NewsHawks 29 September 2023

Price US$1 Friday 29 September 2023 NEWS Sadc leaders push for extraordinary summit on Zimbabwe Story on Page 4 NEWS Mnangagwa takes cronyism to new and shocking heights WHAT’S Story on Page 15 INSIDE SPORT Zim community continue to rally behind the Hatters Story on Page 46 ALSO INSIDE Sadc refuses Zanu PF bullying Nssa ex-boss quit facing 30 damning corruption accusations

Page 2 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE ARTHUR Johnson Manase recently quit as the National Social Security Authority (Nssa) boss facing more than 30 corruption charges which include gross inefficiency and incompetence, wilful disobedience of lawful orders, and theft or fraud, documents seen by The NewsHawks show. Manase, who had been on leave of absence since July last year amid investigations into a series of mismanagement and corrupt activities at the statutory pension fund, recently quit as general manager, the apex Nssa position, under the weight of over 30 charges of maladministration and malpractices. This comes as Manase intensifies his bid to gag The NewsHawks. This week he wrote yet another letter through his lawyers complaining about some aspects of last week’s story that he has now resigned, while threatening to reactivate his sinister agenda to use police to criminalise journalism. Documents read by The NewsHawks say corruption accusations against Manase include violation of procurement regulations, imposition of contractors and service providers without a competitive bidding process, irregular purchase and disposal of properties, unlawful cash withdrawals, illegal sale of shares, lack of proper accounting for transactions, improper transfer of funds, inappropriate investments, and wrong investment disposals. The allegations also entail implementation of an unapproved remuneration framework, unauthorised condition of service motor vehicle frameworks, unlawful acquisition of motor vehicles, unprocedural granting of loans through Nssa instead of the National Building Society (NBS), United States dollar loans improperly paid back in local currency, unlawful housing loan tenures, double-dipping and abuse of public funds in executives’ solar installation project, appointments without following company guidelines, irregular staffing levels at his office, illegal promotions, and misrepresentation of facts to the board on public claims of venality at Nssa. Following his placement on leave of absence in July last year and subsequent corruption investigations, Nssa decided to suspend Manase without pay and benefits with effect from 28 July 2023. This was pending his appearance before a disciplinary committee and hearing in terms of section 12B of the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) as read with the Labour (National Employment Code of Conduct) Regulations, 2006 (SI 15 of 2006). Charges against Manase included misconduct, wilful disobedience of lawful orders and theft or fraud. “Nssa signed a composite loan agreement with NBS, whereby NBS was to take over the administration and provision of loans to Nssa employees, effective from 1 November 2016,” one document says. “However, you caused Nssa to extend housing loans directly to seven executive employees, including yourself, amounting to US$2 898 472.02, as well as motor vehicle loans to 15 executive employees amounting to US$1 097 747.73. As a result, you failed to comply with set procedure to access loans by the executive employees. “Your aforementioned conduct was in breach of the express and/or implied terms of your contract of employment. Additionally, your conduct amounted to theft/fraud.” Documents say from 1 January 2020, Manase caused Nssa to acquire listed and unlisted equity investments, enter into joint ventures and disburse some loans without due diligence, valuations, risk assessment and before fulfilment of conditions precedent, board and ministerial approvals and other necessary procedures. “Further, you allowed funds to be disbursed to projects and/or for investments before conditions precedent had been met and without safeguarding of Nssa’s interests on some investments, for instance, Nssa’s funds were used to pay almost the full fund-raising fees to a related party before the other investors had made their contributions on the authority’s investment in Centragrid Investments (Pvt) Ltd,” a document says. “You therefore failed to safeguard interest of the authority as its chief accounting officer and exposed the authority to potential financial loss. Your aforementioned conduct was in breach of the express and/ or implied terms of your contract of employment. Additionally, your conduct amounted to incompetency and/or inefficiency in the performance of tour duties.” Manase engaged in improper investment disposals without necessary approvals, particularly regarding National Tyre Services Ltd, Masimba and Bindura Nickel Corporation, the documents also state. In some cases, Nssa received unsolicited offers to buy its shares in different companies which were then sold without competitive bids and necessary approvals. In the disposal of Turnall shares, Manase did not notify the Competition and Tariff Commission as required. “For some disposals, the authority was paid through a swap for CBZ Bank Ltd shares, which resulted in an increase of Nssa’s shareholding when the board had approved the banking portfolio refocus strategy where the authority wanted to reduce its shareholding to 9%,” the document notes. In another charge, the document says Manase did not implement the Corporate Governance Unit (CGU) directives for Nssa to ensure its remuneration framework was in line with the cabinet-approved new remuneration framework. “On 11 April 2022, the Office of the President and Cabinet wrote another letter to the minister in which they advised him to ensure Nssa complies with the approved remuneration framework, the PPDPA and the Public Enterprises Corporate Governance Act,” it says. “However, you did not implement the CGU directives which were not implemented by Nssa until March 2023. As a result, for the period from 1 January 2021 to 30 September 2022, Nssa suffered approximately US$58 019 and ZW$19 859 040 prejudice through payment of unauthorised allowances and benefits to executives. “In addition, during the period 1 January 2020 to January 2022, you approved the payment of some benefits in USD, which were not approved by the board and these benefits amounted to a total of US$265 820. You therefore, wilfully defied and/or refused to implement lawful directives and caused financial loss to the authority of payment of unapproved salaries and benefits.” Manase also presided over former Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare minister Paul Mavima’s US$400 000 corrupt upmarket house deal in Quinnington, Borrowdale, Harare. Besides, there was another fraudulent transaction by Nssa involving a commercial property in Kariba valued at US$220 000. The property was bought for US$215 000 after negotiations, but US$244 000 was paid. This means US$29 000 was siphoned. Manase and his management also tried but failed to sell Nssa's shares in OK Zimbabwe without board approval. “In April 2022, Nssa management entered into a transaction whereby Nssa would sell 123 835 670 OKZ shares (constituting 9.83% of OKZ issued share capital) to Croco Motors (Pvt)  (later changed to Palmwealth Investments (Pvt) Limited) for a price ZW$3 715 070 110,” a document says. “The purchase price for the OKZ shares was to be settled partly in cash and partly by delivery of motor vehicles worth US$2 404 614 by Croco Motors to Nssa. “Although the agreement was verbally cancelled on 26 April 2022, the proposed transaction was not approved by the Nssa board. Further, the process of acquiring motor vehicles violated the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDPA) and cabinet approved condition of service vehicles policy. You therefore violated internal control mechanisms and exposed the authority to the risk of violation of PPDPA regulations.” Nssa executives were given improper and unlawful housing loan tenures. “Housing loan entitlement for executives was being computed as three-and-half times one’s annual basic salary and loan repayments are being spread over 25 years regardless of the beneficiary’s age and contract tenure,” the document points out. “As a result of your conduct, you exposed the authority to the risk of failure to recover the loans granted should the employees with outstanding loan balances retire or their contracts terminated.” Documents further indicate there was double-dipping by nine Nssa executives on the solar system installation. “You allowed or approved some executives (including yourself) who had accessed housing loans, which also incorporated funding for solar installations to benefit under the programme, thereby resulting in double funding for solar installations,” the document indicates. “The solar installation tender was awarded to a contractor at a total price of US$167 685 and Nssa paid a deposit of US$100 611 on 12 August 2021. However, the contractor failed to deliver as per contract, and attempts by Nssa to liquidate the performance guarantee issued by Metbank was not successful.” Manase is also accused of making appointments without following Nssa guidelines and unlawfully staffing his office, while making illegal promotions and unprocedural staff transfers amid charges. On cars, documents say: “You unlawfully implemented a policy of availing condition of service vehicles, in addition to motor vehicle loans in violation of the 20 March 2018 cabinet-approved circular on conditions of service vehicles for independent commissions, state enterprises and parastatals. “You unlawfully acquired and/or funded acquisition of six vehicles using the authority’s resources for your own use within a period of two years contrary to provisions of the circular on conditions of service vehicles.” Manase was also accused of failure to hold annual general meetings for 2020 and 2021 on time. On allegations of corruption against management at Nssa which were widely circulated on social media, Manase was accused of misleading the board on the issue. “After allegations of looting at Nssa circulated on social media, the board requested management to respond to the allegations, and management prepared a document for the board responding to the allegations,” the document says. “However, investigations have revealed that the document that you and your team presented before the board misrepresented some facts, and/or withheld some critical information from the board. “On 24 May 2022, Nssa received an enquiry from Zimbabwe Independent on the allegations, and you instructed Prudence Mutsvanga (an ex-Alpha Media Holdings lawyer now with Nssa) to manage the issue, and she responded to you and said: ‘Thank you I am getting in touch with Tendai (Mutseyekwa who is in charge of Nssa marketing and communications). If possible, we will meet Wisdom (Mudzungairi, former NewsDay editor and AMH editor-in-chief) or Faith (Zaba, Zimbabwe Independent editor) tomorrow. We have enough leverage so it can be suppressed'." Efforts to get comment from Manase were unsuccessful as he did not answer calls and messages from The NewsHawks. Nssa ex-boss quit facing 30 damning corruption accusations Nssa ex-boss Arthur Johnson Manase

NewsHawks News Page 3 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 RUVIMBO MUCHENJE FORMER National Social Security Authority (Nssa) boss Arthur Manase is entangled in a luxury vehicles scandal amid accusations that he unlawfully bought six cars using the statutory pension fund’s money for his own use within a period of two years. He is also accused of unlawfully implementing a policy of availing condition-of-service vehicles – in addition to motor vehicle loans – in violation of the 20 March 2018 cabinet-approved circular on condition-of-service vehicles. This comes as Manase wants Nssa to dispose of a third luxury car – a Land Rover Defender – to him on top of a Mercedes-Benz E55 AMG and a Mitsubishi Triton double cab he already got before quitting recently. This will be his third top-of-the-range car from Nssa in two years. Executives who work at scandal-ridden Nssa mostly treat it as a self-enrichment organisation. The three cars Manase has and wants are valued at US$416 000 in total: Mercedes-Benz US$178 000, Land Rover Defender US$175 000 and Triton US$63 000. Manase, appointed in January 2021, resigned on 1 August. This was more than a year after he was put on leave of absence since July last year to facilitate investigations into a series of irregularities, mismanagement and corrupt activities. He was suspended without salary and benefits on 28 July, three days before he quit facing over 30 charges of misconduct, malpractices and maladministration. Nssa wanted to haul him before a disciplinary committee over corruption issues, some of them involving cars. Documents seen by The NewsHawks show Manase is accused of implementing an unauthorised condition-of-service motor vehicle framework and unlawful acquisition of six cars. One of the charges against Manase reads: “You unlawfully implemented a policy of availing condition of service vehicles, in addition to motor vehicle loans, in violation of the 20 March 2018 cabinet-approved circular on conditions of service vehicles for independent commissions, state enterprises and parastatals. You therefore wilfully defied and/or refused to implement lawful directives and caused financial loss to the authority as a result of payment of unapproved vehicle loans. “Your aforementioned conduct was also in breach of the express and/or implied terms of your contract of employment.” Manase is also accused of unlawfully acquiring six cars. “You unlawfully acquired and/or funded acquisition of six vehicles using the authority’s resources for your own use within a period of two years contrary to provisions of the circular on conditions of service vehicles as detailed below: “In December 2022, you bought a Land Cruiser Discovery vehicle as your condition of service vehicle as acting general manager, although your contract of employment did not provide for condition of service vehicle for the acting position and when you had already become the substantive General Manager. “In June 2021, you accessed a motor vehicle loan and acquired a Mitsubishi Triton from Zimoco for US$63 000. “On 29 March 2022, you acquired a Mercedes-Benz E55 AMG from Zimoco for US$178 000 as your condition of service vehicle and the authority paid the amount in full. “On 1 April 2022, you acquired a Land Rover Defender worth US$175 000  as a condition of service vehicle for the General Manager, and a deposit of US$87 500 was paid by the authority. You also had at your disposal a Nssa Isuzu Double Cab vehicle. “In June 2022, you acquired the Mercedes-Benz referred to above through a motor vehicle loan before you had completed paying the motor vehicle loan granted in June 2021. "Additionally, your acquisition of that Mercedes-Benz motor vehicle, which at that time belonged to Nssa, as a condition of service motor vehicle, constituted a disposal of a Nssa asset and yet section of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act was flouted, and you had attempted to acquire a Land Cruiser 300 Series through the sale of OK Zimbabwe shares.” The documents add: “Your conduct aforesaid violated procurement regulations and defied lawful directives on conditions of service vehicles framework and abused the authority’s financial resources to the detriment of pensioners. Your aforementioned conduct was a breach of the express and/ or implied terms of your contract of employment.” Despite all this, Manase has told Nssa he wants the Land Rover (Reg. No. AFK2044), purchased in December 2020, so that he can walk away with three cars in two years. The Land Rover Defender, which he wants to purchase, is a Nssa pool vehicle. Already he has the Triton double cab bought in August 2021. He paid off the loan he got to buy the car. Then there is the Mercedes-Benz purchased in March 2022 as a condition-of-service vehicle, which he later converted into a loan. Disposal of vehicles at Nssa to an employee or former employees is governed by the organisation’s condition-of-service vehicle policy and the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet’s circular. This is also consistent with the Corporate Governance Unit circular number SEP/37/23 of 2023. The policy, which is clear as to whom it applies and relates to on condition-of-service vehicles only, was last amended on 1 March 2022. This excludes any other class or category of vehicles like pool cars. The policy takes into account a number of scenarios about the employee and the vehicle like age, usage of the car, condition and whether new or old. It also considers whether the employee resigned, or was retrenched, promoted, as well as the period of service and how long they have been using the vehicle. The policy also covers situations where employees shall not be entitled to purchase. As a result of the car scandal, Nssa assistant accountant Erasmus Mavondo was arrested last year and appeared in court on allegations of corruptly awarding Manase a personal loan to buy a car using an undervalued exchange rate. Mavondo allegedly helped Manase to buy the Mercedes-Benz for ZW$25 351 418.60 instead of ZW$60 251 593.80, which was equivalent to US$178 000. The money was purportedly given to Manase as a personal loan to regularise a problematic company-cars deal in which he ended up with two condition-of-service vehicles instead of one. In so doing, Mavondo allegedly prejudiced Nssa of ZW$34 900 175 after converting the US$178 000 using a 31 March 2022 rate of US$1: ZW$142 instead of US$1: ZW$138 as of 21 June 2022. Efforts to get comment from Manase were unsuccessful as he did not answer calls and messages from The NewsHawks. Manase in messy luxury cars scandal Land Rover Defender and below is its interior. Mercedes-Benz E55 AMG

Page 4 News OWEN GAGARE SOUTHERN African Development Community (Sadc) leaders are pushing for an extraordinary summit on Zimbabwe as they resolutely dig in on the country's recent disputed elections. Although diplomats have raised concern that not much is being done from key stakeholders in Harare to empower regional leaders to put more pressure on President Emmerson Mnangagwa, calls for special summit are growing. There is consensus in Sadc that the 23 August general elections violated Zimbabwe’s constitution, Electoral Act and Sadc Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections as highlighted by the regional body’s election observer mission (EOM). Diplomatic sources said minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Sadc Organ Troika Ministerial Committee held on 26 September 2023 captured the thinking of Sadc leaders. The ministers, diplomats said, cannot reflect their own opinions but express the views of their leaders. The minutes showed that the ministerial committee defended the report produced by the Sadc EOM which was headed by former Zambia vice-president Nevers Mumba. The ministers slammed senior Zanu PF and government officials for vilifying Mumba and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema after the observer mission, for the first time, gave an adverse report on the polls. They said attacks from Harare had the potential of undermining Sadc processes and credibility while insisting that the report reflected the opinion of the regional observers and not Zambia as wrongly portrayed by Zanu PF propagandists. Diplomats told The NewsHawks that the ministers reflected the Sadc opinion which was expressed in a way that heads of state would not do. Following Tuesday’s ministerial meeting, Hichilema chaired an online Sadc organ on politics, defence and security cooperation troika meeting which discussed the political and security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe's recent disputed elections and the upcoming polls in Eswatini. Tanzania was represented by Vice-President Phillip Mpango and Namibia by Deputy President Nangolo Mbumba. DRC Defence minister Jean-Pierre Bemba also attended. Sadc executive secretary Elias Magosi and secretariat staff, including Elvado Santos and Barbara Lopi, who is head of communication and public relations, also participated in the meeting. A communiquè released after the meeting revealed that the Sadc EOM had presented its final report to Hichilema who was preparing to hand it over to Mnangagwa and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. Minutes of the ministerial meeting however gave a reflection of Sadc leaders’ thoughts. “The EO-MCO Troika noted that the SADC Electoral Observation Mission (SEOM) was deployed to the Republic of Zimbabwe to observe the Harmonised Elections which took place on 23rd-24th August 2023. In accordance with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, the Chairperson of the Organ, His Excellency Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, appointed Dr. Nevers Mumba, the former Vice President of the Republic of Zambia to lead the SEOM to Zimbabwe. “The EO-MCO Troika also noted that the SEOM is mandated to observe elections in terms of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections which all SADC Member States signed and adopted, and have been operational since 2004 . . . . The EO-MCO Troika further noted that all SADC Member States send individuals to serve as observers under the SEOM each time another SADC Member State conducts elections. “For the purposes of the August 2023 Harmonised Elections, observers were seconded from the Republic of Angola, the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Eswatini, the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Zambia.” The EO-MCO Troika noted that the Sadc EOM issued its preliminary statement on 25 August 2023, as stipulated by section 11.8.1 of the Principles and Guidelines. The meeting said the SEOM was meant to produce its final report within 30 days, adding this had been done. In terms of section 11.8.2, when SEOMs officially submit their election reports, member states which held elections may consider the recommendations advanced by the SEOM for improving the conduct of elections; submit to the chair of the Organ, a response to the SEOM report. The ministers then blasted Zimbabwe over its conduct. “The EO-MCO Troika also noted with concern, the personal attacks and threats on the media that have been directed at the SEOM Head of Mission Dr Nevers Mumba and the Chairperson of the Organ, His Excellency Mr Hakainde Hichelima since the Zimbabwe SEOM released its Preliminary Statement on 25th August 2023. The attacks were made by individuals in both the ruling ZANU PF political party and some in high level positions in the Government of Zimbabwe,” the minutes read. “The narrative in these attacks have been that the SEOM Preliminary Statement on the Zimbabwean elections was personally authored by Dr Nevers Mumba. “The EO-MCO Troika further: (i) noted that such attacks undermine the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and might have a negative bearing on the SEOMs that are to be deployed in the future elections, especially with another election coming on the 29 September in the Kingdom of Eswatini; and (ii) reiterated that SEOMs are in line with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, and that reports are produced by a collective of the Member States observers, led by the Organ Troika and supported by the Secretariat. “The EO-MCO Troika noted that there is a risk that if unchecked, further attacks on the leadership of the Organ and of the SEOM have the potential to damage the credibility of SADC as an institution.” Ministers commended the secretariat for taking the initiative to issue media statements that clarified the procedures that are followed by the SEOM, as they rebuffed Zimbabwe’s position, while protecting the credibility and leadership of the Organ and the SEOM. Some Sadc leaders have been pushing for an extraordinary summit to deal with the Zimbabwean crisis. Only three leaders attended Mnangagwa’s inauguration, in what was seen as a snub to Mnangagwa following the controversial polls. Mnangagwa however used the United Nations General Assembly in New York to lobby Sadc leaders as the pressure mounted. Although there is consensus that the Zimbabwean polls were shambolic and not free and fair, Sadc leaders are divided on what action to take. “Sadc’s position has been further complicated by lack of a push by key stakeholders in Zimbabwe, including political parties. With each passing day, Mnangagwa’s hand is evidently getting strengthened,” said a diplomat. Sadc leaders push for extraordinary summit Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

News Page 5 NATHAN GUMA WHILE the Harare government has been making frantic efforts to sanitise the chaotic general polls, the Sadc region has refused to ignore or forget Zimbabwe’s shambolic polls, which were underlined by a host of serious irregularities, The NewsHawks has learnt. The bloc has resolutely rejected vicious attacks on its election observer mission which, in an unprecedented move, produced a damning report on Zimbabwe’s polls. The report has seen Zimbabwe’s leaders go on a warpath castigating Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema, for appointing the country’s former vice-president, Nevers Mumba, as head of the mission which produced the report that poked holes into the disputed election. This week, an extraordinary meeting of the Sadc organ troika ministerial committee resolutely defended the regional grouping's election observer mission and its report, saying the 23 August election did not meet the thresholds of the country’s constitution, the Electoral Act and the Sadc Principles and Guidelines governing Democratic Elections. The ministers indicated the behaviour of Zanu PF and Zimbabwean government officials over the issue was reprehensible as it practically damaged Sadc's reputation and credibility, while also distorting the processes of electoral observation in the region. Effectively, Sadc told the Harare authorities to stop behaving like a bull in a China shop as that risked discrediting the regional body and its future election observer missions in other countries due for elections such as Eswatini, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and the Comoros Islands. “The EO-MCO Troika noted the personal attacks and threats on the media that have been directed at the SEOM Head of Mission Dr. Nevers Mumba and the Chairperson of the Organ, His Excellency Mr. Hakainde Hichelima since the Zimbabwe SEOM released its Preliminary Statement on 25th August 2023,” read the report by Stanley. K. Kakubo,  Zambian Foreign minister, and chairperson of the Ministerial Committee of the Sadc Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation “The EO-MCO Troika further noted that such attacks undermine the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and might have a negative bearing in the future elections, especially with another election coming on the 29 September in the Kingdom of Eswatini; and reiterated that SEOMs are in line with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, and that reports are produced by a collective of the Member States observers, led by the Organ Troika and supported by the Secretariat. "The EO-MCO Troika noted that there is a risk that if unchecked, further attacks on the leadership of the Organ and of the SEOM have the potential to damage the credibility of SADC as an institution." According to Sadc’s electoral calendar, Eswatini started its elections on Friday, while Madagascar is holding the first round of its presidential election in November and the second one in December this year. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is holding its presidential, legislative and provincial elections in December this year. Sadc guidelines Zimbabwe’s flawed election violated the Sadc guidelines promoting the holding of regular free and fair, transparent, credible and peaceful democratic elections, sparking a row.   The country, being a member of the bloc, is bound by the regional instruments that provide for a clear delimitation process. According to the guidelines: “A SEOM must observe whether the member state’s legal and constitutional framework guarantees human rights relevant to elections [Article 11.3.2].  More specifically, the SEOM should assess ‘the structure and model of the electoral system, the Electoral Management Board, the Electoral Act and regulations and the nature of civil and political rights’. ” [Article 13.2.3]. “Also in the pre-election period, a SEOM must inquire into the delimitation of electoral boundaries — whether the factors considered were in accordance with the law of the land [article 11.3.6]. During the electoral period a SEOM must assess the locations of polling stations, the production and distribution of ballot papers, the processes of voting and counting votes and the adequacy of safeguards against inaccuracies [article 13.5].” “In the post-electoral period, the mission is mandated to observe whether there are effective remedies for violations of electoral-related rights [article 11.7.1.1.]. Also in the post-electoral period, a SEOM must assess “the development of changes to electoral-related laws, rules, regulations and administrative procedures preceding and following elections” [Article 13.6.2.1].” Delimitation The regional mission also pointed out that the delimitation process had several grey areas that ate into the credibility of the election itself. “The mission was informed that the delimitation exercise that was concluded in 2022 by the Zec was marred with controversy. In one way or another, concerned stakeholders claimed that the report that Zec submitted failed to observe the constitutional requirements for such an exercise, and that there were also divisions amongst serving commissioners of the Zec regarding veracity of the report,” reads the SEOM preliminary report. “The main allegations made against the (delimitation) report was that it constituted gerrymandering, and that it failed to observe the correct methodology for calculating the 20% variance constitutional rule.” The report also resulted in divisions among commissioners. Seven commissioners have spoken out against the delimitation process and outcome, effectively opposing Zec chairperson Justice Priscilla Chigumba. As a result of the fallout, Chigumba removed Commissioner Jasper Mangwana and his deputy Catherine Mpofu from their roles as spokespersons of the election management body. Chigumba allocated that role to herself, her deputy Rodney Kiwa and Zec’s chief elections officer Utloile Silaigwana. The final report gazetted by President Emmerson Mnangagwa in February has in some cases retained a ward and constituency population threshold of over 20% — in violation of the constitution — which has in the past been condemned by experts, while failing to declare ward and constituency boundaries, which is contrary to section 161 (11) of the constitution. Voters’ roll Some stakeholders, particularly the main opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC), expressed concern over the delayed release of the voters’ roll in searchable and analysable format. The party went into the election without an analysable copy of the voters’ roll after Zec had released the roll in PDF format,  in violation of the Electoral Act, amid suspicion that the electoral body was manipulating the vote register in favour of Zanu PF. Section 21 (7) of the Electoral Act mandates Zec to release an analysable copy of the voters’ roll to nominated candidates. It reads: “Where a voters’ roll is provided in electronic form in terms of subsection (3), (4) or (6), its format shall be such as allows its contents to be searched and analysed.” Section 21 (6) also mandates Zec to release the voters’ roll in reasonable time after closure of the nomination process. “Within a reasonable period of time after nomination day in an election, the Commission (Zec) shall provide: ‘(a) free of charge, to every nominated candidate, one copy in electronic form of the voters’ roll to be used in the election for which the candidate has been nominated; and (b) at the request of any nominated candidate, and on payment of the prescribed fee, one copy in printed form of the voters’ roll to be used in the election for which the candidate has been nominated’.” Freedom of assembly The campaign period was largely tilted towards the ruling Zanu PF, while other opposition outfits had their campaign rallies banned. In August, the SEOM reported that it had noted controversy emanating from the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA), which sets out a process for notifying the Zimbabwe Republic Police of the intention to hold rallies. In January, CCC leader Nelson Chamisa exclusively told The NewsHawks that 62 of the opposition party’s meetings were banned since the party’s formation in 2022, showing the government’s intolerance ahead of the polls. The number gradually increased.   A month before the election, police were forced to intervene, with Ndofandaedza Jaboon, police commander for elections, writing to police commanders saying rallies must not be banned out of partisan whim. “Commanders should note that for elections to be deemed free, fair and peaceful and credible, the playing field should be reckoned as level, hence the police actions should not discredit the electoral processes,” read the letter directed at officer commanding police provinces, officer commanding Support Unit, director of the Criminal Investigation Department and the director of police intelligence. “The Regulatory Authorities (officers commanding districts) should acquaint themselves with provisions of the Electoral Act and MOPA [Maintenance of Peace and Order Act] as to make informed decisions. The purpose of this legal instrument is for the police to prepare and take actions aimed at ensuring that any political activity is done peacefully.” Logistical challenges The voting process was largely riddled with logistical challenges that saw voting starting as late as 4pm in the evening in wards and constituencies known to be opposition strongholds, contrary to the Electoral Act provision that voting starts at 7am. “64% of the voting stations opened on time, 36% did not open for the 7am stipulated time. Some polling stations opened 12 hours later after the stipulated time,” read the SEOM report.  The reason provided by Zec for this was the unavailability of ballot papers, particularly for the local authority elections, and also due to previous litigation, raising outrage as the electoral body had earlier assured the nation it was ready to conduct the election emphasising that it printed enough ballot papers for the election. Postal voting In August, Zec was caught in a storm after it controversially changed the Electoral Act to alter the deadline of postal votes. Postal voting is a system that enables voters to cast their ballots even though they cannot get to their polling station on polling day. Zec confirmed that the government gazetted Statutory Instrument 140A of 2023 which altered the deadline for the submission of postal voting materials from 9 August to 20 August due to delays triggered by a series of electoral court challenges. The changes to section 75(1)(d) of the Electoral Act through Statutory Instrument 140A of 2023 altered the minimum period in which the chief elections officer must receive postal votes from a minimum of 14 days to a minimum of three days from polling day. This piled pressure on Zec to print and distribute the postal ballots throughout the country and around the world to the 17 483 registered voters who qualified to cast their ballots of the 18 000 voters who applied for postal voting by deadline day on 5 July 2023, and then subsequently receive on time the postal votes back in the remaining 13 days before 20 August 2023.  Sadc rejects Zanu PF bullying Former Zambian vice-president Nevers Mumba NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 6 News NATHAN GUMA ZIMBABWE’S polls continue to divide the Southern African Development Community (Sadc), with Namibia’s opposition party, the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), calling out the bloc’s leaders for giving preferential treatment to Zanu PF. The leader of the Landless People's Movement, Bernadus Swartbooi, said Zimbabwe's recent elections were "corrupt, fraudulent, unfair, unfree", although Sadc leaders have congratulated President Emmerson Mnangagwa — whom he described as a "military puppet" — for his disputed victory. In a fierce attack on Zanu PF and Sadc leaders, Swartbooi says what Sadc leaders are currently doing on Zimbabwe is tantamount to congratulating and supporting criminal activity. Mnangagwa and his Zanu PF political party won the 23 and 24 August elections which were condemned by observers, including the Sadc Election Observer Mission, over gross irregularities which include failure to align with key laws governing free and fair elections. However, other leaders from the region have stood in Zanu PF’s corner. At the 78th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa said the Sadc report has not yet been finalised and it does not invalidate the elections, but merely points out flaws in the electoral process for future improvement. His approach to Zimbabwe has drawn criticism, with many expressing outrage in his handling of the country’s electoral crisis. On Friday, Swartbooi, Namibia’s opposition leader, slammed Sadc for giving Zanu PF preferential treatment, amid overwhelming evidence of foul play in the conduct of the country’s general elections. “How do you send your own trusted institution, and this time you discredit yourself? You mutilate yourself for Zanu PF. What does Sadc owe Zanu PF? What do we owe them? What have they done uniquely for South Africa, for Mozambique, for Namibia, for Angola, for Botswana, for Zambia, for Tanzania?” Swartbooi said. He said Sadc also failed to condemn the coup that brought Mnangagwa to power in 2017, despite there being overwhelming evidence of a military takeover of government institutions. “But it was a clear coup. They even sent Kenneth Kaunda who confirmed that Mugabe was in military custody at State House in Zimbabwe, and you could all see it being broadcast. The military was present at State House having taken over every system of Zimbabwe,” he said on the stet-controlled Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). “No suspension from Sadc, no condemnation from AU – nothing. Again Zimbabwe got what it wanted and got away with whatever it was doing.” Swartbooi further said Sadc is damaging its credibility over the Zimbabwe issue by sending an election observer mission and not upholding its own report. Swartbooi said Mnangagwa was illegitimate and running a caretaker government. He says a transitional authority must be put in charge to run proper free and fair elections. Swartbooi added that the continued failure to rein in Zimbabwe's countless acts of impunity at home and within the region, including abuse of human rights, the breakdown in the rule of law and democratic a series of aberrations, should be condemned by Sadc leaders. The Namibian former governor and deputy minister said Sadc has allowed Zanu PF to get away with murder on many things, including a military coup, subversion of the constitution and electoral theft, among other outrageous acts. He said Sadc does not have a genuine or real plan to resolve the issues of Zimbabwe. “They are not interested,” Swartbooi said. “These are political parties that are interested in keeping each other in power. Why do we allow Zimbabwe, in particular the Zimbabwe of Zanu, to dictate to this region and to destroy the good name and the good work that this region has done in terms of trying to build some degree of democracy in our society?” Zimbabwe’s disputed polls have also seen Namibian and South African leaders come under fire for rushing to congratulate Mnangagwa, amid glaring evidence of irregularities in what has been condemned as a shambolic electoral process. For instance, this month, Maximalliant Katjimune, a legislator from Namibia’s opposition Popular Democratic Movement, while making his submissions in the country’s Parliament on Wednesday, demanded to know why Namibian President Hage Geingob rushed to congratulate Mnangagwa for winning a discredited election. Geingob was among three out of 16 Sadc leaders who rushed to congratulate Mnangagwa on his disputed victory. “Elections in Zimbabwe have over the years been tainted by irregularities, voter suppression and lack of transparency. And the elections held on the 23rnd of August to 24 were no different. That is why when President Geingob was the first President of Sadc to congratulate Mnangagwa in a disputed election, it raised concern,” Katjimune said. “This action by President Geingob is inconsistent with Namibia’s democratic principles and human rights. Both regionally and internationally. Moreover, the Sadc observer report on the elections came to the conclusion that aspects of the elections fell short of the requirements of the constitution of Zimbabwe, their Electoral Act and the Sadc principles on free and fair elections.” The MP said he intended to ask Namibia’s minister of Foreign Affairs about Geingob’s endorsement of Mnangagwa’s victory in a disputed election. South African President Ramaphosa also came under fire in his country’s Parliament from the main opposition Democratic Alliance leader John Steenhuisen, for attending Mnangagwa’s inauguration and hobnobbing with other dictators under the Brics bloc led by Russia, which is waging a war of aggression on Ukraine. Steenhuisen said Ramaphosa had chosen to support Zimbabwe’s disputed elections because his governing ANC is likely to follow the same path of rigged polls in future. “You are standing with autocrats and dictators who are sacrificing the principles in our own constitution. This is not human rights on what Brics can do to South Africa; it’s about what Brics and particularly Russia can do to ANC,” Steenhuisen said. “It is for the same reason that you attended Emmerson Mnangagwa’s inauguration. You are willing to give false legitimacy to Zanu PF because you know full well that your own party is following in their footsteps.” Steenhuisen directly criticised Ramaphosa, who was present in Parliament, saying he did not seem to care about the suffering of Zimbabweans who will now endure the rule of an illegitimate government. “Mr President, do you care nothing about the suffering and deprivation experienced by women of Iran and the people of Zimbabwe that are now shackled in an illegitimate election which your own Sadc region has cast aspersions on?” he asked. Mnangagwa’s inauguration was attended by only three leaders, with other countries represented at lower level officials. Namibian opposition blasts Sadc for pussyfooting on Zim elections Landless People's Movement leader Bernadus Swartbooi NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

NewsHawks News Page 7 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA JAILED Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) former Zengeza West legislator Job Sikhala has sensationally accused some members of his party of betrayal, by exhibiting double standards in calling for his release by day while encouraging his detention by night and persecuting those who have stood by him. In an exclusive letter to The NewsHawks, Sikhala says he will remain resolute in his fight. He says he has been hardened by his unjustified incarceration. He also singled out lawyer Harrison Nkomo, Bulawayo mayor David Coltart and Harare East legislator Rusty Markham for standing by his side during his incarceration. Sikhala, who was arrested on June 14 last year for allegedly inciting violence while representing slain CCC Moreblessing Ali in Manyame, has had his countless bail applications thrown out by the courts. In May, Sikhala was convicted, almost a year after his arrest, and slapped with a suspended six-month custodial sentence and a US$600 fine. Sikhala was however not released from custody, despite spending over 300 days in prison, with the state arguing he has outstanding cases. Through his letter, Sikhala accused some of his associates of betraying him, but said he is prepared to pay the ultimate price, even if it means death. “I write to all of you after my almost 16 months of incarceration in the Hitlerian concentration camp of Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. I am under political persecution by the regime in Zimbabwe. I did not commit any crime. I am not a criminal, I will never be one and no one will create one out of me. I am a political prisoner, persecuted for being an opponent to the regime,” reads the letter. “Prison, a place intended to be a punishment, became the most valuable college for me. It became the place I discovered and understand myself and many things. It is the place I was able to think, discover and reflect on many things including my relations with certain persons, who during daylight behave like angels, but are profound witches at night.  “Like Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who portrayed Nelson Mandela as a friend and publicly called for his release, but behind the scenes condemned the Release Mandela Campaign as a gimmick and privately warned the apartheid military establishment that Mandela was the most dangerous threat to national security and national stability and that it would be irresponsible to let him out.” Citing the example of former Rhodesia-Zimbabwe prime minister Reverend Abel Muzorewa, Sikhala said some of his friends have been working against his release from prison. “Pretending to be holding an anointed sceptre, roaming around the four corners of Zimbabwe, from east to west, from the south to the north, he was publicly denouncing the incarceration of the nationalist leaders, but privately he was telling the Rhodesian kingpin, Ian Douglas Smith, not to dare release Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and other nationalist leaders as they were terrorists and a danger to national security,” he said. “The character of someone is measured by facing up to a swelling and difficult situation. Let it be known that I am a man who will never ever break down even under the most trying circumstances. Martin Luther King Jnr taught me, 'if a man hasn’t found something he will die for, he isn’t fit to live'." “Under the barrage of attack from your mortal enemies, never be surprised that when you look behind, you will realise that you are by yourself and those who attempt to stand in solidarity with you come under attack, blackmail and humiliation, from the angels of the daytime but profound witches of the night. Only true friends and strong characters remain steadfast with you, while opportunists melt like morning dew. That is the character of an insincere struggle.” Sikhala said while his family has fallen on hard times since his incarceration, he has been receiving help from well-wishers and friends. “I was stunned by the swift response of love after the visit by my children here in prison bidding me farewell back to school, in tears that I have not paid their school fees and that they were going back to school without supplementary needs. I warned them that tears are not good under whatever circumstances,” he said. “Swiftly, my good lawyer Harrison Nkomo, despite having spent hundreds of hours representing me for free on the Moreblessing Ali cases, paid fees for my two daughters at boarding schools. Honourable David Coltart through the family trust paid Fidel’s fees.  “Honourable Rusty Markham, my new member of Parliament for my new domicile, Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison, came on board with some significant contributions to my other son’s school fees who is doing ‘A’ Level. Such love is not taken for granted. It is a mark that will live forever in my heart. I thank you, brothers. I also would like to thank all those who have helped my family during my difficult times.” Sikhala said his jailing has seen the crumbling and subsequent shut down of his law practice in Chitungwiza. However, he said he will remain resolute, as he knows that his incarceration is premeditated. “When I was thrown into Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison, some good soul, from the national intelligence systems, whispered to me that, it was long planned, that I must be thrown into prison for a long time to teach me a lesson of who wields power in Zimbabwe. I quickly notified myself that surviving prison calls for immense reserves of mental strength,” he said. “I had to arm myself with those things that enhanced my inner stability and discarded everything that might weaken me.  “I became hardened. I started reading voraciously, books that sustained me and internalised where I read about the lives of others who were once in similar position with my new station in life, whose connective theme is the human struggle and triumph against insurmountable ordeals.” He said the Zanu PF government has been exhibiting fear, as evidenced by its continuous incarceration of dissenting voices. “Imprisonment, murder, poisoning, torturing and the use of terror and violence as instruments of political organisation by unpopular regimes, is the weakest and most unsophisticated weapons and methods used against political opponents.  “It depicts cowardice and desperation. When I was tipped last year in December, dear Zimbabweans and my worldwide friends, about the plot to assassinate me through poisoning, I did not linger. No one will grow horns.  “I only informed my family, my lawyers, selected political leaders and friendly embassies. I was and still prepared to suffer martyrdom for the sake of freedom of our oppressed masses. There are several men and women who walked the road of pain and scars collected as the ultimate prize of pursuing truth and justice. I am prepared to suffer for my principles.” Some opposition colleagues have betrayed me — Sikhala Former Zengeza West MP Job Sikhala

Page 8 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 Dear Zimbabweans and my Worldwide friends: I write to all of you after my almost 16 months of incarceration in the Hitlerian concentration camp of Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. I am under political persecution by the regime in Zimbabwe. I did not commit any crime. I am not a criminal, I will never be one and no one will create one out of me. I am a political prisoner, persecuted for being an opponent to the regime. I write to you in different circumstances. When I was arrested on the 14th of June 2022, I was the Member of Parliament for the good people of Zengeza West. 16 months down the line, as per the desires and wishes of my persecutors, I am displaced. Congratulations to them for achieving, the political profit they wanted. At the time of my arrest, I was running a very successful law practice in Chitungwiza. I am advised that my law offices have been shut down and ruined. In their illusory thoughts, they think I will count loses, and in their tradition of thoughtlessness, they are making comical antics and inebriated postures. Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe said, “True leadership demands complete subjugation of self, absolute honesty, integrity and uprightness of character, courage and fearlessness and above all, a consuming love one’s people”. Professor Arthur Mutambara goes further to teach us that, “you can influence and change reality without official or formal power, and yet you can have the position of authority while having no influence or impact”. It must be known that a leader must not have a delicate skin. I told myself that if I truly believe for what I am suffering for, that is, the cause of the downtrodden, as symbolized by Moreblessing Ali, I must be prepared to suffer or even to die for the principles and beliefs. I will not accept anything or anyone to change my principles. Since boyhood, it was naturally inherent in me, to give a voice to the downtrodden and more importantly, protect their rights against the scourge of abuse of power by those in leadership positions. When I was thrown into Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison, some good soul, from the National Intelligence Systems, whispered to me that, it was long planned, that I must be thrown into prison for a long time to teach me a lesson, of who wields power in Zimbabwe. I quickly notified myself that surviving prison, calls for immense reserves of mental strength. I had to arm myself with those things that enhanced my inner stability and discarded everything that might weaken me. I became hardened. I started reading voraciously, books that sustained me and internalized where I read about the lives of others who were once in similar position with my new station in life, whose connective theme is the human struggle and triumph against insurmountable ordeals. In my reading, I came across the truth by James Baldwin, who told me that, “Force does not work the way its advocates seem to think it does. It does not reveal to the victim the strength of his adversary. On the contrary, it reveals the weaknesses, even the panic of his adversary, and this revelation invests the victim with patience. Furthermore, it is fatal to create too many victims”. Imprisonment, murder, poisoning, torturing and the use of terror and violence as instruments of political organization by unpopular regimes, is the weakest and most unsophisticated weapons and methods used against political opponents. It depicts cowardice and desperation. When I was tipped last year in December, dear Zimbabweans and my worldwide friends, about the plot to assassinate me through poisoning, I did not linger. No one will grow horns. I only informed my family, my lawyers, selected political leaders and friendly embassies. I was and still prepared to suffer martyrdom for the sake of freedom of our oppressed masses. There are several men and women who walked the road of pain and scars collected as the ultimate prize of pursing the truth and justice. I am prepared to suffer for my principles. In the state of affairs in our country, one must take sides. Either you are sincerely with the downtrodden masses of our people or you are on the side of the oppressor. The moment has come to choose. The masses of our people have been reduced to destitute members of society. We have been pauperized with unmatched increasing misery. Can anyone please tell me the reasons why I am in jail? Prison, a place intended to be a punishment, became the most valuable college for me. It became the place I discovered and understand myself and many things. It is the place I was able to think, discover and reflect on many things including my relations with certain persons, who on the daylight behave like angels, but are profound witches at night. Like Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who portrayed Nelson Mandela as a friend and publicly called for his release, but behind the scenes condemned the Release Mandela Campaign as a gimmick and privately warned the apartheid military establishment that, Mandela was the most dangerous threat to national security and national stability and that it would be irresponsible to let him out. The same script was being played by our own Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa in Rhodesia. Pretending to be holding an anointed scepter, roaming around the four corners of Zimbabwe, from East to West, from the South to the North, he was publicly denouncing the incarceration of the nationalist leaders, but privately he was telling the Rhodesian kingpin, Ian Douglas Smith, not to dare release Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and other nationalist leaders as they were terrorists and a danger to national security. The character of someone is measured by facing up to swelling difficult situation. Let it be known that I am a man who would never ever breakdown even under the most trying circumstances. Martin Luther King Jnr taught me, “if a man hasn’t found something he will die for, he isn’t fit to live”. Under the barrage of attack from your immortal enemies, never be surprised that when you look behind, you will realise that you are by yourself and those who attempt to stand in solidarity with you come under attack, blackmail and humiliation, from the angels of the daytime but profound witches of the night. Only true friends and strong characters remain steadfast with you, while opportunists melt like morning dews. That’s the character of an insincere struggle. Those who were attacked and humiliated in my name, let me reassure you, that you have found a special place in my heart. Your solid personality is immeasurable and shall ever be remembered. Solid fraternal brotherhood, in the environment of our opportunistic struggle, like the one we have today, where selfishness and deception are the order of the day is a rare golden characteristic of individuals. In the world where some don’t stand on principle but chasing after opportunity, and along the way in chase of opportunity distort private conversations and expose their disordered nerves. Those in desperate pursuit of opportunity invented stories using my name to ingratiate themselves to the unstable and intended recipient to flower their limitations. Be advised that I know everything that happened and was said about me and caused sorrows and tears to many who became victims in my name. My heart bleeds and my eyes tear ceaseless by that several people were humiliated after they have been labelled Job Sikhala sympathizers. Blackmailing is the art of foolishness through distorting someone’s name for the purpose of opportunism. Thank you very much, from the bottom of my heart, to all those who are standing with me in Zimbabwe and worldwide. Your love is recorded and will never be forgotten. I was stunned with the swift response of love after the visit by my children here in prison bidding me farewell back to school, in tears that I haven’t paid their school fees and that they were going back to school without supplementary needs. I warned them that tears are not good under whatever circumstances. Rather they must thank God, to have a father, who afforded them education at good schools at the time when I was not deprived of my responsibilities to fend for them through incarceration. There are children of victims of oppression in memory history who became angry at their fathers for being incarcerated for a cause. I told them that Nelson Mandela’s children suffered untold poverty and humiliation in the hands of his oppressors until God raised good men and women who ameliorated their misery, so they must brace for the worst and that they must start to disabuse their mindset from thinking that the situation is till the same. Swiftly, my good lawyer Harrison Nkomo, despite having spent hundreds of hours representing me for free on the Moreblessing Ali cases, paid fees for my two daughters at boarding schools. Honourable David Coltart through the Family Trust paid Fidel’s fees. Honourable Rusty Markham, my new Member of Parliament for my new domicile, Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison, came on board with some significant contributions to my other son’s school fees who is doing ‘A’ level. I would also want to thank Hopewell Chin'ono for his unweavering friendship and support. Such love is not taken for granted. It is a mark that will live forever in my heart. I thank you brothers. I also would like to thank all those who helped my family during my difficult times. The greatness of man and women is seen by what they say and do for others during times of trials and tribulations. If need be, I will direct my wife to sell every property of ours to the last spoon to sustain my family during the period of my incarceration occasioned by my oppressors. It is foolish for anyone to underestimate my inner resolve to suffer any consequences for the cause I am standing for. I did not commit any crime. I am a subject of tyrannical oppression because of my political beliefs that will never be changed by anyone even under the threat of a gun pointed on my head. Pray for me, pray for Zimbabwe, I love you all!!!!!!!! By Job Sikhala Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison Job Sikhala: The agony of betrayal

NewsHawks News Page 9 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 A ZAMBIAN telecommunications company, Rock Telecom Limited, had its 81 540 mobile phones worth US$352 930 confiscated by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra) after it tried to smuggle them out of the country. The matter recently spilled into the High Court after efforts to retrieve the mobile phones from Zimra hit a brick wall. However, the High Court has dismissed the company’s application after hearing both parties. Rock Telecom wanted an order   declaring that Zimra’s forfeiture of its Tecno mobile phones is grossly irregular. The company argued that Zimra failed to take into account the fact that the applicant was not involved in the violation of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02]. The company also said Zimra’s forfeiture of its mobile phones was grossly harsh, excessive and unfair because the authority could have imposed a penalty which is provided for by the laws. Rock Telecom also said Zimra was unfair because it failed to treat it in the same way that it treated other parties which committed similar offences in the past. High Court judge, Justice David Mangota dismissed the application, noting that its arguments lacked merit. “It follows, from a reading of the above-analysed matters, that the applicant’s last ground of review is devoid of merit. It is dismissed as well. “The applicant, it is evident, failed to prove its case on a balance of probabilities. “The application is, in the result, dismissed with costs,” he ruled. Rock Telcom had submitted that in October 2022, it imported 96820 Tecno mobile phones from China. These were to be delivered to Zambia which is its country of domicile. It engaged a transporter,Allied Customs Freight who lodged a manifest and its clearing agent registered a bill of entry. At the point of entry of the goods into Zimbabwe, Zimra’s officials conducted a physical examination of its goods. They discovered that the goods which the clearing agent declared were less than what was being transported as a result of which they seized its mobile phones. It was discovered that 81 540 mobile phones with a value of US$352 930 were not declared. Rock Telecom it avers, declared only 9000 mobile phones with a value of US$9 000. According to court papers, the company wrote Zimra advising that its agent, and not it, under-declared the goods. The agent, it claimed, had been provided with all the paperwork for the goods. It took its case to Zimra’s regional manager who did not believe its submissions. He ruled that the goods were liable to forfeiture. The company approached Zimra’s commissioner for customs and excise who confirmed the decision of the regional manager. It, as a final resort, approached Zimra’s commissioner-general arguing that forfeiture of the goods which were never consumed or intended to be consumed in Zimbabwe was a drastic punishment. Rock Telecoms persuaded the commissioner-general to impose other forms of punishment which the law provided to him instead of forfeiture. The company argued that another company, Gatbro International Limited, Zambia whose circumstances were on all fours with its own case was treated more leniently than it was by Zimra who, according to it, offered release terms to Gatbro International Limited. Zimra opposed the application. According to Zimra, on 3 November 2022, its Forbes Border commercial release desk issued an order for physical examination of Rock Telecoms goods after they observed that the same were grossly under-valued. Zimra  avers that, on 4 November 2022, the company’s clearing agent, Allied Customs Freight, requested a waiver for the physical examination of the goods which the respondent declined. It asserts that it instructed the clearing agent to arrange to do the physical examination of the goods. The agent, it claims, made a further appeal to the acting customs manager for physical examination waiver claiming that the  Zimra’s GMS would be held liable in the event that the goods are, in any way, damaged or if the same reach their destination with a shortage. The appeal was refused. The agent, according to Zimra  refused to co-operate resulting in its officials clamping the motor vehicle which carried the applicant’s goods. On examination, it was discovered that 81540 mobile phones with a value of US$352 930 were not declared. The undeclared goods, it states, were detained on notice of seizure number 041064 L of 22 November, 2022. The clearing agent, it avers, was advised of his right to make written representations to the regional manager requesting release of the goods. Allied Customs Freight unsuccessfully made written representations to the regional manager, the commissioner of customs and excise, as well as to the commissioner-general of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. It claims that the goods which were the subject-matter of the offence were liable to forfeiture in terms of s 188 (2) of the Act. Zimra successfully argued that the duty to make sure that a correct declaration is made at the point of entry falls upon the importer and the transporter. It distinguished the case of the applicant from that of Gatbro International-Zambia stating that the quantities in the two cases are not the same. Zimra said Rock Telecom  declared only 13 000 mobile phones with a value of US$9 000 which were assessed to US$54 930 free on board value. It avers that 81 540 mobile phones with a duty value of US$352 792.80 were not declared, adding that the punishment was fair. In handing down his ruling Mangota Mangota said it is trite that, in any sentencing process, the moral turpitude of the offender plays a pivotal role. “The applicant’s moral blameworthiness cannot be wished away. It is very high by any standard. “It under-declared the goods which it was importing in a most unacceptable manner. “The reasons which the respondent advances for acting in the manner that it did cannot be faulted,” said the judge.  Rock Telecom said the surety it gave was insufficient. The judge agreed that the decision which it took was the only way to deter smuggling of goods. “The respondent cannot be said to have acted irregularly given the circumstances of the present case. The law supports the approach which it took of the applicant’s case He said the applicant, as a business entity, should always make the effort to act honestly in its dealings with other persons, governments of the countries through which its goods pass on their way to it in particular. “If Zimra fails to act in circumstances such as what occurred with the goods of the applicant, the respondent will be failing in its duty to bring to book people or business entities which have their goods pass through this country. “Punishments which the respondent imposes should bring to the business community, within and without, Zimbabwe that dishonesty has no room and is not tolerated in this country. “The sentencing adage which states that punishment should fit the crime and the offender holds true in the present case. “This is a fortiori the case where, as in casu, the applicant had the apparent intention to under-declare its goods for its own unknown reasons,” ruled the judge. The judge also said whilst the case of Gatbro International Limited was one of negligence, the applicant’s case was, it would appear, one of a clear intention to smuggle the goods into Zimbabwe. “The moral turpitude of the two entities are markedly different from each other. “The gravity of the applicant’s moral blameworthiness accounts for the difference in the treatment of the applicant from that of Gatbro International Limited, Zambia. “It follows, from a reading of the above analysed matters, that the applicant’s last ground of review is devoid of merit. It is dismissed as well.” — STAFF WRITER. Zimra confiscates new Zambian cellphones worth US$350 000 Zimra says Rock Telecom declared only 13 000 mobile phones.

Page 10 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 NINE people have been confirmed dead following the collapse of a mining shaft at Bay Horse Mine in Chakari, Chegutu, according to officials. The mine, owned by Tendai Sigauke, collapsed on Friday morning while 34 miners were underground. According to Mines minister Soda Zhemu, a total of 13 miners managed to escape unhurt immediately while eight were rescued on Friday night. Despite indications that retrieving the remaining bodies is almost impossible, Zhemu said they are hoping for the best. "Some big minds have been approached and they are in the process of providing assistance ... not only that, we have also managed to come and also give assistance. "A variety of stakeholders have come to this place to also see how best they can give assistance. "It's a very difficult thing  to respond to the question  whether  it will be easy or difficult to remove  those  trapped. It all depends with the people that have gone underground. But from the report that they gave, it shows that about 100 metres by 20 metres is what actually collapsed in. It requires removal of the boulders that have just closed the way.  "So at this point, I wouldn't be very certain to say it is going to be easy, it's going to be difficult unless a report has been provided," said the minister. Giving an update ont the situation underground, Bay Horse mine blasting engineer Hussein Phiri said they are finding it difficult to get to some of the bodies. "We could clearly count six bodies but it is difficult to get to them because that side is still collapsing. "What is making it more difficult is that there is a boulder above them and we have to get through to reach them. "The boulder has to be removed but we fear that the moment we move it the mine will also collapse on us," he said. He added: "We are expecting to retrieve six bodies, but we have not located three miners, so we have to keep searching. "We will do the best but the challenge is that the mine is still collapsing," he said. Phiri said they are convinced that all miners located are dead. "They are all dead. We haven't managed to reach them but we could see they are dead," he said. Most of the mine workers who were interviewed said there are no safety measures at the mine. "This is a registered mine, but the owner has not been following safety measured as provided for by the laws. "There are no pillars to support the ground and we were at risk because the shaft is open like a playing ground with nothing to support it. "We asked him to solve this problem but our requests fell on deaf ears," said a miner who only identified himself as Tawanda. Over a thousand mourners, including families of the victims, were at the site waiting to identify bodies of their loved ones. The minister also  stayed  at the mine for the rest of the day as rescuers made efforts to retrieve those who are trapped. — STAFF WRITER. Chegutu mine disaster death toll rises Nine people died when a shaft they were working on collapsed on Friday at Bay Horse Mine outside Chegutu. — Picture: Aaron Ufumeli

NewsHawks News Page 11 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 Bay Horse Mine disaster in pics — Pictures: Aaron Ufumeli

Page 12 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 OVER two million (2 062 290) voters failed to vote in the just-ended 23 and 24 August 2023 elections, according to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec), which is almost a third of the total 6 691 691 registered voters. Zimbabwe has a total population of 15.1 million (2022 Population and Housing Census preliminary report), with over half of the population being eligible to vote. This raises concerns of the socio-economic and geopolitical barriers which stood in the way of many people’s electoral participation. Some of the worst affected areas are mineral-rich communities, which often lag behind when it comes to civic participation, yet they are always affected by the decisions made by the status quo. One such area is Zvishavane in the Midlands Province, which harbours mining giants such as Mimosa, Murowa Diamonds and Sabi Gold mine. It is also home of the former asbestos giant, Shabanie mine. Zvishavane is also a hub for small-scale and artisanal mining activity as well as common gold rushes which characterise the area. The rampant artisanal mining activities come with a lot of migration and these miners, commonly referred to as “makorokoza”, are among the most difficult groups of people to reach out to in Zimbabwe. The miners also face accessibility challenges as they are often located deep in the forests, where there is limited access to information and services. For 20-year-old Clotilda Zivanai, 2023 would have been her first time as a voter. She moved from Sanyati, Kadoma to Zvishavane with her husband who is a small-scale miner. Zivanai does not have a national identity card and efforts to get the ID in Zvishavane were futile. “I went to the registrar’s offices and I was told that I could only get documentation in Kadoma where I grew up. I could not afford to travel to Kadoma, hence I ended up not registering to vote,” she said. Her husband also failed to register to vote because his temporary paper ID documentation was said to be invalid and he was told to get a plastic ID in Kadoma. Zivanai and her husband were not the only ones affected by the issue of documentation. Blessing Mwembe from Binga also moved to Zvishavane with her husband who works in a mine. “My paper ID was torn and I was told to get a new ID. I went to the registrar in Zvishavane four times with no luck. They kept making excuses about not having ink and paper until it was past the time of registering to vote and I gave up,” she said. Mwembe says she voted using the same ID in Binga in 2013, but could not register under the Biometric Voter Registration system which was introduced during the 2018 electoral cycle. Last year, parliamentarians raised concerns over the issuance of temporary paper national IDs, saying they are not accepted anywhere. There were also complaints over thousands of citizens who are undocumented. Following the complaints, the Department of the Registrar-General conducted a six-month mobile exercise issuing birth certificates and IDs countrywide. However, it would seem that this exercise did not necessarily solve the documentation problem as in most areas people were given temporary documents which they cannot use anywhere. Most people also failed to find their names on the voters’ roll on election day, leading to many being turned away. Elizabeth Mlambo, an elderly citizen, moved from Manicaland Province in 1986 with her family. They currently live in Sabi vlei in Mazvihwa. “I voted well in the primary elections but when I went to vote for the President on 23 August I could not find my name. I had gone to confirm if my name was there when the Zec teams were doing a mobile registration exercise and I was told my name was there only for me to be turned away on the day of voting,” she said. Her granddaughter Rudo Moyana also faced a similar challenge. “I registered during the mobile exercise and could not get a receipt slip. When I went on voting day, I could not find my name,” Moyana said. Small-scale mining communities are also affected by poor flow of information, including that relating to electoral processes. Most of the miners were affected by the delimitation process as they were not aware of the changes in boundaries. Samuel Rimai, who comes from Chipinge but currently conducts small-scale mining in Zvishavane, says he and his peers changed their polling stations from Chipinge to Zvishavane but for some reason their names were not found when they wanted to vote. “We feel like we do not belong anywhere because we are always mobile. I hope in the future there are mechanisms put in place to recognise everyone regardless of their place of origin,” said Rimai. Midlands province, which is home to many mining communities like Zvishavane, Shurugwi, Kwekwe and Mberengwa, had a total of 840 961 registered voters. While most people seem to have been denied their right to vote for one reason or another, they often lag behind in terms of service delivery and infrastructure development. A lot of exploitation happens in the areas with little given back to the community, which tends to suffer from the poor resources management hence they remain the most underdeveloped areas. “We don’t have water or toilets at our mines. We just camp there and work. We get water from a distant source and we use bush toilets making us vulnerable to all kinds of diseases,” Rimai said — STAFF WRITER. Resource curse and electoral participation in mining hubs

NewsHawks News Page 13 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 ZIMBABWE’S human rights record has continued worsening on President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s watch over the past five years, amid calls for the government to adhere to constitutionalism to protect people’s rights, a new report has revealed. According to the latest review published this week by human rights watchdog Amnesty International titled "Zimbabwe: Human Rights Under Attack", the country has failed to remedy the repressive legacy left by Mnangagwa’s predecessor, the late Robert Mugabe.  The report, which reviews the human rights situation in the period between 2018 and 2023, has urged the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community to pay close attention to the deteriorating human rights situation to ensure safety of Zimbabweans. “Amnesty International further calls upon the African Union (AU) to pay close attention to the deteriorating human rights situation in Zimbabwe. Amnesty International requests that the AU call on Zimbabwe to uphold its human rights obligations under the AU Constitutive Actand the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. “The organisation has previously called upon Heads of State and Government in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to redouble their efforts to ensurethe Zimbabwe authorities end human rights violations in the country. “Electoral processes in Zimbabwe have traditionally been characterised by increasedviolations of human rights. SADC must play a role to ensure that Zimbabweans are safe and that authorities uphold human rights before, during and after all elections.” Findings by the review show that the government has ramped up efforts to suppress human rights, with individuals who speak out or organise protests facing persecution, and with family members being targeted and harassed in order to intimidate activists. “Abductions have also been on the rise, further exacerbating the human rights situation. Although the Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of expression, journalists, opposition party members and critics of the government who speak out on and offline are harassed or arrested for speaking out against human rights violations,” reads the report. “Activists and political party leaders have been criminalised for exercising their right to dissent. Socio-economic rights continue to be eroded in Zimbabwe with access to healthcare being inadequate, especially for women and girls’ enjoyment of sexual and reproductive rights.” Amnesty International says the Mnangagwa regime has introduced repressive tools to close the civic space over the past five years, a continuation from Mugabe who in 2002 assented to the now repealed Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Aippa). The provisions of Aippa were used by the government to silence dissenting voices, with at least 21 journalists arrested and charged under various provisions of the Act in 2003, a year after its inception. Mnangagwa has however introduced repressive laws which include: the Cyber and Data Protection Act [Chapter 12:07] (No. 5 of 2021); the Freedom of Information Act, 2020 (which replaces Aippa); and the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act [Chapter 11:23]. The draconian Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill, H.B. 10, 2021 has since lapsed before presidential assent. “This legislative agenda is not dissimilar to the “tools of repression” introduced by the Mugabe government at the turn of the millennium. Instead, the Zimbabwean government has carried on in the same tradition, using the law as an instrument of oppression and a means of cracking down on human rights.” Mnangagwa has been under fire for violently thwarting the constitutional right to protest, in tactics similar to the Mugabe playbook, according to the review. For instance, six unarmed citizens were killed by the military in the wake of the 1 August 2018 shootings in which opposition MDC-Alliance supporters were protesting the delay in the release of the 2018 general election results. “The delay in releasing the election results may have caused anxiety among the electorate due to past events. In 2008, the presidential election took place on 29 March, but the results were not announced until 2 May 2008. The Chairperson of the election management body attributed the delay to the need for ‘meticulous verification of the results’,” reads the review. “In the aftermath of the announcement of the results, and consequently, the need for a run-off, Mugabe engaged in a violent campaign that resulted in the death of over 200 Zimbabweans. Even before the 2018 polls had been held, there were several reports of intimidation against the electorate that were reminiscent of the Mugabe government. “The period leading up to the 30 July election was marred by reports of intimidation in rural areas. Military personnel and intelligence agents were deployed to villages and sometimes went to people’s homes, particularly in Mutoko and Domboshava in Mashonaland East, telling villagers to ‘vote right’.” Security forces also violently quashed the January 2019 fuel protests called for by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), after Mnangagwa had announced an increase in fuel prices, raising outrage. In the aftermath of the protests, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) reportedly treated 343 people for injuries. Among these cases, 78 individuals had suffered gunshot wounds, while four had been bitten by dogs, according to the review. — STAFF WRITER. Mnangagwa’s human rights record atrocious — Amnesty President Emmerson Mnangagwa’

Page 14 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 OWEN GAGARE AFTER stuffing his cabinet with ethnic cronies, clansmen, friends and relatives, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has continued to reward longtime allies by preparing space for them on the feeding trough. This week, Mnangagwa appointed his political loyalist and homeboy — with whom he has some familial relations from the Midlands province — special adviser to the President responsible for Monitoring and Implementation of government programmes. His very close allay, former Justice ministry permanent secretary Virginia Mabhiza, was appointed Zimbabwe’s new Attorney-General. The AG is an ex-officio member of cabinet. Another key Zanu PF factional political crony, Mike Madiro, was appointed National Railways of Zimbabwe chairperson, granting him a slot on the state feeding trough. Mnangagwa also appointed his relative Martin Rushwaya — a cousin — the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet to replace Misheck Sibanda, another relative, in a brazen display of nepotism bordering on corruption. Sibanda retired. Rushwaya, former Defence ministry permanent secretary, was Sibanda's deputy since Mnangagwa came to power in 2017. Gumbo was a vital cog in Mnangagwa’s machinery during Zanu PF’s factional battle during his long stint as the party’s chief whip. He was the ruling party’s chief whip from 1995 to 2015, where he used his position to quietly recruit legislators for the Mnangagwa faction, while also advancing factional agendas using influence. Mabhiza is very close to Mnangagwa. The two worked together when Mnangagwa was Justice minister in 2013. Mnangagwa continued to oversee the ministry’s operations when he was appointed vice-president in 2014 after the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from Zanu PF and government. As Justice secretary, Mabhiza pulled the strings for the Mnangagwa faction on legal matters and appointments to ensure he ascended to the presidency. This included clandestinely retiring the late former Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, who was associated with the G40 faction, which had rallied around Mugabe and his wife Grace, as they prepared room for Chief Justice Luke Malaba, a Mnangagwa loyalist. Mugabe reversed the retirement. Mabhiza also played crucial roles alongside Justice minister Ziyambi Ziyambi to push for Constitutional Amendment number 1 and 2 Acts, which buttressed Mnangagwa’s power consolidation. The Acts allow Mnangagwa to extend Chief Justice Luke Malaba’s term beyond 70, enabling him to be in office during the 2023 elections, so that he superintends over electoral challenges, before and after the elections. The judiciary, with Malaba as the head, played an important role in the 23 August elections passing a number of controversial judgements including barring Saviour Kasukuwere from contesting the presidential elections and dismissing applications for the opposition to be given access to the voters roll among other things. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.1) Act changed the procedure for the appointment of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and the Judge President of the High Court. The president, after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), now makes the appointments, without the need for public interviews, thereby opening the door to promotions on the basis of political suitability and cronyism. It allows judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court to continue to serve beyond the current retirement age of 70, if the President, after consulting the JSC, consents to their doing so.  This strips judges of their security of tenure and hence their independence, since they will hold office from year to year subject to the President’s consent. The acts concentrated power in the president personally by removing the running mate clause to allow the president to choose vice-presidents after his or her election ensuring they hold office at the president’s pleasure. The Act further allowed the President to appoint up to seven ministers from outside Parliament — from five previously — thereby extending the president’s power to control his cabinet as well as extending his powers of patronage. In addition, the amendments changed the procedures of the appointment and dismissal of Prosecutor General, which were similar to that of a judge. The Act altered this by removing the need for public interviews of candidates before the President appoints the PG. The president was given the ultimate discretion to decide whether or not a PG should be dismissed. Mabhiza was also in the thick of things in quarrels among Zimbabwe Electoral Commissioners as she sought to influence decisions, resulting in clashes with Zec chair Priscilla Chigumba. Mnangagwa has also rewarded Madiro, his longtime allay, by appointing him to chair the NRZ board. He was one of the six Zanu PF chairpersons who were dismissed by Mugabe for supporting Mnangagwa during the controversial Tsholotsho Declaration in 2004. The chairpersons were accused of plotting Mnangagwa’s rise to the deputy presidency ahead of former vice-president Joice Mujuru, but with the ultimate aim of succeeding Mugabe. Mnangagwa used a classic dictator’s handbook to appoint his sons into his administration in a brazen act of patronage, nepotism and cronyism. The President, who was re-elected in the disputed general elections, courted widespread derision after selecting a cabinet that has been condemned for being weak and having a nepotistic bent. He appointed his son, David Kudakwashe Mnangagwa, nephew Tongai Mnangagwa and many of his cronies. Kudakwashe was appointed deputy Finance minister while Tongai landed the post of Tourism deputy minister without any known track records. One of Mnangagwa’s twin sons is an army captain. His wife Auxillia, who has now surpassed Grace Mugabe in public flexing of the muscle of power, is sometimes sent on government business even though she is not a public official, for instance to Iran and Belarus. In so doing, Mnangagwa effectively joined the likes of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, former US president Donald Trump, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and certainly Filipino kleptocrat Ferdinand Marcos, among others, in abusing power and office. This is in contrast to Kenyan President William Ruto who said recently that he will never appoint any family member to his government. Mnangagwa’s nepotistic and appalling move smacks of corruption, kakistocracy, mediocracy and kleptocracy, observers said. Kakistocracy basically means a government run by the least suitable or competent people, while kleptocracy is rule by thieves. Mnangagwa’s action raises a number of critical issues which span the central question of meritocracy, “our time to eat mentality” that implies greed and corruption, governance, leadership succession and family dynasty. New Attorney-General Virginia Mabhiza Mnangagwa takes cronyism to new and shocking heights

NewsHawks News Page 15 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA LEGAL and parliamentary affairs watchdog Veritas has urged parliamentarians to reduce the effects of the Patriotic Act in the 10th Parliament, with the United Nations Human Rights Council calling out the draconian law for violating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In July, President Emmerson Mnangagwa controversially assented to amendments to the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act which criminalises fundamental freedoms of association, assembly and speech of any citizen who holds meetings with foreign diplomats or any other foreigner. The promulgation of Clause 2 of the amendment, also known as the “Patriotic Act”, has plunged the country into the dark days reminiscent of the oppressive Rhodesian colonial era. This week, Veritas said Parliament should consider lessening the effects of amendments to the Act, which have been flagged by the rapporteurs for being inconsistent with the ICCPR. Zimbabwe being a signatory to.the covenant, is bound to comply. “With the opening of the Tenth Parliament of Zimbabwe due very soon, we ask that the new parliamentarians also consider ameliorating the Act. Any response from the government, the (UN) Rapporteurs said, would be made public. We await the government’s response with interest,” reads the analysis. “The Rapporteurs looked at the new section 22A which the Act inserts in the Criminal Law Code and which creates the crime of “willfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe. Their comments, though couched in respectful diplomatic language, are highly critical. They find that the Act violates Zimbabwe’s obligations under international law.” According to the letter by the rapporteurs to Mnangagwa, Clause 2 is inconsistent with several sections of the ICCPR. “We refer your Excellency’s Government to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Zimbabwe acceded to on 13 May 1991, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),” reads the letter dated 16 August, by special rapporteurs Clement Nyaletsossi Voule, Morris Tidball-Binz, Irene Khan and Mary Lawlor on behalf of the UN Human Rights Council. “In particular, we would like to draw your Excellency’s Government’s attention to articles 6, 7, 9, 17, 19, 21, 22 and 25 of the ICCPR which guarantee, respectively, the right to life, that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security of persons and to be free from arbitrary detention, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the right to participate in public affairs. “We would also specifically like to underline that the ‘principle of legal certainty’ under international law, enshrined in articles 9(1) and 15 of the ICCPR and article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), requires that criminal laws are sufficiently precise so it is clear what types of behaviour and conduct constitute a criminal offence and what would be the consequence of committing such an offence.” The rapporteurs also urged the government to consider repealing section 22A – which carries a death penalty, as it is inconsistent with the international law on the protection of civic rights. “We respectfully urge your Excellency’s Government to consider repealing section 22A of the Act in its entirety and to refrain from adopting any such provisions which restrict rather than enable and protect the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and association. “According to the Act, any association whose activity has the purpose of “willfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe” (section 22A (1) will be subject to criminal sanctions. “We would first like to emphasise that any restriction on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association on the basis of 'national interest' is not permitted under international human rights law. 'National interest' is indeed not a valid ground to restrict these freedoms under articles 19, 21 and 22 of the ICCPR.” Rising outrage against Patriotic Act

Page 16 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA THE 2023 Africa Risk Index (ARI) by research firms Control Risks and Oxford Economics Africa has classified Zimbabwe as Africa’s riskiest country to do business in, while trailing regional neighbours. The index, which scans the political and macro-economic conditions of 54 African nations, measures country risk in detail, to caution against pitfalls while guiding investors towards economic opportunities. The South African-based think-tank, Oxford Economics Africa, is a majority-owned subsidiary of UK-based Oxford Economics that specialises in political and macro-economic research across the continent. “The risk scores for each country stem from the Economic and Political Risk Evaluator (EPRE), a joint subscription platform of Control Risks Oxford Economics Africa. Control Risks and Oxford Economics analysts rate a series of political and economic risk factors on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 representing the highest level of risk,” reads the index. “Each political and economic rating is assigned a default weight, based on its significance in the country context and its potential impact on business. The individual political and economic risk variables are then combined – multiplying rating by weighting – into the overall risk rating of a country,” reads the index.” According to the report, Zimbabwe has a risk score of 7.65 points and a low reward score of 2.53, tallying with Nigeria with a similar risk score, but with a reward score of 5.5. Ethiopia comes second with a high risk score of 7.64 respectively. In the Southern African Development Community (Sadc), Mauritius has the lowest risk of doing business with 3.52 out of 10 points, followed by Botswana with 4.06 points, while Namibia has a fair score of 4.42 points. South Africa also has a lower risk score of 5.06, followed by Malawi with 5.67 and Zambia with 5.73 points. Mozambique with 6.62 points trails the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), while Zimbabwe has the highest score. “The reward scores incorporate medium-term economic growth forecasts, economic size, economic structure and demographics. “The economic growth outlook has the biggest weight in the reward score, as investment opportunities multiply where economic growth is strong. But the absolute size of the economy makes a difference, too: the 3.2% real GDP growth in Nigeria in 2022, for example, represented extra value added of nearly US$44bn, while 8.2% growth in Rwanda translated into just under US$2.3bn in new value added. “So our score also incorporates a weight for economy size. The economic structure indicator derives from the “economic structure risk” component of Oxford Economics Africa’s country risk assessment model, which takes into account debt metrics, the current account, financial structure (including banking sector stability) and investment. “Demographics are incorporated through the formulation of a demographic dividend, which incorporates population size, urbanisation and dependency ratios.” According to the index, a wave of discontent is likely to be the highest challenge the continent’s food and energy crisis. “Agriculture and trade infrastructure sectors are at the centre of debates on solutions. They will open up new opportunities – and risks – for investors in the coming years. Political stability will likely be the biggest challenge in realising the continents energy transition and food security ambitions,” reads the report. Southern Africa’s economic growth has been predicted to decline. In May, the African Development Bank (AfDB) forecast a 1.1 percentage point slump in Sadc’s economic growth, from an estimated 2.7% in 2022 to 1.6% in 2023, largely owing to the continual weakness of South Africa, the region’s largest economy and trading partner. South Africa, Sadc’s largest economy (60% of the region’s GDP) and main trading partner, recorded a 2% real GDP growth in 2022, less than half the growth rate in 2021 (4.9%), due to subdued global demand, power outages, and devastating floods that affected industrial production. “A build-up in inflationary pressures also affected household consumption spending, a key driver of growth in South Africa. South Africa’s close trade ties with other countries in Southern Africa means that shocks buffeting the country are transmitted to the rest of the region. Countries in the Common Monetary Area and the Southern African Customs Union experience near-symmetrical shocks to those affecting South Africa. “Protracted delays in addressing South Africa’s worsening energy crisis, coupled with operational and financial weaknesses in state-owned entities and slow progress in implementing reforms, will keep the country’s growth below emerging market peers. Growth in the region will thus remain subdued, with real output projected to decelerate to 1.6% in 2023 before rising to 2.7% in 2024,” AfDB says. Zim has worst risk profile in Sadc

NewsHawks News Page 17 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 NYASHA DUBE NEWLY elected councillor for Mhototi ward 16 under Runde Rural Development Committee in Zvishavane district, Emmanuel Mhike (35) of Zanu PF, knows he is under a lot of public scrutiny because of his age, but says he is keen to deliver. "Being a young councillor in a rural area is no child's play because of the socio-cultural structures that exist in our communities," says Mhike. Mhike is the youngest councillor in Runde RDC, and the first to be elected at such a young age. His journey begins in rural Mazvihwa as the 22nd royal child out of 23 children born to Chief Mazvihwa. He attended Gudo Primary School and Gwavachemai Secondary School, and later Mandava High School for his Advanced Levels. He read for his undergraduate and master's degrees in development studies at Midlands State University. He is a published author, who also pursued a career in community development under Muonde Trust, a community-based organisation. Mhike says he had no interests in politics until last year, when he was encouraged to contest following the impact he was making in the rural community. "I did a lot of community and resource mobilisation as an individual and at professional level. I created soccer and netball clubs for young people in my community and even engaged former students, some who had moved to cities and abroad to give back to the community. We managed to construct school blocks at Gudo, Mhototi, Gwemombe Dip and Baradzamwa primary schools solely sponsored by former students. They also donated printers in schools,” he said. He adds that there is a huge gap in youth political participation in rural communities. "During my work I saw a lot of youth needs, especially the need for civic and political participation. It felt like political participation was reserved for the elderly in the communities regardless of politics shaping the daily lives of the young people. When I first started my campaign, I faced a lot of backlash and criticism which was mainly centred on my age, despite all the work I had done to uplift the community before joining politics," Mhike said. Asked on his role as a councillor and how he plans to fulfill this role, Mhike says he will focus more on representing young people. "I understand that my major role is representation and I am going to represent young people's socio-economic needs. This means improving the quality of education through lobbying for solar-powered facilities in schools and bringing ICT to rural areas. There is also need for more secondary schools as there is only one school. “I will also make sure to link young people with economic opportunities, especially in mining as our community is largely dominated by mining activities," Mhike said. He adds that youth participation in community issues has improved following his election as councillor as they are motivated by seeing their peer in a position of power. "I believe me being a councillor has changed rural communities' perceptions of what a councillor is expected to do. Usually people approach the councillor with issues which are outside his/her mandate, but I am committed to change the narrative and work with the council to engage communities on civic participation and information literacy," Mhike said. Mhike also challenged other young elected councillors, members of Parliament and cabinet ministers to be up to the task and also collaborate with the elders who have been in the political race. "We have to remain standing and prove the critics. I also encourage my peers in various political administrations to engage those who have been in the field for longer as they know the way better. Some may not be as educated as we are but they surely have the experience we are looking for. It's upon us to introduce new ideas which are in line with the advancing digital technology and uplift other young people. To young people in my community, you can also instill hope into the future generation despite your age," Mhike said. Youth councillor committed to changing political narrative Councillor for Mhototi ward 16 under Runde Rural Development Committee in Zvishavane district, Emmanuel Mhike

Page 18 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA WHILE Zimbabwe is targeting 5.2% economic growth in 2024, this will be largely dependent on key issues such as massive investment in public service delivery, fiscal discipline, good governance and the curtailment of illicit financial flows, according to a new report by a social justice watchdog, the Zimbabwe Coalition for Debt and Development (Zimcodd). The country has been dogged by illicit financial and mineral flows which, for instance, leading to the loss of an estimated US$1.2 billion in gold every year and Treasury approving loans without Parliament’s authorisation in violation of the constitutional tenet of accountability. In its 2024 Budget Strategy Paper released last month, Treasury said it is targeting to collect 19.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in tax revenue, underpinned by tax administration initiatives to enhance tax enforcement and compliance as well as adoption of technology. According to an analysis of the 2024 Budget Strategy Paper by Zimcodd, the country is facing numerous risks that are likely to slow down the projected economic growth. “There remain many risks to the second half of 2023 (2HY23) economic outlook that can slow down economic activity. For instance, the August 2023 presidential election result is contested, which will compromise the legitimacy of the declared winner,” reads the analysis. “Other risks of disputed election include inter alia squandering of public assets, corruption and impunity, political violence, sour international relations, and capital flight.” Adds the report: “The nation, together with other Sadc member states, is also projected to experience drought weather conditions for the 2023/24 season thus greatly subduing agricultural activity. Elevated fiscal spending is expected in 2HY23 and beyond as the government seeks to cushion the economy and citizens from a likely drought that will threaten Zimdollar and price stability.” Zimcodd says growth will largely depend on good governance. “The economy is projected to grow by 5.2% but this is largely dependent on good governance, curtailing illicit financial flows, massive investment in public service delivery, climate mitigation and smart agriculture, fiscal discipline among others,” reads the Zimcodd report. “Strong and effective institutions are critical for optimum governance that foster transparency, accountability and responsibility. The 2024 budget will set aside resources for institution building.  The targeted institutions include the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (Zacc), Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and Judicial Service Commission (JSC). The targeted institutions have an oversight, watchdog and ombudsman role that is prerequisite for good governance and resource utilisation accountability.” Treasury's latest economic growth projection is a shift from 3.8% forecast in the previous budget strategy paper, and even higher than the African Development Bank's projected 3.2% growth between 2023 and 2024, largely owing to the country’s volatile economy. “The severe macro-economic fluctuations witnessed in the first half of 2023 (1HY23) derailed some key assumptions underpinning the 2023 budget such as stable local currency (ZWL), low inflation, and increased electricity production,” reads the report. “The fluctuations greatly subdued business activity by sending production costs haywire. Also, the resultant hyperinflation eroded the real value of earnings, subdued social service delivery, and plunged many citizens into poverty.” Zimcodd adds: “This compelled authorities to institute a plethora of policy measures to tame instability. Statistics show that Zimdollar depreciation and price growth moderated in July 2023 through August 2023. As a result, authorities now expect national output (GDP) to grow by 5.3% in 2023, up from initial projections of 3.8%.” Zimcodd said the government should target key priority areas which include social protection to address the humanitarian crisis facing the nation. According to the analysis, 3.8 million rural people are facing food insecurity, while a further 1.8 million urban people are facing food insecurity. Approximately 3.5 million children are chronically hungry, while about 60% of rural girls and women encounter period poverty by lacking access to menstrual supplies and education. An estimated 68% of pre-primary aged children (3-5 years) and 47% adolescents (13- 18 years) are not in school, while 4.5 million children experienced loss of learning due to Covid-19 by early 2021.  No social justice without good governance: Zimcodd Zimcodd says 3.8 million rural people are facing food insecurity,

NewsHawks News Page 19 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 PRISCA TSHUMA WORKERS at clothing retailer Truworths have taken their boss to the National Employment Council (NEC) for the Commercial Sector in Zimbabwe for delaying the payment of salaries. This comes after employees had tried to resolve the issue with company management through meetings, also attended by chief executive officer Themba Ndebele. A letter from the NEC regarding the alleged non-payment of salaries of the 56 workers was addressed to management and copied to Brighton Mudambanuki, the complainant and workers' representative. “In order to resolve the matter amicably, you are invited to call at the Council Offices, No 16 Luck Street, Rangano House, Kopje, Harare on 29 September 2023 at 10.00 am for a meeting with the undersigned. By copy of this letter the complainant is advised to attend the meeting,” reads the letter. On two occasions, Ndebele has denied to The NewsHawks that workers are not receiving their salaries. But the employees told The NewsHawks that management failed to fulfil its promises to resolve the issue within a month in August this year. A worker who spoke on condition of anonymity said they had trusted management since the company had issued a rights offer to raise capital for the business. “The operations [manager] is the one who said after one month we will see what we can do, but nothing is materialising,” the worker said. The worker said the uncertainty in the company is what pushed employees to involve the NEC. “There is no proper communication on the investors. The human resources department doesn’t even address the workers on the position of the company,” complained an employee. Faced with growing competition and battling a weakening economy, the apparel retailer — that has prominent brands such as Topics and Number 1 Stores — has been scaling down on operations by closing some branches to stay afloat. Last month, the company raised ZW$2.2 billion for capital through issuing 384 067 512 renounceable rights offer shares. The workers hoped to be paid after that, while others pinned their hopes on fresh capital injection. “Grapevine says an investor injected US$500 000, but the CEO and operations department are fighting on decisions. The stores are still very empty whilst they are holding money,” lamented a worker. Despite all this, workers continue reporting for duty in the hope that they will eventually receive their salaries. Workers drag Truworths to NEC

Page 20 News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023 EFFORTS to block Tetrad Investment Bank (TIB)’s extraordinary general meeting (EGM) by one of its directors, Dimitrios Divaris, have flopped after the High Court struck off the roll his court application. Divaris is the executor of the estate of his late mother Vassilliki Divaris, who was a modelling and fashion guru. Vassilliki owned 454 890 minority shares in Tetrad. In December last year, another High Court judge, Pisirayi Kwenda, had granted Divaris interim relief that the EGM should not go ahead. He said if the EGM proceeded, its resolutions would cause irreparable harm to Divaris’ substantial financial interests. “The Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) for Tetrad Investment Bank scheduled for 16th December 2022 shall not proceed and shall only proceed subject to new notices in terms of the law,” Kwenda said. However, on 28 June 2023, Tetrad published a notice of an EGM. The EGM was scheduled to take place on 20 July 2023 and its purpose was to procure shareholder approval to change the nature of the company`s business. Tetrad`s directors had resolved to surrender the bank`s licence and set sights on venturing into property and real estate. Alarmed by this development, Divaris rushed to court with an urgent chamber application to stop the meeting. To him, the purported transformation of Tetrad from a bank to a realtor was unpalatably irrational. When he rushed to court, Divaris prayed for a prohibitory interdict staying the holding of the EGM. He intended to put a stop to all that. In addition, he attacked the same directors on other allegations of corporate misconduct. Divaris, among other arguments, contended that the EGM improperly pre-empted the finalisation of case number HCHC 82/23, this being an application he had filed in this court on 3 February 2023 seeking the placement of Tetrad under corporate rescue. He had filed this application as an “affected person”, in terms of section 124 (1) of the Insolvency Act. The application under HCHC 82-23 is still pending finalisation. His present application was opposed with Andre Lourence Vermaak deposing an affidavit in the capacity of a director of Tetrad. Tetrad was represented by its lawyer Hebert Mutasa. Divaris’ attorney, Listen  Zinyengere,  argued that corporate rescue proceedings commenced the instant that application was filed under HCHC 82/23. “The consequences of corporate rescue proceedings automatically kicked in,” he said. Zinyengere said the consequence was the suspension from office (and resultant cessation of function) of Tetrad`s directors. For that reason, the lawyer said Vermaak’s opposition to the present proceeding on behalf of Tetrad, was invalid. He said Vermaak had no mandate to act in the capacity of director. Tetrad, in response, argued that corporate rescue proceedings only started after an order to that effect was granted by the court. High Court Justice Joseph Chilimbe found for Tetrad. Chilimbe struck off Divaris' application, ruling that there was no matter before him because of filing defects. The court observed  that corporate rescue commences in two main ways, and each method triggered its own formalities. “Notwithstanding the clear guidance in Metallon Gold, Mr Mutasa for the respondent argued a contrary position. “He urged the court to distinguish that authority. And with considerable vehemence too. He submitted that corporate rescue proceedings commenced, not when an application was filed, but when an order was granted. I drew neither comfort nor conviction from counsel`s argument. He proffered no supportive authority for his position,” said the judge. Chilimbe said the law is clear that corporate rescue must be considered a process and not an event. The judge concurred with Divaris that the process commences upon the filing of an application. He said the troubled entity must be preserved at the earliest opportunity in order to accord the rescue practitioner the best possible chances of turning the entity round. Chilimbe ruled: “I am satisfied that corporate rescue proceedings for Tetrad commenced on 3 February 2023 upon the filing of HCHC 82-23.  This takes us to the residual issues on effect of rescue proceedings,” he said. The judge however noted that  during corporate rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement action, against the company, or in relation to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum. “This provision is similarly clear. No legal proceedings may be instituted or sustained against an entity under rescue. This is an old, established rule. But that bar is not absolute…” The judge said it became unnecessary to deal with the status of Tetrad`s directors. Zinyengere had impugned the authority of Vermaak as a director or Tetrad. Mutasa, in response, argued that the automatic suspension of directors upon the mere filing of an application created an absurdity. In this regard, the judge concurred, stating that the company would be instantly plunged into a legal and administrative vacuum. He ruled: “I do not have a proper application before me. What stands before me (and to borrow the observation in Chiwenga v Mubaiwa SC 86-20) is a matter burdened by 'misapprehensions of the law'. It will be struck off the roll. “It is therefore ordered that the application be and is hereby struck off the roll with each party bearing their own cost.” Tetrad’s board of directors wanted to pass a resolution to convert the financial institution with an asset portfolio of about US$13 million into a property management company. The institution retains significant residual value. The EGM is contentious as the board wants to use it to change the bank into a property management company and entrench itself against shareholders’ will and interests. Directors also want to remain in charge of the money-spinning property portfolio for personal benefits. Shareholders want a new board appointed because they have not received a return on investment for eight years now. The current management and board have not produced financials for three years, further angering shareholders. There has been so much controversy which saw TIB former acting board chairperson Appollinaire Ndorukwigira, a prominent economist resigning. In his resignation letter written to the board, dated 5 December 2023, Ndorukwigira said he quit because he strongly objected to the agenda of the upcoming EGM, particularly the proposal to transform the bank into a property management company. “The meeting of the board which took place on 1 December 2022 at the Pavilion, St George’s College (Harare), refers. In that meeting, I did strongly object to the proposed agenda of the Extraordinary General Meeting of the company as well as the proposed draft resolution to recommend the surrender of the banking licence and the proposed conversion of Tetrad Investment Bank into a property management company,” Ndorukwigira said. “As the records of the meeting would show, I did oppose that draft resolution on the basis that the proposed new business orientation is based on insufficient technical and financial data demonstrating the viability of the new property management company. “The executive management has failed to produce a credible business plan that would clearly demonstrate that shareholders would be better off by adopting the property management business model. The documentation sent to shareholders does not show the type of activities to be undertaken to improve the revenues of the company, other than collection of rental income of the current property portfolio over the next five years.” Ndorukwigira said as a result of the seemingly dodgy and self-serving proposal, he is opposed to the move to convert the bank to a property management company. After the resignation of Ndorukwigira, a Harare-based Burundian economist who is ex-special adviser to the executive secretary of the African Capacity Building Foundation, the bank’s board now comprises Misheck Mpiwa Chiwayo, John Alexander Brydone Graham, Harry John Orphanides and Andre Lourence Vermaak, all Zimbabweans. — STAFF WRITER. Divaris fails to block Tetrad EGM

NewsHawks News Page 21 Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 22 THE latest Georgian official found to have failed to declare a valuable property, as required by law, is David Peradze, head of Georgia Railway. It’s a pattern journalists have revealed before. In the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, near a popular resort area with a water park and arboretum, stands a two-story home with a minimalist exterior and a flat gray roof. Its entire second floor is ringed by one continuous balcony. Large glass doors look out onto a wellkempt lawn and garden, a sparkling blue swimming pool, and a tennis court. A gated driveway slopes down to an underground garage. This elegant villa belongs to a man named David Peradze. Since November 2017, he has been the director of Georgian Railway, the state company that manages the country’s strategically important rail transport system. But Peradze’s lavish home has never appeared in his asset declarations, which, as a government official, he is required to file every year. He has declared the plot of land on which it sits, however land records do not indicate that there is a villa on the site. The value of the home is unknown. A new investigation by OCCRP’s Georgian partner, Studio Monitor, also reveals several other omissions. Photos in which Peradze’s wife Tamar Kakhaia is tagged on Facebook show that she has a collection of luxury-brand shoes and accessories, including Prada and Dior purses and a Cartier bracelet. These items are sold online for between $3,520 and $8,000, and though all expenditures greater than 5,000 GEL (around $1,900) must be listed, Peradze has never declared any of these items. Reporters also found that Kahaia drives a Toyota RAV4 that is registered to her brother and is not included on her husband’s two most recent asset declarations. (Peradze did include a Toyota RAV4 on his declaration for his wife in several previous years. This may be a different vehicle.) Responding to reporters’ questions on Peradze’s behalf, Georgian Railway said that his villa is still being built, but it will be declared as required once completed. “As for the house, its construction has been going on for several years and is still not finished,” Georgian Railway wrote to Studio Monitor. “Some work is left, inInternational InvestigativeStories Head of state railway company of Georgia has undeclared villa David Peradze’s undeclared villa in Tbilisi, Georgia. Insert: Georgian Railway director David Peradze. Credit: Studio Monitor International Investigative Stories NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

International Investigative Stories Page 23 cluding the improvement of the drainage system, and [the villa] will be declared according to the rules when it passes final inspection.” When journalists visited the home, however, it appeared not only livable but actually occupied. Drone footage captured in September 2023 shows a woman hanging laundry on the balcony and children riding a bike and a scooter around the property. There are no visible signs of construction work, the lawn and garden are well manicured, and there is patio furniture on the deck. In addition, the SUV driven by Peradze’s wife has been spotted at the villa on five occasions. Regarding her luxury items, Georgian Railway responded that Kakhaia purchased them with her own money, and that any item which must be declared will be. “In David Peradze’s declaration, his wife’s personal income is indicated,” the state company wrote. “The aforementioned declared incomes provide for the wife’s personal consumption items and if any of them needs to be declared, they will be reflected in the declaration in the appropriate manner.” “As for the car, she definitely uses the family-owned Toyota RAV4,” the company added. OCCRP has already reported on problems with Georgia’s declaration system, which was adopted in 2017 as a corruption-fighting mechanism. But the penalty for failing to declare assets — a onetime fine — appears to be of little deterrence. Over half of the 346 officials whose declarations were checked by officials last year had omissions and inaccuracies, according to a report by Transparency International. “The [Peradze] case is a direct example of the violation of the obligation to declare,” says Sandro Kevkhishvili, an analyst at the Georgian chapter of Transparency International. “These cases must be sent to the prosecutor’s office for further investigation. Only an investigation can determine whether there are actually undocumented assets and various corruption crimes.” In his first five years as railway director, Peradze earned about $450,000 from his salary and other sources. His wife co-owns a small business from which she reported profits of $55,000 in the same period. The couple have also taken out a few hundred thousand dollars in mortgages in recent years. It is therefore plausible that the couple could afford their undeclared assets on their known incomes, making the failure to list them somewhat of a mystery. In response to a query from journalists, Georgia’s Anti-Corruption Bureau wrote that Peradze had been selected for monitoring by an independent commission that chooses a certain number of declarations to be verified every year. “The declaration of David Peradze’s property status will be checked by the end of the year,” the Bureau wrote. Peradze was appointed the director of Georgian Railway in November 2017. Prior to that, he had been the director of Mtkvari HPP, a hydropower plant in southern Georgia owned by the country’s richest man, Bidzina Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili founded Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, in 2012. Though officially retired from politics, his pervasive influence over the state is well-documented. The EU has included “deoligarchization” among the primary conditions of Georgia’s accession to the bloc, a requirement widely understood as a call to curtail Ivanishvili’s system of informal power. The prevalence of the oligarch’s former employees at the highest levels of government has led the local chapter of Transparency International to call Georgia a “captured state.” The country’s railways are a strategic asset, and their importance has only grown. Georgian rail lines form an important part of the socalled “Middle Corridor” route connecting two of the world’s largest traders — China and the European Union — while bypassing Russia. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has opened a new window of opportunity for the Middle Corridor, part of which is Georgia,” George Abashishvili, a former head of administration and economic advisor to the president, told reporters. “The biggest challenge is the infrastructure: how well can this infrastructure withstand the increased demand for freight?” In November 2017, when Peradze was appointed the director of Georgian Railway, the company was in the midst of a troubled modernization program. Underway for years under both the current and previous governments, and plagued with delays, the still-unfinished effort has left the country’s railways working at half capacity, according to official statistics. — Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. A Toyota RAV4 in Peradze’s driveway. NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 24 The NewsHawks is published on different content platforms by the NewsHawks Digital Media which is owned by Centre for Public Interest Journalism No. 100 Nelson Mandela Avenue Beverly Court, 6th floor Harare, Zimbabwe Trustees/Directors: Beatrice Mtetwa, Raphael Khumalo, Professor Wallace Chuma, Teldah Mawarire, Doug Coltart EDITORIAL STAFF: Managing Editor: Dumisani Muleya Assistant Editor: Brezh Malaba News Editor: Owen Gagare Digital Editor: Bernard Mpofu Reporters: Brenna Matendere, Ruvimbo Muchenje, Enock Muchinjo, Jonathan Mbiriyamveka, Nathan Guma Email: [email protected] SUB EDITORS: Mollen Chamisa, Gumisai Nyoni Business Development Officer: Nyasha Kahondo Cell: +263 71 937 1739 [email protected] Subscriptions & Distribution: +263 71 937 1739 Reaffirming the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and media freedom as the cornerstone of democracy and as a means of upholding human rights and liberties in the constitution; our mission is to hold power in its various forms and manifestations to account by exposing abuse of power and office, betrayals of public trust and corruption to ensure good governance and accountability in the public interest. CARTOON Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe The NewsHawks newspaper subscribes to the Code of Conduct that promotes truthful, accurate, fair and balanced news reporting. If we do not meet these standards, register your complaint with the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe at No.: 34, Colenbrander Rd, Milton Park, Harare. Telephone: 024-2778096 or 024-2778006, 24Hr Complaints Line: 0772 125 659 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] WhatsApp: 0772 125 658, Twitter: @vmcz Website: www.vmcz.co.zw, Facebook: vmcz Zimbabwe Mutapa Investment Fund: A big monument to corruption Dumisani Muleya Hawk Eye Editorial & Opinion THE failure to cure Zimbabwe's 2017 military coup is continuing to bring untold grief to long-suffering citizens who are starkly reminded at every turn that nobody is coming to rescue them anytime soon. After making a very costly strategic blunder by supporting a putsch which they wrongly assumed would bring finality to the unfinished business of liberating Zimbabwe, the people of this country are realising that they jumped from the proverbial frying pan straight into the fire. On that dramatic November day six years ago when soldiers ousted the longtime ruler Robert Mugabe — triggering euphoric scenes as the rapturous masses jostled to take selfies in front of rickety military tanks — many people genuinely believed that the country was turning a new leaf. Little did they know that the nightmare was only gaining momentum. It did not take long for President Emmerson Mnangagwa to give the naive plebeians a rude awakening. On 1 August 2018, opposition supporters, protesting a delay in the release of election results, were gunned down in broad daylight on the streets of Harare. Videos and pictures of unarmed civilians shot dead in cold blood by marauding soldiers were beamed around the world. Harare was teeming with local and foreign journalists as well as election observers at the time. The murders were literally televised live. It did not end there. In January 2019, another protest erupted, this time sparked by growing disgruntlement over spiralling prices. Predictably, Mnangagwa returned to default settings: unleashing soldiers and police on citizens. Lives were lost, women were raped and many were left maimed. Mnangagwa’s true colours were laid bare. People had been sold a dummy. All his flowery rhetoric centred on the "Zimbabwe is open for business" mantra came to naught. A commission of inquiry chaired by former South African president Kgalema Motlanthe found Mnangagwa and his government culpable for the 2018 killings. The panel, featuring eminent personalities, made a raft of recommendations, which have all been ignored by Mnangagwa. Why has the government not compensated the victims and their families? When will the murderous soldiers be brought to justice? Why is Mnangagwa not implementing the governance reforms necessary to give practical expression to the Bill of Rights? On Friday, Amnesty International released a new report showing that the Mnangagwa government has failed to live up to its promises for change and break with Mugabe’s brutal human rights legacy. Covering the period from 2018 to 2023, the report enunciates a spine-chilling record of state-sponsored murder, brutality and unmitigated impunity. The tragedy in this situation is that Mnangagwa has repeatedly squandered glorious opportunities to chart a new path. Apart from Mugabe himself, it is difficult to think of a Zimbabwean politician who has a more atrocious human rights record than Mnangagwa. From the killing fields of the 1980s Gukurahundi genocide to the 2008 "short sleeve, long sleeve" pogrom, to the post-Mugabe atrocities, Mnangagwa’s hands are dripping with the blood of innocents. Zanu PF has responded to the Amnesty International report in typical fashion. The ruling party's director of information, Farai Marapira, bluntly told Amnesty International to go to hell. Speaking in Shona to the Voice of America's Studio 7, he blurted: "Amnesty International is free to write what it wants and it can take its report wherever it wants. As Zanu PF, we have nothing to do with it, we're unfazed, we don't care about it, we don't care about what it writes." There is a clumsy effort by propagandists and apologists of autocracy to dismiss Amnesty International as an instrument of imperialist intrigue. This is sad. Zanu PF members must never forget that when their leaders were incarcerated by Rhodesia's racist colonial government during the liberation struggle, it was human rights organisations such as Amnesty International which gave them much-needed solidarity on the global stage. Today, these same human rights defenders who provided the jailed liberation leaders with practical support have suddenly become imperialist pawns? No, that is a lie. The truth shall set us free. Zanu PF, as currently configured under Mnangagwa’s inept leadership, has become a scar on the conscience of every self-respecting African. We should not be surprised that only three foreign leaders bothered to attend the sham inauguration in Harare on 4 September. Mnangagwa lacks all legitimacy. There is no better evidence of this self-evident fact than his horrific human rights record. Innocent blood will haunt Zim NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

New Perspectives ZIMSTAT has changed inflation calculation methodology, moving away from modified Laspeyres formula to the geometric mean formula, with inflation reported at 18.4% in September year-on-year up from 17.7% in August. Year-on-year inflation was last reported at 77.2% in August using the modified Laspeyres formula. This has raised concerns and speculation among many stakeholders as to whether the national statistics agency is trying to massage the numbers to make them look better. Rate of inflation is an important yardstick as it is used for policy formulation. Using the modified Laspeyres, Zimbabwe was in a hyperinflationary environment justifying the move by the authorities to peg lending rates above 100% as shown below. High interest rates discouraged borrowing and also curtailed money supply growth through the bank lending channel. This managed to drive inflation downwards. However, using the current methodology that has been adopted by ZimStat, inflation in Zimbabwe though high has never breached the 100% mark. How then do the authorities justify the setting of interest rates so high that they have disrupted banks' performance, suppressed demand and limited the flow of capital? If the authorities accept that the geometric methodology is the best measure of inflation in Zimbabwe, then they have to contend that they have been implementing wrong policies. To simplify, the modified Laspeyres formula estimates the monthly price of a fixed basket of goods and services. In contrast, the geometric mean estimates the price of a varying basket of goods and services. If all prices within the basket increase by the same amount, say 10%, then both the modified Laspeyres and the geometric mean will show the index increasing by 10%. In that case, there is no problem on the methodology used. The two formulae, however,   will give different results  if prices of items within the same basket increase by different proportions. For example, suppose the sample market basket for bread in Bulawayo consists of two items, a loaf of Baker’s Inn Bread and a loaf of Lobel’s Bread. If the price of Baker’s Inn Bread increases from US$1 to US$1.50, while the price of Lobel’s Bread remains equal to US$1, then the price of the fixed market basket increases from US$2 to $2.50, an increase of 25%. That is the price increase that would be reported by the modified Laspeyres formula. The geometric mean formula, however, assumes that the market basket varies in a specific manner with the change in relative price between Baker’s Inn Bread and Lobel’s Bread. In particular, the geometric mean formula assumes that the quantities of the two types of bread that are purchased adjust so that relative expenditures on the two items remain constant. In our example, the market basket shifts to include roughly 20% more of the Lobel’s Bread (now relatively less expensive) and 20% less of the Baker’s Inn Bread (now relatively more expensive). The price of the market basket increases 22.5% under the geometric mean formula. This implies that there is an element of substitution of goods in the same basket with respect to price changes. ZimStat now acknowledges that Zimbabweans do respond to changes in relative prices by changing their consumption bundles and the conceptual cost-of-living index ought to incorporate those responses. However, the major challenge is the data collected in constructing the Consumer Price Index (CPI) do not provide enough information about shifts in quantities and expenditures to determine whether consumer substitution behaviour at the lowest level more closely mimics the first, fixed market-basket scenario, or the second scenario in which quantities are adjusted to hold the share of expenditures on each item constant, making the process more of an academic exercise. Indeed, Zimbabweans have been responding to price changes by either substituting the payment method, looking for cheaper alternatives or spending more in informal markets which are difficult to monitor. Under normal circumstances, the modified Laspeyres methodology, if used consistently, should not provide figures that are way off from the geometric mean methodology. The huge disparity in the numbers when calculated using both methodologies in Zimbabwe highlights how the economy is highly informalised and the challenging task ZimStat has in coming up with reliable statistics that can be used for policy formulation. Surprisingly, the number one user of inflation data, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, has been defending ZimStat’s modified Lasperyers methodology and issued a statement published in The Herald of 23 January 2018. This raises serious concerns among all stakeholders and economic agency regulated by RBZ. More communication and transparency therefore is needed from the sole and official statistics agent in Zimbabwe to instil confidence, otherwise stakeholders may end up relying on other sources. *About the writer: Kaduwo is a researcher and economist. Contact: [email protected], call/ Whatsapp +263773376128 US$ inflation, ZW$ inflation, blended inflation and now geometric aggregation to blended inflation Econometrics HawksView Tinashe Kaduwo Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe NewsHawks Page 25 Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 26 NewsHawks Issue 76, 15 April 2022 Business MATTERS NewsHawks CURRENCIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE USD/JPY 109.29 +0.38 +0.35 GBP/USD 1.38 -0.014 -0.997 USD/CAD 1.229 +0.001 +0.07 USD/CHF 0.913 +0.005 +0.53 AUD/USD 0.771 -0.006 -0.76 COMMODITIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE *OIL 63.47 -1.54 -2.37 *GOLD 1,769.5 +1.2 +0.068 *SILVER 25.94 -0.145 -0.56 *PLATINUM 1,201.6 +4 +0.33 MARKETS *COPPER 4.458 -0.029 -0.65 BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE has set an ambitious target to increase manufactured exports by 10% per annum over the next six years as the sector gears for intense competition from the region. While the coming into force of the African Continental Free Trade (AfCFTA) has opened additional avenues for expanding export markets, critics say limited investment to replace obsolete machinery and antiquated equipment have made the southern African nation less competitive in the region. Zimbabwe became a member of AfCFTA in 2018 and ratified the agreement in 2019. This week, the government launched an economic blueprint for the manufacturing sector which seeks to increase output and grow exports. The Zimbabwe National Industrial Development Policy (2024 – 2030) is, according to the Industry and Commerce ministry, aligned to United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union Agenda 2063. “Its objectives are to increase manufacturing sector growth by 2% per annum, produce quality goods and services, increase investments in the manufacturing sector, and grow manufactured exports by 10% per annum,” a draft of the blueprint seen by The NewsHawks has shown. “In this regard, the manufacturing sector will position itself to take advantage of the opportunities being unlocked within the Free Trade Area. This must be matched by production and productive capacities of firms to deliver in-demand high quality manufactured goods.  Therefore, the country needs to attract both domestic and foreign investors ready to export into the large continental market.” Official figures show that in the early 2000s, Zimbabwe used to introduce 600 new products in the export basket. The rate of discovery (exports of previously un-exported products), however, has been declining and in 2019 it dropped to just five. Over the past five years, the sector exhibited positive growth, contributing about 12.44% to gross domestic product in 2022. Over the period, capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector rose from 47% in 2020 to 56.1% in 2022. Immediately, Zimbabwe’s quest to transition into an upper middle-income economy by 2030 was brought into sharp focus and questions were asked as to how feasible this ambitious project is without a robust export-driven development plan. Experts say the main constraints to Zimbabwe’s export development and economic diversification include the reliance on primary production, macro-economic instability, skills availability to drive diversification, entrepreneurship development and deficiencies in key enablers such as energy. Zimbabwe, which at Independence had one of the most diversified economies on the continent, has often been cited as a case study on the efficacy of sanctions. During the 1965 Universal Declaration of Independence era under former late prime minister Ian Smith, Rhodesia, a British territory in southern Africa that had governed itself since 1923, now regarded itself as an independent sovereign state. It was slapped with sanctions, but emerged stronger. Through a combination of inward-looking policies and an aggressive industrialisation drive, Rhodesia, which later became Zimbabwe at Independence in 1980, managed to build a solid manufacturing sector with forward and backward linkages and its core infrastructure continues to stand to this day. 10% annual export growth target set

Companies & Markets Page 27 ZIMBABWE Stock Exchange-listed retail giant OK Zimbabwe says it has adopted a raft of measures to counteract existential threats on its doorstep as most formal businesses battle a thriving informal sector. High unemployment and weak enforcement of by-laws by authorities in most urban centres has resulted in sidewalks full of wares being sold by informal traders at lower prices compared to formal retailers. While the growth of the informal sector has eased unemployment pressures, experts say the traders are largely operating outside the taxation dragnet, thereby prejudicing Treasury of revenue. According to a Finscope Survey, Zimbabwe could be losing millions of United States dollars in tax revenue after it emerged that 70% of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) do no keep accounting records. OK Zimbabwe, one of the country’s largest supermarkets by geographical presence and revenue, this week flagged the uncertainty surrounding government policies and the regulatory landscape as some of the major constraints creating an unpredictable business environment. The retail group also highlighted high interest rates, limited access to funding affecting capital expenditure and investment plans and growing competition from informal retailers and traders. Untamed hyperinflation and multi-tier exchange rate distortions are also affecting pricing strategies, OK Zimbabwe says. To keep the business afloat, the company now focuses on cost containment measures to mitigate the impact of inflation and currency volatility. “Diversification of our product and service offering to attract a wider range of customers and improve our resilience to economic shocks,” the company says in a statement presented during its analyst briefing held on Wednesday. Investment in digital transformation, including a new enterprise resource planning system and e-commerce platform, OK says, will also help the business navigate through the volatile economic environment. Despite facing a turbulent economic environment, the group’s annualised revenue increased by 33.3% to ZW$311.3 billion in inflation-adjusted terms. — STAFF WRITER. OK Zim feels the heat from informal retailers NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 28 Companies & Markets BERNARD MPOFU STATE-OWNED fixed telephony operator TelOne says there is scope to work with Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet amid indications that the new low-cost network may disrupt the country’s multi-million-dollar industry, a company official has said. Telecoms experts say the launch of SpaceX’s Starlink project in 2019 marked the start of a new era in global connectivity While Zimbabwe’s internet penetration has been rising over the past decade, the country continues to have low penetration rates due to several factors such as high costs in deploying infrastructure in remote areas, pricey devices beyond the reach of many, frequent power outages and high internet tariffs. Official figures show that there were 5.74 million internet users in Zimbabwe at the start of 2023, when internet penetration stood at 34,8%. A total of 14.08 million cellular mobile connections were active in Zimbabwe in early 2023, a figure which represents nearly 85% of the country’s population. TeOne acting chief operating officer Joseph Machiva told The NewsHawks on the sidelines of the company’s social corporate investment event recently held at Harare Sports Club that the country’s telecoms sector may undergo a major revolution should the authorities grant Starlink a licence to operate. “Definitely it will be a disrupter to the current status quo not because current operators are overpricing or anything like that, but it’s a slightly different technology from what we are currently using in the satellite space,” Machiva said. “The way we view it is we need to partner with them somehow. We already offer satellite services, we do not have a satellite in orbit. We work with partners. Currently we are working with Utelsat, we push their equipment through our customers, so that is the same thing we want to do with Starlink. So once they are licenced and operating in Zimbabwe, we can then distribute for them using our channels of distribution which we have already established in the country and, off course, we will have some customers that would want to swap out equipment and take on Starlink.” Recently, Starlink announced that the planned availability of its satellite internet service in Zimbabwe is 2023 pending regulatory approval. Any new telecommunications player in Zimbabwe has to go through the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe to get registered and licensed. Starlink is the world’s first and largest satellite constellation using low earth orbit to deliver broadband internet capable of supporting streaming, online gaming and video calling among other services. Experts say most satellite internet services come from geostationary satellites that orbit the planet and, as a result, the round-trip data time between the user and the user — also known as latency — is high, making it nearly impossible to support streaming. Starlink, on the other hand, is a constellation of thousands of satellites that orbit the planet much closer to earth and cover the globe and, because the company’s satellite are in a low orbit, latency is lower. BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE’S projected capital inflows from new investment licences approved during the past year dramatically rose to US$2.3 billion from nearly US$558 million registered in 2021, driven by renewed interest in lithium mining and manufacturing sectors, statistics obtained from the country’s investment promotion agency have shown. The southern African nation is endowed with over 40 base minerals and global demand in lithium for the manufacturing of eco-friendly alternative energy sources has resulted in a rush for the strategic mineral. According to the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (Zida) annual report,  the nearly four-fold increase was also attributable to the easing of Covid-19 restrictions. The respiratory ailment, which was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation, had slowed down economic growth across the globe. New investment licences, Zida notes, refer to general investment licences issued to private investors seeking to make investments in their chosen sector and this will be a first-time application to the agency. These projects may be 100% foreign-owned or in partnership with local private investors and will not be seeking incentives as provided under the Special Economic Zones scheme. “As Zimbabwe is endowed with various mineral resources including gold, platinum, chrome, coal, lithium among others, there has been noted interest by investors to invest in the sector as they seek to exploit the abundant resources,” reads the annual report. “Worth noting is the recent discovery of lithium resulting in the lithium rush. Of the approved projects in the mining sector, 31 were into lithium mining and 99 in other minerals. “The high number of renewals in 2022 as compared to 2021 can be attributed to the uplifting of Covid restrictions which enabled investors to submit more applications for consideration as well as continued improvement in service delivery by the Agency resulting in more applications being considered. In addition, the Agency also went on a deliberate drive in 2022 to follow up with investors with expired licences as part of its monitoring and evaluation efforts.” Zida, the report further shows, has a database of 5 952 licenced investors since 1993 to March 2023. Of these, 579 were issued by Zida, following its formation in 2020 to March 2023, with the rest carrying licences issued by Zida’s predecessor. For 2021 and 2022 renewals, the agency mainly followed up with investors with post-2018 licences as these have clear renewal requirements. The process of renewal requires that the agency carry out a monitoring and evaluation visit to the project to establish project implementation and verify amounts invested and jobs created among other measures. Although every province received investment during the period under review, mineral-rich Midlands and Harare provinces topped the list as the country’s most preferred investment destinations. “The high number of new investment licences in Harare Province can be attributed to the fact that investors in non-mining operations generally choose to locate in the province due to the availability of better infrastructure and utilities services and other factors of production such as labour, growth potential through linkages with suppliers of other related goods and services,” the report reads. Approved investment projects quadruple We can explore synergies with Starlink — TelOne NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 29 ZIMBABWE'S 2023 general elections serve as a pertinent case study, highlighting the use of various tactics to sway public sentiment. Elections in general are a contestation of ideas as well as a battle to win the hearts and minds of the electorate. The one that is the subject of this article seemed to be that of gaining numbers. In the realm of politics, the concept of "manufacturing consent" refers to the manipulation of public opinion through various means including perception management and sentiment manipulation. These techniques are often employed during elections to shape the narrative and influence voters. In communication studies, the concepts of the "manufacture of consent" and "perception management" are typically placed within media and propaganda analysis. These concepts explore how media organisations, governments and other influential entities use the media to shape public opinion and gain support for their agendas by manipulating perceptions through various communication strategies. This concept was popularised by the philosopher and social critic Noam Chomsky in his book "Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media." Perception management is the deliberate effort to shape or manipulate public perception of events, individuals, or organisations. It involves techniques such as framing, selective presentation of information, and the use of persuasive communication strategies to influence how people perceive and interpret information. Both tactics are key areas of study within communication studies as they shed light on the power dynamics and influence exerted through media and communication channels. The media, consciously or unconsciously, can manipulate information, frame narratives, and set the agenda to mould public perception and maintain the existing power structures. Sentiment manipulation involves the intentional shaping or alteration of public sentiment or emotions for a particular purpose. It can involve tactics such as spreading misinformation, amplifying certain viewpoints, or using emotional appeals to shape public sentiment in a desired direction. It typically occurs in the context of social media where it is associated with attempts to influence political discourse, public opinion, or consumer behaviour. In the digital age, social media platforms have become powerful tools for political campaigns. During the 2023 Zimbabwe general elections, political parties and their supporters utilised social media to shape public perception. There was the active use of so-called “Twitter Armies” that gained notoriety for the undelared “twars” that they were vigorously engaged in. They even gained epithets that betrayed their leanings, like "Varakashi" or "Nerorists". However, this also opened the door for the spread of misinformation and the manipulation of sentiment. For instance, fake news articles and manipulated images were shared widely, targeting specific candidates and parties. These tactics aimed to create a negative perception of certain individuals or groups, attempts at influencing voter sentiment. Media plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion, and during the 2023 general elections, biased media coverage was observed. This was highlighted in most of the election The manufacture of consent during Zim's 2023 elections observer mission reports that were released after the plebiscite. Certain media outlets displayed blatant favouritism towards specific candidates or parties, while others engaged in character assassination and sensationalism. By selectively highlighting or downplaying certain events, media organisations influenced public sentiment for or against particular political actors. This manipulation of information undermined the democratic process by distorting the public's understanding of the candidates and their policies. As a result, the conclusion by analysts was that this election concentrated more on personalities than on issues. In the context of the 2023 general elections, astroturfing was employed to create the illusion of widespread support for certain candidates or parties. Astroturfing refers to the creation of real or artificial movements, or online communities to manipulate public opinion. Fake social media accounts, bots, and trolls were used to amplify positive narratives and drown out dissenting voices. By artificially inflating support, perception management tactics aimed to sway undecided voters and create the bandwagon effect, ultimately influencing the outcome of the election. Emotions play a significant role in decision-making, and political campaigns often exploit this vulnerability. During the election, emotional manipulation was witnessed through the strategic use of rhetoric and imagery. There were candidates and their campaigns that employed fear mongering, appealing to voters' anxieties and insecurities. By stoking emotions such as anger, fear, or hope, political actors sought to sway public sentiment and m a n u f a c t u r e consent. This manipulation of emotions can cloud rational judgment and hinder the democratic process. This was the case in many rural constituencies. This election saw another bout of voter suppression and intimidation tactics that were observed in previous elections. Some political players argue that the delimitation exercise was a case in point, where the adjustment of constituency borders offset a significant number of voters.  A disturbing number of polling stations in urban constituencies opened late, even after a presidential declaration extended voting hours at selected ones. The observance of extra-electoral outfits that conducted so-called “exit polls” within the vicinity of polling stations threw doubt on the transparency of the process in some constituencies. On the whole, such tactics aimed to discourage certain demographics from participating in the electoral process, influencing the outcome. Instances of voter registration irregularities, intimidation of opposition supporters, and the manipulation of electoral boundaries, and double candidacy were reported. By limiting access to the ballot box through delays in the opening of polling stations, these tactics undermined the principles of democracy through exclusion. The 2023 general elections serve as a stark reminder of the prevalence and impact of perception management and sentiment manipulation in the political landscape. From the exploitation of social media to biased media coverage, astroturfing, emotional manipulation, and voter suppression, these tactics were employed to shape public opinion and influence the democratic process. In the next article, we will address the issue of how manipulative techniques can be countered and how this is crucial for safeguarding the integrity of elections and ensuring a fair and transparent democratic system. *About the writer: Lenox Lizwi Mhlanga is a consultant communication strategist with over 23 years’ experience in the profession. He has worked for organisations such as the World Bank Group’s International Monetary Fund (IMF). He is a respected thought-leader and is a mentor, facilitator and trainer. He can be contacted on mobile: +263 772 400 656 or email: [email protected] Corporate Communications Lenox Lizwi Mhlanga NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 30 News Analysis AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL THE government of President Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe has failed to live up to its promises for change and break with Robert Mugabe’s brutal human rights legacy, Amnesty International said in a briefing on Friday. Following an election  marred with human rights violations, President Mnangagwa was elected, and a new cabinet announced. The briefing outlines a human rights agenda for Mnangagwa’s second term in office and calls for him and his cabinet to improve and prioritise human rights in Zimbabwe. The report, titled Human Rights Under Attack: A Review of Zimbabwe’s Human Rights Record in the Period 2018-2023, details how the authorities have systematically supressed peaceful dissent, making it increasingly challenging for people to freely express their opinions. The briefing also describes a disturbing trend towards the militarisation of policing and a rise in the use of excessive force by law enforcement during protests. Amnesty International found that individuals who speak out or organise protests often face persecution. In some cases, relatives of protesters have been targeted and harassed as a way of intimidating activists. Abduction of human rights defenders and activists has also been on the rise. “The Mnangagwa administration lost a historic opportunity to right the wrongs of the past and, instead, has ramped up efforts to suppress human rights,” said Khanyo Farisè, Amnesty International’s deputy director for southern Africa. “The cyclical nature of violence will continue until there is genuine political will to uphold human rights and end impunity. The Zimbabwean government must make genuine efforts to deal with the past injustices to ensure that history does not repeat itself.” Legislate to repress Under the Mugabe administration, authorities amended existing legislation or introduced new laws with the excuse of protecting national security or facilitating access to information, to target dissenting views and groups, and limit the space for political debate. More recently, authorities have followed similar repressive practices. In 2002, the Mugabe administration passed the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Aippa), which was misused to thwart the growing influence of opposition groups and other critical voices. A little over two decades later, in July 2023, under President Mnangagwa authorities passed the Amendment to the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act or the Patriotic Bill. It follows in the same tradition of the Aippa and criminalizes “wilfully damaging the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe.” The Amendment frames the offence in vague and overly broad terms which opens it up for abuse by the state. It also provides for the use of the death penalty. Both pieces of legislation were introduced in the run-up to an election and affected people’s ability to freely express themselves, and exchange information and ideas. “The Mnangagwa administration has continued to misuse the law to crack down on human rights and on anybody who dares to voice a dissenting opinion,” said Khanyo Farisè. “The enactment into law of the Amendment to the Criminal Code will invariably have a chilling effect on would-be dissenters, particularly given the hefty penalties it carries.” Other pieces of legislation that were amended, or introduced, by the current administration and have had a chilling effect on civil society include the Cyber and Data Protection Act [Chapter 12:07] (No. 5 of 2021), the Freedom of Information Act, 2020 (which replaces the AIPPA), the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act [Chapter 11:23], and the Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Bill, H.B. 10, 2021. In September 2022, authorities used the Cyber and Data Protection Act to arrest two journalists. Wisdom Mudzungairi, the editor-in-chief of Alpha Media Holdings and editor of NewsDay newspaper, and Desmond Chingarande, a senior reporter at NewsDay, were arrested for allegedly transmitting false data with intend to cause harm. They were summoned to Harare Central Police Station. They were questioned in connection with a story they had published on a private business enterprise believed to be run by individuals with connections to the government. They were charged with transmitting “false data intending to cause harm” and released three hours later after their lawyers assured officers that they would be available for further questioning when needed. Their stories illustrate a wider pattern of systematic attacks on media freedom with at least 15 journalists reporting being assaulted, arrested, or detained by security agents in 2021 alone for carrying out their legitimate work. Hopewell Chin’ono, a freelance journalist and anti-corruption activist, faced repeated police intimidation and harassment. He was detained three times and   for more than 80 days between July 2020 and January 2021. This was due to his efforts to expose allegations of government corruption and advocate for the right to peaceful assembly. A number of other laws have also been used to stop people from voicing dissenting opinions and organizing with others. In 2022, Zimbabwean author and activist Tsitsi Dangarembga, along with activist Julie Barnes, were convicted and sentenced to a six-month suspended sentence for allegedly “inciting violence” following their participation in a protest on 31 July 2020. However, they successfully appealed against both conviction and sentence. The political reprisals intensified as Zimbabwe drew nearer to the 2023 general elections, when Mnangagwa was elected for a second term. In January for example, 25 members of the opposition political party Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) were arrested and physically assaulted for holding a meeting at a private residence in Budiriro. On 17 May, six students from the University of Zimbabwe –Benjamin Watadza, Emmanuel Chitima, Comfort Mpofu, Lionel Madamombe, Gamuchirai Chaburumunda and Darlington Chigwena– were arrested after they staged a peaceful protest in Harare. Amnesty International calls on the Zimbabwe authorities to uphold and adhere to the 2013 constitution and the country’s international human rights obligations, and ensure that the values and principles, and the human rights they enshrine are effectively respected, protected, promoted, and fulfilled. The organisation also urged regional heads of state including at the Southern African Development Community and the African Union to play their part in ensuring human rights are a reality for all in Zimbabwe, and on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to conduct a fact-finding mission to investigate reports of human rights violations in the country. The African Commission should publicly condemn the growing crackdown on human rights in Zimbabwe and call on the authorities to uphold their obligations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. *About the writer: Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 10 million people in over 150 countries and territories who campaign to end abuses of human rights. Zimbabwe: Mnangagwa fails to break with the past, fuels cycle of abuse and impunity • Shrinking civic space, crackdown on human rights and attack on peaceful dissent intensifies. • Mnangagwa followed Mugabe’s steps in misusing laws as instruments of oppression. • False hopes for a new Zimbabwe as former regime’s legacy of violence, oppression and impunity endures. President Emmerson Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 31 WILLIAM HATUNGIMANA/ HARUKA NAGAO CHINA has big ambitions in Africa. Between 2000 and 2020, the economic superpower loaned African governments US$159 billion to build railroads, highways, stadiums and bridges. Complementing those loans, foreign direct investment by Chinese-owned businesses that operate in Africa and employ Africans have grown from US$75 million in 2003 to US$5 billion in 2021. China’s investment and influence in the region have garnered both recognition and criticism from scholars as well as  Western media. Some see a mutually beneficial relationship  that improves infrastructure and economic development for African countries. Others warn that China’s presence and noninterference policy is a guise for its intent to “colonise” Africa. As  professors of political science who study Africa-China relations, we have seen how the arguments on either side rarely factor in how the African public feels about China’s involvement on the continent. So in March 2023 we asked 1 000 urban professionals in Zimbabwe – 64% were college educated; 94% lived in urban areas – for their opinions on China’s economic and political influence on their country. Our study is currently under journal review. We found that exposure to Western media led to a more negative view of China’s economic and political activities in Zimbabwe. Exposure to Chinese media, such as the English-language People’s Daily  and  Xinhua News, meanwhile, improved Zimbabweans’ views of China’s economic activities – but had little or no effect on their views of China’s political activities. Our study also shows that the political party that respondents belonged to played a role in how much they were influenced by Chinese or Western media. China’s long relationship with Zimbabwe During the Cold War, China competed with the Soviet Union to project itself as a force for liberation in Africa. For example, China trained and supported  Zanu PF, which was fighting for the liberation of the black majority from the white-minority government  led by white supremacist Ian Smith. Zanu PF has remained in power in Zimbabwe since the country’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1980. This relationship has been unshakable since 2003 when then-president Robert Mugabe’s government was  sanctioned by the West. The sanctions followed a controversial  land reform policy  that led to white Zimbabwean farmers losing land to black Zimbabweans. China responded by  strengthening its economic ties  with Zimbabwe – providing loans and increasing investments. Debt-trap diplomacy? However, the spectre of colonisation still haunts Africans, and some politicians and scholars depict China as a colonising power dressed in a mantle of non-interference. They  accuse China of exploiting African countries  to enrich itself. These critics claim that loans from China trap African countries in debt as China makes further inroads into Africa’s economic landscape. This is a precursor for neo-colonisation, some observers claim. Furthering this argument is the fact that Chinese companies have  contributed to the destruction of areas of Zimbabwe,  Sudan,  Democratic Republic of Congo  and  Ghana  through mineral and oil extraction – disrupting natural landscapes, emitting hazardous pollutants and displacing local residents. On the other hand, proponents of greater Africa-China relations see the economic ties as mutually beneficial. They say the debt-trap narrative  underestimates the decision-making capacity  of African governments who seek to leverage the economic advantages from their relationship with China to benefit their populations. This vantage point posits that China boosts economic development, that Chinese loans are not significant drivers of debt distress, and that there is an overemphasis on the drawbacks of China’s investment in Africa. African perspectives on China As to what ordinary Africans think about Chinese influence, survey data collected by the independent research network Afrobarometer  in more than 30 countries between 2019 and 2021 shows that  roughly 63% of Africans think China’s economic and political influence is positive. This public perception of China is on par with public perception of the United States – which 60% of Africans view favourably when it comes to economic and political influence. Our survey respondents in Zimbabwe, however, were far more critical: Only 37% viewed China’s influence positively. We also examined how foreign media coverage from the West – specifically the US and UK – and from China influenced respondents’ views on China’s economic and political influence. While Chinese media is favourable to China’s involvement in Zimbabwe and  emphasises how Zimbabwe benefits  from the relationship, Western media is  critical of China’s economic presence and warns about exploitation. We found that Zimbabweans were more likely to negatively perceive China’s economic and political impact when exposed to critical coverage. Researchers call this a  negativity bias. We found the effect of positive media coverage was more limited – and affected the perceptions of Chinese economic influence but not political influence. However, partisanship also played a role in how likely Zimbabweans were to be swayed by foreign media. Zimbabweans who support the country’s China-friendly incumbent party Zanu PF were more likely to be influenced by foreign media than opposition supporters. Their favorable views of China diminished when exposed to critical news and improved when exposed to favourable news. Opposition party supporters, meanwhile, already had a critical position toward China and were less likely to be swayed by media. This echoes the opposition party’s critical stance on China. Concerning China’s political influence, we found neither positive nor negative media coverage significantly affected their attitudes. Weight of public opinion What ordinary Africans think of China has significant implications for China, especially in democracies and in countries where the opposition parties have influence. China, of course, knows this and uses its news media to sway public opinion in Africa. We believe the discussion surrounding China’s presence in Africa should be democratised by taking public opinion more seriously. Although China might win the hearts of African elites through economic investments, critical voices exist among the public, especially among those negatively affected by China’s presence. The public will ultimately decide the extent of China’s endeavors in African countries through the influence they exert on their elite representatives. — The Conversation. *About the writers: William Hatungimana is visiting assistant professor of political science at Oklahoma State University in the United States. Haruka Nagao is assistant professor of political science at Oklahoma State University. We asked 1 000 Zimbabweans what they think of China’s influence on their country − only 37% viewed it favourably President Emmerson Mnangagwa with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 32 Reframing Issues ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA The Extraordinary meeting of the Troika of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (hereinafter referred to as the EO-MCO Troika) considered and adopted the Draft Agenda (SADC/ EO MCO Troika/6/2023/1A) as presented by the Secretariat. 2. UPDATE ON ELECTIONS IN THE REGION 2.1 The EO-MCO Troika recalled that Summit at its meeting of August 2023 noted the elections calendar as in table 1 below:   Government of Zimbabwe response to the SEOM Preliminary Statement  The EO-MCO Troika noted that the SADC Electoral Observation Mission (SEOM) was deployed to the Republic of Zimbabwe to observe the Harmonised Elections which took place on 23rd-24th August 2023. In accordance with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, the Chairperson of the Organ, His Excellency Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, appointed Dr Nevers Mumba, the former Vice-President of the Republic of Zambia to lead the SEOM to Zimbabwe. The EO-MCO Troika also noted that the SEOM is mandated to observe elections in terms of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections which all SADC Member States signed and adopted, and have been operational since 2004. The EO-MCO Troika further noted that all SADC Member States send individuals to serve as observers under the SEOM each time another SADC Member State conducts elections. For the purposes of the August 2023 Harmonised Elections, observers were seconded from the Republic of Angola, the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Eswatini, the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Zambia. The EO-MCO Troika noted that; (i) in terms of section 6.1.3, the Chairperson of the Organ shall receive the SEOM reports and reports of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) on matters pertaining to elections and the enhancement of democracy and good governance in the SADC region; and (ii) the reports of the SADC Electoral Observation Mission are handled in terms of section 11.8 of the Principles and Guidelines. The SEOM issues a Preliminary Statement immediately after the close of polls. The Preliminary Statement outlines the initial findings of the SEOM. The EO-MCO Troika also noted that the Zimbabwe SEOM issued its Preliminary Statement on 25th August 2023 and, as stipulated by Section 11.8.1 of the Principles and Guidelines, the SEOM should produce its Final Report within 30 days and submit to the Member State that held the relevant election. The EO-MCO Troika further noted that since the 30 days have lapsed, the Zimbabwe SEOM report has been finalised for submission to the Chairperson of the Organ for onward transmission to the Head of State and the Electoral Management Body of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The EO-MCO Troika noted that in terms of section 11.8.2, when SEOMs officially submit their election reports, Member States which held elections, may: (i) consider the recommendations advanced by the SEOM for improving the conduct of elections; and (ii) submit to the Chair of the Organ, a response to the SEOM report. The EO-MCO Troika also noted with concern, the personal attacks and threats on the media that have been directed at the SEOM Head of Mission Dr Nevers Mumba and the Chairperson of the Organ, His Excellency Mr. Hakainde Hichelima since the Zimbabwe SEOM released its Preliminary Statement on 25th August 2023. The attacks were made by individuals in both the ruling ZANU PF political party and some in high level positions in the Government of Zimbabwe. The narrative in these attacks have been that the SEOM Preliminary Statement on the Zimbabwean elections was personally authored by Dr Nevers Mumba. The EO-MCO Troika further: (i) noted that such attacks undermine the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and might have a negative bearing on the SEOMs that are to be deployed in the future elections, especially with another election coming on the 29 September in the Kingdom of Eswatini; and (ii) reiterated that SEOMs are in line with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, and that reports are produced by a collective of the Member States observers, led by the Organ Troika and supported by the Secretariat. The EOMCO Troika noted that there is a risk that if unchecked, further attacks on the leadership of the Organ and of the SEOM have the potential to damage the credibility of SADC as an institution. The EO-MCO acknowledged and commended the Secretariat for taking the initiative to issue media statements that clarified the procedures that are followed by the SEOM, and in the same statements, for protecting the credibility and leadership of the Organ and the SEOM. On the basis of paragraphs 2.2.8 and 2.2.9 above, and in order to manage the situation and avert future attacks on the leadership of the Organ and SEOMs and restore the dignity and resilience of SADC and its long standing Structures, the EO-MCO Troika recommended as follows: i) The Secretariat to remain proactive in its efforts at protecting the credibility and leadership of the SADC structures such as the SEOM; ii) Given that some circumstances are not predictable, and that there will always some individuals who will not agree with the SEOM, all reports and statements should be crafted in a manner that ensures relevant procedures and rules are followed to protect the SADC institutions from unwarranted attacks; iii) Continue to field technically experienced staff from the Secretariat who are complemented by capacitated observers to facilitate the work of the SEOM; and iv) The Secretariat to ensure that the Organ Troika Member States continue to process, adopt and own the reports of the SEOM so as to avoid unwarranted suggestions that the reports are the product of one individual or Member State. President Emmerson Mnangagwa Full statement of the ministerial committee of organ troika virtual meeting Table 1:  Election Calendar: August 2023 - May 2024  Country Type of Election Date  1. Zimbabwe General Elections 23 August 2023 2. Eswatini General Elections 29 Sept 2023 3. Madagascar Presidential Election First Round 9 November 2023; possible Second Round: 20 December 2023 4. DRC Presidential, Legislative and Provincial Elections 20 December 2023 5. South Africa National and Provincial Elections TBA 2024 6. Comoros Presidential TBA February 2024 NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 33 SIPHOSAMI MALUNGA THE recent Zimbabwe election impasse was predicted – manifestly unfair process, uneven playing field, contested outcome. Resolving this stalemate is key to moving the nation forward constructively. What can be done to change this? What stands in the way? What are the opportunities? Broken politics Zimbabwe’s politics has always been broken, violent and exclusionary – from the colonial regime violently denying the Black majority political participation, to ZANU-PF adopting those same tactics against opponents after independence. This violent confrontation template continued most intensely against ZAPU in the 1980s, ZUM in 1990, MDC since 2000 and CCC after 2022. Unlike some regional liberation movements that evolved to tolerate opposition, ZANU-PF clung to a one-party state mentality, systematically attacking opponents to monopolise power. Motivations likely combine fear of accountability for misrule with maintaining access to economic rents and corruption enabled by unfettered political control. The 2017 coup exposed shocking levels of military and security services capture – serving not party, country or citizens, but parochial coup plotters’ interests. Zimbabwe in a class of its own Zimbabwe’s entrenched exceedingly violent, confrontational political culture stands out in comparison to ZANU-PF’s liberation movement compatriots in the region. For example, despite the intensity of political competition between MPLA and UNITA in Angola, there is a begrudging recognition and acceptance by the former of the latter as the official opposition in the country. In Mozambique, whilst FRELIMO has used its power to dominate the political space — mindful of the bloody historical conflict, it recognises that RENAMO is a real political force to reckon with and regularly engages it to resolve existential national questions. In South Africa, the ANC — in power since 1994 — must contend with a vibrant opposition that is able to hold it to account in Parliament relying on a robust constitutional framework that guarantees free speech, assembly and right to protest. Despite its gradual loss of public support since 1994, the ANC has managed to adhere to the tenets of multi-party democracy. On the contrary, over the past 40 years, Zanu PF has deployed a political agenda to violently and systematically attack, persecute, weaken and destroy political opponents, critics and dissenters. A clear-eyed understanding of the problem Fixing these fundamentally broken politics requires clear-eyed recognition of Zanu PF’s entrenched unwillingness to reform, while still pragmatically engaging them as part of the solution. The ruling political elite stands to lose out financially from a process of normalisation of politics in Zimbabwe. The Zanu PF elite excludes other political players. It monopolises political space using its tight control of the state machinery and security apparatus. It is also motivated by a combination of fear of repercussions, loss of power, and prospects of facing accountability for the many years of misrule. Any reform agenda to reset and redistribute political and economic power in Zimbabwe must contend with this expansive elite as potential losers and therefore spoilers. At the centre of such a transformation agenda is the genuine democratisation of our political processes and institutions. We must honestly accept that since independence, Zimbabwe’s political processes and institutions have never been genuinely democratic. Since 1980, Zanu PF has maintained a  one-party state agenda  and never abandoned it. It has not spared any efforts at de facto in realising this agenda, including capture and manipulation of state institutions, deployment of violence and other forms of coercion and abusing its control of state resources. In typical Levitskyian competitive authoritarian style it has repeatedly held regular elections since 1980, but ensured that it wins every one of them. The party uses several strategies, including control of the election management body, manipulation of the voters roll, the voting, counting, transmission and announcement of results. In addition, it had deployed violence to  intimidate opposition voters to either not vote for the opposition or to vote for the ruling party. It has also captured, controlled, manipulated and directed other democratic institutions responsible for ensuring electoral fairness and justice such as the courts. It has used its  control of the coercive apparatus of the state  — the army, police and intelligence agencies — to secure its place in power. Democratising the political space will require that the Zanu PF stranglehold on electoral processes and institutions, on the courts, on the army, police and intelligence is fully dismantled. Any effort to democratise politics and democratic institutions that does not free them from the shackles and exclusive control of the ruling party will be futile. On closer analysis however, Zanu PF’s control has proved to be a threat to the party itself. A transformation road map The goal must be normalising politics through articulating an inclusive democratic vision and multi-year transformation programme. This should involve a temporary power-sharing arrangement to achieve: • Comprehensive reform of electoral institutions and processes, including establishing an independent, impartial election management body; ensuring an accessible, transparent voters roll; providing balanced media access for all political parties; enabling peaceful, unhindered political campaigning; reforming voting, counting and results transmission processes; and instituting effective election dispute resolution mechanisms. • Fundamental transformation of the confrontational zero-sum political culture, including fostering inclusive political discourse recognising the legitimacy of differing views; instituting protections for non-violent dissent and opposition; implementing regulations to encourage moderation and cooperation across political spectrum; reforming the winner-take-all electoral system. An inclusive electoral system would ensure that in the event it loses power, as it has previously, Zanu PF would still be able to seriously ‘participate’ in power and not ‘lose it all’. It would forestall retributive political behaviour and would reign in revenge politics that Zanu PF fears most. • Revitalising key oversight institutions, including developing an impartial, independent judiciary and security sector; building a capable, independent civil service; strengthening parliament’s oversight role; expanding the space for independent media; establishing robust anti-corruption institutions. • Investment in developing capable, ethical public service human capital. It would help contribute to creating a more accountable, ethical and responsive political elite that genuinely serves the citizens under a rubric of clear regulations, policies, behaviours and attitudes. • Conducting a new election under these reformed institutions, processes and transformed political culture. Success requires building broad national consensus recognising legitimacy of diverse perspectives, even when disagreeing. It also requires savvy engagement with influential regional and international actors – Eastern, Western and multilaterals to unlock immediate financial support, debt relief and lifting of sanctions. There are more reasons why this would never work rather than why it could. The first is that Zanu PF is simply unable to conceive of yielding any political space and power let alone lead the process of democratising Zimbabwe. The party will likely resist yielding any power or lifting controls enabling elite enrichment. However, this path offers them safety from captured rogue institutions, averts potential retributive justice if ever defeated, and crucially would temper future governing elites’ powers. It is simply easier to continue with the path most trodden and the strategy tried and tested — one of holding on to power and shutting down any and all opposition. This option – attractive to many hardliners in Zanu PF, themselves beneficiaries of the current system — would be ill-fated. The party will soon find itself in the Mugabe 2017 moment where it must contend with Mnangagwa’s succession. It is already in the throes of a succession battle and it has proved incapable of a democratic process to resolve it. In any event, as has happened elsewhere, it remains a question of time before Zimbabweans muster enough courage, rise up to confront and upend the entire political system, its partisan army notwithstanding. Last chance for a redeeming legacy At 81, this may be Mnangagwa’s last opportunity to secure a redeeming legacy, avoid Mugabe’s ignominious fate, and attract the vital regional/ global support needed to rescue Zimbabwe’s economy before it implodes. Contrary to helping him consolidate power, the legitimacy concerns related to the recent election have left him significantly weaker than the last election did, which buoyed him with internal post-coup cohesion, some significant national support to  ‘give him a chance’ after Mugabe, some optimistic Western and Eastern support. The current dysfunction leaves him paralysed and weakened. A dramatic reconciliation gesture could gain the backing required for his eventual dignified exit. This may be his last and only chance to avert an ignominious exit from within or outside Zanu PF like Mugabe. — The Africa Report. *About the writer: Dr Siphosami Malunga is a Zimbabwean international human rights lawyer. How to fix Zimbabwe’s broken politics President Emmerson Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 34 Reframing Issues IBBO MANDAZA I: The context: OR Tambo's legacy THREE weeks ago today, this lecture was unceremoniously cancelled by the Secretary-General of the African National Congress (ANC), Fikile Mbalula. In an email letter on the 6th of September, a day before the scheduled lecture, Mbalula directed the head of the OR Tambo School, David Masando, “that the lecture should not proceed on Thursday 7th September, 2023.” The correspondence was copied to Cdc K. Motlanthe, Chairperson of the Board of the OR Tambo School of Leadership. Significantly, Mbalula was writing out of Harare where he had accompanied President Cyril Ramaphosa for Mnangagwa’s inauguration on 4 September. And so while Ramaphosa returned to South Africa soon after the inauguration ceremony, Mbalula and his entourage extended their stay for discussions with their Zanu PF counterparts. Speculation is rife as to the nature of the meetings between the ANC and the Zanu PF, with references to “cheque book diplomacy” (about which we will soon know more), but Mbalula’s email letter suggested that the discussions included the subject of the messy election in Zimbabwe on 23 August, 2023. And so I quote the sentence that was suggestive of the ANC being engaged with the crisis in Zimbabwe: "At this moment the leadership of the ANC is engaged in a number of delicate engagements regarding the situation in Zimbabwe. In this context, a public lecture, at this time, on what is clearly an ANC platform, would complicate these initiatives.. We invite you to engage with us further on the detail of these matters, and the possibility of the lecture being held in future, in a different format, and on a different platform.” I am not sure, though I remain as suspicious, at the reference to a ”different format” and ”on a different platform.” Whatever the import of these words, it is clear that David Masondo and his comrades stuck to their guns, postponing the lecture as they have done, with the same title, format and platform. I am therefore pleased to be here as part of the assertion of academic freedom and a large response to those in our midst who dare try to muzzle the few corridors of intellectual and ideological discourse in post-liberation Southern Africa. In this regard, let me quote from one of the many comrades, at home and across the diaspora, who were outraged at Mbalula’s email letter which, thanks to social media, had gone viral within hours of its dispatch from Harare. Apologies, David, if I'm inadvertently betraying confidences, but a mutual comrade confided in me and I'm likewise confiding in my audience, appropriately: “Good evening Cde David, I hope this message doesn't offend you. At any rate, I would strongly encourage you to stand fast against any interference with the OR Tambo School's total autonomy and power to decide who to invite to speak on any subject your institution deems appropriate. Any abdication of this principle would be a betrayal of the principles OR lived for and upheld. it is your board's responsibility to uphold this cardinal principle.”-- Mavuso Msimang. I want to add here, how critical, and indeed most legitimate, that more and more of those of us who are from the ranks of the former liberation movements stand up and be counted, to inspire the younger generation, keep the flame of liberation alive, and remain a thorn in the flesh of those amongst us who have since gone rogue and constitute an embarrassment to the history and objectives of the liberation struggle. Yes, who will dare shut us up comrades? Who amongst them has that moral authority? Need I say more? And now to the topic of my lecture, after that very useful digression and an open challenge to those in our midst who have since gone rogue. The state of democracy in the Sadc region I will spend less on the elections per se and more about Sadc whose Election Observer Mission (SEOM) has at last plucked the courage to state the reality that has been the nature and content of the crisis In Zimbabwe over the last two decades. More significant in this regard is the extent to which all this has exposed the cowardice of many of the current leadership in Sadc, while providing this opportunity to remind all of us of the origins and mandate of the regional body itself. In doing so, to prompt Sadc to take on its responsibility in the face of the crisis in Zimbabwe, convene the Extraordinary Summit as it has done several times before over the four decades of its existence. For, we have to remember that Sadc was born out of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the successor of the FrontLine States that were the backbone and rear guard of the struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, and today, the custodian of peace, security and stability in the sub-region. II: The 23 August election in Zimbabwe: the unending legacy of disputed elections Understandably, the Sadc Election Observer Mission Report (SEOM) on the 23rd of August harmonised election in Zimbabwe has taken centre stage and refuses to go away. But it was not the only Observer Mission Report that returned a negative verdict on the poll. There are the European Union Observer Mission (EUOM), Carter Centre, Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) and African Union (AU-Comesa) reports. Although there has been little or no reference to them, the ANC, Swapo, Frelimo, CCM (Tanzania), MPLA, Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Botswana Government, also dispatched observer missions to Zimbabwe. There is no guessing why these observer mission reports have not been made public; but none have yet contradicted the import of the SEOM which has clearly left the authorities in Harare embarrassed and wounded, while most of the Sadc member states, and indeed the AU generally, appear to have acknowledged its findings by neither congratulating Mnangagwa nor attending his inauguration. President Ramaphosa In particular has made some clumsy statements on the subject, at the risk, states an observer on social media, of “breaking the rules of procedure and undermining the authority of Sadc by taking a position on the Zimbabwean issue before the region decides (at the nExtraordinary Summit that appears inevitable).” In this regard, sections of the media have caricatured Ramaphosa’s position on Zimbabwe. For example, Business Day of the 21 September 2023 had this very suggestive cartoon on “Premature Congratulations” : with Ramaphosa stating that “The Zec made a declaration and on that basis we issued our congratulations to President Mnangagwa;” and on the side of it: “This Just In: EU to withdraw US$5 million financial aid to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) due to election irregularities and lack of transparency.” Nonetheless, Ramaphosa’s stance on the recent elections in Zimbabwe is welcome relief to the authorities in Harare, not least his comments that no election is perfect nor without challenges (“ even in the USA…”). But, surely, how does one ignore the stark reality that Zimbabwe has been the sick man in a region--particularly in South Africa itself--in which free, fair and credible elections are the order of the day, where ruling and opposition parties can interact, either in business or jest, as fellow citizens of one country? By contrast, the Zanu PF state in Zimbabwe has since Independence treated opposition parties as enemies to be vanquished: whether it was Joshua Nkomo and Zapu, Edgar Tekere and Zum, Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC, and now Nelson Chamisa and CCC. It has jailed without trial (political) prisoners like Job Sikhala and Jacob Ngarivhume, manipulates the delimitation report and the voters roll, and has virtually captured to itself the judiciary and the law enforcement and security apparatus. As Blade Nzimande observed in his remarks on a Zanu PF that had by 2000 since lost the very forces that constituted it during the struggle: “Now you know, comrades, when we went to Zimbabwe….. as part of the South Africa Communist Party fact finding mission…… When we engaged with our Zanu Pf comrades everybody was the enemy: ZCTU was the enemy, professionals, academics, everybody! But we asked, how come comrades all these forces you are saying are enemies, were they not part of the victorious forces led by Zanu PF on the victory of your struggle in 1980? What has changed? Zanu PF has lost the middle classes, has lost the professionals and has lost many urban-based organisations; it has become a rural party because of the mistakes they were making. Now the comrades are denying that there is a problem . There is a danger once liberation movements begin to lose power or sense that they are losing power -- they start doing a lot of funny things. The first thing they start doing is coming up with 'radical' concepts. Mugabe lost a referendum and started a 'radical' land reform. They took land anyhow… and if they do not succeed, they unleash the security forces on the population." Indeed, both the electoral process over the last year and the poll itself on 23 August 2023, were part of a major security operation the likes of which has not been seen before in Zimbabwe. Not to mention again the point that every election since 2000 has been rigged and/or ended in dispute. As Nigerian activist Aisha Yesufu stated recently; “Until rigged elections are treated in the same as coups, democracy will continue to be in danger." Clearly, the 23 August 2023 election is in serious dispute and joins the series of "coups" (not excluding the military one of November 2017) . The very antithesis of democracy itself, and renders the electoral process farcical, just a mechanism through which the securocrat state seeks to renew its illegitimate mandate, especially and significantly with respect to the presidential poll. As we have pointed out before, by all accounts, Robert Mugabe lost to Morgan Tsvangirai in the presidential polls of 2002, 2008 and 2013. Closer scrutiny of the 2018 elections would appear to confirm the view of a member of analysts that Emmerson Mnagagwa likewise, lost to Nelson Chamisa. The security operation – including the deployment of the shadowy Faz and the calculated delay in the supply of ballot papers in Harare and Bulawayo on polling day, with many polling stations securing these well into the night of 23rd August and even on the following day 24th of August - that accompanied both the electoral process and polling day itself, should leave no one in any doubt as to the extensive rigging that underpinned Mnagagwa's wafer-thin "victory" of 52% (to Chamisa's 44%). Time will soon confirm, but we can confidently conclude that the election as a whole was neither, free, fair nor credible. A most depressing, if not cynical, feature about elections in Zimbabwe is the extent to which elections are so brazenly stolen and the voters rendered useless statistics. Deplorable! Depressing. More so when we hear would-be statesmen glibly dismissing a pattern that has become legion in Zimbabwe as mere "challenges" that can be addressed in the future. Not to mention the shamelessness with which one can stand before the UN and claim that such an election was free, fair and credible! III: What is to be done? The necessity and urgency of Sadc intervention in the Zimbabwe crisis There was initially the obvious expectation that the Sadc Troika of Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation would be seized immediately with the Zimbabwe situation, especially given the verdict of the Sadc Election Observer Mission (SEOM) Report on 30 August 2023 (with the final version submitted on 4 September, just before Mnangagwa was inaugurated). Since then, there has been a discernible vaccilation and even debate as to the mandate of Sadc and its Organ. All this quite apart from the emotional outpourings out of government spokespersons — and other critics of Mumba, the head of SEOM — in Harare: crude attacks on the person of Mumba and even against President Hichilema. Most unprecedented and certainly bordering on serious diplomatic breach on the part of the Government of Zimbabwe towards its northern neighbour. Notwithstanding a statement from Ramaphosa on the very day he was defending his congratulatory message to Mnangagwa, that Sadc would have to meet and discuss the report, the retort out of Harare in particular and the region generally has been to throw doubt on the mandate of Sadc in these matters, let alone its capacity to do anything. Including the following statement, purportedly from the Sadc secretariat itself, but dubious given our understanding of the mandate of Sadc: "SADC ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSIONS only observe elections. Sadc does not conduct elections in its member states but observes them. We then make recommendations. Understand the role of Sadc. When it comes to observing elections. Our mandate is only to observe and issue a report." All this might reflect on the lack of political will on the part of the current leadership of Sadc, but it is certainly the very antithesis of the mandate of the regional body’s Windhoek Treaty of 1992, its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security of 1996, and the Sadc Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) which was formed by the Organ in 2005. To quote the latter. The Southern African Development Community (Sadc) Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) was formed to transform election observation, the conduct of democratic elections and the prevention of electoral related conflicts in the Sadc region. Established in August 2005 in terms of Article 9(2) of the Sadc Treaty by the Sadc Summit held in Gaborone, Botswana, SEAC's broad mandate is to advise Sadc on matters pertaining to elections, democracy and good governance. The overall objective of SEAC is to contribute to the prevention of electoral related conflict in the Sadc region through the design and implementation of a conflict prevention strategy focused on each stage of the electoral cycle that outlines the specific contribution of SEAC. The proposal to establish SEAC resulted from a stakeholder workshop convened by the Sadc secretariat in Lesotho in 2004. Stakeholders recommended that Sadc form a mechanism that would not only guarantee the implementation of the Sadc State of democracy in the Sadc region: Reflection on national elections of Zim ANC secretary-general Fikile Mbalula NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 35 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections but also strengthen the capacities of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBS) and facilitate the work of the SADC Electoral Observation Missions (SEOMs). Following a comprehensive assessment of the workshop recommendations, the Ministerial Committee of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (MCO) recommended to the Heads of State Summit, the formation of SEAC. After SEAC's formation in 2005, the MCO adopted the SEAC Structures, Rules and Procedures in March 2009. SEAC was officially established in August 2010 at Maputo, Mozambique and inaugurated on 13 April 2011 in Gaborone, Botswana. According to the SEAC Structures, Rules and Procedures, the main objective of SEAC shall be to advise Sadc, through the MCO, on issues pertaining to elections and the enhancement of democracy and good governance. In addition to its main objective, the specific objectives of SEAC are: • To urge and encourage Sadc Member States to adhere to Sadc Principles and Guideline Governing Democratic Elections; • To encourage Sadc Member States to adhere to international best practices whenever they are holding elections; • To advise Sadc Member States on strategies and issues to enhance and consolidate capacity of EMBS in the Sadc Region; and • To encourage Sadc Member States to uphold and respect the independence and autonomy of Electoral Management Bodies. Of course, SEAC is derived from the provisions of the Sadc Treaty of 1992, and its overall objective of creating an integrated community of nations as part of the building blocs towards an integrated African Union. Implicit in all this is that member states necessarily forego part of their sovereignty in the interest of the larger whole. But those of us who were charged in 1996 with the responsibility to draft the protocols of the Sadc Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, were informed by these ideals of regional and continental unity, and the quest for a Common Foreign Policy, through which to prevent conflict, promote peace and stability and, if necessary, attend to, and deal with, an errant member state. We were aware, of what I referred to in 1998, on the occasion of the Sadc intervention in Lesotho, as the "hierarchy of powers" implicit in all regional and global organisations. This is the extent to which some member states therein wield more power than others, tend to be politically and economically hegemonic in a given region, or lend themselves into the so- called permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, China, Russia, Britain and France). In short, there has always been the inplicit acknowledgment that South Africa is the hegemon in Sadc. Of course, Zimbabwe, particularly under Mugabe as the latter tried to challenge Mandela as the obvious giant that he was, has always tried to play the card of precedence or seniority, as the case may be. It was this untidy relationship between Mandela and Mugabe, especially over the crisis in DRC in 1998, that led to the Defence Pact, signed on 31 July that year, sponsored by Zimbabwe and including the three other members, namely Angola (who were equally perturbed at Mandela's hosting of Savimbi in Pretoria), Namibia and the DRC itself. Suffice it to state that this Defence Pact, although designed within the ambit of the Sadc Organ on Politics, Defence and Security of 1996, nevertheless constituted a serious threat to Sadc itself, at least to the extent to which it was meant to warn Mandela’s South Africa, which was a loudly opposed to the intervention in DRC and whose overtures to Savimbi and Mobutu were regarded as offensive on the part of Angola and DRC respectively. In retrospect, both these developments and the precedents in which Sadc had an interventionalist role, would have helped to grow the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and informed and underpinned SEAC itself. The more reason why Sadc itself, the member states therein, and the current heads of state of the regional body, should be reminded of their respective responsibilities in the face of the disputed elections in Zimbabwe. Indeed, we need to list the precedence in terms of Sadc's intervention in the face of similar cases over the years, if only to highlight the capacity and responsibility of the regional body in the face of such crises: The Final Phase in the Liberation of Namibia and South Africa: working as both Front Line and Sadc states, the latter were invaluable in both the isolation of apartheid South Africa and the enforcement of global sanctions against Pretoria, whilst providing support to the liberation movements — including the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) — in Namibia and South Africa. The Rome Accords for Peace in Mozambique (1990) : under the auspices of Sadc, and as the leader of the country which had provided military support to Mozambique in its fight against Renamo, Robert Mugabe was a key factor in the Rome Accords which brought peace to the former Portuguese colony. The Lesotho crisis: September 1998 to May 1999: Sadc intervention through South Africa having to deploy military force to quell a crisis following a disputed election in that country. The DRC War: 1998 to 1999: with Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia actively involved in supporting Kabila, the other Sadc countries like Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique provided support in various ways at their disposal. Sadc intervention in the DRC: to state the least, Sadc, through its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, has been engaged with the situation in the DRC since 2014 to the present. On 8th May 2023, a Summit of the 16-bloc Sadc agreed to deploy Sadc troops to the DRC, to help quail violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where groups have terrorised civilians for decades. In fact, there has developed a possible combination of such Sadc forces and those of the East African Community troops from the three Sadc countries — Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania — have operated in eastern DRC for a decade under the United Nations peacekeeping force Monusco. Following a meeting of the Sadc Troika on Politics, Defense and Security on 8th May, 2023, and again on 11th July 2023, Sadc approved "the mandate, legal and operational instruments necessary for the deployment of the Sadc mission in DRC, that is SAMIDRC. To quote the communiquè: "This exchange between the sub-regional heads of state, opened by Namibia's Hage Geingob and chaired by Zambia's Hakainde Hichilema, followed several other meetings of the various Sadc bodies. On 4 July 2023, the organization's defense sub-committee met in Windhoek, Namibia, to discuss the technical details of this deployment, with the issue being raised again on 10th July at the meeting of Sadc Troika on Politics, Defence and Security." Just yesterday, the Troika met virtually under the Chairmanship of President Hichilema of Zambia, together with Presidents Samia Suluhu Hassan of Tanzania and Hage Geingob of Namibia, on the deployment of Sadc forces to eastern DRC on 30 September, 2023. This is a 12-month mandate up to 30 November 2024, with possibly a South African Defence Force command and a budget of US$554 552 472. "This sum, which is subject to change and intended to cover the first 12 months of the operation, is based on the estimated needs of a workforce of around 5 000 people. In theory. It should cover the cost of the Sadc secretariat, the office of the head of mission, and, above all, the military components of the force as well as the equipment (African Report, 21 July, 2023)." All indications are that the Zimbabwe election issue, including the SEOM report, would have been on the agenda of the Troika meeting yesterday, but certainly to be dealt with in the not too distant future. Sadc intervention in Madagascar: After suspending Madagascar from Sadc in November 2009, the Extraordinary Summit of Sadc held in Sandton, South Africa, in June 2011, prescribed a roadmap on the basis of which the member state was re-admitted to the regional body in 2014. IV: Sadc and Zimbabwe Turning to Zimbabwe specifically. Sadc has had two Extraordinary summits on the country in less than two decades: • 28-29 March, 2007, -- Dar es Salaam, following the brutal and physical attacks by state-related agents on Morgan Tsvangirai and his lieutenants on 7th March 2007. So incensed was the region and the world at such barbaric behaviour that the Extraordinary Summit mandated President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to continue to facilitate dialogue between the opposition MDC and Mugabe's Government, and report to the Troika. • 1 July 2008 - Sharma ElShaikh, Egypt. SADC/ African Union Summit Resolution on Zimbabwe,following the disputed and Violent runoff election of June 2008. The Summit decided as follows: 1. To encourage President Robert Mugabe and the leader of the MDC Party Mr Morgan Tsvangirai to honour their commitment to initiate dialogue with a view to promoting peace, stability, democracy and the reconciliation of the Zimbabwean people. 2. To support the call, for the creation of a Government of National Unity. 3. To support the Sadc Facilitation, and to recommend that Sadc mediation efforts should be continued in order to resolve the problems they are facing. In this regard Sadc should establish a mechanism on the ground in order to seize the momentum for a negotiated solution. 4. To appeal to states and all parties concerned to refrain from any action that may negatively impact on the climate of dialogue. 5. In the spirit of all Sadc initiatives, the AU remains convinced that the people of Zimbabwe will be able to resolve their differences and work together once again as one Nation, provided they receive undivided support from Sadc, the AU and the world at large. V: What is to be done? An appeal and petition to Sadc to play its role in the face of another disputed election in Zimbabwe. We believe that Zimbabwe has again reached the Lancaster House moment, the occasion on which to get back to the drawing board, reflect on a difficult two decades of conflict and embark on the path towards a Comprehensive Political and Economic Settlement. Accordingly, on 7th September, 2023, a resolution of the combined meeting of the is a Sapes Trust and the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC) launched the following Petition to the Sadc Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation: Once again a Zimbabwean election fails the test of credibility. However, the 2023 harmonised elections have failed the test so comprehensively that even the reputable regional and international observers are for once are in agreement that this election has failed. The main opposition and many civil society organisations have condemned the election, as have many ordinary citizens. The only response can be to declare the elections null and void, but then what should be done? By any measure the Zimbabwean government since 2017 has shown no ability to reform, either politically or economically, and to create the conditions that could lead to an election that is free, fair, and credible. The coup in 2017 did not usher in a new dispensation but a continuation of the kind of governance that has led to the 2023 result. There needs to be new way to resolve the crisis that this election has now deepened further, and not in the way that the crisis of 2008 was managed. The way forward must be bold and innovative, recalling the manner in which the Rhodesian crisis was dealt with. This must require the following: • The establishment of an Eminent Persons Group, tasked with negotiating the establishment of a Transitional Government, composed of political parties and other major citizen groupings. • The negotiations must be broad-based, including political parties, civil society, churches, labour, women, and other citizen groupings. • The Transitional Government should set up with a clear and specific set of reforms that must be achieved, which should include: • The resolution of the coup and the amendment to the Constitution allowing untrammelled military interference in civilian affairs. • Full adherence to constitutionalism, the rule of law, and human rights. • The reform of critical state institutions. • The stabilising of the economy, with a pro-poor emphasis. • The establishment of a sovereign fund to ensure the country benefits form Zimbabwe’s bountiful resources. Complete overhaul of all the election machinery and legislation to ensure that the election that follows the period of the Transitional Government will lead to an election that meets regional and international standards. This is the only way forward to resolve the crisis, and we call on all Zimbabweans, in the country and in the diaspora to support this petition, and we call on Sadc — through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security — the AU, and the international community to support and scaffold this. Ibbo Mandaza and Tony Reeler Co-Convenors (PCC) By September, 2023, the petition has mobilised 80 000 signatures, with plans to officially elevate the document into the national programme on the back of a meeting, to be held in Harare on 5 August, 2023, in which the totality of civil society, trade unions, churches, professional and other lobby groups at home and in the diaspora - will press towards a Comprehensive Political and Economic Settlement in Zimbabwe. In appealing to both Sadc and the AU, the Petition is recommending the appointment of the Eminent Persons Group, possibly of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania and Kgalema Motlanthe of South Africa, as the facilitation and mediation agency through which Zimbabweans at home and abroad can find each other and hopefully have a traditional government, or something similar, and charged with a Political and Economic Reform Agenda before the next elections in Zimbabwe. In this regard, we have also solicited the support of the Coalition for Dialogue on Africa (CoDA), a joint venture of the African Union Commission (AUC), the Africa Development Bank (AFDB) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and chaired by President Obasanjo, to assist Zimbabwe in this dialogue towards a resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe. And through the occasion of this Public Lecture, this is to appeal to the ANC and its government to pursue what Fikile Mbalula referred to in his email to David Masonda on the 6th of September, 2023, as the “delicate engagements regarding the situation in Zimbabwe.” If the latter objective was indeed the reason for the apparent “unceremonious” cancellation of this lecture on 7th September, to this day, then I plead with you all that the ANC Secretary-General be forgiven, in the sincere expectation that South Africa itself in particular, Sadc and the AU, are indeed engaged with the crisis in Zimbabwe. *About the writer: Professor Ibbo Mandaza is a Zimbabwean academic, author and publisher. He is co-convener of the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC) which has sponsored a petition tgat has been forwarded to the chair of the Sadc Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, as well as to the chair of the AU and the international community in general. Mandaza presented this public lecture at the OR Tambo School of Leadership in South Africa on 28 September. NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 36 Reframing Issues Book Excerpt from: In Search of the Elusive Zimbabwean Dream, Volume III (Ideas & Solutions) PROFESSOR ARTHUR G.O. MUTAMBARA THERE is a physical fight between Edgar Tekere and Enos Nkala in detention. The incident is narrated in Professor Ngwabi Bhebhe’s biography of Simon Muzenda titled “Simon Vengayi Muzenda & the Struggle for Zimbabwe”. According to Bhebhe, Tekere and Nkala were always feuding and insulting each other ad nauseam. During one particular episode, a fellow detainee, Robert Mugabe, suggested that this quarrelsome duo be allowed to fistfight. “We are tired of their unending primitive wrangles. Let them fight. Violence settles matters completely,” Mugabe is alleged to have said. When I put this story to him, Mugabe denies having such a crude philosophical disposition about the efficacy of violence. “How can I say something like that?” Nevertheless, he confirms the boxing encounter but challenges the veracity of certain aspects of the story, narrated to Bhebhe by veteran politician Eddison Zvobgo. Mugabe says: “Tekere was not defeated or out-boxed by Enos Nkala. That is not correct. Tekere bloodies and swells up easily. That is why he looked trounced. They were separated before there was a conclusive end to the fight.” So, the wily fox, the Machiavellian gladiator, was carefully watching the fistfight with a scoreboard in hand. In an unrelated discussion, Mugabe has a scathing view of Zvobgo as a fellow detainee. He explains: “Every year, there was this practice where government officials would come to the detention centres to listen to those who want to plead for mercy. Three detainees distinguished themselves by never subjecting themselves to the undignified act of pleading — Morton Malianga, Enos Nkala and me. [Eddison] Zvobgo would plead every year. In fact, he would go to the detention gates and enquire when those handling the pleading exercise were coming! What a coward! Being in detention with Eddison was a miserable experience. He would literally beg the colonial government to release him so he could join his wife and children. He was desperate to go out of the country to further his studies – away from the hardships of the struggle. If anyone tried to restrain or discourage him from begging the colonialists, he would shout: ‘Leave me alone,’ and become completely uncooperative and disagreeable. What a nuisance! When he is eventually released from jail in 1971, he is upset with the party — ZANU, asserting that it did not do enough to look after his family. He says: ‘I have done my stint,’ abandons the struggle and heads to the United States to study in 1972. From Salisbury, he goes through Botswana and refuses to visit the ZANU offices in Lusaka, where Herbert Chitepo and Josiah Tongogara are prosecuting the liberation war. Having been part of the leadership in the formation of the ANC in November 1971, an outfit established by ZANU and ZAPU to campaign against the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Proposal, he overstays in the ANC when most ZANU cadres withdraw. In 1976, he then comes back to ZANU with Michael Mawema, as we head towards the Geneva conference, saying they want the positions to which they were elected at the 8 August 1964 ZANU Gweru Congress. Eddison Zvobgo had been appointed Deputy Secretary General of the party at that inaugural ZANU Congress. No one in ZANU in Maputo in 1976 is interested in the duo’s claims. When he approaches ZANU in 1976, Zvobgo has written a small booklet on me, praising and eulogising me. It is all quite embarrassing. Eventually, he comes to join us in Mozambique in 1977. This time, he is alone without Michael Mawema. His standing in the party is diminished. He has to re-establish himself within the party ranks, starting as Deputy Secretary for Information and Publicity. When we arrest and detain Rugare Gumbo and his co-conspirators in 1978, Zvobgo then becomes the Secretary for Information and Publicity. This leads to him being Party Spokesman at the Lancaster House Conference, which ran from 10 September to 15 December 1979, with the Lancaster House Agreement being signed on 21 December 1979. For someone appointed Deputy Secretary General at the inaugural ZANU Gweru Congress of 1964, Eddison could have achieved much more in the party. His shenanigans and prevarications constituted his Achilles' heel. In fact, politically, he never fully recovers from his previous treacherous misdeeds right up to his death in 2004.” That is Bona’s son’s take on Zvobgo. Of course, Mugabe’s disparaging assessment of Eddison Zvobgo must be viewed as that of a politician – driven by tribalistic instincts – appraising a rival belonging to a different ethnic group. On his part, Zvobgo also occasionally launched scathing attacks against Mugabe. For example, he alleges that while in detention, Mugabe would fail all his university exams at first take and only pass at the second sitting. “We used to laugh at him each time we received exam results in detention,” Zvobgo would mischievously retort as he ridicules and chides Mugabe. He also mocks Mugabe’s pursuit of many undergraduate degrees as a sign of an inability to pursue a PhD: “Obtaining five undergraduate degrees is like taking and passing the Grade Seven Examination five times and feeling proud about it. What moron does that? Why don’t you proceed to Form One? At this rate, will you ever get to Form Four?” The witty and articulate Zvobgo would disparage and humiliate Mugabe in open settings where he knew someone would relay the message to Mugabe. He couldn’t care less. In fact, it was Zvobgo’s intention for Mugabe to receive the insults. Indeed, there was no love lost between the two distinguished Zimbabwean nationalists. Incidentally, with respect to the PhD put-down, this is an academic qualification Zvobgo himself pursued in the United States but did not finish. Many Zimbabweans do not know this dirty little secret. I meet Zvobgo’s Tufts University (Massachusetts, United States) PhD academic supervisor – Prof. Robert Rotberg – during my two stints at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the United States, in 1995 and 2000. He is clear and unequivocal on the matter. Rotberg says: “Every time I meet him [Zvobgo], I ask him: ‘Why do you go around calling yourself Dr Eddison Zvobgo?` and Zvobgo says to me: ‘But Prof, I almost finished it!’ Well, well, he did not finish his PhD. He can come and complete the doctorate if he wants to be known as a PhD. I will supervise him. I am still available as his PhD thesis advisor.” That is the position of Prof. Robert Rotberg, Zvobgo’s PhD supervisor. He is still alive, 88 years old, and can confirm the above conversation. Anyway, back to the petty jealousies, competition and idiosyncrasies among the nationalists. Zvobgo shares Tekere’s virulent assertion about Mugabe: “That man is just not intelligent!” He also agrees with Rugare Gumbo’s description of Mugabe as a “man Arthur Mutambara (right) with Edgar Tekere. Nationalists and their sordid escapades, petty jealousies and idiosyncrasies NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 37 with an inordinate lust for power.” Although Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere had bitterly differed and acrimoniously parted ways, Mugabe maintains begrudging respect for and deference to Edgar in private discussions with me. He remarks: “Oh, Edgar Tekere, he was always principled in all his stances and actions! Indeed, principled to a fault.” I am pleasantly surprised, for I am very fond of Edgar Tekere, having grown up in awe of his hair-raising anti-corruption outbursts and flamboyant manner of speech delivery. As students at Hartzell High School and the University of Zimbabwe, we were great fans of Cde Edgar Tekere. Even now, as I participate in the GNU with Robert Mugabe, I am in touch with Edgar and invite him to speak at several national events I organise. His delivery and impact are outstanding. He is phenomenal. The relationship between Mugabe and Tekere degenerated soon after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, leading to a massive and irretrievable fallout. This culminated in Tekere’s expulsion from ZANU-PF on 21 October 1988 and his formation of the opposition party — the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) — on 23 April 1989. Although he does not mention it, Mugabe is immensely relieved that despite their ugly, deeply personal and highly publicised differences, Tekere, in his 2007 autobiography – “A Lifetime of Struggle” – does not opportunistically cast aspersion on Mugabe’s character over the death of Tongogara. In fact, Tekere absolves Mugabe of any wrongdoing concerning that tragedy. The correctness or lack of it of Tekere’s position is addressed elsewhere in this current book. Tekere was probably not in the loop with respect to the elimination of Tongogara. However, in that same memoir, Tekere does brutally deglossify and debase Mugabe’s liberation struggle record when he alleges that Josiah Tongogara, with the tacit concurrence of Machel, says: “Mugabe was a sell-out incapable of discharging the task at hand – the liberation war.” In the autobiography, Tekere refers to conversations that he had separately with President Samora Machel and ZANLA Chief of Defence Josiah Tongogara. They were planning a counterattack after the Chimoio massacre of 23 November 1977: “I arrived by plane from Beira at about 8.00 in the evening, and we [Machel and I] spent the whole night in discussion, reviewing the situation. Eventually, we agreed that we would meet again the following night, each accompanied by a military delegation. And Machel said to me, ‘I respect Mugabe, but he does not measure up to this scale of military operation and planning. He does not belong as a soldier.’ In fact, the military Machel did not much like Robert Mugabe.” The first night of planning had only involved Tekere and Machel. Given Machel’s reservation about Mugabe, Tekere felt it prudent to rope in Josiah Tongogara, and not Mugabe, in the next session of military planning: “I immediately requested that Tongogara be brought from Tete. The second night’s discussion was much more detailed. We were planning a counter-response to the Chimoio massacre. After the meeting, I said to Tongogara: ‘Look here, you are going to see President Mugabe to make a courtesy call, but don’t give him a lot of details about this meeting.’ Tongogara leapt to his feet with: ‘Now you have heard it yourself! You are the one who brought a sell-out here! Look how many of the people have been killed!’ He continued, ‘I told you not to bring him here — but you only believe what I said now because Machel has told you!’ I did not react but was shocked at the extent of Tongogara’s anger against Mugabe.” From their entry into Mozambique in 1975, up to the Chimoio massacre, Tekere had always supported Mugabe and worked with him as an effective and dynamic duo. During this period, he would always eloquently emphasise that: “The Secretary General – Robert Mugabe – and I were sent from Zimbabwe to Mozambique by the ZANU leadership to lead and reorganise the armed struggle after the death of Herbert Chitepo.” Now, with Tongogara’s unambiguous, palpable and vitriolic disdain and unrestrained antipathy towards Robert Mugabe, Tekere has to do some serious soul searching as expressed in his memoir: “Sometime later, I brought up the subject again with Tongogara. ‘Are you saying I brought a sellout?' This time, the two of us analysed the situation and realised that we were both equally apprehensive that Mugabe might let us down.” As explained earlier, the antipathy of Machel towards Mugabe is manifest right from his entry into Mozambique with Edgar Tekere in 1975. In his 2011 memoir – “Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter” – Wilfred Mhanda talks about Machel’s palpable anger when they, as the ZANLA part of the ZIPA leadership, presented Mugabe as the leader of a potential ZANU leadership line-up. This matter was presented earlier in this current book. It is important to note that Machel had isolated and banished Edgar Tekere and Robert Mugabe to the coastal town of Quelimane, which was far removed from both the refugee camps and the border with Rhodesia because, in his own words, he “did not trust Mugabe”. In Miles Tendi’s book “The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe,” Mugabe confirms Samora Machel’s initial undiluted antipathy towards him: “Samora wanted to know precisely who I was, where I was from and whether I was a Smith man [spy] ... he said to me point-blank, this man must be a Smith man. But eventually, he got enough information that I was genuine and let me go to Geneva [in 1976] as the leader of ZANU.” In my discussions with Mugabe, he does not acknowledge or say much about his forced stay in Quelimane. Machel’s strongly negative views about Mugabe in his early months in Mozambique are also confirmed to me in graphic details, sprinkled with fascinating humour, by General Solomon Mujuru during one of our many elaborate conversations. In fact, Mujuru lucidly explains how he experienced and solved the animosity of Samora towards Mugabe. He is quite clear and proud about his role as Kingmaker. On his part, Mugabe, in our conversations, begrudgingly acknowledges Mujuru's intervention but adds another curious dimension: "In fact, Mujuru was our [Mugabe and Tekere’s] spy among the ZIPA commanders. This explains why we were able to decimate ZIPA easily." Wow! What riveting and explosive revelations! All these fascinating accounts are carefully detailed in later chapters dealing with Mugabe, Mujuru and ZIPA. This is an excerpt from the book: In Search of the Elusive Zimbabwean Dream, Volume III (Ideas & Solutions) By Professor Arthur G.O. Mutambara. *About the writer: Prof Arthur G.O. Mutambara is the director and full professor of the Institute for the Future of Knowledge (IFK) at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa. Arthur Mutambara (right) with Rugare Gumbo. NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 38 Reframing Issues World News SIPHOSAMI MALUNGA COMMISSION as mode of liability is provided for in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special Court for Sierra Leone SCSL), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that "commission covers physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable omission of an act". "Committing" is regarded a more serious form of criminal responsibility than, for instance, instigating or aiding and abetting. The commission may also occur through participation in the realisation of a common design of purpose. The SCSL has reaffirmed the decisions of the ICTY in several cases. In addition, the ECCC has also followed the reasoning of the ICTY on the concept of commission. The ECCC has used exactly the similar language to the SCSL case of Kamara in finding that "committing extends to physical perpetration or a culpable omission of an act, and commission through the participation in a joint criminal enterprise." The ICTR has however taken a slightly different approach to commission. In Gacumbitsi, which dealt with commission of genocide, the Appeals Chamber held that: direct and physical perpetration need not mean physical killing; other acts can constitute direct participation in the actus reus of the crime. [...] It was [the accused] who personally directed the Tutsi and Hutu refugees to separate — and that action, which is not adequately described by any other mode of Article 6(1) liability, was as much an integral part of the genocide as were the killings which it enabled. In Gacumbitsi, the accused had been instrumental in planning, organising and overseeing an attack on Tutsi refugees in which thousands were killed. There was no evidence that he had actually killed any himself although he was said to have killed one person, which killing was unfortunately not charged in the indictment. In taking a surprisingly broad approach to the concept of "committing", the Trial Chamber found that, although he had not killed anyone, he could still be found guilty of committing the crime of genocide. This finding divided the Trial Chamber judges. The ICTR Appeals Chamber reaffirmed the reasoning in Gacumbitsi in Seromba. A priest, Seromba, was accused of supervising the bulldosing of a church with 1 500 Tutsi who had taken refuge. The ICTR held that by approving the use of the bulldoser, and by virtue of his authority over the driver of the bulldoser, "[the accused’s] acts cannot be adequately described by any other mode of liability pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute than ‘committing’, indeed were as much as an integral part of the crime of genocide as the killings of the Tutsi refugees." In his dissenting judgment, Judge Liu found that the broad approach to "commission" was inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the ICTs, particularly the Stakić Appeals judgment, which held that co-perpetration is not part of customary international law and tribunal law. The broad approach to "committing" taken by the ICTR has been criticised by Giustiniani who argues that the reasoning was misplaced and that the facts of the case were better suited to a finding of instigation than committing despite the possible desire by the ICTR to demonstrate its disapproval of Seromba’s conduct. Giustiniani criticises the Appeals Chamber for not explaining why Seromba’s conduct was qualified as committing instead of instigation. Although Giustiniani’s criticism on the ICTR is merited, his conclusion that "the facts of the case were better suited to a finding of instigation" is rather flawed. In both Seromba and Gacumbitsi, a finding of aiding and abetting would make sense. Manuel Ventura posits that aiding and abetting is "[a] mode of liability in international criminal law which refers to acts or omissions that assist, encourage or lend moral support to a crime and substantially contribute to its commission." It is evident that the actions of the accused in the aforementioned cases assisted in the commission of the crime and therefore a finding of aiding and abetting would have been better suited. The ICC also envisages "commission" under Article 25 of the Rome Statute which takes a broad approach to commission to include perpetration and other forms of participation as well as omission. In Lubanga, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held that "committing" in Article 58(1)(a) is broader than direct/physical perpetration. It includes modes of liability, attempt, incitement and superior responsibility. The ICC has interpreted indirect or co-perpetration expansively with regard to crimes committed by organisations or multiple perpetrators. In Katanga, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that indirect or co-perpetration refers to committing the crime through another person and extends to ‘control over troops’ who implemented a criminal plan. Although there are questions regarding the propriety of this reasoning and its legal basis, its application to Gukurahundi offers a unique opportunity to hold the civilian and military leaders who had control over Five Brigade, other Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) troops and other security forces in Matabeleland and Midlands liable as indirect or co-perpetrators of all their crimes. Commission is defined as the physical perpetration, it means that every member of Five Brigade, Central Intelligence Organisation, Zimbabwe National Army, Zimbabwe Republic Police and other security and government agencies who physically committed or culpably omitted to act would be liable for commission. Based on the Tadić Appeals Decision which held that "the commission may occur through participation in the realisation of a common design of purpose", every individual who participated in the realisation of the common criminal (genocidal) plan either to destroy in whole or in part the Ndebele civilian population; or the plan to systematically attack civilian Ndebele Zapu supporters and their leaders, in furtherance of the Zanu PF one-party state agenda and ideology, committed crimes against humanity. Similarly, the participation in the common plan to conflate and attack civilians as part of the military operations in Matabeleland and Midlands would constitute the commission of war crimes. In the case of Kordić & Čerkez, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that "[A] person found to have committed crime will not be found responsible for planning the same crime." Therefore it is important and necessary to distinguish perpetrators who physically committed the crime and those perpetrators who planned the crime. *About the writer: Dr Siphosami Malunga is a Zimbabwean international human rights lawyer. Gukurahundi: Perpetrators can be nailed on commission charge NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 39 Africa is the future of multilateralism MARK MALLOCH-BROWN A comprehensive new study of global public opinion shows that people worldwide still have faith in democracy but expect it to yield better results. Nowhere is this truer than in Africa, whose residents are far more likely to support bold measures to reduce inequality and combat climate change. “We do not seem to have any common values on which we can all agree, nor common goals to which we all aspire.” Ghanaian President  Nana Akufo-Addo hit the nail on the head when he made this observation during his address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly last week. At a time when interlocking crises are escalating, the international order appears increasingly fractured, and there is profound uncertainty about the role of the UN itself. Where can we find the impetus and direction needed to restore multilateralism? Answering that question requires a deeper understanding of the attitudes, concerns, and hopes of people around the world. To this end, Open Society Foundations, the philanthropic organisation I lead, recently ran one of the largest studies of global public opinion ever conducted. Our Open Society Barometer surveyed more than 36 000 people from a diverse group of 30 countries that represent roughly two-thirds of the world’s population. The responses shed some light on the unifying values and goals that are conspicuously absent from today’s global governance system. They show that people around the world still have faith in democracy, but in an age of crisis and inequality, they want it to deliver tangible improvements in their own lives. The figures from Africa were particularly striking. Eight of the 30 countries we surveyed – Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia – are on the continent. Of course, responses varied significantly on some questions, reflecting different historical and political circumstances. For example, 63% of Egyptians believe that military rule is a good way of running a country, compared to 40% of Ethiopians and only 20% of Senegalese. At the same time, an even higher proportion of Egyptians yearn for democracy; evidently, they are unsure whether their brief experimentation with it could be considered a success. Notably, while most respondents across the 30 countries we surveyed expressed feelings of insecurity and inequity, these sentiments were most pronounced in Africa. Similarly, respondents from the continent were among the most anxious about climate change’s negative impact on their lives and livelihoods. In Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, 83% of respondents voiced such concerns. Of the five countries where our polling found the greatest fear that political unrest would lead to violence within the next year, four were in Africa: Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal. African respondents were also the most likely to say that inequality between countries is a bigger challenge now than it was in 2022. This sense was strongest in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal, but all eight African countries were in the top half of that chart. Likewise, while a majority of respondents in most countries shared certain views regarding the necessity of global changes, those majorities were generally the largest in Africa. For example, African respondents, led by those in Nigeria and Kenya, were the most inclined to say that “human rights reflect values I believe in” and among the most likely to agree that “tools such as travel bans and freezing bank accounts are useful ways to bring human rights violators to justice.” Africans, more so than respondents from other continents, agreed that countries should open more safe and legal routes for refugees. They strongly backed the rebalancing of international institutions, with many advocating for lower-income countries to have a greater say in global decision-making. Seven of the ten national groups most supportive of the statement “high-income countries should give more money to the World Bank” were from Africa. Taken together, these results suggest that Africa is like the rest of the world – just more so. Given that the continent is on the front lines of the socalled “polycrisis,” Africans experience its pressures more immediately than most. But they are also most likely to embrace the necessary solutions, such as reforming global governance structures and the international financial architecture, stabilising today’s chaotic interdependence, and making massive new investments in sustainable development. At the global level, the poll suggests that people are much more forward-leaning in their expectations of multilateralism than their political leaders. They want effective international solutions to the pressing problems in their lives. Nowhere is this truer than in Africa. For those of us seeking future champions and ideas for multilateral reform, it is clear that we must look beyond the usual suspects – Western governments zealously protecting their power and privilege – and instead tap into the wellspring of the Global South. This is where the future lies. – Project Syndicate. *About the writer: Mark Malloch-Brown, a former deputy United Nations secretary-general and co-chair of the UN Foundation, is president of the Open Society Foundations. Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 40 Africa News Introduction SINCE April 1994, South African leaders and their governments have always taken a leading role in mediating and resolving the political crises within the African continent. Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, protection of and support for  human rights were the hallmarks of South African foreign policy. Thabo Mbeki`s presidency was characterised by an aspirational foreign policy through the doctrine of African Renaissance whereby a Pan-Africanist  approach of “African solutions for African problems” towards conflict resolution was the guiding principle. However, President Jacob Zuma was associated with a more indigenous concept of ubuntu towards his foreign policy approach to conflict management in Africa. Nonetheless, the current South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has not been able to demonstrate much diplomatic acuity in terms of conflict resolution and mediating in some of Africa's conflict hotspots, particularly Zimbabwe. This opinion piece attempts to scrutinise the ostrich foreign policy approach of President Ramaphosa. I shall  argue that unlike his predecessors, President Ramaphosa has adopted an arms length diplomatic approach towards the crisis in Zimbabwe and this approach is the antithesis of the hands-on approach and interventionist diplomatic approaches of the other former South African presidents. Therefore, I shall first look at the South African diplomatic strategies from Mandela to Zuma and then analyse the current diplomatic approach of President Ramaphosa. From Mandela to Zuma South Africa became the last African country to attain multi-racial democracy and political pluralism. That is, South Africa became an independent state  led by President Nelson Mandela on 10 May 1994. However, despite being a fledgling independent and democratic state on the global stage, nonetheless South Africa was immediately thrust on the frontline of conflict resolution and conflict management on the African continent. Hardly two months into his presidency as head of state, Nelson Mandela in 1994 found himself taking a frontrow seat in mediating in the 19-year-old Angolan civil war. President Mandela hosted President Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola and the then Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko in Pretoria in an effort to find a lasting solution to the Angolan civil war. President Sese Seko was there as an ally and supporter of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi was able to later meet President Mandela in Pretoria on 18 May 1995. Moreover, during his presidency Mandela took his interventionist diplomacy to Burundi. Thus Mandela was able to get international support for the mediation process in Burundi. He managed to raise financial resources that allowed for the hosting of the Burundi Peace Summit in Arusha, Tanzania, in February 2000. Through the diplomatic and political influence of Mandela, the warring parties to the Burundi conflict were able to sign both the 2000 Arusha Agreement in August 2000 as well as the Pretoria Agreement in 2001, that ultimately paved the way for the transitional authority in Burundi. Crucially, the diplomatic acumen and political dexterity of President Mandela also resulted in having a Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in August  1999, that involved six countries who were involved in the conflict and war in  the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 1998 DRC war was dubbed "Africa's first world war", because it involved Angola, Namibia, Chad, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. When Mandela vacated the political scene by the turn of the millennium, President Thabo Mbeki emerged as his political and diplomatic successor both on the local, regional and continental sphere. Therefore, President Mbeki immediately took over from where Mandela had left in SA's Cyril Ramaphosa and the tragedy of ostrichism diplomacy Cyril Ramaphosa Taona B. Denhere NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Africa News Page 41 terms of mediating in regional and continental conflicts. Accordingly, President Mbeki managed to mediate and broker the Pretoria Agreement between Rwanda and the DRC. This led to the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. As a result, Mbeki was credited with playing an important role in bringing to an end Africa's first world war. However, the pinnacle of Mbeki`s diplomatic acumen and conflict resolution skills and competence is associated with the role he played in Zimbabwe from 2002 up to 2009. Mbeki initially got involved in the Zimbabwean conflict in 2002.  In 2002 the Commonwealth troika of Nigeria, Australia and South Africa was involved in trying to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe in an effort to prevent a violent and contested 2002 presidential outcome. Consequently, Mbeki in 2002 preferred a power sharing agreement regardless of the outcome of the March 2002 presidential elections. He advocated a political arrangement where Zany PF and Robert Mugabe will emerge as the senior partners in a power sharing agreement involving the opposition MDC and Morgan Tsvangirai as the junior partners. However, Mbeki's political prescription to the 2002 Zimbabwean elecrion did not materialise as no coalition government was able to be formed after the 2002 disputed presidential elections. However, it was not until 2008 that Thabo Mbeki became deeply involved in trying to resolve and manage the political and economic conflict in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, in March 2008, Zimbabwe held another round of harmonised elections. The elections resulted in opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC-T winning 47% of the vote and Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF winning 43%. Therefore, it led to a presidential runoff  between Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe, since none of them had managed to surpass the 50+1% threshold. Nonetheless, the June 2008 presidential runoff was characterised by egregious state-sanctioned violence perpetrated by Zanu PF supporters and the elements of the security forces against the MDC-T and Tsvangirai supporters. As a result, more than 250 of Tsvangirai’s supporters were murdered and hundreds more internally displaced and injured during the presidential runoff period. Consequently, Tsvangirai was forced to withdraw in order to protect his supporters. Subsequently, Mugabe went on to contest a one-man election, which resulted in him infamously declared the winner. Mugabe's June 2008 one-man electoral charade spawned a tsunami of legitimacy deficit and political and economic crisis. Therefore, President Mbeki has to come into consideration with his much reviled quiet diplomacy approach to the Zimbabwe crisis. President Mbeki had undergone severe criticism over his handling of the Zimbabwe crisis. Mbeki had been viewed as showing strong bias towards the politics of solidarity of former sister liberation movements in southern Africa. In this particular circumstances Mbeki had demonstrated strong bias towards protecting and preserving Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF at the expense of democratic accountability and respect for human rights and the free will of the Zimbabwean people. Coupled with the fact that President Mbeki had downplayed the magnitude and severity of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, when he infamously declared there was no crisis in Zimbabwe, this bias towards Zanu PF and Mugabe led to a level of great mistrust between Tsvangirai and Mbeki. However, despite reservations against Mbeki's quiet diplomacy approach towards the Zimbabwean crisis, nonetheless he managed to eventually produce a power-sharing agreement between Robert Mugabe of Zanu PF, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDCT and Professor Authur Mutambara who led a smaller faction of the MDC.This subsequently led to an inclusive government that lasted between 2009 and 2013. When President Jacob Zuma assumed the leadership of both the ANC and South Africa in 2009, he continued with the diplomatic intervention initiatives of his predecessor Thabo Mbeki. At the 2013 Extraordinary Summit of Sadc Heads of State and Government which was held in Maputo Mozambique, President Zuma supported and pressed for electoral and security reforms to be implemented in Zimbabwe before the elections could be conducted in 2013. Electoral and security reforms were part of the most essential tasks to be undertaken by the Zimbabwean inclusive government between 2009 and 2013. Therefore, the opposition, particularly the MDCT and Morgan Tsvangirai, had found an important voice and ally in President Zuma , who had even advised them not to participate in an election until reforms are fully implemented. Ostrichism policy and approach Zimbabwe recently held its harmonised elections and the elections were widely condemned as illegitimate, shambolic and fraudulent by most regional and international election observer missions  and groups. These included the Sadc Election Observer Mission (SEOM), the African Union observer mission, the Carter foundation and the Commonwealth observer mission  and they all cited that the elections failed to satisfy the international and regional guidelines as well as the Zimbabwean electoral and constitutional guidelines in terms of being free, fair and credible. Consequently, these inconclusive elections immediately spawned a legitimacy, political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, that also has far-reaching consequences within the Sadc region, particularly South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC government became the centre of attraction over their conduct and handling of these widely condemned Zimbabwean elections. Most Zimbabweans were looking up to what kind of diplomatic and political leadership President Ramaphosa and the ANC government were going to provide and demonstrate  in light of these damning  election reports, especially from the Sadc EOSM. This was because of the historical role South Africa has played in mediating and resolving the political and electoral crisis in Zimbabwe since 2002. Coupled with the fact that Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political crisis has become a de facto domestic policy for South Africa, due to the reasons that South Africa is home to more than 1.5 million zimbabwean political and economic migrants. However, a publication titled: “Ramaphosa and a New Dawn for South African Foreign Policy”,one of Ramaphosa`s  diplomatic centrepieces is progressive internationalism. Which he defines as “an approach to global relations anchored in the pursuit of global solidarity, social justice, common development and human security”. Therefore, there was a huge disappointment among Zimbabweans when President Ramaphosa quickly congratulated President Emmerson Mnangagwa on his controversial and disputed win of the 23 and 24 August 2023 presidential elections. Thus is coupled with the fact that President Ramaphosa was one of only three heads of state in the Sadc region who attended the inauguration ceremony of President Mnangagwa. These partisan actions from President Ramaphosa extinguished any hopes that he was going to employ balanced and fair diplomatic strategies in order to find a lasting solution to this political and electoral crisis. Therefore, it is important to note that whenever there is political and socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe, President Ramaphosa has often adopted a laissez faire and ostrichism diplomacy of see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil, rather than adopt a hands-on approach and interventionist diplomatic strategies of his predecessors like Mandela and Mbeki. For instance, when Zimbabwe was rocked by protests against increases in the price of fuel and the cost of living in January 2019. The protests resulted in violent crackdown by the Zanu PF government which resulted in 12 deaths and violations of human rights of innocent civilians. However, many expected President Ramaphosa to speak strongly against this, but he instead found a convenient scapegoat and called for the United States government to lift sanctions against the Zanu PF government. Therefore, it  was not surprising that during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York Cyril Ramaphosa invoked the sanctions issue during his address to the summit. Moreover, during the sidelines of the UNGA during an interview with a South African Broadcasting Corporation journalist, when pressed about the controversial and fraudulent elections in Zimbabwe, Ramaphosa resorted to whataboutism and spin doctoring in an effort to sanitise the widely condemned elections. Consequently, there was a lack of demonstrable political will or diplomatic signal from Ramaphosa on how he will attempt to help in resolving the political and electoral crisis in Zimbabwe. This was in direct contrast with the position laid out by Mbeki who was also in New York and was interviewed by the same journalist. Accordingly, Mbeki  laid out a political strategy on what should be done and how previously he had managed to mediate and found a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008. Needless to say, Ramaphosa and the ANC through their commissions and omissions have demonstrated that they will remain indifferent to the current political and socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Thus, they will continue with their business-as-usual approach and adopt a waitand-see attitude. As a result, President Ramaphosa will not likely adopt a hands-on approach and mediate in the Zimbabwean crisis in the similar way Mbeki did. The possibility of Ramaphosa or the ANC government acting as an impartial and neutral mediator and interlocutor to this crisis has been made untenable by the moral delinquency  of ANC  secretary-general Fikile Mbalula. Mbalula has openly supported and endorsed the Zanu PF government and President Mnangagwa. Mbalula, through his social media posts, has behaved and acted like a de facto Zanu PF political commissar. Furthermore, he has shown clear disdain for the opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change and its leader Nelson Chamisa. Consequently, President Ramaphosa is likely to continue with his fence sitting approach with little diplomatic manoeuvres towards resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe. *About the writer: Taona Blessing Denhere is a human rights and international development lawyer. NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

CAROLA LENTZ KWAME Nkrumah Memorial Park lies at the centre of Ghana’s capital, Accra.  Recently renovated, it is dedicated to the memory of Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana’s independence struggle and its first president. Marking the spot of his final resting place at the park is a massive statue. The statue has been continuously contested since its original commission in 1956 and its unveiling at the first anniversary of independence in 1958. As a social anthropologist who has  researched and written  about Kwame Nkrumah themed monuments, I have explored the contradiction that generally characterises monuments: built as lasting memories, they remain embedded in social and political conflict. Nkrumah is heralded as one of the most influential African political leaders of the modern era. His vision of a liberated and united African continent influenced politics on the continent in the 1950s and 1960s. But that is only one view of a man who was deposed in a coup in 1966 and died in exile in 1972. In Ghana, there was vociferous criticism of “personality cult” and “hero worship”. Alongside presentations of him as the country’s “redeemer” were descriptions of him as a “dictator”. The idolisation of Nkrumah began even before the country became independent. It had all the hallmarks of a new nation state trying to establish a charismatic national “founder” to stabilise its creation. But, as I have shown, Nkrumah’s story shows both the limits and dangers of doing this. These debates have been matched by unfolding dramas around various efforts to commemorate him – before and after his death. Attitudes have shifted from straightforward veneration to confrontation and destruction and, finally, to more subtle forms of remembrance. The birth of a monument With thoughts of Ghana soon celebrating 25 years of independence, then military ruler  Ignatius Kutu Acheampong  intended to publicly honour the memory of Nkrumah. The deposed leader had passed away in 1972, in exile. After his overthrow, several of his statues and images had been destroyed by the military government. His memory was taboo. Acheampong discussed the possibility of creating a mausoleum, adorned with an imposing new statue, on the grounds where the ex-president had declared independence. The statue was commissioned in Italy but before it could be erected the Acheampong government was toppled by Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings in 1979. In addition, the continued economic crisis militated against any large-scale investment in the monumental landscape. The memorial project was finally realised in 1992 based on the design of Ghanaian architect  Don Arthur. The heart of the memorial is the mausoleum, surrounded by water basins, with fountains and figures of Asante elephant-horn blowers that traditionally accompany royal processions. The mausoleum stands in a landscaped park that is successively greened by commemorative trees planted by important international visitors. It is complemented by a museum that exhibits a collection of Nkrumah memorabilia. These include the famous smock he wore to declare independence, his desk at the seat of government and numerous photographs. The mausoleum itself, made of Italian marble, evokes a gigantic tree stump, but also draws on the imagery of Egyptian pyramids, the  Taj Mahal  and the  Eiffel Tower. The whole ensemble celebrates Nkrumah as a kind of chief. The shining large bronze statue erected in front of the mausoleum shows Nkrumah clad in royal kente cloth, not the humble smock of the original sculpture. Opponents of Rawlings regarded the mausoleum project as an attempt to exploit the growing nostalgia for Nkrumah in his electoral campaign and to style himself and his party as worthy heirs of Nkrumah’s ideas. Another major motivation behind the project was to show the world that Ghanaians, after many years of neglect, respected Nkrumah as a great African leader. This was actually the first time since his overthrow that Nkrumah was publicly commemorated with such splendour. The memorial park conferred on Nkrumah an indisputable place in the national narrative. This status, however, did not mean that his political legacy was now without contest. When the anti-Nkrumah New Patriotic Party won the elections in 2000, they, unlike the 1966 coup-makers  (who removed all images and monuments of Nkrumah), made no attempts to destroy the Nkrumah monument. However, the new government found other ways to correct, or at least complement, Nkrumah-centred nationalist narratives. For instance, in the course of preparing for the golden jubilee of Ghana’s independence in 2007, the John Kufuor  administration  created a series of monuments  that commemorate the political heroes of his party, the New Patriotic Party. Most prominently,  J.B. Danquah, Nkrumah’s most noted political opponent, was honoured by a renovated sculpture at a busy traffic roundabout in the capital. This proliferation of historical monuments can be read as an attempt to neutralise the commemoration of Nkrumah. This was done not by eliminating existing statues of him, but rather by reducing Nkrumah’s status to being only one of several national founders. Strong memories remain For the masses of Ghanaian students and foreign tourists who come to the park, the statue of a triumphant Nkrumah has become the dominant icon of the national hero and of Ghana’s independence. It has been reproduced over and over again on thousands of private photographs, and is marketed on postcards, posters, calendars, T-shirts, bags, towels, tea cups and similar souvenirs. However, there are still limits to the depoliticisation of Nkrumah’s memory. Heated debates over whether Nkrumah was a “democrat” or a “despot” flare up periodically. National heroes, as the case of Nkrumah shows, can divide people just as much as they can unite. Developing the mausoleum into an attractive tourist site, as happened in the renovation and re-inauguration of the park in 2023, adds another intriguing twist to the long history of the commemoration of Kwame Nkrumah – another attempt at depoliticising and nationalising memory. — The Conversation. *About the writer: Carola Lentz is professor of anthropology at Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz in Germany. Kwame Nkrumah Kwame Nkrumah: memorials to the man who led Ghana to independence have been built, erased and revived again Page 42 Africa News NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

STYLE TRAVEL BOOKS ARTS MOTORING Porsche just got angrier Being a Fashion Model Life&Style Page 43 Issue 150, 29 September 2023 JONATHAN MBIRIYAMVEKA IF ever there was need for a reminder that Zimbabwe is a nation at ease with its remarkable racial diversity, Brooke Bruk-Jackson, a white girl from Harare’s luxurious northern suburbs, won the coveted Miss Universe Zimbabwe title a week ago. Gorgeous Brooke will now represent this country at the Miss Universe for El Salvador in Central America in two months. The 21-year-old beautician – who is related to former Zimbabwe national team cricketer Glen Bruk-Jackson – was crowned winner at the glamorous ceremony at Harare Hippodrome auditorium. Attending the all-girls’ Chisipite Senior School in Harare, the stunning Brooke was also sporty, just like Glen, who played two Test and one One-Day International matches for Zimbabwe in the early '90s. Expectations are high that Brooke could break the jinx that has seemingly hampered Zimbabwe on international runaways where the country's models only make the top-four and nothing better. But will Bruk-Jackson bring the world crown to Zimbabwe? Maybe or maybe not, but the one good thing is that there has been great support back home where beauty pageants were dying a slow death. To boost her confidence ahead of the Miss Universe World, Jackson won a US$10 000 cash prize from Style by Minnie, a trip to Victoria Falls courtesy of the Tourism and Hospitality Industry ministry, one-year contract with clothing company Hilz Couture, a spa treatment from Essentials by Tanya, two-year accommodation from West Properties, beauty products from Langa Cosmetics, air ticket to and from Central America courtesy of Traverze, photoshoot contract by Optimas Photography and latest Apple products courtesy of iHelp Company. Jackson will also be brand ambassador for several companies that sponsored the pageant. First princess accolade went to Chegutu-based model and former Miss University of Zambia first runner-up Nokutenda Marumbwa was picked as first princess while the second princess was Amanda Ziyambi Mpofu. Bruk-Jackson, a newcomer on the ramp, expressed shock and disbelief in an interview with The NewsHawks. “I have been modelling a few years back in Cape Town and have been travelling around the world, but this is my first pageant,” she enthused. “It came as a surprise and, like I said, I need time to absorb this. I work at a local beauty spa as a therapist.” Rebirth of pageantry after blonde girl from ‘northern suburbs’ wins Miss Universe Zim Brooke Bruk-Jackson

Page 44 People & Places Samora Machel posthumous birthday Thousands of people on Sunday 1 October attended the late Mozambican leader Samora Machel’s posthumous 90th birthday celebrations held at his birthplace in Chilembeni, Gaza Province. The event was attended by his widow Graca Machel (who was also married to the late South African president Nelson Mandela), his son Samora Machel Jr "Samito", Frelimo leaders, Professor Adriano Nuvunga, Zimbabwe's Professor Ibbo Mandaza and compatriot international human rights lawyer Siphosami Malunga. They laid a wreath at Samora’s monument which is part of the homestead. NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

Page 45 THE Rugby World Cup has provided a number of entertaining games in the group stages, highlighting the improvement of tier-two rugby nations who are gradually closing the gap on the world’s top sides. One such impressive team has been Uruguay, who have won one of the three games played so far. The game that has won Uruguay praise is one that they actually lost, a 27-12 defeat to the host nation France.  To put this result in context, France won against the mighty All Blacks with almost an identical score line, 27-13. Rugby analysts across the world felt Uruguay were unlucky with a few of the referee’s decision at critical stages of the game going in favour of Les Bleus. As I watched the match, I could not help but notice a number of familiar faces from the Uruguay team: seven of the players on the field were part of the Uruguay Under-20 team that took part in the 2016 Rugby World Under-20 Trophy held in Harare, Zimbabwe. These players, with jersey numbers, that now make up the core team for Uruguay, are: Manuel Leindekar (5), Santiago Civetta (7), Manuel Diana (8), Santiago Arata (9), Felipe Etcheverry (10), Tomás Inciarte (13), Guillermo Pujadas (16). These same seven players, who are aged 27, took part in the 2019 World Cup as well when Uruguay fielded a young team and one is almost certain that, barring injury, the same core players will take part in the 2027 edition and give tournament favourites one more crack. It is inspiring to see how a team that finished sixth at the Under-20 tournament in Harare seven years ago has come full circle, purely on the basis of being consistent and deliberate on nurturing their talent. Zimbabwe, who took part in the same tournament, finished eighth. Only one member of the Zimbabwean team back then, Shingi Katsvere, regularly plays for the country’s senior sides these days. Where are the rest of the boys? Such talent drain explains why Zimbabwe is not in France right now, and why Uruguay are threatening the big boys of the sport at the World Cup. In 2016, it was clear to all spectators that the Zimbabwe Under-20 had arguably the most talented players in the tournament, but lacked preparation. Zimbabwe had two out of five tries named in the “Try of the Tournament” awards announced by World Rugby. Namibia, a team that narrowly beat Zimbabwe in the lead up to the tournament, finished in third place. It is clear Zimbabwe had enough talent in 2016 to be playing at the same level as Uruguay are playing at the ongoing 2023 World Cup. For many years, Zimbabwe has produced world-class sports stars. This is not just in rugby. But our lack of planning and failure to nurture players has seen us fall short of podium performances. “Miracles don’t just happen you make them happen": (J. Peters, 1952).  Uruguay produced a miraculous performance against France due to consistent deliberate efforts. Zimbabwe usually accepts mediocre performances at national level, hiding behind the excuse that a handful of our players are lured by other nations. The reality is that every country at the World Cup has lost players to other nations. If there are countries that should be allowed to use this excuse, it should be New Zealand and South Africa, two countries that lose the most talent yet are still the most successful countries in the history of the Rugby World Cup. Recently, the Zimbabwe Under-20 team produced outstanding performances in 2022 and 2023 to be crowned African champions.  We should however not relax and assume that participation at the next World Cup edition in Australia is guaranteed. Collectively as a rugby community, let us plan and ensure our rugby talent achieves the podium performances they deserve. *Guest columnist and NewsHawks contributor Nyasha Muchochomi is a high-performance enthusiast, leading rugby analyst and sporting talent manager. Sport SEVEN years ago they were in Harare as kids, now SEVEN of them are helping Uruguay threaten the big boys at the World Cup The Uruguay Under-20 team after training at Hellenic School in Harare in 2016. Nyasha Muchochomi HawkZone NewsHawks Issue 150, 29 September 2023

NEWS $60 Covid tariff for visitors & tourists CULTURE Community radio regulations under review @NewsHawksLive TheNewsHawks www.thenewshawks.com Thursday 1 October 2020 WHAT’S INSIDE ALSO INSIDE Finance Ministy wipes out $3.2 Billion depositors funds Zim's latest land cStory on Page 3 Story on Page 8 Chamisa reacout to Khupe Unofficial president calls for emergeFriday 29 September 2023 ALSO INSIDE Uruguay threaten the big boys at the World Cup Sports Brought together by the power of sport, and a family affair JIRVAS GWANZURA IN LUTON, ENGLAND ABOUT four months ago, the multi-racial Luton Town allowed its people’s hearts to beat as the home of diversity turned into one enormous sea-wave of sunset colours on the day of celebration and after. The Luton sunset colours that usually symbolise an end to something major was not to be the case this time as Luton Town Football Club birthed a new chapter. Many were worried about the size of the club’s stadium and some made mention of their feeble financial muscle in beefing up the squad as they readied to compete with the big boys in the world’s best football league. Luton has had plans for many years of building a new stadium and this made many believe this dream was going to be accelerated by the promotion. Again this his was not to be, as the team and its fans set off to endure the experience of the English Premier League in the most humble of football settings. I have both deliberately and spontaneously engaged in many conversations with football fans and most were very worried about Luton being among the very best. Indeed the journey in the top-flight took off with turbulence, but there are positives to derive from their performances so far. I remember pundits from one of the most watched programmes in the United Kingdom, Match Of The Day, saying that Luton has to learn how to survive the new challenge and they have to do so really fast. I felt my affection hindered facts and the reality of the new experience, but conversing with different people made me realise I was alone. As I always do with one of my most trusted, well-versed fellow Zimbabweans, who is also a super researched football and music fanatic, Tinashe ‘’Tsanoz’’ Ndudzo, I realised that my sentiments are not a farfetched dream. The usually reserved Manchester United fan made mention that Luton Town have the ability to adjust and burst in form at any given time. He noted several newcomers who experienced the same torment early in the season and later found in them the tenacity to bounce back to push for survival. He even said that he will not rule out relegation and again managed to squeeze positivity from that possible outcome. Ndudzo explained that the way Luton is built is not for flair but a unit that if it falls it rises again. With passion oozing out of his soft but intense tone, he further explained that Luton will return to the Premier League if ever it was to fall short this time and will improve the club’s financial status. My job role also allows me to work with different people from different backgrounds who become family through the Luton Council’s impartation of unity. From this I have also engaged in interesting conversations with a passionate Luton Town fan of Kenyan background. Isaac Brown made it a point that he gave me his history with the club from both sides of his family. Without pronouncing it verbally, it was absolutely clear that he takes pride in the fact that he started supporting the club from when he was merely three years of age. Isaac confidently declared that Luton will stay up as he feels the team is getting used to the new challenge. It is also fair to note that Luton has always had the tendency of heating up when it matters most. This aligned with Isaac’s prediction that Luton will soon adjust. One weather generous day I left the office for a breather off the computer to capitalise on the vitamin D of the sun that will soon be rare in Luton and the rest of England. I went and sat in the famous St George's Square where the parade climaxed on the day of celebration with the entire town. I sat not far from the Luton library and a couple emerged from the direction of the fancied Nando’s. A proud father with his family strolled towards the mall while their son freely ran up and down under the close eye of the father who wore a smiling face as he also kept close to his heavily pregnant wife. From a distance I sensed his warmth and at that time I was already contemplating penning yet another Luton Town FC piece. Damien Porter noticed what must have been a stare from me and he further stretched the smile, prompting me into braving a conversation with him. And of course, after finding out about my roots, he was happy to talk about Marvelous Nakamba, the Hatters midfielder from Zimbabwe. Damien was wearing the Luton Town FC predominantly orange top, and something in me convinced me that I can extract substance from conversing with him about the performances so far. Damien’s smile never faded. As his wife waited with their boy, he explained that what is happening is far from disappointing. He declared that he was behind the team no matter what happens. He really impressed me when he stated that he is enjoying every moment of it and does not expect more from the Hatters as they have already earned his trust. He declared that he will continue to attend all matches no matter how far the away matches are. Worried about the patient pregnant wife, I would look at her with a subtle apology of holding up her husband. She would give a smiling gesture of approval. Damien, before re-engaging with his family, emphasised that he is having a time of his life despite the reflection of the figures of the score-lines of the games so far. Lastly, I provoked a passionate and husky Richard Mandongwe all the way from Cape Town. The Liverpool fan has an obvious soft spot for Luton Town. He is one of the humble people blessed with the passion to support youths in both sports in music, which aligns with our 263Rise dream. Hence he is a valued contributor to our pieces. Richard shared that Luton Town seem to be struggling. However, he reported that he believes that the team will get better as they have players capable of doing the job. He further explained that at the moment it is too early as they are accumulating experience which they will definitely use to bounce back. He also noted that that they currently lack composure, which is resulting in wrong decisions in wrong positions. However, he made sure that I understand that he has faith in them, that the players have a crucial attribute in them, of great ethics. Luton registered their first point again a 10-man Wolves, a result that elevated them from the base of the league. This is clearly not over and it would be short-sighted to dismiss the Hatters at this juncture. The Zimbabwean community continue to rally behind the team from a town regarded as home away from home. *Jirvas Gwanzura has lived in Luton since the early 2000s and regularly contributes to The NewsHawks. Marvelous Nakamba in Lutton colours. ‘Zim community continue to rally behind the Hatters’