SAN BEDA COLLEGE COLLEGE OF LAW STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NOTES BACKGROUND The Philippine Legal System In Re: Max Shoop FACTS - Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York. - The said rule requires that: New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5 years in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.) - The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases: 1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia 2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law (ECL). ISSUE: WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established HELD - The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't. established by the Congress. - In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions. - The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent. - New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
- Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesn’t establish a precedent with respect to future applications. Reasoning On TERRITORY: a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US b.We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the United States but c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be incorporated but we are a territory since the US Congress legislates for us and we have been granted a form of territorial government, so to that extent we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen. e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the word "territory" to be limited to the technical meaning of organized territory or it would have used the more accurate expression. f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first requirement since the full phraseology indicates a SWEEPING INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of the US. On COMMON LAW jurisdiction: (On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence based?) g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and statute law have come to be a very large proportion of the law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case law which has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in the old English cases. h. In speaking of jurisprudence "based on the English Common Law" it would seem proper to say that the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction Is based upon the principles of that Common Law if its statute law and its case law to a very large extent includes the science and application of law as laid down by the old English cases, as perpetuated and modified by the American cases. i. Common Law adopted by decision: i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American codification and remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is transpiring in this jurisdiction today. ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law" in a general sense iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the jurisprudence of the courts where practical considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives round for such a decision.
iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in Anglo-American jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the extent that Common Law principles are NOT in conflict with the LOCAL WRITTEN laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and there is NO OTHER FOREIGN case law system used to any substantial extent, THEN it is proper to say in the sense of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippines is based on the ECL. j. IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: i. The extent of the English or Anglo-Am Common Law here has not been definitely decided by the SC. But there is a similarity to the quotations from the American decisions cited with reference to the ECL. ii. Alzua & Arnalot vs. Johnson: we apply Anglo-Am jurisprudence only in "xxx…so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing law; nevertheless, many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law have, to all intents and purposes, been IMPORTED into this jurisdiction, a RESULT of the enactment of new laws and the organization of new institutions by the Congress of the US…xxx" iii. The Spanish judicial system was abrogated replaced with a new one modeled after the judicial systems of the US. Therefore, those Spanish doctrines and principles in conflict with the new one were abrogated. iv. US. v. De Guzman: For proper construction and application of the terms and provisions we borrowed from or modeled upon Anglo-Am precedents, we review the legislative history of such enactments. v. US. v. Abiog and Abiog: The courts are constantly guided by the doctrines of Common Law. Neither ECL or American Common Law is in force in this Islands…save only in so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and aren't in conflict with existing law." vi. What we have is a PHILIPPINE COMMON LAW influenced by the ECL or American Common Law. vii. A great preponderance of the jurisprudence of our jurisdiction is based upon AngloAmerican case law precedents-exclusively in applying those statutory laws which have been enacted since the change of sovereignty and which conform more or less to the American statutes, and-to a large extent in applying and expanding the remnants of the Spanish codes and written laws. k. PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW
i. The chief codes of Spain that were extended to us were as follows: Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Ley Provisional, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure, Civil Code, Marriage Law, Mortgage Law, Railway laws, Law of Waters. ii. There were also special laws having limited application. iii. The foregoing written laws had acquired the force of statute law by change of sovereignty. iv. There was no properly called Case Law of Spain since Spanish jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of Stare Decisis. 1.Manresa' s discussion of Art. 6 of the Civil shows how far from a case law system is jurisprudence. Spanish courts are governed by: a. first, by written law b. 2nd, by the customs of the place (derives its force because it is the acknowledged manner on how things are done and not jurisprudence) c.3rd,by judicial decision (when in practice, these were considered last; the development of case law was impeded because the courts were free to disregard any information or decisions of other courts.) d. 4th, by general principles of law l. SPANISH STATUTE LAW i. All portions of political law were abrogated immediately with the change of sovereignty ii. All Spanish laws, customs, and rights of property inconsistent with the Constitution and American principles and institutions were superseded. iii. It was as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modeled upon those same Spanish statutes. m. CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES i. It appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative from Anglo-American sources; derivative in a sense of having been COPIED, and in the sense of having been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its authority. ii. In all of the cases, Anglo-American decisions and authorities are used and relied upon to a greater or less degree. Although in many cases, the use is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the building up of a very substantial elaboration of Anglo-American case law. n. CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES i. We use Anglo-Am cases in interpreting and applying the remnants of the Spanish statutes thus showing how permanent the hold of the Anglo-Am Common Law has on our jurisprudence. ii. Anglo-Am case law plays a very great part in amplifying the law on those subjects, which are still governed by the remaining portions of the Spanish statutes, as exhibited in the groups of cases cited in the footnotes.
iii. Anglo-Am case law has entered practically every field of law and in the large majority of such subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance of the Court in developing jurisprudence. iv. The result is that we've developed a Phil. Common Law which is based almost exclusively, except in cases where conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo-Am Common Law. o. COLLATERAL INFLUENCES i. There are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of Bench and Bar vs. the abundance of digests/reports/textbooks on English/Am. courts. ii. There is a prolific use of Anglo-Am authorities in the decisions of the court, plus, the available sources for study and reference on legal theories are mostly Anglo-Am iii. Therefore, there has been developed and will continue a common law in our jurisprudence (i.e. Phil Common Law) based upon the ECL in its present day form of an Anglo-Am CL, which is effective in all of the subjects of law in this jurisdiction, in so far as it does not conflict with the express language of the written law (where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories) or with the local customs and institutions. (Digest from CMV Mendoza, Scribd user) Rules on Legislative Drafting Statutes and their Construction (L. Gonzaga) Two steps involved in legislative drafting 1. Ethical or Formulation of Policy 2. Technical or the Mechanics of Bill Drafting 1) Formulation of Policy Two kinds of policy: basic policy and immediate objective Basic policy is the general or overall principle that everyone has agreed upon, while the immediate objective is more specific and targeted. Policy is determined by the judgment of legislators, with the assistance of specialists, pressure-groups, and others. 2) The Drafting of a Statute Legislative drafting involves: mastery of language, and research. Drafters should also take note of: "(a) The exact state of facts in the field to which the law will relate; (b) The form of previous statutes relating to
the same subject in the same jurisdictions;(c) The form of previous statutes relating to the same subject in other jurisdictions; (d) The manner in which such statutes have actually operated; (e) The consensus of opinion among experts as to the best method for meeting the problem." The Legislative Reference Service renders technical assistance to Congress by indexing Philippine laws and drafting bills. 3) Objectives of the Draftsman Drafters should "make his readers understand what is commanded and what is forbidden by the law." They should not adopt the style of literary composition, but should be "more like that of a man who writes directions on how to use a kodak or how to use a Burroughs Calculator. This practice will help minimize problems in interpretation. Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 5 Janz Hanna Ria A2013 But no matter how precise a statute is crafted, there will still be gaps and ambiguities because: one cannot foresee all the possible consequences of the relations between language, and the person or situations where it might apply, and courts in some cases would want to follow a certain policy direction which the statute does not cover 4) Problems of Drafting Either related to the form and structure of the statute, or the language used Form and structure i. Dividing statutes into sections makes them flexible and facilitates amendments ii. Drafters should follow proper construction and logical development of sections and other parts of a statute Length of Sections i. There is no rule on how long or short sections may be, but it should be made as brief as may be compatible with accuracy Sentence Structure i. A legislative declaration consists of a “legal subject” and a “legal action”.
ii. More complex provisions also have a “case” where its operation is confined, and “conditions” which trigger its operation Language i. Statutes should be written in “clear, simple, and concise language,” but when they deal with technical matters, like laws regulating accounting practices for instance, specialized terms are unavoidable ii. Drafters should also avoid variations in expression, that “the same word should not be used in different senses,” and that when one word is used, it should be used and defined uniformly throughout STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT Laws and Statutes Laws - A whole body or system of law - Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state - Includes RA, PD, EO (President’s legislative power), PI (ordinance power), Jurisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of LGUs Statues - An act of legislature (PC, PL, BP, Congress) - PDs of Marcos during Martial Law - EO of Aquino during revolutionary period Statutory Construction - Art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247) - Art or process of discovering and expounding on the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed it to convey to others (Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws) - Art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts (Justice Martin, Statutory Construction) - Branch of the law dealing with the interpretation of laws enacted by a legislature (American Jurisprudence)
Construction v Interpretation - Two terms are not the same although often used interchangeably - Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known and given in the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used. - Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text, while construction goes beyond and may call in the aid of extrinsic considerations Classifications of Statutes General Law – one that affects the community at large. A law that relates to a subject of a general nature or that affects all people or all of a particular class Special Law – different from others of the same general kind, designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action on operation Local Law – relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory Public Law – general classification of law, may be general, local or special. One concerned with the organization of the state, the relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers to the state, to each other, to people and the relations of states to one another. Private Law – portions of the law which defines, regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among individuals, associations and corporations Remedial Statute – provides means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained Curative Statute – one which reaches back into the past to operate upon past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended Penal Statute – one that defines criminal offenses and specify fines and punishments Prospective Law – applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment Retrospective Law – one which looks backward or contemplates the past; made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came into force
Affirmative Statute – one which directs the doing of an act, or declares what shall be done in contrasts to a negative statute which is one that prohibits a thing from being done, or declares what shall not be done Mandatory Statutes – one which require and not merely permit a course of action Permanent Statutes – one whose operation if not limited in duration but continues until repealed Temporary Statutes – duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event Declaratory Statutes - one enacted for the purpose of removing doubts or putting an end to conflicting decisions in regard to what the law is in relation to a particular matter Directory Statutes – one the observance of which is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings. It relates to form and manner, and when an act is incidental or acquired after jurisdiction Substantive Law – one which creates, defines, and regulates rights Procedural Law – one which provides for the manner of enforcing rights Parts of a Statute Title – The title of a statute is the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is individually known. It is usually prefixed to the statute in the form of a brief summary of its contents. (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (1987 Constitution, Article VI, section 26 (1)) Purpose: to apprise the legislators of the object, nature, and scope of the provision of the bill and to prevent the enactment into law of matters which gave not received the notice, action and study of the legislators To prohibit duplicity in legislation To prevent log-rolling legislation To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature To fairly apprise the people, through publication of the subjects of the legislation
Used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose; may clarify doubt or ambiguity *Liberally construed. If there is doubt, it should be resolved against the doubt and in favor of the constitutionality of the statute Lidasan v. COMELEC Facts: Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title YES. RA 4790 is null and void The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill.
This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. (lawsandfound.blogspot.com) Tobias v. Abalos FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”. ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1) HELD: For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. (reenfab.wordpress.com) Enacting Clause – That part of the statute which declares its enactment and serves to identify it as an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. “Be it enacted” (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Preamble – That part of a statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the objects sought to be accomplished. Usually, it starts with the word “whereas.” Generally, it is a declaration by the legislature of the reasons for the passage of the statute and is helpful in the interpretation of any ambiguities within the statute to which it is prefixed. (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Purview – that part which tells what the law is about Body – The main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found in the body of the statute. (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Repealing Clause –That part of the statute which announces the prior statutes or specifies provisions which have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Saving Clause – A restriction in a repealing act which is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted repeal (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Separability Clause – That part of the statute which provides that in the event that one or more provisions are declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in force (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Effectivity Clause – That part of the statute which announces the effective date of the law (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz)
Steps in the Enactment of the Statute 1987 Constitution, Article VI Sec. 26 (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Sec. 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object CIR v CTA FACTS: Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law". By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.
CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses. DECISION: The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. (ulandi-digest.blogspot.com) Arroyo v. de Venecia Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious; Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is therefore dismissed. Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. In view of what is essential Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED. First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. In view of the Courts jurisdiction This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction". In view of House Rules No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. In view of grave abuse Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. In view of the enrolled bill doctrine Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.” (nonamalum.weebly.com) Process Proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of congress for enactment into law Shall embrace only one subject which shall be express in the title Signed by the authors File with the Secretary of the House Bills may originate from either lower or upper House Exclusive to lower house (HR) o Appropiration o Revenue / Tariff Bills o Bills authorizing increase of public debt o Bills of local application o Private Bills After 3 Readings, approval of either house Secretary reports the bill for first reading 1 st Reading – reading the number and title, referral to the appropriate committee for study and recommendation o Committee – hold public hearings and submits report and recommendation for calendar for second reading 2 nd Reading – bill is read in full with amendments proposed by the committee unless copies are distributed and such reading is dispensed with
o Bill will be subject to debates, motions, and amendments o Bill will be voted on o A bill approved shall be included in the calendar of bills for 3rd reading 3 rd Reading – bill approved on 2nd reading will be submitted for final vote by yeas and nays Bill approved on the 3rd reading will be transmitted to the other house for concurrence (same process as the first passage) o If the other house approves without amendment it is passed to the President o If the other house introduces amendments, and disagreement arises, differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both houses o Report and recommendation of the 2 Conference Committees will have to be approved by both houses in order to be considered pass President o Approves and signs o Vetoes (w/in 30 days after receipt) o Inaction If the President vetoes – send back to the House where it originated with recommendation o 2/3 of all members approves, it will be sent to the other house for approval o 2/3 of the other house approves – it shall become a law o If president did not act on the bill w/in 30 days after receipt, bill becomes a law Evidence of Due Enactment of Statutes Enrolled Bill Theory Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was
passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.” **Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.” The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals. (www.uberdigests.info) Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v Gimenez Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill Facts: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the bank’s auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: “The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx xxx xxx “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBP’s auditor. Casco maintains that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended
to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde” The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. (www.uberdigests.info) Morales v. Subido Political Law – Journals vs Enrolled Bill Facts: Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police
of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: “Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.” Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: ‘No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.’ Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy. (www.uberdigests.info) Journal Entry Rule Astorga v. Villegas Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.
FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. When courts may turn to the journal Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. (scire-licet.blogspot.com) EFFECTS AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES When Statute Becomes Effective Article 2 of the Civil Code – Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Tanada v. Tuvera (1986) When Regulation Becomes Effective EO 292, Book VII Sec. 3 Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Sec. 4 Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Sec. 5 Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Sec. 6 Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Sec. 7 Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Sec. 8 Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. Sec. 9 Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. People v. Que Po Lay Tanada v. Tuvera
Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review. Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette. Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect Held: NO. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.” Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. (lawsandfound.blogspot.com) When Ordinance Takes Effect RA 7160 Section 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. (c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay. Section 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. (c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned. Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision. (c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall
declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances. (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. (c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected. Section 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned. Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. - (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned. (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit
concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. (c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated. (d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation. Bagatsing v. Ramirez Facts: In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the non-compliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Issue: Whether the publication requirement was complied with Held: The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code id a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Section 17 of the Charter speaks of “ordinance” in general. Whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. While the Charter requires publication, before the enactment of the ordinance and after approval thereof, in two daily newspapers of the general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Being a general law with a special provision applicable in the case, the Local Tax Code prevails. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Language of the Statute that shall prevail 1987 Constitution, Article XIV Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system. Section 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis. Section 8. This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish. EO 292, BOOK I, Chap. 5 Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted. Manner of Computing Time Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a) National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson Facts: On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely,
Issue: W/n the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from notice of the judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65. Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one yr. Held: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days. [The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.] (casesdigests.blogspot.com) Territorial Extent of Operation 1987 Constitution, Article I, National Territory The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. Civil Code Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a) Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Revised Penal Code
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. Prospective and Retrospective Operation of Statutes 1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Civil Code, Article 4 – Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. EO 292, Sec. 19 – Prospectivity – Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. RPC, Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. People v. Sumilang It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedures of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court (section 1, Rule 54); for
said period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the present case. (from original text) Salcedo v. Carpio “the appointment of the respondent as members of the Board of Dental Examiners is valid. Although there is no express provisions in Republic Act No. 546 abolishing the preexisting Board of Dental Examiner and other boards of examiners, created under Sections 785 and 787 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 4007, and Republic Act No. 417, it is obvious that it was the intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Republic Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by said Act No. 4007 and Republic Act No. 417. The last paragraph of Section 1 of said Republic Act No. 546 provides that "except as modified by this Act, all laws governing examinations given by the above-mentioned boards shall continue in force."” “it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage” “our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprived a person of property without due process of law, that is which do not divest rights of property and vested rights.” (from original text) Tiu San v. Republic FACTS: Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530. ISSUE: Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect?
DECISION: Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides: “This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship...” (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Buyco v PNB “Mandamus case filed by petitioner Marcelino Buyco praying that the respondent Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, as payment of his obligation with said respondent.” ~ there was an amendment in the charter of PNB which prohibits them to accept backpay acknowledgment. The offer was made before the amendment. “"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez, et al. v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997, 1007); that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect (Montilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil. 220). These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild v. U.S., 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99 F. 534).” (from original text) Chavez v. Court of Agrarian Relations Facts: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the intention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavez was working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already. Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was dismissed.
Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death. On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity “between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally …”. Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively? Decision: NO. Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively. Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant. In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that “The amendment to section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity “between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally …” which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively.” To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become vested. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Tac’an v. CA FACTS: Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a document entitled “Deed of Quitclaim” as payment for legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-
an continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario. On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the “Deed of Quitclaim”. And on October 7, 1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and Libetario be annulled and he be paid for damages, attorney ‘s fee, etc. The CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiado’s, et.al appealed to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu – “Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites”. On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiado’s as non-Christians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested. Issue: Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA 4252? Held: Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still necessary. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Eugenio v. Drilon Facts: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.
Issue: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. Held: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.” (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Alunan III v. Mirasol AMENDMENTS, REVISIONS, REPEALS Amendments Estrada v. Caseda Facts: On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-mentioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval." Issue: Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA No. 66 Held: Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.
The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board Facts: The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race of PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays. However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays. (2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in club races as debated in the House of Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502. Held: (1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays) because their holding on races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by GAB. (2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication.
In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Sarcos v. Castillo Facts: Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit, within the communcal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government. As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in accordance with theSec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967. Issue: WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos under RA 5185 Held: No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of thePetitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly theparagraph dealing with preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Boardand
City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate thetruth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was theformer law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor toorder preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by theDecentralization Act of 1967. The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order byGovernor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independentcandidate thus of a different political persuasion. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspensionorder by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to hisposition.*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended /repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicniclagorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola officaial was municipal official wasone affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincialboard which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension. (Richelle_Joy_B_2547, scribd user) Erectors Inc. v. NLRC Facts: In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE. On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231. Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him. On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos. Held: No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Revisions and Codifications Montelibano v. Ferrer Facts: In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However, Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case. Issue: Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney
shall charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod. Held: No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case. In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different conclusion. In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police wherein it was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of Manila should then be interpreted the same. Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge shall be annulled. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) American Bible Society v. Manila Facts: In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospels throughout Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without providing the city with Mayor's permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, 3364 and required plaintiff to secure within three days the permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from fourth quarter of 1945 to second quarter of 1952 in P5, 281.45. ABS protested about the requirement but paid to the defendant the said permit and license fees in the said amount.
Issue: Whether or no the Ordinances of Manila Nos. 3000 as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364 are applicable to the case at bar. Held: Yes, the city ordinances mentioned are still in force and effect. When the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts all or certain portions of the pre-existing law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities whihc have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizeds the repeal, therefore continueing the law in force without interruption. In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the city of Manila were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The only essential difference between these two provisions is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein,shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CTA Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, Petitioner Corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section
24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.” In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon. Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied. Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them. (coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com) Ortiz v. COMELEC Facts: The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by then President Marcos for a term expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation of the Aquino government, the petitioner submitted a "courtesy resignation" which was accepted by President Aquino. The petitioner requested for payment of retirement benefits by invoking RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595 and re-enacted by RA 6118, which was denied by the respondent on the ground that he is "not entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits as provided by RA 1568 and re-enacted by RA 6118. Decision: YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in character which should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit thereby. This is, as it should be, because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com)
Mecano v. COA FACTS: Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. HELD: NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia. (engrjhez.wordpress.com) Repeals Civil Code, Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a) Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 5 Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided. Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise. US v. Soliman Facts: Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code. Issues: (1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury. (2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge. Held: (1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury,