not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697. (2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters v. Feliciano Facts: On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452. Issue: Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is repealed by RA 3452 Held: No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452. Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the
rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Lagman v. City of Manila Facts: Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the name and style of “Marco Transit”, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line. On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled “an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and for other purposes”, which the city mayor approved. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes; “Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx” Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act. Issue: WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails over Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)? Held: Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail. Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute vesting
power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter. Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) NAPOCOR v. Arca Facts: On 26 December 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company and the Dagupan Electric Corporation, filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 55824) to restrain enforcement by the National Power Corporation of a revised rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold by said defendant, which schedule of new rates would take effect 1 January 1964. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that the disputed revised rates, which would increase the cost of electric power and energy being purchased from defendant by plaintiff Philippine Power and Development Company by 24% and that purchased by plaintiff Dagupan Electric Corporation by 30 %, are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary; that the said revised rates had not been previously approved by the Public Service Commission; and that the unilateral revision by the defendant of the rate and its imposition upon the plaintiffs of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between them. Plaintiff filed a TRO to prevent the scheduled enforcement and was awarded to them. Defendant moved to dissolve the injunction but was dismissed by the court. Issue: Whether or not the lower court has no jurisdiction over the matter and only the PSC was vested the said jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of RA 2677. Held: No. The authority to inquire into the rates of charges for services rendered by NPC does not devolve upon the Public Service Commission. Commonwealth Act No. 120, creating the National Power Corporation, specifically provides that the NPC has the power/function/right to sell electric power and fix rate for any service rendered provided that the rates of charges shall not be subject to revision by the Public Service Commission. It is true that under Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act 2677, amending the Public Service Act and approved on 18 June 1960, the Public Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges by public
utilities owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National Government or by any government-owned or controlled corporation. But the enactment of this later legislation, which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed or withdrawn the exempting proviso of Section 2, paragraph (g), of the earlier Commonwealth Act No. 120 above quoted. For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that a special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. In the present case, there appears no such legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier special law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later became Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Public Service Commission over the public utilities operated by governmentowned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such public services, "in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests. No other conclusion appears possible, therefore, than that the authority of the Public Service Commission under Republic Act 2677, over the fixing of rates of charges of public utilities owned or operated by governmentowned or controlled corporations, can only be exercised where the charter of the government corporation concerned does not contain any provision to the contrary. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Gaerlan, Jr. v Catubig Facts: Gaerlan Jr and Catubig were registered candidates for councilors in 8-seat City Council of Dagupan in the 1963 elections. Catubig was proclaimed one of the eight elected councilors while Gaerlan lost his bid. However, Gaerlan went to Court to challenge Catubig's eligibility for the office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was below 25 years of ages as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy or date of election or date of assumption of office. Catubig claims that the question of ageeligibility should be governed by RA 170 which provides that the elective members of the Municipal Board shall be qualified electors of the city residents therein for at least one year and not less than 23 years of age and not RA 2259 which provides that no person shall be a city mayor, vice mayor or councilor unless he is at least 25 years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter. Issue: Whether or not Section 12 of RA 170 (23 years of age) should give way to Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) Held: No. Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) should prevail. RA 484 amending Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter (RA 170), took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas RA 2259 became law on June 10, 1959. The question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly upon the intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its
members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259,except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. All cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said act are subjct thereto. Hence, the age-limit provision in RA 2259 is continuing, because Dagupan City was not excluded. Therefore, its charger provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. This is because the last statute si so broad in terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the prior staute. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) People v. Pimentel Facts: As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( AntiSubversion Law) as amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found. Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA. Issue: Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied retroactively to Tujan Held: Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA 1700, as amended was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal. With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Hagad v. Gozo – Dadole Facts: On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No.
018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue. The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160. Held: No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)
Republic v. Marcopper Mining Corp. NATURE AND CONCEPT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION National Federation of Labor v. Eisma People v. Mapa Luzon Surety Co. Inc. v. De Garcia Matabuena v. Cervantes People v. Nazario OBJECTS AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION Verba Legis or Literal interpretation/ plain meaning rule “If a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.” Colgate Palmolive Phil. Inc. v. Gimenez Facts: On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof.". The OIC of ETA of CBP approved the application for refund of the special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate. However, the auditor of CBP refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amout fixed by OIC of ETA on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt form Section 2 of ETC. The Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law
refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Issue: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to refund under Section 2 thereof Held: The ruliong of Auditor General is based on the principle "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose". It is applicablle only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in teh enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, the items do not belong to the same classification. On the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. Therefore, the decision is reversed and the Colgate-Palmolive is entitled of the refund which was approved by OIC of the ETA in the thotal amount of P23, 958.13 (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Ratio Legis or Interpretation by considering the spirit and reason of the law /Golden rule Hidalgo v. Hidalgo Facts: Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas. In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the
respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor. In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor. The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. OR Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants? Held: The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent. Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Procorpio Hidalgo for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)
Mens Legislatoris / Mischief Rule “It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discemible in such codal provision would not be attained.” US v. Toribio Facts: The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Issue: Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases: (1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer. Held: The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit. Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer. Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and
33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co. Facts: Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company ate Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill many of them preferred to commute and the deceased went home about thrice a week, to which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the day following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave birth to the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel. Issue: Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Held: Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents. It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of DSTC. Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail. In US v. Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the compensation and attorney's fees is affirmed. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)
Equity of the Statute Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. Amatan v. Aujero Facts: Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Amatan filed an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what he did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Issue: Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Held: Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum. However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a
result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience. These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE Common Meaning Rule Kuenzle & Streiff v. Collector of Customs Facts: From the record it appears that the plaintiff and appellant imported into Philippine Islands a quantity of merchandise, which was invoiced as "cases roast coffee, chicory, cereals." Said merchandise was classified by the department of customs as "Bonanza mixture." Against that classification the plaintiff, through its attorney, protested, alleging "that the mixture is a product and manufacture of the United States, in chief value of the growth of the United States; the shipment came direct, was accompanied by the proper certificate of origin; the goods should have been passed free of duty as American products, under section 5 of American Tariff of 1909." Said protest was duly considered by the Insular Collector of Customs, who decided that: "This claim for the free entry of certain `bonanza mixture' as a manufacture of the United States under section 12 of the Philippine Tariff Law of 1909, is overruled and denied, for the reasons stated in the decision of this office, on protest 7298 of the same importers (copy attached), which decision has been affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Manila. As stipulated by the parties, the "bonanza mixture" is a mixture of coffee, cereals and chicory; that the coffee it contains was originally imported coffee it contains was originally imported into the United States in the bean, and was there roasted, ground and finally mixed with the chicory and cereals which are, nevertheless, products of the United States. According to the report of the Bureau of Science, the proportion of the mixture is about 50 per cent of real coffee and the rest is chicory and cereals.
Issue: Whether or not the roasting, grinding and mixing of coffee with chicory and cerals constitutes a manufacture Held: The bonanza mixture is not a manifacture article. The Philippine Tariff Law of August 5th, 1909 in paragraph 242 provides for a duty upon coffee. said duty depends upon the condition of the coffee or the manner of its packing. Paragraph 243 provides for a duty on chicory. Paragraph 215 — 218 provide for duty upon various classes of cereals. There is no express provisions in the law of a duty upon a mixture of said articles. In order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of these words, resort may be had to the definitions given by well-recognized lexicographers. Webster, in his valuable International Dictionary, defines manufacture as — "The operation of making wares or any product by hand, by machinery, or by other agencies; anything made from raw material, by the hands, by machinery, or by art, as clothes, iron utensils, shoes, machinery, saddlery, etc." Black, in his valuable Law Dictionary, defines manufacture as — "Any useful product made directly by human labor, or by the aid of machinery directed or controlled by human power, and either from raw materials or from materials worked up into a new form. Also the process by which such products are made or fashioned." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, defines manufacture — "To make or fabricate raw materials by hand or by machinery, worked into forms convenient for use;" and, when used as a noun, "anything made from raw materials by hand or by machinery or by art. The application of labor to an article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make the article necessarily a manufactured article within the meaning of that term as used in the tariff laws, unless the application of such labor is carried to such an extend that the article suffers a species of transformation and is changed into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use. If the mixing of the different kinds of ground coffee or different grades of tea does not constitute manufacture, then it would seem to be reasonable to say that the mixture simply of ground coffee with other ground materials or articles such as chicory and cereals, would not constitute a manufacture. The courts have been obliged to formulate their definitions in order to give effect to the purpose of legislative enactments, while lexicographers have been free to define said term upon the pure etymology of the word. Courts have been obliged to define the terms in order to make it applicable to practical affairs. It is the duty of the court to give the Tariff Law a strict interpretation, which will give force and effect to such law. The primary purpose of the law is to produce revenue. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines Facts: During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans. Issue: Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended. Held: No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not. On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is after September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Tan, et. al. v. People Facts: On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated. Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277.
The accused were all convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code which requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit. The CA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the decision. Issue: (1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional. (2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705. Held: (1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license.". One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not “charged with the *unlawful+ possession of ‘firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, ‘the associated water’ or fish;” thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 “is absolutely of no concern” to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity. (2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared for the market.’ Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law itself. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Terms with Legal Meaning Bernardo v. Bernardo Facts: On December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for
the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide occupants of the lot in question. Held: No, Enrique does not come under the description of bona fide tenant or occupant employed in the statute. The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to over each another. It is also in contrary that the words "bona fide occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual" occupants. The first reason is that Section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust. The SC ruled that a person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Terms with Multiple Meaning Manlayaon v. Lising
Facts: Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal Held: No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Doctrine of Associated Words or Noscitur a Sociis Buenaseda v. Flavier Ejusdem Generis Rule Vera v. Cuevas Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius Rule San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. v. CIR Casus Omissus Rule People v. Manantan Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos
Ramirez v. CA Doctrine of Last Antecedent Florentino v. Philippine National Bank Reddendo Singula Singulis People v. Tamani Doctrine of Necessary Implication DAR v. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. Verbal or Clerical Errors Rufino Lopez & Sons v. CTA Number, Gender and Tense Santillon v. Miranda Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words Amon Trading Corp. v. CA Use of “Shall” and “May” Office of the Ombudsman v. Macabulos AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Intrinsic Aids Title Central Capiz v. Ramirez Preamble People v. Purisima Punctuation Marks
US v. Hart Definition Sections and Interpretation Clauses People v. Buenviaje Capitalization of Letters Unabia v. City Mayor Extrinsic Aids Legislative History Prior to Enactment Contemporaneous Circumstance Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs Policy Sarcos v. Castillo Legislative History of Statute Oliva v. Lamadrid Contemporaneous and Practical Construction Nestle Philippines v. CA Other Aids (Dictionaries, documents, scientific and political writing, legal treatises, etc.) CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE, ITS PART AND OTHER STATUTES Araneta v. Concepcion Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu Magtajas and City of Cagayan de Oro v. Pryce Properties Corp. and PAGCOR Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA National Tobacco Administration v. COA Co v. Civil Register of Manila STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION: MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY People v. Terrado
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres THE STATUTE AND THE CONSTITUTION Nitafan v. CIR People v. Munoz Ordillo v. COMELEC Calderon v. Carale Manila Price Hotel v. GSIS