Luther and Liberation: A Latin American Perspective

All these questions—and, of course, there are more—merit their own treatment but cannot be addressed here. I propose two tasks: first, to suggest an appropriate characterization of Luther and the movement to which he gave rise, and second, the fundamental theological explanation for the elaborated characterization. II. A General Characterization of Luther’s Work The movement that originated with Luther acquired four principle designations: Protestant, reforming, Lutheran, and evangelical. We will examine their relevance and aptness.22 1. Protestant In 1979, the 450th year of the origin of this term was celebrated. In the Diet of Speyer, in 1529, when, through the effort of Emperor Charles V, an attempt was made to reverse the decision of the previous Diet of 1526 which granted freedom to form evangelical territories, some princes protested, claiming freedom of conscience as the foundation for decisions of faith. It is not the purpose here to go into the historical details of this episode nor to pursue the question of the interests underlying the contradiction between claiming freedom of conscience for faith and claiming the establishment of territorial churches,23 but to note that, regardless, the term “Protestant” came to be a characterization of Luther’s movement, “becoming in time the ‘secular’ name of the adherents of the Reformation.”24 In fact, we “Sacramentos: Túmulo ou Berço da Comunidade Cristã?” Estudos Teológicos 20, no. 3 (1980): 127–42. 22. In this part, I am basically following Karl Gerhard Steck, “Die Autorität Luthers,” Evangelische Theologie, Special Issue: Ecclesia semper reformanda, a Festschrift for Ernst Wolf on his 50th Anniversary (1952): 104–20. 23. See, therefore, above, the section on the formation of the territorial churches, in chapter 6: The Church—Poor People of God. 24. Steck, 116, quoting Ferdinand Kattenbusch. [All quotations from Steck translated into English from the German by MS.] Luther and Liberation 330 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

can go back into the life of Luther himself and point, for example, to his steadfastness during the Diet of Worms (1521). It is important to highlight that it is not a question of protest for protest’s sake, but that it was done in the name of conscience.25 There is here an apparent contradiction between this aspect and the trait of the “authoritativeness of Luther’s doctrinal claim.”26 The bipolarity of conscience and doctrine could have been responsible for the fact that pietism and rationalism clung, each in its own way, to conscience, while orthodoxy clung to doctrine. Steck observed, in case we elevate this apparent contradiction to dissociation: “In this case Luther’s authority would carry within it the seed of its own dissolution.”27 However, the contradiction is only apparent. Luther knew: a troubled conscience could lead to despair and self-annihilation but a conscience freed by the word of God and inextricably linked to it had the duty, the courage, and the impetus to protest. It is clear, therefore: in Luther the free conscience is bound to the word of God. The conscience itself has to undergo a process of liberation, which comes from justification, through the gospel.28 “In other words: Luther’s understanding of doctrinal authority does not exclude the prophetic element; it includes it,”29 and when this is missing, there is without doubt a serious limitation of the doctrinal element as Luther intended. In the attempt to understand for ourselves the relevance of the term “Protestant,” it is possible to recover a positive interpretation. Protestant would not simply be one who is against something but 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., 117. 28. For analogous reasons, Paul Tillich could talk about the “transmoral conscience,” in The Protestant Era, abridged edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 136–49. Also, Dietrich Bonhoeffer spoke of the “liberation of conscience.” See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (London: SCM, 1955), 211–16. 29. Steck, 117–18. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 331 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

one who pro-tests, that is, places oneself in favor of a higher value. This attempt at positive interpretation is legitimate, insofar as Protestants are not constituted as simple protesters but favor the gospel. This observation is important to overcome, for example, a banal and unchanging polemic against Catholicism, but one also should not forget the oppositional element inevitably present. To paraphrase Gustavo Gutiérrez,30 using Freirean concepts, we say: every “annunciation” implies a “denunciation,” and every “denunciation” must serve an “annunciation.” Note, however, that Luther did not aim to limit himself to denunciation but to get to annunciation and stay there. Therefore, the characterization of Protestant, although it has a dimension of validity, is not, from a theological point of view, the most fitting term.31 2. Reforming Luther not only passed into the history books as the Reformer but this also seems to have been the preferred designation for the first evangelicals and appeared in the Formula of Concord itself.32 Again, there is much that is true and undeniable in this characterization. From the preaching and work of Luther came a series of reforms and, in fact, a Reformation church emerged. Luther saw in this a permanent task, expressed in more than one of the brilliant formulations attributed to him: ecclesia reformata semper reformanda (church reformed, always being reformed). But here, we 30. Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, ed. and trans. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), 150–56. 31. It should be conceded, however, that in certain circumstances and specific contexts, in which other alternative terms (reforming, Lutheran, and evangelical), particularly “evangelical,” assumed very different connotations to their original meanings, the term “Protestant” can be the most appropriate on an emergency basis. 32. Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert, eds., The Book of Concord: The Confession of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 527; hereafter referred to as BC. Luther and Liberation 332 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

must also make an exception. If the term “reforming” were the best characterization for the work of Luther, “then the authority of the reformer would be the authority of the renewer or the innovator.”33 And again, then, there is a contradiction: Luther accused Rome precisely of being innovative and repeatedly defended himself against accusations of innovation. He was, on the contrary, giving expression to the continuity of the true early church. For him the contradiction was not between a stagnant church and another, reformed, but between the true church and the false church. He himself did not intend to reform but above all simply to preach the gospel. It is true: according to him, the word of God has such power that it transforms reality. So he asserted against Erasmus: “For the Word of God comes, whenever it comes, to change and renew the world.”34 Reform is, therefore, the fruit of the preaching of the word and not of Luther’s planning. Thus, Luther was often surprised by new developments and the whole movement that emerged from his preaching was for him a huge surprise. “Ingenuously,” Luther said at a certain point, “I saw myself caught up by events.”35 We can see this clearly in the immediate and spectacular repercussions of the actually unpretentious 95 Theses. Even later, Luther reacted more to events than inducing them.36 For him, the church is a creature of God, not a human construction, coming to observe that: Therefore they cannot tolerate the Word of God or those who declare it, for such a person disfigures their building by causing cracks and rents 33. Steck, 113. 34. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehman, eds., Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955–), 33:52; hereafter referred to as LW. 35. Steck, 114, referring to D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Harmann Böhlau, 1983–), Tr, IV, nr. 3944; hereafter referred to as WA. It is not included in the selection of Luther’s table talks in LW 54. 36. Possibly one can explain from this fact some of his controversial or even recriminated decisions in the political and social order. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 333 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

in it. He is a rabble rouser who misleads the people whom they have so beautifully edified, ordered, and organized. His way of doing things is entirely different from theirs.37 To the accusations that he would have destroyed the papacy without constructing a new church, he observed that to construct a church does not mean to establish new organizations but “to lead consciences from doubt and murmuring to faith, to knowledge, and to certainty.”38 Luther intended, therefore, to proclaim the gospel not to reform the church. The rest was a consequence. 3. Lutheran Lutheran doctrine is (or should be), of course, the doctrine of Luther. There is, in Steck’s formulation an “indissoluble bond between person and cause in Luther’s own doctrinal claims.”39 We know that Luther could become very zealous about his doctrine and argue harshly against his opponents. Notable for this was the drafting of his will, in 1542, when he asked to dispense with the legal authentication by a notary, renouncing the prescribed legal procedures because I in truth am, namely, a public figure, known both in heaven and on earth, as well as in hell, having respect or authority enough that one can trust or believe more than any notary. For as God, the Father of all mercies, entrusted to me, a condemned, poor, unworthy, miserable sinner, the gospel of his dear Son and made me faithful and truthful, and has up to now preserved and grounded me in it, so that many in the world have accepted it through me and hold me to be a teacher of the truth. . . . So, his own signature should suffice, of one who is “God’s notary and witness in his gospel.”40 37. Ibid, quoting Luther, WA 31/I, 173 (see LW 14:97). 38. Ibid, quoting a table talk by Luther (LW 54, nr. 3323b). 39. Ibid, 118. 40. Ibid., 119, quoting a letter by Luther, LW 34:297. Luther and Liberation 334 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

However, in this point as well it is necessary to make some qualifications. Firstly, the name “Lutheran” goes against Luther’s express will. He asked everybody to “make no reference to my name; let them call themselves Christians, not Lutherans. What is Luther? After all, the teaching is not mine. Neither was I crucified for anyone.”41 Then he mentioned I Corinthians 3, and called himself a “poor stinking maggot-fodder,”42 concluding: “I neither am nor want to be anyone’s master. I hold, together with the universal church, the one universal teaching of Christ, who is our only master.”43 Luther went so far as to say that the common people would be driven away from truth when they are called by his “wretched name.”44 There was in Luther, therefore, a clear awareness of the distance between himself and the word of Christ. How is this consistent, however, with his doctrinal claims, which are bound to his person as God’s chosen instrument? The answer seems to me to consist in that being Lutheran is an event and not a state of being. This advice is best of all: We should not suppose that the Gospel, which we now have, will stay with us forever. Wait, and see what the situation will be in twenty years. Then tell me about it again. After the death of the present pious and sincere pastors, others will appear who will preach and act according to the pleasure of the devil (. . . ) The people become weary of the Word and suppose that it will endure forever. [. . .] In fact, it stays and endures but a short time before it is gone.45 Being Lutheran, therefore, is not something that is acquired once and then preserved, but it is something that must be obtained each moment, in renewed faithfulness to the gospel. It is a permanent task. Therein lies the truly problematic aspect of the confessional fixation 41. LW 45:70. 42. Ibid. 43. LW 45:71. 44. LW 45:70. 45. Steck, 120, quoting Luther LW 23:262–63. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 335 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

of Lutheranism, even in the sense of a particular church (Lutheran), because there it is supposed to be possible to fix and thus preserve, with the person of Luther, the contingent and instrumental identity of the evangelical cause.46 In any case, a process so dubious came, without doubt, to block to a large extent the “free course of the gospel,” preparing the path for what Steck calls the “very problematic road from Luther to Lutheranism.”47 4. Evangelical Thus we come to the term “evangelical,” as a theologically more appropriate characterization of Luther and his work. Here, “the authority of the cause, not of the human being”48 is expressed. Here throbs the positive, fundamental interest always reiterated by Luther. From here comes courage for protest; from here the Reformation is born. Here, Luther’s relevance today and, by extension, also of Lutheranism itself, may reside. From this also comes his tireless work as a preacher because the gospel comes through the word, and the living word, preached, in event and not eternally fixed. Its authority is “spiritual,” understood as exempt from coercion whether external (by laws or governments) or internal (through legal and doctrinal prescriptions of the ecclesiastical institutions). Luther was convinced that in this event the gospel is required for each new situation. Indeed, this was, he was certain, his own private and public experience. Hence, for him also, the evangelical cause was 46. Also, with regard to this point, there are no conditions of entering into the historical and political details of the transition of the “course of the gospel,” so important to Luther, to the stratification of the movement in territorial churches under the principle of cuius region eius religio. We know that Luther conferred on the princes ecclesiastical authority as an emergency measure, which, however, came to constitute something definite. (See above the section on the formation of the territorial churches in chapter 6: The Church—Poor People of God.) 47. Steck, 119. 48. Ibid., 115. Luther and Liberation 336 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

equally a constant return to the word of God expressed in the Bible, characterizing the church as a creature of the word and its servant.49 III. Key Elements to Understanding the Gospel What, then, would be the central features of what is understood to be evangelical?50 We must be consciously selective. An investigation of Luther’s many theologies, concerning the delimitation of his authority and core doctrines, will result in a large disparity (despite several recorded consensuses). Undoubtedly, one of the fundamental characteristics in Luther was his emphasis on the authority of Scripture and the uniqueness of this as a source of doctrine and faith. Thus, Martin Schmidt, addressing the authority of Luther, developed it from the rediscovery of Scripture and its message.51 The process of the rediscovery of Scripture and the hermeneutic developed by Luther merit careful attention.52 In this context, however, we focus our attention directly on the content of Luther’s biblical discovery. Specifically, we will 49. See for example WA 7, 721. 50. In addition to opting, with Steck, for the term “evangelical” as that which best characterizes the work and intention of Luther, I will make two brief observations. Firstly, Hans Küng in an interview once pointed out that the terms “evangelical” and “catholic,” currently used to designate church denominations, are really ecclesiologically complementary. In practice, both can serve as a corrective for the denominations: what is evangelical, because it issues from the gospel of Jesus Christ, is at the same time necessarily catholic, in the sense that it has universal scope; it cannot be limited to one confessional body; inversely, what is catholic, or universal, is only such if it is evangelical, that is, if it proceeds from and is in agreement with the gospel. The second observation is practical. In Brazil, only in the South is the designation “evangelical” more or less current for the churches of the Reformation, particularly the Lutheran confession. In the rest of the country, the term has come to designate Pentecostal churches, or, to a lesser extent, conservative Protestant churches. This tendency is accentuated lately even in the South. Thus, the designation “Lutheran” or “Lutheran confession” is often seen as necessary to avoid misunderstanding. However, it remains undeniable that theologically the self-understanding of “Lutherans” is, or should be, “evangelical.” 51. Martin Schmidt, “Luther als Autorität,” Luther 45 (1974): 33. 52. See in this volume, chapter 5: Scripture—Instrument of Life. See also Gottfried Brakemeier, “Interpretação Evangélica da Bíblia a partir de Lutero,” in Reflexões em torno de Lutero: Estudos Teológicos, vol. 1, ed. Martin Dreher (São Leopoldo: Sinodal, 1981), 29–48. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 337 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

only understand well the important principle of sola Scriptura (only through Scripture), if we grasp it not as a determination of formal authority but as the discovery of a material center of Scripture that inversely serves also as an internal hermeneutical principle for its understanding—which has been designated as the canon within the Canon. Very often, especially in the most popular expositions, one presents the evangelical in Luther in terms of solae characteristics: sola Scriptura, sola gratia, sola fide (only through Scripture, only through grace, only through faith). Although this approach is consonant with the doctrine of justification, it is not always clear that these three principles, in turn, converge in the solus Christus (only Christ). Furthermore, there is the temptation to limit the exposition to the work of God in Christ for us, and its appropriation through faith, forgetting the equally necessary and essential new life of the believer. Mühlhaupt chose the following sequence of topics: Bible, justification, two kingdoms.53 Von Loewenich addressed the question through salvation, Scripture and reason, the new morality.54 Meyer, in turn, developed the “pure gospel,” the “correct use of the sacraments,” and the “living faith.”55 These are just a few examples. One can observe that each theology of Luther presents its own structure, reflecting not only the perception of each author but also their own particular presuppositions. As there is no neutral theology, neither is there a possibility of reconstructing abstractly a universal theology of Luther. Our interpretations are inevitably influenced by our locations. The only objectiveness, for which we advocate, is to give an account to 53. Erwin Mühlhaupt, 114–19. 54. Walter von Loewenich, “Das “Thema Luther”—der Mann und sein Werk,” Luther 44 (1973): 99–100. 55. Harding Meyer in Erwin Iserloh and Harding Meyer, Lutero e Luteranismo Hoje, trans. Breno Schumann (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1969), 45–57, 57–69 and 69–84. Luther and Liberation 338 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

ourselves and our interlocutors of our own purposes, testing them repeatedly on the subject of our research. I do not intend, then, only to reproduce, but to interpret, to re-understand within my conceptual and experiential horizon. As I have already observed in the beginning, the question “what did Luther want, in the end?” has to be fluid within the question “And what do we want in the end?” This option is inevitable. I will try to be aware of it and to show it. 1. Justification by Faith This is, as we all know, Luther’s central doctrine. This does not stop it from being controversial within Lutheranism itself, culminating in a great debate in the Fourth General Assembly of the LWF in Helsinki, in 1963,56 interestingly around the same time in which a kind of ecumenical consensus was established about its validity. The result of this meeting and the process of ecumenical consensus are summarized in the well-known “Malta report,” in 1972, entitled The Gospel and the Church. 57 Meanwhile, officially a joint CatholicLutheran declaration was reached on this doctrine, signed on October 31, 1999, in Augsburg, Germany.58 The date and place of signing are symbolic, given their importance to the Reformation. The significant advances in Catholic-Lutheran dialogue in the last five decades, as well as the agenda still pending in this dialogue, are well summarized and outlined in the report of the Lutheran 56. See Commission and Department of Theology of the LWF, Justification Today: Studies and Reports (Geneva: LWF, 1965). 57. See Walter Altmann and Bertholdo Weber, eds., Desafio às Igrejas (São Paulo: Loyola, 1976), especially 93–126. 58. See the text Doutrina da justificação por graça e fé: Declaração conjunta Católica Romana—Evangélica Luterana (Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1998). This publication, even before the signing ceremony of the Joint Declaration, includes contributions made in the Catholic-Lutheran Seminary in Brazil. The Declaration is also available on the Vatican website: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/ rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_31101999_cath-luth-joint-declaration_en.html. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 339 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Catholic Commission on Unity from 2013.59 If I read this correctly, it establishes a consensus when looking retrospectively at Luther and the differences arise when one questions the relevance of the doctrine today. We refer, first, to Luther. Justification by faith, as a doctrine, is an expression of Luther’s deep personal experience. It is not necessary to dwell on this, as the facts are known. Luther struggled with the question “How is it possible to have a merciful God?” and sought the answer in the late medieval theological conception that “to whom does what is possible, God gives grace” (facere quod in se est). All his efforts to obtain and deserve grace, through the recommended practices of prayer, asceticism, self-examination, penance, the most humble services, and so forth, redounded in failure. The advice of Staupitz, his superior in the monastic order, to look further into the cross of Christ, helped, but Luther could not really accept Staupitz’ observation that he should not be so rigidly scrupulous in the self-examination of his smaller faults. Later, Luther repeatedly explained that the path of meriting the grace of God is an expression of a profound egoism and, as such, a total sin that leads unwaveringly to one of two effects: to vainglory and arrogance or to despair. Luther was lost in this last, with his scruples. He came to consider himself as hopelessly condemned and hated God, a feeling that intensified when he was faced with the statement of Paul (Rom. 1:17a) that the “righteousness of God is revealed in the gospel.” As if, indeed, it is not enough that miserable sinners, eternally lost through original sin, are crushed by every kind of calamity by the law of the Decalogue, without having God add [new] pain to [old] pain by 59. Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commission on Unity, report: From Conflict to Communion: Lutheran-Catholic Common Commemoration of the Reformation in 2017 (Leipzig: EVA, 2013). Luther and Liberation 340 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

the gospel and also by the gospel threatening us with his righteousness and wrath!60 He was furious with God. He struggled, however, with the text of Paul, until, noting the sequence of the text, “the just shall live by faith” (Rom. 1:17b), he understood that God’s justice is not an active one that punishes the sinner but a “passive” justice, through which the merciful God justifies us by faith, as it is written: “the just shall live by faith.”61 Luther felt reborn and as if he entered into paradise itself. Because of this experience, Scripture acquired a new and liberating sense. He had found his personal liberation and, simultaneously, the hermeneutical key to understanding Scripture. Luther recognized that for the church also this is a fundamental doctrine, the article stantis et cadentis ecclesiae (on which the church stands or falls). On the one hand, the preaching of the Church can only break the arrogance of one who considers herself naturally righteous and comfort people afflicted by their sin, when it is based on this article. On the other hand, however, this is also because the Church itself is tempted to try to merit grace and God, and places itself as the intermediary between God and people, receiver of the meritorious works of the people and transmitter of God’s grace. This has led to the institutional security sought by the church and frequent ecclesiastical authoritarianism. The “good works become the works” that the faithful do for the church. In contrast, however, the church that lives in justification by faith is the one that proclaims and transmits freely God’s forgiveness, as Luther explained masterfully in his 95 Theses. Let us approach, however, the question of the current relevance of the doctrine of justification by faith. Many of the difficulties seem to consist in problems of terminology. The juridical conceptualization 60. LW 34, 337. 61. Ibid. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 341 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

is not as easily accessible to human beings today. Luther’s existential dilemma and question is also not reproduced automatically in all people. Neither is the alternative absolute, but it seems very true, in certain contexts, that the question of guilt and forgiveness is today frequently substituted by the question of emptiness and meaninglessness to be overcome by God’s unconditional acceptance.62 However, in the Latin American context the relevance of other points related to the doctrine of justification is worth noting.63 First, we find in this doctrine the rejection of the prevailing values in modern capitalist society—partially, at least, those that were in the socialist too: production, possession, culture, power, social stratification. In justification by faith, the person is accepted unconditionally—this is justification of the ungodly, in Pauline terminology—accepted as the person he is, and not for what he has or can produce. We can find there, in my view, also one of the important roots to the modern question of human rights that must not be overlooked in Lutheranism as an expression of selfishness, the amor sui (self-love), criticized by Luther.64 It is highly significant that the LWF, in view of the next general assembly, to be held in Windhoek, Namibia, in May 2017, commemorating the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, chose subthemes that emphasize the gratuitousness of salvation, deriving from this that neither salvation, nor human beings, nor creation can be understood as tradable commodities (not for sale). Thus, the gratuitousness of salvation, the unrestricted value of the human being as such, and full respect for creation are affirmed. 62. See Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), especially 40–63 and 155–78. 63. See in this volume chapter 4: Conversion, Liberation, and Justification. 64. Hans Joachim Iwand, Glaubensgerechtigkeit nach Luthers Lehre (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1951), 23. Luther and Liberation 342 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Second, the doctrine of justification by faith is critical to the church itself, insofar as it is always tempted to make efforts to mold itself and accommodate itself precisely to the prevailing values in society. Its decisions can be taken in accordance with social morality; its internal system of values can be a copy of the mode of economic production and it can enter into an express pact (through identification or through alliance) or tacitly but effectively (through a dichotomous approach) with the prevailing political power.65 According to the doctrine of justification by faith, however, the dignity of the Church consists only in hearing the word of God, a word simultaneously prophetic and heralding God’s love. 2. Evangelical Freedom The concept of evangelical freedom, explained by Luther in a brilliant treatise66 , is in its first part a variant of the doctrine of justification by faith, reflected on in relation to the theme of freedom. “A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none,”67 is the first thesis, valid for the realm of faith. Fundamental to its understanding is the distinction that Luther makes between the person and work.68 Outwardly, one can see works of different kinds. We are likely (“the natural man” does this inevitably, according to Luther) to judge a person by their works. However, these are worthless before God on behalf of the person. On the contrary, the believer is free from having to do works. 65. See in this volume, chapter 8: The Reign of God in Church and State. 66. Martin Luther, Freedom of a Christian, LW 31; 333–77. The reader should not be confused by the distinction that Luther makes between the body and soul. His interest is not biologicalanthropological (to establish the separate parts of the human being) but relationalanthropological (to establish the relationships of the integral human being). In the first part, Luther referred to the relation of the human being with God, in the second, of those who believe with their neighbor. (See also the quote from Luther in chapter 7: Sacraments: Tomb or Cradle of Christian Community?, footnote 18.) 67. Ibid., 344. 68. See Iwand, 47–50. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 343 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

And when others challenge you with the passages in the Scriptures in which works have some value, stand fast with those that support grace. The passages that refer to works you should understand as treating works as consequences: live in grace and do not feel the lack of any merit; from there on in, the corresponding consequences will emerge.69 God wants to reach the person in her entirety, behind the outward works. This is also, according to Luther, the fundamental claim of the first commandment: the whole person.70 Precisely at this point, we find the root of the peculiar freedom that characterizes the Lutheran churches generally in relation to others that adopt legalistic conceptions frequently. This freedom has its expression in the joy of living and letting live, which despite many faults, still characterizes many of the Lutheran communities. Let us replace our thinking about works with ethical behavior, political affiliation, or theological beliefs, and we will have also the root for the internal theological pluralism of the IECLB. “Christian freedom” is, it seems, what most characterizes “Lutheran-ness” for the IECLB, and it does not seem appropriate to see it as a deficiency and a shame in relation to other churches, like Catholic on the one hand, and Pentecostal on the other, not to mention others. There is an important contribution against legalism and fundamentalism that preys on us from all sides. People, the church, the Brazilian people, all humanity, need this freedom that in all systems, including the majority of churches, is terribly withheld from them. However, let’s not get carried away. This is only half of the theme of “evangelical freedom.” Luther’s second thesis is that “A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.”71 Its validity lies in the sphere of love. Probably the greatest tragedy of Lutheranism and its constant temptation consists in confining itself to the first 69. WA 15, 424, 20–22, in a sermon from the year 1524, not included in LW. 70. Iwand, 38. 71. LW 31: 344. Luther and Liberation 344 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

thesis of Christian freedom. The other side of the coin is (should be) inevitably: free to serve.72 The tree, being good, in fact produces good fruit.73 Now Luther did not hesitate to speak again about good works, in a positive sense. Incidentally, in 1520, the same year he wrote his treatise on Christian freedom, he also wrote another on good works.74 There, Luther carried out a decided reversal, with regard to works. Those works that were customarily considered good, that is, those made for God or for the church (prayers, fasting, pilgrimages, penances, veneration of relics), are decidedly classified as bad and works of the devil, “for God and the church do not need” them.75 It was the devil who narrowed the scope of the worship of God, to works within the church. Good works, by contrast, are those that express service, love for the neighbor.76 3. The Cross The most intimate and decisive point in this stupendous reversal is the cross of Christ. Here we see Luther’s famous theologia crucis. 77 Here is the renunciation of all and any triumphalism. The path to power is abandoned, to value instead weakness. The cross is the point of 72. In the quotation cited in note 67, Luther referred to works as “consequences.” 73. A more radical formulation than the one used by Philip Melanchthon in the Augsburg Confession, article VI, that “faith should yield good fruit and good works and that a person must do such works . . .” (BC, 40, translation of the German version of the AC) or that “faith is bound to yield good fruits and that it ought to do good works . . .” (BC, 41, translation of the Latin version of the AC). Emphases added. 74. Treatise on Good Works, LW 44:21–114. 75. WA 10/I/2, 40 (not included in LW). 76. LW 44:60. There is no need to go into detail here because the issue will be taken up in section 4. Note, however, that evidently also those works (prayer, fasting) can be legitimate good works, where they are expressions of service. In WA 10/1/2, 40 Luther included among the good works also those done for the benefit of animals! 77. See Walter von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), and Gerhard O. Forde, “The Work of Christ,” in Christian Dogmatics, v. 2., ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 47–63. See also in this volume, chapter 3; In the Cross of Christ, Victory over all Evil. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 345 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

confluence of God and the human being, in which the orientation of human life is inverted. On the one hand, the cross marks the path of God forsaking God’s majesty and God’s threatening omnipotence, for, as an expression of God’s love for human beings, God places Godself in human hands. There lies the consolation for the believer: “The more we draw Christ down into nature and into the flesh, the more consolation accrues for us.”78 On the other hand, this coming of God on the cross is a barrier that stops the human presumption to reach God through his own means or establishing the human being as God. At this meeting point is what Luther called the “wonderful exchange.” Christ assumes our sin—he becomes a sinner, we received his righteousness—therefore we become righteous.79 Justification cost God God’s own son; it costs us our old selves. Here is what Luther classified as “deiformitas,”80 which we can classify as “con-formity” with Christ and which Manas Buthelezi (SouthAfrican Lutheran) called “identity as identification.”81 Or, returning to Luther’s words: “He is our abstraction, and we are His concretion.”82 There, our path is reversed from ascending to descending. The perspective of the believer begins a movement downward: as Jesus, she does not return to the healthy but seeks those who are ill; she does not collude with the strong but shows solidarity with the weak; she does not see through the lens of the powerful but from the perspective of those who are oppressed. For the Lutheran church this means that, regardless of its members (to what class they 78. WA 10/1/1, 68, 6–7. (not included in LW) 79. See Iwand, 62–63. 80. Ibid, 60; see in this volume, chapter 3: In the Cross of Christ, Victory over all Evil. 81. Statement he made at a consultation we both attended. 82. LW 11:318. Luther and Liberation 346 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

belong, for example), its lens has to be decidedly that of the little ones and the weak: the smallholders or landless, the unemployed and underemployed, factory workers, migrants, people with disabilities, those who suffer marginalization for their sexual orientation, people of color, the indigenous, women, and children. Or she is not of Christ, and, therefore, is neither Lutheran nor evangelical. 4. The New “Holiness” Luther created a profound and incredible change in the concept of holiness.83 In the Catholic theology and practice of Luther’s time, there was a double standard in holiness and ethics. One thing was required of the people in general, which was obedience to the Ten Commandments. All people were capable of this. The other was the ethic for members of religious orders (friars and monks), who had to follow the evangelical councils, contained mainly in the Sermon on the Mount. For this, special conditions were required, such as seclusion and monastic vows. The requirements were greater but the conditions also were more appropriate for their fulfillment. The resulting holiness was considered of superior quality. For Luther, the effort to match this ideal of holiness resulted in his experience of the failure of his own flesh. He discovered that the “world” from which he intended to flee was installed inside each one and that concupiscence consisted in the slave-like love of oneself. All the works carried out to get rid of this were precisely an expression of its tutelage. He characterized the human being then—this, another of his brilliant expressions—as a being “hunched over oneself.” The liberation obtained with the discovery of justification by faith enabled a radical reversal of values, as indicated above. The “good 83. See one of the classic articles of the Luther renaissance, published originally in 1919: Karl Holl, The Reconstruction of Morality, ed. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, trans. Fred W. Meuser and Walter R. Wietake (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1979). What Did Luther Want, in the End? 347 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

works” (veneration of relics, pilgrimages, purchase of indulgences, fasting, prayer, asceticism, etc.), were thus characterized as works of the devil, as meritorious practices ultimately focused on self-interest.84 In contrast, those works considered neutral or even necessary evils, such as those for subsistence and social organization, came to be good and desired by God, the true location of a new “holiness.” Luther is known to have coined the German word Beruf, corresponding to profession. In Beruf, however, we find the root rufen, “to call.” That is to say: profession is vocation. The reasoning is clear: not longer would the “professional” office and one’s own “sustenance” become most important, but the dimension of serving through the profession as vocation. From homemaker to politician—all was recovered for this new “holiness.” From the institution of prostitution to the practice of usury—all was condemned as an abuse of the human being and of the neighbor, and, therefore, of God. It is difficult to imagine today how revolutionary that position was in Luther’s time. It was a complete reversal of values, of holiness, of ethics. Those filled with apparent “holiness” were “sent empty away,” whereas those “hungry” for ethics were “filled with good things.” Nevertheless, to remember this achievement is insufficient today. This revolution is misleading and needs to be experienced in new terms- revolutionized again. For the conscience of the evangelical Lutheran, there was nothing, so it seemed, more than the notion that one should be efficient in their profession, and if subordinate, then obedient. I mean: there was an acceptance of the economic and political patterns prevailing in our midst.85 The most significant 84. It is important to recognize, however, that despite the controversy, Luther did not discard but required prayer, fasting, and discipline of the body when an expression of selflessness and love of the neighbor. 85. This fact is evident, for example, in research conducted at the Evangelical Congregation of the Lutheran confession at São Leopoldo. See Gerd Uwe Kliewer, “Uma Comunidade Evangélica Luther and Liberation 348 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

and frightening result is precisely this: first, efficiency, denies in practice justification by faith, which now comes to be justification through professional efficiency—“whoever progressed did so because they worked”; and second, obedience negates freedom and the cross as perspectives and condemns the weak to subservience, conformity, and slavery. Therefore, to understand Luther’s “new holiness” today, we need to insert it in the context of the identification with the cross and understand justification by faith as freedom to take on the cross. This means: to place “vocation” and the “holiness” of the secular profession into a broader context, where today history is made, that is, in the context of the social organizations and movements. This is the place where one decides today if we live in freedom and in the cross of Christ and, therefore, we renounce any worth before God for what we have achieved and we are willing to live only through grace.86 *Revised version of a lecture published originally in Martin N. Dreher, ed., Reflexões em torno de Lutero: Estudos Teológicos, vol. 1 (São Leopoldo: Sinodal, 1981), 9–28. frente aos Problemas Sociais e à Atuação Sócio-Politíca da Igreja,” Estudos Teológicos 17, no. 3 (1977): 5–23. 86. Let me insert one observation as to the effectiveness of this option within the IECLB: I see at the moment its implementation to be less likely in the cities than in rural areas. In rural areas, the IECLB does not only have members, but partially still is the people, although let me add a caveat that due to a number of factors, especially given that through the development of communications and the model of economic development adopted in Brazil, the social structure and urban cultural structure have already been transplanted to the rural areas with enough intensity. Returning to the city, however, almost everywhere the transplantation of the rural parish structure occurred in the past and is now quite solidified, having opted for the location of the temple-church in the city centers, leaving aside the people. In this model, the popular neighborhoods become dependent on the center or are abandoned to “sects.” In the rural areas, subject to violent changes, the right moment for a reordering of the pastoral option has almost passed. If, however, it was done—and there are experiences of this type—the interdependencies and rural exodus will open greater opportunities for an urban popular pastoral in IECLB. In this sense, meanwhile, there are a growing number of experiments in the constitution of communities and places of worship in the neighborhoods of large and medium sized cities. Also, missionary projects develop here and there in the big cities, particularly in poor and peripheral neighborhoods. What Did Luther Want, in the End? 349 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:24:39 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

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16 Matthew 25:31–46 Justification and Liberation The well-known parable of the so-called “Judgment of the Nations” has inspired the doctrine and social action of the churches. I. The Relevance of the Parable The great social encyclicals of the Catholic Church almost invariably cite it, particularly verse 40.1 Vatican Council II also invokes it when it exhorts us to become “to make ourselves the neighbor of every person . . . and of actively helping him.”2 The IECLB also refers to this parable when, from it, the church introduces its social position confessing “our failure.” 1. Leo XIII, Rerum novarum: Encyclical of Pope Leo XII on Capital and Labor, nr. 36 (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_ rerum-novarum_en.html); John XXIII, Mater e Magistra: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Christianity and Social Progress, nr. 109, (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/ encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html); and Paul VI Populorum Progressio: Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on the Development of Peoples, nr. 74 (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_ populorum_en.html). 2. Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, nr. 27, (http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_ 19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html). It can also be found in a different translation from the Latin original in Austin Flannery, ed., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Northport: Costello, 1975). 351 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

We have omitted ourselves as part of our communities, where we close our eyes to what is happening around our temples. We have omitted ourselves from the national realm, closing our eyes to the injustices suffered by our compatriots. We have omitted ourselves in the face of the suffering of people and individuals worldwide. In so doing, we became disobedient and denied the one who we confess as our Lord. It behooves us, therefore, as Christians, as a community and as a Church, to recognize our guilt, repent and ask for forgiveness, expressing all this in meaningful work for the hungry, thirsty, stranger, naked, sick and imprisoned Jesus in our surroundings.3 If this parable has a unifying power in the inspiration for the position and social action of the churches, propelling both Catholic as well as the Evangelicals of Lutheran Confession (among other Protestants) along a common path, there is in it too, through eventual diverging doctrinal interpretations, a disruptive potential. I refer to the traditional Catholic-Lutheran controversy with respect to justification by faith and of sanctification in charity. The starting point of the present study is the following: there is, on both sides, a tragic misunderstanding and we need to make an effort to not insert into the present text the doctrinal-theological controversy that, according to the Catholic-Lutheran dialogue of recent decades, should be considered as overcome.4 The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification between the LWF and the Vatican, signed in 1999, summarized this fact as follows: The understanding of the doctrine of justification set forth in this Declaration shows that a consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification exists between Lutherans and Catholics. In light of this consensus the remaining differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis in the understanding of justification [. . .] 3. Nossa Responsabilidade Social, in Quem Assume esta Tarefa? Um Documentário de uma Igreja em Busca de sua Identidade, ed. Germano Burger (São Leopoldo: Sinodal, 1977), 43. [Translation by T. Cooper.] 4. See Walter Altmann and Bertholdo Weber, eds., Desafio às Igrejas (São Paulo-Loyola, 1976), 96–97. Luther and Liberation 352 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

are acceptable. Therefore the Lutheran and the Catholic explications of justification are in their difference open to one another and do not destroy the consensus regarding the basic truths.5 II. The Parable in Liberation Theology Apart from its relevance in the positioning of the churches, the parable of the “judgment of the nations” has played a leading role in the work of a number of contemporary theologians, particularly Latin American liberation theologians. Leonardo Boff, in his famous book, Jesus Christ Liberator, wrote: There is a sin that is radically mortal: the sin against the humanitarian spirit. According to the parable concerning anonymous Christians in Matt. 25:31-46, the eternal Judge will not ask people about the canons of dogma, nor whether they made any explicit reference to the mystery of Christ to help those in need. Here all is decided.6 As a key to understanding this biblical passage Boff referred to the known concept, created by Karl Rahner, of the “anonymous Christians,” who in Rahner’s theology were characterized precisely by making manifest their Christianity (and thus guided by the divine) by their conduct, without even being conscious that they are Christian themselves. Soon after, developing Yves Congar’s concept of “sacrament of the neighbor,” Boff further radicalized this interpretation, asserting: “The sacrament of brotherhood is absolutely necessary for salvation.”7 The way to attain salvation was also the axis of Juan Luis Segundo’s considerations, when he addressed the current text. He asserted that 5. Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, by the LWF and the Catholic Church, paragraph 40 (http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_ chrstuni_doc_31101999_cath-luth-joint-declaration_en.html) 6. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology for Our Time, trans. Patrick Hughes (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1978), 95. 7. Ibid. Matthew 25:31–46 353 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

there are, with respect to this, in the New Testament, “two lines of thought.” “One line of thought shows salvation to be conditioned by particular, specific means [. . .] entering the Church through faith and baptism.”8 The other—and here the key text is Matt. 25: 31–46—has an “absolutely universal dimension,”9 that “eternal life will be awarded to those who showed true love, that is, to those who truly aided the God-made-man.”10 The concept of salvation as “reward for acts of love” recalls traditional Catholic terminology that in the past instigated the Lutheran-evangelical polemic, jealous of defending the principle of justification by faith. Indeed, one must ask whether this concept lives up to the reality intended by the parable. Later, Segundo tried to synthesize the two lines, observing in it also the influence of Rahnerian thought: the Christian is “he who already knows” what God enabled all to do: love.11 Gustavo Gutiérrez, in his classic book, A Theology of Liberation, extended the coordinates further, helping us to glimpse more clearly the importance of this text for the theological conception of liberation. He spoke of the key text, in a section entitled “Conversion to the neighbor” in the chapter “Encountering God in history.”12 For him there were three important aspects: the stress on communion and fellowship as the ultimate meaning of human life; the insistence on a love which is manifested in concrete actions, with “doing” being favored over simple “knowing,” and the revelation of the human mediation necessary to reach the Lord.13 The “little ones” of the brothers and sisters of Jesus is any and all 8. Juan Luis Segundo, A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity: The Community Called Church, vol. 1, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1973), 8, reflecting on Mark 16:15f. 9. Ibid, 8. 10. Ibid, 9. 11. Ibid, 11. 12. Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, ed. and trans. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), 106 and 110. 13. Ibid., 113. Luther and Liberation 354 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

persons in need, needing to consider only two factors: the love of the neighbor has to be “a real love of persons for their own sake”14 and not for the love of God. On the other hand, it is relevant in the current situation that the “neighbor” is not just taken individually. It is the human being located in “the fabric of social relationships, to a person situated in economic, social, cultural, and racial coordinates. It likewise refers to the exploited social class, the dominated people, the marginated.”15 Thus, love acquires a historical-political dimension. Hugo Assmann continued to synthesize this perspective dramatically when, in his book Opresión—liberación: Desafío a los Cristianos (Oppression-Liberation: Challenge to the Christians), he interpreted the conversion to the kingdom of God as conversion to the transformation in history and conversion to the human being.16 And referring to chapter 25 of Matthew, he affirmed: This is the Christian paradox of tremendous revolutionary significance: to convert to God and to the perspective of God’s kingdom it is necessary to convert, here and now, to the human and to human history. It is in the struggle of liberation that God’s love is embodied.17 In short, we found in the cited interpretations three main lines: a) identification of God or Christ with the poor and oppressed; b) the call to conscious participation in the historical process, by conversion to the human being in need; c) salvation as reward for the acts of love as practiced. It seems important for us to reflect in the light of the text on the inter-relationship between these aspects. The text has two poles: the presence of Christ in the poor and the scene of the “judgment of the nations.” The question of the relationship between 14. Ibid., 116. 15. Ibid. 16. Hugo Assmann, Opresíon—Liberación: Desafío a los Cristianos (Montevideo: Tierra Nueva, 1971), 154–55. [Translation by T. Cooper.] In English, for Assmann’s position, see: Hugo Assmann, Theology for a Nomad Church, trans. Frederick Herzog (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1975). 17. Ibid., 155. [Translation by T. Cooper.] Matthew 25:31–46 355 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

divine and human action is in both, in an indissoluble tension. To prepare us for a concluding reflection, we turn to additional insights, now from Protestant theologians. III. The Pericope and Protestant Theology Who are the “little ones” mentioned by Jesus: his own disciples, as in Matt. 10:42 and 18:6–10, or all and any human beings in need? The exegetes and theologians are divided. 1. “The Little Ones” Luther, in a sermon in 1537,18 interpreted the parable as referring to the judgment of Christians in their behavior towards their needy fellow Christians. In favor of this interpretation one counts, beyond the texts of Matthew mentioned above, the concept, equally important in the first Gospel, of Jesus sending his disciples as his representatives and preachers (chapter 10). However, the placement of the pericope immediately before Jesus’ Passion story (of universal reach), the theme of the Beatitudes (Matt. 5: 3–12), the exhortation to love even our enemies (Matt. 5:43–48), and the original configuration independent of the parable seem to indicate a broader identification of Jesus with any poor, needy, and suffering people. Karl Barth considered this too: Jesus is no less present, though hidden, in all who are now hungry, thirsty, strangers, naked, sick and in prison [. . .] For these are the least of His brethren. They represent the world for which He died and rose again, with which He has made Himself supremely one, and declared Himself in solidarity.19 18. Martin Luther, Predigten über den Weg der Kirche (Munich: Siebenstern, 1967), 119–212 and in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1983), 45, 324–29; hereafter referred to as WA. Sermon not included in Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehman, eds., Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955–); hereafter referred to as LW. Luther and Liberation 356 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

John A. T. Robinson, in his renowned booklet Honest to God, also understood the passage in this broad sense. Using the terminology of Paul Tillich, he said “God, the unconditional, is to be found only in, with and under the conditioned relationships of this life: for he is their depth and ultimate significance.”20 Christ is found in “common humanity,” through love.21 Returning to Luther, we see that this idea, in another context, was not strange to him. Significantly, we find it in a sermon (given in 1526) on Matt. 22:33–40, the pericope about the double commandment of love. For Luther, it was not a path to salvation itself but a new life in God’s love for human beings. The world is full, full of God. In all lanes, in front of your door, you will find Christ. [. . .] Hear, O wretched man: if thou be willing to serve God, thou hast in thy house, your household and your children. Teach them to fear and love God and to trust in him alone, etcetera. Console your afflicted and sick neighbors; help them with your wealth, your wisdom, your knowledge; do not put out of your house your employees, if they are sick; with them you put Christ on the street. Do you not hear Christ saying that what you do to one of the little ones, he wants to accept it as if you did it to him [. . .] Listen to what I say to you: if you want to love me, if you want to do something for me that makes me rejoice, then help the poor with all that you would want done to you, if you were equally in need; thus, you will really love me. Take care not to set me aside. I want to be very near to you, in each poor human being who needs your help and your teaching; I am with them.22 In this respect, therefore, there is no dissonance between liberation theology and Luther. We clearly found in Luther even the reason that love is not due to God but to others, as well as the consequence 19. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, vol. 3, part 2, ed. GW Bromley and TF Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960), 507–8. 20. John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCM, 1963), 60. 21. Ibid., 61. 22. WA 20, 514, 27–515, 29. (Sermon not included in LW.) In the previous section there is a direct allusion to the parable in Matt. 25: 31–46. [Translation from the Portuguese by T. Cooper.] Matthew 25:31–46 357 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

that Christian works are not due to the church but occur in everyday life in the secular sphere of home, profession, and public order. “You must not do good to God and the saints because they do not need it. [. . .] But to people, to people, to people—do you not hear me?—to people you must do all that you would have done to you.”23 It is true that Luther’s explanation was predominantly an appeal to the individual, although one should not forget that he was also a constant critic of unjust structures and oppressors of human beings. The bitter and constant polemic against the church structure of his time fits into this context. Luther was equally a critic of constituted political and secular authority, advocating for necessary social reforms. The image of a subservient Luther is completely wrong. However, Luther also could not be classified as a social revolutionary. He had an acute sensitivity to human needs but he did not have in his time and context the conditions to perceive in full detail the social, economic, and political realities with their harmful consequences for a large portion of the people.24 Liberation theology undoubtedly has greater sensitivity in this context. However, nothing prevents us from seeing, from Luther’s premises, the needy neighbor as a victim of unjust structures, concluding consequently that the identification with the neighbor in love must inevitably assume social-political dimensions. 2. The Establishment of the Kingdom How are the appeal to concrete fraternity with the “little ones” and the establishment of God’s kingdom related? There will be no doubt that neighborly love is a manifestation of the present reality of 23. WA 10/1/2, 40, 10-13 is a passage from his 1522 Sermon collection. (Sermon not included in LW.) [Translation from the Portuguese by T. Cooper.] 24. However, one should not forget Luther’s radical critique of the economic practice of his time. See in this volume, chapter 11: The Economy and the Community. Luther and Liberation 358 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Christ’s love and Christ’s kingdom. However, the parable that we are examining does not support a simple identification of both aspects. The relation is more dialectic and also establishes clear distinctions. The apocalyptic features that maintain the exclusivity of divine action are all too apparent. The Son of man will come in glory and sit on the throne (verse 31); he will separate the nations (verse 32); the blessed will enter into the kingdom already prepared from the foundation of the world (verse 34). Being a participant in the kingdom is not dependent on having built it ourselves through bold actions on our part. Neither is there in the parable a later reward for acts of love required as a previous condition. What is at stake is simply having lived concretely, in relationship with “the little ones,” in accordance with the hope of the kingdom and from the liberation already given through the identification in solidarity of Jesus with “the little ones.” The sheep on the right will have lived with a neighbor in need, the same reality experienced in Christ for themselves, in that they were also needy; meanwhile, the goats on the left will not have lived this reality and, therefore, did not live in liberation and hope. Consequently, if we must conclude that it is true that our parable is not compatible with a doctrine of justification by faith in the merely forensic sense, in that God only declares righteous the sinner, without a new reality of justice springing from there, it is also true that it in no way contradicts the doctrine of justification by faith that we find in Paul and Luther himself. For both, being justified by faith signified the real possibility of living from Christ, from his work, now free from egoism and, therefore, free for the neighbor. It was for freedom that Christ freed us. Therefore, keep standing firm and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery. [. . .] For, brethren, you have been called unto liberty: but do not use liberty for an occasion to the flesh; rather become servants of one another, through love.25 Matthew 25:31–46 359 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Luther, in turn, in a sermon in 1522 on Matt. 11: 2–10, expressed it thus: All other works, with the exception of faith, we must do for the neighbor. [. . .] Know that serving God is none other, than serving your neighbor, doing good for him with love, be it a child, a woman, a servant, an enemy or a friend. [. . .] Look at your life. If you do not find yourself, as Christ in the Gospel, amid the needy and the poor, then know that your faith is not true and that certainly you have not experienced in yourself the favor and work of Christ.26 Also the Catholic theologian Xabier Pikaza, in an acute analysis of our text, saw it inserted into a “covenantal structure, in its dual expression of support (I am your God, I am in the little ones. . .) and demand (be my people, love the little ones).”27 Or, put in more traditional terms: The judgment of Jesus begins with grace and only after is there a demand. It is free because the kingdom offers forgiveness and life to the poor, sinners, marginalized and the landless: the revelation of God is like a triumph of creative and transforming love. Only after the judgment is the demand: by the grace of God received does the human have to convert in grace to others; with God and from God is the need to love the little ones, the sinners and the lost.28 It seems to me that only in this relation, under Christ’s freedom, can any action be interested only in the neighbor for the neighbor’s sake, as Gutiérrez wanted. Outside this, all demand would be the enslaving weight of the law. Karl Barth also saw it this way. 25. Gal. 5:1,13. The term “flesh” is equivalent, in Paul, to “selfish,” “self-interest.” 26. WA/10/1/2, 168, 18–19; 168, 33–169, 2; 169, 7–10. (Sermon not included in LW). [Translation from the Portuguese by T. Cooper.] 27. Xabier Pikaza, “Mateo 25.31–46: Cristología y Liberación,” in Jesucristo en la Historia y en la Fé, ed. A. Vargas-Machuca (Madrid: Sígueme, 1977), 221. [Translation of all his quotations by T. Cooper.] 28. Ibid., emphasis in original. Luther and Liberation 360 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

According to him, the evidence at judgment will be to verify if it was “simply and directly human.”29 They [the righteous] had helped the least of His brethren, they had helped the world in its misery for its own sake. They had no ulterior motive. As the true community of Jesus, they saw the need and did what they could without any further design or after-thoughts. They could not do their duty or fulfil their mission without realising their solidarity with those in affliction and standing at their side. They found themselves referred quite simply to their neighbours in the world and that wholly “secular” affliction. They had no spiritual strategy. They obeyed without explanations.30 All was, therefore, simply for the human being.31 “It is because they knew Jesus as their Brother and God as their Father that they fed the needy, gave them drink, clothed and visited them.”32 We find here, therefore, once again, the linking of justification by faith with freedom for the human and concrete needs. According to Barth, this is an issue also for the Christian community, its members, its institution, its worship, its preaching, and its theology. “What has all this had to do with afflicted who as such are Jesus’ brethren? Has the community been first and foremost human in all that it has done?”33 3. Christ in the Neighbor We should also look more closely at the identification of Jesus with the little ones. There is no doubt that this is the most characteristic feature of the life of Jesus. So the Gospels present it. The message and life of Jesus are part of a revelation from God: Jesus became the least with the little ones, shared in humility, persecution, 29. Barth, 508. 30. Ibid. (Emphases in the German original.) 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. (Emphases in the German original.) 33. Ibid. (Emphasis in the German original.) Matthew 25:31–46 361 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

death in the world; but at the same time helped the little ones: offered them a message of hope, promised them the kingdom and powerful freedom on the path (healed, encouraged, urged, and saved them).34 The parable challenges us: the neighbor in need is Christ for us. We are so accustomed to knowing that Christ comes to us through his word and the sacraments that we resist hearing and seeing this message. However, it is important to note that the little ones, the needy, do not directly reveal Christ to us, although they are in fact the Christ in need for the exercise of our freedom and love. The meaning of this essential distinction lies precisely in the fact that our solidarity with the needy can be without ulterior motives. These would be if the works of love were made “for Christ” and, therefore, indirectly, to obtain his “reward for us.” The fruit of the solidarity of Christ already experienced, they will be simply human and in favor of the human being, who we meet at our side. A significant feature of the parable is that love as well as the lack of love for the little ones occurred without anyone being conscious that it was a relationship with Jesus. This aspect precisely is greatly enhanced in a sermon by Rudolf Bultmann.35 According to him, we are judged by our unconscious behavior because it is in this that we reveal ourselves. We have to be conscious that the judgment depends on unconscious behavior and recognize that the essence of our being is love, giving us our real value. This love is a power of which we cannot take possession but that takes possession of us, if we open ourselves to it. And that is why Christ tells the story, showing God’s love to us. Thus, we recognize “Christ in the neighbor,”36 because Jesus’ word is proclaimed in this identification. In this sense, in fact, the Christian 34. Pikaza, 164. 35. Rudolf Bultmann, “Sermon (Matthew 25: 31–46),” in Hören und Handein: Festschrift für Ernst Wolf, ed. Helmut Gollwitzer and Hellmut Traub (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1962), 47–52. 36. Gutiérrez, 112. Luther and Liberation 362 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

is one who knows things beforehand (or could know). Returning to Luther’s sermon on Matt. 25:31–46, we see that it highlighted the seriousness of the judgment for the Christian, precisely in that now this truth is preached. “Here is preached, there is given the sentence.”37 Then, Luther illustrated dramatically the scene of judgment: “When then you want to challenge Christ, saying: ‘I did not see you,’ the devil will come accusing: ‘But then were there not upright preachers who correctly preached to you the word of Christ?’”38 Impressive: the devil as a prosecutor in the divine court! In fact, the narrative of Jesus is in itself an expression of grace: the word and his preaching open the eyes of the human being to the fact that Christ is with the poor. Therefore, Christ does not require anything from anyone, without already being mercifully present at one’s side. So that, as we are beneficiaries of the solidarity of Jesus, the inverse reality can also be asserted: becoming Christ for our neighbor. Thus, Luther expressed in his treatise on The Freedom of a Christian: I will therefore give myself as a Christ to my neighbor, just as Christ offered himself to me [. . .] Behold, from faith thus flows forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a joyful, willing, and free mind that serves one’s neighbor willingly [. . .].39 For Christians and the church, this concrete love becomes then the test for the authenticity of preaching. In Karl Barth’s words: Without this active solidarity with the least of the little ones, without this concrete witness to Jesus the Crucified, who as such is the Neighbor 37. Luther, Predigten, 201 (WA 45, 325). [Sermon not included in LW.] 38. Ibid., 204 (WA 45, 326). 39. LW 31: 367. This is the Latin version. The same passage in the German version is more effective: “I want [. . .] to become a Christ to my neighbor, as Christ has become for me [. . .] See, in this way love and joy in God emanate from faith, and from love a free life, willing, happy to serve the neighbor freely.” (WA 7, 35, 32–36, 4) [The German version of the treatise was not translated to be included in LW]. In addition to the emphasis on generosity, this version provides a more direct identification with Christ. Matthew 25:31–46 363 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

of the lost, its witness may be ever so pure and full at other points, but it is all futile.”40 Jürgen Moltmann’s analysis is also noteworthy, which distinguished a double identification of Christ in the Gospels: one is the identification with the “active mission,” with those sent (John 20:21,23; Luke 10:16); another is the identification with the “suffering expectation,” when it is concealed in any and all sufferers.41 Rightly, Moltmann noted that through this identification “Matthew 25 does not make poor people into objects of Christian charity [. . .], but subjects of the messianic kingdom.”42 Thus, Christ is present in the mission of the believers and the suffering of “the least of these.” His community is therefore the brotherhood of the believers and the poor, the lovers and the imprisoned, the hopers and the sick. The apostolate says what the church is; “the least of these” say where the church belongs.43 Thus, the parable becomes for the Christian people an opportunity to verify where they are located and, eventually, to relocate. Christ already is where people are suffering. IV. Conclusion: Justification and Liberation, Grace and the Ethical Imperative We come to the conclusion of our study. First, we return to Pikaza’s words, one more time, for his own conclusion: Matthew 25:31-46 implies a dialectic vision of the historical Jesus: a) on the one hand he was the poor: he assumes the little ones and the suffering of the earth, sharing the fate of the people, and fulfilling in his existence 40. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV, part 3/2, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1962), 891. 41. Jürgen Moltmann, The Passion for Life: A Messianic Lifestyle, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (Philadelphia: Fortress Press), 104. 42. Ibid., 105. Emphasis in the original. 43. Ibid. Emphasis in the original. Luther and Liberation 364 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

the sense of the Beatitudes (the poor, those who mourn, the hungry); b) on the other hand, he is the one who helps the poor: evangelizes the little ones, offers love and the kingdom to the lost, heals, forgives, and reflects in the world the mystery of God and the kingdom. [. . .] Consequently, liberation begins as grace: one can speak of salvation because Jesus the Lord is found in the little ones, encourages people on the path of life. In the beginning everything is free. But all is immediately a demand: Christ’s salvation realizes (mediates) through the commitment of inter-human help. This means that Christ is found in the little ones (his brothers and sisters) and in those who want to help the little ones (they are “the blessed of their Father” and, therefore, brothers and sisters of Jesus like the others). [. . .] The division into the little ones and those who help the little ones cannot be translated into sociological statistics, neither in this world nor at the end of time. [. . .] At the same time, we are the little ones and we must help the little ones who are at our side. Salvation will be for us both free (Christ has made us his) and a demand (being made his means to live with him and like him for others). Christology and human liberation have become united forever in a powerful form in Matt. 25:31-46.44 Let us return to our starting point. With good reason, and not coincidentally, the parable of the “judgment of the nations” has inspired church doctrine and the action of numerous Christians, in concrete attitudes and gestures of solidarity, justice, and love. And this has occurred independently of their respective confessional and denominational hue. The parable is grace and an ethical imperative that exceeds such boundaries. The parable is also a significant (and positive) test for overcoming the traditional Catholic-Lutheran controversy with respect to the doctrine of justification. To God belongs, without any shadow of a doubt, the first and last word. The dignity of the human being is limited in power and has to exist and act within these words of God, from them, and in correspondence with them. Their gestures and 44. Pikaza, 227-28. [Translation by T. Cooper.] Matthew 25:31–46 365 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

experience may come from the reality and solidarity with the human being, experienced in Jesus, and directed for the fulfillment of the promise of divine consummation.45 45. In Walter Altmann, “Penúltimo Domingo,” 240-41, I presented some homiletic considerations regarding this biblical text. I suggested, as one possibility, to structure the sermon in three steps: 1. the little ones; 2. Jesus and the little ones; 3. Us and the little ones. Luther and Liberation 366 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

17 The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom in Latin American Liberation Theology I propose an exploration of the possible contribution of Martin Luther’s concept of freedom to the Latin American theologians’ adoption of the concept of liberation. It is a systematic endeavor, rather than a historical analysis. As seems obvious, it is not possible to trace any direct link between Luther’s concept of freedom and Latin American liberation theology—and even an indirect relationship is difficult, if not problematic. This chapter proposes, above all, to expose influential Latin American liberation theologians’ understanding of Luther through examples. In addition, I limit myself to surveying non-Lutheran theologians, to verify the alliance of Luther beyond denominational borders originated in his own work.1 I will add my own assessment, however brief, to this understanding. 1. For a general overview of pertinent literature published in Brazil, both of Lutheran and nonLutheran—even non-Christian—authors, up to the date of the publication, see: Joachim Fischer, “Quem é Lutero no Brasil?” in Reflexões em torno de Lutero. vol. II., ed. Martin N. Dreher (São Leopoldo: Sinodal, 1984). See also Gottfried Brakemeier, “Justification by Grace and Liberation Theology: A Comparison,” Ecumenical Review 40, no. 2 (1988): 215–22; and Vítor Westhelle, “Luther and Liberation,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 25 (1986): 51–58. 367 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Special attention will be given to the question of freedom and liberation, which is why the chapter and the book will conclude with some brief systematic reflections on the relation between these two concepts. Before this, however, as preparation for the concluding theses, I will offer a hint of the direction in which it is possible to speak of Luther’s influence in Latin American liberation theology. This cautious approach is also indicated by the fact that we will be trying to compare and relate two distant and dissimilar eras and situations. Although Luther had lived precisely in the era in which the Europeans came to invade and conquer the American continent, the Reformer barely took notice of this fact. At no moment did he attribute special significance to this event so decisive for the later development of the history of humanity. He wanted to point troubled consciences to the path of freedom and combatted vigorously the ecclesiastical structures that oppressed them. Latin American liberation theologians, for their part, reflect from the perspective of Christians conscious of a history of 500 years of oppression and exploitation initiated with this epic conquest. It is important not to forget that the Christian faith was linked to this process, not only the ecclesiastical but also economic, political, and social structures that merit the prioritized attention of the liberation theologians. Moreover, although Luther could be, for the representatives of colonial Catholicism in the post-Tridentine period, the prototype of the heretic to be opposed everywhere, there was no significant presence of communities committed to the heritage of the Reformation in Latin America for centuries. Finally, instead of being preoccupied with troubled consciences, liberation theologians long ardently for the liberation of the bodies mutilated by poverty and social injustice. The view of Luther must take into account the specific context in which he lived and acted and also reflect the questions raised from Luther and Liberation 368 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

current experience. What is the assessment of Luther made from these premises? I. Non-Lutheran Latin American Liberation Theologians’ Approach to Luther We begin with Catholic theologians. 1. Catholic Theologians Here we examine Juan Luis Segundo, Hugo Echegaray, Franz Hinkelammert, Leonardo Boff, and Eduardo Hoornaert. 1.1. Juan Luis Segundo: The Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms Juan Luis Segundo (1925–1996), a Jesuit from Uruguay, positioned himself in relation to the theology of the Reformation, Luther in particular, in the context of the relation between faith and ideology. Segundo defined ideology as the set of resources used in real and concrete historical conditions and faith as a basic and global attitude of the human being. In this sense, there is no faith without ideologies, because all and any faith is lived in concrete historical situations, although it transcends them. On the Protestant side, Segundo criticized its conception of eschatology, that is, the notion of “a transcendence of anything and everything in history,” under the suspicion that “this continuing function of de-ideologizing” would “in fact oppress our ideological creativity. Why? Because it wields the sword of criticism even before the ideologies have time to become effective and to arouse real enthusiasm.”2 This attitude, which Segundo came to even in political and revolutionary theologies, would impede the adoption of a true theology of liberation. 2. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1999), 126. The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom 369 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

In the origin of this incapacity for historical commitment, Segundo detected Luther’s doctrines of justification by faith and of the two kingdoms. Drawing on James S. Preus, Segundo understood there to have been “the fastidious depoliticization of the doctrine of justification, via the two-kingdoms doctrine.”3 Thus, with the distinction between “two kingdoms,” Protestant theologians “use that precise argument to counter any attempt to attribute to mankind historical causality in the construction of God’s Kingdom,”4 which would be attributed exclusively to God. Segundo recognized “this eschatological relativization of any and every existing historical reality, the desacralization of any and every political regimes, initially has a liberating impact,” because then “faith enables people to imagine new possibilities and to escape the mesmerizing allure of the established order.”5 On the other hand, however, the permanent relativization of any and all human endeavor leads to “a politically neutral theology.”6 Therefore, we would be led inevitably “not to opt for anyone or anything in concrete history,” and this would mean nothing less than the “death of liberation theology.”7 In his evaluation, Segundo admitted that the Reformation, in particular Luther, had rescued Pauline thinking, though it “was faithful only to one part of Paul’s thinking, to that aspect which we could call freedom from,”8 that is, freedom from legalism. However, Catholic theology related to the “merit of human endeavors for 3. Ibid., 142. [Quotation with emphasis in its entirety in the original.] 4. Ibid., 143. [Emphasis by the author.] 5. Ibid., 144. 6. Ibid., 145. 7. Ibid., 148. English trans. from the Spanish original, Juan Luis Segundo, Liberación de la Teología, (Buenos Aires: Carlos Lohlé, 1975), 169. 8. Ibid., 150. English trans. from the Spanish, 172; emphasis in the original. Luther and Liberation 370 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

gaining entrance to the eternal kingdom of God”9 could, in turn, provide a correction to “Lutheran passivity.”10 Segundo concluded with accentuated severity: So the Catholic doctrine was clearly inadequate insofar as it made the law the object of our liberty, and the Lutheran doctrine was inadequate insofar as it turned faith into a deprecation of human liberty.11 Therefore, Segundo expressed his desire that, instead of the controversy, there could exist between Catholic and Protestant theologies “a fruitful and liberating synthesis.”12 On this basis, in his view, liberation theology should develop. 1.2. Hugo Echegaray: Luther and Müntzer Echegaray (1940–1979), a Peruvian priest who died young, examined Luther and Müntzer as two antithetical models for the ongoing problem of the relationship between faith and politics and did so with special attention to the concepts of freedom and liberation.13 In relation to Luther, Echegaray recognized the legitimacy of his protest against the tutelage of the Church over the political realm, as well as the “democratic character”14 of this claim. He understood that Luther, when distinguishing between an interior and an exterior freedom, “anticipates by one century, obscurely and in the realm of theology, the philosophical principle of Descartes of the dichotomy 9. Ibid., 139 (emphasis in the original). Segundo lamented that in order to arrive at “an honored recognition that Catholic theology past over the teachings of Paul in respect to justification by faith,” post-Vatican II Catholic theologians, such as Hans Küng, have also not taken into account “the true aspect that the Catholic Church defended at the time of the Reformation” (Ibid, 160 note). 10. Ibid., 150. 11. Ibid., 151. 12. Ibid., 150. 13. Hugo Echegaray: “Lutero y Münzer: Dos Concepciones Antitéticas de la Liberación,” in Anunciar el Reino: Selección de Artículos (Lima: CEP, 1981), 134–69. [Translations by T. Cooper.] 14. Ibid., 139. The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom 371 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

of reality into two different orders: one of extension, the other of thought.”15 Thus, he contributed to the modern concept of freedom of conscience,16 and also established “a certain desacralization of power,” but equally lay the foundation for “a radical distinction between two realms or orders entirely independent from each other.”17 Luther is seen as modern with a dichotomy between two kingdoms, which bases the modern conception of freedom on the individual conscience but also leads to a contradiction: to have internal freedom—again, according to Echegaray—external freedom is not important; freedom can be exercised, on the contrary, precisely in external captivity. The sources of this thought are found, according to Echegaray, in Luther’s “radical anthropological pessimism,”18 which does not admit any cooperation of the human being with God in the former’s liberation, and in his Christology of the cross, which knows God only in God’s hiddenness. “Christ’s humanity is de facto devaluated, even if theoretically it is orthodoxically affirmed.”19 Redemption consists then in the “exchange of God’s righteousness and human being’s sin,” “without any real change in human nature”20; “the transfer of imputations” is a “juridical fiction.”21 Thus, Echegaray concluded: “The subject who has acquired Christian freedom, in reality, for Luther, lacks any effective freedom before God and the world.”22 Echegaray betrayed his own basis 15. Ibid., 140. 16. “For Luther, the only true freedom is that obtained by faith in the power of one’s own conscience.” (Ibid., 157.) 17. Ibid., 143. See also: “The political order is autonomous with respect to the religious sphere” (157). 18. Ibid., 158. 19. Ibid., 162. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., 164. Luther and Liberation 372 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

of judgment—indeed traditional—when he observed that in Luther the Thomistic doctrine of humanity as “instrumentum coniunctum” of divine action was forgotten. Luther would know only freedom from sin, intending to “ignore” the world.23 The conclusion was, in short, merciless: “Luther subtracts any moral relevance from the political realm.”24 The effort made by Luther in order to de-politicize faith, breaking with Rome for turning away from the concrete content of the real social context, produces a new form of politization: Faith will be a victim of the dominant system.25 Meanwhile Müntzer, whose concept of freedom “does not accept the dichotomies of Luther,”26 would be the extreme opposite, and had sought to destroy the world “completely.”27 Müntzer would have taken a radical political position under religious inspiration but without giving attention “to a sufficient degree to political judgment,”28 which would have led to failure (“the old ideal of Christendom”29). In this sense, “Luther’s position of considering the political sphere autonomous is certainly more modern,”30 but the paradox is that Luther reaches a reactionary political position from a modern theory of the Nation-State, as Müntzer, based on the medieval conception of the world, turns into a manager of a revolutionary movement.31 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., 165. 26. Ibid., 149. 27. Ibid., 164. 28. Ibid., 165. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., 165–66. The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom 373 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1.3. Franz Hinkelammert: Charism and Institution Hinkelammert (1931–), a German economist living in Costa Rica since 1963, examined the Reformation with the backdrop of current problems confronted by the base communities in Latin America.32 He registered certain analogies and even “a close resemblance to the Reformation,”33 fundamentally, in the constitution of the communities and their autonomy reading the Bible. There is an evident “charism of freedom,” with two central elements: “the preference for the poor and [. . .] the special insistence on the resurrection of Jesus, which derives from the promise of a New Earth.”34 On the other hand, this charism necessarily lacks institutionalization. It does, however, insist, inversely that “any institutional system has to exist and develop itself on the basis of human needs.”35 In this regard, it is interesting to examine the Reformation, which Hinkelammert sought to understand equally in the context of the historical dialectic between charism and institutionalization. Institutionalization is contrary to Christian charism but it also serves as a vital support for it to be proclaimed.36 In this view, the Reformation is seen as that historical period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the first half of the seventeenth, which encompassed a broad anti-institutional millenarian movement, as well as the foundation of new churches, and later, societies. In this broad sense, it was “a people’s liberation movement,”37 holding 32. Franz Hinkelammert, “Carisma Cristão, sua Institucionalização e as Reformas: Uma Tentativa de Reflexão,” in Luta pela Vida e Evangelização: A Tradição Metodista na Teologia LatinoAmericana, ed. José Miguez Bonino et al. (São Paulo-Piracicaba, 1985) 9–21. [Translations by T. Cooper.] 33. Ibid., 19. 34. Ibid., 20. 35. Ibid., 21. 36. Ibid., 12. 37. Ibid., 14. Luther and Liberation 374 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

charismatic claims against the still prevailing medieval order. However, as charismatic expression, the movement lacked a clear institutional perspective. Still, strictly speaking, the reformers would not have been representatives of millenarian charism—against the peasants, Luther even presented “an antimillenarian fury without limits”38—but precisely “men of the institutionalization of the millenarian charism,”39 thus moving the popular movement to assume inevitably and gradually “a certain bourgeois character.”40 From this, Hinkelammert derived similarity and difference between the period of the Reformation and the experience of base communities today. Not only are the constitution of the base communities and the reading of the Bible analogous but the starting point is the same: subjectivity—that is, people become subjects of their lives. But there is also an important difference [. . .]. The Reformation conceives the autonomy of the subject in the context of bourgeois values and affirms this concrete subject as a subject who can live in harmony with these values. The current liberation movement, on the contrary, makes explicit the needs of the concrete subject and is conscious of the conflict between these values and the bourgeois values.41 One could not, however, simply blame the reformers for this development: It would be a mistake to believe that the subject of needs is absent from the social movements of the Reformation. Although the Reformers prepared the way for the bourgeois individual, they did not realize the future contradiction between the bourgeois individual and the subject 38. Ibid. While the German peasants would come to deposit their hope in Luther’s support, he “never had any doubt as to institutionalizing the church and society, against them” (Ibid.). 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid., 17–18. The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom 375 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

of needs. They affirmed bourgeois values, which lead to the realization of a society completely different than what they had expected.42 1.4. Leonardo Boff: Luther—Revolutionary or Only Reformist? In Leonardo Boff (1938–), a Brazilian and former Franciscan, we find a theologian who understands Luther’s importance with high admiration. His peculiar reading occurred methodologically, according to the premises of liberation theology, “from the option for the poor and the commitment to walk with the Christian communities who, motivated by faith, struggle for changes of society.”43 This perspective did not keep him from seeing in Luther “one of the greatest witnesses of the evangelical spirit and of the courage to postulate reforms in the church and society,” able to “perhaps serve as inspiration and also of critique.”44 Boff formulated the problem in the following way: To what extent does Luther have a liberating function in the historicsocial-religious process? Conversely, to what extent does he give legitimacy to a modernity that brings so much oppression to the majority of humanity in our time?45 Boff believed that the Reformation was “above all a religious phenomenon,” however “always in articulation with [the] concrete history and economic-political structures” of the time.46 In the religious realm, “Luther brought about a grand liberating process. He will forever be an obligatory reference point for all who seek 42. Ibid., 18. 43. Leonardo Boff, “A Significação de Lutero para a Libertação dos Oprimidos,” in E a Igreja se Fez Povo: Eclesiogênese: A Igreja que Nasce da Fé do Povo (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1986), 168. [Translation by T. Cooper.] In English: Leonardo Boff, “Luther, the Reformation, and Liberation,” in Faith Born in the Struggle for Life: A Re-reading of Protestant Faith in Latin American Today, ed. Dow Kirkpatrick, trans. Lewistine McCoy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 195–212. The texts do not coincide entirely, particularly in the introductory sections. 44. Boff, Significação de Lutero, 164. [Translated by T. Cooper.] 45. Boff, “Luther,” 200. 46. Boff, “Luther,” 200–201. [Significação de Lutero, 168.] Luther and Liberation 376 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

liberty and know how to struggle for it.”47 Boff, referring to Luther’s great writings of 1520,48 recognized in them “liberation from the Babylonian captivity of the church,”49 and classified “the basic thesis of justification by faith” as “a radical liberation” from all demands of the law, in order to receive God’s grace, “the expression of the incredible inner freedom achieved by Luther.”50 Significantly, Boff did not fall into the traditional trap of understanding justification by faith, in Luther, as intractable with good deeds in the social realm. On the contrary, quoting Peter Manns, Boff recognized in Luther the opposition of the “fides concreta, composita seu incarnata (active in good works)” to the “fides abstracta vel absoluta (outside of good works).”51 Boff’s conclusion was, therefore: “An undeniable aura of liberty pervades his principal texts and is transformed into the yeast of liberation in the corpus christianorum.”52 As for Luther’s influence in the political realm, Boff was more reticent. He recognized that Luther “was not able to control the 47. Boff, “Luther,” (in the original: “[. . .] to struggle and to suffer for it,” 169). In Leonardo Boff’s book Church: Charism and Power: Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church, trans. John W. Diercksmeier (New York: Crossroad, 1988), which earned him many troubles through the reaction of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, of the Vatican, under the iron command of then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Boff spoke about “Pathologies of Roman Catholicism,” (84–86) and understood there the Protestant criticism, in good measure, as a legitimate expression of dissent to the ““catholicistic” (the decayed form of Catholicism)” (84). Roman Catholicism has not been sufficiently critical (84–86). “The rejection of Protestantism was a historical mistake not only because Luther was excommunicated but because any possibility for true criticism or questioning in the name of Gospel was also expelled. Catholicism became a total, reactionary, violent, and repressive ideology. There is nothing further from the evangelical spirit than the catholicistic system’s pretention to unlimited infallibility, to unquestionability, to absolute certainty. There is nothing further from the Gospel than the encapsulation of Christianity in one unique and exclusive expression, than the inability to recognize the Gospel if it is not expressed through a unique doctrine, a unique liturgy, a unique moral norm, and a unique ecclesiastical organization” (86). 48. For example, the treatise, The Freedom of the Christian, is classified as “one of the most beautiful texts of [original: ‘the’] Christian tradition.” (“Luther, the Reformation, and Liberation,” 205; original: 173.) 49. Boff, “Luther,” 202. 50. Ibid., 202–3. 51. Ibid., 211–12. 52. Ibid., 206. The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom 377 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

movement he unleashed” and understood that he “was not even aware of its sociopolitical implications.”53 He regretted also the “spiritualist interpretation”54 of the rich and powerful, on the one hand, and the poor and humiliated, on the other in the Magnificat of 1521.55 Since, “fundamentally, he respects secular power” as authorities instituted by God,56 Luther’s religious movement attracted finally as allies “more than the poor people, the peasants and serfs, [. . .] the princes, the humanists, and the artists [. . .], the urban bourgeois,” whose project “was not oriented to the line of liberation but to the accumulation of wealth and privilege.”57 Thus, for Boff, Luther’s role in the sociopolitical order was only as a reformer, so that the Protestantism that emerged out of it, with its individualism, “runs the risk of masking the conflicts that torment the poor and thereby failing to collaborate with the messianic task of the liberation of the condemned of the earth.”58 To be able to play such a role, Boff proposed recovering “some perceptions of Luther, especially [. . .] his open spirit of liberation within the church,”59 mentioning specifically the Protestant principle (Paul Tillich), “recovery of the liberating potential of the Gospel,”60 in particular to put the Bible in the hands of the common people, and to stress “faith which brings forth deeds of liberation.”61 53. Ibid., 207. 54. Ibid., 208n3. 55. It is possible, however, that Boff only consulted the short “ecumenical” edition of Luther’s writing (Martin Luther, The Magnificat), the hallmark of which is precisely to accentuate the spiritualization by excluding some of the more concrete passages and those with blunt political criticism. 56. Boff, “Luther,” 208. 57. Ibid., 209. 58. Ibid., 210. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid., 211. 61. Boff, Significação de Lutero, 178. (The edition in English unfortunately reverses the statement, missing completely Luther’s theological view: “faith which is fired by works of liberation” [Boff, “Luther,” 211].) Luther and Liberation 378 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1.5. Eduardo Hoornaert: Luther—a Theologian of the People The most favorable position toward Luther in Catholic Latin American theology we find in the relatively brief assessment of Eduardo Hoornaert (1930–), a Belgian former priest, living in Brazil since 1958, on Luther’s writing: On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church. 62 The selection is surprising, inasmuch as it is known as a very virulent text against the papacy and the Roman Church. However, Hoornaert detected precisely in this writing “a thinker, who is organically linked with the people at the grassroots level, who perceives the problems and the way of thinking of the common people”63; someone who, although radical, but never anarchic, formulated his critiques inspired by the most healthy realism and understanding the constraints, which affect people. From them emanates a deep pain for the degradation of the church under the “tyranny” of an ecclesiastical system, but never hatred towards concrete persons or situations.64 Hoornaert understood that Luther revealed himself as “excellently knowledgeable of Christianity as was practiced in the Medieval Age among the common people,”65 having made a most necessary “analysis of at least four hundred years of Christian life lived out under the dominance of a clergy ever more professionalized,”66 since the Lateran Councils of 1179 and 1215. Hoornaert remembered that the sacramental ministry initiated by these councils sought nothing less than the re-conquest of the believers and their separation from the first large 62. Eduardo Hoornaert, “Martim Lutero, um Teólogo que Pensa a partir do Povo,” in Reflexões em torno de Lutero. v. 2, ed. Martin N. Dreher (São Leopoldo: Sinodal, 1984), 9–17. [Translations by T. Cooper.] 63. Ibid., 9. 64. Ibid., 13. 65. Ibid., 11. 66. Ibid., 12. The Reception of Luther’s Concept of Freedom 379 This content downloaded from 132.174.252.140 on Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:26:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms