Volume_01

336 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

The Solicitor-General said:

“The States will not agree to federate in a structure which within
limits, is definite and certain and obviously we could not completely alter
the structure afterwards. The purpose of this clause is to lay down those
matters which can be altered without being regarded as fundamental or as
impinging on the Instrument of Accession.” ...... “If the structure were to
be altered in fundamental respects, of course the States would clearly have
the right to say “This is not the Federation to which we have acceded.”

The Secretary of State said :

“If you amend the parts of the Bill which affect the States, obviously
you would be altering the conditions on which they have acceded and
that would certainly create a situation in which the Princes could rightly
claim that their Instrument of Accession had been altered. It certainly
means that we cannot amend any part of the Bill which affects what is
virtually the treaties under which the Princes come in. If we make a
change in the Bill as to strike at the basis of their Instrument of Accession
then obviously, the agreement has been broken between the Princes and
Parliament and the Princes are free.”

“It will be accepted by every one that under the general scheme of the
Bill the States, when they are asked to federate are entitled to know with
certainty certain aspects at any rate, of the Federation to which they are
to accede. It would be an absurd position if having said to a State this
month, “Will you accede to a Federation,” it was possible next month for
this House to alter in some fundamental respects the provisions of the
Federation to which the State was held to have acceded. Therefore, some
schedule of this kind is necessary. It is a sorting out of the various parts
of the Bill which should be capable of amendment without in any sense
altering from the point of view of the States the constitutional machinery
to which they have acceded. The scheme of the Schedule is to set out the
provisions of the Act, the amendment whereof is not to affect the validity
of the Instrument of Accession of a State.”

“One sees set out those parts of the Bill the amendment of which is not
to affect the validity of the Instrument of Accession of a State, and on the
opposite side there are set out those subjects the amendment of which,
would affect the validity of accession. In drawing up a schedule of this
kind one has to proceed with great care in defining what are the legitimate
matters on which the Rulers of a State are entitled to ask that there shall
be no amendment without their consent. Of course there will be border-line
cases. There could be minor amendments, which would not really make any
great difference to the existing position, and it would be very unreasonable

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 337

if the States took objection to such amendments and said, “We are going to
stand on our rights on this point as affecting the validity of our Instrument
of Accession.” It is right that any matter which really affects what I may call
the general balance of powers, the questions of the reservation of subjects of
executive control and of matters which can be dealt with by the Governor-
General in his discretion, matters which are vital to the architecture of the
Federation to which the States are asked to accede, should not be amended
without their assent.

“The whole area of the special powers vested in the Governor-General is one
of the essential features of the Federation. That is one part where the States are
entitled to say ‘That is a change’ or ‘That is altered’. But this does not in any
way check for all time the development of India. These are to be the subject-
matter of negotiations with the States, because, in effect, they will produce a
Federation of a different kind from that to which the State has acceded.”

Therefore to the question what would happen if Parliament did make
such changes which by virtue of Schedule II are treated as changes which
will affect the Instrument of Accession the answer is that the Princes will
get a right to walk out of the Federation. In other words, the consequence
of any such change would be to break up the Federation.

What are the changes which cannot be made without affecting the
Instrument of Accession ? I will draw your attention to some of the provisions
which Schedule II says cannot be amended by Parliament without affecting
the Instrument of Accession. According to Schedule II no changes in the
Constitution can be made which relate to (1) the exercise by the Governor-
General of the executive authority of the Federation ; (2) the definition of
the functions of the Governor-General ; (3) the executive authority of the
Federation ; (4) the functions of the Council of Ministers and the choosing
and summoning of ministers and their tenure of office ; (5) the power of the
Governor-General to decide whether he is entitled to act in his discretion or
exercise his individual judgment ; (6) the functions of the Governor-General
with respect to external affairs and defence ; (7) the special responsibilities
of the Governor-General relating to the peace and tranquility of India or any
part thereof ; (8) the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government;
(9) the rights of the Indian States and the rights and dignity of their Rulers;
(10) the discharge of his functions by or under the Act in his discretion or
in the exercise of his individual judgment ; (11) His Majesty’s Instrument
of Instructions to the Governor-General ; and (12) the superintendence of
the Secretary of State in the making of the rules for the Governor-General
in his discretion for the transaction of and the securing of transmission to
him of information with respect to, the business of the Federal Government.

338 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

Schedule II is a very extensive collection of constitutional don’ts. I have
given just a few of them. They will however be sufficient to show how limited
is the authority of Parliament to make changes in the Constitution.

Why is the authority of Parliament limited ? To understand this it is
necessary to note the exact limits of the authority of Parliament. According
to law the authority of the Parliament to legislate extends only to countries
which are the Dominions of the King. The States did not form part of the
Dominions of the King and none of them not even the finest of them was
subject to the legislative authority of Parliament. The Government of India
Act makes no change in this status of the States. The States remain foreign
territories inspite of the Federation, and as they were before Federation.
This is the most extraordinary state about the Indian Federation, namely
that the different units are as between themselves foreign states. As the
Act does not make the States Dominions of the King, Parliament gets no
right to legislate about them. Parliament derives its authority over the
States from the Instrument of Accession. That being so, the authority of
Parliament cannot but be limited to what is transferred to it by the States
through their instruments. To use the language of the Privy Council itself,
as the stream can rise no higher than its source, similarly, Parliament
cannot have powers over the States greater than those given to them by
the Instrument of Accession. This explains why the authority of Parliament
to amend the Constitution is limited.

The analysis made so far shows that the authority of Parliament 10
change is limited by the Instrument of Accession and that for any excess
of authority, there must be prior consent given by the Princes. As a legal
effect of the provisions of the Act it may not be shocking. But consider the
fact that the provisions in regard to which Parliament has no power to
change include those that relate to the transposition of such subjects as
Defence and External affairs from the category of Reserved to that of the
Transferred and that it will not have that power unless the Princes consent
expressly to confer that authority on Parliament and permit it to do so. You
will be in a position to realize how grave are going to be the consequences
of this Federation. The establishment of the Federation means that the
mastery has gone from the hands of Parliament into the hands of Princes.
This Federation makes the Princes the arbiters of destiny. Without their
consent India cannot politically advance.

Other consequences of this Federation might also be noted. I will just
refer to one. It is that this federation, if accepted will weaken the position
of British Indians in their struggle for change. Hitherto, in the struggle
between the Indian people and the British Parliament the latter was
always the weaker party. It had nothing to oppose the right of the people
to change except its will. After the Federation the position is bound to be
reversed. The Indian people would be in a weaker position and Parliament

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 339

would be in a stronger position. After the Federation, Parliament would be in
a position to say that it is willing to grant the demand for change but that
its authority to change is limited and that before making any demand for
change. Indians should obtain the consent of the Princes. There is nothing
to prevent Parliament from taking this stand.

What reply would Indians be able to give if they once accept the Federation
and thereby admit the implications underlying it ?

VIII

THE FATALITY OF FEDERATION

What shall we do with the Indian States ? That is a question that is
often asked. Some people with Republican faith in them desire their total
abolition. Those who do not care for forms of Government will reject this
view. But even they must abide by the consideration that what works best
is best. Can the Indian States be said to work best ? I do not know that
there is anybody, who will be prepared to give an affirmative answer, at
any rate an affirmative answer which will apply to all States. The internal
administration of the States is a bye-word for mismanagement and mal-
administration. Very few States will escape this charge.

The people are always asking as to why there should be this mismanagement
and maladministration in the States. The usual answer is that it is the
consequence of Personal Rule. Everywhere the demand made is that Personal
Rule should be replaced by Popular Government. I have grave doubts about
the efficacy of this demand. I do not think that in a large majority of cases
the substitution of Popular Government will be any cure for the ills of the
State subjects. For, I am sure that the evils arise as much from the misrule
of the Ruler as they arise from want of resources. Few have any idea as to
how scanty are the resources of the Indian States.

Let me give you a few facts. Out of the total of 627 States there are
only ten with an annual revenue above 1 crore. Of these ten, five have just
about a crore, three have between 2 and 2¼ crores. One has just about 3¼
crores and only one has a revenue just about 8 crores. There are nine with a
revenue ranging between 1 crore and 50 lakhs. About twelve have a revenue
ranging between 50 to 25 lakhs. Thirty have a revenue varying between
25 lakhs and 10 lakhs. The rest of the 566 have an annual revenue which
is less than 10 lakhs. This does not, however, give an idea of how small
are some of the States which fall below 10 lakhs. A few illustrations may
therefore be given. Among these 565 States there is one with a revenue of
Rs. 500 and a population of 206 souls. Another with a revenue of Rs. 165
and a population of 125 : another with a revenue of Rs. 136 and a population
of 239, another with a revenue of 128 and a population of 147 and another

340 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

with a revenue of Rs. 80 and a population of 27. Each one of these is an
Autonomous State, even the one with a revenue of Rs. 80 and a population
of 27 !

The Autonomy of these States means that each one must take upon itself
the responsibility to supply to its subjects all the services which relate to
matters falling under law and order such as revenue, executive and judicial
and all the services which affect public welfare such as education, sanitation,
roads etc. We in Bombay with our 12 crores of revenue are finding it difficult
to maintain a civilized standard of administration. Other Provinces with
equally large revenue are finding the same difficulty. How then can these
small tiny states with a revenue of few hundreds and a population of few
thousands cater to any of the wants which a civilized man must have his
Government satisfy in full measure ? With the best of motives and given
an ideal Prince the task is hopeless.

The only way out is to reorganize the whole area occupied by the Indian
States. The proper solution would be to fix an area of a certain size and of
certain revenue and to constitute it into a New Province and to pension off
the rulers now holding any territory in that area. Only such States should
be retained in whose case by measure of area and revenue it can be said
that they by reason of their resources are in a position to provide a decent
standard of administration. Those which cannot satisfy the test must go.
There is no other way. This is not merely what might be done. I say, to do
this is our duty and a sacred duty.

I know some will think of the hereditary right of the Prince to rule over
his territory. But I ask, what is more important, the right of the Prince
or the welfare of the people ? I am sure that even the best friends of the
States will not say that the rights of the Prince are more important than
the welfare of the people. Which should give way, if the two are in conflict ?
There again, I am sure that even the best friends of the States will not say
that the welfare of the people should be sacrificed for the sake of maintaining
the rights of the Prince.

The question of the reorganization of the Indian States is not a political
question. As I look at it, is a purely administrative question. It is also an
inevitable question. Because, not to tackle it is to condemn the people of
the States—and there are millions of them—perpetually to a life of misery
and security. The way I suggest is not a revolutionary way. To pension off
a Prince and to annex his territory is a legal way and can fall under the
principles with which we are familiar under the Land Acquisition Act which
allows private rights and properties to be acquired for public purposes.

Unfortunately, the question of the Indian States has not been tackled
from this point of view so far. The question that I want to place before

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 341

you is, and it is a very important question, “Will it be open to you to tackle
this question after the Federation is established ?” I say no. You will perhaps
ask why. How does this conclusion follow ?

I have already pointed out that with regard to the entry into the Federation,
the Provinces and the States stand on a different footing. The Provinces have
no choice. They must agree to be the units of the Federation. The States
have a choice. They may join the Federation or they may refuse to join the
Federation. That is so from the standpoint of the Provinces and from the
standpoint of the States. What is the position from the standpoint of the
Federation ? Has the Federation any choice in the matter of the admission of
the States ? Can the Federation refuse to admit a State into the Federation ?
The answer is no. The Federation has no right to refuse. The State has a
right to enter the Federation. But the Federation has no right to refuse
admission at any rate for the first 20 years. That is the position. Now what
does the admission of a State into the Federation mean ? In my view the
admission of a State into the Federation means recognition of the sovereign
status of the State. Recognition of its sovereign status means the recognition
of its indestructibility which means its right to the integrity of its territory
and to guaranteeing of its powers of internal administration. This would
apply even to the State with a population of 27 and revenue of Rs. 80. These
being the implications of the admission of a State in the Federation, I am
perfectly justified in suggesting that the territorial reorganisation of the
Indian States will not be possible after the establishment of the Federation
and the people of the Indian States will be forever doomed to misrule and
mal-administration.

Can British India do anything in the matter now ? I think British India
is not in a position to do anything in the matter. If British India could have
secured Responsible Government for itself, it might have been in a position
to dictate which State should be admitted and on what terms. It would
have been in a position to make the reorganization of the States territory
into tolerably big units as a condition precedent for their entry into the
Federation. Unfortunately British India has no Responsible Government.
Indeed its right to Responsible Government at the Centre is denied and is
made dependent upon the entry of the States. “No States, no responsibility”
has now become the fate of British India. That being the position of British
India, British India is not in a position to make terms with the States as
she would have been able to do if she had Responsible Government. That
is why I have said and that is why I have always maintained that British
Indians should first ask for a Federation and Responsibility confined to
British India. Once that is obtained, the path for an All India Federation
on the basis of freedom and good government all round will become possible.
That possibility will be gone if this Federation comes into being.

342 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

I have already drawn your attention to some of the deformities of the
Federal Scheme. What I have now drawn attention to is more than a
deformity. It is a fatality of the Federation. So far as the States’ people are
concerned, it is a decree of fate. It is something which they will never be
able to escape once it is executed.

The State’s problem is one which, I believe could be solved by the Paramount
Power along the lines I have suggested or along any other line consistently
with the welfare of the people, if it wishes to do so. Paramountcy is like
the Trimurti of Hindu Theology. It is Brahma because it has created the
States. It is Vishnu because it preserves them. It is Shiva because it can
destroy them. Paramountcy has played all these parts in different times in
relation to the States. At one time, it played the part of Shiva. It has now
been playing the part of Vishnu. To play the part of Vishnu with regard to
the States is from the point of view of the good of the people the crudest
act. Should British India be a party to it ? It is for you to consider.

IX

FEDERATION WITHOUT THE STATES

There is another point of view from which the case for Federation is
argued. I must now proceed to examine that argument.

It is argued that the constitution creates Autonomous Provinces. The
Autonomy of the Provinces means independence and therefore disruption of
the Unity of British India. This must be counteracted. Some binding force
must be provided so that the Provinces may be held together and unity
and uniformity built up for the last hundred years as a result of British
administration is preserved intact in fundamentals if not in details.

The argument is quite sound, if it only means that the creation of
Autonomous Provinces makes the creation of a Central Government a
necessity. This proposition I am sure will command universal assent. In
all the Round Table Conferences the late Sir Mahomad Iqbal was the only
delegate who was against the establishment of a Central Government.
Every other delegate irrespective of caste or creed differed from him. They
asserted that with the creation of Autonomous Provinces the establishment
of a Central Government was a categorial imperative and that without it
autonomy would result in anarchy.

But the argument goes beyond its legitimate scope. It seeks to justify the
establishment of a Central Government for All India. The argument which
can justify the establishment of a Central Government for British India
is used to justify a Central Government for the whole of India. And the
question that you have to consider is whether the creation of Autonomous
Provinces in British India can justify a Central Government for the whole

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 343

of India including the Indian States. My contention is that the creation of
Autonomous Provinces does not require the creation of a Central Government
for the whole of India.

The establishment of Autonomous Provinces in British India will call for
two things; (1) That there shall be a Central Government for British India and
(2) that the form of that Central Government must be federal and not unitary.
The essence of Federation lies in the division or allocation of Legislative and
Executive Powers between the Central Government and the Units by law.
The powers of the Units and the Centre are defined and demarcated and
the one is not entitled to invade the domain of the other. Autonomy of the
Provinces means that their powers are defined and vested in them. To make
Provincial Autonomy real the Powers of the Central Government must also
be limited, otherwise it would be in a position to invade the domain of the
Provinces. To put it simply, autonomy means definition and delimitation of
Powers by law and wherever there is definition and delimitation of powers
between two Political Bodies there is and there must be Federation. You
will now understand why I said that all that Provincial Autonomy demands
is that the Central Government for British India shall be Federal in form.
It does not justify all India Federation. Why is it necessary to bring in the
States still remains to be answered and those who plead for this All-India
Federation as distinct from British India Federation must answer this
question.

As I said all that is necessary is that Central Government for British
India shall be Federal in form and this fact has been recognized by the
Constitution.

Many seemed to have failed to notice that the Government of India Act,
1935 establishes two distinct Federations. One is a federation which is a
federation of the Provinces of British India another which is a Federation
of British Indian Provinces and the Indian States. It is surprising that so
many should have missed so important a fact. That the Government of India
Act establishes two federations is beyond dispute. To those who have any
doubt they should read Parts III and XIII together and Part II and Part III
together. Part II and Part III reveal that there is an All-India Federation
and lay down the constitution of that Federation. Part III and Part XIII
reveal that there is a Federation of British India Provinces apart from the
States and lay down the Constitution of that Federation. That Part XIII
relates to provisions which are called transitional does not make the British
India Scheme any the less a Federation, because the law is law whether it
is for a limited period or for all times.

That the Act establishes a Federation for British India Provinces and
also an All-India Federation cannot be denied. What is the difference
between these two Federations ? Is there any difference in the Legislative

344 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

Powers of the Federation ? The answer is no. The Federal Legislative List
remains the same whether the Federation that is in operation is British India
Federation or the All-India Federation. The Concurrent list also remains the
same whether the Federation in operation is one or the other.

Is there any difference in Financial Powers ? The answer again is no.

The Powers of taxation remain the same whether it is an All-India
Federation or British India Federation.

Is there any change in the Judicial organization of the Federation ? There
is none. Federal Court is as much necessary for the All-India Federation as
for British India Federation.

How do these two Federations differ ? The two differ in one respect only.
To find out this difference you should compare section 313 with section 8.
The comparison will show that if the Federation is a British India Federation
the Executive Authority of the Federation will be the Governor-General
in Council and if the federation is an All-India Federation the Executive
Authority in transferred matters to be the Governor-General acting on the
advice of Ministers responsible to the Legislature. In other words while there
is British India Federation only there is no responsibility at the Centre so
long as there is no All-India Federation.

This means that the entry of the States is a condition precedent for the
grant of responsibility to British India. You will therefore ask, why is the
entry of the States so essential ?

All Federations have come into existence as a result of some danger from
outside affecting the safety and integrity of the Units. The States of North
America federated because of the fear of subjugation of the States by British
Imperialism. The Provinces of Canada federated because of the danger
of invasion or absorption by the United States. The Australian Colonies
federated because of the danger of invasion by Japan. It is obvious that
the Indian Federation is not the result of any such circumstance. There is
no new invader on the border of India waiting to pounce upon both British
India and the Indian States. Nor is this Federation necessary for bringing
about peace between British India and the Indian States. It matters not
that British India is under the sovereignty of the Crown and the Indian
States are under the suzerainty of the Crown. So far as foreign relations
are concerned, and they include peace and war, the two are subordinate
to one and the same authority namely the crown. That is the reason why
the two have been at peace. That is the reason why they will not be and
cannot be at war. Prevention of external aggression or the maintenance of
internal peace cannot be the motive for this All India Federation. What
then can be the motive of this Federation ? Why are the States invited to
enter into this Federation ? Why is their entry made a condition precedent
for responsibility at the Centre ? To put it bluntly,

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 345

the motive is to use the Princes to support imperial interests and to curb
the rising tide of democracy in British India. I should like to have another
explanation, if there is any. I see none. That the Princes are wanted in the
Federation to serve ends of the British Imperialism is beyond question. The
Secretary of State for India speaking in Parliament during the course of the
debate on the Government of India Bill admitted that “we should all welcome
the entry into the Central Government of India of a great force of stability
and imperial feeling represented by the Princes”. While the suppression of
democracy in British India may not be the motive I am sure that that will
be the consequence of the entry of the Princes in the Federation.

What a price has been paid for the entry of the Federation ! I do not wish
to repeat what I have said. If you will re-call what I have said regarding the
discrimination which has been made in favour of the Princes in the matter
of representation, taxation, administration, legislation etc., you will know
what benefits have been conferred, what rights have been surrendered and
what immunities have been granted by British India to induce the Princes
to come into the Federation. And what has British India got in return ?

If the Federal Constitution had provided full responsible Government,
there would have been some compensation to British India for the price it
has paid to the Princes for their joining the Federation. But British India
has not got any responsibility worth the name. What British India has got
is a system of responsibility halved in part and mutilated in substance by
conditions and restraints. Not only British India has not been able to secure
responsibility at the Centre commensurate with the sacrifices it has made
for making the Federation easy for the Princes, but it has lost its claim for
Dominion Status in its own right and independently of the Princes. Many
people do not know what British India has lost and stands to lose in this
business of an All India Federation. The new Constitution is the result
of the struggle of the people of British India. It is the agitation and the
sufferings of the people of British India which was the compelling force
behind this constitution. What was the right which the people of British
India were claiming for themselves ? As I have said, their first claim was
good government in British India. Next they claimed self-government, that
is responsible government for British India. Lastly, they claimed Dominion
Status for British India. Each one of these claims have been accepted by
the British Parliament. In 1917 the British Parliament accepted the goal of
Responsible Government. In 1929 the English Nation accepted the goal of
Dominion Status, Now it must be emphasised that each time the claim was
made, it was made in the name of the people of British India. Each time it
was accepted in relation to the people of British India. What is going to be
the position of British India as a result of the Federation ?

346 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

The position of British India is that they can never get any responsibility
at the Centre unless the Princes come into the Scheme. That means that
British India has lost its right to claim Responsible Government for itself
in its own name and independently of the Princes. This right was a vested
right because it was the result of a claim made and accepted. That right has
been lost because British India is made dependent for the realization of its
destiny upon the wishes of the States. Of the two parts of this Federation.
British India is the progressive part and the States form the unprogressive
part. That the progressive part should be tied up to the chariot of the
unprogressive and its path and destiny should be made dependent upon
the unprogressive part constitutes the most tragic side of this Federation.

For this tragedy you have to blame your own national leaders. Fortunately
for me I am not one of your national leaders. The utmost rank to which I
have risen is that of a leader of the Untouchables. I find even that rank has
been denied to me. Thakkar Bapa, the left hand man of Mahatma Gandhi.
I call him left hand man only because Vallabhbhai Patel is the right hand
man—very recently said that I was only the leader of the Mahars. He
would not even allow me the leadership of the Untouchables of the Bombay
Presidency. Whether what Thakkar Bapa said was said by him out of malice
or out of love of truth does not worry me. For politics is not my first love nor
is national leaderhip the goal of my life. On the other hand, when I see what
disasters your national leaders have brought upon this country I feel relieved
to know that I am not included in that august crowd. Believe me when I say
that some of your national leaders were thoroughly unprepared for the job
of constitution-making. They went to the Round Table Conference without
any comparative study of constitutions and could propound no solutions to
problems with which they were presented. Others who were undoubtedly
competent to tackle the problem were like little children so charged with
the ideal of Federation that they never cared to see whether what they
were shaping was a real federation or a fraud in the name of Federation.
This tragedy is entirely due to wrong leadership. I do not know if the steps
taken can be retraced and whether the lost ground can be regained. But I
think it is a right thing that the people of British India should know what
they have lost. They have a federation of their own and they have right to
demand responsibility for their federation.

There is another reason why it would be desirable to have a Federation
of British India only. A Federation of British India and of the Indian States
cannot work harmoniously. There are two elements which I am sure will
produce a conflict between British India and the Indian States. The first
element arises out of the difference in the position of the representatives
of British India and those of the Indian States. The representatives of
British India will be free men. The representatives of the Indian States

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 347

will be bondmen of the Political Department. The sources of mandate of those
two sets of representatives in the Federal Legislature will be different. The
British India representatives will be engaged in extending the authority of
the Ministers. The States representatives are sure to act and will be made
to act so as to lend support to the authority of the Governor-General as
against the Ministers. This conflict is inevitable and it is sure to embitter
the feelings of British India towards the Indian States. This was precisely
what happened in the last regime in the Provinces. The feelings of the elected
members towards the nominated members in the old Provincial Councils
were certainly unfriendly. This experience I am sure will be repeated in the
Federal Legislature. That it should be so is very natural when one section
of the House feels that the other section has been brought in to thwart
its wishes and is acting as the tool of some power outside the control of
the Legislature. This is one element of disharmony. The other element of
disharmony is the disparity in the position of British Indian States under
the Federation. Equality before law is a precious thing. But not all people
value it for the same reason. Most cherish it an ideal. Few realize why it is
crucial. Equality before the law compels men to make common cause with
all others similarly affected. Whereas if there is no equality, if some are
favoured and others are burdened, those specially favoured not only refuse
to join those who are burdened in the struggle for equality but actually
take sides against them. A Dictator might, as the kings did in the olden
times, pull out one by one the teeth of a few without necessarily exciting
the resentment of the other people. On the contrary, the others will join in
the raid. But suppose a law was made that all must contribute as much
money as the dictators ask for under penalty of their teeth being drawn out
all would rise in opposition. There is no equality between British India and
the Indian States under the Federation. Indian States enjoy many benefits
and many exemptions which are denied to British India. This is particularly
so in the matter of taxation. There is bound to be great acrimony between
the representatives of British India and those of the Indian States as to
who should bear the load of taxation first. Patriotism vanishes when you
touch a man’s pocket and I am sure that the States representatives will
prefer their own financial interest to the necessities of a common front to
make the executive responsible to the Legislature.

What is the use of housing British India and the Indian States under one
edifice if the result is to make them quarrel with each other ?

There is a complete dissimilarity between the forms of Government
prevalent in British India and the Indian States and the principles underlying
the two. These dissimilarities need not produce any antagonism between the
Indian States and British India if the two continue to evolve in their separate
spheres. So long as the form of Government in the Indian States does not
become a factor in the decision of affairs which affects British India, British

348 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

India can tolerate those forms of Government however antiquated they
may be. But the Federation makes them a factor and a powerful factor
and British India cannot remain indifferent to them. Indeed the forging
of the Federation will compel British India to launch a compaign in sheer
self-interest for revolutionising the forms of Government prevalent in the
Indian States.

This will be the inevitable result of this Federation. Is this a consummation
which the States devoutly wish for ? This is a question they will have to
consider.

Does British India welcome this prospect ? Speaking for myself I will
not. It would be impossible to wage war on so vast a front. The States are
too numerous to allow concentrated attack. The States being a part of the
structure, you cannot attack them and justify your attack as a Constitutional
Act. Secondly, why put yourself in this difficulty ? Sometimes it turns out
that a man thinks that he is buying property when as a matter of fact he is
buying litigation. For British India to accept this Federation is like buying
trouble. Thirdly, this Constitution is a settlement from which Dominion
Status is most rigidly excluded not only for the present but also for the
future as well.

Looked at from any point of view, the wisest course seems to me that
leaving the States where they are, British India should proceed on its own
evolution and Federation for itself.

X

FEDERATION FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW

Different people are looking at this Federation from different points of
view. There is the point of view of the Princes. There is the point of view
of the Hindus and the Muslims and the Congress. There is also the point
of view of the Merchant and the Trader. The point of view of each one of
these is of course the result of their particular interests.

What is the interest of the Princes in this Federation? To understand
the motives of the Princes you must go back to the Butler Committee. The
Princes had been complaining of the encroachment of the Political Department
of the Government of India upon their treaty rights under the Doctrine of
Paramountcy. The Princes were insisting that the Political Department had
no greater right against the States except those that were given by the
treaties subsisting between them and the British Government. The Political
Department on the other hand claimed that in addition to the rights referable
to the treaties, the Crown had also rights which were referable to political
usages and customs. To adjudicate upon this dispute, the Secretary of State
agreed to appoint the Butler Committee. The Princes had hoped that the
Butler Committee would accept their contentions and limit the scope of

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 349

Paramountcy to the rights referable to the treaties. Unfortunately for the
Princes they were disappointed, because the Butler Committee reported that
the Paramountcy was paramount and that there could be no definition or
delimitation of it. This decision of the Butler Committee meant a complete
subordination of the Princes to the Political Department of the Government
of India and the Princes were in search of an escape from this unfortunate
position in which they were placed and they found, and quite rightly, that
the only solution which can enable them to esape the tyranny of the Political
Department was the Federation; because to the extent to which the Federal
authority prevailed, the authority of the Political Department would vanish
and as the Federal authority could only be exercised by a Federal Legislature
and a Federal Executive and as they would have sufficient voice in the
Federal Legislature and the Federal Executive they thought of federation.
The federal solution of their problem offered two advantages to the Princes.
The first was that it would secure to the States internal autonomy which
they were very anxious to have, for it is of the essence of federating units
to remain in their own hands all powers save those which they themselves
have willingly delegated to a common centre and over which they themselves
possess a share in the control. The second advantage of the Federation was
that Paramountcy would disappear to the extent of the Federal authority. The
motive of the Princes, therefore, was selfish and their primary aim was to get
rid as much as possible of the authority of the Political Department of the
Government of India. This was one of the primary interests of the Princes.
The Princes had another interests to safeguard. That was to preserve their
powers of civil and military government as much as possible. They wanted
to make the Federation as thin as possible so that it might not impinge
upon them very hard. The interest of the Princes is two-fold. They wanted
to escape Paramountcy. Secondly, they did not want to subject themselves
too much to the authority of the Federation. In looking at the Federation,
the Princes keep two questions before them. How far will this Federation
enable them to escape the tyranny of Paramountcy ? Secondly, how far does
this scheme of Federation take away their sovereignty and their powers of
internal government ? They want to draw more under the former and give
less under the latter.

The Muslims had an interest which not only coloured their whole vision
but made it so limited that they did not care to look at anything else.
That interest was their interest as a minority. They knew only one means
of protecting themselves against the Hindu majority. That was to ask for
reservation of seats with separate electorates and weightage in representation.
In 1930 they discovered that there was another and a more efficacious
method of protecting the Muslim minorities. That was to carve out new
Provinces in which Muslims would be in a majority and Hindus in a minority
as a counterblast to Provinces with Hindus as a majority and Muslims as

350 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

a minority. They hit upon this system because they felt such as a system
of balance of Provinces would permit the Muslims in the Muslim majority
Provinces to hold the Hindu minorities in their Provinces as hostage for
the good behaviour of the Hindu Majorities in the Provinces in which the
Muslims were in minority. The creation of Muslim majority Provinces and to
make them strong and powerful was their dominant interest. To accomplish
this they demanded the separation of Sindh and the grant of responsible
government to the North West Frontier Provinces so that the Muslims could
have a command of four Provinces. To make the Provinces strong they
insisted on making the Centre weak. As a means to this end the Muslims
demanded that residuary powers should be given to the Provinces and the
Hindu representation in the Centre should be reduced by giving the Muslims
not only 1/3 of seats from the total fixed for British India but also 1/3 from
the total assigned to the Princes.

The Hindus as represented by the Hindu Mahasabha were concerned
with only one thing. How to meet what they called the menace of the
Musalmans ? The Hindu Mahasabha felt that the accession of the Princes
was an accretion to the Hindu strength. Everything else was to them of no
consequence. Its point of view was Federation at any cost.

The next class whose point of view is worthy of consideration is the Indian
Commercial Community. The commercial community is no doubt a small
community in a vast country like India, but there can be no doubt about it
that the point of view of this community is really more decisive than the
point of view of any other community. This community has been behind
the Congress. It is this community which has supplied the Congress the
sinews of war and it knows that having paid the piper it can call for the
tune. The commercial community is primarily interested in what is called
commercial discrimination and the lowering of the exchange Ratio. It was a
very narrow and limited point of view. The Indian Commercial Community
is out to displace Europeans from Trade and Commerce and take their place.
This it claims to do in the name of nationalism. It wants the right to lower
the exchange rate and make profit in its foreign trade. This also it claims
to do in the name of nationalism. Beyond getting profits to themselves the
Merchants and Traders have no other consideration.

What shall I say about the Congress? What was its point of view? I
am sure I am not exaggerating or misrepresenting facts when I say that
the Congress point of view at the Round Table Conference was that the
Congress was the only party in India and that no body else counted and
that the British should settle with the Congress only. This was the burden
of Mr. Gandhi’s song at the Round Table Conference, He was so busy in
establishing his own claim to recognition by the British as the dictator of
India that he forgot altogether that the important question was not, with

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 351

whom the settlement should be made but what were to be the terms of
that settlement. As to the terms of the settlement, Mr. Gandhi was quite
unequal to the task. When he went to London he had forgotten that he
would have before him not those who go to him to obtain his advice and
return with his blessings but persons who would treat him as a lawyer
treats a witness in the box. Mr. Gandhi also forgot that he was going to a
political conference. He went there as though he was going to a Vaishnava
Shrine singing the Narsi Mehta’s Songs. When I think of the whole affair I
am wondering if any nation had ever sent a representative to negotiate the
terms of a national settlement who was more unfit than Mr. Gandhi. How
unfit Mr. Gandhi was to negotiate a settlement becomes evident when one
realizes that this Ambassador of India was ready to return to India with
only Provincial Autonomy when as a matter of fact he was sent to negotiate
on the basis of Independence. No man has brought greater disasters to the,
interests of India than did Mr. Gandhi at the Round Table Conference. Less
one speaks of him the better.

How far each of these interests feel satisfied with the Federal Scheme
such as it is, it is not for me to say. The question one may however ask
is, are these the only points of view that must be taken into consideration
in deciding as to what we shall do with this Federation ? I protest that
there are other points of view besides those mentioned above which-must
receive attention. There is the point of view of the Free man. There is also
the point of view of the Poor man. What have they to say of Federation ?
The Federation does not seem to take any account of them. Yet they are
the people who are most deeply concerned. Can the free man hope that the
Federal Constitution will not be a menace to his freedom? Can the poor
man feel that the constitution will enable him to have old values revalued,
to have vested rights devested? I have no doubt that this Federation if it
comes into being will be a standing menace to the free man and an obstacle
in the way of the poor man. What freedom can there be when you are made
subject to the autocracy of the Princes? What economic betterment can there
be when you get Second Chambers with vested rights entrenched in Ml and
when legislation affecting property is subject to sanction by the Government
both before introducing and after it has passed ?

XI

CONCLUSION

I have perhaps detained you longer than I should have done. You will
allow that it is not altogether my fault. The vastness of the subject is one
reason for the length of this address.

I must, however, confess that there is also another reason which has
persuaded me not to cut too short. We are standing today at the point of

352 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

time where the old age ends and the new begins. The old age was the
age of Ranade, Agarkar, Tilak, Gokhale, Wachha, Sic Pherozeshah Mehta,
Surendranath Bannerjee. The new age is the age of Mr. Gandhi and this
generation is said to be Gandhi generation. As one who knows something of
the old age and also something of the new I see some very definite marks
of difference between the two. The type of leadership has undergone a
profound change. In the age of Ranade the leaders struggled to modernize
India. In the age of Gandhi the leaders are making her a living specimen
of antiquity. In the age of Ranade leaders depended upon experience as
a corrective method of their thoughts and their deeds. The leaders of the
present age depend upon their inner voice as their guide. Not only is there
a difference in their mental make up there is a difference even in their view
point regarding external appearance. The leaders of the old age took care
to be well clad while the leaders of the present age take pride in being half
clad. The leaders of the Gandhi age are of course aware of these differences.
But far from blushing for their views and their appearance they claim
that the India of Gandhi is superior to India of Ranade. They say that the
age of Mr. Gandhi is an agitated and an expectant age, which the age of
Mr. Ranade was not.

Those who have lived both in the age of Ranade and the age of Gandhi
will admit that there is this difference between the two. At the same time
they will be able to insist that if the India of Ranade was less agitated it was
more honest and that if it was less expectant it was more enlightened. The
age of Ranade was an age in which men and women did engage themselves
seriously in studying and examining the facts of their life, and what is
more important is that in the face of the opposition of the orthodox mass
they tried to mould their lives and their character in accordance with the
light they found as a result of their research. In the age of Ranade there
was not the same divorce between a politician and a student which one
sees in the Gandhi age. In the age of Ranade a politician, who was not a
student, was treated as an intolerable nuisance, if not a danger. In the age
of Mr. Gandhi learning, if it is not despised, is certainly not deemed to be
a necessary qualification of a politician.

To my mind there is no doubt that this Gandhi age is the dark age of
India. It is an age in which people instead of looking for their ideals in
the future are returning to antiquity. It is an age in which people have
ceased to think for themselves and as they have ceased to think they
have ceased to read and examine the facts of their lives. The fate of an
ignorant democracy which refuses to follow the way shown by learning
and experience and chooses to grope in the dark paths of the mystics and
the megalomaniacs is a sad thing to contemplate. Such an age I thought
needed something more than a mere descriptive sketch of the Federal
Scheme, It needed a treatment which was complete though not exhaustive

FEDERATION VERSUS FREEDOM 353

and pointed without being dogmatic in order to make it alive to the dangers
arising from the inauguration of the Federal Scheme. This is the task I
had set before myself in preparing this address. Whether I have failed
or succeeded, it is for you to say. If this address has length which is not
compensated by depth, all I can say is that I have tried to do my duty
according to my lights.

I am not opposed to a Federal Form of Government. I confess I have a
partiality for a Unitary form of Government. I think India needs it. But I
also realize that a Federal Form of Government is inevitable if there is to be
Provincial Autonomy, But I am in dead horror the Federal Scheme contained
in the Government of India Act. I think I have justified my antipathy by
giving adequate reasons, I want all to examine them and come to their owe
conclusions. Let us however realize that the case of Provincial Autonomy
is very different from that of the Federal Scheme. To those who think that
the Federation should become acceptable if the Governor-General gave an
assurance along the same lines as was supposed to be done by the Governors
that he will not exercise his powers under his special responsibilities I
want to say two things. First I am sure the Governor-General cannot give
such an assurance because he is exercising these powers not merely in
the interest of the Crown but also in the interest of the States. Secondly,
even if he did, that cannot alter the nature of the Federal Scheme. To
those who think that a change in the system of State representation from
nomination to election will make the Federation less objectionable, I want
to say that they are treating a matter of detail as though it was a matter
of fundamental. Let us note what is fundamental and what is not. Let there
be no mistake, let there be no fooling as to this. We have had enough of
both. The real question is the extension and the growth of responsibility.
Is that possible ? That is the crux. Let us also realize that there is no use
hugging to Provincial Autonomy and leaving responsibility in the Centre
hanging in the air. I am convinced that without real responsibility at the
Centre, Provincial Autonomy is an empty shell.

What we should do to force our point of view, this is no place to discuss.
It is enough if I have succeeded in giving you an adequate idea of what are
the dangers of this Federal Scheme.

zz



9

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK
AND

A WAY TO SOLVE IT

Address delivered at the Session
of

the All India Scheduled Castes Federation
held in

Bombay on May 6,1945

Published: 1945



COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND

A WAY TO SOLVE IT

Mr. President,

I am indeed very grateful for your kind invitation to address the Annual
Session of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation. I am happy to see this
great gathering of the Scheduled Castes. Having regard to the very short
time which has elapsed since its establishment, the growth of the Federation
appears by all evidence to be phenomenal. That the Scheduled Castes all
over India have rallied round the Federation and are determined to make
the Federation their only representative organization is beyond question. The
growth of the Federation within so short a time will not be fully appreciated
unless the tremendous difficulties in the way of our organization have been
fully appreciated. There are agents of other political organizations which
decoy our people by false blandishments, by false promises and by false
propaganda. There is the ignorance of our own people, who do not know the
critical nature of the times we are living in and who do not know the value
of organization for achieving our political objects. There is a lamentable lack
of resources at our command. We have no money. We have no press. The
cruelest of tyrannies and oppressions, to which our people are subjected,
day in and day out all over India, are never reported by the Press. Even
our views on social and political questions are systematically suppressed
by an organized conspiracy on the part of the Press. We have no funds to
maintain a machinery, to render help to our people and to educate, agitate
and organize them.

These are the odds we have to contend against. That the Federation,
notwithstanding these difficulties, should have grown to this dimension is
entirely due to our men who have been ceaselessly and unselfishly devoting
themselves to the building up of this organization. I am sure you would
like me to pay Mr. Ganpat Mahadev Jadhav, the President of the Bombay
City Scheduled Castes Federation, our tribute for the work he has done. As
everyone knows, he possesses remarkable degree of organizing capacity and
I am sure the success of this Session is due to a great extent to his efforts
and to those who have been his co-workers.

358 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

Ordinarily, at a gathering such as this I would have spoken—and our
people would expect me to speak—on any one of the social and political
problems of the Scheduled Castes. But I do not propose to engage myself
in a discourse on so sectarian a subject. Instead, I propose to speak on a
topic, which is general and has a wider appeal, namely the shape and form
of the future Constitution of India.

It may be as well for me to explain the reasons for my decision. For
the moment, the responsibility for leading the movement of the Scheduled
Castes and facing its day-to-day problems does not lie on my shoulders. On
account of my office I am out of it and I have no desire to take it up. That
is one reason why I do not propose to take up a sectarian subject which is
related only to the Scheduled Castes.

The Scheduled Castes are often charged as being selfish, interested only
in themselves ; that they have no constructive suggestions to make for the
solution of the country’s political problem. The charge is entirely untrue ; and
if it is true, the Untouchables will not be the only ones who will be found
guilty of it. Most people in India do not make constructive suggestions. The
reason is not that there are not people capable of constructive thought. The
reason why all constructive thought remains bottled up is because a long
and continuous propaganda has inculcated upon the minds of the generality
of the people that nothing should be respected and nothing should be
accepted unless it emanates from the Congress. It is this which has killed
all constructive thought in this country. At the same time, I believe this
charge against the Scheduled Castes should be repelled in a positive way by
showing that the Scheduled Castes are capable of putting forth constructive
proposals for the general political advancement of the country which the
country, if it cares to, may consider. This is the second reason why I have
on this occasion chosen this subject of general interest.

II

RESPONSIBILITY FOR FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION

Before I set out in concrete terms the constitutional proposals I have in
mind, I wish to raise two preliminary issues. First is : Who should frame a
Constitution for India ? It is necessary to raise this question because there
are quite a lot of people in India who are hoping, if not asking, the British
Government to resolve the deadlock and to frame a Constitution for India.
I think there is a gross fallacy in such a view which needs to be exposed. A
Constitution, framed by the British Government and imposed upon Indians,
sufficed in the past. But if the nature of the future Constitution Indians are
clamouring for, is borne in mind it will be clear that an imposed Constitution
will not do.

The difference between the past Constitutions and the future Constitution
of India is fundamental, and those, who still rely on the British for framing

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 359

a Constitution for India, do not seem to have realized this difference. The
difference lies in this that the past Constitutions contained a breakdown
clause. But the future Constitution of India cannot contain such a breakdown
clause. People in India decry the breakdown clause—by now the notorious
section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. That is because they do
not know the why and the how of its place in the Act. Its importance will
become apparent if two important considerations governing the political life
of a community are borne in mind. First of these considerations is that Law
and Order is the medicine of the body politic, and when the body politic
goes sick this medicine must be administered. Indeed, so important is this
consideration that failure to administer it must be deemed to be a crime
against society and civilization. The second consideration is that though it
is true that no government has a vested right to govern, it is equally true
that there must always be a government to govern—which I mean maintain
Law and Order—until it is displaced by a better government. The breakdown
clause serves these two purposes. As such, it is of the highest value for the
peace and tranquillity of the people. It is the one and only means which can
save the country from anarchy. For, when Constitutional Government fails,
the breakdown clause has at least the merit of maintaining Government.

In the past this distinction between Constitutional Government
and Government with the provision for Government stepping in when
Constitutional Government failed, was a feasible proposition. It was
feasible because while the British Government gave Indians the right to
a Constitutional Government, it kept to itself the right to govern, should
Constitutional Government fail. In the future Constitution of India, it
would not be possible to maintain this distinction. It would not be possible
for the British Government to give the Indians the right to Constitutional
Government and also to keep to itself the right to govern in case there was
a breakdown in the Constitutional Government. The reason is quite obvious.
The past Constitutions of India did not treat India as a Dominion. The future
Constitution will proceed on the assumption that India will be a Dominion.
The breakdown clause or the possibility of Government stepping in, when
Constitutional Government has failed, can be reconciled in the case of a
country, which has no Dominion Status. But the two are irreconcilable in
the case of a Dominion. In the case of a Dominion or for the matter of that
in the case of any free country, there is either a Constitutional Government
or a Rebellion.

What does this mean ? It means that it is impossible to frame a Constitution
for an Indian Dominion with a possibility of a breakdown. To put the same
thing in a different language the Constitution must be so made that it will
not only command the obedience but also the respect of all ; and all or if
not all, at any rate, all important elements in the national life of India shall
be prepared to uphold it and to give it their support. This can happen only

360 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

if the Constitution is framed by Indians for Indians and with the voluntary
consent of Indians. If the Constitution is imposed by the British Government
and is not accepted by one section and is opposed by another, there will
arise in the country an element, hostile to the Constitution, and which will
devote its energies not to working the Constitution but to breaking it. The
anti-Constitution party may look upon destroying the Constitution as its
only duty and may engage itself in “pronouncing” against a party working
the Constitution in the real Latin American fashion.

It is useless for the British to frame a Constitution for India which they
will not remain to enforce. The same result will ensue if the Constitution is
imposed by one powerful section or a combination of such sections on other
sections. I am, therefore, firmly of opinion that if Indians want Dominion
Status, they cannot escape the responsibility of framing their own Constitution.
The position is thus inescapable.

III

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The second question that I wish to raise is : Should there be a Constituent
Assembly, charged with the function of making a Constitution ? Constituent
Assembly is on the lips of everybody. The Congress parties in their
resolutions, passed before the Congress ministries resigned, demanded
that the Constitution for India should be made by a Constituent Assembly
composed of Indians. A Constituent Assembly was included in the Cripps
proposals. The Sapru Committee has followed suit.

I must state that I am wholly opposed to the proposals of a Constituent
Assembly. It is absolutely superfluous. I regard it as a most dangerous
project, which may involve this country in a Civil War. In the first place,
I do not see why a Constituent Assembly is at all necessary. Indians are
not in the same position as the Fathers of the American Constitution
were, when they framed the Constitution of the United States. They had
to evolve ideas, suitable for the constitution for a free people. They had
no constitutional patterns before them to draw upon. This cannot however
be the case for Indians. Constitutional ideas and constitutional forms are
ready at hand. Again, room for variety is very small. There are not more
than two or three constitutional patterns to choose from. Thirdly, there are
hardly any big and purely constitutional questions about which there can be
said to be much dispute among Indians. It is agreed that the future Indian
Constitution should be Federal. It is also more or less settled what subjects
should go to the Centre and what to the Provinces. There is no quarrel
over the division of Revenues between the Centre and the Provinces, none
on Franchise and none on the relation of the Judiciary to the Legislature
and the Executive. The only point of dispute, which is outstanding, centres
round the question of the residuary powers—whether they should be
with the Centre or with the Provinces. But that is hardly a matter worth

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 361

bothering about Indeed, the provision contained in the present Government
of India Act could be adopted as the best compromise.

Having regard to this I cannot see why a Constituent Assembly is necessary
to incubate a constitution. So much of the Constitution of India has already
been written out in the Government of India Act, 1935, that it seems to be
an act of supererogation to appoint a Constituent Assembly to do the thing
ever again. All that is necessary is to delete those sections of the Government
of India Act, 1935, which are inconsistent with Dominion Status.

The only function which could be left to a Constituent Assembly is to find
a solution of the Communal Problem. I am quite positive that whatever be
the terms of reference of the Constituent Assembly, the Communal Question
should not form a part of them. Consider the composition of the Constituent
Assembly as suggested by the Sapru Committee. The total membership is
fixed at 160. The election is by joint electorates by members of the Provincial
Legislative Assemblies under a system of proportional representation and the
decision is to be by three-fourths of the members present and voting. Can a
minority accept this Constituent Assembly as a safe body, in the impartiality
of which it can place implicit confidence ? The answer to this question must
depend upon what answers one can give to two other questions : Does it
guarantee that the representatives of a minority elected to the Assembly will
be its true representatives ? Secondly, does it guarantee that the decision of
the Assembly with regard to the claims of any particular minority will not
in fact be an imposition on the minority ? On neither of these two questions
can I confidently say that a minority need have no cause for fear.

Before taking up these questions, let me point out what differences there
are between the Cripps Constituent Assembly and the Sapru Constituent
Assembly. They may be stated as follows :

(i) The total number for the Constituent Assembly fixed by the Sapru
Committee is 160. Sir Stafford Cripps had not fixed any number. But
the provision contained in his proposal that the Constituent Assembly
shall consist of ten per cent of the total number of members of the
Provincial Legislatures virtually fixed the number to about 158—a
difference of only 2.

(ii) The method of election to the Constituent Assembly by the Sapru
Committee is by joint electorate under the system of proportional
representation. In this there is no difference between the Cripps plan
and the Sapru plan for the composition of the Constituent Assembly.

(iii) Under the Cripps plan, there was no communal reservation. The
Sapru plan departs from the Cripps plan in this respect, in as
much as it reserves seats for particular communities in prescribed

362 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

proportions. This difference is only normal. For, though the Cripps
plan did not in terms fix the number, the scheme of proportional
representation would have in fact resulted in such reservation. The
difference in the quota of representation under the two schemes
will be seen from the following table :

Communities and Interests Quota of seats in the Constituent
Assembly

Under Cripps’ Under Sapru’s

Hindus .. .. .. 77 51

Muslims .. .. .. 50 51

Scheduled Castes .. .. 15 20

Sikhs .. .. .. 3 8

Indian Christians .. .. 2 7

Anglo-Indians .. .. 1 2

Europeans .. .. .. 6 1

Aboriginal Tribes .. .. 2 3

Special Interests .. .. .... 16
Others .. .. .. 2 1

158 160

The Sapru Committee has not only fixed the numbers for each
Community in the composition of the Constituent Assembly but it
has offered the Muslims equality with the Hindus. For this departure
the Committee’s plea is that in consideration for this offer it has
demanded joint electorate as a basis for election to the Constituent
Assembly. In this, the Committee must be said to have entirely
misunderstood the Cripps proposals. Joint-Electorates were already
provided for in the Cripps proposals one clause of which reads—“The
members of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures are
to form a single Electoral College”. This is simply another way of
saying that the election shall be by joint-electorate. It has given
something for nothing to one element and thereby put the other
Communities in a hazard.

(iv) Under the Cripps proposal the decision of the Assembly was to be
by majority of those present and voting, Under the Sapru proposal
the decision is to be by a majority of 3/4th of those present and
voting.

Now to revert to the two questions. How does the position stands with
regard to the first question ? To give one’s opinion on it, it is first necessary

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 363

to know the communal distribution of the membership of the Provincial
Legislative Assemblies. The following table sums up the position :

Distribution of Seats by Communities in the Provincial
Legislative Assemblies*

Communities General Women University Trade Com- Land Total
Unions merce lords

1 2 3 4 5 6 78

1. Hindus .. 651 26 7 33 31 22 770

2. Muslims .. 482 10 1 5 6 13 517

3. Scheduled Castes. 151 .. .. .. .. .. 151

4. Indian Christians. 20 1 .. .. .. .. 21

5. Anglo-Indians .. 11 1 .. .. .. .. 12

6. Sikhs .. 34 1 .. .. .. 1 36

7. Europeans .. 26 .. .. .. 19 1 46

8. Aboriginals .. 24 .. .. .. .. .. 24

Total .. 1,399 39 8 38 56 37 1,577

Has the communal reservation made by the Sapru proposal, and which
is not to be found in the Cripps proposal, any value ? That depends upon
how far one community will be able to influence the election of the members
of the other communities ? What are the prospects in this regard ? Let me
give another table :

Voting strength in relation to seats

Communities Voters for Quota of Number of (+)Excess of
Constituent seats in the votes required voters over
Constituent (–)Deficiency
Assembly Assembly for electing
the quota of voters
below

requirement

1. Hindus .. 778 51 561 + 217
2. Muslims .. 561 51 517 + 44
3. Scheduled Castes .. 151 20 220 – 69
4. Indian Christians .. 21 7 77 – 56
5. Sikhs .. 36 8 88 – 52
6. Europeans .. 46 1 11 + 35

From this table the following conclusions emerge :

(i) Taking the total votes to be 1577 and the total number to be elected
160, the quota under the proportional system of representation would
roughly come to 10 + 1 = 11.

*The distribution of seats for (1) Universities; (2) Trade Unions, (3) Commerce and (4)
Landlords among the communities does not stand for an exact figure. It is based on guess as
to how they may be divided among the communities having regard to the relative position.

364 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

(ii) Taking 11 as the quota, the Hindus will have 217, the Muslims 44
and the Europeans 35 votes to spare, while the Scheduled Castes
will be short by 69, the Indian Christians by 56 and the Sikhs by
52 votes.

To put the same thing in a different way :

(i) The Hindus with their excess of 217 votes can elect 20 non-Hindus,
who would be dependent upon them ; the Muslims with their excess
of 44 votes can elect 4 non-Muslims, who would be dependent upon
them and the Europeans with their excess of 35 votes would be able
to elect 3 non-Europeans, who would be dependent upon them.

(ii) The Scheduled Castes with a shortage of 69 votes will be able
to elect only 13 members on the stock of their own votes and for
7 seats they will have to depend upon Hindu, Muslim or European
voters. The Indian Christians with a shortage of 56 votes will be
able to elect only 2 seats on the stock of their own voters. For the
rest of the 5 seats they will have to depend upon Hindu, Muslim or
European voters. Similarly the Sikhs with a shortage of 52 will be
able to elect only 3 seats on the stock of their own voters. For the
rest of the 5 seats they will have to depend upon Hindu, Muslim
or European voters

Such is the position. It is evident that the excess representation granted
to the smaller minorities is only an eye-wash. Their representation is made
so dependent that in no sense can it be called a real representation.

Let me now take the second question. Is the rule of decision adopted
by the Sapru Committee for the Constituent Assembly a safe rule ? The
Cripps proposal had adopted the rule of bare majority. This was an absurd
proposition which no sensible man could have proposed. I know of no case
where questions relating to the constitution were left to be decided by a
simple majority.

The Cripps proposals sought to excuse the adoption of the majority rule
on the ground that there was to be a further provision for safeguarding
the interest of the minorities. The provision was to take the form of a
Treaty between the British Crown and the Indian Constituent Assembly,
before Parliament was to relinquish its sovereignty and make India free.
The proposal of a Treaty would have had some sense, if the Treaty was
to override the constitution. But the proposal was impossible as under the
Cripps scheme India was free to become a Dominion or an Independent
country as she pleased. For once India became a Dominion it would ipso
facto acquire all the legal power necessary to pass an enactment declaring
that the Treaty shall not override the constitution. In that case the
Treaty would have been no better than a calendar which members of the
minorities might, if they wished, hang on the walls of their houses. This

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 365

was exactly what happened to the Irish Treaty. The Irish Treaty continued
to override the Irish Constitution so long as Ireland was not a Dominion.
But the moment Ireland became a Dominion the over riding power of the
Treaty was taken away by a short and simple enactment of the Parliament
of the Irish Free State and the British Parliament did nothing, for it knew
that Ireland was a Dominion and therefore it could do nothing. How so
absurd a provision came to be put forth by so eminent a person to assure
the minorities, I am unable to understand.

The provisions contained in the Sapru proposals appear to be an
improvement. But are they really an improvement ? I am sure they are not.
A three-fourths majority of 160 means that a view to prevail must have the
support of 120 members. Before accepting this as an improvement, one has
to have some idea as to how this group of 120 is likely to be formed. If the
Hindus and the Muslims combine they will together make up 102 and will
need only 18 more to make up 120. Most of the special seats and a few more
from others may easily fall into the hands of this combine. If this happens the
decision of the Assembly will obviously be an imposition upon the Scheduled
Castes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians etc. Similarly, if the Muslims are
isolated the decision will not be a joint decision but an imposition upon the
Muslims by non-Muslims. These possibilities of permutation and combination
for the purpose of check-mating or out-manouvering of some communities
by others, I am sorry to say, have not been taken into consideration by
the Sapru Committee. There would have been some safety, if the Sapru
Committee had provided that the three-fourths majority shall at least include
50 per cent of each element.

Following upon the procedure adopted in the making of the constitution of
the United States, the Sapru Committee could have added a further provision
for the ratification at any rate of the communal part of the decision of the
Assembly by the representatives of the minorities outside the Assembly. None
of these provisions finds a place in the plan of the Constituent Assembly as
designed by the Sapru Committee. Consequently the Constituent Assembly
has become a snare.

There are many other arguments against the plan of a Constituent
Assembly. I may mention one, which I confess has influenced me greatly.
When I read the history of the Union between Scotland and England, I was
shocked at the corruption and bribery that was practised to win the consent
of the Scottish Parliament. The whole of the Scottish Parliament was bought.
The chances of corruption and bribery being used in the Indian Constituent
Assembly to buy over members to support decisions desired by interested
groups are very real. Their effects, I am sure, cannot be overlooked. If this
happens, it will not only make mockery of the Constituent Assembly but I
feel quite certain that any attempt made to enforce its decisions will result
in a civil war. It is my considered opinion that the proposal of Constituent
Assembly is more dangerous than profitable and should not be entertained.

366 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

IV

NECESSITY OF A NEW APPROACH

I shall be asked that if the Constituent Assembly is not the correct
approach, what is the alternative ? I know I shall be confronted with such
a question. But I am confident in my view that if the Communal Question
has become difficult of solution it is not because it is insoluble, nor because
we had not yet employed the machinery of Constituent Assembly. It has
become insoluble because the approach to it is fundamentally wrong. The
defect in the present approach is that it proceeds by methods instead of
by principles. The principle is that there is no principle. There is only a
series of methods. If one method fails another is tried. It is this swing from
one method to another which has made the Communal Problem a jig-saw
puzzle. There being no principle there is no guide to tell why a particular
method has failed. There being no principle there is no assurance that the
new method will succeed.

The attempts at the solution of the Communal Problem are either in the
nature of a coward’s plan to cow tow to the bully or of bully’s plan to dictate
to the weak. Whenever a community grows powerful and demands certain
political advantages, concessions are made to it to win its goodwill. There is
no judicial examination of its claim ; no judgement on merits. The result is
that there are no limits to demands and there are no limits to concessions.
A start is made with a demand for separate electorate for a minority. It is
granted. It is followed by a demand for a separate electorate for a community
irrespective of the fact whether it is a minority or majority. That is granted.
A demand is made for separate representation on a population basis. That
is conceded. Next, a claim is made for weightage in representation. That
is granted. It is followed by a demand for statutory majority over other
minorities with the right for the majority to retain separate electorates. This
is granted. This is followed by a demand that the majority rule of another
community is intolerable, and therefore without prejudice to its rights to
maintain majority rule over other minorities, the majority of the offending
community should be reduced to equality. Nothing can be more absurd than
this policy of eternal appeasement, it is a policy of limitless demand followed
by endless appeasement.

Frankly, I don’t blame the community that indulges in this strategy.
It indulges in it because it has found that it pays, it pursues it because
there are no principles to fix the limits and it believes that more could be
legitimately asked and would be easily given. On the other hand, there is a
community economically poor, socially degraded, educationally backward and
which is exploited, oppressed and tyrannized without shame and without
remorse, disowned by society, unowned by Government and which has no
security for protection and no guarantee for justice, fair play and equal
opportunity. Such a community is told that it can have no safeguards, not

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 367

because it has no case for safeguards but only because the bully on whom the
bill of rights is presented thinks that because the community is not politically
organized to have sanctions behind its demand he can successfully bluff.

All this differential treatment is due to the fact, that there are no principles,
which are accepted as authoritative and binding on those who are parties to the
Communal Question. The absence of principles has another deleterious effect. It
has made impossible for public opinion to play its part. The public only knows
methods and notes that one method has failed another is being suggested. It
does not know why one method has failed and why another is said to be likely
to succeed. The result is that the public, instead of being mobilized to force
obstinate and recalcitrant parties to see sense and reason, are only witnessing
the discussions of Communal Questions whenever they take place is mere shows.

The approach I am making for the solution of the Communal Problem is
therefore based upon two considerations :

(1) That in proceeding to solve the Communal Problem it is essential to
define the governing principles which should be invoked for determining
the final solution, and

(2) That whatever the governing principles they must be applied to all
parties equally without fear or favour.

V

PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION OF THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM
Having made my position clear on certain preliminary points, I will now
proceed to deal with the subject.
The Communal Problem raises three questions :

(A) The question of representation in the Legislature ;
(B) The question of representation in the Executive; and
(C) The question of representation in the Services.

A. REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES
To take the last question first. This can hardly be said to be a subject of
controversy. The principle that all communities should be represented in the
Public Services in a prescribed proportion and no single community should be
allowed to have a monopoly has been accepted by the Government of India. This
principle has been embodied in the Government of India Resolutions of 1934
and 1943 and rules to carry it out have been laid down. It has even prescribed
that any appointment made contrary to the rules shall be deemed to be null and
void. All that is necessary is to convert administrative practice into statutory
obligation. This can be done by adding a Schedule to the Government of India
Act, which will include the provisions contained in these Resolutions and similar
provisions for the different provinces and make the Schedule a part of the Law
of the Constitution.

368 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

B. REPRESENTATION IN THE EXECUTIVE

This question raises three points :

(i) The quantum of representation in the Executive;

(ii) The nature of the Executive ;

(iii) The method of filling the places in the Executive.

(i) Quantum of Representation

For the solution of this question, the principle which should be adopted is that
the representation of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes should
be equal to the quantum of their representation in the Legislature.

With regard to the other minorities such as the Sikhs, Indian Christians and
Anglo-Indians, it is difficult to give them representation in the Executive in
strict proportion to their representation in the Legislature. This difficulty arises
largely from the smallness of their numbers. If they are to get representation in
the Executive in exact proportion to their numbers, the Executive would have to
be enlarged to a fantastic degree. All that can be done, therefore, is to reserve
a seat or two for them in the Cabinet for their representation and to establish
a convention that they will get a fail portion of representation in the corps of
Parliamentary Secretaries that will have to be raised, when the new Constitution
comes into existence.

(ii) Nature of the Executive

In the Constitution of the Executive, I would propose the adoption of following
principles :

(1) It must be recognised that in a country like India where there is a
perpetual antipathy between the majority and the minorities and on
which account the danger of communal discrimination by majority against
minorities forms an ever-present menace to the minorities, the executive
power assumes far greater importance than the legislative power.

(2) In view of (1) above, the system under which a party which has secured
a majority at the poll is deemed entitled to form a Government on the
presumption that it has the confidence of the majority is untenable in
Indian conditions. The majority in India is a communal majority and not
a political majority. That being the difference, the presumption that arises
in England cannot be regarded as a valid presumption in the conditions
of India.

(3) The Executive should cease to be a Committee of the majority party in
the Legislature. It should be so constituted that it will have its mandate
not only from the majority but also from the minorities in the Legislature.

(4) The Executive should be non-Parliamentary in the sense that it shall
not be removeable before the term of the Legislature.

(5) The Executive should be Parliamentary in the sense that the
members of the Executive shall be chosen from the members of the

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 369

Legislature and shall have the right to sit in the House, speak, vote
and answer questions.

(iii) Method of Filling Places

In this connection, I would propose the adoption of the following principles :

(a) The Prime Minister as the executive head of the Government should
have the confidence of the whole House.

(b) The person representating a particular minority in the Cabinet
should have the confidence of the members of his community in the
Legislature.

(c) A member of the Cabinet shall not be liable to be removed except on ;
impeachment by the House on the ground of corruption or treason.

Following those principles, my proposal is that the Prime Minister and the
members of the Cabinet from the majority community should be elected by the
whole House by a single transferable vote and that the representatives of the
different Minorities in the Cabinet should be elected by a single transferable
vote of the members of each minority community in the Legislature.

C. REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURE

This is the most difficult question. All other questions depend upon the
solution of this question. It raises two points :

(i) The quantum of representation; and
(ii) The nature of the electorate.

(i) Quantum of Representation

I would first put forth my proposals and then explain the principles on
which they are based. The proposals are worked out in the following tables,
which show the scale of representation for the different communities in British
India in the Central Legislature as well as in the Provincial Legislature :

Proposed Ratio of Representation in the Legislatures
N.B.—The percentages of population in the following Tables differ from
the census figures as they have been taken after deducting the population
of Aboriginal Tribes :

1. CENTRAL ASSEMBLY

Community Percentage of Percentage of

Hindus population to total Representation
Muslims
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 54.68 40
Indian Christians .. .. .. 28.50 32
Sikhs .. .. .. 14.30 20
Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 1.16 3
.. .. .. 1.49 4

.. .. .. 0.05 1

370 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

2. BOMBAY

Community Percentage of Percentage of
population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Muslims .. .. .. total 40
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 28
Indian Christians .. .. .. 76.42 28
Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 2
Parsees .. .. .. 9.98 1
1
9.64

1.75

0.07

0.44

3. MADRAS

Community Percentage of Percentage of
population to total Representation
Hindus .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. 71.20 40
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 16.53 30
.. .. .. 7.98 24
Muslims .. .. .. .. 4.10 5
0.06 1
Indian Christians

Anglo-Indians

4. BENGAL

Community .. .. .. Percentage of Percentage of
.. .. .. population to Representation
Muslims .. .. ..
Hindus .. .. .. total 40
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 33
Indian Christians 56.50 25
Anglo-Indians 1
30.03 1

12.63

0.19

0.05

5. UNITED PROVINCES

Community Percentage of Percentage of
population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. total 40
Muslims .. .. .. 29
Indian Christians .. .. .. 62.29 29
Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 1
21.40 1

15.30

0.24

0.03

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 371

6. PUNJAB

Community Percentage of Percentage of
population to Representation
Muslims .. .. ..
total 40
Hindus .. .. .. 28
57.06 21
Sikhs .. .. .. 9
22.17 2
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 13.22
4.39
Indian Christians .. .. .. 1.71

7. C.P. & BERAR

Community .. .. .. Percentage of Percentage of
.. .. .. population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. total 40
Muslims 34
Indian Christians 72.20 25
1
20.23

5.70

0.36

8. BIHAR

Community .. .. .. Percentage of Percentage of
.. .. .. population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Muslims .. .. .. total 40
Scheduled Castes 30
Indian Christians 70.76 28
2
15.05

13.80

1.71

9. ASSAM

Community .. .. .. Percentage of Percentage of
.. .. .. population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Muslims .. .. .. total 40
Scheduled Castes 39
Indian Christians 45.60 19
2
44.59

8.76

0.48

10. ORISSA

Community Percentage of Percentage of
population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. total 40
Muslims .. .. .. 36
Indian Christians .. .. .. 70.80 22
2
17.66

2.07

0.37

372 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

11. SIND

Community Percentage of Percentage of
population to Representation
Hindus .. .. ..
Muslims .. .. .. total 40
Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 23.08 40
Indian Christians .. .. .. 71.30 19
4.26 1
0.29

VI

EFFECT ON MINORITIES

It may be desirable to set out in a tabular form the changes in the
representation of the different minorities as prescribed in the Government
of India Act, 1935, and as laid down in the proposals—

EFFECT ON MUSLIMS

Ratio of Representation

Legislature Population Under the Under the
Ratio
Central Government of proposed
Madras 28.50
Bombay 8.00 India Act, 1935 scheme
U.P. 10.00
C.P. .. .. 15.30 32.00 32
Bihar .. .. 5.70
Assam .. .. 15.00 13.49 24
Orissa .. .. 44.60
.. .. 2.00 17.40 28
.. ..
.. .. 28.95 29
.. ..
12.50 25

26.32 28

31.48 38

6.66 22

EFFECT ON SCHEDULED CASTES

Ratio of Representation

Legislature Population Under the Under the
Ratio
Government of proposed
14.30
16.50 India Act, 1935 scheme
9.60
Central .. .. 12.60 7.60 20
Madras .. .. 21.40
Bombay .. .. 4.40 13.90 30
Bengal .. .. 20.20
U.P. .. .. 13.80 8.50 28
Punjab .. .. 8.70
C.P. .. .. 17.60 12.00 25
Bihar .. .. 4.20
Assam .. .. 8.70 29
Orissa .. ..
Sind .. .. 4.50 9

17.80 34

9.80 28

6.50 20

10.00 36

Nil. 19

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 373

EFFECT ON INDIAN CHRISTIANS

Ratio of Representation

Legislature Population Under the Under the

Ratio Government of proposed

India Act, 1935 scheme

Central .. .. 1.16 3.00 3
Madras ..
Bombay .. .. 4.10 4.20 5
Bengal ..
U.P. .. .. 1.70 1.70 2
Punjab ..
C.P. .. .. 0.19 0.80 1
Bihar ..
Assam .. .. 0.24 0.90 1
Orissa ..
Sind .. .. 1.70 1.14 2

.. 0.35 Nil 1

.. 1.70 0.66 2

.. 0.48 0.90 2

.. 0.37 0.16 2

.. 0.29 Nil 1

EFFECT ON SIKHS

Ratio of Representation

Legislature Population Under the Under the

Ratio Government of proposed

India Act, 1935 scheme

Centre .. .. 1.50 2.40 4
Punjab ..
.. 13.20 18.29 21

EFFECT ON HINDUS

Population Ratio of Representation
Ratio
Legislature Under the Under the
30.00
Bengal 22.10 Government of proposed
Punjab 23.80
Sind India Act, 1935 scheme

20.00 33

20.00 28

31.60 40

VII

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE PROPOSALS

I may now proceed to state the principles on which this distribution has
been made. They are :

(1) Majority Rule is untenable in theory and unjustifiable in practice.
A majority community may be conceded a relative majority of
representation but it can never claim an absolute majority.*

*I have not framed any scheme of representation for the North-West Frontier province as the
minority is so small that even the Principle of relative majority cannot help it.

374 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

(2) The relative majority of representation given to a majority community
in the legislature should not be so large as to enable the majority
to establish its rule with the help of the smallest minorities.

(3) The distribution of seats should be so made that a combination of
the majority and one of the major minorities should not give the
combine such a majority as to make them impervious to the interest
of the minorities.

(4) The distribution should be so made that if all the minorities combine
they could, without depending on the majority, form a government
of their own.

(5) The weightage taken from the majority should be distributed among
the minorities in inverse proportion to their social standing, economic
position and educational condition so that a minority which is large
and which has a better social, educational and economic standing gets
a lesser amount of weightage than a minority whose numbers are
less and whose educational, economic and social position is inferior
to that of the others.

If I may say so, the representation is a balanced representation. No
one community is placed in a position to dominate others by reason of its
numbers. The Muslim objection to the Hindu majority and the Hindu and
Sikh objections to the Muslim majority are completely eliminated, both in
the Central as well as in the Provinces.

VIII

NATURE OF THE ELECTORATE

With regard to the question of electorates the following propositions
should be accepted :

(1) Joint electorate or separate electorate is a matter of machinery for
achieving a given purpose. It is not a matter of principle.

(2) The purpose is to enable a minority to select candidates to the
Legislature who will be real and not nominal representatives of the
minority.

(3) While separate electorate gives an absolute guarantee to the minority,
that its representatives will be no others except those who enjoy
its confidence, a system of joint electorates which will give equal
protection to the minorities should not be overlooked.

(4) A Four-member constituency, with a right to the minorities to have
a double vote and requiring a minimum percentage of minority votes,
may be considered as a possible substitute.

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 375

IX

MATTERS NOT COVERED

(i) QUESTION OF SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS

There are other demands made on behalf of particular minorities such as :

(1) Provision of a Statutory Officer to report on the condition of minorities.

(2) Statutory provision of State aid for education, and

(3) Statutory provision for land settlement. But they are not of a communal
character, I do not therefore wish to enlarge upon them here.

(ii) ABORIGINAL TRIBES

It will be obvious that my proposals do not cover the Aboriginal Tribes
although they are larger in number than the Sikhs, Anglo Indians, Indian
Christians and Parsees. I may state the reasons why I have omitted them
from my scheme. The Aboriginal Tribes have not as yet developed any political
sense to make the best use of their political opportunities and they may easily
become mere instruments in the hands either of a majority or a minority and
thereby disturb the balance without doing any good to themselves. In the
present stage of their development it seems to me that the proper thing to
do for these backward communities is to establish a Statutory Commission to
administer what are now called the ‘excluded areas’ on the same basis as was
done in the case of the South African Constitution. Every Province in which
these excluded areas are situated should be compelled to make an annual
contribution of a prescribed amount for the administration of these areas.

(iii) INDIAN STATES

It will also be noticed that my proposals do not include the Indian States.
I am not opposed to the inclusion of the Indian States, provided the terms
and conditions of inclusion are such—

(1) that the dichotomy of divided sovereignty between British India and
Indian States is completely done away with,

(2) that the judicial and political boundaries which separate British India
from Indian States will disappear, that there will be no such entities
as British India or Indian States and in their place there will be only
one entity namely India, and

(3) that the terms and conditions of inclusion do not prevent India from
having full and plenary powers of a Dominion. I have worked out a
scheme for the fusion of the Indian States and British India, which
will permit the realization of these objects. I do not wish to overburden
this address with the details of the plan. For the moment, it is better
if British India marches to her goal without complicating its progress
by an entanglement with the Indian States.

376 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

X

PAKISTAN IN THE LIGHT OF PROPOSALS

My proposals are for an United India. They are made in the hope that the
Muslims will accept them in preference to Pakistan as providing better security
than Pakistan does. I am not against Pakistan, I believe it is founded on principle
of self-determination, which it is now too late to question. I am prepared to
give them the benefit of the principle, on condition that the Muslims do not
deny the benefit of the principles to the Non-Muslim residents of the Area.
But I believe, I am entitled to draw the attention of the Muslims to another
and a better plan of security. I claim that my plan is better than the plan of
Pakistan. Let me state the points which tell in favour of my plan. They are :

(i) Under my proposal the danger of a communal majority, which is the
basis of Pakistan is removed,

(ii) Under my proposal the weightage at present enjoyed by the Muslims
is not disturbed.

(iii) The position of Muslims in the Non-Pakistan Provinces is greatly
strengthened by an increase in their representation, which they may
not get if Pakistan comes and which will leave them in a more helpless
condition than they are in at present.

XI

A WORD TO HINDUS

Much of the difficulty over the Communal Question is due to the insistance
of the Hindus that the rule of majority is sacrosanct and that it must be
maintained at all costs. The Hindu does not seem to be aware of the fact that
there is another rule, which is also operative in fields where important disputes
between individual and nations arise and that rule is a rule of unanimity. If he
will take the trouble to examine the position he will realise that such a rule is
not a fiction, but it does exist. Let him take the Jury System. In the jury trial
the principle is unanimity. The decision is binding upon the judge only if the
verdict of the jury is unanimous. Let him take another illustration that of the
League of Nations. What was the rule for decisions in the League of Nations ?
The rule was a rule of unanimity. It is obvious that if the principle of unanimity
was accepted by the Hindus as a rule of decision in the Legislature and in
the Executive there would be no such thing as a Communal Problem in India.

One may well ask the Hindu that if he is not prepared to concede constitutional
safeguards to the minorities, is he prepared to agree to the rule of unanimity ?
Unfortunately he is not prepared to accept either.

About the rule of majority the Hindu is not prepared to admit any
limitations. The majority he wants is an absolute majority. He will not be
satisfied with relative majority. He should consider whether his insistance
on absolute majority is fair proposition, which political philosophers can
accept. He is not aware that even the constitution of the United States does

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 377

not lend support to the absolutistic rule of majority rule on which the Hindu
has been insisting upon.

Let me illustrate the point from the constitution of the United States.
Take the clause embodying Fundamental Rights. What does that clause
mean ? It means that, matters included in Fundamental Rights are of such
supreme concern that a mere majority rule is not enough to interfere with
them. Take another illustration also from the Constitution of the United
States. The Constitution says that no part of the Constitution shall be altered
unless the proposition is carried by three-fourths majority and ratified by the
States. What does this show ? It shows that the United States Constitution
recognizes for certain purposes mere majority rule is not competent.

All these cases are of course familiar to many a Hindu. The pity of it is,
he does not read from them the correct lesson. If he did, he would realize
that the rule of the majority rule is not as sacrosanct a principle as he thinks
it is. The majority rule is not accepted as a principle but is tolerated as a
rule. I might also state why it is tolerated. It is tolerated for two reasons;
(1) because the majority is always a political majority and (2) because the
decision of a political majority accepts and absorbs so much of the point of
view of the minority that the minority does not care to rebel against the
decision.

In India, the majority is not a political majority. In India the majority is
born ; it is not made. That is the difference between a communal majority
and a political majority. A political majority is not a fixed or a permanent
majority. It is a majority which is always made, unmade and remade. A
communal majority is a permanent majority fixed in its attitude. One can
destroy it, but one cannot transform it. If there is so much objection to
a political majority, how very fatal must be the objection to a communal
majority ?

It may be open to the Hindus to ask Mr. Jinnah, why in 1930 when he
formulated his fourteen points he insisted upon the principle of majority
rule to such an extent that one of the fourteen points stipulated that in
granting weightage, limits should be placed whereby a majority shall not
be reduced to a minority or equality. It may be open to the Hindus to ask
Mr. Jinnah, if he is in favour of a Muslim majority in Muslim Provinces,
why he is opposed to a Hindu Majority in the Centre ? The Hindu
must however realize that these posers may lead to the conclusion, that
Mr. Jinnah’s position is inconsistent. They cannot lead to the affirmation of
the principle of majority rule.

The abandonment of the principle of majority rule in politics cannot affect
the Hindus very much in other walks of life. As an element in social life they
will remain a majority. They will have the monopoly of trade and business
which they enjoy. They will have the monopoly of the property which they

378 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

have. My proposals do not ask the Hindus to accept the principle of unanimity.
My proposals do not ask the Hindus to abandon the principle of majority
rule. All I am asking them is to be satisfied with a relative majority. Is it
too much for them to concede this ?

Without marking any such sacrifice the Hindu majority is not justified in
representing to the outside world that the minorities are holding up India’s
Freedom. This false propaganda will not pay. For the minorities are doing
nothing of the kind. They are prepared to accept freedom and the dangers
in which they likely to be involved; provided they granted satisfactory
safeguards. This gesture of the minorities is not to be treated as a matter
for which Hindus need not be grateful. It may well be contrasted with what
happened in Ireland. Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalists once
told Carson, the leader of Ulster; “Consent to United Ireland, Ask for any
safeguard and they shall be granted to you”. He is reported to have turned
round and said : “Damn your safeguards ; we don’t want to be ruled by you”.
The minorities in India have not said that. They are ready to be satisfied
with safeguards. I ask the Hindus Is this not worth a mass ? I am sure it is.

XII

CONCLUSION

These are some of the proposals I have had in mind for the solution of
the Communal Problem. They do not commit the All-India Scheduled Castes
Federation. They do not even commit me. In putting them forth, I am
doing nothing more than exploring a new way. My emphasis is more on the
principle, I have enunciated, than on the actual proposals. If the principles
are accepted then I am sure the solution of the Communal Question will
not be as baffling as it has been in the past.

The problem of solving the Indian deadlock is not easy. I remember reading
a historian describing the condition of Germany before the Confederation
of 1867 as one of ‘ Divinely Ordained Confusion’. Whether that was true of
Germany or not, it seems to me that they form a very accurate description
of the present conditions of India. Germany did get out of this confusion,
if not at one stroke at least by successive stages until just before the war
she became a unified people, unified in mind, unified in outlook and unified
by belief in a common destiny. India has not so far succeeded in evolving
order out of her confusion. It is not that she had no opportunities to do
so. In fact, there have been quite a number. The first opportunity came in
1927, when Lord Birkenhead gave a challenge to Indians asking them to
produce a constitution for India. That challenge was taken up. A committee
was formed to frame a constitution. A constitution was produced and was
known as ‘The Nehru Constitution’. It was, however, not accepted by Indians
and was buried without remorse. A second opportunity presented itself to
Indians in 1930, when they assembled at the Round Table Conference.
There again, Indians failed to play their part and write out their own

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 379

Constitution. A third attempt is the one recently made by the Sapru
Committee. The proposals of this committee too have fallen flat.

There is neither enthusiasm nor optimism left to indulge in another
attempt. One is persued by a sense of fatality, which suggests that as
every attempt is doomed to failure, none need be made. At the same time
I feel that no Indian ought to be so down hearted or so callous as to let the
deadlock stink, as though it was a dead dog, and say that he is prepared
to do nothing more than be a mere witness to the political dog-fight that is
going on in this country. The failures of the past need not daunt any body.
They do not daunt me. For, I have a feeling that though it is true that all
attempts to reach an agreement on the communal question have failed, the
failure have been due not so much to any inherent fault of the Indians as
they have been due to a wrong approach. I feel confident that my proposals,
if considered dispassionately, should be found acceptable. They constitute a
new approach and as such I commend them to my countrymen.

Before I conclude, I must, however, warn my critics that they may be
able to amend my proposals in some respects ; but it will not be easy to
reject them. If they do reject them, the first thing they shall have to do is
to controvert the principles on which they are based.

zz



10

STATES AND MINORITIES
What are Their Rights and How to
Secure Them in the Constitution of

Free India

Memorandum on the Safeguards for the Scheduled Castes
submitted to the Constituent Assembly on behalf of
the All India Scheduled Castes Federation

Published: 1947



STATES AND MINORITIES

PREFACE

Soon after it became definite that the framing of the future
Constitution of India was to be entrusted to a Constituent Assembly,
the Working Committee of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation
asked me to prepare a Memorandum on the Safeguards for the
Scheduled Castes for being submitted to the Constituent Assembly,
on behalf of the Federation. I very gladly undertook the task. The
results of my labour are contained in this brochure.

The Memorandum defines Fundamental Rights, Minority Rights
and Safeguards for the Scheduled Castes. Those who hold the view
that the Scheduled Castes are not a minority might say that in this
matter I have gone beyond prescribed bounds. The view that the
Scheduled Castes are not a minority is a new dispensation issued on
behalf of the High and Mighty Hindu Majority which the Scheduled
Castes are asked to submit to. The spokesmen of the Majority have
not cared to define its scope and its meaning. Anyone with a fresh
and free mind, reading it as a general proposition, would be justified
in saying that it is capable of double interpretation. I interpret
it to mean that the Scheduled Castes are more than a minority
and that any protection given to the citizens and to the minorities
will not be adequate for the Scheduled Castes. In other words it
means that their social, economic and educational condition is so
much worse than that of the citizens and other minorities that in
addition to protection they would get as citizens and as minorities
the Scheduled Castes would require special safeguards against

384 PREFACE

the tyranny and discrimination of the majority. The other
interpretation is that the Scheduled Castes differ from a minority
and therefore they are not entitled to the protection which can
be claimed by a minority. This interpretation appears to be such
unmitigated nonsense that no sane man need pay any attention to
it. The Scheduled Castes must be excused if they ignore it. Those
who accept my interpretation of the view that the Scheduled Castes
are not a minority will, I am sure, agree with me that I am justified
in demanding for the Scheduled Castes, all the benefit of the
Fundamental Rights of citizens, all the benefit of the Provisions for
the Protection of the minorities and in addition special Safeguards.

The memorandum was intended to be submitted to the Constituent
Assembly. There was no intention to issue it to the public. But
my caste Hindu friends who have had the opportunity to read the
typescript have pressed me to give it a wider circulation. Although
it is meant for members of the Constituent Assembly, I do not see
any breach of decorum in making it available to the general public.
I have therefore agreed to fall in line with their wishes.

Instead of setting out my ideas in general terms, I have drafted
the Memorandum in the form of Articles of the Constitution. I am
sure that for the sake of giving point and precision this method
will be found to be more helpful. For the benefit of the Working
Committee of the Scheduled Castes Federation, I had prepared certain
explanatory notes and other statistical material. As the notes and
the statistical material are likely to be useful to the general reader,
I have thought it better to print them along with the Memorandum
rather than keep them back.

Among the many problems the Constituent Assembly has to
face, there are two which are admittedly most difficult. One is
the problem of the Minorities and the other is the problem of
the Indian States. I have been a student of the problem of the
Indian States and I hold some very definite and distinct views
on the subject. It was my hope that the Constituent Assembly
would elect me to the States Committee Evidently, it has found
men of superior calibre for the work. It may also be because I
am one of those who are outside the tabernacle and therefore
undesirable. I am not sorry to find myself left out. My only regret
is that I have lost an opportunity to which I was looking forward

PREFACE 385

for placing my views for the consideration of the Committee. I have
therefore chosen to do the next best thing—namely, to incorporate
them in this brochure along with the Rights of Citizens, of Minorities
and of the Scheduled Castes so that a wider public may know what
they are, may value them for what they are worth and may make
such use of them as it may deem fit.

“Raja Graha” B. R. AMBEDKAR
Dadar, Bombay-14
15-3-47