words, Congress is bound to abide by the
constitutional requirement of due process of law. (see Art. III, Sec. 1.) Of
course, such rules are subject to the provisions of Sections 2 and 3.

SEC. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise itsjuris-
diction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The anti-graft court known
as the Sandiganbayan.

Under the 1973 Constitution, the Batasang Pambansa was directed to
create a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan.1 This court "shall
h ave jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases inv.olving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offen ses committed by public officers and employ-
ees x x x in relation to their offices as may be determined by law."2

~v.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 379.

'A coined term in Filipino which literally means "Support of the Nation."
2Articlc XIII, Sec. 5, 1973 Constitution.

Sees. f>-9 ART. XL- ACCOUNTABILITY OF l-'l'l:\l.lC OFFICERS 345

The 1973 Constitution did not vest in the Sandiganbayan exclusive
JUrisdi(~t.ion over these cases; neither did it limit its jurisdiction to said
catws. ln the exercise ofits legislative power. the Congress could, therefore,
eon fer .~oncurrent jurisdiction over cases invol\'ing graft and corrupt prac-
tices to other courts and give to Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction over other
cases. Under Section 4, the SQ.ndiganbayan "shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may he provided by law."

SEC. 5. There is herebycreated the independent Office ofthe
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed.

SEC. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be.appointed by the
Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.

SEC. 7. The existingTanodbayanshall hereafterbe known as
the Office ofthe SpecialProsecutor. It shall continue to function
and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by
law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution.

SEC. 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-
born citizensofthe Philippines, and at the time oftheir appoint·
ment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and inde-
pendence, and members of the Philippine Bar. and must not
have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman must ha,·e for ten years or
more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same dis·
qualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of
Article IX-A of this Constitution.

SEC.9. The Ombudsman and hisDeputies shallbe appointed
by the President from a list ofat least six nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees
for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require
no confirmation. Allvacanciesshallbe filed withinthreemonths
after they occur.

~This special court, as created hy Presidential Decree !\o. 1606 fDec. 10. 1978, whid1
revised Pre!". Decree No. 148fU, as amended by R.A. No. 8249. is composed of a Presiding
.Tustice onrl fourteen ll4) Associate ,Justices. It. is of the same le-vel as the Court of Appeals. lt
shall <=:it in five (fil divisions of three (3) justices eaeh. The th'e >5 >divisions may sit en bane,
i.e., at the same time.

346 TEXTBOOK ON THF. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 5-11

SEC. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the
rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitu-
tional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary,
which shall not be decreased during their term of office.

SEC. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a
term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be
qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.

Office of the Ombudsman to be known

as Tanodbayan.

(1) Creation. 1 - The Constitution directly creates the Office of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, z categorizing it like the three (3)
Constitutional Commissions (Art. JX.) as "independent." (Sec. 5.) The
Tanodbayan provided for under the 1973 Constitution is now known as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor3 which shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman under Section 13.

(2) Composition. - It is composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one (1) over-all Deputy, and at least one (1) Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The President is authorized to appoint a
separate Deputy for the military establishment. (Ibid.) In view of the rigid
discipline in the military establishment, ordinary soldiers and subordinate
officers may not be expected to file complaints as freely as in civilian offices
against their superiors.

(3) Appointment. - The first Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
appointed by the President from a list of six (6) nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council (which also nominates the members of the Judici·
ary), and from a list of three (3) nominees for every vacancy thereafter,
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
aim is to insulate ihem from the baneful influence of partisan politics.

All vacancies are required to be filled within three (3) months after
they occur. (Sec. 9.)

(4) Qualifications. -They are the following:

(a) They must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines;

(b) They must be at least 40 years at the ti:me of their appointment;

(c) They must be persons with recognized probity and independ-
ence;

'Executive Order Nr.. 24a declares thE' effectivity of the creation of the Offlce of the
Ombudsman on .July 24, 1987, the date of its promulgation.

~A coined term in Filipino which literally means "Guardian of the Nation."
~Executive Order No. 244 declares the effectivity of the creation of the Office of the
Speciall'rosecutor on July 24, 1987, the date of itil promulgation.

Sees . 5 -11 ART. XI. -ACCOUNTABILITY OF Pl'RLIC OFFICERS 347

(d) They must be members of the Philippine Bar; and

(e) They must not have been candidates for any elective office in
the preceding election.

In addition, the Ombudsman must have been for ten (10) years or more
a judge or engaged in the practice oflaw in the Philippines. (Sec. 8, par. 1.)

(5) Disabilities. - During their tenure they are subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibit ions similar to those provided for members of
the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, A-Section 2. (Ibid., par.
2. )

(6) Term of office. - Their term of office is seYen (7) years without
reappointment. They are disqualified from running for any office in the
election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. (Sec. 11.) This
is to discourage them from playing politics during their tenure in office.

(7) Rank and salary. - They are given the rank of Chairman and
members of a Constitutional Commission, respectively. and the same sal-
ary which shall not be decreased during their term of offic e. (Sec. 10.) Until
Congress provides otherwise, the annual salary of the Ombudsman is
P204,000 and his Deputies, P180,000. (see Art. XYIII. Sec. 17.)

(8) Appointment of officials and employee8. -All officials of the Office
of the Ombudsman other than the Deputies shall be appointed by the
Tanodbayan according to the Civil Service Law. Section 6 is similar to the
provision with respect to the appointment of officials and employees of the
Supreme Court (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[6].) and of the Constitutional Commis·
sions. (Art. IX, A-Sec. 4.)

Rationale for creation of the two bodies.

The rationale for the creation of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of
the Tanodbayan is provided in Section 1. (supra.) The principal sponsor of
the Tanodbayan proviso explained its inclusion in the 1973 Constitution,
thus:

"Its raison d'etre is the recognition that with the burgeoning of
bureaucracy, the administrative machinery of government has become
terribly complicated and too impersonal that, therefore, the 'little man'
needs protection from being possibly trampled by the vast juggernaut
of the government machine ... Existing mechanisms - the courts, the
national assembly, executive and administrative agencies - are not
sufficient to cope with th e grievances of the aggrieved individual. There
is a need for a supplementary institution ... to which the individual
can readily repair for assistance and for immediate redress of griev-
ances."4

•oel. R.odolfo D. Robles, The Fil ipino Ombudsman, Phil. Panorama , Feb. 4, 1973, p. 4.

34fl T EXTBOOK ON TifF. PHT l.I PPTNE CONSTlTlJTTON Sees. 12-13

The above explanation can be easily understood by the majority of the
Filipinos whose ~<Hi Pxperiences in the past arc still fresh in their memory.
For so long a time, they h fl d to suffer from the compa rtmentalized adminis-
tration of justice, corrupt and int>fficient public servants, deteriorating
peace an d order conditions which jeopardized thej r pursuit of legitimate
livelihood, and a host of other inconveniences. Indeed, one may venture to
say, that had there been an Ombudsman before Proclamation No. 1081
which declared ma rtia l Jaw on September 2 1, 1972, most of the legitimate
griovances of t he ci tizens would have been dispelled , the people's faith in
the government wou ldn't h ave hecn E~roded, and t he chaos and disorder
that prevailed during the period wouldn't have r eached such alarming
proportions.;,

The Ombudsman is definitely a positive contribution towards the reali-
zation of a dedicated, c ffiei ent and responsible public service and the
revival of the people's faith in government .•Judging from the experience in
other countries, an authority on the ombudsman says, "Even if an ombuds-
man plan were to work only one-half th e E:'ffectiveness of its original
scheme, itl' adopti on would he well worthwhile ."6

SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Govern-
ment, or any subdivision, agt"ncy or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owm~d or -controlle d corporations, and
shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action
taken and the result thereof.

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the follow-
ing powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as ofany government-
owned or -controlled corporation with original charter, to per-
form and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the perform-
ance of duties.

"Ibid., p. a.

glbid., p. 5, citing Donald (; . Rowat.

Sec;;. 12- 13 ART. XI.- AC:COUNTAR ILTTY OF I'l" HLLC ()lo'J-'I C:ERS

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
againsta publicofficialoremployee atfault, a-nd recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion , fine, <'en ~ure, or p1·osecutioll,
and ensure compliance there with.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any a ppropriate case,
and subject to such limitations as may b e provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts o r
transactions entered into by his office in...-olving the disburse-
ment or u se of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for a ppropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assis tance and in-
formation necessary in the discharge of its r esponsibilities, and
to examine, if necessary, p ertinent records a nd documents .

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes ofinefficien cy, red tape, misman-
agement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and m a ke
1·ccommenda tions for the ir e limination &.nd the observance of
high standards of ethics and e fficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law .

Powers, functions, and duties
of the Ombudsman.

The specific powers, funcbons and duties of the Oflice of the Ombuds-
man are enumerated in Section 13.1 As protector of the people, the Om·
bud s man and his Deputies are mandated to a <.:t promptly on comp laint ::,
filed in any form or manner against public officia ls a nd ~mployees and. in

appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the adi on taken and th ~

results thereof. (Sec. 12.)

(1) Accessibility. - I n relation to the publi c, t he Ombudsm ~~:: :::.:-;.;..,:-:;
himself available at such hou.r...and......plac.e_l'ea sonahly corwr:-nit-n: : c. :hE-
people, to receive such complaints, grievances, and reque8t;.: fn !" a :'S:~ta :1ce
a s may be su bmitted to h im . Th~ pr oceedings befol'e th e 0~!:-·Jd::man.
s ubject only to the provisions of any later law, a n~ ;.: pt-t-dy . informal.
summary and at no cost to the com plainant. Stomp~ nnd tel egrams are
included. (see Sec. 12.)

(2) Inve.<~tigatory pou.1er. -On his own initi at i,·e or upon complaint of
any person , the Ombudsman m ay act or conduct im·e~tigat}on~ on the basis

1R.A. No. 6770 (Nov . 17, 1989• prt)vide,; for tht· functt nnal 11 nrl ,-tructura! org;ln ization of
t h e Office of the Ombudsman.

350 Tli:XTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 14

.,

of phcne calls, letters or oral complaints which, in his discretion, deserves
serious consideration. Such service guarantees the Ombudsman's accessi-
bility even to those in jail or in hospitals. This does not mean, however,
that immediately upon the receipt of a phone call from an anonymous
source complaining against the action of, say, « policeman, the Ombuds-
man will readily file the charges against the policeman, or following t he
r eceipt of a letter complaining against the discourtesy of a clerk in the civil
service, the Ombudsman will immediately reprimand the clerk, or recom-
mend his dismissal. This is not how the Ombudsman works.

If for example, an individual complains that the papers relative to his
request for retirement are not being processed with reasonable speed, the
Ombudsman begins by forwa rding a copy of the complaint to the head
office, asking for an explanation. If the explana tion is not satisfactory, the
Ombudsman has authority to look into the files of the agency concerned, to
call witnesses, and to require that t he agency itself investigate the matter
and submit a repor t to the Ombudsm an. Ifthe slowness in the processing of
the papers is found to be due to an established procedure in the office, then
the Ombudsman r ecommends to the agency a way of rectifying the defect
and suggests a morP. expeditious way of dealing with matters of the kind .
a,:~_!!!_!!J_also -~~f~~~Jt~Q_i_p.v~§.t!&.~· (see Sec. 13[1].)

(3) R emedial weapons. - lr.. other cases, if an administrative act is
complained of, and the Ombudsman finds that there is no legal or other
imperfection in the act, he seeks to persuade the agency concerned to make
a different decision in order t.o save the complainant from needless hard-
ship. Usually, before an opinion or recommendation is rendered, the Om-
budsman will meet with the administrator, and present his findings a nd
his proposed recommendations. If the administrator does not accept the
recommendations of the Ombudsman, the latter seeks recourse in the
media, and by an appeal to the higher echelons of the government.2 (see
Sec. 13[6].)

(4) Absence ofrevisory authority. -l.l..r.tlJke the -~~:>urhs, th~ 9n.!.l>\lds~.~P.
~o.t.nr:deL.a..Dy _go.v.er_n..menLQffice to rever§..EU.t~ ,9ecisl.Qn. He is simply a
"watchdo,g." (supra. ) Ifthe Ombudsman were given the power to reverse or
a mend administrative action, it would be more tha n a super-administra-
tive agency or a special court , and as such, it would conflict and render
u seless other government agencies equipped with administrative proce·
dures for discipline.3 (see Sec. 13[3).)

SEC. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be auto·
matically and regularly released.

'Del. R.D. Robles, "The Ombudsman," in C.R. Montejo, ,,u.pra, p. 232; see Pre::~ide ntial
Decree No. 1630 (as amended), Sees. 10, 15, 16.

~ Del. E .R. Sarte in Unita~ . Vol. 46, No. 3, S ept. 1973, published by U.S.T ., p . 435,
quoting David C. Cu mmins.

Sees. 15-16 ART. XI. - ACCOUNTABILITY OF Pl"BLIC OFFICERS 35 1

Fiscal autonomy.

Like the judiciary (Art. VIII. Sec. 3.; and ~h e Constitutional Commis-
sions (Art. IX, A-Sec. 5. ), including the Commi5-5ion on Huma n Rights (Art.
XIII , Sec. 17[4]. ), the Office of the Ombudsma n enjoys fiscal autonomy, t o
further enhance its independence. It does not haYe to request the Office of
the President or any government agency for the r elease of its approved
annual appropriations.

SEC. 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlaw-
fully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth.

Generally s peaking, prescription, laches and ._,,n oppel bar or prevent
the enforcement of a right which a person, and ~v cn the State, may have
against another person . Section 15 makes it clea!" that the right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or em-
ployees, from them or from their nominees or tra nsferees shall not be
barred by any of these causes.

(1) .By pre~cr.iJltLQ!!_. a party having a caust: ·:.::· act ion (i.e., ground for

which an action may be brought) is precluded fro :::u e nforcing his right or
r esorting to court for redress for his failure to do ~o wit:hin a certain period
of time fixed by law.

(2).b{ZC:~~s__ is the failure or neglect of a pany for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to assert a right O!' ctaim giving rise to the
presumption tha t he ha s abandoned it a nd maki~g- it inequitable to permit
the right or claim to be enfo1·ced.

(3) Throug~taPP~l an admission or represe nta tion is rendered con-
clusive against the person making it a nd ca nnot bo: denied or disproved by
him as against the per·son relying tbereon. 1

~ J.ir No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial

accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, di-
rectly or in directly, by any governme nt...ov.-ned or controlled
bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-Presi-
dent, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supre me
Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman,
or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest,
during their tenure.

1Article 1431, Ci vil Code.

35~ TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec,:. 17 - 1~

Prohibition against grant of loan, guaranty or other
form of financial accommodation.

The prohibition contained in Section 16 further gives s tress to the
principle that public office is a public trust. (Sec. 1.) The purpose is tn
prevent the officials mentioned from making use of their infl uence to
secure such loan, etc., to benefit t hem.

Note tha~ the prohibition extends to any firm or entity in which any of
the officiall'l me ntioned bas a contr olling interest (at least 51% ). It d oes not
apply where the luan, etc. i.s not for any business purpose (e.g., hou!{ing
loan ), or is given to a firm in which he has no controlling interest, nor in
any case , after his tenure of office. In any of said situations, no conflict of
interest is involved.

SEC. 17. A public officer or e mployee shall, upon ass umption
of office and as often thereafter as may be required b y law,
submit a declaration under oath of h is assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabine t , the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Const itutional Commissions a nd other constitutional offices,
and offic ers of the a rmed forces \\oith general or flag rank, t he
declaration shall be d isclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law.

Declaration of assets, liabilities
and net worth.

.Th.~ JPJl~ing of.{l__d.es:~.a r_ati_<?.Jl__~n d~E o~!h.!!f hi~~~ ts , liabilities a nc!n."!!
W...?!~h is ~.~l_fi._d~-~?.ryfo_r..~.."~~L"!?.~bli~offr~:_:_or ~!_Uplo:r.~pon a!l~~mptio_!l__~

efft~-~.an.~ ~<!_nn~-t~e .c!.isp~n_s_~.cL~ith by law. l!L~h.e. c~~e._Qf_t!t_e.__:p!_~jde~t

etc.., ..the.. declaration . is required by the Constitution to be disclosed_in
~.bh~._Congress is empowered to provide by law how often the declaration
shall be made and the manner by which the de·claration by the officials
m entifmed s hall be disclosed to the public.

Th~ purpose of the declara tion is to determine the net worth of a public
official or employee at a gi ven date or ~tarting point (i..e., assum pt ion of
office), such that an incre&se in net worth at a subsequent period if unre-
ported and unexplained, taking into account his known sources of income
and reasonab le a llowance for living and other expen!Ses for the peri od ,
gives rise to the presumption th at the increase represents ill-gotten \Vealt.h
and/or untaxed income.

SEC. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Con stitution allegiance at all times, and a ny public officet· or
·employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
s tatus of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall b e dealt with by law.

Sec. 18 ART. XI. - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 35:~

Duty of allegiance to the State
and the Constitution.

:PEbli~_2ff!~~I:S. .an<t~..!n..P.J.~~~!!!E.~li~ve_fh~ PE!QP-.lf._W~th u_tmos~.."l9..Y.'.
E!-L_ ~n<!__:~~t -~~~~-p~tri otism."_ (Sec. 1.) '[h ~y 0':"~-~h,LState andj:t§..
J;_r;m.~t..i~!!t.~Q!l.~JJ.~giJ!~_~e at all timeS\ A public officer or employee who ~ eeks
to change bis citi zenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of ano ther
country during hi ~ tenure or incumbency violates this duty of loyalty and
allegiance.

Th e law may impose sanctions on the guilty officer or employee.

- oOo-

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