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Textbook on the Philippine Constitution [Hector S De Leon]

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Published by catherineshainapasion, 2016-09-07 21:17:52

Textbook on the Philippine Constitution [Hector S De Leon]

Textbook on the Philippine Constitution [Hector S De Leon]

254 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHrLIPPJNE CONSTITUTION Sec. 5

Origir1al jurisdiction of Supreme Court
over petitions for certiorari, etc.

The Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. 4

It has original and exclusive jurisdiction (supra.) over petitions for the
issuance of writ of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the
Court of Appe al s.~

(1) Cer.~iQr.arJ. -(as a special civil action, not as a means of elevating an
appeal, infra.) It is a writ issued from a superior court (Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or Regional Trial Court) requiring a lower court or a board, or
officer exercising judicial functions to transmit the records of a case to the
superior court for purposes of review. It will lie when such tribunal, etc., has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and appeal or any other remedy is not available to the aggrieved
party.6

(2) Pro.h.i,p~ti_on,, - I t is a writ by which a superior court commands a
lower court or a corporation, board or person acting without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to desist from
further proceedings in an action or matter. It will lie only when no appeal
or any other remedy is available to the aggrieved party.7 Prohibition is a
negative remedy prohibiting the doing of a certain act.

(3) M..q.IJdft.TJJ-U§: - It is an order issued by a superior court commanding
a lower court or a corporation, board, or person to perfonn a certain act
which it is its or his duty to do. Again, this writ will lie only when no other
remedy in the ordinary course of law is available.8 Mandamus is an af-
firmative remedy ordering a certain act to be done.

(4 ) Q.HQ....J£.arrq,7J:!£1. - It is an action by the goverpment to recover an
office or franchise from an individual or corporation usurping or unlawfully
holding it .9

In addition, the Supreme Court exercises original and exclusive juris-
diction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President and Vice-President. (Art. VII , Sec. 4, last par.)

'R.A. No. 296 (.Judiciary Act of 19'48), Sec. 17, as amended. This law has been superseded
hy Batas P~:~mbansa Blg. 129, but only the provisions of the former which are inconsistent
wi th those of t he latter are de~me d repealed or modified.

~Ibi d.

"See Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
7See Ib id., Sec. 2 .
ASee Ibid., Sec. 3.
9See Ibid., Ru le 66, Sec. 1.

Sec. 5 ART. VIIl.- Jt:DICIAL ImPARTMENT 2o5

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.

__Th.~ ex~l-~_~iY-~- -~p.J2elt~-~~jurisdt~!_i_o..n_ ·(supra.) Qf__th~ Supr~:m.~ _Q<?U_~t­

r_ef.e.rf!_lQ <;a.~~~-_o.f gr,eat Pt1blic. !nJ~_r.~!§....QLO[ §..et:i_9_us moment to in._d_br_i<J,~~L
~. 10 They are enumerated in Section 5(2). The only power which Con-
gress may exercise with respect to this jurisdiction as thus provided is to
determine whether the elevation of cases from the lower courts should be.
done through appeal or certiorari-- a matter of procedure which may also
be determined by the Rules of Court itself. 11 fin{ra.)

(l}Jiy_~l, the appellate court 1:eviews_ all the_fl!ldings oUJl~nd of

fu.c.J of a lower court as in special proceedings (e.g., adoption and custody of

minors).

(2) By certiorari (as a means of elevating an appeal), the appellate or
superior court can review only questi~~~2r errqr.s of l~w decided or com-
mitted by a lower court (e.g., appeal from an order or decision of the Court
of Appeals).

A que~l.~Q.IJ. _of_!a_w is that which involves no examination of the proba-
tive value of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them in the
lower court (e.g., constitutionality of a law). Ail.uestion offac.t (e.g., whether
or not a particular event has taken place) cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court on certiorari on the theory that the lower court which
"heard the case, observed the demeanor of the witnesses or otherwise
acquired acquaintance with the issues and incidents thereof,"12 i!:l in a
better position to pass upon the question.

Assignment of judges of tower courts
to other stations.

Section 5(3) modifies the rule established under the 1935 Constitu-
tion13 which empowered the executive department to designate or transfer
to another district a judge appointed for a particular district, but with the
approval of the Supreme Cour~..

Under the provision, temporary assignments of judges of lower courts
may be made only by the Supreme Court. This additional comtitutional
power further enhances the independence of the judiciary by eliminating
possible political influence in such assignments. It is also consistent with
the transfer of the adminiotrative supervision of the judicial machinery to
the Supreme Court. (Sec. 6, infraJ

(l.J The requirement that the temporary assignment of a judge to an-

other station for a p!:!riod longer than six (6J months must be with his

10See V.G. Sinco, op. cit.. p. :]07.
11lbid., p. 316. So, it may be provided that the remedy shall be by certiorari only.
12Macandile vs. Macalino. L-24874. Sept. 30. 1978.
13Article VHI. Section 7 thereof.

25(i TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 5

consent accommodates t he demand for such detail when required by the

exigencies ofthe service (e.g., to relieve the clogged dockets ofa court which

is vacant) while at the same time protecting the right of a judge to perma-

nency at a station. ·

(~) I.Lthe...tr~:usfe..r.i&.~_pcrm.t,!~.enJ [email protected] be.J~ff~.~.ted wrtl!_!!t~
c~:!!~.~-(lt ?.f_t~ ~ i~~~-~()~.<:~1.:~~4--~119: . by_th~ -~~t~Q§i.~m .<Lf..fl..n~W-fl.P..ru>iill.ment

.by.the_.Ere.sid&ru. (Sec. 5[3].) The reason is that a judge enjoys security of

tenure (Sec. 11.) and such transfer is tantamount to removal from one office
(former station) and an appointment to a new office. The ~tation of a judge is

the place where he is assigned by law to hold regular sessions. A regional trial

court judge is appointed by region. He may be assigned to any regionaf branch

of the court in the city or municipality within the same region without the

need of his consent because the whole region is his station.14

9tC_l!f!!).Q~ of v~n'!~ Qt.PI@c:e t_r~!~

The Supreme Court can order a change of venue or place of trial
whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial or of pre-
venting a miscarriage ofjustice so demands. (Sec. 5[4].) This had been done
before in one case under the 1935 Constitution by the Suprem e Court
where the complainants who were also the prosecution witnesses in several
criminal cases against the accused, a member of a family known to be very
powerful and influenti al in the place of trial, were reluctant to testify, it
appearing that they had reasons to fear that attempts would be made to
silence them, and there was no guarantee that such a possibility would not
take place. 15

Rather than make the Supreme Court rely upon the general grant of
judicial power , the present Constitution expressly invests the Supr.em e
Court with the specific prerogative to transfer the place of hearing in the
interest of truth and justice.

The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with full legislative
authority to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice oflaw, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. The rules promulgated are called the "Rules of Court."
Such rules have the force and effect of law.

Rules of procedure of special courts (i.e., Sandiganbayan, Court !)f Tax
Appeals) and quasi-judicial bodies (e.g., Insurance Commission, Securities

1~B.P. Big. 129, Section 17.
1~People vs. Gu t ierrez, l r 32282-83, Nov. 26, 1970, popularly k now n as the ~nantay
Case"; see also People vs. Pelotin, L-35377-78, July 31, 1975; Mondiguing, et al. vs. Menabad,
L-41313, Nov. 6, 1975.

Sec. 5 ART. VIII.- ,JUDICIAL DRPARTMENT 257

and Exchange Commission) sh all remain effective unless di ~approved by
the Supreme Court.16

(1) E!l:ate.c.t.i.O.ll- .and enfJu:..c.e.nzr;!~.t...Pf£..o.n.~tj_tt;tJ.i!.>.'!:..a:f rights_. - The Consti·

tution accords great importance to the full enjoyment by the people of their
constitutional rights that even the Supreme Court is enjoined to promul-
gate rules of procedure concerning their protection and enforcement in
cases pending befo1·e the courts. These rights a re mostly found in Article
III. The Constitution recognizes the evils of what has been termed as "com-
partm~_ntalized ju~t!_<::~" _whereby through unequal application of the law,
those who have power or influence are favored to the detriment of poor,
ignorant or helpless litigants_

In criminal prosecutions, the Constitution seeks to avoid the conviction
or punishment of an accused who may be innocent.

(2).J!kJJ.di.JJg. - It is the act of presenting one's claim, answer, or
arguments in defense or prosecution of an action. The term is often used to
refer to any paper filed in court in connectior. with a case before it. In a
strict sense, however, £!~~s are the written allegations made by par-
ties to a case for the purpose of presenting the issues to be tried. 17 Exam-
ples of pleadings are the written complaint and the answer thereto .

(3) j>ractice...JJLlfilli.. - As generally understood, it is the doing or
performing of services in a court of justice, in any matter pending therein.
In a larger sense, it includes legal advice and counsel and the prepa ration
of legal instruments and contracts a lthough such matter may not be pend·
ing in court.18

(4) P~w:.e....- It refers to the method by which substantive rights
may be enforced in courts of justice. The rules on court procedure promul-
gated by the Supreme Court are now embodied in the Revised Rules of
Court of the Philippines (effective Jan. 1, 1964).

(5) .d.¢r.n..issi9l1.. ~Q t/Je..IJ.m.ctic~p.l.lam_or to the !;Jar..- A person is s aid to
be admitted to the Bar or is a member of the Bar when he is authorized by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines. He is authorized if he
has the necessary legal, moral, and educational qualifications, and the
prepa ration or training in law and h as passed the required examination. 19

(6) J.llifJJ.r..g_~$..4..qq._r:._. - It means the official national unification of the
entire lawyer population of the Philippines in a single organization. This
requires membership and financi al support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law a nd the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

~e Supreme Cou r t m~:~y not exe rcise th e power with respect to the interna l ru les of the
Constitutional Commissions \Ar t. IX, See A-Sec. 6; Art. XIII, Sec. 18f2 l.l which are independ-
ent bodies but it may exercist' t.ht~ power of judicial r eview over the m in cases involving
constitutional or legal questions.

1741 Am. Jur. 288.

·~7 c.•J.s. 704.

lDScc Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 11.

258 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHIUI'PINE CONSTITliTION Sec. 5

The term ".B.ar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names

appear in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. An Integrated Bar
(or Unified Bar) perforce must ir.clude all lawyers.20 Th~ general purposes
of an integrated bar are:

(a) To elevate the standards of the legal profe ssion;

(b) To improve the administration of justice; and

(c) To ena ble the bar to discharge its public res ponsibility more
effective ly .2 1

17) Lega.L.JlE.s.iBJIJlJ..<;.? ..!..Q.. t!J.,~ .l:lnc.Jerp riu~. - Poor and uninfo rmed
litigants are entitled to legal assistance from the government in defending
or enforcing their rights to r edress the imbalance between the parties in
civil a nd criminal cases. For instance, they are given lawyers, free of
charge, to reprelSent them and are exempted from paying court fees. With-
out governmental help, victims of injustice may take the law in their own
hands to vindicate their rights. The consequent mistrust of the judicial
process paves the way to the breakdown of the law.

The rules concerning legal assistance to the underprivileged must
assure that free access to the courts a nd quasi-judicial bodies is not denied
to any person by reason of poverty. (Art. III, Sec. 11 .) The observance of
this constitutional mandate will go a long way in instilling in the people
faith in our justice delivery syRtem as the haven of their rights and free-
dom.

Limitations on ttl.~ .r.YJ~m@~ng..P.9_~~r

2J.~!:te -~':I.Pre~e.~Q~rt.

They are the following:

~l.) Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases;

(2) They shall be uniform for alJ courts of the same grade; and

(3) They shall not dimini!:ih, increase. or modify substantive rights (as
distinguished from procedural rights). (Sec. 5[5.1.)

Congress h as the power to repeal, alter or a mend the rules promul-
gated by the Supreme Court.~2

~0Rcport of Com mission on Bar Integration. p. 305.
2' R.A. No. 6397, Sectio n 1. Pursuant to Article X, Section 5(51 of the 1973 Constitution,
the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 139-A {effective ,Jan. 16, 1973) of the Rules of C:ourt
which contains the rules on the Integrated Bar of the Philippi nes, tho n ational official
organization of lawycrR in the Philippines.
,UTbe new Constitution deleted the phraRe "which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa." Nevertheless, it is submitted tha t Congrc~s still
retains the power since it possesses a ll legislative powers exce pt only those which have not
been expressly withheld.

Sec. 5 ART VIII.- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 259

~UP!l~!ln~iy~~l..l~..P.t~~Elc!~raU~w/right~
..d.istinguiShed,

(1) Substqn.tive lau: is that part of the law which creates, defines, and
regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property, or the powers of
age ncies or instrumentalities for the administration or public affairs,
whereas fi:1-jectiJ1§~9.L~.lJJ:l!_Slia:.l (or procedural j law is that part of law which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
violation. Examples of substantive law are the Civil Code, Code of Com-
merce, Insurance Code, Corporation Code, National Internal Revenue Code,
Revised Penal Code (criminal law), and the Constitution.23 The adjective
law in the Philippines is governed by the Rules of Court promulgated by
the Supreme Court and by special laws. It neces!:iarily includes the rules
relating to courts and their jurisdiction, pleadings (supra.j, remedies, trial,
and evidence. (supra.)

From the foregoing discussion, it is plain that the substantive law is
useless without the adjective law, as it will simply be a collection of
unenforceable rights and duties, while without the sub5tantive law, the
adjective law would have no reason for its existence, as it would merely
provide for the enforcement of rights which are not prescribed.2~

(2) SJ.J:b~1.aJJJJyi:L...ligh &s are rights which substantive law declares or
rights concerning life, liberty or property. Examples are the rights pro-

vided in Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. Procedural rights,
on the other hand , refer to the remedies or means by which an aggrieved

party, whose (substantive ) rights have been -violated, may bring h is case to
suit, trial, and judgment. An example is the right of a party to appeal a
decision of a low~r court to a higher court.

In some cases, however, a right cannot be neatly classified as substan-
tive or procedural. This is particularly true with respect to the constitu-
tional rights of the accused (see Art. HI, Sees. 15-22.) which are imple-
mented by the Rules of Court..

~ppoimm~mt9.t.Qffll:t~'~-~Q9 eo::u~!Qy~.

The Supreme Court has the power to appoint all ot1icials and employ-
ees of the judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. (Sec. 5[6]; see
Art. IX, A-Sec. 8; B-Secs. 2[2], 6-8. ) This authority further enhances its
independence as envisioned by the Constitution. It was formerly provided
by law. Once appointed ,. they shall be entitled to the protection of the
provisions of the Constitution on Civil Service. (ibid., Sec. 2f3], infra.)

It should be recalled that Congress may, by law, vest in courts, a uthor-
ity to appoint "other officers lower in rank" in the judiciary. (see Art. VII,
Sec. 16.)

2·1See Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640; Primicias vs. Oca mpo, 93 Phil. 446.
2' Melquiades J. Gamboa, An Introduction to Phil. Law (1955), 6th ed., p. 97.

s.,.cs.260 1'1-~XTB OOK ON THE P HILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 6-7

SEC. 6. The Supt·eme Court shall have administrative super-
vision over all courts and the persormel there of.

Administrative supervision over
lower courts.

The Supreme Court exercises administrative supervision over all courts
from the Court of Appeals down to the lowest cour ts a nd the personnel
thereof. This is one of the fundamental changes introduced in respect of the
judicial system by the 1973 Constitution.

The 1935 Chart er was silent on this poin t. Under the law then in force,
the lower courts wer e subject to the adminis trative supervision of the
President who exercised it thrcugh the Department of J us tice headed by
the Secretary of .Justic:e' who was no more and n o less than the alter ego
(Lat. , another I.) of the P resident. It was n a tural tha t decisions taken eve n
in t he matter of supervising judges and personnel of lower courts were
sometimes heavily influe nced by poli t ical considerations. The change re-
moves possible executive intervention in t he affairs of the courts and the
a dministration of just ice.~

The power of administrative supervision of the Supre me Court extends
to the Sa ndigan.bayan, a special court (see note 5, under Art. XI , Sec. 2. ),
because Section 6 r efers to "all courts.":l

SEC. 7. (1) No pers on shall be a ppointed Membe r of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless h e is a
n atural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Su-
preme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
b een for fifteen years or more a judge ofa lowe r court or engaged
in the prac tice of la w in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescr ibe the qualifications ofjudges
of lower courts, but no pers on may be appointed judge the reof
unless h e is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judicia ry must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, a nd independence.

1The fo r mal tra nsfer of adminii'l trati ve su p~ 1·vis iou ove r infl!. rior (no w l<>wcr) co ur ts from
the Department of Justi ce to the Supreme Court was eftb:tt~d by Presidential De~rec No. 185,
iss ued Ma y 7, 1973. It is now ~xercised by the Supre me Court through an oflice headed by a
Court Admi nistrator who is ap poi nted by the Chief .f ustic~ . (Pres. D~cree No. 828.)

2Be that as it may, the additional work imposed by the pr·ovision on the Supreme Court
canno t but adversely atle r:t its adjudicative functions particular ly in th e face of the increas -
ing number of ca sef> that are brought before it.

3l t ha::~ betm hA!d th <'~t the exl!rcise of the rule -maki ng power of the Sandigan baya n is
s ubject to th e approv a l of the Supreme Court. <De Guzma n vs. People, 119 SCR.A 337, Dec.
15, 1982.) Under th e new Constitution, rulci'i of procedure of s pecial co ur ts J>ha ll re main
effecti ve un les>; dis approved hy the Supreme Court. t Sec. 5[5 ).)

Sec. 7 Al{'l'. V III. - JUDIClAL DEJ:'ART~1ENT ~61

Qualifications for members of the Supreme Court
and any lower collegiate court.

The qualification~ for a member of the Supreme Court are :

( 1),1Ie must be a nAtural-born citizen of th e Philippines. (see Art. IV,

Sec. 1. )Therefore, a natura lized citizen may not be appointed;

(.2{ He must be at lea s t fo rty (40) years of age;

(3} He must have, for fifteen {15) years or more, been a judge of a lower
court or engaged in the practice ofla w in the Philippines (Sec. 7111.); and

(41 He must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and

independence. (Sec. 7l3). ) This criterion hao something to do with the
qualities of mind a nd spirit which a member of th e j udiciary mu st possess.
It is intended as a guide to the r ecommending body (Judicial and Bar
Council) anrl the appointing authority (President), and as a reminder to the
appointee. ' This qualification is prescribed for a ll members ofth ejudiciary.
Its indispensability is easily s een when it. is accept ed th at any system of
justice is only "as good or as bad a s ils judges.''

The qualifications of members of a ny lower collegiate court (composed
of more than one judge, i.e., Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals, <lnd Court of
Tax Appeals) shall be prescribed by Congresf' as provided in Section 7(2}as
in the case ofjudges of lowe r courts, O\!Lth~Y-.IDY.-~.Qg_n~.!:!I~ :.Q~:!l.~iY.?i~l:t~.
ilih~~hilippin~ s.. (Sec. 71" lJ.)

Authority of Congress to alter qualifications
of certain constitutional officers.

Congress is not empowered to increase or decrease the qualifications of
the Justices of t he Supreme Court a s laid down by the Constitntion .2 The
same thing may be said in connection with constitution al provi si ons pro-
viding for the qualifications of members of Congress, the Preside nt, and
the members of Constitutional Commissinns, the Ombudsman , a nd his
Deputies. ( Art. XI , Sec. 8.)

Congress is not prohibited, however, from prescribing disqualifications
t.e.g., conviction of a crime for the position of Just.jce of the Supreme Court)
as long as they are relevant to the nature and fun ctions of the office.1

Qualifications of judges of lower courts.

They are:

(l) Constitutional:

\a) H e must be a citizen. He..1l_~~.d_p..qL9.~..l!.~tura.l ~hor~:.. This is to

obviate the objection against naturali zed citizens being treated as

11986 UPL Con sti tu ~ion Project. ,J udicia ry, p. 3.
' See Va rgas vs. Rilloraza. 80 Phil. 297.
3Sce V.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 313.

262 TEXTROOK ON THE P HILIP PI_:i!E CON STIT'CTION Sec. 7

s econd-class citizens. In the case of members of appellate courts, the
:-nat ural-born requirement was retained principally by reason of the
· fact that their decisions are generally final; a nd

(b) He must be a member of the Philippine Bar (Sec. 7[2].), i.e., a
lawyer whose n ame is duly inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys4 Of the
Supreme Court. (sec Sec. 5[5], infra.) Membership in the Bar (infra.) is
a prerequisite to the practice of law in the Philippines. It is obvious
that judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and apply the law to cases before them, so as to
forestall any harm or prejudice to litigants. Hence, the r equirement of
me mbership in t he Bar a nd practice of law for appointment t o the
judiciary; and

(c ) He must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity
and indepen dence.5 (Sec. 7[3].)

The above are the minimal qualifications which cannot be altered by

Congress.

' Statutory. -- Congress is given t he authority to prescribe additional

(2)

qualifications fo r judges of lower courts. These statutory qualifications are

now provided for under a law passed by the defunct Batasang Pambans a.6

The administration of justice.

(1) NaJ.J.!,li. - "Compared to other public functions and (luties, the
dispensing of justice, being extremely important, is both delicate and
singular. To sit in judgment over one's fellowmen, to pass upon their
contr oversies involving their rights and fortunes, and in criminal cases,
de termine their innocence ot· guilt, which decision affects a nd involves
their freedom, lheir honor, even their lives, is no ordinary chore or busi-
n ess. It is a serious task, weighty and fraught with grave responsibility
and of far-reaching effects, a task earnest and solemn almost partaking of
the divine."7

(2) .Ch.a.r:ac.te.r._a.ncL.fit.n.~_o{ iud_g_e_.~. - The possession of the legal
qualifications prescribed for appointment to the judiciary and the exist-
ence of constitutional safeguards to protect judicial independence (supra.)
are n o assurance that the appointee will discharge the duties of his office
impartially, free from all outside pressure a nd influence .

,) :''· "There can be no surer guara ntee for a true administration of

of, justice than the God-given character and fitness those appointed to

~It is the official record cont aining the names and signatures of those who are autho rized

to practice Jaw. (Pangan vs. Ra mos , A.M. No. 1053, Sept. 7, 1979.) ·

5/fhis additional criterion for selection of members of the judiciary is left to the subjec-

tive determination of the Judicial and Bar Council and the President.

6S ec Batas Pambans a Blg. 129.

7Dissenting: Justice M. Montemayor in Ocamp o vs. Secreta ry of Justice, 51 O.G. 147,

Jan. 18, 1955.

Sec. 8 AH.T. 'liii.- .JUDICIAL DF:PARTMENT 263

the bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during
good behavior and a salary that cannot be decreased, but if they are of
such a stuff as allows them to be subservient to one adminis tration
after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the judiciary will be not hing more than a myth or an
empty ideal.

The framers of our Constitution wanted the person exercil:ling the
judicial function to be absolutely impartial and independent-minded so
that the parties before him can obtaia and receive justice based only on
the merit of their claims 'h. x x however humble and lowly and poor they
may be, and regardless of wealth, power and influence of their adver-
saries."8

(3) Judicial standards more exacting. -There is no place in the judici-
ary for those who cannot meet the exacting s tandards of judicial compe-
tence a nd integrity. Although every office in the government is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of a n individual than a seat in the judiciary.9

SEC. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Member, a
representative ofthe Integrated Bar, a professor oflaw, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be app()inted
by the President for a term offour years with the consent ofthe
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed,
the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four
years, the professoroflaw for threeyears, the retiredJustice for
two years, and the representative o~ the private sector for one
year.

(3) The Clerk ofthe Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
SupremeCourtshall provide initsannual budget theappropria-
tions for the Coun~il.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recom-
mending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Sf bid.
9Baria vs. Bercacacio, A.M . No. 561-MJ, Dec. 29, 1976.

264 'tEXTBOOK ON 1'HE PHI LlPPl NE CONSTlTUTlON Sees. 8-9

SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courtsshall beappointed by the Presidentfrom a list ofat
l east three nominees prepare d by the Judicial and Bar Council
for eve ry vacancy. Such appointments n eed no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the Preside nt shall issue the appoint-
ments within ninety days from the submission of t he list.

Appointment of members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts.

(1) Non-political process ofselection and appointment. - The appoint-
ing power is veste d alone in the President. (Sec. 9. ) Under the 1973
Constitution, only the Presidtnt w as involved in the a ppointme nt of high
offici a ls of the gov ernment, including members of the judiciary. There was
no effective r emedy in case of abuse by the President of his appointing
power. The situation was a little better under the 1935 Constitution.

The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts were
appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments in Congres s. However, this power of Con-
gress to confirm appointments to the judicia ry was sometimes a source of
political "haggling" and "horse trad ing" which affected the judicial inde-
pendence of the appointees.

A non-political process of selection and appointment of members of the
judiciary is now provided.

( 2 ) List of at lea st three (.'3) nominees. - The President shall appoint
from a list of at least (3 ) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. The President cannot appoint anybody out side
of the list but he can ask for a dditional nominees. Such appointments need
no confirm ation from the Com mission on Appoin tmen ts. This avoids the
pitfalls of the 1935 Cons titution .

The President shall issue the appoint ments of judges of lower courts
within 90 days from the submission of the list. (Sec. 9. )

(3) Judicial and Bar Council. - Instead of leaving its creation to
legislation, the Constitution itself creates the Council, providing at the
same time its composition, appointment of the members, their terms of
office, their emoluments, and their functions. 1 (Sec. 8 .) Although it is not
expressly mentioned by the Constitution as a qualification, a member of
the Council, like a member of the judici a ry, must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. (Sec. 7[3J.) The broad-
based membership of the Council will help ins ure quality appointments to
the judiciary.

' Executive Order No. 216 declares t he etfcctivity of the creation of the Judicial and Bar
Council on J uly 10, 1987, t he date of its promulgatio n.

Se~.:l.i . 10·11 ART. VIII. - JUDICIAL DEPAR'f}..1ENT 265

(4) Exclusive authority to recommend appointees to judiciary. - ln the
past, appointments to the judiciary were claimed to have been influenced
by political and other extraneous reasons. It is expected that giving to the
Judicial and Bar Council, in place of the Commission on Appointments, the
exclusive authority to nominate justic;es and judges will further insulate
the judiciary from political intrusion, result in the appointment only of
persons "of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence," con-
tribute to the substantial improvement of the administration of justice,
and enhance the faith of the people in the courts and their respect for law.

Critics say, however, that the new nominating and selection process
h as not completely removed politics and outside influence in the process.

SEC. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts
shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.

Compensation of members of the judiciary.

(1) Prohibition against reduction. - The salary ofthe members of the
Supreme Court and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. Until
Congress shall provide otherwise, the initial annua l salary of the Chief
Justice is P240,000 and each Associate Justice, P204,000. (see Art. XVIII.
Sec. 17.) After Congress has fixed the compensation of any of them, it may
not reduce the same during his incumbency.

(2) Purpose of the prohibition. - The purpose is not to benefit the
judges but to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote
their independence of action and judgment.t As has been said: "In the
general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amount~
to a power over his will."2 There is no prohibition, however, against in·
crease in sa]a!'y which may be made effective immediately.

The salaries of the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts are subject to the payment of income tax.a

·sEC. 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
-reach the age of sev~p..t~-Y~$!!_s or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. ':l'l!~.S~P..r~me CoJJ.I1.&UJ bane.

~l!.~Jt ~.~~.tA.~..P.9W.e.r ..t2.. dis~ipline. judges. of lower courts,. or.

prd.er.their d~~~~~~J..P.Y-.1! vot.e..ofa.majority.ofthe Memher&.:Wh.o

..tctually too~ part in ti~e delib~r..~i<m.s .on th~ .i.ss-g.~_s_httb.('. ~~l'.e

an··•d· .v.oted. . t.her.eo-p.

""1.Evans vs. Go:..r..e, 253 U.S. 246; Perfecto vs. Meer, 86 Phil. 552 ; Enden<:ia vs. Davi d, 93

Phil. 696.
~A. Hamilton, The Federalist. No. 79.
~Nitafan vs. Comm. of Internal Revenue , 152 SCRA 284, July 2.'5. 1987.

266 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTIT'C'TION s~c. 11

Tenure of office of members of the judiciary.

(1) im.p£lr.t.aD.t:..Ulf_B£.CJJJitLail&.IuJ,[~. - S ection 11 insures the security
of tenure of the members of the Supreme Court and the judges of lower
courts. They shall hold office during,a:ood behavior until they reach the age
~ ~e.veptf.<7.Q) year~ or~~~QIJ.:l.ejn~a.P.~~it~t~<t. P..hY2.i.~a11Y_..QZ:..:!lle[ltalJ.y, to
dis charge the duties of their office. Security of tenure dependent upon good
behavior has long been comidered as a n indispensable guarantee to keep
judicial independence, the cornerstone of all systems of effective adminis-
tration of justice. 1

(2) ...R.eti.rg,m~nt 'Yi~· - The retirement age in the 1973 Constitu~ion was
reduce<! from the'originalseventy (70) to sixty-five (65) years whicli is the
retirement age of other non-e~tive government offi cials and employees,
and restored again to seventy '{70). The reduction was obviously intended
to afford members of the judiciary ·ample time to enjoy the b enefits of their
retirement from the service and to give opportunity to comparatively younger
men to occupy the Bench. On the other hand, it will d€iprive the count ry of
the services of members of the judiciary who have acquired experience,
wisdom and expertis e in their work but are flti\1 ca pable physically and
mentally to discharge the duties of their office although past the age of
sixty-five (65).

(3) T_e_r~ inatio.n_ ofr.igh..UQ. hd.d...Qffi£e., _- The Constitution provides for
the impeachment of the members of the Supr eme Court. {Art. XI, Sec. 2. )
As for judges of lower courts, Congress h as the power to prescribe the
procedure and the causes for their removaL Congress may also validly
provide for the process of determining the incapacity of a judge to dis-
charge the duties of his office.

(4) Abolition of o/f'ice. - It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of
offices is neither r em oval nor separation of t he incumbents. R-emoval from
office is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. In case of removal, there is an office with an occup ant who would
thereby lose his position. After the a bolition of an office, there is in law no
occupant. Thus, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not aris~. 2

This ruling does not apply to the judiciary. Sect ion 2 expressly provides

that "no law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines

the security of tenure." The prohibition seeks to pz:event the use of such

law, under the guise of r eorganization, to remove members of the judiCiary

who refuse to kowtow to the powers that be. ·

"

1Summers vs. Ozaeta, 81 Phi l. 754.
3De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 244, March 12, 1982.

s~c. 12 ART. VIII. -JUDICIAL DEPART:-.1ENT 267

Meaning of good behavior.

Qood behavior is conduct authorized by law. So, mere mistake or error
of judgment is not a breach of good behavior, within the meaning of the
Constitution, to just1fy expulsion from office.3

( 1) With reference to the members of the Supreme Court, it implies
that they have n ot committed any of the offenses which are gr oun ds for
impeachment. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2.)

(2) As regards judges of lower courts, the determination by the Su-
preme Court as to whether there has been a de viation or not from the
requirement of good behavior is conclusive since it alone has t he power to
order their dismissal.

Disciplining or dismissal of judges
of lower courts.

The present Constitution gives to t he Supreme Court the power to
discipline judges oflower courts,4 including justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan. By a vote of a majority of the me mbers who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, it can order their dismissaF• (Sec. 11.)

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Prohibition against designation to quasi-judicial
and/or administrative agencies.

In the past administration, m embers of the judiciary were sometimes
designated to executive positions in the government, a t t he same time
retaining their rank or seniority as such members. This practice is no
longer possible under the new Cons titution. Section 8 prohibits the desig-
nation by the President of members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial and/or
administrative functions.

3State v.s. Roll. 1 Ohio Decision, 284.
•See Supreme Court Resolution dated July 25, 1974. The misconduct of a judge that will
warrant disciplinary action by the Supreme Court must have a direct r elation to and be
connected with the performan~ of his offici al du ties, not h is character as a pr ivate indi-
vidual. (Salcedo vt~. Judge, A.M . No. 1810-CTJ, June :.:!9. 1979.)
5During the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the powe r to discipline or remove judges
of lower courts was exercised by the President upon recomme ndation of the S upreme Court
in the caF;e of judges of th e Courts of First Instance <now Regional Trial Courts) and on the
recommendation of the di :>trictjudgc in the case of municipal judgl'~. (see R.A. No. 296, Sees.
67 and 97.)

261:\ TEXTBOOK ON THE PHJLIPPI:-:E CO:\STITl:TiO:S

The following rea::;ons rnay be given for the prohibition:
(1) Such designation violates the doctrine of separation of powers be-
tween the judicial and executive branches of the goHrnment;

{2) It ' may compromise the independence of the members in the per-

formance of their judicial functions; and
(3) With so many cases pending in courts, the practice will result in

further delay in their disposition. The Supreme Court and t he Court of
Appeals particularly, which are already burdened with heavy load of cases,
could never r l;ldllCe, much less eliminate, the backlog in their dockets if
thei r members co uld be assigned to non-judicial agencies .

SEC. 13. The conclusions of the Supre me Court in any case
submitted to it for decision en bane or in division shall be
r eached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member
for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to
this effect signed by the ChiefJustice shall be issue d and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the cas e and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took ao part, or dissented, or ab-
stained from a decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same r equirements shall b e observed by all lower
collegiate courts.

Procedure in rendering decisions.

The above provision prescribes the manner by which the conclusions of
the Supreme Court and all lower collegiate courts i.n any case submitted to
them for decision shall be arrived at.

A certification of complianee, i.e., that the case has been assigned to a

member for the writing of the opinion of the court, signed by the Chief
Justice or Presiding Justice or P residing Judge must be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the records of the case and served upon the parties.
(Sec. 13.) The certification should not identify the member to whom the
case has been assigned.

The purpose is to avoid t he practice of assigning a case to a justice for
study and decision by him alone, t he remaining just.ices affixing their
signa tures to the decision merely as formal routine. -It is }!.l:~~l!lb.~nt_~~--~h.~
i'::sti.:~s !~ !a~~. P.~!~}~_t_~e _cg_n~icl._~r.~.ti9n__?.J!.£.~~t;i_§_i()t1 _~f ey~.n:-~A~-~ wb_~her
~th~__C:_O_\!r:t_sits ~7!-..~f!-_n.c or J~ qi"i_sio~...L.~~-f~!~-~!2Y..i~~-tice is .~iven the ~ssign­
ment . fo.r.. the ..~:r.i.ting. Qf .tJ:H~...QPi!l.i<l.D....2Ltl'l...L.cou\t. In this way, the case
receives the full benefit of the views and ideas of the d ifferent justices.1

1S~:~e V.G. Sinco, op. c:it., p. 325.

Sec. 14 ART. \ 'l.II . - JUlHCTAL DEPARTMENT 269

Requirement in case of non·participation,
dissent, or abstention.

~~~ml>~r uf.~!"l~. ~uprem~..QQ!:!!:L9.r a_ lo~~.r-!:!.Qll.egi!!te ~lliJ.rt who t:Qok
9&. Il!i_I:b _QI....cH.~~~-DJgg .9I.~ hst_!!in~~-.fi..2D.L!i.. cle.cis.i_~n.sh2 !L§!!lte__t.~c _r:e_a_s~l}_s
(Q_r hi_s._non:P~:r:~icip a.!~~~.LQi~-~-I!.h.• s>L.a..9.~~-§!!1.!-ion. (Sec. 13. )

This requirement as to dissenting opinions is a recognition of the value
of such opinions. There is no guarantee that the decision reached by the
majority is conect and just in all cases. }Jfhile the dissenting opinion does
not express the law on the subject, if well rea:;oned and supported by
cogent considerations, it may influence the Supt·emc Court, and even
become the majority opinion, in the decision of future and analogous case~ ·
"A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal x x x. to t he intelligence of a
future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which
the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.":l

As it is the duty of every member of a collegiate court to take part in the
study and resolution of every case before it, he must state the reason for his
non-participation or abstention. His vote could h ave resulted in a different
decision.

SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court wit hout
expressingthereinclearly anddistinctlythe facts andthelaw on
which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.

Meaning of decision.

&ili&J:J...is the judgment r endered by a court of justice or other compe-
tent tribunal after the presentation of the r espective positions of the
parties in an ordinary or criminal case or upon a F;tipulation of facts upon
which the disposition of the caso is based. 1

Form of decision of court.

~y_decision of a court shall clearly and distinctly stP.te..th.e fac1£.~n<!
.the law o.n...Yl.hich. it.Js.....b.as.e.d., (Sec. 14.2) The standard expected of the

~Tai1ada and Ft:rmmdo, up. t:it., p. 1156.
:chief ,Justice Hughes, The Supreme Court of the Uni t.ed States, p. 68.

1See Soncuya Vl). Nat. Loan & Invest. Board, 40 O.G . nth Supp., p. 297.
2Section 14 ha!> l~en held to apply only to courts ofju stice. Thus, it does not apply to the
Constilutior.a l Commission!! CArt. IX.) (Mangca vs. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 27:-l, Feb. 12,
19l:!:3.J There is. however, no reason why the rt!quirement. a11 to the form of de cision of a court
~ hould not be made to apply also to decisions of <tdministrativc bodies.

270 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 15

j udiciary is that th u decision rend ered makes clear why either party pre-
vailed under t be law applicable to the facts established.3

The rule applies to the decision s not only of the Supreme Court buj:, also
of all lower courts. With respect , however, to petitions fo r review or mo-
tions fo r reconsideration of a decision of any court, it is sufficient for the
court to state only the legal basis for its refusal to give th em due course or
for their denial to save time for the court.~ It would seem t h at a court is not
required to cite the factual or legal basis of its resolution granting a
petition for 1·eview or motion for reconsideration of its decisions.

It is certainly desi rable in the interest of clearness and certainty, that
courts should state t he facts and the reasons upon which their decisions
rest;5 otherwise rights based upon them would have no concrete and lasting
evidence, and errors committed by courts lower than the Supreme Court
might escape detection and rem ain uncorrected to the detrime nt of the
parties and t he administration of j ustice!;

SEC. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-
four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.

(2) A case o r matter shall be deemed s ubmitted for decision
or r esolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum r equired b y the Rules of Court or by the court
i t se l f.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding p eriod, a cer-
tification to this effect signe d by the Chief Justice or the presid-
ing judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached
to the record of t he case or matter, and served upon the parties.
The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory pe-
riod, t he court, without prejudice to s uch responsibility as may

"Bernabe vs. Geraldez , L-39721, J uly 21, 1975.
'The 1973 Constitution (Art. X, Sec. 9 lhe re of.) empowert"!d t h e Supreme Co urt to
promul gate ru les on t h t promulgation of what a r e k n own as ~minute resolutions." As

distinguished from a decision, a m inute reRolulion s tates briefly the action a court ha8 taken
on a petition or motion without citing the factual and l egal basi;; of such a resolution (e.g. ,
"Denied for lack of merit" or ucranted"l.

''Ocampo vs. Cahangi.s, 15 Phil. 828.

"V.G. Sinco, op. cit ., p. 332; Bernabe vs. Geraldez, supra; Lee vs. Court of Appeals,
L-28126, Nov. 28, 1975.

Sec . 15 ART. VJll. - Jl"DICLU DEPARnfENT 271

have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or
resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay.

Maximum periods for rendition
of decisions.

By constitutional mandate, the various courts must decide or resolve a
case or matt.er submitted thereto within the following periods from the
date of submission:

( 1) Suprema Court. - within twenty-four (24 l months;

(2) The Court ofAppeals and other collegiate appellate courts - within
twelve (12) months unless reduced by the Supreme Court; and

(3) Lower courts - within three (3) months unless reduced by the
Supreme Court. (Sec. 15[1].)

A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution from
the date the last pleading (see Sec. 5[5].), brief,1 or memorandum2 is filed.
(Sec. 15[2.1. ) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period , a certifica-
tion to this effect (i.e. , that the period has elapsed) signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge must be issued a copy of which is required to
be attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties.
(Sec. 15L3].)

Time limitations mandatory.

The time limitations established above are mandatory. They are in~
tended to ease up ~he clogging of court dockets and to implement the right
of party lib gants to speedy justict> (see Art. III, Sec. 16. ) under the familiar
aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied." Under Section 5(5 ), the
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. Violation of
Section 15( 1) by the Supreme Court will constitute culpable violation of the
Constitution, a ground for impeachment of the members of the Supreme
Court. (Art. XI, Sec. 2.)

A court must still decide a case or matter even after the lapse of the
applicable maximum period provided above without prejudice to the re-
sponsibility of the justice or judge concerned. (Sec. 15[4].)

1li is a written statement pre pa red by a counsel and presented to an appellatP. court

setting forth. often in cvnside ra hle deta:l, the main contentiOM of his client with the
:mpporling arguments, facts and l a w.

2It is a written presentation of the arguments of a party in a case submitted to the court
afte r the trial or hearing but before a judgment or decision is rendered.

272 TEXTBOOK ON THB PHILJPP[NE CONSTITUTION Sec. 16

SE C. 16. The S u preme Court shall, within thirty days from
t he o pening of each regula r sessio n of t h e Congress, s ubmit to
t he P reside n t and t h e Congress a n annual r eport on the opera·
tions a nd activities of the Judiciary.

Submission of annual report.

T he a bove provision requires the Supreme Court to submit to the
President and Congress an annual report on the operations and activities
of the j udiciary. Through such r eport a nd the recommendations that the
Supreme Court may make, the President and Congress may be guided in
proposing or in the.enactment of legislations affecting the courts a nd the
administration of justice. (see Art. VII, Sec. 23. )

It s hould be noted that it is these organs that determine the appropria-
tions for the expenses of the judiciary.

-oOo -

Article IX

CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS

A. COMMON PROVISIONS

SECTION I. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commis·
sion on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Independent constitutional bodies.
Aside from the t hree (3) grand departments or branches entrusted with

the exercise of the traditional powers of government, i.e., the Presidency

and ex~cutive offices, Congress, and the Supreme Court and lower courts ,
the Constitution has directly created independent bodies charged with
specific functions. Their creation is established in the Constitution because
of the extraordinary importance of their functions and the need to insulate
them from undesired political interference or press ure. Their independ-
ence cannot be assured if they were to be created me rely by statute.

/'tind~l' the Constitution , t hese agencies are thttl.Civil Servic~ommis­
sio'n, th!tommission on Electioo~the Commission on Audit, th~Commis­
sion on Human Rights1 (Art. XIII , Sees. 17-19.), and the Office of the
Ombudsman. (Art. XI, Sees . 5-14.) The Electoral Tribun als and the Com-
mission on Appointments in. Congress (Art. VI, Sees. 11-19.) are likewise
directly created in the Constitution.

.hl...t.h._g~~.~.rc_Ls~ .9.fthe!I..Y.Q.W.~..I§ ..?.'9d_f'Jl19~i9.1'lli,.t.h.eyJtr~-~-l.l.Pregle wit.J!:jn

i.h~.iL9~.s.I!Jlere ~n9,_:w_:u~..Jh~r~fox.~...h~._c;Qn~~Q,jp t~t..r.~e.~j:1 _c;.9..Q~di:­
~t~ .{lml GQ~-~g.mtl . w.ith..t.he. ~~sid.~n.t, ..Con.gre.s.s.....avd..Jb.~ .~tmr.:EliTie Cl?.!:!!t

Like t he other organs ofthe government, however, their acts are subject to
scrutiny by the Supreme Court on certiorari. <A-Sec. 7, see Art. VIII, Sec.
5 [ 2 ).)

.. .1The term of office and othAr qualificatio ns and disabil it.ies ')f tht:! members of the
Commission 0:1 Human Rights shall he provided by law. I Art. XIII. Sec. 17.)

273

274 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 2-4

SEC. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither
shall he engage in the practice ofany profession or in the active
managementorcontrolofany business whichin any waymaybe
affected by the functions ofh is office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirec tly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including govern-
ment-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Disabilities of members of Constitutional
Commissions.

The fiduciary nature of a public offic.q which the Constitution expressly
guards in the case of the President, the Vice President, members of the
Cabinet, a nd their deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13.), and the
members of Cong:ess (Art.VI , Sees. 13-14.) is a lso protected in relation to
t he members of the Constitutional Commissions .

Their disabilities during their continuance in office are similar to those
imposed on the President and the Vice-President.

SEC. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be fixed by law and shall not b e d ecreased during their
tenure .

Compensation of members of Constitutional
Commissions.

Section 17 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) prescribes the initi?.l
annual salaries for the Chairman a nd Members of a Constitutional Com-
mission at P204,000 and Pl80,000, respectively, which can be increased
but not decreased by law during their continu ance in office. Any decrease
will affect only the Chairman or the Commissioners appointed s ubse-
quently to the enactment of the law. (see Art. VIII, Sec. 10.)

It would seem that Section 17 of Article XVH does not apply to the

Commission on Human Rights. (see Art. XIII, Sec. 17 .) Sa id provision

refers to the "Constitutional Commissions" which, under Article IX, do not

include the Commisl>ion on Human Rights. •

SEC. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their
officials and employees in accordance with law.

Appointment and removal of officials
and employees.

As independent bodies charged with the sole a nd exclusive responsibil-
ity for the proper management of their respective offices, the four (4)

Sec. 5 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTlONAL COMMISSIONS 275
A. Common Provisions

Constitutional Commissions have, accordingly, the power to a ppoint their
own officials and employees and to remove them.

In th~JL~F.ci~~_Qf. .s uch...P.Q:W..~1_!h~y .S:r..e ~ ybj ect ..t~Lt.he .Jll:Qyjs ions of tlw

.Civil Service Law. Said law m ust, of course, be in accordance with the
pro.~isi~ns. of the--Constitution , particularly those on Civil Service. CArt. IX,
B-Sec. ll2); see Art. XIII, Sec. 18[10].)

Other common fea'iures.

In addition, to further insure the exercise of their powers and functions
with the highest degree of independence against outside influences, the
Constitutional Commissions have been given these common features:

(1) They are multi-headed bodies;

(2) They are categorized as "independent" by the Constitution;

( 3) Their power s a nd functions are defined in the ·Constitution;

(4) The Commissioners are required to be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines;

(5) Th eir terms of office are staggered with a two-year interval;

(6) The Commissioners appointed a re ineligible for reappointment for
a period beyond the maximum tenure of seven (7) years;

(7 ) Appointment t.o any vacancy is only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor;

(8) The Commissioners cannot be appointed or designated in a tempo-
r ary or acting capacity; and

(9) The Commissioners are removable only by impeachment. 1Art. XI,
Sec. 2.)

The last five (5) features (Nos. 5 to 9) do not a pply to the Commission on
Human Rights. (Art. XIII, Sec. 17.) Note, however, that under the cited
provision, only "the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities
of the members of the Commission" are mentioned which shall be provided
by la w. 1

Under the law, a special retirement scheme is provided for members of
the constitutional commissions.2

SEC. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly release d.

1Although Article XI, Section 2 Flpeaks of "the members of the Constitutional Commis-
sion~;" without distinction, it refers only to the three (3) Constitutional Commissio n~ created
in Arti cle IX.

'S ee R.A. No. 3595, as amended hy R.A. No. 1568 and P.D. No. 1582. See Footnote 1.

276 T~XTROOK ON THE t'HJ LIPP1 NE CONSTITCTION Sees. 6-7

Fiscal autonomy.

Like the Supreme Court, the Con~titutional Commissions enjoy fi scal
autonomy to s trengthen t heir independence in the perfo rmance of their
co n~titutional functions. Note, however, that unlik l~ in the case of t he

judiciary (see Art. VIII, S ec. :u, there is no prohibition against the t'educ-

tion of the appropri a tion ~ fo r the Constitutional Commissi~'ms below tho
amount appropriateri for the previous year.

SEC. 6. Each Commission en bane may promulgate its own
rules concerning pleadings and practice b efore it or before any
ofits offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.

Rules of procedure.

E ach Commission I'm brznc is authorized to promulgate its own rules
governing pleadi ngs a nd p ractice befo re it or any of its offices. (see Art.
VIII, Sec. fi[5] ..l Such rules shall not dimini sh, increase or modify substa n-
tive rights as distinguished fro m procedural rights. (see Ib id.)

SEC. 7. Each Commission shall d ecide by a majority vote of
a ll its Members any case or matter brought before it within si:"f~
~ays from the date of its submission for d 2cision or resolution.
A case or matter is d eem ed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
a ny decision, order, or ruling ofeach Commission may bebrought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty d ays from receipt of a copy thereof.

Rendition of decision and judicial
review.

( 1) Any case or matter brought befor e each Commission must be de-
cide d by a majority vote of all its members within sixty (60) days from the
date of its subm ission for decision or resolution. The period begins to run
from the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum (see Art. VIII.
Sec. 15[21.) requi red by th e rules of the Commission or by the Commission
i t s e l f.

12) An aggr ieved party may bring any deci sion, order or ruling of each
Commission to the Supreme Court on certiorari (see Art. VIII, Sec. 5r2].)
within (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof. By certiorari, a party raises
questions of law in the Supreme Court. The findi ngs of fact made b"y a
Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court. (see Ibid., Sec. 5l2,
e].) Under C-Section 2(2 ), decisions, final order s or rulings of the Commis-

ART. IX. -CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSlONS 277
B. The Civil Servict> Commission

sion on Elections on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable.

Congress is empowered to prescribe by law the manner and period of
review of the decision, ordt>r, or ruling of each Commission.

SEC. 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions
as may be provided by law.

Additional functions under the law.

In addition to their constitutional functions, "each Commission shall
perform such other functions as may be provided by law: ' Thus, by means
of legislation, the Commissions can be given the necessary measure of
flexibility in the discharge of their constitutional t asks . Of cou1·se, Con-
gress cannot diminish the powers and functions granted by the Constitu-
tion to the Commissions.

B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SECTION 1. (1) The civil service shall be administeredbythe
Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners who shallb e natural-born citizensofthe Philip-
pines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the elections immediately preceding their appointment.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent ofthe Commission onAppoint-
ments for a term ofseven years withoutreappointment. Ofthose
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any va-
cancy shall be only for the unexpired term ofthe predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Composition of the Civil Servic;e Commission.

It is composed of a Chairman and t wo Commission er s. cSec. 1[1).) The
former Civil Service Commission before the 19n Constitution was a statu-
tory one-man Commission. 1 Its conversion into a collegiate body is envi-
sioned to enhance its independence on the theory that it will be more

:R.A. No. 2260, as amended by R.A. No. 6040.

278 TF.XTBOOK ON THE PHILIP P INE CONSl'T'J'UTION Re c. 1

r esistan t to political pressure or in f.!uence tha n a body h eaded b y a s ingle
i ndividua l.

Qualifications of members.

They are:

(1 ) Thr~y mu~t be n a tural -born citizens of the P h ilippines;

(2) They must be a t least thirty-five (:35 ) years of a ge at the tim e of
their a ppointme nt (r ath er t han a~sum ption of office );

(3) T h(>y must. be persons \Vith proven ca pu.city for public admi nistr a-
t ion. Knowle~ge of law or experience in the practice of law is n ot regu ircd
hy the Constj t ution pres umably beca use the position calls m0rc (~Jl­

as.i.s.l::I:ati~.!.Ui!:Y..!.ath er t h a n ~L!<9J.J:l.P.Ctepce . Th ere m ust be a showin g

tha t they hav e heen 'i~"' thc"~'ef'v1~e"' a n effective public administrator.

T his is necessary hecau:::le t h e Commissioners are r espon sib le for an agency
tha t performs significant func tions;2 and

(4) T hey m us t n ot have been candidates for any elective position in the
el ections imm ediately preceding the ir a p pointment. This requir eme n t in-
sures t he p olitical neutrali ty of pros pective a ppointees a n d effe ctively
precludes the appointment of JlOlitic.aUyrq:u~.lli:l.<~- I see S ec. 6.)

'-· .....( ; ...:... ... ~ f .... .. .. '- ·-"!"

Appointment and terms of office.

They sh all be a ppointed by the P resident wi t h t h e con:>ent of th e
Commission on Appointments for <1 term of seven (7 ) years wi t hout reap-
poi ntment. Of the Comm issi oners firs t a ppoin te d, one sh a ll h old offi ce fo r
seven (7) years, another for five \5 l y ears, and t he third for three (3 ) y~ars

without reappointment.

Reappointment cannot be made in favor of a Commissioner who has been

jus t appointed for a term ofless than seven (7J yea rs afler the expiration of his

term. Subsequent ap PQintm ents shall h e for a term of seven (7) years . The

appointment or designation of a ny Member in a temporary or acting capacity

is not a llowed.'1 (Sec. 1(2j .) ·

Rotational scheme of appointment

This sche me ofmtational a ppoin tme nt is i n tended to give continu ity to
th e Commission by allowing t h e term of only one Comm issioner to expire
every t&.o..J2).~s . Consequently, its m e mbers would invariably have the
benefits of th e experi ence of older member s in the performance of its
functions. Moreover, it is unlikely, in the ordi nary course of e vents, that

~19811 lil'L Constilu tion Projcd . The Constitutional Com m i;;:;ions, p. l:i.

"Presiden t F . :-.-ia rcos appointed in an adin::! l:<l p arity t h e for rnt-r Chairman of the
Com mission on Audit who. nftct· serving for a n umber of yea r~; , was given a perrnt• nen t
appo intmen t fo r a ter m of seven (7i year;;.

Sec. 2 ART. IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMlSSlONS 279
R. The Civil Service Commission

the same President will be ahle to appoint all the members of the Commis-
sion. This is also the policy in the other two Commissions. !infra.)

The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both
indispensable to itR workability:

(1) The terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should ~tart on a
common date; and

(2) The appointment to any vacancy due to death, resignation. or dis-
ability should be only for thE> unexpired balance ofthe term of the predeces-
sor.

The starting point of the terms of office of the staggered 7-5-3 year
terms of the first appointees to the three (3) constitutional commissions.
regardless of the dates of their appointments and assumption of office, i:<
on Et.hruary 2, [email protected] date of the adoption of the Constitution.

Reasons for creation of the Commission.

The creation of an independent centralized agency having direction
and control over the civil service system and empowered to enforce civil
service legislations was believed essential to the operation of the system,
and its inclusion in the Constitution, an additional safeguard for the
successful implementation of the merit system.

A Civil Service Commis~ion created by statute is subject to reorganiza-
tion or abolition at any time. But even discounting this possibility, the
power over appropriations is a mighty weapon which Congre~s can readily
wield over the Commission. On the other hand, under his power of control,
the President can reverse or revise decisions of the Commission. Because of
its independence from the political branches of the government, a constitu-
tiona.l body as the Civil Service Commission could more effectively resist
the pressures of politicians and thus ensure that selection and advance-
ment in the Civil Service are attained through merit and fitness.4

SEC. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, sub-
divisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations with

-Qri,gi~.c.b..a·--r·t.~ers....

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fit:q_~to be deter~ined, as far as
practica,ble, and, except to position~ which arelpolicy-determin·
ing, pri:rt'1arily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be re-
moved or suspended except for cause provided by law.

'See 1970 UPLC Constitution Revision Proje-ct, pp. 653-655.

280 TEXTBOOK ON THI<~ PH lLlPl'l~E CONSTITUTLON Sec. 2

(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage,
directly or indirectly, in any electioneeringor partisan political
campaign.

~) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.

(6) Te mporary employees of the Gove rnment shall b e given
such protection as may be p1·ovided by law.

Meaning of Civil Service.

T he term Civil Servic_e m eans that professionalized body of men a nd
wom en who have made of the government service a hfetime career. It has
also been u sed to r efer to that portion of the public ser-vice that is "governed
by the meri t principle in the .selection of officers a nd employees.''1

Scope of the Civil Service.

The Civil Service embr aces every branch , agen cy, subdivision, and
im;trumentality of th e governme nt, includi ng every gover nment-owned or-
controlled corporation with origi na l charter .2 (Sec. 2[1].) The intention of
the Constitution is to extend t he r~quirements a nd benefits of t.he Civil
Service System over the administrative personnel of the entire governmen-
tal organization - nationa l an d local including the military esta blish-
m en t.3

Un der the Constitution (see Ar t. XII, Sec. 16.1, only government-owned
or -cont rolled corporations can be created hy special law or charter. But
they can be created under the general incorporation law4 in which case
they arc not embraced within the scope of the Sen ·ice.

Constitutional classification of positions
in the Civil Service.

On t he basis of appointment, the Constitution classifies positions in the
Civil Service into two principal groups/' namely:

' i''ield, Civil S~rvice Law 3 ( l9:Hl L
2Sect ion 2( I l placing em ployee!' of government-ow ned M -con trolled co rpora tio nf; u nder

t h e Ci'-i l Servi.:e is implemented hy Presidential DccreA No. 807 (infra. ! <tnd Prc;;idon tial

Decree No. 442 C L~tbor Gode of thP. P hilippines I is.succl M11y 1. 1974, cffe(:tive N o,·ember 1,

1974 , as amend~~ ll.
;Not all th ~: provision~ of the C:on ~titution on the civil Hc rvice arc ,.;trictly abo u t the civil

scrviee only. (see R-Secs. G, 7, 8.i
'The Corporclt}()n Code of th e PhHippines,lB.P. 13lg . 68.1
:;l'~d.c.nt jal Decree.liD..Jilll (Ci vii Service Dec re e) ,·echu;sificd the category of po!;itions

in Lhe Civil Service (from compe Li i ive st•rvi ce, non -compt!ti tive or uncla;;~ified service. and
exP.mpt sen;icol into: < ll ~!..~'?IJD!.i.CJ' ch aracterized by: <a) entrance hased on merit and

fitness to he determ ined as far a s pr a ctic-able by competitiYe examiuat ions, or based on
highly t echnical qualifications; !h ) s~:~curity of t enure; and (c) opportu n it y for advancement tC>

Sec. 2 ART. IX. -CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 281
B. The Civil Service Commission

(1) .Corn.p.ctitiue. -Those whose appointments are made according to

merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations;" and

(2) J::!.g_n-co!!JJ2~Wive. -Those whose appointments do not haw to take
into account merit and fitness as determined by competitive examinatjons.
To the latter belongs those. positions described by the Constitution as
;'policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature."
(Sec. 2[2].) But their appointments shall still be made according to merit
and fitness.

The merit system.

(1) Me.r.~t...4!!1~rmingd.J!Jr9.Jillh..~.QfJJ:Pgti.tjve examination-'.!.- As a general

rule, the selection of any appointee to any government position "shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable x x x by competitive examination." ([bid.)

It is obvious from the provision that the recruitment of government
personnel is not to be made on the basis of an indiscriminate or whimsical
method of selection or on consideration of friendship, kinship, partnership
or social connections. Merit and fitness as qualitative factors in the selec-
tion of civil servants have reference to personal qualifications for compe-
tence and ability to perform thE> official task. A person's qualifications in
this regard are to be determined by competitive examinations as far as
practicable.7

(2) _Qtjter_!!_t~t_h,g_cj~o[_de~er"!f.'!:ing_Tl!:_eri~. -Where competitive exami-
nations are not practicable, other methods ofdetermining merit and fitness
may be resorted to, such as by an investigation of school records, experi-
ence in actual work, achievements of a character relevant to the position to
be filled, and such other tests modern educational science has produced.~
According to Presidential Decree No. 907 (supra.), "graduation with honors
earned under the competitive atmosphere ofthe academic community is as
good as a qualifying mark in a competitive examination to determine merit
and excellence for public employment."

higher career positions; and (2) Nan·Cru:ccr Sert'i~e characteri1.ed by 1<1'1 <'ntr:~nce -:,n oa;;es

other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the car.:-.::r ;;er\·ice: 1b1
,<enure which is limited to a period specified by law, or· which is coterminou~ wuh that of the

appointing authority ot· subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to thE- duration of a

particular project for which purpOse employment was made. (see SN:i'. 5 and o thereof.)

~sid~ntiaLDc~~e No.J!Q.? .<Ma1·ch 11, 1976), aR amende(! by Pn•:'idt-nti<tl Decree No.

893. i grants honor graduates (those who have earned at least cum ir11.de hon('r"' of four-year

O:•Jllcgc course eithet· second or first-grade civil service eligibility rating depending on the
;:·ositions to which they are appointed, whil<'.f,residential Dec.z:ee.~~Sept. 16, 1976)
:onfers civil service eligibilities on scientist~=~ and teC'hnnlo~;,>ical ~pECialists ha;;ed on t.h~ir
:J.Ualifications and the requirements of public service.' •ee al~o Pre:<. Decree No. 1408, June 8,
!9i8.1

'V.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 413.

"Ibid.; sec also Presidential Decree No. 997, supra.

282 TEXTBOOK ON THF: l'HILIPPINg CONSTETUTION Sec. 2

(3) Ik1!!fJ.t.tir..o_f!l_ S)!Sl.~!!!· --The merit system,9 as shown by experience

the world over, secures efficienc y in govern ment service a nd promotes
social justice. Efficiency r esults becaus e selection and promotion of ~m­
ployees is based not on political considera tions but on merit and fitness.
Social jus tice, on t he other hand, is subserved because the merit system
guarantees equality of opportunity (see Art. XIII , Sec. 1, supra.. ) to all
deserving applicants desirous of a career in public service. '('

Non-competitive positions.

They are the following:

(1) .P_olicy <l.f...ter:..!Jlining, where its occupa nt is vested wit.h the power of
fonnulating policies for the government or an y of its agencies, subdivi-
sions, or instrumentalities, like that of a member of the Cabinet;

( 2) Er.i1111J.Ii~rrfisismlffi...l, where its occupant enjoys more than the
ordinar y confidence of th e appointing power but bear s such close intimacy
which relieves the latter from mi!-!givings of betrayal of personal trust on
confidential matters of th e State ,11 like tha t of a private secretary; and

(3 )_!Jighly techni£!!L where it s occupant is required to possess skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, 12 like that of a scientist. The
position of legal counsel of a government~owned or -controlled corporation
is highly technical in nature, and at the same time pri marily confidential. 1'l
In such case, the occupant canno.t insist on a fixea or a definite term if the
la tter asped predominates.

Those holding primarily confid ential positions hold office at the pleas-
ure of the appointing power (e.g., private sec1·eta ries of certain officers;
confidential agents). 14 According to the Supreme Court, when such pleas-
ure turns into displeas ure, the incumbent is not removed fr om office, bu.,

9 Presidential Decree No. 1409 (.fum• 8, 197Hl creates in the CSC a Meri t System Boa!'d
re na med by the Administrative Code of Hl87 (Exec. Order No. 2n.! n11 the t-1erit System
Protection Board, whose primary function , Among {>t.he rs, is to hear un.:l dc(·ide cai'C!l brought

before it by officers a nd employees who feel aggrieved by determination of a ppoi nting
authoriti~s involving appointment, promotion , t r ansfer , detail, l!tC., a s well as complain ts
against ofticers in the government arisin g from violations of the merit. system.

1"1970 UPLC Constitution Project, p. 646. Letter of £nstructio n No. 799 IJan. 29, 1979)

directs every ministry (now d epartment.) and al'cncy of the government including govern-

ment-owned and -controlled corporatiQn ::; and regi onal offi ces to o~;tablish a Selection Board
and a P romotion Board to as$iSt the appointing authority in the sele<:tion and pr<>motion of

personnel in the Civil Service, and thereby implemen ts the merit syst em ordained by the
Constitution and th e Civil Service Law.

11See Santos \'S. Mallari, 87 Phil. 289.
' 2Ibid.
'"See J:>.N. B. n•. Besa, L-26838, May 29, 1970.
"See, however, Cari no vs. ACC FA. L ·19080, Sept. 29, 1966; Gray vs. De Vera, L-23966,
May 22, 1969.

Sec. 2 ART.IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIOl\t:
R. The Civil Service Commission

his term merely expires in much the same way that a person who has fixed
term of office is not removed upon the expiration of his term. 1=-

Guarantee of security of tenure.

The merit system established in Section 2(2) does not necessarily imply
that the persons so appointed have securitv of tenure. There is thus in
Section 2(3) a guarantee of se~urity of tenure to officers and employees in
the Civil Service.

The constitutional guarantee is of utmost value in maintaining morale
and in promoting efficiency. Any employee whose continuance in office 1s
dependent upon the whim or pleasure of his superior, is likely to be the
victim of fear and insecurity. His inefficiency can be expected, as a matter
of course. under the above provision, if faithfully enforced, civil servants
can be confident of staying in their respective positions as long as they do
their work efficiently and wel1.1G

Meaning of "for cause provided

by law."

(1) Substantive requirement. -The phrase17 means for reasons which
the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient ground for suspen-
sion or removal. It means legal cause or cause provided by an existing tau·,
and not mer~ly causes which the appointing power in the exercise of
discretion may deem sufficient. It implies, moreover, that such cause must
relate to and affect (as a general rule) the functionR of the office which the
officer or employee holds. 1~

'"Hernandez vs. Villegas, L-17287, June 2H. \965; Angeles vs. Mutuc. L-20:HJI) ~ov. :29.
1968: Salazar vs. ~1athay, .Jr. & Suhido. L-44061, Sept. 30, 1976.

'~See Taiiada and Fernando. op. cit., p. 1202.
17The following, among other!:>, are dedared to be grounds for ilisciplinary aC'tinn in
accordance with the civil service law:
(1} Di8honesty, oppres:;ion, or misconduct;
(2) Habitual drunkenness;
(3) Neglect of duty;
(4l Disgraceful or immoral conduct.;
(5J Being notoriously undesirable;
(6j Physical or mental incapacity;
l7J Frequent absences or tat·dine:;s;
(8J Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duut-.;;:
C9} Insubordination;
OOi L~nding money at usurious rates of interests;
i 11l Willful refusal to pay just debts:
( 12) Pnnmit of private business, vocation or profession w!thout :securing the pcrmis:sion
rcquir.~d; and
( 13) Nepotism. lsee Pres. Decr~e Xo. 807. Sees. 36[a]. 49. • Also Admini:ltrative Code of
1987, Book V, Title I. Subtitle A. St-ction 46.
1'Tec.:;on vs. Romero, 84 Phil. 74.

284 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Ser.. 2

(2) Procedural requirement. - Basically, the guarantee of procedural
due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard before one is
suspended or dismissedY' Under the law, no complaint against a civil
service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in
writing and ~ubscribed and sworn to by the complainant.20

Abolition of position.

Congress may abolish any civil service office unless it is a constitu-
tional office. When the office itself is legally abolished, there is no removal.
Removal from office contemplates that the incumbent is separated but the
office or positicn itself subsists. The Constitution protects an officer or
employee only as long as the position remains.21 No person has a vested
right to an office which cannot be disturbed by le'gislation.2:l

Abolition, however, may not. be used as a cover for circumventing the
guarantee of security of tenure. Thus, it has been held that a civil service
officer or employee (in the local government) may not be removed by the
abolition of the office in bad faith.n

Th e principle that valid abolition of an office is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbent, does not apply to the judiciary. A judge's right
to his full term is not subject to the contingency that Congress may, for the
public good, abolish his office. (see Art. VIII, Sec. 2, par. 2 .)

In fine, abolition of an office is invalid if it involves an office provided in
the Constitution or a judicial position, or is done in bad faith.

-~.Qbi.P.U!.QD..~.9i\iO.l!t ~le.c.t(Qn~r~n.9..~nst9.ther

~an politi~~~mpaigq.

(1) Ssif.e.gy.a.r._cf: _ggqjf!.s.t. !.he_..SP.<!.il§. !'.J.~ti!.'!!:· - The principle of political

neutrality for civil servants finds its justification in the desire to secure
discipline and efficiency in the public service by doing away with the spoils
system. Many government employees have been accustomed to work for t he
candidacy of particular persons to assure security of t enure or to get
reward in the form of appointments or promotions in government positions
as sl!QiJL~..Y.i.<:!.~!X· It is, therefore, considered that the public service
"would be more truly devoted to the public welfare if public servants were
not overactive politically."24

Section 2(4) reinforces this neutrality principle.

19Sec Reyes vs. Subido, 66 SCRA 203, Aug. 21, 1975.
20Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(c).
~'Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 9·i Phil. 903.

22Z2 R.C.L. 378-379; Baldoz vs. Office of the President, I.-44622, Aug. 26, 1977.
2''Briones v11. Osmena, 104 Phil. 588.
24United P ublic Workerli vs. Mit chell , 330 U.S. 100.

Sec .~ ART. JX. - - <.;ONST1TU1'IOKAL COMMIS~IONS 285
R. The C ivil Sen·ice Cummitision

(2) f)y:_tm.t_Q[JN.LtisJJJ.atiQ..TJ:)n elections. - Officers a nd employees in the
Civil Service a r e "servants of the Stata a nd not the agent s of any politica l
group."25 Their loyalty l:>hould be t o the publi c service, not to the "rulers" of
the m oment. Under t he provis ion, their participation in any e lection is
limited to t hat of voting. In fact, it is an obligation, although it is not
m a nda t ory, of every citizen qualified to vote to r egist er a nd cast his vote.
(see Art. V, Sec. 1.) However, t hey have the right to express their views on
political issues provided such expression does not amount to any "election-
eering or pa rtisa n political campa ign ."

(3) OJ[icers _an.Q._employees covered. --The prohibi tion covers member s
of the armed forces (Art. XVI, Sec. 5[3]. ) but it refers only to t hose in t he
a ctive service, exclu ding those in the re_ser ve fqrce.2~

Civil Service, as used in Section 2(4 ), refers only t o career service.
Elective officials and members of the Cabinet who are holding political
offices are not embraced in the prohibition .2~

Meaning of electioneering or partisan
political campaign.

Under t he 1935 a nd the 1973 Constitu tions , the term used is "any
partisan political activity" which is practica lly synonymous with ''a ny
electioneering or par tisan political campaign" as used in Section 2(4 ).

Both refer to acts des igned to h ave a candidate elected or not, or to
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office. They
include such activities as participation in political campaigns, conventions,
caucuses , pa r a des or r allies, making s peeches or commentaries for or
against the e lection of any party or candidate, publishi ng or distribut ing
campa ign literature or materials, and soliciting votes or contribution s,
either directly or indirectly. 2~

Activities not covered.

( 1) ~rtisan actil.;ity_. -The pr ohibition in Sect ion 2(4 ) is directe d
against "any e lectioneering or partisa n political campaign," and not against
every kind of political activity .J.fly political activit.Y..i.§. .P-SJ.!tisAg,.lf.it....is.
dire~t:~~-tQwar_d th e a dvancement of a part ic11Jar party ~!_.Q~at~ An

a ctivity is qgt part jsa l} i~it i§ a ddn;1§§ed to th.e...at..tainment of the objective

·~qf i!l.s.~riug free, QrQ&rly.._b.2.D&§t, peaceful. and...cr.edihle..elections." (see C-
Sec. 2 f4]. }

( 2) }lgJ_r.J:§.~~Q!l.Q[..J.Li~li tical issu e>t... - Consideri ng the freedom
of expression which is equally secured by the Constitution even to gove rn·

HCaillers vs. Bonif<1Ci11, 65 P hil. :32 1.

2 ~ /hid.

27Sce :::lantos vs. Yatco, 106 Phil. 745.
V'fhe Omnibus Election Code (B.P . Blg. lUll.), Section 79(b); Presidenti al Decree No.

807, Section 45.

2HH TEXT BOOK ON THE PHILIPPI NE CONST\'l'UTION s~c . 2

ment employees, th ey may express their vie ws on current political prob-
lems or issues, or mention the names of candidates for public office whom
t hey support.20

(~) C.!J_]]lJ2.Q-.ign,?ng..fg_r._,_q_r__g.gq_ilJ:$.tJ!_-p_lg.bisc.~~__j_nj tia.£~_..Qr_r._eff!_~"!

qpestion. - Such participation does not constitute parlisun political activ-
ity. Plebiscite, initiative, or referendum is not a n election within the
meaning ofth.~,above prohibition. It involves only issues, not candidates for
public office,. 'Bence, officers a nd employees in th~ Career Civil Service can
actively pa;tici pate in the discussion of plebiscite, initiative, or referen-
dum issues without violating civil service rules and regula tions.

Right of government employees
to self-organization.

Section 2(5J grants to government employees in the civil service the
right to form unions enjoyed by workers in the private sector.:Jo A parallel
provision is Section 8 of the Bill of Rights which declares that "the right of
the peop le including t hose employed in the public and private sector s to
form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contra ry to la w
shall not be abridged." Eve n if th ere is no statement of the right to self-
org3ni zation in t he Constitution , governme nt workers can form associa-
tions for purposes not contrary to law.

The grant of the right to unionize was born out of the traditional
neglect of government workers in terms of salaries, fringe benefits, promo-
tions and working conditions which are ta ken for granted in the priva te
sector. Through unions, government employees can promote their interest
an d the interest of t he public service. They can seek peaceful remedies for
their grievances and work for mutual benefits without going through the
long process normally provided unde r civil service regulations.

Rightotgo'leUlJD~nUmm!QY~s to ~.tr!.!i~-

(1 ) G,r..an,L.Qf...rigltt not advisable. - It is not clear whether or not the
constitutional gr;nt.ofti~; right to self-organiza tion carries with it the
right to strike. If the t wo rights are to be considered separate and distinct
from each other, t he an swer must be in the negative for the latter right is
not expressly given; if otherwise, Section 2(5) together with Section 8 of the

Bill of Rights, must be construe,d as granting the right to strike as well.

Be that as it may, to allow government workers to strike is not advis-
able in the long-run. A strike declared by members of the civil service can
paralyze or disrupt government operation and ultimat~ly prove prejudicial

29See Presidential Decree No. 807, Sectio n 45.

" 0Executive Orde\· No. 180 (June 1, 1987) provides guidelines for t.h e exercise ofthe right
,p,f Eo.,;er/)i-5"e.Ii,femployee::! t o organi~~· 1t doC,.s riot aJ?.ply't? !J:l.e'm"b.ef~ ~(.~he::!\r~i!i_Ji:Q.r.~·es o(.
and jail guards·.~
.....the P h i l i.ppi n es , including police office rs, p ol i c e m e n, firemen. · · .,
-

Sec. 3 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTI0t\AL CO~lMISSIOKS 28 7
B. The Civil Service Com rnission

to public interest. The right can be taken advantage of for political or

whimsical purposes, or for purposes other than for redress of legitimate

grievances...A..st.:r:ik~. by governm.ept e'!.l.tp1oyees ~:ould be u:>cd as a coer~ive
~pon. to destp.bilize the gover,nme_nt. ~- · · · ·
-

(2) .Righi_!lQLgr:.a_nteg_bv laU?.- - Even as the right to strike is constitu-
tionally granted, Congress may. by law, deny the right to strike to some
sectors of labor like memb~!r!. of the armed forces and police and fire-
fighting units, a nd even to civilian employees operating communications,
financial institutions and other vital public ser"ices. It can provide the
details fo r the exercise of the ri ght. Un der Sect ;on 3 t par. 2. ) of Article XIII,
the right to strike shall be exercised "in accordance with law," i.e ., subject
to limitations that may be provided by law.... 'tb.tl.e__ is no .la)L permitting
public em pl o~o...strik.e.1

"e~~n of tempor¥y emp~ee§_.

Employees in the government given tempora ry appointments do not
enjoy sec urity of tenure. They may be replaced anytim e a qualified civil
service eligible becom(!S available, or at the discretion of the ap,)ointing
authority with or without cause notwithstanding that their performance
meets the standards of public service d<.~manded of them.

The Constitution mandates t hat tempurary employees in the govern·
ment be given protection as may be provided by law. iSec. 2[61. • The aim of
such law is to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of temporary personnel
and to see to it that their sepa ration or replacement is made only for
justifiable reasons. Such laws may even grant to temporary employees who
have rendered continuous and faithful service benefits that accrue to
permanent employeesY

SEC. 3. 1'he Civil Service Commission, as the central person·
nel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service
and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiv~ness, and courtesy in the civil serv-
ice. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards ~ystem, integrate
all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel progra ms.

Powers and functions of the Commission.
In the performance of its powers and functions, the Commission as the

~ntr~.~er~~m.P.dJ~g.e.n~__QLthe.. goyernrne&t, shall be guided by the objec-

~ 1 R.A. No. 6850 (feb. H. 199()) grants civil service t>ligiuil ity under ce rtain conditions to
government em.ptoyee:s appointed under p1 ovisioncl or t.emp,)rnry status who h ave rendered
a total of Reven (7) years of cfficit>nt sMvice.

· -··

2R8 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTI'J'UTION Sec. 3

tives as laid down in the Constitution to establish a career service and to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the Civil Service as well as the economic, social, and other
policies of the government.1

Under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Oct. 6, 1975), otherwise known as
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, the Q~v.i.l_S~rvice Commission
has, a mong others, the fo llowing g.n.w.e.u_&P..4f).!Il~tiQ.!.H'l:. · . - · -···-······· ·- ·

(!,Admi nister and enforce the constitutional and :statutory provisions
on the merit system;

(2) Prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree;

(3) Promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service
and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient, and effec·
tive personnel administraiion in the government;

(4J Supervise and coordinat-e the co~duct of civil service examinations;

(5) Approve appoin tments, whether original or promotional, to posi -
tions in the civil :service;

(6) Inspect and audit periodically the personnel work programs of the
different departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities
of the government;

(1) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted di -
rectly with it or brought to it on appeal; and

(/:}) P erform such other functions as properly belonging to a central
personnel agency.z

The Decree declares t hat the Civil Service Commission sha ll be the cen-
tral personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules
governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil serv-
a n t s . :i

lmportanc~ cf a permanent civil service.

(1) The work of the government would never be done ifthere were only
the Je gislators, Cabinet members and other he ads of offices to do it. These
people cannot be expected to collect taxes, audit accounts, inspect factories,
take censuses, arrest criminals , to say nothing of keeping bookR, delivering

'See Presidential Decree No. 110. (Jan. 26, 1973)
2Sce Pres idential De(:ree No. 807, Section 9; see Letter of I nstruction No. 319. (issued
Sept. 23, 1975.)
"Presidential Dec ree No. 807, Se.~tion 1. Presidential Decree No. 1218 (Oct. 14, 1977)
establishes a Civil Service Academy to implement centralized training programs for the Civil
Scn·vi ce. I.ettc1· of Instruction ~o. 785 (Dec. 22, 1978), on the other h and, (Teates "a National

Planning and Coordinating Secretariat for the purpose of designing 11nd implornenting
reorientation a nd motivational train ing programs and special course for civil service persou·
nel in e ach ?rfinistry in pursuance of the n eed to internalize government reforrns."

Sec. a ART. 1X. - COI'\STITUTIO NAL COM.MISSION::3 289
B . 'flH: Civil Service C.ornmiAsion

mails, and carrying messa ges . Such manifold tasks lmany of them purely
clerical, but many othe rs not a t. all so) fall, rather, to t he body of officia ls
and employees known as the permanent. civil service.

(2) It is this great body of men and women that translates law into
action from one end of the country to the other a nd b1·ings the goYernment
into its daily contacts with the rank and file of the citizenry. It is likewise
this reservoir of experience and knowledge that furnishes those who, fo r
the time being, have been entrusted with the reins of government with
much of the information required in shaping and enacting policies on a
multitude of subjects.

Indeed, there r.an be no denying that without the a ll-pervading and
unremitting work of the civil servants, "government would be only a jumble
of rules and regulations suspended in mid-air, without force or effect upon
th e people. "~

Purpose of providing a civil service system.

T.h~__cht~~ mo.li~..ts. JQ _fqrm. ~.....mQ.fu.s siQI.lli~d...b~f..PJI..hlic__s.erx.Qnts

pusses~.-~tain..d.c,gr.e~fJ.mi.niD_g_and compet~.!!£~..n~c~s~?-...!Y..~2 _c~~t_

ilie.J.:.Oml2lex and diver.siti~_taak...of admini.s.tfring__the affairs Q.fgyygnu_n.~.L-,

The executive busi ness of running the country and of advising the
rulers of the country is a matter fm- specialists. It cannot be learned in a
few weeks by the casual supporters of any new government. The civi l
service has been established "as an unchanging carefully constructed in-
strument which is r eady for use by whatever political party may happen to
form the government of the day.''''

Basicrequis,~es ofa. .c.iyil ~er.yi~~~Y~~~-~·

For a civil service system' to be operated succei'isfully, certain basic
requisites must be ful fi lied.

(J' M~r_it §.Y8t:i11lU.W.d.3JCf.;.t.JJ:~t:uil t.e.tll.l..!:e. - I t is esse ntial t hat appoint-

ments m ust be made strictly on the basis of merit and that the persons
appointed enjoy security of tenure; otherwise, the r ecruiting of competent
and h onest civil servants cannot be expected.

<~> f.Q},_iti,J;QLIJ&J4mlli:;.. - The other requisite is that th e civil service
mu st be politically nl:!utl·al. (see Sec. 2f41.J If the civil servant is to dis-

'F.A. Ogg., op. cit.. p . 118.
·'1970 lJPLC Comtitution R+~v i,;ion Projoct, p. 654.
1'Pct.er du Sawtoy , The Civil Service !.1957 ), p. 58.
' The ci,•il ser,·icc in the Phili ppines wa~ first cstabli:;hcd in 1900 by Act No. fi of t h e
P hilippine Commission t:ntitled -An Act for thc Esta blishm(:nt and Maintenance of an
Efficient and Hone:-;! Civil Sen·ir.:e in the .Philippine Islands ... It provided the frarn<; wnrk for a
merit-based civil se n ·i{·e .iyst~m manda ting the appoi mm ent and promotion to government
pc)sitions according t o ID{'l"it and lhrough comp{'tith·e exa m inations as far as pmcticablc.

290 TEXTBOOK 0~ TH E PHILIPPI NE CONSTITUTION Sees. 4-0

cha rge his duties faithfully, impar tially a nd efficiently. he should not be
beholden to whatever political party is in the saddle.8

SEC. 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath
or affirmation to uphold and defend this t.:!onsti.tution.

Oath to defend and support the Constitution.

The requireme~t as to the taking of an oath to support a nd defend the
Constitution is a standard provision in con~:;titutions.' (see Art. VII, Sec. 5. )
Section 4 includes employees among those required to take the oath. Under
the provision, the oath of office must be taken before assuming the position
or office or before beginning to discharge the duties thereof. It may be
t a ken before a ny person authorized by law to adminis~er oath.

Section 5( 1) of Article XVI imposes the same requirement on members
of the armed forces.

SEC. 5. The Congress s hall provide for the standardization of
compensation c f government officials and employees, including
those in government-owned or -controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature ofthe respon·
sibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.

Standardization of compensation.

(1) Salaries to be fixed by law. - To solve the problem of salary
dis parities in the civ il service system which have been a sour~e of dissatis-
faction and dissension for many governmen t employees, t he Constitution
directs Congress to provide for the standardization of the compensation of
government offici als and employees, including those in government-owned
or -controlled cor porations. This means t hat thei r salaries shall be fixed by
law ar.d in th e case of employees in government corporations, they shall no
longer b e the subject of col lective bargaining agreement with the manage-
ment of such corpora tion.

In view of the a bove provision, legislations granting sp~;!cial salaries
would be unconstitutional.

(2) Matters to be taken into consideration. -- Congress shaH t a ke into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifica-
tions required for, the positions concerned (Sec. 5.) in fixing the rates of
compensation allowable. An equitable and r ealistic salary scale based on

8See 1970 UPLC ConRtitutional Revision Project, p . 654.
1/bid., p 6613.

Sec3. 6 ·7 ART. IX.- · CONSTTTlJTIO!':AL C:OM.YIISSIONS 291
H. The Civil S~rvice Com mil"~ ion

the principle of equal pay for ~qua! work for all government employees is
another essential facto1· for promoting "morale, efficiency, integrity, re-
:';ponsiveness, progressivene::.s, and courtesy in the Civil Service .''

Sect ion 18 of Article XVl li (Transitory P rovisions) speaks of inaea.se of
the salary scal~s of ofii eials and t:!mployees of the National Gove1·nme nt
other than the officials m entioned in Section 17 of Article XVIII whose
annual salaries have been fixed by the Constitution.

SEC. 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall,
within one year after s ucb election,be appointed to any office in
the Government or any government-owned or·contr olled corpo·
rations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Ineligibility for appointment of defeated
candidate in an election.

A can didate \vho has lost in an election js likewise disqualified for
appointment or reappointment to any office in the government, or in any
government-owned or -controlled corporation. including any of its subsidi-
a r ies within one ( 1J year following such election.

The purpose is to sto p the practice whereby one with political connec-
tion aspires for an ch·ctive position with the hope that e ven if h e should
lose he could still be appointed to a n office or reinstated to his former
position in the govern ment. This practice of rewarding defeated candidates
is defini tely a tra nsgression of the will of the e lectorate in that the candi-
dates they did not wish Lo hold public office~ are rewarded with an office
after their defeat.

The provision i::; directed agai nst all defeated candidates hut more
particularly, a gainst the so-called "poli tical lameducks."l

SEC. 7. No elective official shall be e ligible fo1· appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law orby the primar y functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office
or e mployme nt in th~ Governme nt or any subdivision, agency or
ins b·umenta lity thereof, jncluding government-owned or -con-
t rolled corporations or t heir s ubsidiaries.

''I'he term "lru:ccduck': i;; " !c rm taken fro m th~· ,.,,ca bul<~ry of Am eriC<1n poli t ic,; <111d
means an clediv<! official wb o i:; me rel y rom ple t ing hi;. term whi ch iR abou t to ~~xp ire with the
concomitan t los~ ofj.>oliticul intl u!:ncc. ~fter f;li ling in his bid liH· r·c-election.

292 TJ:':X1'HOOK ON THB P HILIPPINJ:': CONSTITUTION Sec. 7

Ineligibility for appointment of elective
officials.

Section 7 seeks to minjmiz.e t he so-call ed "J!noils systew," the practice
by which public offices are distributed among the m embers of the victori-
ous party, and their relatives and supporters. Together with Section 6, it
enhances the chance of others for holding public offi ce. (see Art. II, Sec. 20.)

During .his__t.enur.e. in off1ce (not term of office), any elective official is
disqualified for a ppointment or designation (not from being a candidate or
being elected) to any public office or position in the government, whether
n ational or local , including governm ent-owned or -controlled corpora tions.
(see Sec. 2[1].) A law allowing such appointment is void! He may be
appointed pr ovided h e forfeits h is seat. (see Art. VI, Sec. 13.)

Prohibition against holding more than one
position by appointive officials.

An a ppointi ve offi cial may hold any other offi ce or employment in t he
government, including govern ment-owned or -controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries only ·when all owed by law or when required by the
primary functions of his position. Th e rule aims to remedy the problem of
appointive offici als holding multipl e positions which prevent t hem from
devoting full time to their principal function s and result in double or
multiple com pensation . (Sec. 8 .)

In the first case {when allowed by law), the pos itions m ay be t otally
unrelated to each other. In the second case {when functions a re r el ated),
the prohibitjon does not a pply even in the absence of an e nabling la w.

The prohibition is more strict in the case of t he President, Vice-Presi-
dent, the members of t he Cabine t and their deputies and assistants. They
m ay hold any other office or. employment only when specifically authorized
by the Constitution itself. (see Ar t. VII, Sees. 3[par. 2), 13(par. 1]; Art. VIII,
Sec. 81.1]; Art. XII , Sec. 9f.par. lJ.) These officials exercise more powers;
h ence, the n eed for more checks to avoid the possibility of abuse and
conflict of interest in the condu ct of t heir office.

Section 7 applies to all officials other than t hose mentioned in Article
VII, Sec. 13 (par. 1 thereof. ).2 In any case, the appointive official is not
entitled to receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless spe-
cifically authorized by la w. (Sec. 8.)

1The phrase "unless otherwit:~e provided by law" in the 1973 Cons ti tu tion p rovision (Art.
XII, B-Sec. 4[ 11ther~of. i was delet ed.

1 Executivt: Order No. 284 (J uly 25, 1987) authori:tes the holding of other government
offices or po~itions by me mbers of the Cabinet, und ersecretaries, <issistant secretaries, and
other appointive officials of the E.xecutive Department under ccrt.ain conditions. It contra-

venes Section 13 (par. 1.) of Article Vll.

Sec. 8 ART. IX. - CONSTJ'TU'l'lONAL COM~USSTONS 293
B. The Civil Service Commist;ion

SEC. 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, un:
less specifical,.h_Jmthorized by ~' nor accept without the
consent of the Cona:re!!§, any pt·esent, emolument, office, or title
~f'an_y_kind from any foreign government.

£.ens.iOllS_O.r_na.tyj!.f.ru:Lshall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation.

Prohibition against additional, double,
or indirect compensation.

This provision1 is designed to counter the evils ofdvuble compensation.

(1) Specifically, double compensation produces unemployment because
it eY..cludes other persons from the service, and results in inequalities in
compensation, in the case for instance, where a subordi nate because of his
other salary, receives a higher salary than a superior.~

(2) It may likewise produce confusion and even irregularity, concealing
from public notice the r eal compensation of a govcrnml:!nt officer or·em·
ployee. In order that the people may know the real compensation of an
officer or employee, it is necessary that the salary be from one definite
source .3 For this purpose, the a bove prohibition against additional, double,
or indirect compensation has been incorporated in the Constitution.

:< Q~Hu.:t.~.r .<>r. _m~~l !!U9VXP..ttc.~...J2CI._di~.m~..4 Jr.ee wa..~er. _QLQlr.~tric lig.h!

§~rv..l~~, ~.t.<:!,•..m:.a.P-t..e<t .%D..Qffi.C§!U®s.tillt.t.e_ .additionul comp~n.s..a.ti9~-,

Exceptions to the prohibition.

The constitutional prohibition does not apply where:

(.l) The payment of additional , double or indirect compensation to a
particular officer or employee is speci{i~Q.ll.r..authQ[j_~d _Qy_~ (Sec. 8. ) in
individual instances where the payment of such compensation appears not
only just but necessary.5 The prohibition is aimed against the giving of
extra compensation by executive or administrative order;

(2) The additional compensation is received not from the goyernmeot
or its entities; and

' (3) There are ~-difil j.lli.l!?ffi.c;e.§.. each of which has its own duties and

compensation , in which case both may be held by one person at the same

1Under the 1935 Constitution, the prohibition applies only to appointive officials or

employees.
~ 1970 UPLC Constitution Revision Project, p. 665.

' V.G. Since, op. cit., p. 421.
"[tis "daily allowance" given "for each day an officer or empluyee wat!i away from his

home base." (Lexal Laborntorie;; vs. NAtional Chemical Industrie;; Workers' Union-I'AFLU,
L-24632, Oct. 26, 1968.)

·'Sadueste vs. Mun. of Suriga.o, 72 Phil. 485.

294 TEXTBOOK 0~ THF. PHILIPPINE CONS'l' I.TUT!O!\ s~c . 1

time . He is, in the eyes of the law, t wo office rs .6 The..prohibition. .refers to

_qQ_\J_Q.le compen.~~J..i.9.n .ruHLUQt...t.l.u io.uble_ap.p.ointments and..t.he performanc~

_of.f~:n ~-~~-Q.fl~ _gf..m_o.r~_thmu:m ~ __q_ffice.:7 Jlui..the Q(fi£er_m~y ..d.I:.~w.....th~~l an:
aJ..t~che.d. tQ _the..secQnd.IWsitiun Qol_y__i\~C is specifi~ a uthorized by
,la_w_,

For purposes of the prohibi tion , P.~.!J~~-Q!l1?._9_Lgra.tl}._i~i-~s ~ re n ot co._J;\_~_j~­
~:r~ ~-.JtqgitioJl.<lL. ~Q\l.l.?.~ Ql.:j~dir~-~t.-~~J!l~I}.sa~~!l · ([b id., p ar. 2. J H ence, a
retiree who is re-e mployed in th e gove rnment may continue to r eceive h is
pensions in addition t o his compensation.

PJ:Q.h.tl>!~!~n .!11g_~ins_t a!t.~~ta'l~e of _SJ!Y.J!.r~t,

~,.1r.9.m..M¥..fO.ntign state._

The pr ohibition a gain st the acceptan ce of any present, emolument or
official title of a ny kind from an y foreign sta te or government~ is founde d in
a just jealousy of alien influence in domestic affairs .9 The purpose then is to
discourage and preven t fo reign influence in the rffa irs <>f our govornment .10

~.is...pxohibit.e.dis...thc_ru;;~eil~-ot.a. Jne~~llt:..Qffic;@J I.L9t1'gE.5!...b~
th.~. &O.Y~lJ11n.~nl9.LC!..fu.r~J_gn -~.t~.1e.lH i.!l.th.u.s..P.eim issjble..fa.r...an..offi cia! of the
elliliP.PiQ~..R~_pj.l_Ql.ic..li.o. l}s,;_c_w. i<\..l2rlv.at~ ..QI_p.erao.naUift.f.mm..a k j D i or head

.Qi.a fonii gn...g:o.:.t:.ern m ent. 11

The prohib ilion is directed only ~gain st. pub_lic officers_ a nd employees.
A pri vate citizen could, therefor·e, a ccept a gift or title fro m a foreign
gover n m ent without r unning a foul of t h i:: prohibition. 12

C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman a nd six Commissioners who sha ll be
natural-born citizens ofthe Philippines and, at the tir.oe of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years ofage, holders ofa college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority therecf, including the Chairman, shall be m embers of
the Philippine Bar who have bee n engaged in the practice oflaw
for at least ten years.

~1 Jni ted Sta tes vs . Sa u nd~rs. 20 IJ.S. 126.
~Quim~on v t<. Ozaeta , 9R Phil. 705.

"This portion of ihe provision was formerly fou nd in Arti cle IV (Bi ll of Ri ghts), Soction
9( l j of t h e 1935 Con~titution, and iram;ferrcd t o Article XV <Gener a l Provisions ), Section 5 of
the 197:~ Constitu t io n. Sec Sec. 46 , P n·sidenti al Dee re~ ~o . 807.

0See Ma lcolm & 1.aurcl, op . cit., p. 440.

'°Cooley, Const . Limit., 8th ed., p. 645.

"V.G. Si"co. t>p cit. , p. 702 .
12 1970 UPLC Cons ti t ution Revision l'roj(!Ct.,Ji. H9.__.

Sec. 1 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTJONAL COMMISSIONS 295
C. The Commission ou Elections

(2) TheChairmanand the Commissionersshall be appointed
bythePresidentwiththeconsentofthe Commission onAppoint·
ments for a term ofseven years without reappointment. Ofthose
fil'st appointed, three Membersshall hold office for seven years,
two Members f.>r five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a tempo-
rary or acting capacity.

Composition of the Commission on Elections.

It is comp0sed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners. The 1973
Constitution increased the membe~ship from three (3) in the 1935 Charter
to nine (9) on the theory that it would make it more difficult for the
Commission to become the "captive" of any political party or group or any
person who might be interested in the Commission deciding or taking
action one way or the other. It was held by many that the bigger member-
ship of the Commission, the less likely it was to be "bought" or influen,ced,1

'rhe new Constitution opted for a ~~Y~P..-.ill~.D- collegiate body. In the
final andysi8, what is more important than the size of the Commission on
Elections is the possession of the qualities of integrity, moral character,
and independence ofr.1ind by its members in the face of the feeling ofpublic
distrust towards this agency because of its alleged partiality and partisan-
ship in past elections and the massive frauds and poll-related \'iolence that
attended them.

Qualifications of members.

They are:

(1) They must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines;

(2) They must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age at the time of
their appointment;

(3) They must be at least holders of a coll(~ge degree; and

(4) They must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections.

The Constitution requires that a majority of the members, including
the Chairman, must be .members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law f(,r at least ten (10) year1-;. (Sec. lll].)
Apparently, the reason for this requirement is the fact that the Comnds-
sion exercises quasi-judicial powers.

11970 UPLC Constitution Re\'bion Project, p. 576.

296 Tf~XTDOOK 0!\ THE PHILIPPINE CO~STITUTION Sec. 2

Appointment and terms of office.

The Chairman and the Commissioners are appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
(7) ye ars without reappointment. Of the Commissioners first appointed,
three (3) shall hold office for seven ( 7) years, two (2) for five (5) years, and
the last members for three (3) years, without reappointment.

The Constitution likewise provides, as in the case of the members ofthe
Civil Service Commission a nd the Commission on Audit, for a staggered
term of two years interval. A member appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve
only for the unexpired term to prese1·ve the staggered terms of office. It has
been obBerved that this st aggering of term also makes th e Commission a
continuing and self-perpetuating body a nd consequently, its members would
have the benefit of the experience of the older members in the performance
of its functions. The contin uity of its tenure as a body makes for greater
stability for its policies and decisions and serves as a guarantee against
arbitrary action which is likely to occur in a body handling partisan

question s.~

Appointments or designations in temporary or acting capacity are also
not allowed. (Sec. 1[2].)

Purpose of the Commission.

As previously stated, in democracies, the people f(~present the sover-
eign power of the S tate. (see Art. V, Sec. 1.) T his sovereign authority is
given expression t hrough the exercise of the right of suffrage by the quali-
fied voters.

The pu.rity of elections is on~ of the fundamental requisites of popular
government.:1 It is obvious that the sanctity of the ballot and the free and
honest expression of the popular will can best be protected by an independ-
ent office whose sole work is to enforce laws on elections. The Commission
on Elections is organized for that purpose. The intention is to place it
outside the influence of political parties and the control of the legislative,
..!xecutive, and j udicial organs of the government. It is an independent
administrative tribunal, co-equal with the other departments in respect to
the powers vested in it:1

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall.

2See V.G. Sinco, op. c:it., p. 576.
1Abcede vs. l mperial. l Oa Phil. 136.
•\'.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. :iH2.

Sec. 2 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 297
C. The Commission on Elections

(2) Exercise exclusive originaljurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elec-
tive regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate juris-
diction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location ofpolling places, appointment ofelection
officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcementagencies andinstrumentalitiesofthe Government,
includingthe Armed Forcesofthe Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose ofensuringfree, orde1•ly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, orcoalitions which, in addition to other require-
ments, must present their platform or program ofgovernment;
and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religiousdenominationsandsectsshallnotberegistered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise
be refused registration.

Flm:mcial CQ..I}~ributiol).&..from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, orcandi-
dates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investi-
gate and, where appropriate, prosecute ~ases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to mini-
mize election spending, including limitation of places where
propagandamaterialsshallbe posted,and to preventandpenal·
ize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.

298 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 2

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer
or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedi-
ence to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehen-
sive report on the conduct ofeach election, plebiscite , initiative,
referendum, or recall.

Powt.r.~.J!~.9JYn~!lof!s. .Qf th~..99..1!'~tssio_f!..

The Commission on Elections pe_r(orm.s .executive as well as i~~i.£.i~l
functions. Section 2 enumer ates th e powers and functions of the Comrnis·

'Sion, to wit:

(1) To .enforce l.aw.s....r.£.l.a.ti.IJ.e.-1!2 ..tfl£...£..o.n.dM:.~L..Q[J~{e.ction~. etc. - The

Commis sion on Elections has the power to annul or cancel illegal registry
lists of voter s and t o order the preparation of a new one; 1 t o cancel the
canvass of election r et urn s of a Boar d of Canvasser s a nd order a new one
where certain ret urns were illega lly excluded;~ a nd to suspend t he procla-
mation of winning candidates pending an inquiry intn irregularities brought
to its attention.3

T he power vested in the Commi~:;sion includes the power to enfor ce a nd
administer laws relative to the conduct of plebi scit es, initiatives, referenda
a nd r ecalls which are not, strictly s peaking, "elections'' (Sec. 2f l]. );

(2) To 4.~cid.~ .s:.l&.cJ.iJUl contests. - There is an election contest when a
defeated candidate for elective public office questions the r ight to said
offi ce of one who h as been proclaimed elected ther eto, the question being on
th e elect iond, r eturns, or qualifications of the protestee. (Sec. 2(21.) Its
purpose is to ascert ain the candida te lawfully elected to office. The t erm
also includes any contest involving the right to an elective office, m ade
before the proclam ation of the winner , whether or not t he contestant is
cla iming the offi ce in dis pute. 1!1 ~.~.e ~a. ~ e L h.g~~~~r..Lof_~l~~t.~Q ~~. o f k:1~a ng~.

fl.o-officials , it is limited to proceedings aft,er the· proclamation of the winu..~~

~~· i>i·.e.j?.~.o~J.~~~~iO~· co~~!.9:v.~~~-~~~ ~~i~iiO.~~.~. 4 .. .. ....- . .. - ·---- ·- -· ·-·- -

El~c;li9J.Lc_ont~s ts involving z:.~_g!gE-~1. EEQVin£i_111, and city.. offJJ:i~l s are
placed under the exclusive j urisdiction of the Commis sion on Elections .

r·iot~ -that-el"e~ti~n~ontest.s for iliwlid_gi\i -aiic[~~ID:ang~y otfiilli!i are-Und'e"r.

the j urisdiction oLregianalJ,rial ®1\!16. ~unicipa 1 t ri al caur,ts, r espec-
tively, subject to appeal to the Commission whose aeJision s or rulings a re
final, executory and not appeala ble, subject to certiorari review by the
Supreme Cou r t (see Art . VIII , Sec. 5[2]. );

' PrudentP. vs. Genuino, L-5222, N ov. 6, 1951, cited \n l<'elician<' v.,;. Lugay, 93 Phil. 744.
2De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil. 68G; Abendante vs. Rela t o, 94 Phil. 8.
3Albano vs. Alvarez, L-19200, Jan . 31 , 1962.
•Taule vs. Santos, 200 SC RA 512 .

Sec. 2 ART. IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 299
C. The Commission on Elections

{3) To_d.~dde.a.U £J.U£s.iiQTJ.$ _qff~ting_f:kcti.on..§. - The Commission has
no jurisdiction over questions involving thti_right to vote wr..ich includes

qualifications and disqualifications of voters}: the right of a person to be
registered as voter, _the right to cast his vote, ~he validity of his ballot and

other allied questions. Sl!~h..9.~-~-~tim1~alLb~ s!_~~iged by the~urts;';

(4) '[Q..s/&pu..t.iz.e. la.w_m/Qrs:e.mer:ll ag_eacie:;;. -Note, however, that the

deputizing should be with the cancurre.ru:e. .af the..PresideJ.lt, since such

agencies are under his jurisdiction. This limitation seeks to make the
holding of "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections" fh~ jo~t

responsibility of the President and the Commission; ·

(5) .I.Q..!.'!!.g{§.fe...'.'Jl.C!.lW~.al.Q..q..rti.e.B......ftc. and accredit its citizens' arms. -
This provision is one of the reforms intended to make our political system
more responsive to the needs and demands of the times. Political parties
(in{ra.) which: (~) have no platform or program of government, or (b) seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or (c}refuse to
uphold and adhere to the Constitution, or (d) are supported by any foreign
government.-; sh.alLhe.....refu.s.e.d_registratioll. Religious denominations and
sects are not allowed to be registered as political parties in view of the
vrinciple of separation between the church and the State. (Art. II, Sec. 6.)

A.~<;~ptance of financial contribution§ from foreign governments and

their agencies- related t"o elections'1s a ground for th~ cancellation of the

registration of a political party or organization. Such contributions are
declared as constituting in:terferenc.e in our internal affa!p;.

Citizens' arms accredited by the COMELEC are supposed to be com-
pletely neutral and non-partisan in assisting the COMELEC in the conduct
of elections, etc.;

(6) ToJi_l'!__E(}_titio.!l:.§.....fnvg_t?t.igg.te...fJJl.d..pJ:J:lS£CJJ.te. -The powers given to
the COMELEC under Section 2(6) are new. It can exercise these powers on
its own initiative even in the absence of any complaint;

(7) .Xa..rec.am~. - As the body charged with the duty of
enforcing and administering laws relative to the conduct of elections, etc.,
it has also the duty to recommend measures as would effect more improve·
ments on the election laws of the country such as those that would curb
overspending, ensure the enforcement of the fair·and-equal exposure rule
for political parties and their candidates, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and prevent a strong party or
candidate from taking U'n.due advantage of the weakness of the others.
Under the Constitution, it has the power to prevent and penalize all forms
of election frauds, offenses and malpractices, nuisance candidacies (candi-
date has no bona fide intention to run for office}, or other similar acts;

~Nacionalista Party v,;_ Commi!;Sion on Elections. 84 Phil. 149.
gFO!()igJ1_ill~t...i_t~ti!Jn_§_a.!l9...Qr_ga_E_i_~ati_:>_~-~-~e not covered. Jhe purpose of support must be
political as to influence local politics. ·Support" includes any assistance other than the giving
of "financial contributions''; it may only involve financial contributions.

SGO TEXTBOOK ON THR PHJLJPPINF. CO~STITUTION Sec. 2

(8) 1'~m!!l~11rfi_ reftJJ!...l!..!!L.DL.fi~nary action. - The President

may or may not follow the recommendation of the C~mmission. Howt!ver,

since the deputization was with the concurrence of the President, it is
unlikely that he will disregard the recommendation of the Commission. As
to the officers and employees appojnted by the Commission, it can remove
them for cause;

(9) J'.f!_!.Ub!r~,it .r:.l!J!.~rt. --· The report required should contain a descrip-
tion on how a previous election (regular or special), plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall was conducted and what laws or regulations, if any,
were violated. The Commission may also make recommendations with
respect to flaws or defects it has discovered in the enforcement of the
election laws. Without the provision, the Commission, because of its inde-
pendence, may refuse to give any information at all to other branches of the
governm~mt; 7 and

(10) J._'Qpe_~ff!..r..m..QrJ7-er:_[ynction..s_.- Under present law, the Commission
has also, among others, the follm.ving powers and functions:

(a)· To exercise supervision and control over national and local
officials required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections;

(b)' To promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provi-
sions of the Election Code;

(c( To enforce and executl;l its decisions, orders and instructions;
and

(d) To carry out a continuing campaign to educate and inform the
public on election matters, and the necessity for clean, free, orderly,
and honest elections.~ (see A-Sec. 8.)

F:inality of dQcisions..:.

Under Section 2(21, where the election contests involve el~.~tj~~Lm.mlic..i­
~_l ..~n..~ :t>ar~~g~y_.Qf!lsi~~. the decisions, final orders or rulings· of the
~"' ,. Commission on Elections shall be fi.!!~J..t-!'!~.£~.!Q.!Y and not appealab~.9

'·: ," . Those involving elective regional, provincial, and city officials :may. b.e

<·' ~~EP~~!~~.t.?..~l~~ _?~~Il..r..em.e. q~mr~.:

A decision usually becomes final after a certain period of time (e.g., 30
days) unless an appeal is made to a higher body as may be provided by law
or the Constitution. Under Section 2(2), the decision, etc., of the Commis-
sion instantly becomes final after rendition.

71970 UPLC Constitution Revision Project, p. 581.
8See the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Big. 881.), Section 52; ahw, Administ1·ative Code

of 1987, E"-ec. Order No. 292, Book V, Subtitle C. Section 2.
~This does not p~cu£w.rar.Wurisdictio:n of the Supreme Court when thl'l"e is grave

abuse of disct·etion. (see Rules of Court, l{ule 65, Sec. 1.)

Sec. 3 ART. IX. -· CONS'I''ITUTIONAL COM.MISSJO~S ao1
C. Tht Cummi!lsion on F.lcctions

A final decision is conclusive upon the parties, i.e., it. terminates the
matter at issue covered by such decision. thus precluding any further
litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest C()ncern-
ing the same. Such decision leaves nothing for the Commission to do except
to execute or enforce it, and, therefore, cannot be appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Rationale of registration of political
parties.

If the State is to extend equal protection to all political parties, it is
essential that the State s hould know and be acqu ainted with what they
stand for, how they are organized, how they operate. etc. 10

Registration is the means by which the go\·ernmc nt is enabled to
supervise and regulate the activities of political part ies. 11 It is also in-
tended to inform the people of the parties' existence and of their respective
programs of government to enable them to consider wi::ely to which party
they should pledge their support. 1:t

The role of the Commission on Elections insofar a~ r egi::;tra tion is
concerned is purely ministerial/·~ i.e., its duty to accept the registration is
definite and mandatory, which it must perform ~· ithout any powe r to
exercise its own judgment or discretion. Howe,·er, ~> ~~u~_dmominq.­
~!Qn,~nd sect §hall b~ regif!~!;'J:Q.c;l.g_§..!U)Qli.t.k.sl..uartr~ tho;;;e which seek to

~,E_thejr...gQaLth.ru.u.gh..Y.iolence oti:~unlawful m ean~:: or refuse to nphotd.

.~9.9J.9.!t_~re _t_e>..the._CQnilitJ.t.tiQn._or which are :<:npported by any foreign
~Y.fltnment... (Sec. 2f.5J.) Because ofthe important role of political parties in
our democratic society, it is essential that the State should regulate or
super vise t hem.

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may s it en bane or in

two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in

order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre·

proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided :that motiona.fo.c.recon-
!i.kl.~.r.~tim! ~_f..de.ci.siona. shall be .decided by the. ,Commission. ell

Jum&..

Hearing of election cases.

T he Commission on Elections may sit en bnnt: or in two di\·isions. All
election cases (see Sec. 2[2].) includi ng pre-proclamation controver sies

16S ponsorship speech. Del P. A. Ortiz, S.J., 1971 Con;;titutiona l Co nvention.
11Peralta vs. CO~lELEC . L·4 7';'71. .Y1arch 11. 19';'5.
' 2Sponsorship speech. Del. S.S. Aldequer. 1971 Constitution••) C<)nve.1tion.
•sSponsor~>hip speech, Del. R.T. Fajardo. 1971 Constitutional Convention.

302 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 4-5

shall be heard and decided in division..-However, motions for reconsidera-
tion of decisions shall be decided en bane.

The Commission is empowered to promulgate its rules of prucedure in
order to expedite the disposition of election contests. Congress may, by
legislation, fix a period for the rendit ion of decisions for election cases. 1

SEC. 4. The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all fran·
chises or permits for the operation oftransportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Govern-
ment or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or -controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to en-
sure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public inform a-
tion campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective ofholding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.

Regulation of public ujilities and media.

The above authority given to the Commission is to be exercised for the
purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peacefu l, and credible elections~·
and only during the election period. {see Sec. 9. ) Note that government-
owned or -controlled corporations are among those that may be supm·vised
or regulated by the Com mission. The provision seeks to place all candi-
dates on more or less equal footing in making known their qualifications
and platforms and their stand on various public issues and equalize their
opportunities of winning at the polls.

Section 4 applies to plebiscites, particularly to one relative to constitu-
tional amendmcnts.t (see Art. XVII .)

'SEC. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sen-
tellce for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall
be grantedby the Presidentwithoutthe favorable recommenda-
tion ofthe Commission.

1Under the 1973 Constitution, "all election cases shall be decided within ninety (90} days
from the date of their submission for decision!' (Art. XU, C·Sec. 3 thereof.) Not infrequently
in the past, dela ys in the rendi tion of decisions had allowed the wrong men to occupy elective
positions for practically the entire t erms of the office so tha t the people's wi ll was thereby
nullified.

1U nited Democratic Oppos ition IUN£D0l vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17, April 3, 1981.

Sec. 6 ART. IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 303
C. The Commission on Elections

Pardon, etc. of violators of election taws.

.;~The purpose of this provision is to avoid any possibility of the President

granting pardon, amnesty (see Art. VII, Sec. 19.), parole, or suspension of
sentence to violators of law or rules and regulations concerning elections,
who may belong to his party or for political reasons.

Meaning of parole.

Paro~ is a method by which a prisoner who has served a portion of his
sentence is conditionally released but remains in legal custody, the condi-
tion being that in case of r.lisbehavior, he shall be imprisoned. A parole
does not pardon the prisoner.

Meaning of suspension of sentence.

A sus.vensifJll...d'_ sentea.c;&.. ~~~ the postponement of the execution of a
sentence for an indefinite time. It is different from ff:P!:~~ (see Art. VII,
Sec. 19.) in that the latter postpones the execution of a sentence to a fixed
or definite date.

SEC. 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to
evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.

Meaning of political party.

A.R.Qtiticq(_par.t.Y may be defined as voluntary organization of citizens
advocating certain principles and policies for the general conduct of gov-
ernment and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adop-
tion, designates and supports certain of its leade1·s as candidates for public
office. 1 The chief aim of political party is to gain control of the government.

The term has also been defined as "an association of voters believing in
certain principles of government form~d to urge the adoption and execution
of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like belief."2
It includes organizations which are ordinarily non-political such as those of
farmers, labor, women, urban poor, and other sectors presenting or sup-
porting candidates in electionsr

Free and open party system.

(1) Growth ofpolitical parties encouraged. -The Constitution encour-
ages the development of more than two political parties. It provides that ua
free and open party system should be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people x x x.'' (Sec. 6.) This constitutional policy of

1See Brooks, Political Partie;; and Electoral Reforms (1923), p. 14.
2Peralta vs. COMELEC, L-47771, March 11, 1978.


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