Andy Luttrell - Psychology for the Mentalist

Psychology For the Mentalist Andy Luttrell

Copyright (c) 2015 Andy Luttrell, All Rights Reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, stored, or transmitted in any form whatsoever without prior written consent of Andrew Luttrell ISBN: 978-1-329-72308-5 Published in the United States by Mind Tapped Productions in association with www.PatrickRedford.com

Psychological Concepts Foreword ................................................. 7 Introduction ........ ... ............................ ..... .. 9 A Comment on Research Psychology's Applicability ....... 13 Belief Perseverance: The Power of Explanation ............. 17 Bouba and Kiki ........................................... 22 The Meaning of Color ......... ......................... ... 27 Compliance .............................................. 32 "Because ... " ........................................... 32 But You Are Free ....................................... 34 Consistency .......................................... 35 Reciprocity ........................................... 37 An Interesting Case of"Dual Reality" ...................... 39 Ego-Centric Biases ................................ .. ...... 41 The Spotlight Effect ......... . ......................... 41 The Illusion of Transparency .. ....... .. ................ 43 The False Consensus Effect (aka "Social Projection") .... 47 Embodiment . ...... ............... ........ ...... ....... .. 49 The Endowment Effect .......... . ... ... .. ...... . .. .... .. . 54 Fluency ...... ....... ......................... ............ 61 The Introspection Illusion ................................. 69 Judgment Heuristics .... .... .............................. 72 Availability ................... ...... ........ .... ... ... 72 Representativeness ................................... 7 4 Anchoring . ................... ........................ 76 Linguistic Styles ......... ..... ................. ..... ...... 81 Language Style Matching ............................. 83 Memory ......... ..... .................................... 85 Mental Imagery ............ .. ............................ 88 The Mere Exposure Effect. ..... . .. .......... . ............. 97

Metacognition .... ......................... . ............ 1 oo Name Letter Preferences ............... .. ................ 103 Nonverbal Behavior: Lie Detection ...................... . 11 o Can People Detect Lies Reliably? .......... .. ......... 11 O Who Can Detect Lies? .. ................... .. ... . ..... 111 A Word About Research Methods ..................... 112 Nonverbal Tells ............................. . ........ 113 Linguistic Tells .................... . .......... .. ...... 114 Neuroscience and Deception ......................... 115 When and Why We Lie .............. .... ............. 116 The "Pratfall"Technique ................. .. ............... 117 Making Predictions .... . ....................... .. ..... . .. 123 Failing to Know Our Future Selves .................... 123 Statistical vs. Intuitive Predictions ... .. ............... 124 Priming .... .............................. . ..... .. ....... 127 Assimilation vs. Contrast .. .................. .. .... . .. 132 Rapport .... ............. ... ..................... .... .... 136 Similarity ................... ....... . .. ............... 136 Mimicry ............................ .... ............. 137 Reciprocal Liking ... ................................. 138 Fast Friends Technique ............................... 138 Reactance .............................. .... ............. 143 Self-Affirmation ..... .................. . ....... . ......... 145 Shared RealityTheory ................................... 151 Social vs. Physical Pain ................................. . . 154 The Science of Subliminal Influence ....... . .............. 155 Evidence that Subliminal Persuasion is Ineffective ..... 156 In Support of Subliminal Persuasion .................. 158 Thin Slicing ........ .. .......................... .. ....... 163 Thought Suppression and Post-Suppression Rebound .... 166 Unconscious Thought Theory .. ...... . ... .. .......... .. . . 171

The Power of Ambiguity ................................. 174 Psychology for Cold Reading ............................. 178 The "Frequency Labeling" Principle ................... 178 Situation Dependency ............................... 180 Giving Negative Information ......................... 181 Individual Difference Variables ....................... 184 Population Stereotypes: Updated ................. .. ..... 199 Closing Remarks ... .. .................................... 209 Recommended Reading ................................. 210 References .............................................. 213 Mentalism Applications Psychological Thought Projection (Effect) ................. 15 The Psychology of Dislcaimers ............................ 20 The Maluma-Takete Force ................................. 23 The Because Subtlety ..................................... 33 Gifting the Prediction .......... ...... ..................... 38 Shining a Spotlight on Audience Compassion ............. 43 Transparency Subtlety .................................... 45 Embodied Presentations .................................. 52 Endowment Subtlety #1: Pen Prediction ................... 57 Endowment Subtlety #2: Making a Trade .................. 58 Keeping Displays Fluent .................................. 65 Forcing with Fluency ..................................... 65 Introspection Subtlety .................. . ................. 71 Anchoring Subtlety ....................................... 78 A New Cold Reading System? ............................. 83 Demonstrating False Memory ............................. 85 Imagery in Emotional Memory ............................ 92

Thoughts-As-Objects Technique ......... . .............. . 100 Name Letter Force ............. . ......................... 107 One-Ahead Scribble Subtlety ............................ 118 Scribbledeedoo (Effect) .................................. 119 Learning from Our Inability to Predict the Future ... ...... 126 Priming Presentation .................................... 132 Using Priming to Force ....... ................... .... ... . 134 Faux-Priming and a "Circle-and-Triangle" Script ........... 134 Fast Friends Ploy ........................................ 140 Affirmation Print (Effect) ............................... .. 147 Fostering Shared Reality .. ... ... ........ . ................ 153 A Thin Slice of Mindreading ............. . ................ 165 Suppression Subtlety .................................... 169 Spectator-as-Unconscious-Mindreader ................... 172 Die Hard: Psy Force ..................................... . 207

Foreword "This is the book I always wanted to write:' If you're thinking, "who is Andy Luttrell and why should I care about this book?': let me answer both of those questions with three words: information is power. If you're taking the time to read this diatribe at the beginning of this text, I'm sure you're also the type to read the introduction that follows. This is where you'll learn who Andy is and why he's more than qualified to present this work. If you're not the type to read forewords or introductions, then you won't be reading these words anyway. When Andy first approached me with this project, I was excited. Then I watched it come together and I was ecstatic. I wanted to help bring an audience to this text because it deserves to be read. Here you'll find a mix of performance theory, technique and actual cited psychological research to back up the information. Full stop. Cited research? Evidence? Not just theoretical information based on trial and error? All of this in a conjuring arts text!? Yes. Welcome to Psychology for the Mentalist. This is the book I always wanted to write. This book will quickly become a classic important text. Whether you're an amateur performer or a professional, the information that Andy has compiled will help you hone your current material and help forge new territory. With these techniques, you'll not only appear to really be manipulating, influencing, and reading minds but you'll actually be influencing, manipulating, and reading minds. Psychology for the Mentalist is an inspired work. I suspect it will influence the majority of those who spend the time with its text to reap much reward. Combine these psychologica~ principl~s that.A~dy meticulously dissects with the modus operandi of classic conjuring techniques and you'll be have a powerful performance toolbox to create real miracles. -7-

The first section of this book deals directly with belief perseverance and the power that an explanation, when attached to a truth or fiction, has over our mind. It is my belief that as performers (that demonstrate the ability to read and influence minds), we have a great responsibility to take care of our audiences. We have the real ability to influence what people believe and what shapes individuals' realities. It may seem a ridiculous notion that a simple magic trick can shape and influence one's entire foundation of belief, but religions have been started on less. How are you going to use the information in these pages? Personally, I'll choose to use my powers for good. Well, mostly. This book will find a home alongside some of my most treasured books in my personal library, and I trust it finds a satisfying home in yours as well. -Patrick G. Redford (2015) -8-

Introduction Mentalism and psychology have a close relationship. On the one hand, many mentalists choose to frame their abilities as rooted in a deep understanding of human psychology, and on the other hand, the term "psychology" is used to refer to real techniques and presentational nuances (e.g., psychological forces, psychological subtleties, and techniques that allow you to do mind reading effects "for real"). However, although the term "psychology" gets used a lot, it rarely references the actual research conducted in psychological science every day throughout the world. The kinds of skills that people display under the guise of "psychological illusions" often bear little resemblance to what social scientists actually investigate, and the psychological ploys that have been offered in the magic and mentalism community are not often grounded in the research literature and are instead derived from trial and error experiences in the field. I have no qualms with any of this. Whether the number seven force came from laboratory experiments or from the experience of working performers doesn't matter as long as it's reliable. Similarly, if a presentational premise is not actually consistent with the research, then it probably means the effect is impressive. Social psychological experiments yield fascinating results that inform theories of human thought and behavior, but they don't necessarily make for great theatre. Still, scientific research in psychology remains largely unrepresented in the available literature for mentalists and magicians, and over the last several years, I have noticed an interest in such topics.1 There have 1 Of course, this interest in the intersection of magic and psychology goes back a long way. I remember reading the "Conjuring Psychology" columns in old issues of Linking Ring magazine that were given to me, for instance. The interest goes both ways; psychologists have often looked to conjuring techniques to gain insight into cognitive and perceptual process (see Lachapelle, 2008). For instance, Norman Triplett (often credited with conducting the first experiment in social psychology) wrote a treatise in 1900 titled "The Psychology of Conjuring Deceptions:' Alfred Binet, the developer of one of the first intelligence tests, invited five magicians into his lab in 1894 so that he may better understand human perception (Binet, 1984; for more, see Lachapelle, 2008). Yet another key figure in psychology's history, -9-

been plenty of requests on Internet message boards for books related to psychology, and there are plenty of wonderful books that get recommended in response. What I have tried to do, however, is isolate some of the more interesting findings in the field of social psychology that appear-even if distantly-relevant to the performance of mentalism. Where do I come off writing a book about mentalism and psychology? I find myself neatly situated at the intersection of the two fields, and hopefully I'm able to translate one of them for the benefit of the other. I am a long time magic fanatic, having caught the "magic bug" when I was young. I grew up performing magic on stage, in restaurants, and behind the counter of a magic shop. In college, my interests shifted sharply toward mentalism where I have remained a curious consumer and enthusiastic informal performer. An important point, I should note, is that I am not a professional, so if you are looking for tried and true techniques honed over years of experience, you won't find them here. That said, I have no shortage of performing and communication experience. I teach classes to college students, for example, and I have gotten used to zipping up presentations so that a bunch of tired students are engaged and interested, even at 8:00 in the morning. I am also a stand-up comedian, and I perform regularly, which can come with similar challengesgetting a bunch of intoxicated adults engaged and interested at 1 :00 in the morning. I mention this mostly to reassure you that although I do not regularly perform mentalism, I have knowledge and experience enough to talk about such performances. As far as my expertise in psychology, I am currently pursuing my Ph.D. in social psychology. I received my M.A. three years ago and am in the process of wrapping up my time in graduate school, hoping to continue on this journey as an academic. My own research focuses on opinion certainty and the persuasion process, but my education has given me a broad knowledge base in the field, which I hope to share Joseph Jastrow, published a wonderfully titled piece in 1896: "Psychological Notes Upon Sleight-of-Hand Experts:' More recently, cognitive neuroscientists have taken to studying magic tricks to further understand how the brain processes information and visual stimuli (for reviews, see Macknik, King, Randi, Robbins, Teller, Thompson, & Martinez-Conde, 2008; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2011 ). -10-

with you. I also teach Introduction to Social Psychology as well as Stereotyping and Prejudice, which has prepared me for translating the research from the cold, boring research reports to a graspable level of understanding without sacrificing accuracy. You can find other examples of my attempts to share psychological science with a broad audience at my website, socialpsychonline.com My knowledge is centered in social psychology, which is a subset of the field that studies individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in a social context. I think this particular subfield of psychology is especially relevant to mentalism, but I will also draw on what I know from cognitive, developmental, and biological psychology throughout this book. My goal is for this book to be something like a springboard for your own ideas and adaptations. I will review research in a variety of domains across psychology, pointing out individual experiments that gave rise to what we now know about people in their social worlds. I foresee two general applications of this information. The first is as a basis for presentational premises. Psychological scientists have been thinking about human thought for a long time, and they have uncovered some fascinating patterns of behavior that are relevant to our everyday experiences. These patterns may inspire new effects, routines, or twists on existing demonstrations. The more we know about actual human psychology, the more varied (and authentic) our mentalism presentations become. The second application is as a basis for techniques and subtleties. This is the application for which I must recognize my role as a mere messenger. Throughout this book, I offer thoughts as to how the research in psychology might be applied to create deeper miracles, but I admit that these are largely speculative. My aim is to provide the seeds for what readers might take and turn into astounding, reliable psychological techniques. For instance, I review research in the field of social compliance whereby simple linguistic touches can increase the likelihood that someone will comply with a request. -11 -

Many of the research studies will not already be applied to the specific conditions that are of interest to a mentalist, so the actual implementation may take a little adjustment. However, when I know about studies that test the conditions under which a phenomenon is more likely to appear (these are called "moderators" of effects), I will be sure to acknowledge them. I offer to take care of the brainwork up front by finding, compiling, and reviewing research that seems applicable to mentalism, but from there, the implementation is up to you. Of course, I can only to scratch the surface of each of these many avenues of psychological research. I cannot create an exhaustive review of social psychology- look to textbooks for that- but I am careful to cite my sources, which should put you on the right path if anything in particular jumps out at you. Also, there have been plenty of books written by journalists and researchers themselves that aim to provide a review of social scientific knowledge for the general public. You can find a list of such books in the appendix, and I do my best to acknowledge these books within the sections of this text where relevant. Please enjoy the following pages. It has been a lot of fun for me to formally write a review of the science that I have grown so fond of and to think about the many ways in which these research programs can enrich and inform our art. If anything in these pages inspires you, I would love to hear about new presentations born out of these concepts or successful applications to true psychological subtleties and "real mind-reading" demonstrations. - Andy Luttrell -12-

A Comment on Research Psychology's Applicability It is worth noting that the research literature in psychology hardly represents a repository of information ready to inform dynamic and sure-fire mentalism methods. Purely psychological methods are far from perfect and rarely achieve 100% accuracy in accomplishing an effect. I agree with Banachek's goal in his first Psychological Subtleties release that these psychological ploys are well suited to subtly strengthening the legitimacy of a mentalist's demonstrations. But as recent interests in the mentalism community highlight, there do exist many methods that rely on "real" methods that produce success more often than not. Therefore, I don't mean to discount the pursuit of such methods, but my point is that research in psychological science does not necessarily already contain these sorts of methods. The reason why psychological research isn't the same as pre-packaged mind-reading methods is that this research deals in averages and tendencies. Psychologists learn about people's thoughts and behaviors by observing how many different people respond under the same conditions. A positive finding is when there's a tendency on average for people to respond in a particular way. By way of a very simple example, imagine a study that manipulates the music playing in a waiting room and examines how it affects people's reports of their mood. For half the people, jazz music plays in the room, and for the other half, pop music plays. Possible results of this experiment are represented in the figure below. Each dot represents one person and how happy he or she feels on a positivity scale. It's clear that the people who heard jazz music report feeling happier on average than the people who heard pop music. As long as the average positivitywasdifferentenough between conditions to be considered statistically different (i.e., not just by chance), this kind of effect could be published as a scientifically acceptable effect: hearing jazz music (vs. pop music) in the environment causes more positive mood. -13-

"O 0 0 ~ (!) > ·.;:::; ·-r:n 0 p., • • • • • • • • Jazz Music • I • • I • Pop Music You will note, however, that some people in the "pop music" condition were happier than some people in the "jazz music" condition. Just because there's a difference on average doesn't mean that this effect applies equally to everyone. This is the point I want to emphasize. The research I share in this book is about tendencies and averages. Thus, it would be a mistake to assume t hat these scientific results can be used as sure-fire, ready-made methods. The value of the purely psychological methods in the mentalism literature is that they are built on practice and tailoring to nuances of particular people and particular situations. What I offer hasn't been tinkered with in this way-it will take inspired and creative mentalists to take this information and use it as a base for exploring its unique applications. It is also worth keeping in mind that the people in these studies may not have been in the same mind frame as they will be as participants in the mentalism demonstration. For instance, participants in a psychology study may have been filling out surveys in a computer lab on weekday afternoons. They may have cared little about the -14-

researcher and had no idea what the goals of the research were. Your participants, however, will be witnessing feats of mentalism in an entertainment context, knowing full well that the performer will try to read their minds, predict the future, etc. That said, do not discount the content of this book. There is a lot here, and its applications are limited only by your imagination. There are at least two ways to deal with the fact that psychological tendencies do not perfectly predict individual responses, and these are by no means unique to my own thinking. One is to use them as subtleties-added convincers aimed to enhance an effect without relying on them for the big moment. The other is to use them as "Major Effects;' in the parlance of Mr. Bob Cassidy. An idea for this follows. Psychological Thought Projection (Effect) This is just a simple presentation I've come up with for maximizing the impact of the simplest of psychological forces. Of course, having an audience full of people engage in a psychological force procedure has been around for a long time. Its power lies in how it embraces the "tendency"-ness of such forces. Just because most people think of the number 7 when asked to think of a number from 1 - 10 doesn't ensure that any one person will do so. By having a whole group think of a number, you capitalize on the tendency for people to think of the number 7 and minimize the importance of people who happen not to think of that number. This presentation is designed to take this simple effect and address the possibility that people will think, "I'll bet most people think of 7- there's nothing psychic or .. . psychological illusion-y about it:' Effect: You invite someone to the stage to assist you. You pull out a stack of business cards and ask her to take one at random and secretly look at what's written on it. You explain, "Okay, Michelle is thinking of something that she chose at random. Michelle, please continue to think of this, and as you do, try to mentally project that thought out into the audience. That might feel weird, but just imagine that you're standing here and the thought leaves your mind and spreads throughout the crowd." -15-

You continue, "As she's thinking of this, in a moment I'm going to ask you all to 'receive' the thought. The best thing is to not overthin~ it and go with your gut. Ready? When I snap my fingers ... everyone think of a number between one and ten. *Snap* Any number between 1 and 10- the first that pops into your mind. Hold onto that thought. Remember the number that came to you." You show everyone the stack of cards. A different number from 1 - 10 is written on each card. "There was a different number on each card, and Michelle just took one at random to send to you. For the first time, Michelle, show us your card-what number were you sending out? Seven? Out there in the audience-raise your hand please if you thought of the number seven!" If all went according to plan, the majority of the audience should have their hands raised. Explanation: I really like this approach because it takes the performer out of the equation. This is simply an act of mind reading bQtween th~ volunteer on stage and the people in the audience. At no point does it even seem like you know what the number is. It also addresses the potential explanation that "everyone thinks of 7" because presumably it could have been any number that the person was trying to send. In reality, the only method is forcing the number 7. You can do this however you like, but I like to use a one-way pack of cards in which the number 7 is written on all 10 cards. This makes everything look very free and fair. After the volunteer selects one and thinks of it, you can pocket the stack of cards and later pull out a different stack that does have different numbers written on it. There is plenty of cover for doing this during the business of having the thought projected to the audience. -16-

Belief Perseverance: Tue Power of Explanation As mind readers, we are in the business of dancing around people's beliefs. Moreso than magic, our demonstrations of thought reading, precognition, and influence test people's theories about the world and may even inform their beliefs. If you adopt the psychological angle, you may instill the belief that people can in fact be deeply and powerfully influenced at subconscious levels. If you adopt a psychic presentation, you might create a belief in the supernatural, you might test the strength of someone's non-belief, and you might also provide an anomaly for a skeptic to explain away. Because of this, it is worth spending at least some time discussing what psychologists have had to say about cases where pre-existing beliefs are met with relevant evidence. First, social psychologists use the term "belief perseverance" to refer to times when people hold tightly to their initial beliefs even when new information directly contradicts it. Although this casts a very wide net, belief perseverance is usually studied with respect to information that discredits the basis for forming the belief at all. As a relevant example, let's say I give you a test that's meant to measure your psychic ability by holding up ESP cards one by one and asking you to guess which symbol is on each one. Although I keep the backs of the cards facing you the whole time, I record all of your answers, and at the end of the test, I tell you how you did. I tell you that your psychic abilities are powerful! You guessed 17 out of 20 ESP cards correctly, which is significantly better than what most people do. Now I have you fill out some extra surveys about your previous experience with psychic phenomena, but before you leave, I pull you aside and say, "Thanks for doing the surveys, but I should tell you that we actually just made up your results on the ESP test. Honestly, 1 wasn't even paying attention to your guesses. I tell everyo~e they got 17 out 20:' Any rational person in this situation would realize that -17-

since the results he received had nothing to do with his actual ~bility, he should discredit the belief that he'd come to form about h1~self (i.e., having some psychic ability). Instead, e~en though the basis of the belief was firmly and completely discredited, people often come away from an experience like this continuing to think they have some psychic abilities. In psychological research, this can be a . proble_m because_ any experimenters who use deception in th~1r studies are ethically obligated to "debrief" the participants to inform them of the true nature of the study. Indeed, a lot of the research on b~I ief perseverance has been motivated by an interest in the effectiveness of these procedures. An early demonstration of this effect used a situation very similar to the example I gave in the previous paragraph (although I'm not aware of anyone using "psychic ability" as the belief people form about themselves). Participants in this study engaged in a fairly morbid task in which they had to classify 25 suicide notes as real or fictitious. As they did the task, the participants were given pre-scripted feedback. Regardless of how they categorized the notes, they were either told that they were correct most of the time or incorrect most of the time which led them to form beliefs about their ability to discern real note~ from fake ones. At the end of the study, though, even though the experimenters carefully explained that the accuracy feedback they gave was prescripted and unrelated to their performance on the note classification task, the people who had been told they did well on the task continued to believe they were better at judging real vs. fake notes than the people who had been told they didn't do well (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). Once again, even though the basis for the belief had been totally discredited, people carried on with the beliefs they formed about themselves anyway. This can be an issue in courtrooms as well. Imagine someone provides an eyewitness testimony in a trial that strongly suggests that the person in question is guilty, but it later comes to light that the testimony was made up. According to belief persever~nc~, discrediting the testimony may not do much to change the Jury s -18-

verdict. In fact, some research has shown this to be the case in mock trial settings (Loftus, 1974). Somewhat similarly, jurors sometimes have difficulty fully avoiding the use of evidence that the judge deemed inadmissible when making their final verdicts (Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981 ). For instance, in a trial to decide the guilt of someone suspected of committing theft, it may come to light that this person had actually been convicted of theft some years ago. In such a case, the judge might rule this information inadmissible as evidence and tell the jury to disregard this piece of information when coming to a decision. However, compared to conditions in which this information never came to light at all, jurors are still more likely to find the defendant guilty when they learn about his previous offense even when the judge specifically asks for that information to be dropped from the consideration.2 The reason why belief perseverance occurs, however, is almost more interesting than the fact that it occurs at all. The key seems to be in the power of explanation. That is, when we form beliefs, we can do so by creating compelling explanations for why something is true. So if you tell me that I did really well at distinguishing real suicide notes from fake ones, I'm unlikely to take that at face value and instead I start to create a compelling narrative for how I was able to do so well at that task ("I have an eye for detail;'"l'm good at scrutinizing written communication;"'l've been successful in the past at similar tasks;' etc.). At this point, when you tell me that the feedback was fake, you've only discredited the event that inspired my explanation. You haven't discredited all of the reasons I came up with on my own to explain why I'm good at this activity. Even though the "debriefing" appears to undermine the basis for the belief I formed, in reality, the basis for the belief is really the explanation I created on my own and not just the score you told me. Craig Anderson and his colleagues (1980) presented the first 2 Although this is all interesting and consistent with belief perseverance, I do feel it's my duty to also mention other reassuring research that has shown that in many cases, jurors are able to appropriately reject discredited or otherwise inadmissible evidence in forming final verdicts (e.g., Kennedy & Haygood, 1992). -19-

evidence for the power of explanation in belief per~everance. In their studies, they presented participants with informat~on a~d told them that the goal of the activity was to discern relat1onsh1~s betw~en personal characteristics and behavi~ral outcomes. The information they received in this activity was designed such that people formed a belief about the relationship between risk-taking and being a successful firefighter. After the activity, though, the experimenters either told the participants that the information in the activity was completely fabricated or said nothing about the fictitious nature of the information. As you would expect from belief perseverance, even when the participants were told that the information was fake, they continued to believe in the belief they had formed about the relationship between risk-taking and success as a firefighter. Importantly, this was true regardless of whether their information led them to believe a positive association (i.e., riskier people make better firefighters) or a negative association (i.e., riskier people make worse firefighters). Going one step further, though, Anderson et al. (1980) found that the degree of belief perseverance depended on how much people created their own explanations for the relationships they appeared to uncover in the information. If people spontaneously generated more intri at~ @xplanations (which they could ti;;ill by reading explanations that participants wrote), they held onto their initial beliefs more firm ly. Similarly, if the experimenters asked the participants to come up with an explanation for the relationship, those participants held onto those initial beliefs more than participants who were not guided to explain the belief (see also Anderson & Sechler, 1986). The Psychology of Dislcaimers This al~ strikes me as relevant to the common debate among mentalists about the use of "disclaimers:' What do we tell people about our abilities? Do we fess up and say it's all tricks or do we co~~dently pro.claim that. our abilities are true indications of psychic ab ~1ty? According to belief perseverance, it may not really matter, which matches the intuition and experiences of many performers. -20-

Even after a lengthy disclaimer, audience members still walk away thinking that you have a supernatural gift. Therefore, if your performance is strong enough to instill in the audience the belief that you actually can see into people's minds or that you do possess an expert understanding of human nonverbal communication, then even if it later comes to light that you're just a magician with a penchant for holding his fingers to his temples, they may continue to cling to the belief." Sure, maybe that one thing was just a magictrick,"they might think, "but the way he was able to tell that woman about her childhood memorythat's really something." If your goal, however, is to ensure a persistent belief about you, then you may wish to take a lesson from the power of explanation and encourage people to convince themselves, with their own explanations, that you do have the ability to do what you claim. -21-

Bouha and Kiki Take a look at these two images. These are Martian hieroglyphics, and the Martians call one ofthem"bouba"and one ofthem"kiki:'Which do you think is "bouba" and which do you think is "kiki"? If you're like 95% of people around the world, you'd say the one on the left is "bouba" and the one on the right is "kiki" (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001 ). It's an astounding regularity that doesn't seem to differ between languages and even occurs for pre-literate 2.5-year-old kids (Davis, 1961; Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006). The genesis of the link between these shapes and those names is in the work of Wolfgang Kohler (1929) who instead used the names 11baluma" or 11maluma" for the round shape and "takete" for the spiky shape. The effect has been repeated by other experimenters (e.g., Holland & Wertheimer, 1964), sometimes with variations on the names (e.g., "uloomu" instead of "bouba" or "maluma"; Davis, 1961 ). Exactly why there is such overwhelming consistency in the link between those names and those images is still unclear. At first, people thought it was just because the words contained letters that visually resembled the curved vs. angular nature of the images (e.g., the "t" and "k" in takete and the "b;"'m;' and "u" in baluma). However, because the effect has been shown in other languages and using only spoken words, this explanation doesn't account for the findings. Another -22-

explanation is tha~ angular, spiky shapes like the ones in the image resemble the motions our mouths make when pronouncing a word like "kiki" whereas he round shapes in the other image resemble the movements needed to pronounce a word like"bouba"(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001 ). Still another explanation is that objects in the real world that look like image on the right are more likely to actually produce sounds similar to "kiki" whereas objects that look like the image on the left are more likely to actually produce sounds similar to "bouba:' Indeed, lower frequency sounds often come from larger, softer objects, and higher frequency sounds often come from smaller, angular objects. Regardless of why this effect occurs, with some presentational tweaking, it can be turned into a reliable psychological force that can be used as a quick, purely "psychological" demonstration that can transition into a larger effect. The Maluma-Takete Force Print the images from the beginning of this section onto two pieces of cardstock. Alternatively, you can draw them yourself on the backs of index cards or business cards. On the back of the card with the round shape, write the word "Maluma;' and on the back of the card with the angular shape, write the word "Takete:' To present this, set the two cards on the table side by side with the images facing up. "These are two images that come from an old mythology. They've been found on old parchment in Northeast Africa. I'm not sure exactly what they mean, but one of them was always referred to as "Maluma" and the other as "Takete."/'m not going to tell you which is which- / want you to guess. Just go with your gut and use your intuition to connect with the people who used to draw these pictures. Which one do you think is Maluma and which is Takete?" After they say what they think, assuming they're like most people and correctly assign the images to their names, you can turn the cards -23-

over to reveal the correct name. "Great job. That~ totally right." The following subtlety is built into these particular images3 and allows you to make the effect more unique to the person who registered his or her guess. "/knew you'd get this right. You seem to have a good sense of intuition and ability to connect with others. Oftentimes, people think too literally and make the wrong guess here. As you can see, this image (i.e., the angular one) actually resembles the letter 'M,' the first letter in 'Maluma.' and this other image (i.e., the round one) looks like the letter 't,' as in 'Takete.' But of course, that's just what the letters look like in English. When you get too narrowly focused on your own experiences, your own language, it distracts you from being able to understand the experiences of others. Since you seem to do that pretty well, I'd like to try something else with you ... " The last bit is intended to elevate a simple psychological consistency 3 Although the images I am using in this section and to implement the force are not from the ex!sting research on the Bouba/Kiki phenomenon, I have tested these specific images in an on line surv~y. Regardless of whether the round shape is on the left or on the right, people correctly 1dent1fied the round shape as "Maluma" and the angular shape as "Takete" about 85% of the time. In addition, I asked the participants whether they were familiar with these names or images, and 58 of the 60 respondents said that they were not at all familiar with this experiment. -24-

to something more meaningful. Even though nearly everyone will make the same guess as to which name belongs to which symbol, the framing of this force makes it seem more like this person was able to do something important. Now, this effect alone is not necessarily mindblowing mentalism as there are really only two guesses the person could make, so it's up to you to present this well, take advantage of the psychological "force;' but not rely on it to carry the effect. So what happens if the person gets it"wrong"?You have a few options. The first is to brush it off in the same way any psychological force could be brushed off. I will sometimes turn over the cards anyway to reveal the error. After all, how could you possibly hold the person accountable for failing to guess the words related to an old North African mythology? "That's an interesting guess. As it turns out, it's actually this one that's Maluma and this one that's Takete. I mean, how could you know that? I didn't know it until I read it in a book. After all, this is the problem with language ... the words have a clear meaning to those who speak the language, but to those who don't, it's just another sound that carries no particular meaning." This could transition into any effect in which you reveal the word someone is thinking of. If there are other people watching as well, you can turn it into a "reading" in the same way people often suggest getting out of other psychological forces that fail. By this I mean you can turn to the others watching and ask whether they thought the same or the opposite with regard to which picture was named what. Most of them will say that they had actually thought the opposite (i.e., as you would have predicted). Now you can turn this into a reading about what makes this person unique. "Well look at that. In fact, it's true that most of the time people think that this one is Maluma and this one is Takete, but I did have a feeling that you would be the type of person who goes for the opposite- that's why I picked you to make the guess. Whether consciously or not, you pick up on nuanced clues that many people miss. Everyone, look at the images again. This one (the round -25-

one) is actually in the general shape of a 't,' the first letter of 'Takete.' In the other one (the angular one) yo~ can clearly see the letter 'M,' the first letter of 'Maluma. Pete, you picked up on this beautifully- just as I thought you might-so I'd like to try something else with you." Alternatively, you can build a multiple o.uts meth?d for this: Since there are only two possible outcomes, this wouldn t be too difficult. 1 haven't done this personally, but it could certainly work for you. In fact, if you are presenting this to several people, having the backup plan could pay off. After the person says his or her guess, you can take the opportunity to ask everyone else what they would say; most of them will provide the "normal" guess. Therefore, your reveal sugge.sts you knew that this person was going to go counter to the norm, which would be pretty impressive. I realize I've spent a lot of time outlining "outs" that you'll probably never need, but I wanted to illustrate some ways you can handle a "miss" to keep things going. Because this micro effect would never stand on its own anyway, the risk is minimal. However, when the person gets it right, you have a very pure demonstration of the person's intuition that would be a nice segue into a prediction effect that's presented as a more sophisticated demonstration of the person' intuition. Note also that I chose to go with "Maluma" and "Takete" as the names for this force. There were a few reasons for this. The first is that it was easier t~ create the images that look like "M" and "t" to set up the alternative route the participant could have taken. The second is that these names sounded more plausible as having come from a real language and mythology than "Bouba" and "Kiki:'The final is that the more recent "Bouba" and "Kiki" names are the ones that popular ~sy~hol?gy authors use when talking about this effect. Although the risk is fairly small because it isn't a commonly reported effect, I chose to use the more obscure names in the event t hat the participant later encounters the "Bouba/Kiki" effect in a book or something. These considerations aside, you are free to use whichever variation you find more comfortable. -26-

The Meaning of Color Several popular premises in mentalism deal with colors and their meaning. Mentalists might give color readings or aim to influence o~hers through strategic use of colors (e.g., Bank Night with ?1fferent colored envelopes). In fact, an emerging body of research in psychology may shed some light on this theme. I have to admit, though, that I was surprised to learn of this research. Dealing with the meaning of colors struck me as an unlikely topic for social psychology, but the more I read, the more the data seem to display a consistent pattern. Despite what many online personality tests might have you believe, most popular conceptions of what different colors "mean" isn't grounded in evidence. Although a keen designer can use color to create a particular feeling, painting your office orange because orange "makes people happier" is probably a misguided decision. In 1942, Kurt Goldstein proposed that different colors elicit different physiological responses and could facilitate changes in focus and attention. This idea is similar to other proposals that the wavelength of a color is tied to its physiological effects on people. Longer wavelength colors (e.g., red and yellow) were proposed to create greater arousal, and shorter wavelength colors (e.g., green and blue) were proposed to create calmness and relaxation. The data for these relationships, though, offers little support for them being true (see Elliot & Maier, 2012). A recent, scientifically rigorous and theory-driven approach to understanding the psychological imp~ct of color, ho'::'ever, .has yielded some interesting results. "Color-in-context theory organizes a body of empirical data to suggest that colors have meaning beyond mere aesthetics and that exposure to those colors has a direct effect of psychological responding (Elliot & Maier, 2007, 2012). In thinking about the meaning of various colors, a natural question is: why do these colors have particular meanings? Whe.re do th~y come from? The answer, these psychologists suggest, hes both in "nature" and in "nurture:' Given that color vision must have evolved -27-

by serving some adaptive advantage, biological influences are likely to guide the psychological meaning of individual color experiences. By contrast, colors also achieve meaning through learning. Thus, not only might "yellow" serve a biological function, but its meaning may also correspond to human-created concepts like yellow traffic lights or highlighting markers, whose meanings have arisen through years of mentally associating the color with a particular social purpose. To take another example, depending on whether you grew up in a neighborhood with blue or green recycl ing bins, either of those colors might be differently associated with environmentalism. 4 If the meaning was purely biological, your upbringing would have no influence, but because color associations are somewhat learned, these color meanings can depend upon your unique experience. Similarly, you can think about how different sports teams' colors provide different color meanings for fans of one team rather than another. The key to color-in-context theory, however, is the context component. To say that "blue" has a universal meaning is a stretch. Instead, colors likely carry individual meanings constrained within particular contexts. To extend the previous "yellow" example, in the context of transportation, "yellow" may prompt you to slow down. Yellow lights, school buses, yield signs, caution tape ... they all inspire this connotation. In another context, though, the bright hue of yellow mi~ht instead provoke confidence, exuberance, and a go-get-'em attitude. O~ay, so how do we use this? What do the colors mean according to this theory? Well, that's a huge question requiring enormous amounts of research to clarify a full spectrum of meaning across the color wheel in different contexts. As a starting point, however, researchers have documented many effects regarding the color red- a color whose meaning reliably shifts between distinct contexts. In their experiments, scientists carefully control all details of an activity and manipulate only a specific element of color. Therefore, any difference between conditions can be attributed only to the color manipulation. 4 It's only in proofreading this book that I noticed how the word "mental ism" is in the word "environmentalism:' Use this realization with caution. -28-

Let's look at some specific examples. First, consider the color red in achievement contexts (i.e., contexts in which one's performance is being evaluated). In this context, what does red signal? You may know the feeling of getting back a school assignment with red pen marks strewn across your work. Similarly, researchers have proposed that in such contexts, the color red signals danger and failing. Through social learning, we can acquire this meaning through the aforementioned red pen experience, linguistic phrases like being caught "red handed;' stop signs, the color of an angry face, red lights on sirens. Over time, these clear instances of red get associated with danger. Biologically, some animals use the color red in various forms as a show of superiority or preparedness for attack. Across a range of studies (see Elliot & Maier, 2012), exposing people to the color red (vs. other colors) immediately before an intellectual test decreases their test performance, presumably by instilling self-doubt and a fear of failure. For example, before participants completed a difficult analogies test, the name of the test ("Analogies") appeared on screen with either a red, green or white background. Compared to the green and white conditions, the participants who saw the red background completed significantly fewer analogies correctly (Elliott et al., 2007, Study 2). In another simple study, participants received their test materials, and the only difference between conditions was whether their ID number was printed in red, green, or black ink. Compared to the conditions with green or black ink, the participants who saw their number in red ink completed significantly fewer questions correctly (Elliott et al., 2007, Study 1 ). Importantly, though, these effects only seem to happen in achievement contexts-when people think their performance will be evaluated. Other studies have shown that the color red (vs. other colors) leads to hesitation in moving onto the next part of a study when people think the next activity is taking a test, but not when they think the next part of the study is providing a series of subjective ratings (Elliot et al., 2009). In the latter condition, the color red doesn't have any special influence. -29-

So what about a different context? Does red always carry a negative connotation, inducing avoidance and unwillingness to try hard? The other context that researchers have been exploring is an "affiliation" context, or heterosexual cross-gender interactions. In this context, red means something entirely different; it carries a positive connotation that promotes approach motivations. People commonly link the color red with love, romance, and passion. Walking down the greeting card aisle in February gives you a sense of how t hat association may be socially learned. Biologically, though, the color red is often expressed in t he body during mating, courting, and particular moments within the menstrual cycle. In a series of studies, Elliot and Niesta (2008) had men rate women's photos, and all they manipulated was whether the photos had a red background or not. The photos themselves were the same in each condition. Reliably, men rated the women as more attractive, sexually desirable, and "date-worthy" (but not necessarily more likeable or intelligent) when the photos appeared on the red background, compared to when they appeared on a white backgrounrl. In their other studies, they manipulated the color of the shirt a woman was wearing-red in some cases and green in others. Male participants were given a set of questions that they could ask this woman under the guise of a casual conversation. When the woman was wearing a red shirt, the men chose more intimate questions than when the same woman was wearing a green shirt. In a final study, male participants were shown a photo of a woman who would presumably be their conversation partner in the next part of a study. They were taken to a "conversation room" where they would presumably meet the other person, and the researchers measured how close the men chose to sit to where t his woman was going to sit. Men who had seen a photo in which t he woman was wearing a red shirt then sat closer to where they thought this woman would be seated, compared to men who had seen a photo of the same woman wearing a blue shirt. These same sorts of effects also occur for women evaluating men (Elliot et al., 2010). So the evidence suggests that color can have meaning that has a direct impact on human psychology in ways that depend on specific -30-

contexts. You may be thinking, "Great. I know now that I should wear red to the bar, but how can I use this in mentalism? One application, I think, is the mere idea that meaning shifts with context. This premise is intriguing on its own and opens the doors to interesting presentations. By highlighting the unique role of the environment, things can take on different psychological meanings (see also Gawronski et al., 2014). On another level, the meaning of red in achievement contexts could potentially get worked in as a subtle method for an effect. Some procedures that we have participants do carry with them an element of"achievement:' Having people remember things, add up numbers, and even read from a piece of paper on stage carries with it the feeling of a test. So, avoid explicit use of the color red before these procedures to help them go more smoothly. If, however, your aim is to make these tasks a little more challenging for a participant (e.g., to subtly demonstrate how difficult they really are), then using red papers, markers, or notebook covers could subliminally discourage success in those activities. This, of course, is no guarantee of failure, but rather, subtly nudges them away from achieving the task with the same success they might otherwise reach. -31-

Compliance In the domain of social influence, principles of compliance have garnered much attention, especially in the business and marketing sphere. By "compliance" I mean accepting a direct request. 5 For example, if I ask if you would to write down a two-digit number, you can comply by doing as I asked or you can fail to comply by refusing to write down a number. As you will see, there are many techniques that can be used to encourage compliance and increase the chances that people will agree with your requests. In his seminal book, Influence: Science and Practice, Robert Cialdini reviews the relevant research in this field and offers suggestions for marketers who wish to apply the research as well as consumers who may wish to avoid the traps of compliance techniques. It is a fantastic read if you find this material interesting. Cialdini's 2003 paper published in Annual Review of Psychology is also a frequently cited work in this domain. Throughout this section, I will briefly cover some of this research with a focus on the most practical and applicable findings. Although there are sweeping theories that synthesize existing knowledge in this field (e.g., "the focus theory of normative influence"), my goal is to highlight techniques that you can apply directly to your performance and explain a little bit about why they work. Perhaps more than most other types of magic, mentalism relies heavily on successful interactions with individuals. It can be important that they follow instructions and work with you to create the best result possible. Therefore, I hope the following material is of use in facilitating these successful interactions. "B ecause ... " 5 You . may also ~e ~amiliar with the concepts of "conformity" and "obedience;' which are ?ther kinds of social influence. They differ from compliance however in that the invo~ve a re~ues~. Conformity merely refers to adopting the behaviors 1 of others w~i~~ ;~~ Y coanu 'reOtJouldst yo serving others. Obedience is a response to a demand To "obey'" is to do as -not as you are asked. · -32-

This is the study that turned me onto social psychology. It is so elegant and simple but reveals something remarkable about compliance. That is, people operate according to simple rules that they have learned over time to the point that even when that rule is no longer sensible, it still induces compliance. In their classic study, Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz (1978) examined people's compliance with a simple request that followed the familiar structure of acceptable persuasive requests (i.e., including a reason) and varied whether or not the content of the request was compelling. Specifically, an experimenter approached people who were about to use a photocopier and asked to use the machine first. This request came either with a reason that conveyed no real information (i.e.," ... because I have to make copies"), a reason that did convey information (i.e.," ... because I'm in a rush"), or included no reason at all for the request. Their results revealed that people were more compliant with the request when it was accompanied by some reason than when the request was made in isolation, even if it wasn't actually a compelling reason. That is, saying "because I need to make some copies" is just as effective as saying "because I'm in a rush. When we don't think too hard about it, just that word "because" is enough to convince us that there must be a legitimate reason why someone is making a request, and the actual reason that follows doesn't seem to enter the equation. Importantly, however, the persuasive advantage of providing a meaningless reason occurred only when people weren't thinking much (i.e., when the request was relatively minor). Under conditions characterized by increased thought (i.e., when the request was much bigger), including a meaningless reason was no more persuasive than merely making the request alone. Thus, under conditions of relatively low thought, simple heuristics such as giving a reason (any reason!) can enhance a communication's persuasive impact. The Because Subtlety As a performer, you may be able to apply this principle to increase compliance with a request that may sometimes come with resistance. -33-

One instance that jumps out to me is when a participant in a demonstration is hesitantto say his or her thought aloud. In a situation where the participant thinks of a number, you write something down on a pad, and then you ask the person what number she is thinking of, it is not uncommon for the person to say,"You want me to tel/you?" or "Shouldn't you tell me what I'm thinking?" Instead, consider tossing a "because" into the request, and the reason doesn't even have to be that compelling.6 For instance, you could say, "Now that I've written this down, please say out loud what number you're thinking of because I want them (gesture toward the audience) to be amazed also:' Similarly, many mentalists fear that that participants will be hesitant to write down their thoughts. In fact, the specific "justification" that many mentalists seek out may not matter all that much. To counter any such resistance, you need only offer some reason (e.g.,"And would you please write the word down on this piece of paper because we'll want to show people later if they want:') But You Are Free ... A relatively new compliance technique is the "but you are free" technique developed by Nicolas Gueguen and Alexandre Pascual. Its power lies in its simplicity. According to reactance theory (see its section elsewhere in this book), people dislike having their freedom threatened and will react negatively when they feel like they've lost their freedom make their own choices. This compliance techni · h . that their freedom to c~~~~s t. eonz~d to work by reassuring people variant of the phrase II b t e is not in Jeopardy. By merely adding a compliance rates con~·ideu you are free to accept or refuse" boosts experimenters approache~ably. In ~he first demonstration of this, asked for money U d passe~s y on the street in France and gave money, b~t ~ae:iyn~~~a l ~;rc~:s~an s, only 10% of people experimenters added /1 b P P e gave money when the end of th . . . ·. ut you are free to accept or to refuse" at the e1r request (Gueguen & Pascual, 2000). 6 However," ... because I need to write it down with my nail writer" may backfire. -34-

In another study, the experimenters approached people in a mall and asked if they would complete a survey. Under normal conditions, people agreed to complete the survey about 75% of the time; however, that rate jumped to 90% with the addition of the simple freedom reminder. Specifically, the request was as follows: Sorry, Madam/Sir, I have something to ask you but you are free to accept or to refuse. We are currently conducting a survey on the perception of the local merchants and craftwork of your town. Would you accept to respond to a questionnaire that will take 5-8 minutes? The underlined section is the only part that changed between conditions and was responsible for the giant leap in compliance. In a meta-analysis of 42 studies on this technique, Carpenter (2013) concluded that the effect rel iably fosters compliance. In fact, the technique was no more successful in eliciting compliance for charity appeals as it was for sales messages. The technique, however, was more effective when employed in face-to-face contexts than when used in more distant contexts like over email. The words themselves, though, seem not to matter. The same success has been achieved using "but obviously do not feel obligated:' The important element is to verbally acknowledge the person's freedom to say "no:' Consistency One of the fundamental motivations in human psychology is the drive for consistency (see "Preference for Consistency" on page 190). This need for consistency can play out in several compliance techniques. At their essence, these techniques work because once people are committed to a thought, idea, or action, they later feel compelled to act consistent with themselves. Perhaps the best known of these is the foot-in-the-door principle. According to this principle, after people agree to a relatively small request, they are more likely to agree with a subsequent, larger request. In an early demonstration of how effective this principle is, people went door-to-door in a neighborhood, asking homeowners whether they would mind displaying a large sign that says "Drive Carefully" on their lawns. The sign itself was big and not very attractive -35-

to look at, so the request was met with considerable disagreement. Under these normal conditions, only 17% of people agreed to display the sign. However, compliance rates increased dramatically when the footin-the-door principle was used. For another set of homeowners, the experimenters first approached them and asked if they would display a small three-inch sign that said "Be a Safe Driver:' Almost everybody agreed to this simple request. Two weeks later, however, when these homeowners were approached again, this time with the request to display the huge gaudy sign on their lawns, 76% agreed with the request (Freedman & Fraser, 1966)! By simply getting people to agree to a relatively small request (getting your foot in the door, so to speak), the odds of those people agreeing to the larger request are much higher. To deny the second request would be inconsistent- they had already committed to issues of driver safety after all-so to avoid contradicting themselves as helpful, safety-conscious citizens, they agree to the larger request. Other cases of consistency-driven compliance principles rely on getting people to commit to something before having all the details. This is the low-ball procedure wherein the commitment precedes being informed of the cost. That is, if there's an element to your request that's somewhat unpleasant, it is advantageous to first get people to agree to help you in general. In a great demonstration of this effect, Robert Cialdini, John Cacioppo, and others (1978) attempted to get university students to come in for a 7:00AM psychology experiment. For college students especially, getting up before 7:00AM can be particularly unpleasant, so it's no surprise that when they simply asked students if they would come in for a psychology study at 7:00AM, only 31 % said yes (and only 24% of the students in this condition actually showed up for the experiment). However, ifthe experimenters first asked students if they would mind participating in a psychology experiment at all, 56% said yes. Once they received an answer to the first question, they mentioned the time of the study and offered the students a chance to change their minds about participating. Amazingly, none of them decided against participating when they were told what time it would be at. When the -36-

7:00AM appointment came, all but one of those who had previously agreed actually showed up. Importantly, a follow-up study in the same paper made it clear that these results occur only when people feel like they had the freedom to commit to the behavior initially. That is, if you felt that I bullied you into agreeing to help me, once I tell you that you'll have to show at 7:00AM, you are more likely to back out than if you feel like you initially had a free choice in agreeing to help me at all. Therefore, be cautious of recruiting people to participate in a demonstration who seem not to want to participate. If they feel coerced into helping and then find out that participation requires something unpleasant (like revealing personal information, for instance), you might expect to see compliance drop. On the other hand, however, if you know that you will be making a large request of someone, it may help to allow people the opportunity to help you with something and only then reveal what that task entails. Reciprocity Another well-established compliance principle is that of reciprocity. In essence, when you give something to another person, that person feels like they must return the favor in some way. You may have had the experience of someone offering you a gift and following it up with a request for your time-after having accepted the gift, it feels wrong to deny that person the favor. In fact, just recently I ran into the use of reciprocity as a compliance principle. I received a letter asking me to take a survey for some organization, and a $2 bill was enclosed as a gift. Of course, at this point I couldn't deny the gift- it was in my hands and who would go through the trouble of mailing it back? Nevertheless, this small gift urged me to return the favor and take the survey. Regan (1971) provided initial evidence of the power of reciprocity norms. In the context of a study supposedly about art perception, participants believed they were doing their tasks in groups of two when in reality, the other person in the room was a confederate. During a break in the study, the confederate left the room and came -37-

back with two bonles of Coca Cola, offering one to the participant. In the control condition, the confederate came back with one Coke for himself. After the study, the confederate asked a favor of the participant; he was selling raffle tickets and asked if the participant would buy some. In the end, participants bought twice as many tickets from the confederate when he had previously given them a Coke than when the confederate didn't give this gift earlier in the study. The lesson from this and related research is clear: giving a gift, however small, can be enough to encourage greater compliance. The natural response to being given something is to reciprocate with subsequent compliance. Gifting the Prediction In the context of a prediction effect, consider disguising your prediction in a gift that you give to the volunteer at the beginning of the routine. In this way, you have given a gift upfront, inducing the norm of reciprocity. Therefore, if you have a task that's maybe a bit more demanding than the run of the mill mentalism procedure, a simple gift may nudge the participant in the direction of greater compliance as well as offer an interesting presentational ploy for a prediction revelation. -38-

An Interesting Case of "Dual Reality" I recently saw Dr. Sandra Murray give a talk on her research, and one of the manipulations she and her collaborators used in one of their studies struck me as something mentalists may find interesting. Dr. Murray's research largely focuses on close interpersonal relationships and the predictors of satisfaction in such relationships. In a 2013 paper, she and her collaborators aimed to study the experience of uncertainty regarding how caring one's partner is. The details of this research, while interesting, are beyond the function of this book. I've chosen to share this, however, because of the way in which the researchers manipulated this uncertainty. It is not radical from the perspective of mentalism and its bag of sneaky tricks, but the particular implementation warrants a quick description. The researchers brought couples into the lab and had them sit facing away from one another. Each person was given a one-page questionnaire. Recall that what the researchers needed to do was get one member.of the couple to become uncertain of his or her partner's trust and care. So, in both conditions, the target people in the couples received a questionnaire that asked them to list important aspects of their partner that they disliked. In fact, the questionnaire specified that they "should not list more than one such quality if that was all that easily came to mind" (p. 310). Importantly, these participants believed that they and their partners both received the same questionnaire, but in fact, this was only true for half of the couples in the study. In the control condition, the partner did indeed received the same questionnaire, each person in the couple took about the same amount of time to write down one negative quality in the other person, and the experiment continued. In the experimental condition, however, the questionnaire that the partner actually received asked the person to "list as many of the items in their dormitory room, bedroom, or apartment as they could generate (and a minimum of 25 items)" (p. 310). -39-

So you can imagine a person's distress when he has listed one negative quality about his partner, but he can hear his partner going on and on, writing more and more on her questionnaire. The target, of course, believes that this must mean his partner has plenty to say about his own faults. I hand this off to you, thoughtful and brilliant mentalist, to see if you can use the same principle as a deceptive ploy. This experimental manipulation seems quite similar to what those in the mentalism community have called dual reality in which one person's experience of an effect is slightly different from the audience's experience-a discrepancy that serves to make the overall effect appear more impossible than it actually was. Therefore, one tactic to add to this arsenal is to use how intensely a person writes or draws something as a visual and audible cue that may mean something very different to the audience than it might for participant him or herself. -40-

Ego-Centric Biases The Spotlight Effect According to the spotlight effect, "people tend to believe that they stand out in the eyes of others, both positively and negatively, more than they actually do" (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000, p. 219). That is, the things that we think stand out about us are not quite so apparent to others. As an example, when I was in fifth grade, I got my first pair of glasses, and after getting them, I went with my mom to the mall to pick up some things. The entire time, I was sure that people were staring at me; I figured they all thought my glasses looked strange on me, but of course nobody had such a thought. It was just the I was so focused on my new glasses that I assumed everyone would be. This is the heart of the spotlight effect. As evidence for this effect, Thomas Gilovich and his colleagues (2000) ran a study in which they made the participants where a T-shirt prominently featuring a picture of Barry Manilow. The participants were escorted into another room where there were up to six other people who were dressed normally and were completing some questionnaires. After a quick exchange in this room, the participant was escorted back out of the room where he or she would answer some questions. In particular, the experimenters asked the participants how many people in that room had noticed what singer was on their T-shirt. Participants vastly overestimated how many of the people in that room noticed the T-shirt. If you put yourself in their shoes (or T-shirts, rather), the judgment makes a lot of sense-if you were made to walk into a room wearing an embarrassing T-shirt7 , of course you'd think everyone noticed. But the reality is not nearly what we think it is. As a side note, this is not just an effect of Barry Mani low T-shirts. The 7 My sincerest apologies to Barry Mani low fans .. . sort of. -41 -

same study was replicated with a Vanilla Ice T-shirt (Gilovich et al., 2000), and the same effects also occur when a grou~ member has to judge how much their fellow group members think_ he or she contributed to the group- that is, we tend to overestimate how much people think we contributed (Gilovich et al., 2000). The same thing happens when we have a "bad hair day;" we think people notice how much our physical appearance changes from day to day much more than people actually notice (Gilovich, Kruger, & Medvec, 2001 ). This is an example of what some psychologists refer to as an "egocentric bias:'This just means that we can be so wrapped up in thinking about ourselves that we mistakenly assume everyone else notices what we pay so much attention to. So the participants who wore the T-shirt are themselves focusing so much on this experience that they expect others to be similarly attentive. The reality, however, is that everyone's too busy focusing on their own selves. To further demonstrate that this effect is really the result of egocentrism, the researchers added a twist to the T-shirt experiment. In a new study, half of the participants had exactly the same experience as the one I described earlier, but the other half of the participants were given a delay between putting on the Manilow T-shirt and entering the room with the other people. By giving these participants a delay, it gave them time to get used to wearing the silly shirt and stop focusing so much on it. The results of this study showed that compared to the people who went straight into the room after putting on the T-shirt, the people who were given a chance to get used to the shirt provided much lower estimates of how many other people noticed. Because they were not focused so much on th is attribute of themselves anymore (i.e., the spotlight had dimmed for themselves), they weren't as likely to think other people noticed. -42-

Shining a Spotlight on Audience Compassion Such ego-centric biases may be an important consideration anytime you work closely with your audiences. Whether an audience member comes onstage with you and is literally under a spotlight or whether you perform an effect to just one other person and the spotlight is merely metaphorical, realize that there is often a disparity between how much the participant thinks others are noticing about him or her and what the reality is. For example, participants in magic and mind reading demonstrations can be put in potentially awkward orembarrassing situations.Although neither you nor the broader audience might be paying attention to what the participant may find embarrassing (e.g., closing one's eyes, lying down, or even just standing on a stage trying to appear natural), these participants may perceive themselves as committing some blunder that everybody notices.8 Thus, putting people at ease and focusing their attention away from these distracting elements (like the people who were allowed to get used to wearing the T-shirt) may do wonders for creating a positive experience for the participant and keeping him or her engaged in the focal task that creates a powerful experience. The Illusion of Transparency Like the spotlight effect, the illusion of transparency is the phenomenon where people overestimate how much their internal thoughts and feelings are apparent to observers. Consider the potentially frustrating experience of a magician who has just performed a spectacular trick for someone who seems to offer very little in the way of visible amazement. Although the magician may not have noticed any visible signs of amazement, the spectator herself may have thought she did show visible signs of amazement through facial expressions. 8 In fact, ct.her research has demonstrated that people who commit embarrassing acts often overestimate .how much they are being judged by those who witnessed it. This seems to stem from the failure to consider how capable other people are at reacting with empathy (Epley, Savitsky, & Gilovich, 2002). -43-

In one study, participants were videotaped and instructed to ta~te five drinks, four of which were pleasant tasting and one of which was decidedly gross (Gilovich, Sativsky, & Medves, 1998). Critically, however, the participants were told to suppress any expressions of disgust they might have while drinking these drinks. After doing this task, they reported how successful they thought they were in controlling their disgust expressions by guessing how likely a viewer of the videotape would be to guess which drink was the disgusting one. The researchers later showed these videotapes to others and actually had them guess, based only on the participants' expressions, which drink was the disgusting one. In general, these viewers were no better than chance at guessing which drink was the disgusting one; however, the participants themselves guessed that half the people who viewed the tape would be able to detect the expressions of disgust and pick the right drink. In another study that bears resemblance to the classic mental ism ploy of lie detection, the illusion of transparency also leads people to think that others can easily tell when they are lying. Participants were put in groups to play a simple lie detection game and were assigned the roles of "liars" or "truth tellers" for different rounds in the game. They responded either truthfully or dishonestly to simple questions such as which brand of shampoo they use either. After answering these questions for the group, they privately filled out short surveys in which "liars" reported how many people in the group would be able to guess they lied on that question and "truth-tellers" gave their guess as to which group member was the liar for that round. Their results show that although the accuracy rates for guessing who the liar was on each round were no different than chance (i.e., 25%), when liars estimated how many people would be able to identify them as the liar, they overestimated how transparent their lies were, estimating that an average of 50% of the group would correctly identify them as the liars (Gilovich et al., 1998). -44-

Transparency Subtlety This illusion of transparencyis a great opportunity for a subtlety to add to existing thought reading or lie detection eff~cts. That _is, e_ven though a participant may be trying not to give anything away_rn ~'~or her face, that participant is also likely to think that he or she ts giving something away. The reality, of course, is that the person isn't giving much away through body language (or at least not_ as much as he or s~e. ~!nks) . Knowing this gives you the opportunity to get another h~t. rn a~ otherwise 50/50 guess by being able to pick up on the partrcrpant s internal thoughts. As an example, consider a "guess which hand" routine where it is the performer's goal to guess which hand the participant has hidden a coin in. "My job is to guess which hand you've put the coin in, and of course, your job is to not give that information away in your facial expressions or body language. But I get the impression now that no matter how much you're trying not to, that you think the answer is clear as day written on your face, that you would bet that most of the people here watching already know which hand it's in. I guarantee, though, that most of these people here have no idea which hand it's in even if you think it has to be obvious by now." This additional reading makes it seem like you know way more about what's going on in the mental lives of everyone involved even if all you know is that the coin is definitely in the person's left hand. Also, the way I have tried to word this is such that it's based on the probable state of affairs suggested by the research in psychology (i.e., that the participant would probably overestimate how many people could read her facial expression and that not very many people are actually able to) but that it doesn't bet everything on that probability. It should accentuate that probability by nudging the participant toward believing he or she is revealing the information nonverbally (thus confirming your reading) and merely suggests that most people in the audience don't already know which hand it's in. When the true answer is revealed, enough people in the crowd will have been wrong by chance alone and because you have already made such a -45-

statement, hopefully these people think, "Wow, he was right- I had no idea what hand it was in, but he could tell that she thought I'd know and he was able to guess it correctly:' Consider also a routine in which several people are onstage and you must make some sort of guess like who is holding the black ball (ala Max Maven's Kurotsuke, for instance) or to whom some personal object belongs (ala psychometry). For example, in a psychometryesque routine where you guess who drew which drawing, you might begin one of the reveals by saying: This next one is a drawing of a cat. Again, the chances of guessing who drew this by chance alone aren't great, so we have to rely on other cues-nonverbal cues- and your job in the game is not to give yourself away. This one's interesting, though, because although I'm sure you would all agree that everybody up here looks about equally relaxed, I'm getting the impression that for this drawing, whoever drew this one really thinks he is giving himself away somehow. Although he doesn't want to believe it, he feels like there's no way I can't guess that it's him. Suddenly the reveal is no longer just "who drew this one;' but it's (a) I'm picking up these internal thoughts and (b) who are these thoughts coming fro m? Again, this takes advantage of the probability that the person whose drawing it is truly feels like he's giving himself away (according to the illusion of transparency without relying on it. That is, there's a chance that this person isn t thin ing this thought, but as long as the drawing makes its way to the person who drew it, the effect is strong; it's just made stronger by ta ing ad antage of what the person is probably thinking as well as wha e aud·ence is probably experiencing.

Tue False Consensus Effect (aka "Social Projection") In our social world, we will often find ourselves estimating other people's traits and opinions, but it's often the case that we use our own personality traits, opinions, and behaviors as a guide to estimating the broader prevalence of those attributes. As an example, very early research by Katz and Allport (1931) found that students who admitted to cheating on exams were more likely to think that others would cheat on exams, compared to the students who didn't admit to cheating. Also, consider this anecdote about one-time Penthouse publisher Bob Guccione. When confronted with a statistic that 83% of adults reported having fewer than two sexual partners in the past year, Guccione expressed his disbelief, saying, "I would say five partners a year is the average for men:' Even when presented with the objective data, this man may still have based his estimates about other people on his own personal behavior. Perhaps the most famous demonstration of the false consensus effect was reported by Ross, Greene, and House (1977). They asked students walking around a college campus if they would wear a sandwich board that said: "REPENT!" After the students either agreed or disagreed to wear the sign, the experimenters asked them how many of their fellow students they thought would agree to wear the sign. Those who had initially disagreed guessed that only about 20% of their fellow students would have agreed, but those who had initially agreed guessed that more than 60% of their fellow students would agree. The point here is that our own personal choices have a huge effect on how we perceive other people; we generally think that other people would think the same way as us. One additional point to make, however, is that these effects are specific to judgments about people in our own groups. For instance, a liberal is likely to generalize his or her likes and dislikes (even on politically-irrelevant topics) to other liberals but not to conservatives (Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Cooper, 1992). Likewise, women will be likely to generalize their attributes to other women but not to men -47-

(e.g., Ward, 1967). Another interesting caveat that you may have started to wonder about is that this phenomenon of social projection may actually be rational. Although many have conceptualized it as an "ego-centric bias" whereby our own preferences color our perception of the world, it may actually be a functional way to make estimates of attribute prevalence. That is, when people use their own preferences as a guide to estimate the preferences of other people, the accuracy of those estimates actually increases (see Krueger, 1998). Finally, my inner experimental psychologist urges me to make this final point about the classic "correlation/causation" issue in this research. I assume that at least one reader will have wondered, "Isn't it possible that people simply base their attitudes and opinions on what they perceive to be the majority position?" In other words, rather than our beliefs influencing our perceptions of others, maybe others' beliefs instead influence our own. While it is certainly true that that perceived social consensus does influence our bel iefs and opinions and that much of the social projection research is correlational, some studies have indeed demonstrated that people base their perceptions of others on the attributes they themselves have. For example, in one study, the participants took a bogus personality test and were told that their scores either indicated that they were a "Figurer" or a "Grounder;' two completely made up personality types. Once they read a description of which type of person they were, they were asked to estimate which of these personality types was most common in the population. The results reveal that people reliably estimated that their own personality type (which wasn't real and wasn't based on the person's actual responses to the survey) was the more prevalent one. Thus, even for completely unfamiliar and inaccurate perceptions of oneself, people will still assume that others share their attributes. -48-

' ,lJ ·•., ~ "'~ Embodiment Research on "embodiment" (or "embodied cognition") has exploded in recent years. The idea behind this phenomenon is simple: physical sensations and experiences can have indirect effects on our thoughts and judgments through the mind's use of metaphor. That is, our thoughts can be unconsciously influenced by our bodily sensations. For example, putting yourself in a "power posture;' like sitting with your chest puffed out, can be enough to create real feelings of power (e.g., Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 201 O). To take another commonly cited example, if the specific facial muscles associated with smiling are activated while you read a comic strip, you are likely to find the comic funnier than if those muscles were not activated. Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) showed this by having participants rate cartoons either while holding a pen with their teeth or with their lips. Give this a try- hold a pen in your mouth by inserting one end of the pen into your mouth and biting down with your teeth without letting your lips touch the pen. The pen should be sticking straight out, pointing away from yourself. In this position, muscles that are usually active when you smile have been made active. Now adjust the way you are holding the pen, and rather than using your teeth, keep the pen in place just with your lips. This position shifts muscle activation to muscles usually used to frown. In their study, Strack et al. (1988) found that in the first position, people rated the cartoons as funnier than if they were in the second position. The content of the cartoons hadn't changed- just the bodily sensations associated with smiling or frowning. There are many examples of these processes to date. The facial muscle study is a fairly direct demonstration of the body's impact on thought, but as I had mentioned, these effects often operate indirectly through metaphor. We often turn to physical experience as a metaphor for mental experience. For instance, we say that people are "cold" or "distant:' and everyone knows what we mean. Of course, the people in question aren't physically cold or far away from us, but the physical -49-