Pathways to deep decarbonization

Indonesia

Electricity Generation gas in heavy industry. These decarbonization meas-
Electricity demand will increase significantly with ures would reduce the emission intensity of fuels
economic development and a shift of energy use in industry sector from 3.81 tCO2/toe in 2010 to
in residential, industrial, and transport toward elec- 1.88 tCO2/toe in 2050. The trajectory of industrial
tricity. In the power sector, the decarbonization energy use and the associated emission intensities
strategy includes fuel switching to lower-carbon are shown in Figure 8a. A decreased share of in-
emitting fuels (coal to gas, oil to gas), massive de- dustry and heavy industry in the national economy
ployment of CCS for remaining coal and gas power would also contribute to the emission reductions.
plants, and extensive deployment of renewables It is expected that the share of industry in GDP
(solar, geothermal, hydropower, and biofuels). will decrease from 27.8% in 2010 to 17% in 2050.
Deep decarbonization in power generation will Improvements in efficiency are expected to reduce
also require deployment of nuclear power plants industrial energy intensity from 365 toe/M$ in
and efficiency improvements in existing power 2010 to 229 toe/M$ in 2050.
plants. A summary of this decarbonization path-
way is shown in Figure 7. Electricity demand will Transport Sector
grow 5% per annum on average, from 158 TWh in The energy demand in the transport sector is ex-
2010 to 1,083 TWh in 2050. Decarbonization in pected to increase significantly with economic de-
this sector will result in a decrease in the average velopment and population growth. In the passenger
CO2 emission factor, from 825 gCO2/kWh in 2010 transport sector the decarbonization strategy in-
to 63 gCO2/kWh in 2050, and the CO2 emissions cludes modal shift to mass transport, electrification
of the electricity generation will decrease from of vehicles, fuel switching to less-carbon emitting
130 MtCO2 in 2010 to 68 MtCO2 in 2050. fuels (oil to gas), use of more energy-efficient ve-
hicles, and extensive use of biofuels. Similar strate-
Liquid Fuels gies are also applied to freight transport. A shift of
To achieve deep decarbonization, it is assumed freight transport from road to railway is expected
that there would need to be a significant switch to decrease CO2 emissions. As a result of modal
from petroleum fuels to biofuels. Figure 7b shows shift, it is expected that the share of personal vehi-
the trajectory of the total liquid fuels used in trans- cles decreases from 60% in 2010 to 40% in 2050.
port, industry, and power generation and their as- In 2050, it is expected that 30% of personal cars
sociated carbon intensity. are electric vehicles. Decarbonization of this sector
is expected to reduce the emission intensity from
Industry 3.02 tCO2/toe in 2010 to 1.73 tCO2/toe in 2050.
Fuel switching to lower-carbon fuels and bioenergy Figure 8b shows the trajectory of energy use and the
(solid biomass wastes and biofuels) is the dominant associated emission intensities of transport sector.
strategy for decarbonization in the industrial sec-
tor. In addition, CO2 emission reductions are also Building Sector
realized through industrial efficiency improvement Decarbonization in the building sector would result
(decreasing energy intensity) and CCS for coal and primarily from fuel switching from oil to gas/LPG

2 It is assumed that all government targets on wood, palm oil, and rice production are met. The government target for
wood production from natural forest will be stable at about 18.54 million m3/year (starting from 2020-2050), and
timber plantation will reach 360 million m3 by 2050. The area for palm oil plantation, which is now about 9.27 million
ha, will increase to 15 million ha by 2050, and rice production will meet domestic demand (self sufficiency). The land
demand for settlement and commercial building will increase following the population growth.

135 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Indonesia

and from fuels to electricity along with more ef- economy, especially in the industrial sector. The
ficient electric equipment. Switching from on-site success of the country’s decarbonization pathway
fuel combustion to electricity would reduce direct is obviously dependent on the realization of many
emissions from buildings, and with a decarbonized assumptions used in its development.
electricity generation sector, this switch would lead Indonesian hydropower plants under the illustra-
to emission reductions. For the residential sector, tive scenario would generate around 37 GW in
increasing per capita income will increase energy 2050, which is approximately half of the total
consumption, but this will be balanced by more ef- hydro resources (75 GW). Indonesian geother-
ficient equipment and the expectation that homes mal resources would amount to around 29 GW,
will remain relatively small. The trajectory of build- which supports the 25 GW of geothermal power
ings energy use is shown in Figure 8c. assumed in the scenario. As a tropical country
with an average radiation of 1.45 kWh/m2/day, it
2.2  Assumptions is reasonable for Indonesia to envisage a scenario
where 75 GW solar power is used in 2050.
The deep decarbonization of energy activities in For energy security reasons, Indonesia will most
Indonesia can only be achieved through a com- likely continue to use its abundant coal resourc-
bination of measures: efficiency, fuel switching es for electricity generation. However, most of
(including to electricity), deployment of renewa- the plants will be equipped with CCS facilities to
ble, nuclear, and CCS and structural change of the

Figure 8. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050

Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 70

gCO2/MJ 60 gCO2/MJ 60 71.9  60
67.1 50 50
  50

29.1 40 29.6 40  40
7.0 EJ  30  17.0 30
20  20 46.6 30
 10
20

10 10

6.0 0 2.5 EJ 0 0
5.0 2.5 EJ
Grid
 electricity

4.0  Solid biomass 2.0 2.0

3.0  Liquid fuels 1.5 1.5  Grid
electricity

1.0 Grid 1.0  Biofuels
electricity
2.0 

1.0  Pipeline Gas  Solid biomass 0.5  Petroleum
0.5 products

 Liquid fuels

0  Coal 0  Pipeline Gas 0  Pipeline Gas

2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

8a. Industry 8b. Buildings 8c. Transportation

Note: Carbon intensity for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 136

Indonesia

capture CO2 and store it in geological formation. envisaged in the illustrative scenario could not be
Given the need for deep decarbonization, CCS will realized, hydro would need to be increased from
also be used to reduce emissions from natural gas 30 GW to 61 GW, and biomass would need to in-
power plants. The total CO2 that would need to be crease from 15 GW to 20 GW. The increase in solar
stored by 2050 equals about 3,300 Mton (with an power would eventually be constrained by concerns
annual value of 286 Mton). The storage is assumed for grid reliability associated with resource inter-
to take place in the abandoned and depleted oil mittency. Under the illustrative scenario, the share
and gas reservoirs in Indonesia. It is estimated that of intermittent renewables is only around 14%. If
the volume of Indonesian depleted reservoirs could the use of hydropower were limited below what is
store around 11,000 Mton, which is more than assumed in this scenario, solar could be substantially
three times the space required by the CCS scenario. increased before reaching reliability limits, which are
Deep decarbonization also includes the massive use estimated to occur above a 25% threshold.
of biofuels for transport, industry, and power gener-
ation. In 2050, the total biofuel demand would be 2.4  Additional measures and deeper
around 85 Mton per year. Based on current techno- pathways
logical standards, to meet this biofuel demand do-
mestically, around 18 million ha of land are needed More aggressive efforts to substitute internal com-
to grow the biofuel feedstock. Indonesia currently bustion engine cars with electric vehicles (EVs)
has around 8 million ha of land devoted to crude would help further reduce direct emissions in the
palm oil (CPO) production, which could be used as transportation sector. Under the illustrative path-
biofuel feedstock. The additional 10 million ha of way, the share of EVs in personal cars is 30% in
land needed to support biofuel for decarbonization 2050. It may be further increased to 50% in 2050.
would be available from unused non-forest land, Also, more electrification in the light industry will
which is estimated to be around 50 million ha. reduce direct emissions. Under the current pathway,
the light duty fleet is 35% EVs in 2050. This level
2.3  Alternative pathways and pathway of electrification could conceivably be increased
robustness to 50%. The feasibility of this increase, however,
requires further research. An increase in electrified
Power generation is one of the major contributors transportation and industry will create more emis-
of CO2 emissions. Under the current pathway, the sions in the power sector; the low-electric emission
main tool of decarbonization is coal and gas CCS. factor must therefore be maintained. As mentioned
Therefore, the uncertainty of the pathway lies in the above, additional hydropower and geothermal pow-
uncertainty of CCS deployment. There is only a lim- er could be harnessed to support this increased load.
ited amount of research into the scale of geological To utilize the remaining large hydropower resource,
formation for CCS in Indonesia. The suitability of it would be necessary to construct a subsea elec-
the CCS scenario is based on the assumption that tricity transmission line, given that the resource is
the CO2 will be injected in depleted gas and oil located far away from the demand center.
reservoirs. If all of this storage does not become
available, the alternatives to CCS include: more 2.5  Challenges, opportunities,
hydropower, biomass, and solar. An increase in the and enabling conditions
use of hydropower would require the construction
of long subsea cables, as the location of large hydro The Indonesian illustrative decarbonization
resource is in Eastern Indonesia, while the demand pathway is primarily composed of technological
center is in Western Indonesia. If half of the CCS changes that are very different from the current
mix of energy technologies. Many of the technol-

137 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Indonesia

ogies are still in their infancy (e.g. CCS, electric 2.6  Near-term priorities
vehicles, high efficiency power plants, etc.). The
realization of the pathway is highly dependent Deep decarbonization is a long-term develop-
on the development and maturation of these ment objective, and the incorporation of climate
technologies in the coming years, and the tech- change in the Indonesian national agenda has
nological approach would require massive devel- just begun. To embrace deep decarbonization,
opment of new infrastructure (e.g. infrastructure Indonesia must continue to internalize climate
for enabling mass public transport, new railways, change in the political sphere. Nevertheless,
gas transmission, subsea electrical transmissions, there are a number of near-term actions that
and CCS facilities). As a result, one of the main need to be taken now to begin implementing
challenges of the pathway is how to finance the a decarbonization pathway:
infrastructure investment. yyThe modal shift to public transport was initiated
Some of the commercially available technologies,
such as solar, biofuel and geothermal power, are decades ago, but the success of these efforts has
currently more expensive than conventional fossil been limited. One of the barriers is that invest-
fuel technologies. Wide-scale deployment of these ment in public transport has been limited. As a
low-carbon resources would therefore require fur- result, new efforts to explore financing options
ther technology development to lower costs, mak- for the transportation sector are needed.
ing them competitive with conventional resources. yyBiofuels were introduced into the Indonesian
Deployment of nuclear power also poses a spe- energy system in 2005. However, the use of
cial challenge: social acceptability. It is therefore this fuel is currently limited. One of the barriers
necessary to explore how to convince Indonesians is that biofuels have to compete with subsi-
that nuclear power is a necessary part of the fu- dized petroleum diesel and gasoline. Though
ture energy mix. recently the government has subsidized bio-
In 2009, the Indonesian Government announced fuels, increased policies to promote biofuel
a non-binding commitment to reduce its emis- development are needed. Currently biofuel
sions 26% by 2020 (compared to business as usu- production uses traditional feedstocks that
al development). However, being a non-Annex I are also needed for the food sector, i.e. crude
country, concern for climate change is not yet fully palm oil and molasses. Research and develop-
internalized in Indonesian development agenda. To ment into other biofuel feedstocks must be
embrace a deep decarbonization pathway, the gov- emphasized.
ernment has to first adopt climate change as a key yySome technologies that are envisaged in the
component of its national development agenda. pathway, such as electric vehicles and CCS, are
In summary, significant efforts are necessary for a new to Indonesia. Research, development, and
deep decarbonization pathway to be realized: in- demonstration of these technologies needs to
ternalizing climate change into the national agen- be conducted over a number of years in order
da, financing for investments in infrastructure, to make progress.
technology development, technology transfer, a yyThe key challenge of deep decarbonization is
social campaign for nuclear, and the right energy the financing of low-carbon infrastructure. The
pricing policy for renewables. To overcome some government, therefore, has to begin to look for
of these challenges, international cooperation is international cooperation and find assistance
needed, especially for infrastructure financing and for infrastructure development. In addition, the
technology transfer. government must seek international partners for
the technology transfer of technologies neces-
sary for deep decarbonization.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 138

Japan

Japan

Mikiko Kainuma, 1 Country profile
National Institute for 1
Environmental Studies
and Institute for Global 1.1  The national context for deep
Environmental Strategies decarbonization and sustainable
development
Ken Oshiro,
Mizuho Information & The Japanese economy is characterized by low do-
mestic reserves of fossil fuels, which makes it highly
Research Institute dependent upon importations. This situation has
raised important energy security issues since the
Go Hibino, 1950s when Japan has turned from domestic coal
Mizuho Information & and hydro to imported oil to fuel its fast economic
growth. After the first oil shock in the 1970s, Japan’s
Research Institute energy policy priorities have shifted to be framed
around the three pillars of energy security, environ-
Toshihiko Masui, ment protection, and economic efficiency, with in
National Institute for particular the development of nuclear, liquefied natu-
Environmental Studies ral gas (LNG), and imported coal to limit the depend-
ency on oil. The focus on energy security and climate
change has favored the development of renewables
and the domination of nuclear power, which has been
the most important energy source until the Daiichi
Nuclear Power plant accident in March 2011.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 139

Japan Japan

Energy strategies have changed after the 2011 generation mix); industry, because the industrial
accident. The Innovative Strategy for Energy and sector plays a very important role in the Japa-
the Environment (2012) and the comments on nese economy notably for exports; and transport
Basic Energy Plan by Advisory Committee for sector, because the vehicle transports of both
Natural Resources and Energy (ACNRE, 2013) passenger and freight traffic were increased.
concluded that the dependency on nuclear Moreover, although shares of commercial and
power should be decreased; consequently, the residential sectors are not large, the emissions
power generation from nuclear power decreased from these sectors have increased because of
substantially in 2012 from its level in 2010 and increasing distribution of electrical appliances.
import of fossil fuels, especially LNG, increased At the same time, the emissions from the in-
in spite of energy efficiency improvement in dustry sector have reduced continuously since
end-use sector. 1990, and those from the transport sector have
To achieve the political GHG mitigation tar- reduced since 2000. The trends demonstrate a
get of reducing 80% emissions compared to continuous but moderate increase of total CO2
the 1990 level by 2050 with lower nuclear emissions over 1990-2007 (+14%) before recent
dependence, it is utmostly necessary to re- drastic changes (-8% between 2008 and 2010
duce energy consumption by reducing energy after the economic crisis and +7% between
service demands and by increasing the use of 2010 and 2012 because the closure of nuclear
energy saving technologies, and to increase the plants after Fukushima triggered a temporary
share of renewable energies. As the potential increase of fossil importations).
of renewable energies is unevenly distributed, 2007 saw the most GHG emissions for the 1990
regional electricity exchange is required. The to 2010 period, which was a 15% increase from
major renewable energy capacity is not located base year under the Kyoto Protocol (KPBY). The
in the major electricity demand regions such total GHG emissions in 2010 decreased by 0.4%
as Kanto area but in the rural regions such as compared to the emissions in the base year under
Hokkaido and Tohoku areas. However current KPBY (excluding LULUCF). Since 2010, GHG emis-
electricity interconnection capacity between sions have resumed to increase and accounted for
regions is not high in Japan and strengthening 1,343 MtCO2eq in 2012. They increased by 6.5%
interconnections is therefore a crucial issue. compared to KPBY. During the 1st commitment
period, GHG emissions increased by 1.4% com-
1.2  GHG emissions: current levels, pared to KPBY. On the other hand, if the carbon
drivers, and past trends sink of LULUCF and credit of Kyoto Mechanism
are counted, the GHG emissions during the 1st
Total GHG emissions in 2010 (excluding LU- commitment period amount to 1,156 MtCO2eq,
LUCF) amounted to 1,256 MtCO2eq in Japan a 8.4% decrease from KPBY.
of which CO2 represented a large majority In Figure 2, the decomposition of drivers of
(1,191 MtCO2 or 94.8%) (Figure 1a). The sectoral changes in CO2 emission from fuel combustion
decomposition shows that three activities were over 1990-2012 demonstrates that the Jap-
dominantly responsible for these CO2 emissions anese economy has experienced a continuous
at this date (Figure 1b): power generation, nota- diffusion of energy efficiency permitting an
bly because the power sector was largely fueled average 0.7% annual rate of production energy
by imported coal and LNG (even in 2010 before intensity decrease. The other Kaya drivers did
nuclear was partly removed from the power not have such a consistent effect in that period.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 140

Japan

Until 2007, growth of GDP per capita has been ment of energy efficiency was neutralized by
the increase of carbon intensity due mainly
the major driver of CO2 emission increase, while to the suspension of nuclear plants after the
there was a substantial decrease in 2008 and Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and the
resulting comeback of fossil fuels.
2009 due to the global economic recession. In

2011 and 2012, the contribution of improve-

Figure 1. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010

1a. GHG emissions, by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors

MtCO2 eq 1145  Energy-related 500 MtCO2
emissions 400
1263 300
66  Processes Electricity
(Allocation
by End Use Sector)

26  Agriculture

21  Waste 200 Total MtCO2
209
100  Natural Gas

+6   Petroleum Products 485

LULUCF 0  Coal 429
(Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry) Electricity Generation
Transportation Other

Industry Buildings

Source: Greenhouse Inventory Of ce of Japan (http://www-gio.nies.go.jp/abo3u9tg9hg/nir/n3ir4-6e.html) 226 153 1123

Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions, 1990 to 2010

2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors

20% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 1500 MtCO2

15% 1250 1167 1203
10% 1135
1059 1123  Other
5% 1000  Buildings
0%  GDP per capita  Transportation
-5%  Population 750
-10%  Industry
-15%  Energy 500
 Electricity Generation
per GDP 250

 Energy Related

CO2 Emissions
per Energy

-20% 0
1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1990 1995 2000 2005

141 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Japan

2 National Pathways to Deep Decarbonization
2

2.1  Illustrative Deep The deep decarbonization pathways in Japan are
Decarbonization Pathway assessed using AIM/Enduse model.1 Table 1 sum-
marizes the major socio-economic indicators used
2.1.1  High-level characterization in the estimation of deep decarbonization path-
ways in Japan. The indicators are taken from the
In line with declining birthrate and growing propor- assumption by Working Group of Technology Per-
tion of elderly people, both total and active Japanese spective of Central Environmental Council in Japan
populations are expected to experience a significant and the estimation of population by National In-
decrease between 2010 and 2050, by 24% and 39% stitute of Population and Social Security Research.
respectively as shown in Table 1. Despite the decline In Japan’s illustrative deep decarbonization scenar-
in population, the continuous rise of GDP per capita io, the long-term GHG emission reduction target is
is projected to be sufficient to ensure a steady rise achieved by large scale energy demand reduction
of total GDP (from about 5.38 trillion USD in 2010 in end-use sector and decarbonization in power
to 8.37 trillion USD in 2050).

Table 1. Major socio-economic indicators

2010 2050 Variation 2010/2050

GDP (trillion JPY2000) 538 837 +56%
Population (million) 128 97 -24%
50 -39%
Active population (Million) 82 +116%
GDP per capita (US$/cap) 38003 82116

Source: Central Environmental Council, 2012. Report on measures and policies after 2013.

Figure 3. Energy Pathways, by source

3a. Primary Energy

18.7 EJ - 48 % 3b. Final Energy
1.00 18

0.61 16

3.81 14 13.4 EJ
12 - 52 %
12 3.40
0.16
10 9.7 0.19  Nuclear 5.58 10
2.34  Renewables & Biomass
8.41 8 1.22  Natural Gas w CCS 1.98 8 6.4 3.16  Electricity
2.21  Natural Gas 2.25 6 0.21  Biomass
6 2.84  Oil 0.93  Liquids
0.76  Coal w CCS 2010 1.24  Gas
4 0.20  Coal 4 0.85  Coal

4.86 2 2
0
0

2010 2050 2050

1 AIM/Enduse model is a dynamic recursive, technology selection model for the mid- to long-term mitigation policy
assessment, developed by the National Institute for Environmental Studies, Kyoto University and Mizuho Information
Research Institute. This model has already been applied to assess the mitigation target in Japan. The model applied
for the deep decarbonization pathways is a multi-region version of AIM/Enduse model of Japan, that is to say, the
model is composed of 10 regions and considers the regional differences in renewable energy potential and energy
demand characteristics. The 10 regions almost coincide with the business areas of 10 public power supply firms.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 142

Japan

generation sector including deployment of CCS. fossil fuels, natural gas and oil (including non-ener-
In parallel with continuous growth in GDP per capita, gy use) exist in 2050 while coal is almost phased
improvements of both energy efficiency and carbon out because of its high carbon intensity. Natural
intensity become the major drivers to substantial gas supply increases in the mid term in place of oil
CO2 emissions reductions in the mid and long terms. and coal because of its lower carbon intensity, but
Total final energy consumption in 2050 decreases falls to the 2010 level by 2050 along with energy
substantially and accounts for approximately 50% demand reduction and large-scale deployment of
of the 2010 level (Figure 3, right panel). Particularly renewable energy. Hence, natural gas without CCS
in transport sector, the pace of energy demand re- acts as a bridge technology.
duction is the most rapid in the mid- to long terms,
followed by residential, commercial, and industrial Figure 5. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway,
sectors. The shift to public transport, fuel efficiency by Sector, 2010 to 2050
improvement, and efficiency improvement of trans-
portation service will promote the reduction of CO2 1500 MtCO2
emissions in the transportation sector.
Dependency on fossil fuel is reduced substantial- 1250 1123
ly compared to the 2010 level due to reduction
in energy demand and deployment of renewable 1000 27 - 84 %
energy. In 2050, fossil fuel consumption falls by 153
approximately 60% compared to the 2010 level
with an approximate 35% decrease of total primary 750 226
energy supply and increase in share of renewable
energy which accounts for approximately 40% (in- 500 346 15  Other
cluding hydropower) of total primary energy sup- 7  Buildings
ply in 2050 despite almost complete phase out 250 372 180 41  Transportation
of nuclear power (Figure 3, left panel). Among the 0 105  Industry
2010 2050 12  Electricity Generation

Figure 4. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers, 2010 to 2050

4a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. The pillars of decarbonization

100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. Energy Intensity of GDP
80% Energy ef ciency 5 MJ/$
2010
60%
40% 2050 2 - 60 %
20%
 GDP per capita Pillar 2. Electricity Emissions Intensity
0% Decarbonization of electricity 363 gCO2/kWh
-20%  Population
-40%  Energy per GDP 2010
-60%
-80%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions 2050 11 - 97 %
per Energy
Pillar 3.
-100% Electri cation of end-uses Share of electricity in total nal energy
2010 25 + 24 pt

2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 49 %
2010 2020 2030 2040

143 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Japan

2.1.2  Sectoral characterization with CCS) is developed to ensure balancing of

Power sector the network and reaches about a third of total

The nuclear power is assumed to be phased out electricity generation in 2050. Due to large-scale
gradually (see next section for more extensive
discussion) and electricity generation from coal deployment of renewable energy and natural
without CCS is entirely phased out by 2050.
Renewable energy is developed over the mid gas equipped with CCS, carbon intensity of
to long terms and reaches approximately 59%
of total electricity generation through large- electricity falls to nearly zero in 2050.
scale deployments of solar PV and wind power In 2050, approximately 199 MtCO2 is captured
(Figure 6). In addition, natural gas (equipped by CCS technologies and cumulative captured

CO2 reaches about 3,096 MtCO2. This rep-
resents about 60% of the potential of CO2
storage in an anticlinal structure (the well and

seismic exploration data for Japan is estimated
by RITE).2

Figure 6. Energy Supply Pathways, by Resource Industrial sector
The industrial sector is the largest emitter: its
 Carbon intensity CO2 emissions represent about 40% of total
gCO2/kWh 300 GHG emission in 2050 because fuel demand
363 200 for high temperature heat is hardly replaced
by low-carbon sources. Activity levels demon-
 11 100 strate a moderation of activity in energy-in-
tensive sectors in line with restructuring of
 0 the Japanese industry: -23% for crude steel
production (from 111 Mt in 2010 to 85 Mt
1200 TWh in 2050) and -11% for cement (from 56Mt
in 2010 to 50 Mt in 2050). Combined with
1000  Other renewables energy efficiency, this ensures a reduction of
 Solar final energy consumption by more than 30%.
 Other Fuel switching, and notably the phase-out
of coal without CCS, contributes to improve
800 significantly the carbon intensity of energy in
the mid to long terms (Figure 7a).
600 2020 2030 2040  Wind
400 Electricity 2 The potential storage of CO2 in an anticlinal struc-
200  Hydro ture where well and seismic exploration data ac-
 Nuclear counts for about 5.2 Gt. In addition, the potential
0 storage in existing oil/gas fields represents about 3.5
2010  Natural Gas w CCS Gt. Moreover, the total potential storage capacity
 Natural Gas can be 146 Gt including the storage in geological
 Coal with CCS structure with stratigraphic trapping, etc. (http://
2050  Coal www.rite.or.jp/English/lab/geological/survey.html).
According to the report by Central Environmental
Council in Japan, it is suggested that about a half of
the potential capacity can be economically attrac-
tive by 2050 (http://www.env.go.jp/council/06earth/
r064-03/ccs.pdf (in Japanese)).

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 144

Japan

Building sector Transport sector
In residential and commercial sectors, final In the transportation sector, CO2 emissions in 2050
energy demand is reduced by approximately reduce by almost 80% compared to the 1990 level
60%, in line with a stability of commercial and account for about 17% of Japan’s GHG emis-
floor space (+3% only, from 18,3 Mm2 in 2010 sions, as shown in Figure 4. In a context of a reduc-
to 19 Mm2 in 2050) and a 17% decrease of the tion of passenger total mobility (-10% of passenger
number of households, hence reducing energy transport demand) corresponding to an increase of
service needs in the residential sector. It is worth mobility per person, the 18% decoupling of freight
noting that fossil fuels (notably gas) remain transport relative to production is made possible by
important in the transition (until 2030), thus a combination of energy efficiency, electrification of
explaining a temporary rise of the carbon in- the fleet, as well as hydrogen and a small diffusion
tensity before electricity becomes the dominant of gas-fueled vehicles (for freight), reaching in total
energy over the long term, hence ensuring a almost 50% of energy consumed, substitute for oil-
significant decrease of the carbon intensity in based fuels and ensuring a continuous decrease of
this sector in 2050. the carbon intensity of fuels in 2050 (Figure 7c).

Figure 7. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050

Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ
73.9 70
 gCO2/MJ 60 gCO2/MJ 60 
64.1 50 50 5.0 EJ  60
50
 40 32.5 40 45.1  40
30  30
 20  30 20
26.5 10 5.0 EJ  20 10
10 0
6.0 EJ 0
5.0 3.7  0

4.0  Non-grid 4.0 4.0
electricity
3.0 3.0 3.0
 Grid
electricity
 Solid biomass
2.0  Liquid fuels 2.0 2.0
Grid
 Pipeline Gas  electricity
1.0 1.0  Solid biomass 1.0  Grid
electricity
 Coal w CCS  Liquid fuels
0  Coal 0  Pipeline Gas 0  Liquid fuels
 Pipeline Gas
Coal 

2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

7a. Industry 7b. Buildings 7c. Transportation

Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen
production.

145 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Japan

2.2  Assumptions tion and industrial sectors. In the power generation
sector, both coal plants and natural gas plants can
Low-carbon technology options be equipped with CCS technology, but bioenergy
with CCS (BECCS) is excluded in this analysis. For
A wide range of low-carbon technologies is taken into industrial use, CCS technologies are available in
account in Japan’s illustrative scenario, and include: iron and steel and cement sectors. In 2050, the
yyIn electricity supply: efficiency improvement of amount of captured CO2 in the iron and steel sec-
tor and the cement sector reaches about 60 MtCO2
power generation, coal and gas with CCS, reduced and 20 MtCO2, respectively. A maximum capture
T&D (Transmission & Distribution) line losses, rate of CO2 by CCS technologies is assumed to be
wind power, solar PV, geothermal, bioenergy. 90% for all CCS technologies.
yyIn industry: energy efficiency improvement,
electrification wherever feasible in industrial Electricity interconnection
processes, natural gas use, CCS for iron making In Japan, as the regions with large potential of re-
and cement lime, fuel economy improvement newable energy are different from the ones with
of agricultural machine, bioenergy use, nitrogen large electricity consumption, reinforcement of in-
fertilizer management. terconnection capacity would be helpful to facilitate
yyIn buildings: improvement of the energy effi- more effective use of local renewable sources. In the
ciency performance of buildings, high-efficiency illustrative scenario, due to reinforcement of elec-
equipment and appliances, electric heat pump tricity interconnection, carbon price to achieve 80%
water heaters, energy management system. reduction target is reduced by about 9% because
yyIn transport: energy efficiency improvement, power generation from renewable energy in Hokkai-
gas-powered heavy duty vehicles (HDVs), ve- do and Tohoku regions becomes available in Tokyo
hicle electrification, hydrogen vehicles. region, the largest electricity consumer in Japan. The
capacity of interconnection between Tohoku and
Nuclear power Tokyo region is tripled during 2010 to 2050.
As future availability of nuclear power is still un-
certain in Japan, electricity generation from nuclear Demand-side management
plants and availability of nuclear power is based Deployment of battery electric vehicle (BEV), heat
on the premises of New Policies Scenario of World pump water heater, and converting electricity into
Energy Outlook 2013 published by International hydrogen can provide flexibility to electricity sys-
Energy Agency. According to the illustrative sce- tem through implementation of demand side
nario, nuclear plants’ lifetime is limited to 40 years management. In 2050, electricity peak demand
for plants built up to 1990 and 50 years for all in daytime becomes higher relative to off-peak
other plants, and during 2013 to 2035 an additional demand, and this necessitates integration of sub-
3 GW nuclear plants capacity is included. Subject stantial solar PV into electricity system.
to these assumptions and maximum capacity fac-
tor of 70% for all plants, electricity generation from 2.3  Alternative pathways and pathway
nuclear plants represents about 50 TWh in 2050. robustness

Geologic carbon storage potential Decarbonization pathway without nuclear power
Complying with previous studies, CCS technolo-
gies are assumed to be available from 2025 and The Illustrative Pathway considers a gradual
annual CO2 storage volume is assumed to increase phase-out of nuclear but it still represents 19%
up to 200 MtCO2/year in 2050. The potential of of electricity generation in 2030 and 5% in 2050.
storage of CO2 is set to be around 5 GtCO2. CCS However, no nuclear plant has been in operation
technology can be applied to both power genera-

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Japan

since the end of 2013, though some nuclear plants 2.4  Additional measures and deeper
have been put under safety inspection by the Nu- pathways
clear Regulation Authority, and it is possible that
a complete phase-out is decided. Therefore, it is The following measures should be considered for
worth considering a pathway that would consider a deeper decarbonization.
complete phase-out of nuclear to assess robustness
of deep decarbonization pathways. In this scenario, Further development and diffusion of inno-
no nuclear plant is assumed to restart in the entire vative low-carbon technologies
period of estimation after 2014. The technologies listed in Table 2 are proven ener-
In such an alternative pathway, higher carbon in- gy-saving technologies up to 2050. On the other
tensity is experienced during the transition period hand, further improvement in energy efficiency
where coal and gas without CCS compensates the of low-carbon technology beyond the levels as-
gap caused by the phase-out of nuclear. But the sumed in the scenario analysis and development
impact of nuclear phase-out as compared to the of innovative technology provide additional po-
illustrative scenario is relatively small in the long tential to reduce emission, especially in the in-
term, given the small share of nuclear in 2050 in dustrial sector. In addition, system technologies
any case. An 80% emission reduction in 2050 is such as reinforcement of electricity interconnec-
still feasible with additional deployment of renew- tion and demand side management system would
able energy and natural gas equipped with CCS. be helpful for effective deeper decarbonization.

Decarbonization pathway with less deploy- Change of lifestyle to reduce energy service
ment of CCS demand while maintaining standard of living
As the feasibility of deep decarbonization path-
ways crucially depends on the availability of CCS, a Both in the illustrative scenario and in alternative
Limited CCS Scenario is prepared to assess further pathways, substantial change in lifestyle and reduc-
robustness. In this scenario, CO2 storage volume is tion of energy service demand is not considered.
limited to 100 MtCO2/year (half of the volume as- However, behavioral change has further potential
sumed in the Illustrative Scenario) and cumulative to reduce energy demand affordably while main-
captured CO2 reach about 1,550 MtCO2. taining the standard of living. For example, the
Achieving long-term emission reduction target material stock in developed countries is likely to
proves to be still feasible with substantial increase saturate, and developing countries will also catch
of renewable energy, particularly solar PV and wind up with the developed countries in the future. The
power, in the long-term electricity supply, in place enhancement of service economy or stock econ-
of natural gas equipped with CCS. In the scenario, omy will be able to reduce the material demand,
the share of renewable energy in electricity supply and as a result, energy demand will reduce. Ana-
reaches approximately 85% in 2050 and intermit- lyzing these effects could help with more refined
tent renewable energies account for about 63% in assessment of deeper pathways.
electricity generation in 2050, hence imposing a
further challenge for integration into the electric- Change of material demand and its energy
ity system. The utilization of the technologies that service demand
provide the desired flexibility, such as pumped hydro Both in the illustrative scenario and in alternative
plants and demand side management using battery pathways, substantial change in material produc-
electric vehicles can be helpful to integrate large tion is not considered. However, with existing
amount of variable renewable energies (VREs). stock level of infrastructure and decline in future
population, a small amount of material produc-
tion to maintain the stock level is likely to be

147 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Japan

sufficient. For example, stock of steel in devel- therefore, additional policy instruments such as
oped countries is estimated to be 4.9-10.6 ton dynamic pricing of electricity would be needed.
per capita. If the quantities of material production
are controlled, the energy service demand in in- Promoting public acceptance of deep decar-
dustrial sector could be reduced further, and as a bonization pathways
result, CO2 emissions also could reduce. The pace of deploying low-carbon technology is
strongly influenced by public acceptance. In gen-
Redevelopment of cities designed to con- eral, higher discount rates provide further oppor-
sume less energy tunity to diffuse low-carbon technologies. Public
Further reduction in emission and energy demand acceptance of technologies may also involve so-
in cities can be achieved by change in urban form cial issues as well as economic barriers, because
favoring even more important shift from private there are a wide range of possible co-benefits
vehicles to public transport and reuse of waste and adverse side effects that can be caused by
heat. In addition, mitigation actions in cities often diffusion of low-carbon technologies.
provide multiple co-benefits.
2.6  Near-term priorities
Relocation of industrial firms where unused
energies are easily available Avoiding lock-in of high carbon intensity
Though reinforcement of electricity interconnec- infrastructure
tion is taken into account as an option in the Some infrastructures such as power plants and
scenario analysis, relocation of industrial firms buildings entail considerable lock-in risks be-
would contribute to more effective use of heat cause the majority of those introduced in the
from renewable sources and waste heat. Espe- near term would remain in 2050. As some gas
cially, at present most of the low temperature combined-cycle plants as well as coal plants have
heat is disposed of. Though the locations of var- to be equipped with CCS in 2050, newly built
ious industries and locations between industries plants should be CCS-ready in addition to the
and residential areas are well organized, there introduction of the best available technology.
is a potential to improve energy efficiency and
utilization of heat by reorganizing the locations, Continuation of electricity saving
thereby further reducing CO2 emissions. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011,
electricity use had been reduced in order to avoid
2.5  Challenges, opportunities, and blackouts due to the Fukushima accident and the
enabling conditions suspension of other damaged power plants. Con-
tinuing these actions could be helpful for deep
Energy system transformation decarbonization.
Deep decarbonization in Japan requires a large scale
transformation in the energy system. In particular, Reducing near-term impact of energy import
there is a huge challenge to integrate VRE, such price
as solar PV and wind power, into the electricity Since 2011, fossil fuel import values have in-
system. Additional plants that can provide flex- creased in Japan due to the rise in global crude
ibility, such as pumped hydro storage, are built oil price, the depreciation of Japanese Yen, and the
to complement large-scale deployment of VREs suspension of nuclear plants. Immediate actions
in the scenario analysis. In addition, demand side for deep decarbonization that decrease fossil fuel
management would be an effective option but may demand can contribute to reducing the impact on
not be implemented by a market mechanism alone, the economy in the near term.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 148

Mexico

Mexico

Daniel Buira, 1 Country profile
Instituto Nacional de Ecología 1

y Cambio Climático 1.1  The national context for deep decarbonization
and sustainable development
Jorge Tovilla,
Independent Consultant GHG emissions in Mexico are rising due to an increasing use of fossil
fuels. As the population slowly stabilizes (projected to be 151 million
by 2050)1 and continued economic growth is expected, it is crucial to
design a deep decarbonization strategy before new infrastructure is
built. Many actions to mitigate climate change have valuable co-benefits
(local health improvement, economic savings, and greater productivity,
among others), and some are also linked to poverty reduction and social
inclusion (for example food and energy security).
Proven reserves of oil in Mexico are estimated to be around 1,340 million
tons of oil equivalent (toe), while gas reserves represent an additional 430
million toe.2 The national energy reform approved recently is expected
to boost investments in oil and gas production. Electricity generation is
mainly produced from natural gas (50%), oil (11%), hydro (15%), and coal
(13%); energy-intensive industry accounts for 13% of GDP.
Urban population reached 72% in 2010, and it is expected to be close
to 83% by 2030. Around 98% of households have access to electricity
to date, and there are 210 vehicles per 1,000 people. In some rural
areas, wood is still used as the main fuel for heating and cooking.

1 Comisión Nacional de Población (CONAPO), at: http://www.conapo.gob.mx
2 Data reported for January 2014. SENER, 2014,

at: http://egob2.energia.gob.mx/SNIH/Reportes/
Portal.swf?ProgGuid=FCAF8F9D-21D6-4661-98B5-55D84B9C1D85

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 149

Mexico Mexico

The majority of future economic growth is ex- category are the transport sector and electricity
pected to be driven by tertiary activities (services), generation (Figure 1).
which could account for nearly 70% of national Historically, GHG emissions in Mexico have been
GDP by 2050; in 2010 they represented around driven by increases in both population and in GDP
62% of the total GDP. As this sector is less inten- per capita (Figure 2a).4 Energy use per capita has
sive both in energy and in CO2 than other eco- increased as well, at an average rate of about 1%
nomic activities in Mexico, this shift is expected per year between 1995 and 2010.
to decrease GHG emissions. Total energy consumption reached around 176
As GDP per capita increases, medium-sized cities million toe in 2010, including all consumption by
are expected to grow. Historic trends show that final users (transport, industry, buildings), energy
urban centers expand in patterns that increase industries, and transmission losses.5 The distri-
energy consumption and land use change. Smart bution of final energy use was spread over the
urban development has been identified as a key following fuels: gasoline (32%), electricity (16%),
way to transition towards more efficient and sus- diesel (16%), natural gas (11%), LPG (10%), and
tainable green growth schemes in Mexico. wood (5%). Approximately 30% of all energy use
is dedicated to transportation, and close to 70%
1.2  GHG emissions: current levels, of that energy is consumed by passenger transport
drivers, and past trends alone. This trend reflects the increase in vehicle
ownership, which doubled from 2000 to 2010 to
Total GHG emissions in Mexico reached approximately 207 vehicles per thousand people.
748 MtCO2e in 2010.3 The largest source of This increased ownership and use has caused GHG
emissions is the combustion of fossil fuels emissions from the transport sector to increase at
(56%), and the greatest contributors to this an annual rate of 3.2% between 1990 and 2010.

2 National deep decarbonization pathways
2

2.1  Illustrative deep sion-intensive alternatives. As shown in Table 1, this
decarbonization pathway analysis assumes a GDP growth rate of 3% every
year,6 from around 950 billion USD (at 2008 prices)
2.1.1  High-level characterization in 2010 to some 3,100 billion USD in 2050.GDP per
capita would reach $20,425 USD/person by 2050.
The illustrative deep decarbonization scenario de- Much of projected reduction in CO2 emissions
scribed in this report has been devised to achieve across sectors relies on reducing the carbon in-
reductions of CO2 emissions as a result of changes tensity of electricity generation coupled with a
in energy use and production towards less emis-

3 Inventario Nacional de Emisiones de Gases de Efecto Invernadero 1990-2010, INECC-SEMARNAT, 2013.
4 GDP increased 28% from 1995 to 2000 causing final energy per dollar of GDP to decrease noticeably in the same

period. The significant increase in GDP reflects a recovery from the economic crisis of 1995, so only a limited amount
of information can be gained from an examination of the 1995 to 2000 time period.
5 Balance Nacional de Energía, Sistema de Información Energética, SENER, 2014.
6 In this study we assume 3% annual growth as illustrative of long-term sustained growth. Official estimates for an-
nual GDP growth in 2014 have been recently adjusted from 3.1% to 2.8% (Banco de México, communiqué: http://
www.banxico.org.mx/informacion-para-la-prensa/comunicados/resultados-de-encuestas/expectativas-de-los-espe-
cialistas/%7BB22F53FD-4129-ECE1-85E3-BCA42D652B16%7D.pdf).

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 150

Mexico

switch from the combustion of fossil fuels to use were made regarding the future energy consump-
of electricity in those final uses of energy where it tion of some appliances, the deep decarbonization
is possible to do so. Although some assumptions scenario modeled does not include the effects of

Table 1. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers

Population [Millions] 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
GDP per capita [$/capita]
113 127 137 145 151
8,339 9,987 12,407 15,764 20,425

Figure 1. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010

1a. GHG emissions, by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors
250 MtCO2

MtCO2 eq 421  Energy-related 200
emissions Electricity
748 (Allocation
61  Processes
150 by End Use Sector)

92  Agriculture 100 Total MtCO2
44  Waste
83  Fugitive 50  Natural Gas 126

 Petroleum Products 246

+ 47  LULUCF 0  Coal 33

(Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other
0
Industry Buildings

162 56 153 33 405

Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions, 1990 to 2010

2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors

30% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 500 MtCO2

20%  Energy per GDP 400 373 405
10%  GDP per capita 342
 Buildings
0%  Population
-10% 300 269 295  Transportation
-20%  Energy Related
-30% 200
CO2 Emissions
1995 2000 2005 2010 per Energy  Industry
1990 1995 2000 2005
100

0  Electricity Generation

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

151 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Mexico

dedicated schemes to accelerate improvement energy will be provided mainly by electricity and
of energy efficiency faster than historical trends. natural gas (Figure 3). However, it is important
Non-electric fuel switches include a shift to natural to emphasize that a number of factors make it
gas from petroleum coke, coking coal, diesel, and impossible to anticipate what specific technology
residual fuel oil used in industry, as well as partial choices will be made in Mexico, including the fact
use of ethanol, natural gas, and biodiesel in trans- that the country is undergoing a major reform
port to reduce gasoline and diesel consumption. of its energy sector, which will affect regulation,
This exploratory deep decarbonization scenario planning, and the presence of private sector pro-
to 2050 assumes that primary energy systems in viders. As a result, this scenario in no way rep-
Mexico migrate from a heavy dependence on oil resents an expected or recommended pathway,
to pipeline gas and renewables and that end-use and is neither government policy nor an official

Figure 3. Energy Pathways, by source
3a. Primary Energy

EJ 10.40 3b. Final Energy
+ 48 % 10
EJ
8 + 43 % 8 8.36

7.02 0.09  Nuclear 5.85 6 4.33
0.03 6 2.93  Renewables & Biomass
0.47 3.57  Natural Gas w CCS 1.05  Electricity
2.21 4 2.26  Natural Gas 0.27 4 0.11  Biomass
1.02  Oil  Liquids
3.71 2 0.30  Coal w CCS 1.38  Gas
0.23  Coal 3.04 2  Coal w CCS
0.59 0  Coal
1.34 2.34
2010 2050 0.14 0 0.21

2010 2050

Figure 4. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers, 2010 to 2050 4b. The pillars of decarbonization
4a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers Pillar 1.
Energy ef ciency
100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Energy Intensity of GDP
2010 5.9 MJ/$
80%

60%

40% 2050 2.8 - 53 %

20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2.
Decarbonization of electricity
0%  Population 2010 Electricity Emissions Intensity
541 gCO2/kWh
-20%  Energy per GDP - 96%
-40%
-60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions 2050 22
per Energy
Pillar 3.
-80% Electri cation of end-uses Share of electricity in total nal energy
+ 32 pt
-100% 2010 19

2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 51 %
2010 2020 2030 2040

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Mexico

document of planning or intent. It merely seeks to Figure 5. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway,
lay out what a potential scenario could look like, by Sector, 2010 to 2050
in order to explore possible interplays between
technologies and their feasibility considerations. 500 MtCO2 - 44 % Note:
This deep decarbonization scenario shows a sub- 456 254 2010 Industry data from the present
stantial (96%) reduction in the GHG emissions analysis include an oeisltiamnadtgeafsorprCoOd2uction
released per unit of electricity produced from 400 28 emissions from the
2010 and 2050 (Figure 4). Energy intensity of industry that is not included in the of cial
GDP also decreases, at a less aggressive rate 155 inventory estimate.
of 2% each year to yield an overall reduction 300
of 53% from 2010 to 2050. Finally, there is a
substantial increase in the share of electricity 200 116
in final energy use from 19% in 2010 to 51%
by 2050. 100 20  Buildings
The scenario assumes drastic reductions in the 158 109  Transportation
GHG emissions from electricity generation and 99  Industry
transportation and lower reductions in buildings 0 26  Electricity Generation
when comparing emission levels from 2050 to 2010 2050
2010 (Figure 5).
Figure 6. Energy Supply Pathway for Electricity Generation,
2.1.2  Sectoral characterization by Source

The prominent role of electrification as a de- 541 gCO2/kWh 600
carbonization strategy prioritizes a reduction 400
of GHG emissions intensity in the electricity 
generation sector.

Electricity generation
In 2010, electricity generation was associated  200
with a CO2 emissions intensity of 541 gCO2 per  22
kWh. Results of an initial analysis show that in 0
order to be consistent with the deep decarbon-
ization objective, carbon intensity would need 1200 TWh  Other renewables
to fall to around 20 gCO2 per kWh by 2050. To 1000  Biomass
accomplish this, the illustrative deep decarboni-
zation scenario assumes electricity in Mexico will 800  Solar
be generated from a larger share of renewables
(especially solar), and natural gas with CCS. 600  Wind
The additional electrical power required to
enable the electrification of energy demand  Hydro
is substantial at nearly 1,200 TWh by 2050. 400  Nuclear
To meet this electricity generation need, the
full potential for renewable energy resourc-  Natural Gas w CCS
200  Natural Gas

 Oil
0  Coal with CCS
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  Coal

153 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Mexico

es identified to date has been taken into ac- share of intermittent renewable power of 50%
count7, which includes 6,500 TWh/year of solar, and an average emission factor of only 19 g of
88 TWh/year of wind, 77 TWh/year of geother- CO2 per kWh produced (Figure 6).
mal, 70 TWh/year of hydro,8 and 11 TWh/year
of biomass. Assuming that technological ad- Energy consumption
vances make it feasible to incorporate high Under the deep decarbonization scenario illus-
levels of intermittency into the grid by 2050 trated here, final energy consumption would
(by developing energy storage capabilities, for amount to approximately 205 million toe by
example) a balanced mix was composed with 2050 (from industry, transport, and buildings).
the two main energy sources: solar (40%) and In this exercise, the reduction in carbon inten-
natural gas (35%). It is assumed that the rest sity of the industrial activity is achieved by the
of the supply is provided by wind (11%), hydro massive substitution of oil products (residual
(6%), geothermal (2%), coal (2%), nuclear (2%) fuel oil, coke and, diesel) by largely decar-
and oil (1%). Electricity generation from all bonized electricity (to around 62% of energy
fossil fuels (464 TWh) will require CCS in all demand projected by 2050) and natural gas
generation plants (+60 GW) to comply with (30%). The resulting carbon intensity after such
the stringent CO2 emission intensity discussed measures would be about half of the current
above. Such a generation mix would have a value (Figure 7a).

Figure 7. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050

Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 70
71.9
 gCO2/MJ 50 gCO2/MJ 60 60
50.3 40 50
28.9  50
5.0 EJ 23.9 30  40 48.1 40
4.5 30
4.0  20 30
3.5 11.0 20 20
3.0 10
2.5  10 10
2.0 0 0
1.5 0
1.0
0.5  Grid 3.0 EJ 3.0 EJ
electricity 2.5
0 2.5
2010
2.0 2.0  Grid
electricity
 Liquid fuels 1.5 Grid 1.5
 Pipeline Gas 1.0  electricity 1.0  Liquid fuels
0.5
 Solid biomass 0.5

 Coal 0  Liquid fuels 0  Pipeline gas
2050 2010 2050
2050  Pipeline gas 2010

7a. Industry 7b. Buildings 7c. Transportation

Note: Carbon intensity for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 154

Mexico

Due to the low energy requirements in households Figure 8. Land passenger travels, by mode
and Mexico´s relatively mild weather, GHG emis-
sions from buildings (residential and commercial 2.0 EJ 1.6
sectors) have not historically been increasing at 1.5  Short-distance rail
high rates. However, steps must be taken to ensure 1.0 0.9  Short-distance bus
household energy consumption does not emulate 0.5
North American trends. To reduce the building-re-  Personal car & taxi
lated direct energy emissions, the scenario explores 0 2050
the substitution of gas (both LPG and natural gas) 2010
by electricity in final energy uses (Figure 7b).
In the transport sector, a massive fuel shift from both as dedicated solar power plants feeding the
gasoline and diesel to electricity and natural gas grid, as well as distributed production for house-
has been considered as an illustrative decarbon- holds and industries, and investment in trans-
ization approach (Figure 7c and Figure 8), using mission lines. Further advances in energy storage
three exploratory assumptions: technology and smart grids will also be required to
1. A passenger modal shift to mass-public electric integrate so much intermittent resource into the
grid, where these technologies would help limit
transportation systems to satisfy the increasing demand on the grid and the need for even more
travel demand; generation and transmission infrastructure.
2. Freight shift to electric trains and gas powered Given the large share of gas-fueled electricity project-
trucks; and ed in this scenario, Mexico would need the potential
3. 60% of light vehicles (private cars and taxis) would capacity to store approximately 200 million tons of
switch to electricity, and 90% of freight would CO2 every year. A theoretical storage potential of 100
switch to natural gas and biodiesel by 2050. GtCO2 has been identified in a preliminary study.9
Increasing the amount of electricity produced
2.2  Assumptions from renewable sources other than solar would
require further exploration and technological
The preliminary deep decarbonization scenario development to exploit lower-yield potentials in
outlined in this report relies heavily on the com- wind, geothermal, and biomass resources.
plementarity between the electrification of en- The preliminary approach followed to deeply de-
ergy usage across sectors and the simultaneous carbonize the transport sector assumes the fea-
abatement of GHG emissions in the power sector. sibility of implementation of extensive electric
In order to do this the implementation of large inter-modal mass transport systems. For this to
infrastructure and investments for clean energy be true at the required scale it would be neces-
are required. In this scenario, we have emphasized sary to change the present urban growth patterns.
the role of solar energy, together with extensive Today’s medium-sized cities are expected to drive
use of CCS techniques at gas power plants.
Achieving this very ambitious solar target
(≈270 TWh/year, assuming a capacity factor of
20%) requires an aggressive cost reduction strat-
egy that allows massive roll-out of said technology,

7 Inventario Nacional de Energías Renovables, SENER, 2014, in http://iner.energia.gob.mx/publica/version2.0/
8 Includes estimates for large and small scale hydropower.
9 The North American Carbon Storage Atlas (NACSA), 1st Edition, 2012. www.nacsap.org

155 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Mexico

most of the future growth and would need to 2.5  Challenges, opportunities and
adopt and enforce best smart growth practices. enabling conditions
This scenario also assumed that by 2050 electric
vehicles will be widely available, and that it will be Major challenges that may deter realization of
possible to divert freight from the road to electric this scenario include current energy subsidies
trains without major technical issues. (both for fossil fuels and electricity), economic
potential, lack of resources to fund the transition,
2.3  Alternative pathways and pathway and the technological availability of cost-effec-
robustness tive options for CCS, electric vehicles, solar power
harvesting, and biofuels production.
Given the dependence of this approach on the Amongst the enabling conditions that require
decarbonization of the electricity generation sec- international cooperation, we identify technol-
tor, it is important to explore alternative techno- ogy development for energy storage and energy
logical scenarios for this sector. In this analysis management (smart demand and smart grids),
we assume the presence of competitive energy carbon taxes to imports and exports of fossil fuels,
storage systems that enable grids to include a and the development of zero carbon or carbon
high share of intermittent sources (solar or wind negative agriculture and forestry techniques to
power) and are valuable to manage overall de- support production of sustainable bioenergy crops
mand. However, if such a solar plan is unfeasible, and reduce emissions from these sectors.
an alternative pathway must be devised, perhaps
by increasing the share of nuclear power or natural 2.6  Near-term priorities
gas with CCS.
Although this is an initial exploration of deep de-
2.4  Additional measures and deeper carbonization in Mexico, some conclusions can
pathways be drawn from the magnitude of the challenge
at hand. Adoption of better practices in urbani-
The projected GHG emissions resulting from meas- zation and territorial planning could prove crucial
ures considered in the illustrative deep decarbon- to lower future energy consumption per capita
ization scenario could be further reduced by addi- and simultaneously improve quality of life. Bet-
tional actions that have not been yet evaluated. ter-organized cities could induce the behavioral
Other options that have not been explored at full changes needed for mode shifts in transportation.
capacity in the present study and that may have A robust low-carbon electricity generation policy
interesting potential are: additional renewables is required to evaluate different future alterna-
(wind, geothermal, and marine power), industrial tives, increase certainty over governmental plans,
processes redesigned to decrease energy intensity and provide an economically feasible route for
and byproduct GHG emissions, large-scale CCS in future development.
industrial facilities, massive adoption of hybrid ve- Energy efficiency programs coupled with appro-
hicles, large-scale production of bio-fuels for trans- priate energy price signals could help decrease the
port, and partially substituting the natural gas in financial burden of the transformation needed by
the pipeline network with lower-carbon alternatives. reducing energy demand and thus reducing the
Municipal and agricultural waste can be a source amount of funds needed to transition towards
of biogas, rather than GHG emissions. Utilizing a deep decarbonization development pathway.
biogas from landfills and water treatment oper-
ations might help lower future consumption of
natural gas for electricity generation.

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Russia

Oleg Lugovoy, 1 Country profile
Russian Presidential Academy 1

of National Economy 1.1  The national context for deep
and Public Administration, decarbonization and sustainable development
Moscow, Russia & Environmental
With the largest territory (17 billion km2, of which 67% are
Defense Fund, USA on permafrost), the Russian Federation is endowed with very
high fossil fuel reserves representing 34%, 12% and 20% of
George Safonov, world deposits of natural gas, crude oil, and coal, respectively.
Russian Presidential Academy The energy sector is logically dominated by fossils fuels, which
are importantly used for exports (around 40% of the 1.7 billion
of National Economy tons of coal equivalent (tce) extracted natural gas, coal, and
and Public Administration & National crude oil is exported).
Research University - Higher School of The forest area covers 1.2 billion hectares and the agricultural
land – mainly used for plowing, crops, forage production and
Economics, Moscow livestock pastures – occupies 220 million hectares. Total waste
production is approximately 4 billion tons per year, less than
Vladimir Potashnikov, half of which being utilized or treated.
Russian Presidential Academy National production is structured around industrial production
of National Economy and Public (30%), trade (20%), transport and communication (8%), agri-
culture (4%), construction (7%), services (31%). An important
Administration characteristic of the industrial sector is the rather high overall
depreciation of industrial capital. Since more than 80% of
Dmirty Gordeev, assets are more than 20 years old across all carbon-inten-
Russian Presidential Academy sive industries and sectors, industrial modernization is one
of the high priorities for the national government. Similarly,
of National Economy
and Public Administration

We would like to express our

acknowledgements to the Russian

experts who provided very valuable

input to the project discussions in

Russia, with special thanks to V.Berdin,

P.Bezrukikh, A.Brodov, Yu.Fedorov,

A. Kokorin, V.Lutsenko, O.Pluzhnikov,

O.Rakitova, M.Saparov, L.Shevelev,

A.Stetsenko, M.Yulkin and others.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 157

Russia Russia

since main investments were made in the 1960- 1.2  GHG emissions: current levels,
1980s, the overall capacity structure of the pow- drivers, and past trends
er generation sector is quite old and almost all
large units will exceed their expected service life Domestic energy consumption relies on fossil fu-
and become obsolete in 10-20 years. Notably, els, where natural gas, coal, and petroleum rep-
in 2010, out of the 146GW thermal power and resent respectively 52%, 12%, and 35% of total
combined heat and power (CHP) plants, 91 GW demand. Electricity generation is mainly based
were more than 30 years old and 46 were more on thermal power plants (68% of total produc-
than 40 years old. Another important specificity tion), and major alternatives include hydropower
over recent years is the intense rise of the trans- with 15% and nuclear with 16%. The share of
portation sector, notably for private cars which renewable sources is negligible (below 1% of total
have reached 38.8 millions units or 257 cars per primary energy production).
1,000 people in 2013. Russia’s GHG emissions are dominated by CO2
The long-term strategic goals of economic de- emissions, contributing to 73% of total GHG
velopment are stipulated in various official doc- emissions (Figure 1a). These emissions essentially
uments, such as the Concept of Socio-Economic come from fossil fuel combustion, which amount
Development by 2020,1 Energy strategy–2030,2 to 1.5 Gt CO2e (according to UNFCCC) or 65%
General Scheme of Electricity Units Allocation – of total GHG emissions. Other major sources of
2030,3 and others. The specific climate change emissions include fugitive emissions from the en-
mitigation policy objectives are provided in the ergy sector (403 MtCO2e, or 18%) and industrial
Russian Climate Doctrine (2009),4 Presidential processes (mineral products, chemical industry,
Decree “On greenhouse gas emission reduction” metal production, production and consumption of
(2013)5 and its Implementation Plan adopted by halocarbons and SF6) (173 MtCO2e, or 8%). The
Government (2014),6 as well as the sectoral and agriculture, waste, solvent, and other product use
industrial plans and programs (e.g. the energy jointly account for 221 MtCO2e (10%).
efficiency improvement program, environmental Carbon sinks (forestry and land use) play an
policy, forestry, agricultural, and many others). important role in Russian carbon balance and
The main focus on longer-term development are also of high political concern due to per-
goals in Russia concern the economic growth, ception of the national forest as a source of
diversification of the economy, modernization global ecological gift. In 2010, the net carbon
of its technological base and infrastructure, sequestration (in “managed forest”) amounted
increase of the share of innovative, knowl- to 651 MtCO2e, “compensating” 29% of total
edge-based sectors, improvement of environ- national GHG emissions.
mental quality, and population wellbeing. The In this study, the main focus is on carbon emis-
long-term targets for carbon emissions by 2050 sions related to the Russian energy sector, cov-
have not been identified as yet, and the deep ering primarily CO2 emissions from electricity
decarbonization strategy is still to be developed generation, industries, transport, buildings, and
and adopted by Russia. other sources. The share of these sources and
related energy is described in Figure 1b.

1 http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/strategicplanning/concept/
2 http://minenergo.gov.ru/aboutminen/energostrategy/
3 http://minenergo.gov.ru/press/min_news/3915.html
4 http://kremlin.ru/acts/6365
5 http://kremlin.ru/acts/19344
6 http://government.ru/media/files/41d4d0082f8b65aa993d.pdf

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 158

Russia

Total GHG without LULUCF emissions in Russia for 96% GDP increase). The main drivers of this evo-
lution include economic growth, structural changes
decreased by 31% over 1990-2011, from 3,352 to in the economy, technological changes (moderniza-
tion), fuel switch from coal to gas, growth of energy
2,321 MtCO2e, with in particular a 38% decrease prices, and corresponding energy saving. Less but
of energy-related CO2 emissions over 1990-2010 still important factors for carbon emission dynamics
(Figure 2), notably caused by dramatic drop of in- include transport and infrastructure development,
dustrial production after the collapse of USSR in 1991. waste management, agricultural production and for-
est policy (reforestation, forest management).
The 1999-2011 period was remarkable for Russia as it

demonstrated clear decoupling of economic growth

and carbon emissions (only 18% increase of emission

Figure 1. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010

1a. GHG emissions, by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors

MtCO2 eq 1422  Energy-related 1000 MtCO2
900
emissions Electricity
800 (Allocation
173  Processes by End Use Sector)

2218 142  Agriculture 700
78  Waste 600
500

403  Fugitive 400 Total MtCO2
1  Other 300
200  Natural Gas 880

100  Petroleum Products 252

-651 0  Coal 289

Electricity Generation Transportation Other

LULUCF Industry Buildings
(Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry)
820 237 226 127 13 1422

Source: UNFCCC, IEA (IEA data source is used for decomposition when of cial UNFCCC information is not available.)

Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions, 1990 to 2010

2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors

200% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 2500 MtCO2
2282
150%
2000
100%  GDP per capita  Other
50% 1500 1439 1327 1351 1422  Buildings
 Transportation
0%  Population 1000  Industry
 Energy per GDP 500  Electricity Generation
-50%  Energy Related 0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-100% CO2 Emissions

1995 2000 2005 2010 per Energy

1990 1995 2000 2005

Source: UNFCCC, Rosstat, World Bank.

159 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

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2 National deep decarbonization pathways
2

2.1  Illustrative deep The scenario assumes a population decline from
decarbonization pathway 142 to 120 million people in 2050 and the tripling
2.1.1  High-level characterization of per capita GDP (Table 1). The simulation of to-
tal primary energy supply (TPES) and final energy
The illustrative scenario discusses the technical demand are shown in Figure 3. The deep decar-
feasibility of a low-carbon economic development bonization results in a decline of TPES by 27% in
under assumptions on economic growth (notably, 2050, with significant changes in the structure of
increase of steel and cement production, as well as energy production: total coal use drops to 2.8%
increase of mobility) and patterns of development (half of it with CCS); natural gas contributes 36%
integrating a set of assumptions from official,7 in- of TPES but almost half of it should use CCS; the
dependent, and experts’ visions and assumptions of share of oil should drop to 7.1%; renewables’ share
Russian long-term economic development, tech- including biomass rises to 32.5%; and the share
nologies development reviews, and projections by of nuclear can reach 21.8%.
the Russian and international organizations, as well The final energy consumption (from 20.1 EJ8 in 2010
as extensive expert consultations. to 15.1 EJ in 2050, Figure 3) in Russia should also be
Then the scenario of economic development is sim- significantly transformed in the deep decarbonization
ulated with technological model RU-TIMES with a scenario: coal use to be phased out to 1.6%; the share
decarbonization target set up at 1.67 t of CO2 per of gas to reach 22.5% of final energy consumption; to-
capita in 2050. Uncertainties and robustness of con- tal liquid fuel (including biofuels) to decline to 16.6%;
clusions are discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3.

Table 1. Selected assumptions and results about the socio-economic and energy sector
development for the deep decarbonization scenario in Russia

  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Population (millions) 142 137 132 126 120
GDP per capita (constant 2012 US$) 13,116 19,127 25,726 32,932 40,833

Figure 3. Energy Pathways, by source

3a. Primary Energy 3b. Final Energy
29.5 EJ - 27 %
20.1 EJ - 25 %
1.87 20
0.74 25

21.5
20

16.75 15 4.67  Nuclear 7.89 15 15.1
6.97  Renewables & Biomass
10 3.76  Natural Gas w CCS 0.08 10 8.08  Electricity and heat
5 3.94  Natural Gas 4.30 0.88  Biomass
0 1.52  Oil 2.52  Liquids
5.47 0.31  Coal w CCS 6.35 5 3.41  Gas
4.63 0.30  Coal 0.25  Coal
2050 1.48 0
2010 2010 2050

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 160

Russia

while the share of biomass should reach 5.8% of TPES 2.1.2  Sectoral characterization
and electricity and heat 53.9% by 2050.
The scenario pinpoints a decline of energy-related CO2 Electric power sector
emissions from 1,422 Mt in 2010 (IEA estimate is 1577- The electric power sector is key in the decar-
1678 Mt) to 200 Mt in 2050. The share of renewables in bonization of the Russian economy. The Russian
energy balance moves up to 10% in 2050 (0% in 2010). electric power sector has 700 power and com-
The decomposition of energy-related CO2 emissions bined heat and power (CHP) plants (over 5 MW
drivers and their pillars show that the growth of GDP of capacity). The total installed capacity accounts
per capita drives CO2 emission up but is offset by for 226.5 GW (in 2013), of which zero-emission
the following emissions abating drivers (Figure 4): capacities include 46 GW of hydro and 23 GW
yyThe reduction of the use of primary energy per of nuclear power plants. The rest is covered by

unit of GDP: the energy intensity of GDP must Figure 5. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway,
decline from 15.8 to 4.4 MJ/$; by Sector, 2010 to 2050
yyThe decarbonization of energy production: in par-
ticular, the carbon intensity of electricity gener- 1500 6 1527 MtCO2 Note: The 2010 level of emission in Figure 5
ation should decline from 392 to 14 gCO2/kWh; 1250 130 differs from the 2010 level reported in
yyThe electrification of the economy: the share 1000 257 - 87 % Figures 1&2 because of gaps in data
of electricity in total final energy consumption availability. The latter corresponds to
should increase from 13% to 34%; 750 310 of cial data from UNFCCC, that are not
yyA declining population. detailed enough to support the full
calibration of the model used in the analysis
7 Concept of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of DDPs; for this purpose, additional data
of Russian Federation (2008), Energy Strategy – 2030, sources were used combining IEA energy
industrial and sectoral programs of development (elec- balance and CO2 statistics.
tric power sector, transport, metallurgy and others), IEA
Technology Perspectives (2010, 2012, 2014), and others. 500 1  Other
824 20  Buildings
8 The estimate of the final consumption also includes en- 74  Transportation
ergy used by blast furnance processes for iron production 250 200 82  Industry
less transformed energy to blast furnance gases. 24  Electricity Generation
0 2050
2010

Figure 4. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers, 2010 to 2050 4b. The pillars of decarbonization
4a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers

100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. Energy Intensity of GDP
Energy ef ciency 15.7 MJ/$
80% 2010

60%

40% 2050 4.4 - 72 %

20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2. Electricity Emissions Intensity
0%  Population Decarbonization of electricity 392 gCO2/kWh
 Energy per GDP 2010
-20% - 96 %
-40% 2050 14

-60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pillar 3.
-80% per Energy Electri cation of end-uses Share of electricity in total nal energy

-100% 2010 13 + 21 pt

2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 34 %
2010 2020 2030 2040

161 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Russia

natural gas and coal-fired power plants. The forth- CCS availability, the significant expansion of this
coming retirement of the majority of fossil-based latter category will be required only after 2040
power stations, made necessary by their obsoles- to meet the low-carbon target (see discussion in
cence, creates both opportunities and challenges section 2.3 in case of lower availability of CCS).
for the industry. The modernization will improve The CCS technologies are assumed to be commer-
energy efficiency of the sector, which is far below cially available, and they will play an important
best available technological options. The exces- role in the decarbonization strategy in the power
sive capacities and slowly-growing demand limit sector in Russia beyond 2030. Almost all remain-
opportunities for investment in the industry. ing thermal power plants (coal and natural gas
Several strategic developments can be envisaged fired) need to be equipped with CCS technology
to decarbonize the power industry, including by 2050 to reach the deep decarbonization target
growth of nuclear and large hydropower (already (Figure 6).
planned by the industry) as well as a growth of
renewables’ share in the energy mix. These re- Transportation
newables consist essentially in a progressive It is expected that the recent trends of fast-growing
deployment of wind as well as of small hydro, mobility demand continues, leading to a 133% rise
tidal, and geothermal (the “other renewables of passenger transportation by 2050 and an increase
category” in Figure 6a). However, with assumed of light duty vehicles (LDV) and air transport.

Figure 6. Energy Supply Pathways, by Resource

  gCO2/kWh 400 Carbon intensity
300
392 200
100

14
86.7
0
2000 TWh   gCO2/MJ 80
1800  Other renewables  60
1600 2020 2030 2040  Biomass
1400 6a.Electricity  Solar 6.0 EJ   40
1200  Wind 20
1000  Large Hydro 51.0
 Nuclear
800 5.0 0
600  Natural Gas w CCS
400  Natural Gas 4.0
200  Coal with CCS
 Coal 3.0
0
2010 2050 2.0  Biofuels
1.0  Oil

0 2020 2030 2040 2050
2010 6b. Liquid Fuels

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Russia

The reasons for this growth include growing GDP at relatively low costs. The heavy-duty vehicles
per capita, expansion of the loan market, and a (HDVs) could use LPG and liquefied natural gas
shift from public transport to private light duty (LNG) in medium-term. In the long-term, biofuels
vehicles (LDVs). The low-carbon technological would be the primary option.
options in the LDV sector include liquefied pe- The biggest polluter in transport sector will be
troleum gas (LPG) engines in the mid-term and pipeline transport. There seem to be no alter-
expansion of biofuel use in the long run with up- native to the use of natural gas as fuel to trans-
dating LDV to the best available technologies. port natural gas via pipelines. So the amounts
Electric vehicles will likely experience delayed of consumed natural gas will be defined by the
expansion in Russia due to tough (cold) climate domestic natural gas consumption and exports
conditions, unless the technology improves; plug- via pipelines.
in hybrids with internal combustion engines on With all the decarbonization measures applied,
LPG or biofuel may be more competitive. emissions of the transport sector in 2050 can
Another challenge is limiting emissions from air reach 73.5 MtCO2 . In final energy consumption,
transportation, which will notably be permitted the share of electricity will move up from 7% in
by the introduction of biofuels. 2010 to 24% in 2050, with fall of oil products
The freight transportation (rise from 2,372 to from 60% in 2010 to 6%, and increase of biofuels
4,250 billion t*km in 2050) can be decarbonized up to 35%.

Figure 7. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050

Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 60
 50
32.6 gCO2/MJ 50 gCO2/MJ 50
 40 40 61.5 
40
30 20.9 30 14 EJ
 12  30
  20  20 10  20
10 14 EJ 10
12 8 24.2 10
14 EJ  10 0 6 0
12 0 5.4 4
10 8 2
8 9.9 6 0
6 4
4  Heat 2
2 0
0  Grid  Heat
electricity

 Solid biomass  Grid Grid
electricity electricity
 Liquid fuels 

 Pipeline Gas  Solid biomass  Liquid fuels
 Coal
 Pipeline Gas  Pipeline Gas

 Coal
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

7a. Industry 7b. Buildings 7c. Transportation

Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.

163 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

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Buildings gy efficiency gains and changes in the energy mix
The residential buildings in Russia contain huge are then necessary to make this significant growth
potential for energy efficiency improvements. The compatible with limitations of associated emissions.
heating system in Russia is historically highly cen- The largest energy consumer in industry is integrat-
tralized, with around 75% of heat being supplied ed iron and steel (IIS) production. Since 1990, the
by district boiler houses and combined heat and IIS industry showed significant energy efficiency
power boilers (CHPs). The overall losses in the improvement that resulted in more than 20% re-
heat supply system are over 50%. duction in carbon intensity of steel production due
The considered scenario assumes 30% growth of to retrofit and replacement of fixed capital. Further
living space area per person, from 23 m2 per capita improvement, as expected, will lead to 33% addi-
to 30 m2 per capita in 2050, as a catch-up with tional energy efficiency, mainly due to the adoption
average living space per person for European coun- of blast-furnace gas recycling technologies, which
tries (which is around 35-45 m2 per capita). The will increase carbon intensity of the steel production
decline of population over 2010-2050 however to EU level. However, for deeper reductions, further
limits the expansion of total residential surface. energy efficiency improvement technologies should
The deep decarbonization pathway requires tap- be considered, such as direct reduced iron (DRI) on
ping the existing reserves in energy efficiency natural gas with potential to reduce CO2 emissions
improvement of buildings and overall residential up to 20-30% (with decarbonized electricity).
heating systems. The scenario assumes a drop in Processes of other energy-intensive industries are
energy consumption of buildings by 6 times to the very diverse, and a moderate decarbonization poten-
level of 60 kWh / m2 /year by 2050 (this is still a tial of the remaining industries is considered, mainly
conservative estimate, compared to the best prac- by means of electrification of the industries from
tice estimated around 15 kWh/m2/year). The fuel 14% to 34%, and a 6% energy efficiency growth
mix structure should also be significantly changed from 2010 to 2050. The total fuel mix structure of
with notable increases in biomass, electrification, industry and other remaining sectors (agriculture,
and wide use of geo-heat pumps for heating. forestry, fishing) consistent with the deep decar-
The commercial and residential buildings have bonization scenario is presented in Figure 7a.
to follow the same strategy of energy efficiency
growth, with additional electrification where pos- Agriculture, land use and forestry
sible and reduction of fossil energy consumption. The land use and forestry sector (LULUCF) is a very
Figure 7b shows total energy balance of the res- important source of carbon emissions and abate-
idential and commercial sectors, consistent with ment in Russia. Since 1990, the net carbon seques-
the deep decarbonization target. tration in LULUCF increased up to 628 MtCO2 due
to relatively low levels of logging, low shares of
Industry over-matured wood, and other factors. However,
Industrial output of energy intensive industries (iron the carbon net sink in Russian forests is expected
and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and petro- to decline, and the net sink will become negative
chemicals, mining, and cement) is assumed to grow (emissions will exceed sequestration) by the mid-
significantly over the next four decades, by 26% for 2040s9 due to an increasing share of over-matured
steel production (from 66 Mt to 83 Mt), by 41% forest, expansion of forest fires and diseases, in-
for cement (from 49 Mt to 69 Mt), and by 10% in sufficient adaptation policies and measures, etc.
other energy intensive industries. Important ener- In order to keep and enhance the carbon sequestra-

9 http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/application/pdf/6nc_rus_final.pdf

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 164

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tion capacity of Russian forests, as a large source of is not commercial yet, and it is uncertain if it will
CO2 absorption from the atmosphere, substantial be available under competitive costs in Russia.
enhancement and strengthening of climate change With significant resources of biomass, costs and feasi-
policy in the forest sector is required, including bility of biofuels production depend on many factors,
international cooperation in scientific, forest mon- including location, type of bio-resource, process of de-
itoring, forest fire and disease control measures, velopment, and competitiveness of the technology.
investment, and technological support. In case one of these technological assumptions
cannot be realized, alternative low-carbon strate-
2.2  Assumptions gies should be considered. If CCS is not available,
renewables might be used instead. The current
The major technological conditions for reaching scenario is quite conservative for renewable en-
deep decarbonization in Russia include: ergy in electricity production (about 25% in total
1. Pursue aggressive end use efficiency across generation) versus other countries, where renew-
able energy may reach more than 80%. Though
all sectors; Russia has relatively lower potential for mainstream
2. Electrify where possible, and use gas where solar and wind power, there is more than significant
potential of tidal and hydro energy. A higher share
not possible to electrify; of nuclear power is another alternative. Electrifica-
3. Decarbonize the power sector by increasing tion of transport can be an alternative to biofuels.
Higher energy efficiency improvements of buildings
the use of renewables, nuclear, hydropower can reduce demand for heat and geo-heat pumps.
plants, and maximize efficiency of thermal
power and CHP plants; 2.4  Additional measures and deeper
4. Methane leakage, especially in extraction, pathways
storage, and transportation of natural gas is
not covered by the scenario but will require Though the discussed scenario already has an
substantial reduction; ambitious target, additional measures could be
5. Deep decarbonization of industrial production envisaged to trigger deeper emission reductions
(e.g. metallurgy, cement, chemicals, and other); notably through further electrification of indus-
6. Decarbonization of transport sector via elec- try, transport, final use sectors, and energy effi-
trification, biofuel use, etc.; ciency improvement. In particular, under specific
7. Energy efficiency improvement of all type of conditions to be investigated more precisely, the
buildings; following measures could be envisaged:
8. Use of carbon capture and storage (CCS); yyMaximizing production of renewable electricity,
9. Utilization of huge biomass fuel potential, as
well as other renewable energy sources; and harvesting tidal energy, hydro-power;
10. Large-scale heat production using heat pumps yyMaximizing energy efficiency of buildings;
and energy saving in residential and commer- yyApplication of CCS in industry, including cement
cial sectors.
and iron and steel;
2.3  Alternative pathways and pathway yyCombination of biomass energy with CCS;
robustness yyHydrogen-based technologies where possible, in-

The most critical technological assumption in the cluding transportation and steel production; and
analysis is CCS availability, biofuels potential, and yyOptimizing public transportation, reducing num-
scope of application of geothermal heat pumps
for district heating. Although CCS has been tested ber of trips, switching from private cars to public
in pilot projects around the world, the technology transport, and from air-transport to trains.

165 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

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2.5  Challenges, opportunities and mechanisms, forest carbon sequestration and ad-
enabling conditions aptation mechanisms (LULUCF, REDD+), scientific
research on low-carbon development, etc.
The deep decarbonization of Russian economy These long-term cooperation frameworks need to
will require significant efforts from government, be provided in the new climate change agreement
businesses, and citizens. Rearrangement of the na- with active participation of all major-emitting
tional economy in favor of low-carbon production countries, as well as other international agree-
technologies and a much less traditional use of ments under the UN, WTO, and others.
fossil fuels will require dramatic changes in strate-
gic planning, technological innovations, environ- 2.6  Near-term priorities
mental regulation, low-carbon energy production
technologies, relevant transport standards and Near-term priorities for the Russian deep decar-
infrastructure, household behavioral changes and, bonization pathway should include:
certainly, strong political will. yyEstablishment of the information basis for emis-
Evidently, Russia has an enormous potential for deep
decarbonization. It has the necessary natural capi- sion management (monitoring, verification, and
tal and territory, technological and scientific poten- reporting on the source level);
tial, and financial resources. The biggest challenge yyDevelopment and introduction of the GHG
though is to channel the political will and business emission regulation system (providing incen-
efforts towards the deep decarbonization pathway. tives for emission reduction, project-based, cap-
In the current context, when the major share of Rus- and-trade schemes, etc.);
sia’s industrial capital assets are depreciated and yyStrengthening the current decarbonization efforts
require renovation and modernization, it is a great (gasification programs, energy efficiency, renewable
opportunity for starting the new capital investment energy use, energy saving, decarbonization of trans-
cycle based on the deep decarbonization platform. port, cement, chemical, metal production, etc.);
Russia can also play a significant role in exporting yyEnhancing R&D in and implementation of break-
clean (carbon free) energy and products to neigh- through technologies (e.g. biofuels, electrifica-
boring countries, based on the implementation tion of transport and infrastructure, CCS, new
of large-scale projects on tidal energy genera- generation nuclear power plants, etc.); and
tion in the North-West and Far East of Russia yyImprovement of the adaptation/mitigation pol-
(with unique natural conditions), production of icies and measures in forestry and agriculture,
the second generation liquid and solid biofuels. supporting carbon sequestration capacities.
The competitiveness of the new types of energy These efforts will allow continuing decoupling
will be unlocked by emission reduction targets GDP growth and GHG emission trends and will
around the world. facilitate finding new solutions to deep decar-
Obviously, the international “decarbonization re- bonization in Russia. Partly, these measures
gime” would play an extremely important role in correspond to the activities approved in the
Russia’s mitigation efforts, both in terms of scale Governmental Action Plan on reduction of GHG
and speed of changes required. Involvement of emissions (adopted on February 4, 2014) and oth-
Russia in international initiatives would be crucial, er decisions. However, the deep decarbonization
including technological cooperation, implemen- approach will require significant adjustments in
tation of investment projects (e.g. using Russian strategic planning of the economic development,
renewable energy sources, new generation nu- technological, and institutional changes aimed at
clear power projects, etc.), global carbon pricing the creation of climate-neutral Russia.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 166

South Africa

South Africa

1 Country profile
1

Hilton Trollip, 1.1  The national context for deep
Energy Research Centre, decarbonization and sustainable development
University of Cape Town
The African Climate Change Response White Paper (DEA 2011)
Harald Winkler, states, “South Africa is committed to contributing its fair share
Energy Research Centre, to global GHG mitigation efforts in order to keep the temper-
University of Cape Town ature increase well below 2°C. With financial, technology, and
capacity-building support, this level of effort will enable South
Bruno Merven, Africa’s GHG emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025 in a
Energy Research Centre, range with a lower limit of 398 MtCO2eq and upper limits of
University of Cape Town 583 MtCO2eq and 614 MtCO2eq for 2020 and 2025 respectively,
plateau with a lower limit of 398 MtCO2eq and upper limit of
614 MtCO2eq for approximately a decade, and decline in absolute
terms thereafter to a range with lower limit of 212 MtCO2eq
and upper limit of 428 MtCO2eq.” This is referred to as the Peak
Plateau Decline (PPD) benchmark trajectory.
South Africa has a modern urban economy, with an advanced
service sector and a large energy-intensive industrial base,
dependent on huge mineral resources. There are high levels
of inequality and poverty, given that society is divided along
spatial, economic, and social lines established in colonial and
then Apartheid eras (South Africa, 2013a):
yyThe top decile of the population accounts for 58% of income

while the bottom half accounts for less than 8% (World Bank
2013), resulting in one of the highest inequality levels of the
world as indicated by a Gini coefficient of 0.69.
yy45% of the population lives under the upper-bound poverty
level (R706 [66.36 US$] per month in 2009 prices).

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 167

South Africa South Africa

Unemployment is also a major, related concern. The structure of the economy has evolved from a
The unemployment rate reaches 25.5% accord- tertiary sector accounting for 57% of total GDP in
ing to standard definitions (40% when including 1984 to 70% today. There are important linkages
discouraged work seekers [Gumede, 2013]); this between the tertiary sector and the minerals-based
is the highest rate out of 40 emerging markets components of the primary and secondary sectors,
tracked by Bloomberg (Bloomberg, 2014). and the economy relies on the primary and second-
These issues are acknowledged in key policy ary sectors for much foreign direct investment and
documents, namely the National Development 60% of foreign exchange export earnings.
Plan (NDP) and the New Growth Path (NGP), and South Africa’s recoverable coal reserves amount
they are highly relevant in economic policies re- to approximately 49,000 Mt, giving the country
lated to GHG emissions mitigation. Social grants the world’s sixth-largest coal reserves (SACRM,
were extended to 14.8 m people in 2011, an in- 2013) and a reserve/production ratio of more
crease from 3.8 m in 2001 (Gumede, 2013), but than 200 years. Fluri (2009) estimates 548 GW
relying on grants is not sustainable and substan- of potential for concentrated solar power (CSP).
tial socio-economic development is required to Hageman (2013) estimates wind potential at
address poverty, inequality, and unemployment. 56 GW, 157 TWh p.a. There is a large regional
The population of South Africa was some 52m in hydro potential, greater than 40 GW.1
2011, is 60% urbanized, and grew 21% between The NDP recognizes that the South African econ-
the 1996-2011 censuses. South Africa will need omy is highly energy and (mineral) resource-in-
to make provisions for the projected 8m new ur- tensive but states: “a resource-intensive develop-
ban residents by 2030. Of 10m households, 3m ment path is unsustainable (NPC 2011).” This is at
remain without electricity connections. odds with parts of the Industrial Policy Action Plan
The average GDP growth of 3.5% over the past 2013-2016 (South African Department of Trade
decade has not been associated with a significant and Industry, 2013), the Beneficiation Strategy in
increase in employment. The NDP envisages an the NGP and the current Integrated Resource Plan
average GDP growth of 5.4% until 2030 (NPC, (DOE, 2013), which all envisage strong growth in
2011), and the NGP states that GDP growth be- the resource-intensive sectors and labor absorbing
tween 4-7% is necessary (South Africa, 2011a) to industrialization (South Africa, 2011a).
meet development objectives.
The shift in the twentieth century of the South 1.2  GHG emissions: current levels,
African economy from primarily a rural, agricul- drivers, and past trends2
tural economy to an urban, industrial one was
initially based on mining and then transitioned to GHG emissions in 2010 were around 543 MtCO2eq,
energy-intensive minerals-based industrialization, 78% of which were from fossil fuel combustion,
with the energy supply primarily based on coal and amounting to 10 t/cap. This high level is the com-
imported crude oil. bined result of an energy and electricity-intensive

1 This would require construction of regional transmission lines but projects are already under development and official
planning (DOE 2013) includes Grand Inga in the Democratic Republic of Congo some 3000km from SA and other
research reports indicate firm resource availability see IRENA 2013.

2 Most energy-related figures in this chapter, including energy GHG emissions, are estimated based on: (i) DOE 2006
statistics (DOE 2009) which are the latest available official statistics covering all energy sub-sectors and related time
series from 1992-2006; (ii) Eskom statistics published in the Eskom annual report; and (iii) where public data is not
available, estimates are made based on work by the Energy Research Centre (ERC) at the University of Cape Town (UCT)
related to the SATIM energy and emissions model. see http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/esystems-group-satim.htm

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 168

South Africa

economy, since 95% of electricity is generated 65% is used in industry, 23% in households, and
from coal and about 35% of liquid fuels are man- 12% in commerce (DOE, 2009).
ufactured from coal (coal to liquids, CTL). In 2010, industry, residences, and commercial
Of 250 Mt coal mined annually, 44% is for elec- buildings accounted for 60%, 20%, and 15% of
tricity generation, 28% exported, 18% for CTL, electricity demand respectively. Electricity con-
and 10% used directly. Of the 10% used directly, sumption grew steadily for decades until 2007

Figure 1. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010

1a. GHG emissions, by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors
250 MtCO2

MtCO2 eq 424  Energy-related 200
emissions 150
543 100 Electricity
44  Processes (Allocation
50 by End Use Sector)

15  Waste

40  Fugitive Total MtCO2

 Natural Gas 4

 Petroleum Products 68

+ 19  LULUCF 0  Coal 352

(Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other
52
Industry Buildings

223 53 56 40 424

Note: The “other” category includes both energy and process emissions of South Africa’s unique coal to liquids plants.

Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions, 1990 to 2010

2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors

Five-year variation rate of the drivers 500 MtCO2 424
40% 400 384 390

30%

20%  Energy  Other
10% per GDP
300 (incl. Industry and Buildings)
0%  GDP per capita
-10% 200  Transportation
-20%  Population
-30%
 Energy Related 100
CO2 Emissions
per Energy
 Electricity Generation
0 n.c. n.c.
1995 2000 2005 2010
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Note: Sector speci c data for 1990 and 1995 were not available for this report. (South Africa did develop GHG inventories for the years 1990, 1994 and 2000. However,
between them there are wide variations in methodologies and results and the 1990 and 1994 versions do not have suf ciently detailed supporting information to resolve the
variations to derive suf ciently meaningful trends for DDDP purposes. The 2010 inventory has been released for comment in June 2014 and is therefore not nal).

169 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Africa

when a supply constraint, which is still at work, installed capacity, are under construction. More
arose. Electricity prices have more than doubled than 3 GW of low-carbon electricity generation,
in real terms and are set to double again by 2015. mainly utility scale wind, solar photovoltaic (PV),
Two large coal-fired power stations totaling and concentrated solar (CSP), are also being con-
9.6 GW, equivalent to some 25% of currently tracted or under construction.

2 National deep decarbonization pathways
2

2.1  Illustrative deep development needs in terms of adequate income
decarbonization pathway levels and income distribution and providing energy
services for South African residents, business, and in-
2.1.1  High-level characterization dustry. This is done while retaining the GDP structure
of the economy and configuring an energy supply and
The South African Illustrative DDP is based on an end-use system that is consistent with the PPD. The
economy that prioritizes meeting socio-economic

Table 1. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers

  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Population [Millions] 50 58 67 69 70
GDP per capita [$/cap] 5,052 6,355 8,008 11,411 16,339
Electrification rate [%houses connected] 81% 90% 95% 100%
Household income distribution [m residents] 97%
• Low Income (R0 - R19,200)          
• Middle Income (R19,201 - R76,800)
• High Income (R76,801 and above) 24 14 9 5 0
15 32 39 34 27
11 12 19 29 44

Figure 3. Energy Pathways, by source

3a. Primary Energy

0.14 8.4 -2% 3b. Final Energy EJ 6.24
0.23 EJ 6
0.20 8 8.3 + 149 % 5 2.92
1.58 4 0.23
7 0.76 2.51 3 1.36
0.16 2
6 0.96 1 1.33
0.08 0 0.39
5 0.55 2050

4 2010

3 0.87  Nuclear  Electricity
6.30 2 3.37  Renewables & Biomass  Biomass
1.30  Natural Gas  Liquids
1 1.67  Oil  Gas
1.06  Coal  Coal
0

2010 2050

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 170

South Africa

GDP structure is retained to provide products such for the DDP is achieved with a 2050 level of
as steel and cement crucial for development and to energy emissions of 257 MtCO2eq. There is a
maintain the macro-economic stability provided by large increase in end-use energy required for
investments in and foreign exchange contributions the illustrative economy with a net decrease in
of the minerals and industrial sectors. These assump- primary energy over 2010-2050 and a significant
tions are discussed in section 2.2. decrease in primary energy per GDP.
In the illustrative scenario, the economy has aver-
age GDP growth of some 4%, which is consistent Figure 5. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway,
with the low end of the range of the NDP and by Sector, 2010 to 2050
NGP. Over 2010-2050, there is an improvement
in income distribution, and by 2050 there are no 500 MtCO2 - 39 %
households with “low incomes” (below R19,200 260
[around 1,800 US$]). Meaningful employment 424
impacts could not be estimated. 400
Energy end-use demand per sector for the illus-
trative economy is used as input to the ERC’s 52
TIMES model of the South African energy system 40
(SATIM)3 using a cumulative energy emissions 300 55
constraint over 2010-2050 of 14 GtCO2eq.
This is consistent with cumulative emissions 54
of the median of the PPD trajectory, achieving 200
the same cumulative emissions but a higher
end level. A technically feasible energy system 100 223 21  Other
0
3 For details of the SATIM modeling framework and 22  Buildings
methodology, see http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/ 61  Transportation
esystems-group-satim.htm. 140  Industry
16  Electricity Generation

2010 2050

Figure 4. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers, 2010 to 2050 4b. The pillars of decarbonization
4a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers Pillar 1.
Energy ef ciency
100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers 2010 Energy Intensity of GDP
35 MJ/$
80%

60%

40% 2050 7 - 79 %

20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2. Electricity Emissions Intensity
0% Decarbonization of electricity 879 gCO2/kWh
 Population 2010
-20%  Energy per GDP - 98 %

-40%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions 2050 21
-60% per Energy

-80% Pillar 3. Share of electricity in total nal energy
Electri cation of end-uses 30 + 17 pt
-100% 2010

2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 47 %
2010 2020 2030 2040

171 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Africa

Electricity sector emissions reduce radically, in 2010 to 20 g/kWh in 2050, mainly through the
emissions from buildings halve, and emissions replacement of coal-fired generation with CSP
from industry increase threefold. Transport with storage and construction of significant ad-
emissions remain relatively constant. The “oth- ditional CSP, nuclear, and widespread rooftop PV.
er” sector (in Figure 1), which is largely CTL, With South Africa’s solar radiation resource, the
is phased out. extensive use of CSP with storage and PV across
a wide geographic spread combined with some
2.1.2  Sectoral characterization dispatchable generating assets provides a system
with satisfactory loss-of-load probability.

Electricity Liquid fuels
Electricity generation increases threefold. Electrici- Liquid fuels production emissions intensity is
ty generation emissions decrease from 880 g/kWh radically reduced through phasing out of CTL,

Figure 6. Energy Supply Pathways, by Resource

 Carbon intensity

879 gCO2/kWh 800  gCO2/MJ 180
600 160
186 140
400  120
1.6 EJ 
1.4
200 1.2 73 100
21 1.0
0.9
 0 0.6  80
0.4
1200 TWh 0.2  60

1000  Other 0 Coal to liquid  40
2010 Gas to liquid 20

0

800

600

400  Solar

200  Wind  Oil
 Hydro
0 2020 2030 2040  Nuclear 2020 2030 2040 2050
2010 6a.Electricity  Coal 6b. Liquid Fuels

2050

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 172

South Africa

and by 2050 all liquid fuels are produced locally Transport
from crude oil. Passenger Transportation
Supply of significant additional passenger
Industry transport from 285 bn p-km to 509 bn p-km,
The industrial sector remains a constant pro- a per capita increase from 5,724 km/cap to
portional contribution to GDP, and it signif- 7,233 km/cap, meets basic development ob-
icantly expands at some 4% p.a. along with jectives. Private vehicle transport increases
the rest of GDP, which leads to a significant from 2,669 km/cap to 3,861 km/cap and public
increase in energy demand. Concurrent de- transport from 3,055 km/cap to 3,327 km/cap.
creases in total emissions attributable to in- Public transport involves a significant shift
dustry (i.e. direct and induced emissions) are from mini-bus taxi (MBT) to Bus-Rapid-Transit
achieved through fuel switching from coal to (BRT) and rail, which are far safer and more
gas, improvements in efficiency of end-use comfortable. The number of private vehicles
technologies, and shifting to electricity for doubles from 5m to 10m (9 people/vehicle to
some thermal applications. 6.5 people/vehicle).

Figure 7. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050

Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 180
160
gCO2/MJ 60 gCO2/MJ 60 179  140
50  120
  50 40
47.9  40 30 100
30 20
EJ 28.6  12.3 10  80
20  73 60
10 0 40

0 6.4

4.0 30

3.5 20
10
3.0 3.0 EJ 3.0 EJ 0
2.5 2.5
2.5  Grid 2.0 2.0
electricity 1.5
2.0

1.5  Liquid fuels 1.5

1.0  Pipeline Gas 1.0  Grid 1.0  Grid
0.5 0.5 electricity 0.5 electricity

0  Coal 0  Solid biomass 0  Liquid fuels
 Liquid fuels  Pipeline Gas

 Coal
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

7a. Industry 7b. Buildings 7c. Transportation

Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.

173 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Africa

Passenger transportation achieves a large increase Of some 10m households, 3m remain without
in supply combined with a small decrease (from electricity connections in 2010, but Tait and
31 Mt - 29 MtCO2eq, 2010-2050) in emissions Winkler (2012) show that providing adequate
through a combination of modal shift and ve- electricity for poor households in the medi-
hicle efficiency improvements. The emissions um term will not contribute significantly to
intensity of private transport improves from 160 emissions associated with coal-fired electricity
to 59 gCO2/p-km. in comparison with the emissions from other
The Illustrative DDP has a low 5% level of electric sectors. South African climatic conditions al-
private vehicles, but by 2040 around 19% of Bus low for provision of adequate energy services
Rapid Transit (BRT) vehicles introduced are elec- with little energy on average (<1000kW p.a.)
tric and 25% compressed natural gas (CNG)-pow- required for home space heating and cooling.
ered, increasing to 50% by 2050. 60% of water heating (currently largest single
Jet air transport emissions nearly double over the household energy component accounting for
2010-2050 period and remain largely un-mitigat- 50% of mid-income households) can be pro-
ed as standard fossil fuels are used. There is no vided with solar water heaters and with very
shift to high-speed inter-city rail. efficient lighting and electronic technologies
that are already commercially available, cooking
Freight Transportation becomes the largest electricity energy service
More than 90% of freight is carried by heavy com- at around 5,000 kWh p.a. Thus, with adequate
mercial vehicles (HCV) or rail in 2050 with export thermal performance, an additional 6m house-
of minerals and beneficiated minerals accounting holds could require only some 36 TWh p.a., less
for 20%; thus heavy haulage dominates. than 5% of total demand in 2010.
Freight transport demand derives from sectoral
GDP growth and related transport requirements 2.2  Assumptions
and increases from 292 bn t-km to 998 bn t-km
(~240%) with an increase of 342 PJ to 492 PJ The central assumption used in formulating the
in energy and 24 Mt to 32 Mt in emissions. Illustrative DDP for South African is that it is
The large increase in transport supply com- based on known resources and technologies cur-
bined with the proportionally smaller increase rently deployed commercially although by 2050
in emissions is achieved mainly through a com- industrial end-use technologies are assumed to
bination of modal shift and vehicle efficiency improve significantly in efficiency beyond current
improvements: a shift from HCV to rail and available levels.
improvement in HCV fuel economy from 39.1
to 16.6 l/100km. All rail is electrified. Average Availability and suitability of electricity gen-
freight emissions intensities improve from 83 eration technology and fuel and renewable
to 32 tCO2/t km. energy resources
If biomass is sustainably harvested and paraffin is Achieving the required 14 GtCO2eq cumulative
replaced with biofuels, the liquid fuels and solid emissions, while maintaining a feasible energy
biomass components in figure 7b reduce to zero, supply to industry as per economic development
and the South African building sector contributes assumptions requires early retirement of coal-fired
a negligible amount to GHG emissions in 2050 electricity generation and deployment of low-car-
because all other energy services are supplied with bon technologies to meet additional demand.
very low-carbon electricity.

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South Africa

The specific configuration in the Illustrative 2.3  Alternative pathways and pathway
DDP, with 80% CSP, is one of many very dif- robustness
ferent but equivalently feasible configurations
that could provide similar performance; South The central assumption used in formulating the
Africa has excellent low-carbon natural energy Illustrative DDP for South African is that it is based
resources. on known resources and technologies deployed
at commercial scale.

Industrial end-use technology: efficiency Decarbonization of electricity generation
improvements and lower-carbon alternatives The electricity decarbonization relies heavily on
to coal CSP with storage. There is a more than adequate
Generic assumptions were made regarding end- solar resource. CSP technology is already oper-
use technology per major sub-sector: steady ating at scale (NREL 2014), and bids have been
rates of improvement in end-use technologies accepted by the South African government for
were implemented, as were rates for switching supply of a Power Purchase Agreement for the
from coal to gas technologies, with limits for Bokpoort 50 MW station with storage which
totals. This conservative approach has been is already under construction. Thus, from a
taken in the absence of detailed plant and technical point of view CSP should be a robust
end-use technology inventories. The rates and solution.
limits are considered to be conservative. For However, should CSP not prove to be viable,
example, improvements made in the iron and there are alternative configurations. A combina-
steel sector, which increases its production tion of wind generation, solar PV, and regional
from 10 Mt p.a. to 47 Mt p.a. from 2010-2050, hydro could substitute all or at least most of
achieve an intensity of 0.83 MtCO2eq/Mt by the CSP and additional nuclear could make up
2050. This is at the top end of the range of the difference (See IRP 2010 documentation
the international benchmark range of 0.47- DOE 2013).
0.84 tCO2eq/t.
Switching from coal to gas is an essential com- Industrial end-use technology: efficiency
ponent to decarbonize industry. Although South improvements and lower carbon alternatives
Africa does not currently have significant gas to coal
resources or the required capacity for gas im- As mentioned previously, assumptions are
portation, transmission, and distribution, it is conservative and should not be a threat to
assumed that it is technically feasible for this to robustness.
be provided.

Transport vehicle efficiencies Transport: vehicle efficiency improvements
Efficiencies across the range of small-medium The 2050 vehicle efficiencies are robust. For ex-
passenger vehicles increase by between 50- ample, average light vehicle efficiencies assumed
60% from 2010-2050. Gasoline and diesel in 2050, namely 4 and 3.2 l/100km for gasoline
vehicles improve from 9.0 to 4.0 and 7.5 to and diesel vehicles, are already available for in-
3.2 l/100km respectively, and diesel MBT dividual commercial models available today. The
improve from 11.3 to 5.5 l/100km. It is as- 5% sales of EV’s by 2050 is a conservative target
sumed that 5% passenger vehicle sales are and hence robust.
EV’s in 2050.

175 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Africa

2.4  Alternative pathways and of 4.7 MtCO2eq. If intensity were decreased5
pathway robustness from 0.73 t/tCO2eq/t to 0.47 t/tCO2eq/t, further
emissions reductions of some 12.2 MtCO2eq
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) could be achieved, reducing emissions to
CCS has not been included because South Africa 24 MtCO2eq.
has not identified disposal sites despite the The iron and steel sector exports about a third
considerable efforts that have been devoted of its production. If this remained similar for
to their exploration. A government decision 2050 production and the sector was limited to
has been taken not to pursue ocean storage; providing for local demand, another approxi-
geological storage is still being investigated and mately one-third of 24 MtCO2eq, i.e. 8 Mt,
could provide additional reduction potentials, could be saved.
notably in the industrial sectors. The majority of South African energy intensive
industrial plants were constructed in an era of
Industry very low electricity and coal prices and no GHG
Four subsectors account for 85% of direct emissions constraints; it is therefore reasona-
(non-electricity induced) emissions, namely ble that substantial improvements in energy
iron and steel (28%), “other” (24%), mining and efficiencies and GHG emissions performance,
quarrying (19%), and chemical and petrochem- similar to those in the iron and steel subsec-
ical (14%). Cement and glass (6%) and paper tor, could be achieved, but the lack of readily
and pulp (6%) raise this to 97% of emissions. available or accessible data for other subsectors
Opportunities for significant deeper cuts that has not allowed for meaningful estimations in
have been quantifiable, based on data and this phase of the DDP project.
knowledge accessible in this phase of the DDPP
project, mainly exist through improving emis- Transport
sions intensities in the iron and steel subsector There is a low level of electrification of pas-
and/or limiting production of the subsector to senger transport in the Illustrative DDP, and
local requirements, which is viewed as an option only conventional fossil-based liquid fuels are
in the DDPP approach.4 considered, providing opportunities for signif-
The DDP includes an iron and steel sector icantly deeper cuts involving electric vehicles
that increases production from 10-47 Mt from (EVs) and biofuels. The large contribution of
2010-2050 with emissions of 39 MtCO2eq in kerosene combustion emissions for jet-trans-
2050, i.e. 0.83 tCO2eq/t. This can be com- portation also provides a potential deep cut.
pared with an international benchmark range If 50% of EVs were introduced by 2050, ap-
of 0.47-0.84 tCO2eq/t. Most of these emis- proximately 80 PJ of gasoline + 35 PJ die-
sions are coal and gas emissions associated sel p.a. would be saved, reducing emissions
with providing thermal end-use energy. Substi- by 8 MtCO2eq. If biofuels were introduced for
tuting the remaining coal with gas technology 50% of the remaining light passenger vehicles,
would achieve 0.73 tCO2eq/t, i.e. a reduction 14%, or 4 MtCO2eq would be saved. If biofuels

4 Insufficient data has been (readily/publically) accessible in this phase on other industrial subsectors to assess cuts
deeper than the DDP. Improvements are probably possible in cement and glass and paper and pulp but their relatively
small contribution made this too minor to consider in this phase.

5 These estimations are not based on actual South African iron and steel plant performance metrics but on estimations
based on public energy consumption data and aggregate projections 35 years ahead and thus are indicative only.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 176

South Africa

were substituted for the jet-fuel, then roughly If industry is to grow at a rate consistent with an
economy that can support socio-economic devel-
6 Mt CO2eq would be saved. These ballpark opment and make an appropriate contribution to
estimates of fuel and technology substitu- achieving the PPD, regulations and incentives will
have to be put in place to ensure that consistency
tions save 18 MtCO2eq of the 29 MtCO2eq of with the PPD is maintained and that investment
passenger emissions in 2050, or some 60% of remains attractive when the trade-offs between
cost and reducing emissions intensity are con-
passenger transport emissions. sidered.

Substituting 50% of the diesel used in freight

transport with biofuels would save 11 MtCO2eq.

2.5  Challenges, opportunities, and Transport
enabling conditions The challenge will be to develop and mobilize
policy, strategic planning, finance, project imple-
CTL mentation, and administration to realize the BRT
CTL facilities are the core of the largest industrial and rail projects and to implement complimentary
complex and largest industrial company in South policies in road traffic management to achieve
Africa. Phasing out or decarbonisation of CTL thus the modal shifts. This will require significant de-
presents a significant challenge. velopment of management and administrative
capacity and sourcing of finance.
The electricity generation system
The early retirement of large coal-fired elec- 2.6  Near-term priorities
tricity generation plants departs radically from
official plans (DOE, 2013) and requires the yyAvoiding lock-in to large emissions intensive
construction of considerably more costly CSP energy system assets with long economic
plants and a large expansion to the transmission lifetimes is crucial. Emissions from coal-fired
network. It is unlikely that South Africa could electricity generation will take up emissions
cover such major costs without international space required by other sectors and maintain
assistance. a level of emissions in electricity that will
cause induced emissions from other sectors
Industry: Improvements in efficiencies and to limit their potential to contribute to so-
switching to gas and electricity cio-economic development in a carbon-con-
Production capacities in 2050 are multiples strained world.
of 2010 capacities, and so by 2050 most of
the plant and equipment will be new and in yyThe PPD policy as specified in the Climate
theory should be able to be at the best end of Change Response White Paper (CCRWP) needs
international benchmarks’ ranges. Industries to be implemented. The CCRWP defines the
involved in the majority of emissions, which PPD and elaborates how policies will be imple-
are from large facilities, are typically owned mented to achieve the PPD.
and operated by multinationals who own and
operate world-class facilities worldwide. The yyFast tracking of the necessary capacity to
challenge would thus be to get these multi- develop and implement transport strategies
nationals to invest in the best-emissions class and plans to build transport infrastructure
facilities in South Africa. and to regulate and incentivize modal shifts
is necessary.

177 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Africa

South Africa References

zzDEA 2011. National Climate Prospects for Renewable En- zzSouth African National Planning
Change Response Whitepaper, ergy, International Renewable Commission (NPC), 2011.
Department of Environment Energy Agency (IRENA). National Development Plan,
Affairs (DEA). Pretoria. zzMerven, B., Stone, A., Hughes, November 2011.
A., Cohen, B. 2012. Quantifying
zzDEAT 2009. Greenhouse Gas the energy needs of the trans- zzTait, L., and Winkler, H. 2012.
Inventory for South Africa: 1990 port sector for South Africa: Estimating greenhouse gas
- 2000. Department of Envi- A bottom-up model. Energy emissions associated with
ronment Affairs and Tourism Research Centre, University of achieving universal access to
(DEAT). Pretoria. Cape Town. electricity in South Africa. Ener-
zzSouth African Coal Roadmap gy Research Centre, University
zzDOE 2009. Digest of South (SACRM) 2013. SANEDI (www. of Cape Town.
African Energy Statistics 2009. sanedi.org.za).
Department of Energy. Pretoria zzSouth Africa, 2011a. The New zzWorld Bank 2013. South Africa
2009. ISBN: 978-1-920448- Growth Path – Framework. Overview retrieved March 31
25-7. South African National Depart- 2014 at http://www.worldbank.
ment of org/en/country/southafrica/
zzDOE 2013. Integrated Resource zzEconomic Development, No- overview.pdf.
Plan 2010 Integrated Resource vember 2011.
Plan For Electricity 2010-2030 zzSouth Africa, 2013a. South
Update Report November 2013 Africa Millennium Development
Goals Country Report 2013.
zzFluri, T.P. 2009. The potential Report by Statistician-General
of concentrating solar power of South Africa to the President
in South Africa. Energy Policy of the Republic 2013.
37(2009)5075–5080. Elsevier. zzSouth African Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), 2013.
zzHageman, K. 2013. South Af- Industrial Policy Action Plan
rica’s Wind Power Potential Dr IPAP 2013/14 – 2015/16.
Kilian Hagemann presentation
at Sasol Auditorium Rosebank,
18 June 2013.

zzIRENA 2013. Southern African
Power Pool: Planning and

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 178

South Korea

South Korea

Soogil Young, 1 Country profile
KDI School of Public Policy and 1

Management 1.1  The national context for deep
decarbonization and sustainable
Dong-Woon Noh, development
Korea Energy Economics Institute
The Republic of Korea (‘South Korea’ or ‘Korea’, here-
Ji-Woon Ahn, after) recorded per capita GDP of 20,159 US$ in 2010.
Korea Energy Economics Institute The Korean economy recorded a high growth rate of
6.9% p.a. from the 1960s until the 2000s, following
Sang-Yong Park, the export-led industrialization strategy. As of 2010,
Korea Institute of Energy Research industry was the main sector of the economy (41%
of GDP), dominated by manufacturing, which alone
Nyun-Bae Park, represented 30.3%. Electricity, gas, water, and con-
Korea Institute of Energy Research struction accounted for 8.3%, and agriculture, for-
estry and fishery made up the remaining 2.6%. This
Chang-Hoon Lee, fast industrial development has been driven by the
Korea Environment Institute strong growth of exports; in 2010, they accounted for
46% of GDP. The development of industry has also
Sung-Won Kang, encouraged rapid urbanization, with the urbanization
Korea Environment Institute rate reaching 83% in 2010.

Yong-Sung Cho,
Korea University

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South Korea South Korea

Manufacturing accounted for 51.6% of Korea’s domestic endowment of fossil resources, 96.5%
final energy consumption, of which energy-inten- of this fossil fuel demand is met by importation,
sive heavy industries constituted the dominant which poses the crucial question of energy se-
share of 81.0%. Korea’s economy is highly de- curity. On the other hand, renewable energy,
pendent on fossil fuels, which represent 85% of including wastes and hydro power, accounted
total primary energy supply. Given its very low for only 2.8% of total primary energy supply due

Figure 1. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010

1a. GHG emissions, by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors

350 MtCO2

MtCO2 eq 562  Energy-related 300
emissions
668 250 Electricity
(Allocation
- 44 63  Processes 200 by End Use Sector)

22  Agriculture 150
14  Waste
7  Fugitive 100 Total MtCO2

 Natural Gas 85

50  Petroleum Products 186

0  Coal 291

Electricity Generation Transportation Other
0
LULUCF Industry Buildings
(Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry)
243 181 85 52 562

Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions, 1990 to 2010

2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors

60% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 600 MtCO2

562

40%  Energy Related 500 462  Buildings
20% CO2 Emissions  Transportation
per Energy 400 407  Industry
0% 350
-20%  GDP per capita  Electricity Generation
 Population 300

 Energy per GDP 236
200

-40% 100

-60% 0
1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1990 1995 2000 2005

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 180

South Korea

to the limited endowment of renewable energy per capita. Emissions from fuel combustion were
resources, such as solar and wind supply. Nucle- 562 MtCO2-eq, which corresponded to 84.1% of
ar energy accounted for 12.2% of total primary total emissions (668 MtCO2-eq, excluding sinks)
energy supply in 2010. and 90.0% of net emissions (Figure 1a). Elec-
In 2008, under President Lee Myung-bak, the Ko- tricity generation and industry are the two main
rean government launched the National Strategy activities responsible for energy-related carbon
for Green Growth (2009-2050), along with the emissions (Figure 1b).
first 5-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013), Net GHG emissions rose during the past twen-
proposing to pursue the following three objec- ty years by 132% from 269 MtCO2eq (1990) to
tives: (1) climate change action and energy inde- 624 (2010), while emissions from fuel combus-
pendence, (2) the creation of new growth engines tion increased by 139% from 235 MtCO2eq to
with investment in green technologies and indus- 561 MtCO2eq. The key driver of the rapid increase
tries, and (3) greening of the national territory, of emissions was a rise in energy consumption due
transportation, and lifestyles, while promoting a to high economic growth dependent on ener-
shift to high-value-added services over the period gy-intensive heavy industry that more than offset
to 2050. The succeeding government of President increases in energy efficiency. Large increases in
Park Geun-hye has launched the 2nd 5-Year Plan electricity emissions reflected a massive shift in
for Green Growth (2014-2017), proposing to fo- final energy demand from oil and gas to electricity
cus on GHG emissions reduction, a sustainable due to a relatively low price of electricity made
energy system, and adaptation to climate change. possible by increases in nuclear power supply as
well as the low electricity price policy of the gov-
1.2  GHG emissions: current levels, ernment. There was also an upturn of carbon in-
drivers, and past trends tensity during the second half of the 2000s mainly
due to an expansion of the coal-using iron and
Net GHG emissions including all sources and sinks steel industries and coal-power plants (Figure 2).
were 624 MtCO2-eq in 2010, about 12.63 tons

2 National deep decarbonization pathways
2

2.1  Illustrative deep emissions per person in 2050, the illustrative
decarbonization pathway pathway seeks a very ambitious decarboniza-
tion path for the Korean economy and reaches
2.1.1  High-level characterization an 85.4% reduction of CO2 emissions from fuel
combustion. Emissions are projected to fall from
Korea’s population is projected to peak in 2030 560 MtCO2 in 2010 to 82 MtCO2 in 2050.
and to decline thereafter, decreasing from 50 mil- This is permitted by a drastic decrease of energy
lion in 2010 to 48 million in 2050. The economy consumption (-37.2% in final energy consump-
is projected to grow at the annualized rate of tion) due to large improvements in energy effi-
2.35% on the average over this period. A major ciency. In addition, there are important changes
uncertainty facing Korea is when, if at all, and how, in the fuel mix. In particular, the importance of
the inter-Korean unification is likely to occur. The oil-based fuels, which represent one-half of final
present study ignores this contingency altogether. consumption in 2010, is significantly reduced,
With the global benchmark of 1.7 tons of CO2

181 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Korea

and coal use is almost completely phased-out 2.1.2  Sectoral characterization
over the period (Figure 3). In parallel, electricity
(and notably of renewable sources) develops Power
with an electrification rate of final uses reaching A broad set of low-carbon options for electricity
60.7% in 2050 (vs. less than 20% in 2010) with generation (CCS, renewable energy such as wind
significant reductions of the carbon intensity of and solar PV, and nuclear power) are deployed to
electricity production, from 531 to 41 gCO2/kWh permit the deep decarbonization of electricity sup-
(Figure 4). All sectors are concerned and see ply as measured by a fall in the carbon intensity of
their emissions decreasing radically over 2010- electricity from 531 to 41 gCO2/kWh. CCS is applied
2050 (Figure 5). to 4% of coal power generation by 2050, and all
coal without CCS and a share of gas are substituted

Figure 3. Energy Pathways, by source 3b. Final Energy
3a. Primary Energy

10.74 EJ - 27 % EJ
1.34 10 10

0.10 8 7.83 7.98 8 - 37 %
1.99 1.57 6 5.01
0.07 4
6 3.63  Nuclear 2 2050
2.55  Renewables & Biomass 3.92 0
4.04 4 1.06  Natural Gas 3.04  Electricity and Heat
0.32  Oil 1.21 0.96  Biomass
2 0.05  Coal w CCS 1.22 0.30  Liquids
3.26 0.22  Coal 0.60  Gas
2012 0.11  Coal
0

2010 2050

Figure 4. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers, 2010 to 2050 4b. The pillars of decarbonization
4a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers

100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. Energy Intensity of GDP
Energy ef ciency 7.9 MJ/$
80% 2010

60%

40% 2050 1.8 - 77 %

20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2. Electricity Emissions Intensity
0%  Population Decarbonization of electricity 531 gCO2/kWh
2010
-20%  Energy per GDP 2050 41 - 92 %
-40%

-60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pillar 3. Share of electricity in total nal energy
-80% per Energy Electri cation of end-uses + 41 pt
-100%
2010 20 61 %

2020 2030 2040 2050 2050
2010 2020 2030 2040

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 182

South Korea

with renewables, specifically wind (14% of electricity Figure 5. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway,
production) and solar PV (31% of production), due by Sector, 2010 to 2050
to the installation of 51 GW of wind and 193 GW
of solar PV. Residual fossil fuels are substituted with 600 MtCO2 560 - 85 %
nuclear energy, requiring the installation of 47 GW 500
of nuclear power. The deployment of renewable en- 38
ergy requires the shift to a large-scale distributed 24
renewable electricity system. As a result, network
balancing is likely to be an issue because of the in- 400 81
termittency of renewable energy. Additional tools
such as backup facilities and energy storage should 300 186
be installed to solve this problem.
200 14  Residential
Industry (manufacturing)
The manufacturing sector was the dominant 100 230 82 5  Commercial
source of CO2 emissions in 2010 with 186 MtCO2.
It includes the energy-intensive heavy industries,1 11  Transportation
and the share of these industries in GDP is pro-
jected to increase from 27.2% in 2010 to 35.3% 16  Industry
in 2050. This aggregate figure hides a structural 0 34  Electricity Generation
change among industrial sub-sectors, as the share
of fabricated metal industries increases while that 2010 2050
of other heavy industries (such as cement, petro-
chemical, and iron and steel) decreases).2 Figure 6. Energy Supply Pathways, by Resource
Manufacturing is almost decarbonized by 2050 to
16.4 MtcCO2 of emissions, excluding indirect emission Carbon intensity
through electricity.3 This occurs through a combina-
tion of significant deviations from the current trajec-  gCO2/kWh 500
tory, notably through efficiency improvements result- 400
ing in 1) three-fold and six-fold decreases of energy 531  300
intensity (with respect to the 2010 level) in light and 200
heavy industries, respectively, 2) substitution for 20% 
of fossil fuels in distributed CHP in heavy industries, 41 100
3) 30% deployment of CHP to fuel light industries, 
and 4) an increase to 28% and 72% of the shares of 0
electricity in light and heavy industries, respectively. 1000 TWh
 Other Renewable
1 Heavy industries include iron & steel, petrochemical, 900  Biomass
cement, non-metallic and fabricated metal industries.  Solar
The last one here includes machinery, electronic & 800
electric and shipbuilding sectors.  Wind
700  Hydro
2 The share of these 3 industries in GDP is projected to
decrease from 8.0% in 2010 to 4.3% in 2050. 600  Nuclear

3 Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7a also excludes in- 500  Natural Gas
direct emission through electricity consumption.  Oil
400  Coal w CCS
2050  Coal
300

200

100

0

2010 2020 2030 2040
6.Electricity

183 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Korea

Buildings: Residential and Commercial The commercial buildings sector includes buildings
In the residential buildings sector, a 62% reduc- in business, public, and agricultural sectors. In this sec-
tion of emissions is experienced, from 37.5 MtCO2 tor, despite the continuous increase of floor space per
in 2010 to 14.5 MtCO2 in 2050. The floor space capita (from 14 m2/person in 2010 to 31 m2/person
decreases from 24 m2/person to 21 m2/person. This in 2050), CO2 emissions are reduced by 78% from
is permitted by a combination of the following four 24.5 MtCO2 in 2010 to 5.4 MtCO2 in 2050. This
broad groups of measures (listed in order of the is notably permitted by efficiency improvements in
ease of deployment): 1) the diffusion of LED lighting heating and cooling, waste heat and biomass in dis-
(which substitute for all exiting lighting by 2050), tributed CHP (substituting 11% of fossil fuels in dis-
2) higher efficiency of heating and cooling obtained tributed CHP in 2010 primarily with waste heat and
with new technologies, 3) substituting fossil fuels in complementarily with biomass), and the diffusion of
distributed Combined Heat and Power (CHP) (which renewable energy (substituting 35% of residual fuels
substitute 17% of fossil fuels in distributed CHP in in 2010 with solar-thermal and geo-thermal energy).
2010 mainly with wastes and complementarily with
biomass), and 4) substituting fossil fuels with renew- Transportation
able energy (solar-thermal and geo-thermal energy The passenger kilometers per person increases from
substitute 35% of the remaining fossil fuels in 2010). 13,400 pkm/person in 2010 to 26,300 pkm/person

Figure 7. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050 gCO2/MJ 70
60
Carbon intensity (1) gCO2/MJ 60  50

37.6 gCO2/MJ 40 50
 30 66.0 

33.8 40  40
5.0 EJ
 30 30
4.0 20 20
5.9 20  8.7 10  10
 10  27.3
0
 0  

0

4.0 EJ 4.0 EJ

3.0 3.0 3.0

2.0 Grid 2.0  Non-grid 2.0
electricity electricity
 (2)

1.0 1.0  Grid 1.0
electricity

 Solid biomass  Renewables  Grid
 Liquid fuels  Liquid fuels electricity
0  Pipeline gas 0  Pipeline gas 0
 Liquid fuels
 Coal
 Coal  Pipeline gas
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

7a. Industry 7b. Buildings 7c. Transportation

(1) Excluding indirect emission –from electricity. (2) Including reused oil, wasted oil use, etc.
Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 184