HSE Newsletter Issue 87 March

Date: 05 February 2020
– Post Incident Brief

to remind PICOP’s of some of the outcomes from the
erstand the meaning of all messages whether they are
ical Comms – They must be Accurate, Brief, Clear &
clear about the purpose of your call and who has lead

or a radio.
nd locations that are difficult to pronounce are fully

• Confirm understanding.
To make sure your message is understood you must alw

• With the mouthpiece close to your mouth (but no
• Directly into the mouthpiece.
• Slightly slower than normal, with a natural rhythm
• At the same volume as you would in normal conve

You must always:

• Use clear sentences.
• Use normal railway words and phrases found in th
• Use the phonetic alphabet – to check your messag
• Try to avoid hesitation sounds (for example, ‘um’
• If the other person responds or speaks in an accen

your message is understood and that you underst
PICOPS

When controlling Engineering Train movements, three t

• Establish who you are speaking to – For example,
• Establish exactly where they are – For example, “C

on the Up Brighton Fast”?
• Agree what is to happen next – For example, “OK

boards you have my permission to leave the Work
Six signal and come to a stop at the detonator pro
signal. My Possession Support will meet you there

ways speak:
ot too close).

m.
ersation.

he rules, regulations and instructions.
ge is understood correctly.
or ‘er’) and slurring one word into another.
nt or dialect which is unfamiliar, take time to make sure
tand his or her message.

things MUST be done before any movement is authorised:

“Is this the Driver of Six Juliet Nine One”?
Can you confirm that you are stood at the marker boards

Driver, when the Engineering Supervisor lifts his marker
ksite. Proceed at Caution, disregard Victor Charlie Six Three
otection on the approach to Victor Charlie Six Three Two
e.

USE OF RECORDABLE MOBILE PHONES

Whenever working as a (S)PICOP for VHRL, it is man
you have been issued for ALL work-related commun
SIM cards are not to be transferred from one phone
The recording feature is there to protect you and ot
problems with the phone, please contact your resp
LIFE SAVING RULES – USE OF MOBILE PHONES WHILST D

All personnel are reminded that using a mobile dev
Saving Rules. This also applies to the use Bluetooth
and pace out of reach in the glove compartment or
PICOPS & POSSESSION SUPPORT STAFF
Your assistant must be with you at all times. Neither yo
for meals or toilet breaks without checking with the PIC
attendance, poor communication, behaviour or attitude
to Vital Site Operations Managers and your relevant off

ndatory that you use the recordable work phone that
nications. Personal phones are not to be used and
e to another. This is mandatory.
thers in the event of any incident. If you are having
pective office immediately.
DRIVING

vice whilst driving is in breach of the Network rail Life
h facilities. When driving, turn your mobile phone off
r in the boot of your vehicle.

ourself or the assistant are to leave the site location, even
COP that it is alright to do so. Any lateness, non-
e on the part of the assistant is to be reported without fail
fice, so improvement measures can be taken.

The PICOP is to confirm the attendance of the assistant
phone, at the start and end of each shift. THIS IS MAND

The railway is an extremely dangerous place! We do eve
we provide. We are all responsible for our own safety a
or others. Be vigilant, follow the correct procedures and
concern. If something is not safe, then don’t do it!!!!

Everyone home safe. Every day.

For further details contact: Mark Barrett Hea
Mark.Barrett@

on site by asking for the PS to put the assistant on the
DATORY AND MUST BE COMPLETED.
erything we can to eliminate any risk with the information
and we must ensure that our actions do not endanger you
d adhere to all protocols. Your safety is our number one

alth & Safety Manager on 07717 306817 or at
@vital.uk.com

Mobile elevating work platform
(MEWP) collision

Issued to: Network Rail line managers,
safety professionals and RISQS
registered contractors

Ref: NRB20-02

Date of issue: 03/02/2020

Location: SSV Rochford - OLE Renewals

Contact: Annette McStein, Construction
Safety Specialist, Overhead
Condition Renewals

Overview

Whilst renewing Overhead Lines at around 11am Two Overhead Line Persons were stood in the
on 25/01/2020 two Skyrailer MEWPs collided. stationary MEWP basket. On collision they were
thrown within the basket. Both people were
One MEWP was travelling on the Down Road correctly clipped into the MEWP basket at the
towards a second stationary MEWP also on the time of impact, and remained in the basket.
Down Road.
Both people were taken to hospital, one suffered
The Machine Operator in the travelling MEWP bruising to the lower back and leg. They were
was unable to slow the machine on approach to released from hospital after receiving
the stationary MEWP leading to a collision. treatment. One is currently resting and
recovering, while the other is back at work.
Discussion Points

• Are the requirements of GERT8000- Think RISK and "Take 5" before work
HB15 being followed on site when commences and during the work. If there
controlling and / or operating On Track are changes to the planned OTP work these
Plant (OTP) on the Network Rail should be approved by the POS
Managed Infrastructure? representative who must document any
changes and ensure they are communicated
• How do we manage the movement of and understood.
OTP in a worksite as set out in clause
9.3 of NR/GN/RMVP/0200?

• Are Machine Controllers (MC) and
Plant Operations Scheme (POS)
Representatives carrying out their
duties correctly and effectively?

• Is duplex communications
equipment between the MC and
Machine Operator (MO) being used to
assist in the control of OTP?

Part of our group
of Safety Bulletins

Collapsed excavation - serious
injury

Issued to: Network Rail line managers,
safety professionals and RISQS
registered contractors

Ref: NRL20-02

Date of issue: 12/02/2020

Location: Stamford Underbridge

Contact: Head of S&SD, Capital Delivery
Eastern

Overview

On 30th September during installation of drainage The agreed methodology for the installation of the
works at Stamford Underbridge a supervisor was drainage included the requirement to use trench
struck on the lower back and legs by a lump of boxes. However, for two hours work had been
earth that became dislodged from the vertical undertaken in the trench without the trench box
face of a trench. being used.

The trench was dug to allow for track drainage to The supervisor was taken to hospital and required
be installed and was approximately 12 metres in treatment for a broken pelvis.
length, 3 metres deep and a metre wide.

Underlying causes • Unsafe behaviours and conditions went
unchallenged due to poor perception of the
• A lack of planning to adequately co- risks by those involved in the work.
ordinate the work and the teams
involved in delivery. • Initial false statements from site staff
concealed the extent of the unsafe work.
• A lack of people to adequately plan and
deliver the work safely. • Learning from similar events reported on
the same site (high risk close calls) had not
• The physical restraints in the work area been appropriately actioned or
were not communicated or supported by communicated.
safety critical paperwork such as
accurate Task Briefing Sheets.

• The task was briefed over a month
before the day of work.

Key message The duties for managing excavation
hazards are detailed in Reg 22 of the
Where risk assessment identifies the need Construction Design and Management
for trench boxes or other means of shoring Regulations 2015.
/ support systems then the correct
equipment must be available on site and How well do site staff understand and
properly used. follow the arrangements for meeting these
duties?
How are Close Calls monitored and
reviewed on your projects? How do you check planned control
measures are being used on site?
How do you use timely investigation and
local actions to create safer sites?

Part of our group
of Safety Bulletins

Hackney Wick double fatality

Issued to: Network Rail line managers,
safety professionals and RISQS
registered contractors

Ref: NRL20-01

Date of issue: 08/02/2020

Location: Hackney Wick, Anglia Route,
Eastern

Contact: Richard Tew - Anglia Route
Assurance Manager

Overview

In the early hours of 21st March 2019, two friends At 00:54 the two men made fatal contact with the
left a pub near Hackney Wick station. On the way overhead lines.
to a local shop they saw a stationary Freightliner
train outside Hackney Wick Station. It was held at The two men most likely accessed the railway via
a red signal for around 17 minutes. a hole in the chain link fence that was built on top
of a small 900mm wall and embankment. The
The two adult males accessed the railway and fence did not prevent access.
climbed on top of a container on a freight wagon
at the rear of the train, bringing them into close
proximity with the live overhead line.

Underlying causes The Off Track inspectors who did the inspection
recorded they could not undertake a tactile
A local investigation found that the stretch of inspection of the fence due to vegetation. No
fence in this location had not been physically attempt to view it from the public side was made,
inspected since 2016. nor alternative measures used (e.g. de-
vegetation).
The hole in the boundary fence allowed easier
breaching of the railway boundary at Hackney
Wick and was considered an underlying cause.

Key message N.B. Removing vegetation can sometimes be
counterproductive where it serves to make the
Where boundary fence inspections cannot boundary more secure.
include a tactile test, inspectors must use
alternative means to view/inspect the fence Managers must ensure Non-Tactile forms are
integrity from wherever possible. This includes suitably processed and reviewed, especially for
accessing from the public/3rd party side, repeat locations. A Special Inspection Notice is
alternative vantage points, by technology (e.g. due to be issued.
drones) or removing vegetation to improve
visibility (if appropriate).

Part of our group
of Safety Bulletins

Foxton near miss

Scope: All Network Rail line managers,
safety professionals and RISQS
registered contractors

Ref: NRX20-01

Date: 20/02/2020

Location: Foxton, Anglia Route

Contact: Ian Bradler, Director, Route Health
Safety Quality & Environment

Overview

At 11:01am on 14th February 2020 a Network The train was travelling between 70mph and
Rail track worker from Tottenham Delivery Unit 80mph toward the worksite. The track worker
had a near miss with a train. The person was part reacted to the approaching train when it was six
of a track team working on a reported defect on seconds away and reached a place of safety with
the Down line at Foxton. just three seconds to spare. This event
constitutes a significant near miss.
9S25, a GTR service from Cambridge to Brighton
was travelling on the Up line through Foxton This event is currently under investigation and
station. The driver saw a track worker in the four once this has been concluded we will share our
foot of the Up line who was not moving to a findings with you. Until then please look at the
position of safety. Another train was approaching talking points below and discuss if you are taking
on the Down line. The rest of the track team had these steps for safety.
safely moved to the Down cess.

Talking Points

• If all other options have been explored • What should a Person in Charge (PIC) do
and unassisted lookout warning must be if people want to move to a place other
used, how do you test the Safe System of than the specified position of safety?
Work?
• How should the PIC agree what will
• How do you make sure you have a happen and how people will remain
designated position of safety? protected?

• How do you monitor sites to make sure
people are following the Safe System of
Work that has been applied?

Part of our group
of Safety Bulletins

Managing welding fume risk

Issued to: Network Rail line managers,
safety professionals and RISQS
registered contractors

Ref: NRH20-03

Date of issue: 18/02/2020

Location: National

Contact: The Occupational Health and
Wellbeing Team

Overview

The Health and Safety Executive's Workplace Health Manganese, which is present in mild steel welding
Expert Committee endorsed the hazard reclassification fume, can cause neurological effects similar to
of mild steel welding fume as a human carcinogen in Parkinson's disease.
February 2019.
There is new scientific evidence that uncontrolled
This brought an enhanced duty in the Control of exposure to all welding fume, including mild steel
Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations welding fume, can cause, in some cases, lung cancer in
(COSHH) to reduce exposure to as low as is humans.
reasonably practicable.
Evidence from several sites indicates there is not yet full
compliance with required controls.

Discussion Points

When implementing controls, we must consider:

• Network Rail and its contractors must control • Preventing or reducing exposure through
exposure to welding fume, including that from engineering controls.
mild steel welding, to as low a level as is
reasonably practicable. • Using local exhaust ventilation (LEV) to
remove fumes at source.
• All business units undertaking welding
activities should ensure effective controls are • Using suitable respiratory protective
provided and correctly used to control fume equipment (RPE), to protect workers from
arising from welding activities. This inhaling fumes where engineering controls
includes welding outdoors. are not possible, for example when welding
outdoors.

• Anyone entering the exclusion zone must
use suitable RPE.

Next steps • Network Rail staff should use the task risk control
sheets which can be found at:
• All relevant welding risk assessments must o NR/L3/MTC/RCS0216/TK61
be reviewed, and updated where necessary. o NR/L3/MTC/RCS0216/TK62
o NR/L3/MTC/RCS0216/TK64
• Where suitable engineering controls are not
possible, a powered air-fed respirator with a • Contractors are free to follow this guidance or
minimum assigned protection factor of 20 demonstrate that their own controls discharge
(APF20) must be used. the legal obligations in COSHH.

• For Network Rail staff, RPE is available from
the PPE catalogue. Please select RPE
suitable for the task and make the correct
arrangements for any additional wearer fitting.

For more information, please visit the Safety Central
Respiratory Page



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29



31



32

Planning and authorising the
movement of engineering trains,
on-track-machines and on-track-
plant in worksites

Issued to: Network Rail line managers,
safety professionals and RISQS
registered contractors

Ref: NRB20-03

Date of issue: 04/02/2020

Location: National, all routes

Contact: Leevan Finney, Director, Fleet and
Engineering, Route Services

Overview

An incident occurred at Adswood Junction on Only the ES or SWL are permitted to authorise
19/01/2020. Whilst an engineering train was a movement into a worksite or within the
being worked on, an road rail vehicle (RRV) worksite.
propelled on the adjacent road which could have
injured an employee. Reviewing previous similar If a competent person is used to pass on the
occurrences, there have been several very high- ES/SWL instructions to the driver, (for OTP, this
risk safety incidents which have occurred in is the Machine Controller, Crane Controller or
recent years. This is due to the incorrect Plant Operating Scheme Representative -
movement of engineering trains, On-Track- Handbook 15), these instructions are limited to:
Machines (OTMs) and On-Track-Plant (OTPs)
when entering, working within, or exiting • Identifying which train, OTM, or OTP the
engineering worksites and possessions. These instruction applies to;
incidents relate to the movement of trains, OTMs
or OTP moving whilst staff are in the vicinity and • The exact location the movement is to
not aware. proceed to;

A review has identified a common underlying • The route the movement will take;
cause for the incidents is a misunderstanding • The maximum speed for the movement;
and/or incorrect interpretation of Railway Group
Standard GE/RT8000 (The Rule Book), in The ES shall make sure that the competent
particular the controls for issuing each movement person fully understands the instructions given to
authority. them. The competent person shall make sure that
the driver fully understands the instructions given
Rule Book Handbook 12 "Duties of the to them.
engineering supervisor (ES) or safe work leader
(SWL) in a possession" allows only the instruction
from an ES to be passed to the driver by a
competent person. This means a person who
holds the ES Competence.

Discussion Points • Are you planning enough ES or SWL
support to cover the possession, work
• Are your possession and worksite sites and all moves within them?
plans and resource allocations aligned
with the requirements of the Rule Book • How are you making sure that the
where Engineering Trains, OTMs or movement of multiple vehicles can be
OTP are involved? properly managed by the ES/SWL?

• Are your possessions and worksites • If you intend to appoint a competent
planned to be as small as possible to person on site, when are they
allow ES/SWL to safety control all designated? i.e. in the planning
movements? process.

• Are your planning team members, • How are you managing the risk within
suppliers and support organisations the plan relating to the movement of
sufficiently familiar and competent trains and embedding this in the safe
against the requirements of the Rule system of work pack?
Book for their work area in particular
Handbook 14, Handbook 15, Module • Are you using safety critical
OTM and Module SS2? communications when instructing train
movements?

Part of our group
of Safety Bulletins





Works Delivery Scotland

EyesOnSafety Alert Prepared By – WD Civils
Alert No. – 001 Febr 2020

Alert No.:

Delivery of On Track Plant & Equipment

Overview

On 17th January 2020 a member of the public contacted Network Rail to report:
"A low loader carrying rail maintenance plant had blocked both lanes of a 70mph section of
the A8 near Langbank.

The submitted dash cam footage showed an AB2000 HGV reversing into the Parklea
Authorised Access gate taking up both lanes of the dual carriageway. The manoeuvre had
required all approaching traffic to stop during the rush hour ( at 17:20hrs) on a busy unlit road
section in the hours of darkness of the A8 between Woodhall and Langbank.

The vehicle had no escort or banksman to aid the manoeuvre, which forced the driver to get
out of his cab several times to check his progress as he reversed the vehicle.

Picture 1: showing the access point at Parklea were the incident took place

Picture 2: showing dashcam footage of the delivery lorry blocking both lanes of the A8

For more information on this EyesOnSafety Alert contact:

NAME, James Montgomery Prog Mgr B&C

james [email protected]

Works Delivery Scotland

EyesOnSafety Alert Prepared By – WD Civils
Alert No. – 001 Febr 2020

Alert No.:

Learning points

The incident is subject to an investigation; however the following immediate learning points have
been identified: -

Subcontractor AB2000 did not identify the Authorised Access Point off the Dual Carriageway as a
hazard and hence implement suitable control measures for the safe delivery at this access point.

No communication between AB2000 and AmcoGiffen on concerns of delivering off the Dual
Carriageway.

AmcoGiffen - no process in place for the Delivery and Collection of OTP.

Approved supplier not adhering to planned delivery times.

For more information on this EyesOnSafety Alert contact:

NAME, James Montgomery Prog Mgr B&C

james [email protected]

Works Delivery Scotland

EyesOnSafety Alert Prepared By – WD Civils
Alert No. – 001 Febr 2020

Alert No.:

Actions

All parties involved in deliveries of plant should so far as reasonably practicable exchange and
agree information to make sure the plant can be delivered and collected safely.

Teams should follow the three general principles:

1. Send out safety information on deliveries and collections to other parties involved in the
delivery chain.

2. Request safety information on deliveries and collections to other parties involved in the
delivery chain.

3. Agree a safe delivery plan

Teams should consider the following (please note this list is not exhaustive and should be done on a
site by site basis)

Restrictions on the type and size of vehicle the site can safely handle

Vehicles to be fitted with CCTV or other reversing aids

Best approach routes to the site (one way systems, low bridges, narrow roads, awkward access etc)

A site plan or sketch showing parking, designated turning / reversing areas, location of
loading/unloading areas etc

Any prohibitions on reversing, or conditions for reversing such as using a banksman

Site rules – eg Wearing of HiVi and other PPE

Method of loading / unloading

Information for the Driver on what to do if the plan changes or cannot be implemented
Implement an assurance protocol to check that your procedures are being followed

For more information on this EyesOnSafety Alert contact:

NAME, James Montgomery Prog Mgr B&C

james [email protected]