NewsHawks 26 May 2023

Price US$1 Friday 26 May 2023 NEWS Suspended Nssa boss entangled in US$353 000 luxury vehicles scandal Story on Page 3 NEWS Zimbabwe sleepwalks into yet another flawed poll WHAT’S Story on Page 16 INSIDE SPORT Fifa’s ban on Zimbabwe sparks domestic football revival Story on Page 64 ALSO INSIDE Zimbabwe now among the world’s poorest countries Mnangagwa appoints CIO troubleshooter to consolidate grip on power

Page 2 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 OWEN GAGARE PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa has moved to re-assert his vice-like grip on Zimbabwe’s state security service, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), which is critical to his power consolidation and retention bid. Autocratic leaders rely on the intelligence apparatus for regime and personal security, including coup-proofing. They often manage powerful, brutal and unaccountable intelligence establishments, which they hold close. But, despite their close relationship with — and reliance upon — intelligence, despots also frequently struggle to use it to enhance decision-making and foreign policy, and consequently suffer avoidable intelligence failures. The new appointment is particularly critical for Mnangagwa to ward off any sign of challenge by his ambitious deputy Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga ahead of crucial elections where the spectre of “bhora musango” — internal sabotage — looms large. To shore up his faltering grip on the CIO, largely modelled on his own image as the country’s first State Security minister after Independence in 1980, Mnangagwa quietly appointed director of administration Patrick Donald Mutasa to the level of Deputy Director-General. The new appointment came at a time when Mnangagwa is reportedly losing confidence in CIO Director-General Isaac Moyo and some top spooks who are either not discharging their duties well or are compromised by Zanu PF’s political factionalism and internal strife. “Mnangagwa recently appointed Mutasa who was director of administration to new post at deputy director-general level. The strategy is to take away some functions and responsibilities from those who are no longer trusted or have fallen out of favour, and give them to loyalists to ensure his power consolidation and retention drive succeeds. “It was also influenced by politics, internal dynamics at the CIO top hierarchy and the need for intelligence bosses to checkmate each other and prevent them from acting in collusion or common purpose. It’s a Russian-style or KGB-style approach.” KGB was the Soviet Union’s intelligence service. It is now called Federal Security Service, the largest intelligence organisation in Europe. There has been talk within the Zimbabwean intelligence community that although Moyo is a Mnangagwa loyalist, he has of late been viewed with suspicion, especially after he took a position on the delimitation process supporting the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) chairperson Priscilla Chigumba whom the President currently has a love-hate relationship with. It is understood Chigumba’s relationship with Mnangagwa is frayed, sometimes on the rocks over electoral issues. Chigumba is said to be close to Moyo who offers her huge support in her work. There was a big fallout between Mnangagwa and Chigumba over the delimitation process. Mnangagwa and his allies wanted to sabotage the delimitation report, while Chigumba was rescued by Chiwenga and Moyo. In his 2018 elections monograph, Excelgate — How Zimbabwe's 2018 Presidential Election was Stolen, Jonathan Moyo, a professor of politics, narrates a fallout between Mnangagwa and Chigumba. It got so serious that Chigumba wanted to leave the country. However, Chigumba has denied the allegations. The new appointment means there are now practically three CIO deputy directors-general. The other two appointed in January 2020 are retired Brigadier-General Walter Tapfumaneyi and Dr Gatsha Mazithulela. They replaced Aaron Nhepera who had earlier been appointed Home Affairs permanent secretary. Nhepera has since been moved again to become Defence permanent secretary, replacing the retired Grey Marongwe. In a bid to shore up his support within the intelligence structures, Mnangagwa elevated Mutasa to take some of the functions and roles exercised by Mazithulela whom they say is a great scientist, but not necessary an intelligence guru. While he is reportedly struggling in his CIO job, Mazithulela is a member of the National Defence University Council and chairperson of the National Authority of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Zimbabwe Chapter. Mazithulela graduated with a PhD in genetic engineering at the age of 27 and worked in the United States and the United Kingdom. Listed among his achievements are the Fogarty Aids International Training and Research Scholarship at Johns Hopkins University in the US, Rockefeller Foundation pre-doctoral fellowship, a post-doctoral research fellowship at the University of Nottingham, and post-doctoral scientist at DuPont Incorporated in the US. He was awarded support from the UK-South Africa Science and Technology Research Fund in 1997. Mazithulela served as a board member for the Cape Biotechnology Trust, Anvir Biopharmaceticals (Pty) Ltd and Elevation Biotechnology (Pty) Ltd chair. He also served as National Research Foundation of South Africa vice-president, Nuclear Technology Products (Pty) Limited and at the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, among other achievements. Despite his colourful curriculum vitae, security sources say he is struggling to fit into the structures and operate in the shadows. Mazithulela is not entirely new to the intelligence world. He previously got a scholarship from them. Mazithulela has been embroiled in some drunken and gun shooting controversies. “Mutasa will assume some of Mazithulela’s roles because he seems to be a great scientist, but not an intelligence administrator or operator. That’s not his area.” While Mnangagwa’s relationship with the CIO top boss might be now tenuous, his ties with Tapfumaneyi are strong. With Mazithulela, it is said Mnangagwa has good professional and family ties with him. Tapfumaneyi is very close to Mnangagwa and has been given an extra duty to run the upcoming general elections, through a structure called Forever Associates of Zimbabwe (Faz). Previous elections were run by the military, with other security agents playing a supporting role, but the function has been taken over by the CIO, primarily because Mnangagwa does not fully trust the army, because he believes Chiwenga still has control. Chiwenga was the Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander when the military toppled former president Robert Mugabe in 2017 and thrust Mnangagwa into power. Before that he was a Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, which he joined at its formation after independence in 1980. Tapfumaneyi is leading Faz, which has been assigned to manipulate electoral processes in Mnangagwa’s favour. This is not a constitutional or official arrangement, but an underground operational unit campaigning for Mnangagwa and Zanu PF in the August general elections. Faz has now displaced the army’s structure called Heritage that used to perform a similar role and other functions. In 2018, the army ran elections through Heritage and Africom, a converged communication service provider. The CIO move and channelling of public resources to its shadowy structure is unconstitutional, legal experts say. Sources say, so far, Faz has received US$10 million and 200 cars to run its affairs in preparation for elections. More resources have been promised to capacitate the secret structure. Faz’s mandate is to work together with Zec to coordinate logistics and other state institutions to retain Mnangagwa in power. The CIO, police and the army under the Joint Operations Command (Joc) — a relic of the Rhodesia era — play a critical role in Zimbabwean elections. They are the cog in Zanu PF’s campaign and coercive machinery. President Emmerson Mnangagwa with CIO Director-General Isaac Moyo (right). CIO Deputy Director-General Retired Brigadier-General Walter Tapfumaneyi Mnangagwa appoints new CIO fixer to consolidate grip on power

NewsHawks News Page 3 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BERNARD MPOFU SUSPENDED National Social Security Authority (Nssa) boss Arthur Manase was removed partly due to a scandal over two top-of-the-range cars valued US$353 000 which he bought in violation of company policy, informed insiders say. The two cars bought for Manase in violation of company policy are a Mercedes-AMG E53 for US$178 000 and a Land Rover Defender for US$175 000. Manase was suspended last year in July to pave way for investigations into corporate governance failures, mismanagement and corruption at Nssa, a US$1.2 billion statutory pension fund with scores of properties around the country. Different state institutions, including the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, were involved in the probe. As part of the investigations, a forensic audit report has been produced by AMG Global Chartered Accountants (Zimbabwe). Insiders say Nssa bosses are allowed to have one condition-of-service vehicle, but Manase had two, which is not allowed. After realising that the situation was in violation of internal company policy on his conditions of employment, Manase transformed one of the cars — the Mercedes-Benz — into a loan trying to regularise the issue. However, in so doing Manase tied himself in knots in the process as yet another irregularity emerged — selling the car to himself irregularly. “What happened was that Manase was bought two cars by Nssa: A Mercedes-Benz and a Land Rover Defender. That was in violation of company policy and his condition of employment,” a source said. “After realising how serious the issue was, he then sought permission from (Public Service) minister Paul Mavima and former chairman Dr Percy Toriro to convert the Mercedes-Benz into a personal loan. This means that he effectively sold himself that car irregularly — it was a case of trying to solve one problem while creating another.” Manase enjoyed the support of Mavima while at Nssa, but he was eventually suspended amid corruption investigations at the statutory pension fund scheme. He was replaced by Charles Shava, currently Nssa acting general manager. Shava is the substantive Nssa director of occupational safety and health. As a result of the car mess, Nssa assistant accountant Erasmus Mavondo was arrested last year and appeared in court on allegations of corruptly awarding Manase a personal loan to buy a car using an undervalued exchange rate. Mavondo allegedly helped Manase to buy the Mercedes-Benz for ZW$25 351 418.60 instead of ZW$60 251 593.80, which was equivalent to US$178 000. The money was purportedly given to Manase as a personal loan to regularise a problematic company-cars deal in which he ended up with two condition-of-service vehicles instead of one. In so doing, Mavondo allegedly prejudiced Nssa of ZW$34 900 175 after converting the US$178 000 using a 31 March 2022 rate of US$1: ZW$142 instead of US$1: ZW$138 as of 21 June 2022. Manase’s situation was compounded by a house loan of US$600 000 — not US$750 000 as widely reported — which he was getting, while he also got a US$2 500 housing allowance. There was also the issue of a house in Borrowdale which was renovated for him. The Borrowdale house — No.49A Borrowdale Road, Harare — was renovated for him, while he got a housing loan and allowance. Manase denies the corruption charges and claims he has been exonerated. He is also suing various media organisations over the issue, but insiders say he still has cases to answer and the audit does show that. Several Nssa executives have been suspended, removed or are under investigation. Shava was arrested over a doctors’ allowances scheme involving ZW$12 246 571.48. His lawyers say that was part of Mavima’s backlash against those who are seen as exposing his corrupt house deal. Mavima is embroiled in a US$400 000 Borrowdale house scandal which is part of the audit report. There is also the property scandal emanating from another fraudulent transaction by Nssa involving a commercial property in Kariba valued at US$220 000. The property was bought for US$215 000 after negotiations, but US$244 000 was paid. In fact, US$240 000 was paid after charges. This means US$25 000 was siphoned. At one point, Nssa officials claimed it was valued at US$360 000. When other costs were added, the price went up to US$252 631.59. Since Nssa usually pays round figures, US$300 000 was paid. The balance was purportedly directed to its investment account. Mavima tried to replace Shava with Agnes Masiiwa, the director of contributions, collections and compliance, but was blocked by Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga when he was Acting President in January. Masiiwa’s appointment was officially done by Nssa ex-board chairperson, Toriro. Amid upheavals at Nssa, several executives and managers were shifted and some removed as those in charge sought to assert control amid corruption allegations. Others became collateral damage, like David Makwara, the corporate affairs director, suspended over a loan issue, but who claims to be a victim of the situation. Makwara has been in and out of Nssa as a result. Brian Murewa, Nssa investments director, has skipped the border into South Africa after facilitating the minister’s corrupt deal. New Nssa chair Emmanuel Fundira says officials implicated in the Nssa audit report will be dealt with and face the full wrath of the law. His first challenge is tackling the minister, if he can at all. Suspended Nssa boss mired in US$353 000 luxury cars scandal Suspended Nssa boss Arthur Manase Mercedes-AMG E53 Nssa Borrowdale house, No.49A Borrowdale Road, Harare.

Page 4 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government technically took possession of and sold the late former prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s Highlands mansion to his widow after it had appeared to be willing to let the family have the house for free as part of his pension. Although Mnangagwa’s government wanted US$1.8 million for the house, it is understood that Tsvangirai’s widow negotiated and paid about US$1.5 million. The house — No. 49 Kew Drive, Highlands, Harare — was bought from South African-based Justin Davenport in 2007 for US$800 000. It was renovated at a staggering cost of US$1.5 million to fit the high-profile standards and expectations of the prime minister. However, the project was mired in controversy. There were accusations that the late main opposition MDC founding leader had double-dipped during the process. The issue caused a stir as political hawks in the late former president Robert Mugabe’s regime wanted Tsvangirai arrested over that. The house had been bought by the government and allocated to Tsvangirai after he had boycotted government in 2009 during the coalition arrangement with Mugabe, protesting how he was being badly treated and not respected. Mnangagwa and his deputy Constantino Chiwenga visited Tsvangirai at the house in January 2018 — a month before he died — and subsequently the government assured his family it would not be evicted. At the time Mnangagwa’s spokesGovt sells Elizabeth Tsvangirai her late husband’s Highlands mansion man George Charamba said: “Was he not a prime minister, why would he be evicted? And he retired under a constitution that recognised his office.” After the meeting at the house, Tsvangirai left for South Africa for medical check-ups. The government was paying part of his bills. He subsequently died of colon cancer on 14 February 2018 in Johannesburg. Two weeks after Tsvangirai’s death, Mnangagwa wrote to Elizabeth Tsvangirai (nee Macheka) technically taking control of the house, saying it was government property and authorities were offering to sell it to her. “As you recall, when I came to see the late former Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe , Mr M.R. Tsvangirai, I informed him that the state would offer him to buy House No. 49 Kew Drive in Highlands (Harare), his official residence, as the former prime minister,” said Mnangagwa. “I now wish to advise that the state is offering to sell the said residential property to you madam, as the surviving spouse of the late former prime minister, at a price determined by government of US$1 807 000.00. Please note that the purchase price is payable over a period of 60 months. “Kindly confirm in writing, madam, if you wish to accept the offer as presented, in order to enable the necessary arrangements for the sale to be made forthwith. Alternatively, you should also advise in writing, if you are not able to accept the offer, in which case, the house will revert to the state.” In an interview, Elizabeth Tsvangirai told The NewsHawks she had bought the property after her husband’s death as it belonged to the state up to that time. “I will issue a statement on the issue. I’m currently out of the country. Briefly, it is true we bought the house after my husband’s death. We were government tenants all along then and after his death, they offered to sell it to us as we had the right to first refusal, and we bought it. We will give all the necessary details in the statement.” — STAFF WRITER. The late former prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s house.

NewsHawks News Page 5 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 JONATHAN MOYO APRIL, famously characterised as “the cruellest month” by distinguished poet and literary critic TS Eliot in his critically acclaimed essay “The Wasteland” — not because its first day celebrates fools but due to its sad northern hemispheric association with high suicide rates and severe depression — was this year a month of great depression for different business interlocutors and Zimbabwean VVIPs, including President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who were implicated in the much-hyped Al Jazeera documentary, The Gold Mafia. The documentary, which sought to investigate gold smuggling, money laundering and corruption, had four film episodes, six podcasts and one long narrative. Essentially, Al Jazeera’s Gold Mafia documentary boils down to a useful and gripping yet untested story of high-level corruption, gold smuggling and money laundering in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Dubai which is long on allegations, short on evidence with zero proof. The investigation brought to light some goings-on in the underworld regarding gold trade and money laundering in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Dubai, as well as associated illicit financial flows and a conspiracy to commit financial crimes. It was a brave attempt to tell a revealing story, notwithstanding the verification and ethical questions which it struggled with and ultimately failed to address as will be shown later. The documentary also showed us some of the main characters involved in the shady deals and their connections with ruling authorities. The previously unknown nexus between business, politics and crime was highlighted in spell-binding ways. In that regard, Al Jazeera did well to investigate one of the most critical issues in Zimbabwe in recent times — that of illicit gold dealings involving smugging and money laundering — but sadly it eventually failed on its promise to expose and prove the corruption, gold smuggling, and money laundering. In the end, Al Jazeera journalists simply dipped into a box labelled "half-truths and innuendo" which they then packaged as a ground-breaking investigation when it was merely a hypothesis with anecdotal evidence thrown around. That is the starting point of an investigation, not the conclusion. The other critical stages — gathering facts, verifying them and establishing the truth before choosing a narrative and presentation style, for instance — were not meticulously followed by Al Jazeera beyond muddling through. Al Jazeera failed to gather primary evidence of supreme value to substantiate its storyline or narrative. It only gathered secondary evidence in some cases. In research terms, it gathered primary, source or atomic data which was presented as evidence and proof without being processed into useful information. Raw data, oftentimes referred to as source or primary data, is material that has not been processed, coded, formatted, or yet analysed for useful information. While being a valuable resource, which is what the Al Jazeera documentary is, raw data is incredibly hard to comprehend or act upon, as it is unverified, lacks cohesion and thus incoherent. To make matter worse, Al Jazeera claimed to have thousands of documents, but it has not posted them on its platforms to back its investigation and allow the public to read and scrutinise the material like the Panama Papers, also known as the Mossack Fonseca Papers, the leak of 11.5 million files of leaked financial and attorney-client details covering 214 488 offshore entities from the world’s fourth-largest offshore law firm. The Pulitzer Prize-winning global media project Panama Papers — which was data released in 2016 to a German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung providing details on how more than 120 politicians and officials around the world stashed money offshore by a whistle-blower using the pseudonym John Doe — on the surface did not show criminality, but upon verification and further investigations they proved that many shell companies mentioned were fronts for fraud, tax evasion, and sanctions busting. From the Hutchinson Letters, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, The Pentagon Papers, Watergate, The Plame Affair, The Downing Street Memo, Iraq war Logs (WikiLeaks), Edward Snowden Leaks, Paradise Papers to Panama Papers, transparency was key to ensuring public trust and confidence. However, from the start, Al Jazeera was dodgy. It delayed the documentary without explanation and now it hasn’t published its purported stash of documents. Al Jazeera fixed “sexed up” facts around the narrative, not the other way round. This will be unpacked and demonstrated in detail down the line. First, it is important to take a step back and start at the beginning before delving deeper into other issues. Al Jazeera’s use of undercover methods — meaning subterfuge and systematic deception — as its documentary’s basis of the investigation was questionable. The problem is that in its bid to extract information from the interlocutors, Al Jazeera ended up telling outright lies about who they were and induced some of the sources featured in the documentary to say all sorts of things with their eyes on the prize money. The promise of huge sums of money as reward for money laundering and the deceptive willingness to pay “appreciative fees” to fix appointments for Al Jazeera undercover journalists for meetings with VVIPs provided an incentive for some of the actors to name-drop, exaggerate issues and even lie. There is no doubt that across the world undercover investigations have produced extraordinary and impactful journalism, but there are always ethical concerns on how far journalists can go. One of the key principles of journalism is that reporters must always be transparent, open and honest in information gathering, but when they go undercover to gather details through deception those ethical requirements are compromised and even violated. The crucial point is that investigative journalism that insists on gathering information through deception and invasion of privacy can have only one serious defence: a larger social purpose or the public interest. Undercover investigations by journalists go back a long way. A classical case was in 1887 when the celebrated American reporter Nellie Bly feigned illness, got herself admitted to a notoriously ill-administered New York lunatic asylum, and wrote a powerful expose that hastened legal reforms relating to the treatment of the mentally ill. Since then, undercover journalism has been the subject of heated discussions, especially in the late 1970s, hence stings like the Al Jazeera one can easily cause a stir. With this backdrop in mind, this is how Al Jazeera summarised its story from the start in its main narrative: “Zimbabwe’s government is using smuggling gangs to sell gold worth hundreds of millions of dollars, skirting some of the consequences of tough Western sanctions imposed on the country over human rights abuses, Al Jazeera’s Investigative Unit (I-Unit) can reveal. “The smuggling feeds into an enormous money-laundering operation, all facilitated by Fidelity Gold Refinery, a subsidiary of Zimbabwe’s central bank, and enabled, in some cases, directly by senior government officials and relatives of the country’s president, Emmerson Mnangagwa. “Zimbabwe’s government needs United States dollars because the local currency has no value in international trade following sustained hyperinflation over many years. Gold — the country’s biggest export — is an effective way to earn dollars. But although gold trade itself is not barred, the additional scrutiny sanctions bring on Zimbabwean officials smother the government’s ability to transact directly in the international financial system, especially in dollars, said Karen Greenaway, a former US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent who tracks illicit money flows. 'So, you have to figure out other ways to do that,' she told Al Jazeera. "Meanwhile, global money launderers have Long on allegations, short on evidence, yet zilch proof: A critical review of Al Jazeera’s Gold Mafia documentary Gold mafia

undeclared cash they need to turn into legitimate money. Gold smugglers offer a way around these complications both for money launderers and the Zimbabwe government.” The first thing here is that the news film says the government is using smuggling syndicates to skirt consequences of Western sanctions. It however goes on to acknowledge that gold trade is not under sanctions, thus weakening the tenuous narrative right way, upfront. Yet there is no causal connection between gold smuggling, money laundering and sanctions in this case. The second thing is that the documentary claims that those accused of smuggling were working in cahoots with government authorities and some state institutions, but there was no evidence of that in the documentary beyond insinuations and innuendoes. No copper-bottomed evidence was provided, at all. The third issue is that the film says the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) was being used as a “laundromat” by smugglers and money launderers. That serious allegation was just carelessly flighted, especially in Al Jazeera’s Press statement and trailer for the documentary, but not pursued at all throughout the documentary. There was not even an attempt to prove the allegation. It was thrown around just like a reckless smear, resulting in unjustified character assassination and gaslighting in the process. Fourth, a number of other allegations were made; for instance, that President Emmerson Mnangagwa is paid homage and protection fees fortnightly by gold dealer Kamlesh Pattni. While it is Mnangagwa’s job to defend himself, from a journalistic point of view that serious claim was not verified and proved. Fifth, another example; while some figures presented as “couriers” were seen in the documentary moving suspiciously through the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport in Harare purportedly smuggling gold and carrying money, audiences never really got to know what was actually in those bags which they were pulling. This is not about poking holes in the documentary or defending anyone — there is no need to, but it is about journalistic competence, integrity and credibility with regards to the Al Jazeera investigation. There are many other allegations in the documentary which were just not proven. The fundamental problem is that Al Jazeera journalists did not verify allegations made by their interlocutors whom they recorded secretly, some of them under the inducement of money or even alcohol. The undercover journalists simply regurgitated what they were told without verification to ensure that evidence and proof were ascertained to ultimately arrive at confirmed facts to establish the truth in the public interest. Any serious investigative journalist anywhere in the world knows that without verification, there is no story. It is mere allegations. Facts and the truth can only be established through verification. The essence of the story is the verified content. Put differently, verification is a scientific-like approach to getting the facts and also the right facts, and eventually the truth. While Al Jazeera did indeed provide some scanty facts here and there, it did not provide any evidence let alone proof to support either the allegations or the scanty facts. Evidence and proof are critical in investigative journalism; they are the lifeblood of the trade. For example, it is a fact that some purported smugglers were seen dragging bags through the airport, but there was no evidence that they were smugglers in the first place and indeed there was no proof of what they were actually carrying inside those bags. The reporters made allegations which they should have necessarily gone on to prove but did not. As journalists and media scholars always say, journalism itself is a discipline of verification. Assumption, as some would put it, is the mother of all media screw-ups. Called the Discipline of Verification, this sort of in-depth journalism’s intellectual foundation rests on three core concepts — transparency, open-mindedness and originality. This is the basic yet critical test which Al Jazeera’s Gold Mafia documentary failed dismally. But to be fair, gold smuggling was a good subject of investigation, except that Al Jazeera did a shoddy job, empirically speaking. Where the allegations began and ended, assumptions took over. No wonder the documentary ultimately became a screw-up. There is no doubt that the film was very entertaining. It was full of drama and theatrics. That is why it drew huge local and international audiences through a narrative which claimed that there is a “gold mafia” principally comprising the key interlocutors of Ewan MacMillan, Simon, Rudland Kamlesh Pattni and Alistair Mathias and a “diplomatic mafia” led by Ambassador Plenipotentiary Uebert Angels — described as a senior diplomat when he in fact is neither senior nor a diplomat, but a special presidential envoy — operating in cahoots with his brother-in-law Rikki Doolan and Henrietta Rushwaya, a niece to Mnangagwa; allegedly involved in high-level corruption, gold smuggling and money laundering purportedly to evade Western economic sanctions on Zimbabwe, while supposedly making hundreds of millions of United States dollars to enrich their VVIP bosses and themselves through collusion with bribed officials at Fidelity Printers and Refineries, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport. For the avoidance of doubt, the investigation was necessary and worthwhile. In many important ways, the Al Jazeera documentary was an historic and revealing eye-opener, which lifted the lid off a previously little-known yet corruption-ridden illicit trade of gold smuggling and money laundering by shining the spotlight on the dark enterprise to expose its kingpins, financiers, barons, field runners, smugglers, couriers, and their local and international networks. The key interlocutors in the documentary speak freely and informatively about themselves; their alleged close links to and relationships with Mnangagwa and the first family and other African Presidents past and present; how they operate to access gold, smuggle it out of Zimbabwe and market it in Dubai through money laundering. In the process, the interlocutors reveal how they relate to and compete with one another as warlike rivals; that they have open access to high-level political connections; and that they are willing to commit financial crimes by, for example, engaging in corruption by taking money to fix appointments for criminal gangs that seek to clean their dirty money with high level politicians; that they are willing to smuggle gold and to launder money for people who introduce themselves as criminals; how they bribe government officials to enable their corrupt and illegal trade and that they do not do any due diligence on ‘businesspeople” who openly declare their money laundering intentions. Although the first two episodes of the fourpart documentary aired on 23 and 30 March respectively and the third on 6 April, it was the fourth episode screened on 14 April which was nervously awaited by the documentary’s interlocutors and the VVIPs they had implicated who had been in a state of panic and depression akin to the one unravelled in “The Wasteland” by TS Eliot, as they feared that the last episode would lay bare corroborated and thus incontrovertible proof of the sensational corruption, gold smuggling and money laundering allegations made in the first three episodes. Alas, the fourth and last episode fell short and did not provide any proof of anything. Instead of testing the claims made by the “gold mafia” and the “diplomatic mafia” to independently and factually prove or disprove them as the basis of its documentary, Al Jazeera sought to induce the same mafia to make more untested and unverified claims. In the end, a lot of things were allowed to be broadcast untested, as the claims and allegations made in the documentary were not verified. However, Al Jazeera had an ethical and professional duty to verify the allegations. An otherwise useful documentary failed to test and prove what it set out to do in four episodes, supported by six podcasts that merely repeated the untested allegations of the documentary. Yet the documentary’s allegations were clear, and serious. On 27 February 2023 ahead of the screening of the first episode which had initially been set for 2 March 2023 before it was rescheduled at the 11th hour to 23 March 2023, Al Jazeera released a Press statement, saying an investigation by Al Jazeera's Investigative Unit had infiltrated “rival gangs that control Africa's gold. Criminal networks turn dirty cash into gold, which is sold around the world. The investigation leads to the highest offices of state in southern Africa.” Most serious was the allegation against the RBZ. Page 6 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Uerbert Angel (left) with President Emmerson Mnangagwa

NewsHawks News Page 7 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 The 27 February 2023 Press statement alleged that “the rival crime bosses reveal that at the centre of their operations is southern Africa's biggest laundromat, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The investigation reveals that the Gold Mafia are employed by Zimbabwe's ruling elite to export gold on the government's behalf. It is a scheme to bust international sanctions placed on political leaders and government entities.” The allegation that the RBZ “is southern Africa’s biggest laundromat” was the most reckless, in fact the worst of all the allegations associated with the documentary, not least because it was made by Al Jazeera itself, with no supporting evidence, not even a claim by any of the interlocutors featured in the documentary, no episode and no podcast supported this scurrilous allegation. It was not verified because it is unverifiable unless there is evidence. None of the four episodes of the documentary and its six podcasts implicated the RBZ itself or the governor (John Mangudya) or any official at the central bank proper. It is noteworthy that the sixth and final episode of the podcasts was very sensational, as it pointed fingers at Zimbabwe’s national leadership. This was potentially explosive as it fed on the self-incriminating narratives of the name-dropping key interlocutors featured in the documentary. Notably, Al Jazeera had invited interested media houses and NGOs to collaborate with it, and it had said it would put on its website some interesting material it did not use on the documentary, such as “thousands” of documents. But to date, Al Jazeera has not put any material of the sort on its website, and it does not look like it will put any. A significant development which might have disrupted Al Jazeera’s plans beyond the documentary and its associated episodes, has been the litigation against Al Jazeera by the President of Ghana. Other implicated individuals have also taken the matter on legal advice. Another development of some note since Al Jazeera’s release of its sixth and last podcast on the documentary has been President Cyril Ramaphosa’s statement in Parliament that the South African government is investigating money laundering allegations made in the documentary that implicated some individuals and some South African banks. But besides making indications that there will be investigations, no specific action has been taken by South African authorities, even though the documentary levelled specific money laundering allegations against three South African banks, which pointed to poor oversight or supervision gaps on the part of South Africa’s Reserve Bank. There has been no pressure on the South African Reserve Bank, arising from these allegations, from the media or the opposition or non-governmental organisations in South Africa. Incidentally, the fact that some individuals and at least three commercial banks were implicated by the Al Jazeera documentary effectively muted the South African media’s coverage of the documentary’s Zimbabwe-centric narratives of the documentary. All told, the documentary has the following implications that might linger on into the near future, depending largely on political circumstances and sentiments of the day. Unlike Rudland who was wise enough not to meet with or not to entertain Al Jazeera’s undercover journalists, the documentary’s interlocutors who include Angel, Doolan, Rushwaya, Pattni, MacMillan, Mathias and Chidodo said things and name-dropped in ways that are certain to haunt them down the line. Some of the things said about Mnangagwa particularly by Angel, Pattni, MacMillan and Mathias will indefinitely remain open to curious questions in the public domain. Although none of the episodes and podcasts of the documentary implicated the RBZ itself directly, and none implicated governor Mangudya, or any of the staff at the bank itself and, further; in fact exonerated the RBZ boss through notable remarks made by MacMillan who said he sought protection from Mnangagwa after he complained to him about his non-cooperation, it is nevertheless quite clear there was a sinister agenda to smear the RBZ to suffer collateral damage, with deleterious consequences on the economy. Throughout the four episodes and the six podcasts, there was constant reference to Fidelity Printers and Refineries as the “Reserve Bank” or as the “Central Bank.” In the same vein, former Fidelity staff implicated in the documentary were described as Reserve Bank staff or officials. This conflation between Fidelity and RBZ was a source of confusion in the documentary. Fidelity is not RBZ. Sins of Fidelity cannot be RBZ sins, simply or only because Fidelity is a subsidiary of RBZ. It is like saying a father must by definition be held liable for a crime committed by his son or daughter. It was mischievous for Al Jazeera to create the impression in its documentary that “Fidelity” is by definition the same thing or is synonymous with the “Reserve Bank” or the “central bank”, when Fidelity is a legal entity in its own right. In the wake of the broadcast of episode four of the documentary, Al Jazeera published a rather long article apparently meant to tie the documentary’s loose ends, titled "Six secrets uncovered by Al Jazeera’s Gold Mafia investigation”, whose link is indicated immediately below: https://twitter.com/AJEnglish/status/1647434745259622401?t=tqOMz0DUgzqeTUt26_iutQ&s=03. This Al Jazeera article made some serious yet untested and thus unproven allegations against RBZ, very damaging allegations which were not made in any of the four episodes of the documentary nor in any of its six podcasts nor tested anywhere. As part of its summary, the article says: “The investigation also exposes the involvement of high-ranking officials from Zimbabwe in smuggling and money laundering, which help the country get around the crippling grip of Western sanctions.” Further, Al Jazeera’s article alleges that: “None of this would be possible without the involvement of the banking systems of Zimbabwe and South Africa. In Zimbabwe, Al Jazeera’s investigation showed that Pattni had several members of the central bank on his payroll, including Fradreck Kunaka, at the time the general manager of Fidelity, the bank’s gold refinery. Fidelity authorised smugglers like Pattni and Macmillan to buy gold from Zimbabwean miners on its behalf, documents show. And the central bank also issued letters allowing the smugglers to bring millions of dollars of cash into the country.” Al Jazeera’s post-documentary allegations are not tested anywhere. Yet they are very damaging. The allegations are not contained in any of the four episodes of the documentary or any of its six podcasts. But even worse, the allegations are untested and are thus unverified. This suggests a sinister intention of having the allegations in print, for the archives or for use by researchers for major multilateral entities that might have some interest in the RBZ of one sort or another. Another potentially damaging report that came after all the episodes of the documentary had been broadcast, was published on 17 April 2023 by Veritas, a legal think-tank based in Harare. Emotively if not provocatively titled, Economic Governance Watch 01 — 2023 — The Gold Mafia: Time for a Forensic Audit of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the report, whose link is indicated immediately below, used the backdrop of untested and unverified allegations in the Al Jazeera documentary to call for a forensic audit of the RBZ: https://www.veritaszim. net/node/6263 Aware that the documentary had not implicated the bank, its governor or any of its proper staff or officials, Veritas prefaced its call for an RBZ audit with this uncritical acceptance of untested Al Jazeera claims: “Al Jazeera, a television news network based in Qatar, has broadcast a four-part documentary series entitled Gold Mafia. The series looked at how international criminal gangs were buying gold in Zimbabwe and illegally exporting it to countries such as the Dubai. The persons alleged to be carrying on this illegal trade were shown boasting of their close links to the RBZ and to senior government officials, up to and including the President and his wife. They said they had the RBZ governor 'on speed dial' and that senior managers of Fidelity Printers and Refineries, a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank, were on their payroll to facilitate the issuance of licences to buy and export gold. Through these links, they claimed, all the processes in their trade were made to seem honest, with legitimate paperwork to authorise their gold exports. The RBZ’s response to these allegations has not been entirely consistent.” It is instructive that the Veritas report merely reproduces or repeats untested, unproven, unverified and uncorroborated Al Jazeera allegations and presents them as fact, while dismissing the RBZ governor’s rebuttal of the same allegations in a Press statement released on 6 March 2023 as “not been entirely consistent”. Consistent with what or in what sense? Veritas justified its strange call for a forensic audit of RBZ on the scandalous grounds that: “The Reserve Bank is a vital cog in the country’s economy, and it is essential for it to maintain a spotless reputation for competence, fiscal responsibility and probity. The Al Jazeera series, coming on top of the Bank’s illegal quasi-fiscal activities, have tarnished its reputation and sown suspicion within financial markets, multi-lateral financial institutions and the general Zimbabwean public. In the interests of transparency and accountability an investigation should be undertaken to ascertain precisely what the Bank and its subsidiary companies have been and are doing and whether their activities have been lawful.” In essence, Veritas is calling for a forensic audit of RBZ “to ascertain precisely what the bank and its subsidiary companies have been and are doing and whether their activities have been lawful.” This is astonishingly scandalous and disappointing from a legal think-tank. Judging by Gold dealer Kamlesh Pattni

Page 8 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 the words it used in its own report, what Veritas has called for is essentially a shameless fishing expedition, not a forensic audit. The gratuitous reference to RBZ’s quasi-fiscal activities of more than a decade ago, which thus predate the tenure of the current RBZ governor, to justify the forensic audit call pursuant to Al Jazeera’s documentary, demonstrates the mala fides of the Veritas call whose hidden agenda is in fact naked. The Veritas report makes sweeping, uninformed and misleading assertions about the implications of legislation that governs the RBZ and its functions with respect to gold buying, gold selling and gold custody, in a desperate effort to give the impression that the RBZ is involved in corruption, gold smuggling and money laundering merely and only by dint of its legislative powers which make it the “custodian of gold”. Despite these glaring deficiencies of the Veritas report based on untested and unverified Al Jazeera allegations, elements of the local media and sections of the international media widely quoted the report, with some falsely claiming that the RBZ governor “welcomed” the Veritas call for a forensic audit on RBZ. For example, on 21 April 2023 the privately-owned NewsDay in Harare even carried a shocking editorial, titled “RBZ has a case to answer”. The link to the editorial is indicated immediately below: https://www.google.com/ amp/s/www.newsday.co.zw/amp/editorials/article/200010433/rbz-has-a-case-to-answer. “It has been nearly a week since the last episode of the four-part documentary Gold Mafia was released and yet government remains radio silent. Not a word, not a peep, nothing about the serious allegations made in the documentary. "This is especially shocking considering that the allegations made in the documentary series involve the country’s apex bank, the RBZ. "Why this is important is because the RBZ is the sole institution responsible for selling gold, through its subsidiary Fidelity. In fact, as we reported yesterday, legal think-tank Veritas states that the 'Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act gives the Bank wide powers to buy, sell and keep gold'. That means any sale of gold has to involve the central bank.” The NewsDay editorial entirely relied on the untested Veritas report which, in turn, opportunistically and dishonestly used the unverified Al Jazeera allegations published on its website on 14 April 2023, which were purported to be based on the documentary, when they in fact were not. What is even more shocking about the NewsDay article is its assertion that because Veritas reported that “the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act gives the bank wide powers to buy, sell and keep gold”, this alone “means that any sale of gold has to involve the central bank.” What kind of syllogism is this? The Al Jazeera documentary quoted former Finance minister Tendai Biti as saying “80% of the gold mined in Zimbabwe is smuggled out of the country”, and used the assertion as the baseline of its storyline, and the assertion was echoed by Eddie Cross, a former member of the RBZ Monetary Policy Committee who told a prime time Al Jazeera news programme in support of the documentary that “70% of the gold mined in Zimbabwe is smuggled out of the country”. Neither claim was tested or verified by Al Jazeera. It boggles the mind how, if these percentages are true or reasonably indicative of the gold smuggling scourge in Zimbabwe, something which was claimed in the documentary, but not verified by Al Jazeera, the RBZ can still be alleged to be involved in the sale of gold that is said to have been smuggled out of the country [meaning that it was illegally removed from the country] merely because “the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act gives the Bank wide powers to buy, sell and keep gold”. It is trite to mention that — given the interest in the Al Jazeera documentary in the country — think-tanks and the media in Zimbabwe are not expected to swallow hook, line, and sinker untested and unverified claims in the documentary and peddle them as objective facts, without doing further empirical research to test those facts. Local think-tanks like Veritas and the local media like NewsDay are expected to identify gaps in the documentary and to fill them with verified facts to further develop the story and take it forward. In the first place and with the kind of resources that are available to it as an international broadcaster, Al Jazeera itself should have worked with the local media using appropriate methods of investigation. Traditional investigative reporting relies on public documents, skilled interviewing, exhaustive research and verification. Why should electronic journalists exempt themselves from foundational ethics of journalism and from the rules of objectivity and fairness? But then again, in the case of NewsDay, it would be too much to expect serious collaborations or further investigations on key issues from Alpha Media Holdings (AMH) proprietor Trevor Ncube’s compromised, incompetently run and corrupt media stable. For example, in a case that illuminates this point, one of Ncube’s newspapers — the Zimbabwe Independent — was recently part of The Sentry team’s investigation of a controversial US$120 million shady deal stitched by the Moti Group’s African Chrome Fields allegedly involving the presidency and the military. Before it was unembargoed and published, editors of the Zimbabwe Independent leaked The Sentry report to the Moti Group in exchange for money in a scandal that has shocked the media community in Zimbabwe. The case is currently being dealt with internally, and we are watching that space. This corruption scandal at Ncube’s media house, which is still alive, has rocked AMH after reporters who worked on the story with The Sentry raised a stink, complaining that their editors had leaked the article for payment to line their own pockets with dirty money. How can the public trust such a media organisation to undertake serious, ethical and professional investigations, let alone collaborate with or challenge the likes of Al Jazeera, when its editors are motivated not by the ethical and professional ethos of journalism but by money for personal enrichment in such a brazen way? While Ncube has been pontificating about journalists from other media stables being corrupt, his own sinking AMH and its editors are rotten to the core. There is a clear case of brazen corruption as editors sold a story while betraying their professional colleagues at The Sentry whom they researched the story with, and in the process exposing the Independent’s reporters to serious danger. That is why those reporters are angry and kicking dust over the issue. What will Ncube do about this reckless and blatant act of corruption by his editors which his own reporters are bitterly complaining about to all and sundry who care to listen? On 14 April 2023, Ncube wrote on his Twitter handle: “Corruption has become endemic in Zimbabwe. People bribe police when caught on the wrong side of the law. Paying bribes has become a way of doing business in government and the private sector. Teachers take bribes to teach. Pastors take bribes. Help us fight corruption in our newsrooms. Freelance journalist Simbarashe Sithole was caught taking a bribe this week and has since appeared in court. Sadly, online news scavengers such @ Bulawayo24News aid this corruption. There is absolutely no justification for taking bribes.” Since Ncube appealed for help to fight corruption in the media, here is unimpeachable information on stinking corrupt activities at his own media house by his editors. All eyes are on him to see what he does with it. Will he act or not? Or he was just making noise on 14 April to salvage his own battered reputation? As if the case of the Independent leaking The Sentry report was not bad enough, only last week or so an editor at Ncube’s NewsDay which published an outrageous editorial on the RBZ based on untested Al Jazeera allegations, forwarded a story to a local prominent white businessman, exposing corruption to alert him prior to the publication of the story and naturally curry favour with him for financial benefit. That businessman has a financial and mutually beneficial deal with AMH which is known in media circles. The acting editor concerned is a protégé of the double-dipping Wisdom Mdzungairi, former NewsDay boss, who was forced out in January after he was found to be secretly on a government payroll, holding two jobs at once; working at the ministry of Local Government in the morning and AMH in the afternoon. That is how captured and decayed Ncube’s media house now is. There is also a well-known case of a shameless attempt by an AMH executive to collect US$20 000 from a local bank executive for an interview. That is why Ncube’s In Conversation with Trevor charade must be scrutinised. What was initially supposed to be a platform for high-profile, candid and hard-hitting interviews and debate has now deteriorated into a pathetic farce driven by unenlightened self-interest, self-promotion and a money-spinning get-up-and-go. As if that is not bad enough, there is also the National Building Society interview — a disgraceful puff piece scandal by his editors. The interview was published by the Zimbabwe Independent on 24 March 2023 headlined NBS: Exciting times lie ahead. Ncube must investigate the story behind that interview and see the rot therein. Reporters are fed up with all these acts of brazen corruption at AMH. These stories will be told in full one of these days, while Ncube is busy acting holier-than-thou, with his head deeply and irretrievably buried in the sand like an ostrich; ridiculously pretending to be an anti-corruption paragon of virtue. The point is media organisations like NewsDay in the case of the Al Jazeera documentary and Zimbabwe Independent in the case of The Sentry report are not in a position to partner international media houses to do better investigations, probe issues further or indeed disprove some false allegations because they themselves are hopelessly compromised and corrupt. The failure to probe further Al Jazeera’s important leads cannot be blamed on AMH alone. Zimbabwean media in general, including The NewsHawks, which styles itself as the leading investigating platform in Zimbabwe, failed to do so. Al Jazeera did not provide evidence and proof to their sting operation, so it is up to local media to follow up on those leads to prove or disprove what Al Jazeera reported. While it was most refreshing insofar as it enabled Zimbabweans to hear directly from high-profile figures like Angel, Auxillia Mnangagwa, Doolan, Rushwaya, MacMillan, Pattni and Mathias in their own voices and in their own words tell not only a gripping, hair-raising and self-incriminating stories about their exploits in gold smuggling and money laundering, as well as their gold connections with African Presidents and their families across the continent, including in Zimbabwe, Al Jazeera did not go far enough to prove its claims. Without doubt, the claims of the interlocutors made for a great documentary from the standpoint of an investigative and human-interest story, but the article was not solid enough by any stretch of the imagination from the perspective of investigative journalism seeking to deliver what Al Jazeera promised or set out to do: prove alleged corruption, gold smuggling, money laundering and sanctions busting by the ruling elite in Zimbabwe allegedly facilitated and enabled by the RBZ as “southern Africa’s largest laundromat”. Al Jazeera’s gold mafia story remains blowing in the wind, told but untested and unverified. In the final analysis, despite its huffing and puffing, Al Jazeera woefully failed by its own promise and measure to meet the expectation of an evidence-based and verified investigation to serve the public good. Its story was a load of hot air. *About the writer: Jonathan Moyo is a professor of politics, a former MP and minister in Zimbabwe. RBZ

NewsHawks News Page 9 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 THE world's poorest countries suffer from civil wars, ethnic and sectarian strife. Covid-19, soaring inflation and the war in Ukraine made their bad situations worse, according to Global Finance magazine which provides economic and financial research. Ukraine is now the poorest country in Europe due to the ongoing destructive war. Zimbabwe, which was the most industrialised nation in sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa in 1980 — is now among the top 20 poorest countries in the world — ranking 17th. Out of those 20 countries, 17 are from Africa, while three are from the Middle East — Yemen — and two, Kiribati and Solomon Islands, are from the Oceania region in central and south Pacific Ocean respectively. South Sudan is the poorest country is Africa; Nepal in Asia; Papua New Guinea in the Oceania; Haiti in North America; Venezuela in South America and Ukraine in Europe. Luca Ventura THE world has enough wealth and resources to ensure that the entire human race enjoys a decent standard of living. Yet people in countries like Burundi, South Sudan and the Central African Republic continue to live in desperate poverty. For other likely contenders for the undesirable title of the world’s poorest country — Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen — years of ongoing conflict make it impossible to even attempt an assessment due to the lack of reliable economic figures. So how do we determine the poorest countries in the world? While GDP per capita is often considered the standard metric, compensating for differences in living costs and rates of inflation by using purchasing power parity (PPP) can better assess an individual’s buying power in any given country. It is hard to pinpoint a single cause of longterm poverty. Corrupt governments can make a very rich nation into a poor one. And so can a history of exploitative colonisation, weak rule of law, war and social unrest, severe climatic conditions or hostile, aggressive neighbours. Weaknesses compound: A country in debt will not be able to afford good schools, and a poorly educated workforce will limit capacity. Underprivileged households worldwide suffered the severest social and economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. In the world’s poorest countries with their high level of informal employment, there were no social safety nets or temporary loans to keep businesses open and workers employed. The World Bank forecasts that in low and middle-income countries, the current generation of students could lose up to 10% of their future average annual income. Before Covid-19, the fraction of the world’s population living in extreme poverty — meaning on less than $1.90 a day — had fallen below 10% from more than 35% in 1990. The pandemic not only halted but reversed that progress: since the onset of the health emergency to the end of 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated an additional 198 million people are likely to have entered the ranks of the extremely poor. Then the war in Ukraine triggered sharply higher prices for food. “The Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine further aggravated food insecurity by reducing current and anticipated supplies of food and fertilisers, triggering a sharp rise in global and domestic food prices,” a group of economists wrote in the “Global Food Crisis Update” report just released by the IMF. “These effects have been compounded by the persistent impact of conflicts and devastating climate-related events in several fragile and conflict-affected states.” Despite price pressures easing this year, an all-time high of 345 million people across 79 countries are expected to face acute food insecurity in 2023, more than twice the number for 2020, the IMF concludes. These reversals in food security and poverty reduction gains are especially visible in the top 10 poorest countries in the world, all of which are in Africa. On average, the individual share of the gross domestic output is just US$1 380 in the world’s poorest countries. By contrast, this figure is about US$105 000 in the world’s richest countries. Three of the countries in our list are in or part of Africa’s Sahel region, where persistent droughts cause food shortages and associated Zim now among the world’s poorest countries as of 2023

Page 10 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 medical and social problems. Five of them are landlocked, putting them at a considerable disadvantage relative to those with access to maritime trade. All lack political stability, have experienced disputed elections or ethnic/religious strife and perform poorly on our world's safest countries ranking. Top 10 poorest countries in the world Below is a ranking of the 10 poorest countries, starting from the country ranked 10th poorest and progressing to the country ranked as the poorest in the world for 2023. 1. South Sudan The very poorest of the world’s poorest countries, South Sudan has been wracked by violence since its creation in 2011. Rich in oil reserves, the landlocked state of roughly 11 million represents a textbook example of the “resource curse,” whereby abundance fosters political and social divisions, inequality, corruption and warfare. The majority of the population is employed in traditional agriculture, although violence and extreme climate events often prevent farmers from planting or harvesting crops. While the projected economic growth for 2023 could hold strong at 5.8%, inflation is stronger — among the world’s highest at 27%. Unicef estimates that well over half of the population — some 7.8 million people — are likely to face acute food insecurity during the April-July 2023 lean season. 2. Burundi Tiny landlocked Burundi lacks natural resources and has been scarred by a 12-year civil war, contributing to its ranking of second-poorest country in the world. With about 80% of Burundi’s roughly 13 million citizens relying on subsistence agriculture, food insecurity is almost twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, access to water and sanitation remains very low and less than 5% of the population has electricity. President Evariste Ndayishimiye has made an effort to relaunch the economy and repair diplomatic relationships, and last year both the United States and the European Union resumed aid after lifting financial sanctions. Unfortunately, growth remains sluggish, and inflation is projected this year to be around 16%. 3. Central African Republic Rich in gold, oil, uranium and diamonds, the Central African Republic is a very wealthy country inhabited by very poor people, and has been among the poorest countries in the world for the better part of a decade. The sharp increase in essential good prices that followed the war in Ukraine — simultaneously with cycles of severe flooding and dry spells — has only brought more pain: the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that approximately 2.7 million people (almost half of CAR’s population) are experiencing acute food insecurity. 4. Somalia This country of 17 million in the Horn of Africa never seems to catch a break: 2020 brought coronavirus, floods and an unprecedented infestation of locusts; then Russia’s blockade of Ukraine's wheat exports helped fill Somali health facilities with severely malnourished children. Today, Islamist insurgents are trying to overthrow the central government concurrent with the worst drought in four decades. With humanitarian agencies warning that about half of the population is in desperate need of assistance, Somalia is again near the top — or bottom — of our world’s poorest countries ranking. 5. DRC Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC has suffered decades of rapacious dictatorship, political instability and constant violence, making it a regular in our rankings of the world’s poorest countries. Roughly three-quarters of the country’s 97 million population scrapes by on less than two dollars a day. Yet the World Bank says the DRC has the resources and potential to become one of the richest countries in Africa and a growth-driver for the entire continent. The country is already the world’s largest producer of cobalt and Africa’s leading source of copper — essentials in the production of electric vehicles. 6. Mozambique Rich in resources and strategically located, this former Portuguese colony has often posted average GDP growth rates of more than 7% in the past decade. Yet it remains mired among the 10 poorest countries in the world. Attacks by Islamic insurgent groups since 2017 have plagued the gas-rich northern part of the country. Still, according to the IMF and its sister institution, the World Bank, the medium-term economic outlook for Mozambique is positive, with growth expected to accelerate to 5% this year and 8% the next. 7. Niger With 80% of its landlocked territory covered by the Sahara Desert and a rapidly growing population dependent upon small-scale agriculture, Niger is under threat from desertification. Food insecurity is high, as are disease and mortality rates. Recurrent clashes of the army with the Islamic State (ISIS) affiliate Boko Haram have displaced thousands. In 2021, Niger inaugurated a new president — ex-teacher and former interior minister Mohamed Bazoum — in its first democratic transfer of power. Now considered a bright spot on the continent, the country saw its economy expand by 11% last year, making it seventh of the world’s poorest countries. It is projected to grow a more subdued but still strong 6.1% this year, and by 13% in 2024. 8. Malawi One of Africa’s smallest nations, Malawi’s economy — largely dependent upon rain-fed crops — remains vulnerable to weather-related shocks. Food insecurity in rural parts is extremely high. Malawi has enjoyed stable governments since it gained independence from Britain in 1964. But in 2020, the country's constitutional court annulled former president Peter Mutharika's win for re-election. Theologian and politician Lazarus Chakwera was sworn in his place, and today structural changes have been slow to materialise. Annual GDP growth dipped in 2022 to 0.8%. Year-onyear inflation, in the meantime, rose to a startling 24%. 9. Chad Chad has Africa’s tenth-largest oil reserves yet poverty remains widespread, making it the ninth poorest country in the world. Most of the windfall from the nation’s 2003 oil find was spent by the country’s autocratic ruler, Idriss Deby, on fighting rebels and cracking down on any form of dissent. When Deby was killed in 2021, a military council headed by his son, Mahamat Idriss, took control of the country. The constitution was suspended shortly thereafter, both government and parliament dissolved. Idriss remains “interim” head of state to this day. 10. Liberia Africa’s oldest republic has ranked amongst the poorest countries in the world for many years. Expectations were high when the former football star George Weah became president in 2018. His first years in office were instead marred by high inflation, unemployment and negative economic growth. After contracting by 3% in 2020 due to the pandemic, GDP recovered to 5% in 2021 and 4.8% in 2022. Weah is up for re-election in October this year. — GLOBAL FINANCE

NewsHawks News Page 11 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 NATHAN GUMA THE Zimbabwean government is having sleepless nights over price hikes, which have continued unabated, plunging low-income earners into immense poverty, a snap survey by The NewsHawks has shown. Commodity prices have been spiralling out of control in both the local currency and the United States dollar, worsening the plight of workers, whose wages are predominantly in Zimdollars. Although Zimbabwe's inflation is officially 75.2%, independent estimates say it is 666%. Last week, cabinet announced that it would conduct an inquiry into why prices have been raging, raising the need to liberalise the exchange rate to allow market forces to determine prices and attain efficiency. Finance minister Mthuli Ncube and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe authorities have been making agitated statements about the price escalations, threatening retailers and producers. This week, the Competition and Tariff Commission and the National Competitiveness Commission released a report on the spike in prices. The study, conducted by various government agencies, assessed pricing disparities, investigated cost drivers of recent price hikes, monitored the movement of basic commodities into the informal sector, and tracked the impact of import licence and duty removal on price stabilisation. Numbers from the national statistical agency show that over 70% of all transactions are now being carried out in hard currency. A survey by The NewsHawks this week shows that prices have been skyrocketing, with most retail outlets accepting EcoCash and United States dollars, while swipe services were occassionaly down. Findings of the survey showed that mainstream retail outlets have been on a steep end. For instance, Mega rice is costing ZW$6 779 at a rate of ZW$2 350 against the US dollar, which translates to US$2.90, despite it costing US$1.90 in tuckshops. A 10kg pack of Victoria mealie-meal is costing ZW$17 465 (US$7.40) while two kilogrammes of Gold Star sugar is costing ZW$7 459 while a kilogramme of Hullets Brown Sugar is costing ZW$3 439. Cooking oil price has also been on a continual upward trend, with a two-litre bottle now ZW$10 989. In tuckshops, commodity prices have been non-movers, slightly maintaining their prices. Consumers who spoke to The NewsHawks say they are considering removing some "luxuries" off their home budgets as the price hike has made life unbearable. “A two-litre bottle of Quench juice now costs ZW$6 999, and we have children who are going to school. I think we are going back to the 2008 era, but the only difference is that right now, there are commodities in the shops. “Then, the money was useless, and available in abundance, but without commodities on shop shelves,” said a consumer. As previously reported by The NewsHawks, an experienced rural teacher earned ZW$39 636 (about US$30 on the prevailing parallel market rate), while the rural allowance is ZW$1 982 (US$1.30) and the housing allowance is ZW$7 508 (US$5). Following the 100% hike last month, this means a teacher would earn ZW$79 272, a cushioning allowance of US$250, and an additional teaching allowance of US$80, bringing the total to US$330, which is lower than the US$800 and US$1 200 proposed by worker organisation. Despite the hike, the salary is still not enough to purchase basic commodities for workers, whose livelihoods have been continually deteriorating in comparison to the Mugabe era. When President Emmerson Mnangagwa rose to power on the back of a military coup in November 2017, teachers, among other public sector workers, were earning an average of US$540, which they are now demanding. Findings from the survey are also contrary to the report by ZimStat titled: “Household Welfare Monitoring in Zimbabwe” which shows an increase in basic commodity consumption, with the situation continually worsening. “At national level, the proportion of households that were able to buy cooking oil increased from 55% in round 8 to 62% in round 9. The proportion of households willing to buy cooking oil slightly increased to 69% in round 9, from 68% in the previous round. “About 47% of the households expressed willingness to buy maize meal in round 9, representing a six percentage-points increase from the previous round. Further, households’ ability to buy maize-meal increased by 9 percentage points to 44% in round nine,” read the report. According to the report, the proportion of households consuming own-produced maizemeal was 44% in round 9 compared to 48% in round 8. In rural areas, 61% of households consumed own maize produce in round 9, compared to 63% in round 8. Consumption of own maize meal in urban areas was 6% in round 9 compared to 10% in round 8. Likewise, the share of households consuming own-produced chicken was 28% at national level, 36% in rural areas, and 10% in urban areas. Massive price hikes throw the economy into turmoil Workers’ salaries is are not enough to purchase basic commodities.

Page 12 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 NATHAN GUMA THE African Development Bank (AfDB) has projected a decrease in Zimbabwe’s projected gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate to 3.2%, between 2023 and 2024, owing to external shocks, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a slump in South Africa’s economy. Zimbabwe’s economy, burdened by an unsustainable debt overhang, has elicited gloomy projections trend in comparison with previous forecasts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national Treasury. With a total consolidated debt of Zimbabwe of US$17.5 billion, Zimbabwe owes international creditors US$14.04 billion, with domestic debt pegged at US$3.4 billion. Effects of Zimbabwe’s debt has also been felt slowing down the region. For instance, while speaking at Zimbabwe’s debt dialogue in Harare last week, former Mozambican president Joachim Chissano said: “Many regional infrastructure development plans, including roads, railways and power transmission lines have been brought to a standstill, as they have to run through the country. The continental free trade is also undermined by the situation prevailing in Zimbabwe.” Zimbabwe has been urged to look into economic and governance issues constraining arrears clearance and debt resolution. Last year, the IMF projected a decline in GDP to about 3.5%, less than the estimated 4% announced by Finance minister Mthuli Ncube during last year’s mid-year budget announcement. Data in AfDB’s African economic outlook for 2023 shows that Zimbabwe’s economy has struggled, trailing regional neighbours. For instance, AfDB forecasts 6.6% GDP growth for Mozambique and a 4.1% uptick for Zambia. AfDB has forecast an increase in the Seychelles’ GDP to 4.7%, while the Democratic Republic of Congo’s GDP is projected to increase to 7.6%, the highest growth on the continent. The bank has also predicted a decrease in southern Africa’s economy by 1.1 percentage points, from an estimated 2.7% in 2022 to 1.6% in 2023, largely owing to the continual weakness of South Africa, the region’s largest economy and trading partner. South Africa, Sadc’s largest economy (60% of the region’s GDP) and main trading partner, recorded a 2% real GDP growth in 2022, less than half the growth rate in 2021 (4.9%), due to subdued global demand, power outages, and devastating floods that affected industrial production. “A build-up in inflationary pressures also affected household consumption spending, a key driver of growth in South Africa. South Africa’s close trade ties with other countries in Southern Africa means that shocks buffeting the country are transmitted to the rest of the region. Countries in the Common Monetary Area and the Southern African Customs Union experience near-symmetrical shocks to those affecting South Africa. “Protracted delays in addressing South Africa’s worsening energy crisis, coupled with operational and financial weaknesses in state-owned entities and slow progress in implementing reforms, will keep the country’s growth below emerging market peers. Growth in the region will thus remain subdued, with real output projected to decelerate to 1.6% in 2023 before rising to 2.7% in 2024,” AfDB says. The tightening of lending conditions is projected to impact heavily on Zimbabwe, already grappling with unsustainable debt. “Sustained tightening of global financial conditions has put pressure on African national currencies. National currencies in Africa’s net commodity exporters lost substantial value in 2022, mainly due to monetary policy tightening in the United States, which propped up the US dollar and historical domestic macro-economic imbalances. “Zimbabwe’s dollar, Ghana’s cedi, and Sierra Leone’s leone were among Africa’s most devalued currencies against the US dollar in 2022, with respective depreciation rates of around 323.4%, 42.5%, and 34.0%,” according to the report by AfDB. While inflation is predicted to fall between 2023 and 2024, Zimbabwe has been named amongst countries that are likely to continue on an upward trend. “Inflation in Africa is projected to increase further to a record 15.1% in 2023 but decline to 9.5% in 2024, close to the pre-pandemic levels of 9% in 2019 and 9.7% in 2014–18. “The projected increase in inflation in 2023 is largely attributed to prevailing structural weaknesses in most African countries — including supply chain constraints, output gaps, imported inflation — and an exchange rate pass through from the stronger US dollar, despite declining international commodity prices. “A decline in inflation is expected in 2024 in all regions and most countries, reflecting the expected benefits from the current cycle of monetary tightening. Despite the expectations of single-digit inflation in Africa in 2024, double-digit inflation could persist in East Africa (17.7%), West Africa (11.3%) and a few countries that have a history of high inflation such as South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe,” AfDB said. AfDB projects slower GDP growth AfDB

NewsHawks News Page 13 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE ZIMBABWE Tobacco Industrial Workers' Union (ZTIWU) has formally written to Finance minister Mthuli Ncube pleading for an increase of the tax-free threshold of their salaries, saying its members are struggling due to worsening economic hardships. In a letter dated 17 May 2023 signed by ZTIWU secretary-general Emmanuel Mariro, the workers said their wages are being affected immensely by the hyperinflation which has seen prices of basic food commodities and living expenses skyrocketing. "The Zimbabwe Tobacco Industry Workers’ Union is a duly registered trade union to represent the interest of employees in the Tobacco industry.The Trade union is hereby requesting your good office to relook on the tax bracket of the lower income earner. The employees note that due to currency depreciation coupled with salary increases in line with inflation, employees now invariably fall in higher tax brackets thereby lowering disposable incomes," wrote Mariro. He added: "Needless to say that the bulk of the workers are on seasonal contracts having a duration of three to four months. If the employees can get their wages with tax-free adjusted for the better in USD. The workers are struggling with hyper-inflation and high taxation. The employees who work for three to four months in the industry are suffering. Our request is that the tax-free threshold be increased to USD350 as that will help employees. "Your assistance in this regard will go a long way in addressing the plight of the workers hence we support all monetary and fiscal policies but on taxation help the workers." The NewsHawks also gathered that wages in the private sector and salaries in the public service have also been eroded by the galloping inflation and workers are suffering. In the private furniture and timber sector, workers are earning as little as US$105 a month. Artingson Magume, the secretary-general of the Progressive Furniture, Timber and Allied Workers' Union (PFTAWU), confirmed the development and revealed that wages have not been reviewed in eight months despite a steep rise in the cost of living due to rising inflation. “Workers in our sector are being paid US$105 and a component of RTGS which is equivalent to US$95 at interbank market rate. From that money that is where deductions like NSSA, PAYE tax, medical aid, funeral cover among others are taken.” “The workers are wallowing in poverty and cannot meet basic needs to cover them in a month.” “Workers in the furniture, manufacturing and timber processing had therefore nothing to celebrate on May 1 Workers' Day since there are no wage increments for past 8 months from both NEC furniture and NEC lumber due to bad negotiations and the relation-voluntary NEC is hamstringing our right to collective bargaining," he said. Magume insisted that there is urgent need for the finalisation of the new Labour Act Amendment Bill. "If the Labour Act Amendment Bill is passed into law, we feel that it will go a long way in improving the conditions of service for our members as well as open up avenues for better salaries of the workers. We are demanding a minimum wage of US$400 and it is a matter of urgency that employers must take heed and implement," he said. Progressive Commercial Trades and Allied Workers' Union of Zimbabwe secretary-general Hundushi Nhundu reiterated that workers' struggle for survival has intensified. "Workers have suffered to an extent of dying of stress-related illness because of meagre salaries and wages they are getting." "Furthermore, workers are reeling from high cost of living, inflation skyrocketing to alarming levels, corruption, policy inconsistencies and job security problems. "The majority of workers are on fixed term and suffer long hours of work with no overtime paid, works council resolutions are not implemented, employers are being big bulls in a china shop because of high unemployment in the country. "There is no social protection by unscrupulous investors who are not providing protective clothing, right to maternity leave on full pay while sexual harassment and gender inequality have caused untold suffering to the vulnerable workers," he said. Nhundu said demands of workers in his sector is a salary of US$440. Teachers are currently earning US$250 in allowances and a further US$80 allowance converted at the interbank rate. The salary component remains in local currency at around ZW$80 000. The local currency component includes housing and transport allowances which when converted to US dollars amount to around US$7 each. Obert Masaraure, the Amalgamated Rural Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (Artuz) president, told The NewsHawks that there is massive disgruntlement in schools over paltry salaries. “The ordinary teacher with a family of six will need a minimum of US$200 for rentals alone. Transport allowance for a full month is at US$80. School fees for three children will be at US$540 per month. Functional medical aid is around US$160 per month. Food is around US$200 per month. Clothing and other bills will take the figure to a total of US$1 260. “The employer is paying just 25% of the monthly bill of a teacher. Resultantly, teachers are trapped in debt. Loan sharks are feeding off the suffering teachers. The majority of payslips are in the negative. “Teachers are transferring their learners from boarding schools to day schools. Eventually, the teachers' children are dropping out of school for failing to pay fees,” he said. Masaraure added that his union was approached by 2 300 members who were seeking support to pay exam fees for their children for the first term while 3 500 more have written formal requests of support with medical bills. “In all circumstances the union has failed to assist because the union also relies on subscriptions from members. When members are starving, the union also starves. “Teachers have no savings and they will all retire on a pittance and die miserable deaths, most probably from curable diseases after failing to access healthcare. “The teachers must realise that their labour is their only source of income. For a too long a time, teachers have been over-generous with their labour, donating it to an ungrateful employer,” he said. As the second school term begins next week, Masaraure said teachers have resolved to once again withdraw their labour, demanding a living wage. “The nation should prioritise feeding the goose that lays the golden egg. The teachers and other civil servants are sweating to keep the national functional, yet the ruling elites and the politically exposed persons loot the nation dry. Corruption must be arrested and neo-liberalism must be abandoned,” he said. Takavafira Zhou, the Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe president, also confirmed that urban teachers are wallowing in poverty and bemoaned the discrepancies that are there between their salaries and those of state security operatives who last month got a 400% pay hike. “Because of the pathetic salaries and conditions of service, teachers have fallen from grace to grass with monotonous regularity. They are failing to pay fees for their own children and often forced to report for work to teach other people's children when their own children are at home by virtue of their poverty. “Teachers are always scavenging for food, a situation that has affected their contact time with learners. Many are facing psychological challenges and are now mentally affected. There are high cases of mental stress, suicide and divorce among teachers. “There are also high cases of children of teachers dropping out of school as teachers are failing to pay fees for their children. What is more worrisome is the discrimination teachers are facing as other government workers are getting salaries six times that of teachers, even though their qualifications, responsibilities and years of service are insignificant in comparison with those of teachers,” said Zhou. He proposed that, for a start, the government should restore the purchasing power parity of teachers' basic salary of US$540 as at October 2018. “An education allowance of US$100 per month (not indexed bank rate) will go a long way in alleviating the payment of exorbitant school fees for their children. “Reasonable accommodation and transport allowances in US dollars must be given to teachers in light of the sky-rocketing of costs and in light of the fact that a family of six needs US$250 for rentals per month. “US$30 clothing allowance per month must be given to teachers. There is need to intrinsically motivate teachers so that they are dynamic and innovative in blending theory and life experience to engineer a skills revolution in the education system,” he said. Tobacco workers confront Ncube

Page 14 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE ZIMBABWE Revenue Authority (Zimra) workers have declared incapacitation and demanded that they work for three days in a week, in a development that could result in government finances being hit since they are at the centre of revenue collection for state operations. Zimbabwean workers are increasingly finding it difficult to go to work due to poor salaries. This week state media journalists at a big media house also declared incapacitation just like Zimra workers. The development puts pressure on Zimra Commissioner-General Regina Chinamasa who was appointed substantive in September last year, after having worked in an acting capacity since February. She took over from Rameck Masaire whose retirement became effective at the end of January. Before her appointment, Chinamasa was substantively Commissioner Revenue Assurance and was described by the Zimra board as a tax expert with over 28 years of experience in the field of revenue mobilization customs, domestic taxes and enforcement of compliance to fiscal laws. Zimra workers say their salaries have been hard hit by inflation such that they cannot afford to report for duty daily. Zimbabwe Revenue and Allied Workers Trade Union president Dominic Manyangadze wrote a five-page letter to Chinamasa on 24 May, copied to Zimra to board chairperson Antony Mandiwanza and Finance minister Mthuli Ncube. “Cognizant to the fact that Zimra workers are important to the oiling of the governance machinery of our beloved nation, Zimbabwe and that they have been constantly and persistently meeting the revenue target every year in real terms as adjusted for inflation, which provides adequate capacity to the employer to satisfactorily attend to staff welfare issues," Manyangadze wrote. “Surprised that the welfare of workers is not receiving tangible and adequate attention in the face of a hyperinflationary environment with inflation hovering above the suppressed official blended rate of 75.2% with some unofficial sources stating it at 666%. “Further concerned that the salary of a Zimra worker has been eroded such that it can no longer afford the worker to buy basic food items due to inflationary pressures caused by exchange rate volatility. “Fretful of the fact that landlords are demanding rentals in USDs yet Zimra employees are being paid transport allowance at interbank RTGS$, leaving them to shoulder the premium gap, which is ever widening without any official avenue to secure such forex at the conversion rate; “Frustrated that, besides the fact that the majority of Zimra workers are exposed to paying rent twice for themselves and their families due to the nature of their job, the current housing allowance being paid at the official bank rate is less than half of the actual amount being demanded by landlords and paid by the worker… “For the above reasons the Zimra workers have declared that they are incapacitated, and thus they will not be able to fully engage with the employer’s business on a daily basis to enable them to supplement their incomes to cover rentals required in forex by landlords and school fees required in forex at schools including government schools. “Now, therefore given the foregoing and the inadequacy of Zimra employees’ remuneration against the current economic environment, please take notice that our members will not have the capacity to consistently report for duty and thus request for a work arrangement which enables them to report for duty three days (3) + a week. The workers further request that you prepare and favour them with a timetable/schedule stating the days each one is to report for duty by Friday 26 May 2023.” The workers also said they had continued to perform exceptionally well even in the face of very difficult working and economic conditions but are now having to supplement their incomes from side hustles. They added that since last negotiations, the workers have grappled with the erosion of their salaries which from 1 January 2022 to December 2022 had lost value by 397%. Zimra workers declare incapacitation Zimra Commissioner-General Regina Chinamasa

NewsHawks News Page 15 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 NATHAN GUMA A NEW report by the Research and Advocacy Unit (Rau) has predicted increased organised violence and torture, particularly in urban areas, highlighting the need for more surveillance as the country heads towards the August general election. Three months away from the election, key electoral reforms for a credible poll have still not been implemented. While the Zanu PF government has been painting a rosy picture of tolerance against dissenting voices, new data has shown that incidents of organised violence and torture have been on the rise in urban areas, particularly Harare. According to the report, Harare has witnessed an escalation in cases of violence between 2017 and 2021. Data in a Rau’s report titled A Short History of Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe (1972-20) shows that the country is in a very parlous state — similar to the run-up to the elections in 2008, which was underlined by bloodshed. “Some things are very different to the situation in 2008. The ruling party, Zanu PF, seems beset by serious internal conflicts, with some suggesting that there are those in the party who do not believe that Emmerson Mnangagwa, the current president, can win the presidential poll in 2023. This may give the forthcoming elections a much greater tension and raise the possibility of a return to violence,” reads part of the report. Harare is the most frequent site of violations. For instance, the capital recorded 14% of all violence cases in 2018, which rose to 28% in 2019. The cases rose to 30% in 2020 and were pegged at 25% by 2021. While there have been increasing rates of violations in Manicaland, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West and the Midlands, among other provinces, the changes have not been as dramatic as in Harare. The high incidence of violence has been attributed to Zanu PF’s strenuous efforts to win a base in the urban areas, and over-zealous enforcement of Covid-19 regulations by the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). “There are small trends in both data sources for violations to be increasing, and not explained by the enforcement any longer of Covid-19 regulations. This trend needs careful monitoring as the country moves towards elections and the usual process of violence associated with elections taking place. “Here note the violent events against the Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) in 2022 beginning from the time that the reformed party became active, with violence and harassment being reported during the March by-elections. “Overall, a total of 9 953 violations over the period 2019 to 2021. In past years the monthly average of violations in non-election years was 365 reported violations as opposed to 706 in election years. The monthly average reported by the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) is lower than the non-election average reported, around 200 cases per month on average, but as pointed out in a previous report, this does not suggest that OVT has disappeared since the coup,” according to the report. According to the report, a total of 52 murders cases were recorded between 2018 and 2021, 71% of which were allegedly committed by the ZRP, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), and Zanu PF supporters. According to the report, the major perpetrators have been the police, accounting for 10% of violations in 2018, which rose to 20% in 2019. The violations increased to 30% in 2020, which further increased to 40% in 2021. The army had the least, recording 5% in 2018 after the 2018 elections which remained steady at 5% in 2019. The violations increased to 10% in 2020 which later slumped to 6.3% in 2021. Zanu PF however has been the major perpetrator of violence ahead of elections. For instance, the party accounted for 40% of violations in 2018. The figure fell to 30% in 2019 after the 2018 election to 10% in 2020. However, the statistics rose to 27% in 2021. “What is notable about the alleged perpetrators is the consistent increase in reports about the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), presumably with many reports dealing with events linked to the enforcement of Covid-19 regulations. “Violations of human rights during lockdown periods is amply detailed throughout the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) reports in 2020 and 2021. There is also a decline in reports of alleged violations by Zanu PF supporters, from being the most frequent alleged perpetrators in 2018, but a resurgence is noted in 2021, presumably because of looming elections and reforming of the major opposition under the CCC as pointed out above in the previous section. “Whilst the frequency may be less than it was in the years leading up to 2008 and there have been far fewer serious violations, it is not evident that the Zimbabwe government can claim to be human rights respecting,” according to the report. The government has also been jailing dissenting voices. This month, Zengeza West legislator Job Sikhala was convicted, almost a year after his arrest, and slapped with a suspended six-month custodial sentence and a US$600 fine. Sikhala was however not released from custody, despite spending over 300 days in prison, with the state arguing he has outstanding cases. Another opposition politician, Jacob Ngarivhume, was arrested for leading and organising the 31 July 2020 protests. He was convicted by Harare magistrate Feresi Chakanyuka and has been sentenced to 48 months imprisonment, with 12 months suspended. Violence spectre casts shadow over elections Zanu PF however has been the major perpetrator of violence ahead of elections

Page 16 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE ZIMBABWE has failed to implement major electoral reforms that were recommended by the 2018 election observer missions such as the African Union, European Union, as well as the joint International Elections Observer Mission, in a development that puts the August general elections in danger of failing the credibility test. President Emmerson Mnangagwa will on Sunday announce election dates. Election Resource Centre executive director Barbra Ontibile Bhebe on Wednesday told The NewsHawks that the government's failure to implement reforms and address issues that caused disputes in the 2018 elections will compromise the credibility of the polls. “The failure to implement reforms necessary to build the confidence in the upcoming elections following the disputes that arose in 2018 is concerning. The credibility of the 2023 elections is dependent on the Commission (Zec) and Parliament’s ability to address the post-2018 elections concerns ahead of the upcoming election,” she said. After the 2018 elections, the observer missions recommended a raft of reforms to ensure future elections would be free, fair and credible. In its final 2018 election observer mission report, the African Union recommended that government maintain an open and free political environment. However, campaign activities of the main opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) have repeatedly been banned. There have also been arrests of opposition party officials like CCC deputy chairperson Job Sikhala and opposition stalwart Jacob Ngarivhume who is now serving a jail sentence for organising peaceful protests. The AU also recommended that the government consider reviewing the legal framework for elections to ensure that aspects of the Electoral Act inconsistent with the constitution are properly aligned, as well as provide for “out-of-country voting (OCV), particularly in those countries known to host large numbers of expatriate Zimbabweans to broaden political participation and promote the principle of universal suffrage.” While the government is currently pushing through amendments to the Electoral Act to allow mostly youth quota and women’s quota provisions, Justice minister Ziyambi Ziyambi has openly turned down growing calls for the OCV, popularly known as the diaspora vote. The AU also called for a review of the Political Parties (Finance) Act to ensure transparency and accountability in campaign financing. “The review process of the legal framework should be done well in advance of the next elections to allow sufficient time to stakeholder to be familiar with the changes,” recommended the AU. However, nothing has been done by the government on this recommendation. The AU also recommended that the government enforce laws prohibiting the use of state resources for political campaign purposes and ensure a more level playing field to enhance the credibility of future elections but, again, no action has been taken to implement this resolution. Zec has also failed to implement reforms recommended by the AU, the major one being availing of the voters' roll to stakeholders in time for them to verify its accuracy and inclusiveness. The AU also recommended that Zec ensure a more proactive and effective use of Multi-Party Liason Committee meetings as mechanism not only for interaction and communication with stakeholders but also for resolving emerging electoral disputes that do not necessarily require the intervention of the courts. The AU said that all MPLC meetings were supposed to be held in a regular and consistent manner, but this has not been happening. In addition, the AU also highlighted that “in light of the blatantly partisan and polarised nature of the media in Zimbabwe, the authorities should consider the full implementation of the Broadcasting Services Act and ensure equal access to the state broadcaster to all contestants during elections to create a level electoral playing field. To date, CCC officials and other opposition figures have not been given airtime by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation to articulate their messages to the electorate whereas Zanu PF has been given plenty of room to do so daily, with its campaign rallies being broadcast live. The government has again ignored a recommenadtion by the AU to review the legal provision that requires Zec to seek approval of the minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs before making regulations governing the electoral process which led to a chaotic process during the delimitation process when Ziyambi tried to scuttle the process. The government was also urged by the AU to extend state funding to independent candidates, but the recommendation has been ignored. The AU also recommended that the government ratify and domesticate the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to ensure that the electoral legal framework in Zimbabwe is in full compliance with African continental standards for democratic elections, but the Harare regime has not done so. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Zimbabwe presented its final report on the 30 July 2018 elections, recommending the upholding of the independence of Zec to ensure an improved level playing field, democratic legal framework and an inclusive electoral process. “The EU EOM suggests in order to enhance confidence in the process, to strengthen the independence of Zec; to ensure Zec provides more effective and timely information during the process to enhance confidence; and for Zec to develop the results management process to enhance verifiability and traceability,” explained the EU chief observer Elmar Brok. “To help create a more level playing field and a more conducive environment for the polls, state-owned media must be more impartial in its coverage; legal measures should be introduced to mitigate abuse of incumbency and of state resources; and, campaign finance regulations should be introduced to enhance accountability,” said Brok. “To improve the legal framework for the elections, legislation should be brought into line with the 2013 constitution; and appropriate time limits for the determination of pre-election disputes need to be established. “To make the electoral process more inclusive, areas of under-registration of voters need to be addressed; and Multi-Party Liaison Committees need to be used more effectively,” he concluded. However, irrespective of the current amendments to the Electoral Act being pushed in Parliament, most of the recommendations have not been implemented. Political analysts who spoke to The NewsHawks this week expressed concern over the government’s failure to implement electoral reforms. Professor Stephen Chan predicted that the August elections are likely to be disputed due to a lack of reform. “It is very likely that these will be extremely controversial elections, with the government determined to remain in power despite an appalling economic track record and internationally widespread reports of corruption at the highest level. “The reforms outlined by the last set of observer groups will go unenacted. The government wishes the opposition to have as little space as possible. As in Zambia, the opposition will require a vote lead of 10% or more over the government's tally. That will make for an outcome beyond dispute and beyond 'fixing'. The question then will be as to the reaction of the military,” he said. Rasheat Mukundu weighed in: “I think there is never going to be a conducive environment for elections in Zimbabwe. So the participation of the opposition in elections is not predicated on a scenario in which the electoral field is level, but rather it's actually the participation that incrementally pushes or advances changes to the electoral policy and practice. The opposition must participate in elections as a way of pushing for changes as a way of keeping its political basis active and as a way of exposing the malpractice that ultimately lead to change. “Without participation, then we can as well wait for a hundred years for reforms to take effect or to be done. Participation is not endorsement of the electoral process but is a way to push for change as well as to expose the weaknesses and the lack of transparency within the whole electoral process.” Political analyst Vivid Gwede also warned that the impending election could be disputed. “Many recommendations by observer missions from the last elections have not been instituted. The environment in the country is still repressive to dissenting voices, the state media is still partisan, the voters' roll remains a closely guarded secret, and debates are still ongoing about the diaspora vote. Should this state of play endure without reforms until the day of polling, it is likely that the polls will not meet international standards and will be adjudged so. Hence, the lack of urgency and interest in this area is worrying,” he said. Another flawed poll looms

NewsHawks News Page 17 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE UNITED Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Mary Lawlor, who is based in Ireland, has flagged Zimbabwean police over arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment of opposition activists and civil society leaders. In a statement released on Wednesday, Lawlor said Zimbabwe's bad human rights record has been worsening from the time she assumed the position of UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights. “Since I took office in 2020, I have heard numerous allegations of arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment by police officers against human rights defenders working to protect labour rights,” she said, adding: “I am concerned with the Government of Zimbabwe and will continue to monitor the situation.” Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition’s board chairperson Peter Mutasa in an interview told The NewsHawks the statement by the UN envoy shows that the world is not being deceived by the government’s stunt that the situation is normalising in Zimbabwe. “It is now clear that the government of Zimbabwe cannot deceive the world anymore. The much-spoken-about re-engagement is up in smoke. The world and reputable international institutions are now openly calling the government of Zimbabwe to stop human rights violations. This particular rebuke (by UN envoy Lawlor) is very important because it is coming from an independent rapporteur of the United Nations. “If the government does not take heed of such advice, it will continue to be further isolated. As we witnessed at the coronation of King Charles, Zimbabwe will continue to be embarrassed and treated as a pariah state,” he said. The UN special envoy expressed concern over the treatment of Amalgamated Rural Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe president Obert Masaraure who has faced multiple arrests and charges, as well as torture, for participating in a protest. He faces charges of murder, and public incitement to violence and is on strict bail conditions. After several postponements, he is due to stand trial on 29 May 2023 on charges related to national security, including public incitement to violence and obstruction of justice. A hearing on the murder charge is scheduled for 31 May 2023. “Mr Obert Masaraure has long been targeted in reprisal for his peaceful work in defence of the labour rights of teachers, educators, and all those who seek to uphold the fundamental right to education in Zimbabwe. “I am hoping to see the charges against Mr Obert Masaraure dropped and urge the government of Zimbabwe to promote a safe and enabling environment for all human rights defenders,” Lawlor said. Last week, the American Bar Association also expressed concern over Masaure's case and urged the authorities to drop the charges. Several reports by human rights watchdogs such as the Zimbabwe Peace Project led by Jestina Mukoko and the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum point to the fact that there is worsening trampling of human rights in Zimbabwe. An opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) senior official who is also the Zengesa legislator, Job Sikhala, has spent almost a year in remand prison while another prominent opposition politician, Jacob Ngarivhume, was jailed for leading peaceful protests. Mutasa said the best way forward is for the government to improve the economy and ensure that the generality of workers lead decent lives. “President Mnangagwa must quickly realise that the best way to pacify workers is to address the economic problems that workers are facing. He must improve the wages and other working conditions of workers. The attempt to muzzle trade union freedoms through persecution of its leaders will not work,” he said. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition’s board chairperson Peter Mutasa Arbitrary arrests: UN flags police

Page 18 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE A NEW report by the Research and Advocacy Unit (Rau) in conjunction with the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum has recommended that Zimbabwe urgently ratify the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Forms of Treatment or Punishment Treaty (UNCAT). Such a move would signal a serious commitment to end cases of organised violence and torture mainly by state security apparatus, the organisations argue. The report, released this week, is titled A Short History of Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe and traces cases of violence as well as torture of opposition political party supporters in the pre-independence and post-independence eras. The research delves into periods of violence in the post-colonial era which has been replete with bloody operations against the political opposition and civil society leaders by state security agents ahead of elections. In addition, the report also urges Zimbabwe to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Forms Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). Part of the report reads: “It is difficult to provide a comprehensive list of all the changes needed to political life in Zimbabwe that would prevent recurrences of OVT (organised violence and torture) but a few seem fundamental. “The most basic need is for the government to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Forms Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Forms Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). “These steps will be a first, and long overdue, step towards the elimination of OVT in Zimbabwe. It is the logical and required step for government to take given that the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is enshrined as one of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution (Section 53).” The report questions why Zimbabwe has failed to implement the treaties when over 150 countries have already done so. “It is scandalous that signing and ratifying has not taken place since the promulgation of UNCAT, when 157 countries have already done so, and even more since the insertion of the right to freedom from torture was included in the amended constitution in 2013. “The next logical and necessary step after signing UNCAT and OPCAT is the need to domesticate UNCAT in the criminal law of Zimbabwe. There is substantial pressure on the government to do this and a draft anti-torture bill has been prepared by Zimbabwean human rights organisations. “This has great importance and would signal that torture would be treated in law as considerably worse than aggravated assault and should attract extremely severe penalties for a crime that must be punished internationally and domestically.” The report also adds that these steps would indicate that the government is serious in efforts to stop political violence and would respond to the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Council through several reviews under the Universal Periodic Review processes. “This will be extremely important for elections where the majority of OVT takes place since 1987. It will also be the necessary counter to any attempt at impunity in the future. These steps are to take care of the future, but Zimbabwe also needs to take care of its past. “This is where a genuine, inclusive transitional justice process is needed, which was the major recommendation of the 2003 civil society conference. The current attempt under the constitution has fallen woefully short of a genuine transitional justice process. Given that the lifespan of the NPRC [National Peace and Reconciliation Commission] ends in 2023, it started late with the commissioners only appointed in 2015, and the enabling legislation only passed in 2018.” The report also pressures the government to deal very seriously with the issue of hate speech, primarily because of its relationship to OVT. “The second is to address the culture of politics itself, and to create a culture of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. The former is self-evident and, in fact, is proscribed in the Electoral Act, but needs to have a much wider canvas than merely elections,” reads the report. President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his deputy Constantino Chiwenga have been flagged before over hate speech. In February this year at a campaign rally in Kwekwe, Chiwenga issued chilling threats against the opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC), saying the ruling party was ready to “crush the party like lice” to prevent its leader Nelson Chamisa from winning the elections. “I have heard others here saying down with triple C, let me assure you that there is nothing that it can achieve, you see how we crush lice with a stone. “You put it on a flat stone and then flatten it to the extent that even flies will not make a meal out of it,” he said. Mnangagwa's utterances while addressing Zanu PF supporters in Mutasa district, Manicaland, in October last year were flagged as hate speech. “Next year, we will have elections starting from councillors, members of Parliament and presidential elections. Munotivimbisa here kuti mucharakasha twupwere utwu? (Do you promise us that next year you are going to thrash these youngsters?) Hamuvarakashi chete munosvasvanga (You will not only beat them, you will completely destroy them),” he said. In another case of hate speech, in July last year, Abton Mashayanyika, a bishop in the Habbakuk Apostolic Faith Mission church in Mberengwa, threatened to kill Chamisa for challenging Mnangagwa while addressing a Zanu PF local meeting before the video recording went viral on social media. Police are yet to arrest him. Call to ratify convention against political torture

NewsHawks News Page 19 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 RUVIMBO MUCHENJE THE family of the deceased Citizens' Coalition for Change activist, Moreblessing Ali, maintains that the release of incarcerated lawmaker and family lawyer Job Sikhala is standing between them and the long overdue burial. It has been a year since Ali was abducted from Chibhanguza shops in Nyatsime on 24 May 2022. Her body is lying in a morgue which is unknown to the family. “For as long our family representative, Job Sikhala, is still incarcerated, we cannot move forward because he was with us from the beginning and as a family we will stand loyal to him. So everything is on hold,” said Tafadzwa Montgomery, sister to the slain Ali. “The longer Sikhala remains detained, the longer the whole process will be delayed. We are also in prison, even as we wait for Sikhala, to lead us in finding the truth.” On 28 December 2022, there was an attempt by some extended family members to bury Ali’s dismembered body parts, but they were stopped in their tracks by immediate family members, including her brother Washington and son Silence. Silence is now in hiding after being trailed by security forces over a long time Extended family members, working with state actors, had bought grave space at Mabvuku Cemetery. The burial order was cancelled after the intervention of the immediate family members. The grave had already been dug by the time the burial order was cancelled. Montgomery confirmed that burial arrangements were clandestinely made. “Part of the family tried to go behind everyone’s back from the Ali side of the family,” she said. The family members managed to take the body from Parirenyatwa mortuary and sent it to their undertakers at a parlour unknown to the family. Immediate family members do not know where Ali’s body is. “This is very heart breaking. We honestly do not know where my sister is. There has been speculation of this, that and the other, some of which I do not have the audacity to repeat,” said Montgomery. Sikhala was representing the Ali family and demanding justice for her gruesome murder. He was arrested on 14 June 2022 for allegedly inciting members of the public to commit public violence by “uploading a video on ZimLive, YouTube and social media. His trial began last week. A month after his arrest in mid-June 2022, Sikhala was charged with obstruction of justice in the investigations that police undertook to find Ali's murderer. For this he was convicted and fined. Montgomery said the family was stressed by Sikhala’s detention and their failure to bury Ali. “Nyasha (Ali’s daughter) and Silence have been troubled. We need closure,” said Montgomery. Commenting from his hiding place, Silence told The NewsHawks that he wants justice for his mother. “The issue has taken too long and is now confusing me. We heard that Jamba is before the courts, but how are they having the trial in the absence of the family members? We need the truth. Jamba did not act alone in killing my mother. We need those people to come out and we need a way forward,” he said. Silence was forced into hiding after a series of events in which suspected state agents were lurking in their home area and intimidating him. “It hurts that it has taken so long, but at the end of the day we do not have a choice, we have to wait for Sikhala. I got that call on the 24th of May last year being informed of my mother’s disappearance and it has been a painful journey for me because I am just like Job Sikhala who is in jail because since my mother’s death, I could not go to work or anything. I just managed to flee the intimidation from the guys who were following me, but I am unemployed and failing to make ends meet,” said Silence.Jamba appeared in court on 23 May 2023 for routine remand and was further remanded to 9 June 2023. He has been in custody for almost a year awaiting indictment for trial at the High Court. We’ll only bury Ali after Sikhala’s release: Family Zengeza West MP Job Sikhala

Page 20 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BERNARD MPOFU AS Zimbabwe and the continent commemorated Africa Day on 25 May, the possibility of a world in which it would be permissible to attain collective peace enforcement remains aspirational. This 60th anniversary is being celebrated under the slogan: “Our Africa Our Future” using the hashtag #OurAfricaOurFuture. Under its Agenda 2063, the African Union (AU) has committed to bring peace through its "silencing the guns by 2020" objective, which is largely a mirage. In critically analysing the possibility of peace on the continent, the concept of collective security and the efficacy of the AU has been brought to the fore. Political scientists say since its transformation from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) some two decades ago, the AU had has noble but grandiose goals and objectives, principally focused on intra-state, regional, continental peace and stability. It also created the infrastructure for achieving these goals. The continent, home to over 1.4 billion people, is bruised. Somalia has been relegated to a failed state and closer to Zimbabwe, Mozambique is in turmoil. Further up the continent, Sudan is ravaged by conflict. Some blame the competing interests of superpowers while others point the finger to the dearth of Pan-Africanism for the fragmentation. Eldred Masunungure, a leading scholar at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Governance and Public Management, said failure to deal with conflict on the continent had blemished the AU. “Regrettably, its record of achievement has been rather paltry with the possible exception of Ecowas in West Africa which now appears to be faltering of late,” Masungure says in a written response to questions sent by The NewsHawks. “The inability, despite the rhetorical willingness, to positively intervene in the Sudanese crisis is an indictment and a blemish on the AU's performance record. In short, the AU still has to convert its rhetoric and aspirational commitment to peace into reality. In this regard, it compares quite poorly with its EU counterpart from which it drew its inspiration.” Stephen Chan, professor of international politics at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, says the AU at present has no capacity to engage in timely and efficacious collective peace enforcement. “There are four reasons for this,” Chan says. “A reluctance to utilise the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect', born out of a continuing adherence of respect for sovereign borders. A lack of logistical capacity, i.e. the ability to deliver troops and supplies to any trouble spot in a swift manner. “There are insufficient air transport and troop-carrying planes. The lack of any unified military protocol or command structure for military units drawn from different nations. The out-dated nature of conventional military doctrine and heavy equipment, when most insurgent forces, e.g. in Mali before the French intervention, utilise strategies and equipment designed for great speed and mobility.” The rise of extremism and terrorist groups operating is destabilising the continent. “Foreign interests are not militarily destabilising the continent, e.g. Boko Haram and Al Shabaab are not foreign forces,” Chan says. “The current war in Sudan was not started by foreign interests. Lack of good governance and equality for all sections of the community, selfish pillaging and corruption are far more responsible for violence than anything engineered by any foreign force.” Masunungure, on the other hand, says the competing interests of superpowers growing their interest on the continent is also threatening stability on the continent. “The malign effects of global power politics on Africa are a legacy of the Cold War competition which had ebbed in the decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union,” he adds. "However, the world is witnessing a resurgence of militarised power politics at the regional and state levels as again manifestly exemplified in Sudan and the Sahel region. Lamentably, the AU has proved inadequate if not impotent in countering these global gladitiations for power and supremacy.” Collective security as a concept provides for a number of states pooling their resources to achieve the common safety of their citizens. It is based on the principle that views an attack on any member of the collective as an attack against all. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) as a military organisation was formed after the Second World War as an umbrella body that provided collective security for Western Europe to ward off threats of the westward spread of communism posed by the Soviet Union. The concept of collective security has a long history in the relationship among states. Key proponents of collective security are Immanuel Kant, Hans Morgenthau and A.F.K. Organski. The liberal view point on collective security is informed by the writings of Kant who advocated perpetual peace (Kant, 2010). In this regard the Liberal view point is that international organisations should stop potential aggressors to prevent a war as opposed to responding with force as is the dictum of collective security. Badalan (2009:73) asserts that peace can only be preserved through international law, international organisations, political integration and democratisation. Nato intervention in Libya had serious implications on the AU framework for peace security. Experts say Africa as a continent is now vulnerable and prone to future interventions by external actors because they saw that the AU could not protect it and also countries in the AU had many differences which they could not put aside so that they could work together on the Libyan conflict. According to British researcher on politics and politics Alex De Waal, Africa was fragmented over Libya raising questions over the AU’s capacity to foster unity. Zimbabwe’s late former president Robert Mugabe and Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni did not hide their support for Gaddafi. Mugabe and Gaddafi were close friends who shared the same perspectives which perceived the West as enemies. South Africa’s then president Jacob Zuma was very ambiguous, while Ethiopia and Nigeria sought Gaddafi’s exit. This rift in the AU threatened regional peace and security as there was apparently factionalism based on the Libyan conflict and Nato intervention. On 24 February 2014, there was a meeting held in London to find ways of addressing threats to global security emanating from the Somalia conflict. This meant Western powers effectively ignoring the AU's ongoing efforts to resolve the conflict. The AU’s quest for security and governance was downgraded by Nato’s intervention in Libya. The meeting was held for an African country but they did not include the AU, clearly showing that they are not afraid of infringing on the principles of the AU and its norms. Africa was now prone to future interventions and this would disrupt the AU’s decision-making process on peace and security issues. As Africa reflects on the 60th anniversary of the OAU/AU, the bloc should actualise its original goal of African unity as encapsulated in its original name, Masunungure added. “Paradoxically, the AU’s original sin is disunity and mindless divisions in the face of global powers that use it as their playing ground,” he says. “It is embarrassing and humiliating in the extreme that the two countries involved in attempts to resolve the Sudanese near-civil war are both non-African i.e., the USA and Saudi Arabia, while the 54 African countries individually and collectively watch helplessly. “The salutary lesson is captured in an African proverb: ‘if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.’ That spirit of togetherness is yet to be translated into collective continental action in the face of collective problems. The slogan ‘African solutions for African problems’ still rings rather hollow.” Peace, prosperity still elude Africa

NewsHawks News Page 21 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 RUVIMBO MUCHENJE THE mere mention of the word "elections" has a chilling effect on Plaxedes Mutariswa Ndira. Memories of her late husband, Tonderai Ndira, who was a staunch MDC-T activist, immediately engulf her, particularly her visit to Parirenyatwa Hospital in Harare where she saw his bruised, lifeless and mutilated body for the first time. Ndira’s eyes had been plucked out, the tongue had been cut out and its remainder was tied with a wire. His genitals were also tied with a wire. The signs of heavy torture and indeed a very painful death were there to see. She could only imagine the amount of pain he felt in the final moments of his life. She remembers vividly the day Ndira was abducted by suspected state security agents at their Mabvuku home. It was early in the morning on 14 May 2008. At the time, political tension was high in the country. MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai had outpolled the then president Robert Mugabe in the first round of elections after securing 47.87% of the votes against Mugabe’s 43.24% elections held on 29 March 2008. This was the first time that Mugabe had been beaten in an election but the military would have none of it. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission took more than a month to announce presidential election results amid suspicion they were tampering with figures to rescue Mugabe, who had in fact lost by a wider margin. When Zec eventually announced the result on 2 May, Tsvangirai had outpolled Mugabe but failed to garner enough votes to be declared president. A runoff was declared between the two titans. The military however took over the Zanu PF campaign, before embarking on a reign of terror countrywide. The pogrom resulted in countless killings, rape, abductions and cases of arson. At the time of Ndira’s abduction — two weeks after the presidential election results were announced — Plaxedes thought it was yet another abduction or arrest. Ndira had been arrested 58 times for his political activism, facing numerus charges ranging from criminal nuisance to attempted murder. On each occasion, he would come back home after spending time in police cells or remand prison, but he would immediately resume his fight for democracy. But that was the last time Plaxedes would see him alive. Fifteen years after Ndira’s abduction and gruesome murder, The NewsHawks tracked down Plaxedes to her rented home in Harare's Highfield suburb, where she is using two rooms. She sits in the corner of her sofa, in a poorly lit room that doubles as the kitchen and the lounge, as she welcomes this reporter, around 5pm on a Tuesday. There is no electricity in the area due to load shedding. The room is further darkened by the towering kitchen appliances in the room, which block light. She relives what happened. “On 13 May (2008) he left home and cautioned me against opening the door when strangers came knocking. A group of men came knocking but I did not respond until they left,” she said. “My husband then called me and told me to buy fish as relish for our evening meal. I did so and when he came he offered to cook. He was just jovial besides the crackdown. We retired for bed. “The next morning, a vehicle with about 10 men parked at the entrance to the yard and four men disembarked. “They stormed the kitchen where I was preparing for the children to go to school and asked to see my husband. Before I could even respond, they went to the bedroom where he was still sleeping. “Another man disembarked and stood at the kitchen door wielding a rifle. I asked him what kind of policing this was and he asked if I had a problem with it. “I heard the scuffle between my husband and the men who had entered the bedroom and I rushed out, hoping to solicit help from neighbours. “As I rushed out screaming, the neighbours came out, but they couldn’t do anything because the gun-wielding man pointed the gun at them.” Among those who rushed to the house were two of Ndira’s friends. “They wanted to advance, but were restrained by the sight of the gun,” she said. Plaxedes thought she would be able to see him at the police station, as had become the norm. Ndira was no stranger to being arrested. The arrests had taken him away from his family dozens of times. Their second child was born in 2002 during Ndira’s seven-month stay in remand prison but, even then, he came back. She blankly stares at the floor as she tries to remember the exact charge, but it escapes her. Plaxedes went to Mabvuku Police Station after the arrest, but the police officers said they were not aware of the arrest. She then tried filing a missing person’s report, but was turned away. Hours turned into days without a word. She then sought divine help from apostolic sects and shrines in Mabvuku for a fortnight in an effort to find her husband. While at one of the shrines, she received a call from her husband’s brother, Cosmas, who asked what his brother was wearing on the day he was abducted. Beyond these questions, Cosmas Ndira did not divulge anything and this heightened her anxiety. She left the shrine and on her way home she kept trying Cosmas’ phone, but he was not picking the calls. She got another call from Ndira’s friend, James Chidhakwa, who asked what Tonderai was wearing on the day that he diasppeared and this worsened her anxiety. “I wanted to find out if they had found him, but no one was giving me answers. I was confused but also a bit distressed on why there was so much secrecy around these questions,” she said with rheumy eyes. “I got home and asked some guy that we lived with to call the two men who were not picking my calls anymore. Surprisingly, he actually spoke to them and stood from where he was sitting and left without a word. I think they told him the truth. “A few hours later, Cosmas and Chidhakwa came with our neighbour and told me that they had found him in a terrible state, without eyes. The remainder of his tongue was tied with a wire so were his genitals. His eyes were gouged out.” Ndira’s decomposing body was found dumped in Goromonzi on 22 May, before it was brought to Parirenyatwa Hospital, where Cosmas and Chidhakwa identified it. For the last 15 years, Plaxedes has been hopping from one high-density suburb to another, hoping to avoid scrutiny on herself and children. He children were 10 and six when their father was killed. She never reveals her past in the new neighbourhood and keeps a very low profile. She also does not attend any political party meetings although she always exercises her constitutional right to vote. “You will never see my body at a party rally or meeting. Never! I have told my son to do the same. When Zanu PF people bring their regalia, we take it and wear, when they bring registers for cell we register, but they will never see me set foot at their meetings. I know what politics does. The only thing that I will do is to vote,” she said. She has secured a job and has been fending for her children with aid from human rights organisations. “Growing up we knew that men are the bread winners, we never bothered ourselves with looking for money because it was the husband’s job. This was my mindset before I was reduced to a beggar. One time I actually slept at Harvest House hoping to get something from the social welfare department, but not much could be availed,” she said. “When Tsvangirai and Susan were alive we would just inform them of our predicament as wives of men that had been killed for aligning with the party. Help would come. But, sometimes there were gatekeepers who would say ‘the president is not around’. “This broke my heart because had it not been for the party my husband would not have died that way. For it to be called MDC it was my husband and others who were on the frontline, but they forget those efforts because our husbands are dead now,” she added. In 2021, CCC president Nelson Chamisa, in his capacity as MDC-Alliance leader then, gave the widows Christmas hampers, and that was it. In commemorating Ndira and the day he was found dead, CCC party members, led by deputy spokesperson Gift Siziba, visited his grave last weekend. Plaxedes was excluded. What pains her the most, though, is that those responsible for her husband’s gruesome murder were never brought to account. She still hopes that the perpetrators will be arrested one day and face justice. No arrests were made in connection with the murder. She is worried that abductions, killings and impunity continue. The killing of CCC activist Moreblessing Ali after last year’s 26 March by-elections and the murder of Mboneni Ncube at a rally in Kwekwe ahead of those polls, all remind her of her late husband’s fate. In 2015, journalist and activist Itai Dzamara was abducted in similar fashion and has never been found. Plaxedes can only hope for justice one day. The late opposition activist Tonderai Ndira Ndira’s widow carries heavy heart . . . No justice 15 years later

Page 22 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 MORRIS BISHI BIKITA residents are up in arms against their local council after it failed to account for US$100 000 paid by Bikita Minerals as levies in December last year. This development comes at a time when Bikita Rural District Council is in the eye of a storm following the arrest of its executives by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (Zacc) for unlawfully benefitting from a credit scheme which saw heads of department receiving Toyota GD6 single cab vehicles. Bikita Residents and Ratepayers Association (BIRRA) spokesperson Mark Mutengani told The NewsHawks that it is surprising to note that Bikita Rural District Council received a substantial amount from Bikita Minerals five months back, but there is no trace of how the money was spent. He said there are fears that the money was used to service vehicle loans which benefitted individual employees. “As residents we are worried by this gross mismanagement by our council. We feel the council departed from its core mandate of service delivery. How can the whole US$100 000 disappear without a single cent being channelled towards any project that benefits society? We think that it went to service bank loans for the GD6 vehicles which management bought for personal use at the expense of service delivery vehicles. We will demand answers from the local authority,” said Mutengani. Council chairperson Brian Masakadze confirmed that the local authority received the money from the lithium miner as payment of levies which is done annually. He also agreed that council has begun paying back the loan taken to buy vehicles for senior managers, but said they are buying materials to construct clinics and residents will be notified through reports after the completion of the projects. “We always receive this money as levies on annual basis and l can confirm that we received US$100 000 in December last year. We are buying material and equipment for some of our clinics which are under construction and there is no need for residents to panic since we will notify them through reports. We have since started servicing the vehicle loan and this is being done through deduction from beneficiaries of the scheme,” said Masakadze. Bikita Minerals Spokesperson Collin Nikisi said the lithium miner paid the money as levies, like other businesses in the district are doing. He said the company always holds consultations with the local authority, like any other business entities. A senior council employee told The NewsHawks that financial issues within the local authority are not being handled in a transparent manner. He said there is a need for a forensic audit to look into the financial books of the local authority since there are many grey areas which should be exposed. Residents demand answers from council Bikita Rural District Council received a substantial amount from Bikita Minerals (below) five months back, but there is no trace of how the money was spent.

NewsHawks News Page 23 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 NATHAN GUMA LIVING conditions are continuing to worsen at Arda Transau resettlement facility — where people who were forcibly moved from the Chiadzwa diamond fields were relocated — with communities failing to access water, while wallowing in poverty, a report by the Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG) has revealed. After the discovery of diamonds in Chiadzwa, Manicaland province, many families were moved off their ancestral land of Marange communal lands and resettled at Arda Transau between 2009 and 2011. The government declared the diamond fields protected areas under the Protected Places and Areas Act (PPAA) to pave way for the exploitation of the gems. While promises were made to improve the livelihoods of the resettled families, most of the promises are yet to be fulfilled. For instance, each family was to occupy a three-bedroomed electrified house with clean, treated piped water from taps situated at each house. However, a lack of access to social amenities like water have seen living conditions resembling a concentration camp, according to CNRG. “School-going children were to benefit from the provision of school fees, uniforms, footwear, and books. Schools were to get furniture from the companies and teachers’ houses were to be built near the school. Fast forward to 2023, Arda Transau resembles a concentration camp with shocking levels of poverty and an apparent humanitarian crisis unfolding,” the report reads. “One of the major challenges facing the Arda Transau community is access to water. The taps dried up sometime in early 2022. The community has now resorted to fetching water at an unprotected well on the outskirts of the settlement. “The water slowly springs from the ground, requiring at least 20-30minutes for one to fill a bucket. In the evening long queues form at the well where residents, mostly women and children, spend hours await their turn to fetch water for domestic chores,” read the CNRG report. People in the area have been getting water from unprotected sources, raising fears of waterborne diseases. “The tiny well is less than five metres from a swamp that has become the source of water for laundry for the community,” the report reads in part. “CNRG witnessed women washing clothes about five metres from the well where others were gathered to fetch water for domestic consumption. Livestock also drink from the swamp. The community is in danger of drinking contaminated water as laundry water can easily contaminate the drinking water. “Similarly, animal diseases can easily be transmitted to humans due to the closeness of the swamp to the well.” CNRG raised concern over the deteriorating housing within the resettlement facility, which it said is now degenerating into a humanitarian crisis. “Another major humanitarian challenge unfolding at Arda Transau is that of fast-depreciating shelter. The houses, especially those built by Anjin Investments, are cracking. Massive cracks on the floor and walls were witnessed by CNRG. In some of the houses, there is an imminent danger of the walls collapsing on people. “However, such tragedies are completely avoidable if Anjin Investments and Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) embark on a house rehabilitation programme. This should not be for propaganda purposes but with real intent to avert tragedies. “Many children brought to Arda Transau have grown and started their own families and yet there is no land for them. These young couples are forced to continue living with their parents. The land reform programme ought to cater for these families, given that they were made landless and homeless by the government. Zimbabwe has several multiple farm owners, of which the majority of the farms lie idle since acquisition,” read the report by CNRG. CNRG said Arda Transau residents have limited livelihood options, which has plunged many into immense poverty. “The situation at Arda Transau is compounded by the complete absence of livelihood options. There are no employment opportunities. All they got is a shelter which is now disintegrating. As the population at Arda Transau continues to grow without corresponding social services and employment opportunities, the risk of crime looms large. “We reiterate that Anjin Investments and ZCDC executives must schedule regular meetings with the Arda Transau community to listen to the community and take genuine action to address their grievances. Ignoring the plight of the displaced community has a huge impact on the image and value of Marange diamonds,” CNRG said. Living conditions at Arda Transau continue to deteriorate. Villagers bemoan worsening conditions at Arda Transau

Page 24 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 MORRIS BISHI COUNCILLORS in Chiredzi have begun the process of cancelling an agreement with land developer Full Life Open Arms Africa Investments (FLOAAI), accusing the company linked to minister of Local Government July Moyo of breaching a contract signed in 2018. This development comes only two weeks after residents approached the High Court in a bid to stop the developer from selling unserviced stands at Buffalo Range Extension which is near Croco Motors along the Ngundu-Tanganda highway. With the influence of senior government officials, FLOAAI was given the mandate to develop 750 hectares of Buffalo Range on behalf of a joint venture between Chiredzi Town Council and Chiredzi Rural District Council. The land is for Chiredzi town expansion and the contractor was supposed to develop the area before handing it back to the local authorities. Chiredzi Rural District Council acting chairperson Leornard Makondo told The NewsHawks that his local authority is now initiating a process to formally cancel an agreement they entered with FLOAAI in 2018. He said a technical services committee met on Tuesday and resolved to immediately cancel the agreement, citing breach of contract on the side of the developer. “We are aware that there is a High Court case against this developer but as council we started a process to formally cancel our contract with the developer. According to our agreement, the developer was supposed to develop 750 hectares, that is providing all needed services and roads, and hand the developed area back to council. This is now not the case as the developer is already selling unserviced stands and this, accordingly, is a breach of the Local Authorities Act, as well as our contract with him, so we have to cancel it.” “A technical services committee met on Tuesday and moved a motion to cancel the deal. We are holding a full council meeting on Friday where this will definitely be accepted,” said Makondo. A councillor who heads a critical committee at Chiredzi Town Council said they had discussions as policymakers and agreed to take joint action with their fellow policymakers from Chiredzi Rural since the issue involves both local authorities. He said they will copy what is being done by councillors from the rural local authority. “We agreed verbally as councillors to cancel the deal, citing failure to fulfil what we agreed in 2018. We will be guided by activities being done by our brothers from rural local authority and we will follow suit. The case is between the courts and we are cited as respondents, but we instructed out lawyers not to respond but we will go there as witnesses to what is happening. We cannot defend things which are bad. This developer is a fraudster who should be pushed away from Chiredzi despite his links to government officials,” said the councillor. Emmanuel Matimba, a resident who is an applicant in an interdict to stop the activities of FLOAAI, told The NewsHawks that FLOAAI responded to the application filed by residents at the Masvingo High Court while the two local authorities ignored. He said they are waiting to be furnished with a court date so that the case is heard before a judge. Member of Parliament for Chiredzi West Farai Musikavanhu said despite being in the campaig period his party Zanu PF, which does not condone corruption, should not allow developers to rob people their hard-earned cash in Chiredzi. He said Chiredzi town, which is a declared cholera zone, is already facing water shortages due to a ballooning population figure hence allowing FLOAAI to sell stands without services like water will worsen the crisis. “The terms of reference under which the developer was employed must be put under the microscope as this could turn out to be one of those land baron deals where poor residents are robbed of their hard-earned money while being exposed to pyramid schemes run by briefcase operators with no bank balances to support the undertaking of such a massive project” “Yes, we are in a campaign period, but our culture in Zanu PF is to put the interests of the people first and protect them from wolves that may present themselves in sheep skins. This project is a classical example where we must walk the talk of the 'zero tolerance to corruption' mantra by President Mnangagwa” said Musikavanhu. Residents demand termination of developer contracts in Chiredzi

NewsHawks News Page 25 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 NATHAN GUMA/ PRISCA TSHUMA FOR the one-year period he has been selling wooden utensils in Harare’s central business district, Blessing Magocha (35) has been using popular buildings and landmarks as a meeting point with his clients. He has also been using popular streets to meet his clients, including old figures, which have remained embedded in the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans despite being renamed three years ago. A survey by The NewsHawks this week has revealed that new street names, named along political lines, have failed to resonate with the people, with many people either ignorant of the changes, or resisting the imposed names. “I have been working here for almost a year. I know some names have been changed but it’s of little consequence to me. I don’t know the new names,” Magocha said. “I use names such as 4th Street (now Simon Muzenda Street) and others. Even people I meet have been using the same old names as well. Some of the times, we make use of building names. For example, Charge Office, Mohamed Musa and others. The new names, I have not been aware,” said Blessing Magocha. Nyasha Maradze (22), a student at a local college, said she was also unaware of new names. “I never knew there were any changes to road names,” she told The NewsHawks. “I only know the old names. This has a large effect. Let’s say I would like to direct someone to Charter Road, I cannot use new names which the person does not know. “I do not see people coming to grasp the new names. If they were really changed, we would have heard about it a long time ago. Young people like us spend time in town, but I have never heard of changes to street names. Considering that, will it be possible for the elderly to do so? Others will grasp, but it is difficult to do so.” In 2020, the government promulgated Statutory Instrument 167/20 — Names (Alteration) (Amendment of Schedule) Notice — whose purpose was to alter the names of some streets. The notice amended 43 roads in Harare alone, sparking public outrage as the process was done without consultation. Enterprise Road was renamed Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa Road, but ordinary citizens are still using the old name. Some of the roads have been renamed after African and international luminaries. The name changes have also reflected Zimbabwe’s foreign relations. African leaders such as Congo's Patrice Lumumba, Jomo Kenyatta and Abdel Gamal Nasser had roads named after them, along with international leaders such as Cuba's Fidel Castro, Leonid Brezhnev of the former Soviet Union and China's Mao Zedong. Through the notice, Speke Avenue, formerly named after a British explorer, has become Agostinho Neto Avenue after Angola’s first president. Third Street was renamed after Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Charter Road has been renamed Fidel Castro Road, after the late Cuban leader, Castro. Fidel Castro ruled Cuba for 47 years, from 1959 to 2006. To some people, Castro was a ruthless dictator and a communist tyrant, while to others he was a liberator and a stalwart advocate of egalitarianism. Other renamed roads include Innez Terrace, which was renamed to Mayor Urimbo Terrace. Fife Avenue, which houses the Russian Embassy has been renamed Leonid Brezhnev Street. While many other roads have been renamed since 2020, people have not bothered to call use the new names. To show resentment to the new names, the Bulawayo Progressive Residents' Association (BPRA) on 23 July 2020 filed an application at the High Court seeking an order to set aside the government’s decision to rename some streets in the country’s second largest city as this was illegal after SI 167/20. In an urgent chamber application filed by BPRA represented by Job Sibanda of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, BPRA argued that Moyo’s actions in passing Statutory Instrument 167/20 run counter to the clear provisions of the Alteration of Names Act, are illegal and go against the grain of what is accepted in a normal society. BPRA argued section 4(2) of the Alteration of Names Act states that Moyo should not alter any names in terms of sub-section (1) unless he has consulted the owner of the land where the alteration is to take place of which, considering that Bulawayo City Council C owns the land that forms the basis of the alteration. The organisation protested that Moyo had ignored some proposals made by Bulawayo City Council on street name changes and came up with a list of names that are totally different from the ones the local authority had suggested to the Minister. While it has been three years since the street names were changed, people have remained adamant in continuing to use the old names. Political analyst Rashweat Mukundu says grasping of names is synonymous with the people’s political and social beliefs. “Change does take time and the question is: Do the names resonate with citizens' socio-political aspirations and are such people seen as models?” Mukundu says. Despite that, participants in the interview believe their penchant for old names is unlikely to change soon. “When someone asks me, I just use the use the names I know. It is easy to call someone and ask them to come to Joina City, Charge Office, OK First Street and other names than the new ones. It is even difficult to grasp them,” Magocha says. Zim citizens less willing to embrace new street names

Page 26 News NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Ÿ Choose The NewsHawks Executive Conference Room WORKSHOPS I PRODUCT LAUNCHES I MEDIA/FINANCIAL BRIEFINGS I EVENTS Training Session? Planning a Meeting or Harare 6th Floor #100 Nelson Mandela Ave The NewsHawks Beverly Court For Bookings please contact Charmaine on 0735 666 122 Email- [email protected] Land line- (0242) 721 144/5 The NewsHawks @NewsHawksLive www.newshawks.com [email protected] For more Information visit

NewsHawks News Page 27 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 International Investigative Stories TWO alleged smuggling schemes run through the Brazilian border town of Pacaraima give a glimpse into the murky world of Venezuela’s illegal gold trade. Pacaraima, on the northern edge of Brazil, is a town shaped by migration. Every week, scores of people cross the border from Venezuela to escape an economic and political crisis that has plunged millions into abject poverty. It has also become known as a hotbed for gold trafficking. In recent years, Brazilian police have busted two alleged smuggling schemes that they say funneled millions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan gold across the border into Pacaraima, and from there out of South America to the U.S., Asia, and the Middle East. One was allegedly run by Andrés Antonio Fernández Soto, a convicted gold smuggler from Venezuela, who police say used companies owned by him and his family to traffic gold to Miami. Police detained Fernández — who goes by the name “Toñito” — after he was caught trying to move gold mined from protected land in the Venezuelan Amazon through Brazil. The other case focuses on a group that allegedly smuggled Venezuelan gold across the border to buy food, medicine, and other basic goods in Pacaraima. Brazilian police say the gold was sold to a major metals trader in São Paulo, which exported it to India and the United Arab Emirates. Some of the gold, they suggest, may have come from Toñito and his family. Brazilian authorities are now searching for Toñito, after he removed a monitoring device from his ankle late in March and went on the run. Neither Toñito, nor any members of his family, replied to a request for comment. The two cases give a rare glimpse into the murky world of Venezuela’s illicit gold trade. Experts estimate as much as 75 tons may be extracted from the country’s mines every year, worth more than $4.8 billion at today’s rates. Most of it is thought to come from illegal mines, where workers toil in often horrendous conditions. Official figures are unreliable, however, and the opaque ecosystem of criminality surrounding the trade make it impossible to quantify. Based on accounts from miners and local officials, experts say Venezuela’s illegal gold industry is growing, driven by the same economic devastation that has led so many people to flee the country. “In this context, gold [has become] the new oil,” said a 2021 report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Most of Venezuela’s gold continues to be smuggled abroad, laundered and eventually sold to traders and refiners around the world.” In Pacaraima, the cost of Venezuela’s crisis is plain to see. Groups of migrants, some clutching infants in their arms or carrying bulging rucksacks, crowded the sidewalks when Armando.Info visited last year. As the trade has grown, smugglers have come up with new ways to disguise the origin of Venezuelan gold. The two cases show these different techniques, from trying to pass it off as scrap to routing it through neighboring countries, such as Brazil. Until recently, Brazil’s laws made “heating gold” — as laundering is sometimes known in Portuguese — relatively easy. A “presumption of good faith” rule meant that anyone could sell gold without proving it had been legally extracted, just by attesting that it had. "If you go to a point of sale here in Brazil and say, 'Look, I extracted this gold,’ and you provide the process number of an authorized mining operation, simply because you can say it in good faith, you can easily legalize that gold,” said Melina Risso, the research director at Instituto Igarapé, a sustainability think tank based in Rio de Janeiro.In April, the Brazilian Supreme Court suspended the presumption of good faith of gold-buying companies, but the ruling is a preliminary decision and could still be overturned. ‘A True Criminal Organization’ For a while, Pacaraima was a safe haven for Toñito. Police say he made millions from trafficking illegal gold into Brazil before he was detained there in 2021. Toñito had slipped across the border three years earlier, after he was convicted in Venezuela for smuggling 100 kilograms of gold, worth some $6 million. When he fled to Brazil, Interpol issued a red alert seeking his arrest. International InvestigativeStories How Venezuelan gold is trafficked through Brazil’s borderlands to US The landscape of Roraima, on the border with Venezuela in northern Brazil. (Photo: María de los Ángeles Ramírez)

Page 28 International Investigative Stories Previously, Toñito had flown illegally mined gold from the Venezuelan Amazon directly to the U.S. But when Washginton banned Venezuelan imports in 2018, investigators say he and his family rerouted their trade through Brazil to disguise the gold’s origins. Once in Brazil, Toñito applied for asylum as a refugee — and allegedly set to work trying to smuggle gold out of Venezuela again. But Brazilian police were alerted after they caught a trader carrying around $46,000 in cash, who told them that he was planning to buy gold from Toñito’s brother in law. The discovery prompted police to launch an investigation into Toñito and his group, codenamed Operation Chain. While the investigation is still ongoing, some of their findings are laid out in documents submitted to court so police could detain Toñito in 2021. A judge who reviewed the papers described Toñito’s enterprise as “a true criminal organization, with a well-defined hierarchical and compartmentalized structure, which moved large amounts of money related to gold extracted from indigenous lands — and probably other crimes.” The documents give an unusually detailed insight into how illegal supplies make their way from the Venezuelan Amazon into the international market. The investigation focuses on one shipment of eight gold bars extracted in Gran Sabana, a group of protected indigenous territories in the south of the country where mining is supposed to be banned. In the village of Chirikayén, not far from the mine, small rows of thatched houses lined neatly manicured dirt tracks, overlooked by the summit of a flat-topped mountain known to locals as the “reclining Indian.” The mine was a hive of activity when Armando.Info visited earlier this year. Trucks came and went carrying sacks of gold. Day and night, aircraft would appear loaded with rock material, landing on a nearby helipad or, sometimes, the local community's soccer field. The gold bars mined here were bought by a Venezuelan company owned by Toñito’s sister in January 2020, then sold to a Florida-registered company controlled by Toñito and his mother five days later, according to sales records. Police say the bars were then smuggled across the border from Venezuela to Brazil, though they don’t explain how. Once in Pacaraima, the bars were handed to Union Security, a private security company that was meant to drive the gold in armored trucks to the airport in the state capital, Boa Vista. There, the bars were to be entrusted to a charter airline that would fly them to Florida. Paperwork shows a flight had already been booked to transport the gold to Fort Lauderdale on February 12, at a cost of nearly $30,000. But there was a hitch. To export the gold from Brazil, Union Security needed to be approved as an international transport carrier. Brazilian authorities were on high alert when it came to gold shipments after armed groups had stolen cargoes from other airports. The paperwork for the gold bars was also problematic, including an old U.S. customs certificate that authorities said was intended to “mislead” customs officials. It also claimed the gold would be transported by Toñito’s own plane, rather than the one he had chartered. Unimpressed by Union Security’s application, Brazil’s Federal Revenue Service turned it down, noting in its decision that there was a "high risk to public safety due to the nature of the cargo." Toñito, Tremens Metals, and Union Security filed a lawsuit seeking to overturn the decision, but they lost the case. The Brinks Company, which bought Union Security in 2021, said it was not "informed” that Tremens Metals had contracted Union Security to transport gold in its due diligence for the acquisition. Brinks said it had a rigorous governance policy when it came to moving precious metals. Brazilian police detained Toñito in October 2021, but he escaped house arrest and is now on the lam. The justice department in the state of Roraima, where Pacaraima is located, said intelligence agents are searching for him. Toñito’s two sisters and brother in law, who were arrested at the same time, are also awaiting trial. Brazilian police declined to comment as the case is ongoing. But this wasn’t the only trafficking case implicating Toñito and his family. Brazilian police also have evidence they supplied another group that smuggled illicit gold across the border to buy food and medicine. Food for Gold The second alleged smuggling scheme uncovered in Pacaraima took advantage of the widespread shortages of basic goods that have driven millions of people to flee Venezuela. At least 19 people are under investigation for being part of a criminal group that smuggled Venezuelan gold into Brazil to buy food and medicine that was unavailable across the border. Brazilian police raided several properties in March in connection with the alleged scheme, which they estimate laundered 40 million Brazilian reais ($8 million). The ringleader, police say, was a Brazilian named Marcelo Camacho Pinto. In messages cited in investigative documents he describes how he acted as a middleman between the gold smugglers and shops in Pacaraima. "The Venezuelans give me the [gold] and they sign a certificate of origin. With this material … I make the payment to the companies that sell the food,” Camacho said in one message to his lawyer. In an audio message also cited in the file, Camacho explained he would also buy the gold himself. "Sometimes, there are situations where I pay in cash and other situations I also pay the supermarkets where they buy the food," it said. OCCRP could not read Camacho for comment. Police believe Camacho bought some of the gold from Toñito and his family, though none of them are official suspects. Bank records show a company owned by his sister Lilia and her husband Sousa & Fernandez Representações received $213,000 from Camacho’s company, MC Produtos de Extração Mineral. The payments, they say, “strongly indicate” Toñito and his family supplied the smugglers with gold. When officers visited Sousa & Fernandez’s address in the Brazilian city of Boa Vista, it appeared to be little more than a front company. Inside the office was empty, while outside hung a “for rent” sign. Police say MC Produtos de Extração issued false receipts claiming the gold came from jewelry pawned by Venezuelan migrants in a bid to hide its illegal origins. However, tests carried out by the police on the supposed scrap metal showed it was far more pure than gold used in necklaces or earrings. The smuggled gold was then allegedly sold to RBM Recuperadora de Metais, a major metals trader based in São Paulo. Between January 2015 and September 2019, police say MC Produtos supplied RBM with 1.2 tons of gold, worth close to $30 million, which was then exported abroad to companies in Dubai and India. Brazilian authorities were first alerted that Camacho was trading in gold early in 2017, when he tried to send a little over a kilogram to RBM through the mail. The shipment was seized by the Federal Revenue Service. Investigators became more suspicious when they seized another package of gold a few months later sent by Camacho’s daughter, with an invoice in the name of a Venezuelan miner. Camacho then tried to claim back the gold using fake receipts for jewelry. Police detained Camacho, RBM’s owner at the time, Valdemir de Melo Junior, and more than a dozen other people in relation to the scheme in June 2019. Although the case is ongoing, Melo Junior has been able to renew several mining licenses he holds in the Brazilian Amazon. RBM denied that it had committed any crimes, saying prosecutors had not brought any charges against the company. “All of the company's actions are guided by the legal provisions governing its operations, as well as by best compliance practices,” said a spokesperson. The executive director of sustainable development think tank Instituto Escolhas, Sergio Leitão, said the illegal trade in gold implicated buyers as well as suppliers. "The consequences are serious and pose a reputational dilemma not only for Brazil, which sells this gold, but also for the countries that buy it. In other words, it is a crime that is committed ... both by those who export and those who import,” he said. — Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. (Infographic: Edin Pasovic/OCCRP) NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023

NewsHawks Page 29 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 The NewsHawks is published on different content platforms by the NewsHawks Digital Media which is owned by Centre for Public Interest Journalism No. 100 Nelson Mandela Avenue Beverly Court, 6th floor Harare, Zimbabwe Trustees/Directors: Beatrice Mtetwa, Raphael Khumalo, Professor Wallace Chuma, Teldah Mawarire, Doug Coltart EDITORIAL STAFF: Managing Editor: Dumisani Muleya Assistant Editor: Brezh Malaba News Editor: Owen Gagare Digital Editor: Bernard Mpofu Reporters: Brenna Matendere, Ruvimbo Muchenje, Enock Muchinjo, Jonathan Mbiriyamveka, Nathan Guma Email: [email protected] SUB EDITORS: Mollen Chamisa, Gumisai Nyoni Business Development Officer: Nyasha Kahondo Cell: +263 71 937 1739 [email protected] Subscriptions & Distribution: +263 71 937 1739 Reaffirming the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and media freedom as the cornerstone of democracy and as a means of upholding human rights and liberties in the constitution; our mission is to hold power in its various forms and manifestations to account by exposing abuse of power and office, betrayals of public trust and corruption to ensure good governance and accountability in the public interest. CARTOON Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe The NewsHawks newspaper subscribes to the Code of Conduct that promotes truthful, accurate, fair and balanced news reporting. If we do not meet these standards, register your complaint with the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe at No.: 34, Colenbrander Rd, Milton Park, Harare. Telephone: 024-2778096 or 024-2778006, 24Hr Complaints Line: 0772 125 659 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] WhatsApp: 0772 125 658, Twitter: @vmcz Website: www.vmcz.co.zw, Facebook: vmcz Zimbabwe Editorial & Opinion Elections: Let the game begin Dumisani Muleya Hawk Eye Comrades, who's trying to topple me? This price madness will cost me the election! ZIMBABWE'S cost-of-living crisis is spiralling out of control, with the professional class — including teachers, nurses, doctors and even revenue collectors — now reduced to miserable paupers in a country that claims to be Africa's most educated society. As usual, there is no solution in sight. It is a soul-shattering paradox: a nation vastly endowed with natural and human resources has become the biggest producer of economic refugees in southern Africa. As we reflect on the meaning of Africa Day, we must ask ourselves whether this is the self-determination our forebears died for. Amid immense suffering, what has riled the masses is that the leaders are not affected by economic hardships. The fat cats get a cool US$500 000 each to buy a house of their choice in the leafy suburbs of Harare. The bemused plebeians are seeing a gleaming new private jet on the taxiway and a staggering 18 helicopters imported without Parliament's knowledge, while public infrastructure has crumbled and hospitals are expected to function without essential medicines. Ministers are still rolling in their luxury vehicles, top bureaucrats continue enjoying better lifestyles than corporate executives who run profitable companies, and parastatal bosses will not stop stuffing their pockets anytime soon. Think about this for a moment: life is so hard that even the tax collectors who work for the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority have declared incapacitation to report for duty — a euphemism for a strike. If the taxman is failing to pay a living wage, can you begin to imagine the magnitude of this crisis and what it means for national survival? Zimbabwe's economic woes are complex and multifaceted, of course, but in recent months we we have witnessed a serious dereliction of duty by President Emmerson Mnangagwa's government. The Zimbabwe dollar is now all but worthless, pummelled to submission by an inflation spiral that is giving citizens sleepless nights. Bizarrely, Mnangagwa and his Finance minister Mthuli Ncube are still resolute in their belief that the troubled Zimdollar will defy the proverbial law of economic gravity and somehow crawl from the grave. Every level-headed economist will tell you that the crash of the Zimdollar is the logical outcome of bad economic governance. The excessive printing of money and the government's problematic payments to its contractors have been at the heart of treacherous inflationary pressures in the economy. As we report elsewhere in these pages today, the purchasing power of the Zimbabwe dollar has been decimated. Basic foodstuffs are unaffordable, malnourishment threatens children's health and people are increasingly drawing comparisons with the hyperinflationary years of 2006-2008. Mnangagwa's threats to the business sector are misplaced. The economy responds badly to intimidation. Nobody is saying private companies are without blemish. Far from it; there is indeed reason to believe that an element of profiteering, arbitrage and outright criminality exists in the manner some businesses are run. For instance, how do companies, in good conscience, take money from the Reserve Bank's weekly auction but proceed to price their goods along the parallel market exchange rate? Exporters are receiving a raw deal while some importers are playing a dangerous game of deception. The idea of a forex auction is in itself retrogressive. Freely float the exchange rate and let the market forces determine the direction. Zimbabwe is stuck in a time warp. We dare not return to 2008. We dare not return to 2008

Page 26 NewsHawks Issue 76, 15 April 2022 Business MATTERS NewsHawks CURRENCIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE USD/JPY 109.29 +0.38 +0.35 GBP/USD 1.38 -0.014 -0.997 USD/CAD 1.229 +0.001 +0.07 USD/CHF 0.913 +0.005 +0.53 AUD/USD 0.771 -0.006 -0.76 COMMODITIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE *OIL 63.47 -1.54 -2.37 *GOLD 1,769.5 +1.2 +0.068 *SILVER 25.94 -0.145 -0.56 *PLATINUM 1,201.6 +4 +0.33 MARKETS *COPPER 4.458 -0.029 -0.65 BERNARD MPOFU THE dramatic collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar has thrown the country into a Catch-22 situation after the lifting of a ban on imported basic commodities resulted in a policy clash between Treasury and the ministry of Industry and Commerce. Zimbabwe is currently using a blended inflation rate to measure the rate of price increases. Official figures show that the United States dollar accounts for about 70% of the transactions in the domestic market, while the Zimbabwe dollar accounts for 30%. Desperate to avert total economic collapse ahead of the August general elections, Finance minister Mthuli Ncube introduced a raft of measures such as the 100% retention of domestic foreign currency earnings; adoption of all external loans by Treasury, in particular the Reserve Bank's loans that are currently being serviced through the purchase of the export surrender requirements by the central bank and enhanced foreign exchange system through the implementation of a pure Dutch auction. The minister also lifted all restrictions on the importation of basic goods and undertook to have a supportive interest rate environment. Treasury also promoted the use of the domestic currency by all government agencies, and introduced gold coins and gold-backed digital tokens. After announcing these measures, cabinet early this month instructed the ministry of Industry and Commerce to carry out a study on the new wave of price increases which have eroded the buying power of the domestic currency. For Treasury, a waiver on imported basics would have helped consumers buy the goods currently running out of stock in some retail chains. A joint study done by the Competition and Tariff Commission and the National Competitiveness Commission recommended protectionist measures to save local industry and the economy. The local manufacturing sector recorded an increase in production capacity from 36% before the Covid-19 pandemic period to 66% in 2022. Capacity utilisation for the foodstuffs sub-sector, in which there are most basic commodities, stood at 54% in 2022 from 55% in 2021. Notwithstanding the promulgation of Statutory Instruments 98 of 2022 and SI103 of 2022 in May 2022 (during the same time), which suspended duty (for a period of six months) and import licences on selected basic commodities, respectively, the capacity utilisation for manufacture of basic commodities marginally declined by 1%. This indicates that the above measures had negligible impact on local production of basic commodities. It is, therefore, not surprising that, shelf occupancy for locally manufactured products increased from 47% to 80%. Notwithstanding this positive development, the inflation is impacting on prices of basic commodities. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 2022 Annual Manufacturing Sector Survey Report projected that capacity utilisation was projected to increase to 70.9% in 2023 from 56.1% in 2022. The foodstuffs sub-sector's capacity utilisation was projected to increase from 54% to 71%. “Reverse the opening of imports in the short run to protect the gains once realised by the local industry on the following products; mealie-meal, toothpaste and washing powder as this has a negative impact on NDS 1 [National Development Strategy 1] aspirations on domestication of local value chains,” the study on the price hikes of basic commodities reads. “However, stakeholders have indicated that capacity utilisation is likely to decline following the lifting of all restrictions on the importation of basic commodities announced by the Hon Minister of Finance and Economic Development, as part of measures to stabilise exchange rate and the macro-economy.” The study also recommended that there is a need for the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra) to strengthen measures to combat smuggling of imported goods into the country as this has the potential to reverse the reindustrialisation of the country The market is characterised by exchange rate disparities, which are impacting on price movements on Zimbabwe dollar-denominated transactions, as the official exchange rate depreciated by 109.22% from US$1:Z$671.45 in December 2022 to US$1:Z$1 404.80 as of 16 May 2023. Meanwhile, on the parallel market the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated by 222.58% from US$1:Z$930 to about US$1:Z$3 000 as of 16 May 2023 and the local currency continues to be on a free fall. Prices in Zimbabwe tend to be adjusted in line with the movement of the exchange rate, as businesses follow a cost recovery model. The official rate tends to move upwards on a weekly basis on the auction market, thereby impacting on inflation developments. The month-on-month inflation rate, thus moved from -1.6% in February 2023 to 2.4% in April 2023. Some of the manufacturers demand payment in US dollars. If payment is in local currency, it is indexed to the parallel market rate. Catch-22 for Zim after local currency collapse

NewsHawks Companies & Markets Page 31 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE has given business a two-month grace period to comply with new rules on carbon credits as the southern African nation joins the growing list of regional peers stepping up efforts to fight climate change. Carbon credits are paid to communities for forest conservation since forests absorb carbon emissions which, in turn, help in mitigating the effects of climate change. Last week, cabinet announced a new carbon credit framework for business which would include a tradable certificate representing one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent which is prevented from being emitted into the atmosphere. He said it took three years to develop the new regulations. Zimbabwe has committed to reduce carbon emissions by 40%. This week, Tourism and Environment minister Mangaliso Ndlovu told delegates attending a stakeholders' meeting held in Harare that all agreements in Zimbabwe will now have to pass through the Attorney-General’s office. Traditional chiefs and municipalities have no legal standing to sign agreements. “We are not at this point going to welcome those who then come and tell us how to engage in the exploitation of those resources at their terms,” Ndlovu said. “We desire to see you regularise…I hope that those with existing contracts will utilise a month to two-month window that we will give to make sure that we give those contracts priority.” The rules include a mandatory level of at least 20% of revenue for local investors and a maximum of 30% for foreign investors. They are meant to enhance benefits for the state and the communities that host the projects Zimbabwe, which roiled the global carbon credits industry by canceling offset programmes last week, will now give producers of the securities two months to comply with new rules, including handing the state half of their revenue. The rules include a mandatory level of at least 20% of revenue for local investors and a maximum of 30% for foreign investors. They are meant to enhance benefits for the state and the communities that host the projects. BERNARD MPOFU A NEW government-sanctioned report has exposed the yawning gap between the official and parallel market foreign currency exchange rates as the authorities make frantic efforts to tame runaway inflation. Zimbabwe is battling new price hikes triggered by the rapid depreciation of the local dollar, prompting President Emmerson Mnangagwa to send a chilling warning to the business sector. While the government has been hyping up the efficiency of the current exchange system, a joint study conducted by the Competition and Tariff Commission and the National Competitiveness Commission showed that some local companies are now turning to the parallel market to access the greenback, resulting in the weakening of the Zimdollar. “Liberalise the exchange rate to allow market forces to determine prices and attain efficiency. This measure is unlikely to lead to increases in prices as manufacturers' prices are pegged in US$ and indexed to the parallel market,” the study shows. “The market is characterised by exchange rate disparities, which are impacting on price movements on Zimbabwe dollar-denominated transactions, as the official exchange rate depreciated by 109.22% from US$1:Z$671.45 in December 2022 to US$1:Z$1 404.80 as of 16 May 2023. Meanwhile, on the parallel market the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated by 222.58% from US$1:Z$930 to about US$1:Z$3 000 as of 16 May 2023.” Prices in Zimbabwe, the report shows, tend to be adjusted in line with the movement of the exchange rate, as businesses follow a cost recovery model. The official rate tends to move upwards on a weekly basis on the auction market, thereby impacting on inflation developments. Ahead of his visit to Egypt, Mnangagwa threatened to crack the whip on business after accusing them of rent-seeking behaviour which he blamed for the macro-economic instability. “The more than US$11 billion foreign exchange earned last year is the highest ever done by an economy, and is certainly far higher than in most economies in sub-Saharan Africa, outside South Africa. Sadly, this has not translated into a stable exchange rate,” Mnangagwa wrote in his weekly column published in the state-run Sunday Mail. “Above all, short circuiting set rules and cutting corners in business will attract very stiff sanction. Those who break our exchange control rules, or who money launder, will only have themselves to blame . . . We will take all measures necessary to ensure there is stability, including painful ones should that ever become necessary.” The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the country’s organised manufacturing sector lobby group, says confidence-building measures are key to macro-economic stability. “The current shocks in the parallel market are expected to take a while to ebb, especially with respect to ZWL$ inflation,” reads a CZI Inflation and Currency research note for April. “However, the blended inflation rate is expected to continue to shield the impact, as the USD prices are stable and even going down for some products. The increase in ZWL$ inflation by double digit levels implies that the originally envisaged inflation policy path with respect to ZWL$ inflation is now off rails. “Unless some drastic policy measures are introduced, which would create some demand for the local currency, such as having some tax heads paid exclusively in ZWL$, there will be no demand for the local currency. Although excess ZWL$ liquidity could be mopped through the digital gold tokens, as well as the physical gold coins, this will not help create demand for the local currency which is needed for its stability.” An association of retailers sympathetic to government said an investigation on local firms abusing the foreign exchange system should be launched. “Confederation of Zimbabwe Retailers (CZR) also notes with disdain the unjustified attacks on the Foreign Currency Auction system which has for a long period availed cheaper foreign currency to companies for retooling and purchase of raw materials among others,” Denford Mutashu, the CZR president, said in a statement. “It is also critical for the government to set up an inter-agency committee to investigate companies that accessed forex and make each one of them account for the last dollar. “The ongoing government and private sector dialogue to remove impediments to the doing business environment is highly commendable as the goal is to protect consumer and business sustainability.” Official, parallel exchange rate gap keeps widening Carbon credits: Ultimatum for companies CZR president Denford Mutashu

Page 32 NATHAN GUMA THE government’s involvement in dubious deals that are shrouded in secrecy shows lack of transparency and accountability, which may plunge Zimbabwe into a fullblown authoritarian kleptocracy. Last week, Russian company Rostec delivered 18 of 32 Kazan Ansat helicopters, which President Emmerson Mnangagwa said will be used for ambulance, disaster management, policing and wildlife protection duties. Rostec is a massive Russian state-owned enterprise formed to consolidate the nation’s technological, aerospace, and military-industrial expertise. It is also a holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in a wide range of industries, including automotive, defence, aviation, and metals. While Mnangagwa said he personally sourced the helicopters from Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the nature and cost of the deal entered by government has remained unknown, raising eyebrows, as it was done without Parliament’s approval. Political analyst Rashweat Mukundu says the shoddy nature of the helicopter deal indicates that the government is becoming increasingly unconcerned about transparency and accountability. In a kleptocracy, corrupt government leaders use political power to expropriate the wealth of the people and the land they govern, typically by embezzling or misappropriating public funds at the expense of the wider population. “The challenge with the Zanu PF government after the 2017 coup to date is that they have absolutely no regard for the constitution. They have no regard for transparency and accountability in governance. This is a Mafia that has taken over the state and has no interest in being accountable in its utilisation of state resources,” Mukundu told The NewsHawks. He said this is likely to see the demise of Zimbabwe partly because of unnecessary debt. “This abuse of national resources is predicated on a thinking that they are above the law and nothing can be done to them. I think the saying of those who speak for them on the ground, even those who speak for them officially is; ‘So what will you do to us?’ (Saka muchaita sei?), as we heard from Passion Java, and we regularly hear from the likes of George Charamba on Twitter. “So, a system that is all banked on looting national resources to no end with no regard for anything that has something to do with transparency and credibility. To expect anything better from this group then, is to expect miracles in terms of how we are governed.   “There is absolutely no chance in hell for Zanu PF in its current format to be reformed, to respect the constitution and to respect laws of the land. So to me what we are seeing in terms of procurement issues just points to the collapse of state management. It points to the takeover of the state by criminal elements and it may point to the collapse of the Zimbabwe state as we know it,” Mukundu said. Vivid Gwede, a political analyst, said secrecy shrouding the helicopter deal shows that the government may be concealing more corruption. “There is no doubt that the current administration does not believe in being proactively transparent with procurement processes. But given how procurement processes have been used to loot, including through inflating prices, this attitude is not surprising. “The helicopter deal is no different. There have been contradictory statements on whether it was a donation or a purchase, with Parliament clearly sidelined. “When a government is not proactively transparent or actively concealing its dealings in procurement, there is a high likelihood that it is corrupt,” Gwede said. Zimbabwe’s fight against corruption has been hollow, with the country faring badly on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released in February by the civil society organisation Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ). The country has been a non-mover, with a 23/100 score, falling behind the regional average of 32/100, while ranking 157 out of 180 of the most corrupt countries in the world. The index measures perceptions of public sector corruption levels in 180 countries around the world. The global average has remained unchanged for over a decade at just 43/100, while the sub-Saharan region average is pegged at 32/100. Zimbabwe has the lowest score in the Sadc region, trailing all its neighbours, with the Seychelles scoring 70/100, the highest score in the sub-Saharan region, followed by neighbours Botswana with 60/100. The country also falls below South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi, among others, scoring 43/100, 26/100, 33/100 and 34/100 respectively. Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (Zimcodd) programmes manager John Maketo says the uproar over the helicopter deal shows the need for the country to harmonise public finance management laws in order to strengthen parliamentary oversight.  “This (the helicopter deal) emphasises the need to harmonise public finance management laws in Zimbabwe. You will actually find that, despite all the public uproar, the procurement has a supporting piece of legislation, meaning it is lawful. “Governments use laws and procedures, not emotions or morality. It is therefore urgently imperative that PFM [public fina finance management] laws be aligned to the constitution,” Maketo said. The government has been under fire for its opaque deals and loan disbursements without parliamentary approval. For instance, in March the High Court ordered Treasury to gazette within 12 months a Bill amending the Public Debt Management Act [Chapter22;21], after it emerged Finance minister Mthuli Ncube was approving loans without Parliament’s authorisation, in violation of the constitution. This came after Zimcodd sought a court declaration compelling the government to approve loans only after parliamentary authorisation. The organisation’s founding affidavit shows that the government issued guarantees for domestic creditors amounting to ZW$20.2 billion and US$1.4 billion without Parliament’s approval in 2021 alone. In terms of the current law, Treasury is empowered to provide guarantees in term of section 20 of the Public Debt Management Act [Chapter 22:21]. More unbudgeted expenditure has also recorded. “In 2020, government had issued domestic guarantees to private companies totalling ZW$24.2 billion, and a 77% recovery rate for guarantees in respect of CBZ Agro-Yield (Pvt) Ltd for farmers only a 0.6% recovery in respect of CBZ AgroYield loans to farmers and a 22% recovery to farmers for the 2022 one agricultural season and only 13.2% recovery for 2020-2021 finance to soya beans farmers,” read the affidavit. According to Zimcodd, approval of loans without Parliament’s endorsement weighs heavily on citizens, who end up paying the debt, since loans or debts contracted are ultimately paid by the people of Zimbabwe through the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Zimbabwe has been weighed down by debt, which has seen the country fail to get external lines of credit from institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. With a total consolidated debt of US$17.5 billion, Zimbabwe owes international creditors US$14.04 billion, with domestic debt pegged at US$3.4 billion. Debt owed to bilateral creditors is estimated at US$5.75 billion, while multilateral creditors are owed an estimated US$2.5 billion. The government has also failed to account for the US$10 billion unauthorised expenditure from 2015 to 2018. In 2020, the government brought a Financial Adjustment Bill to Parliament as it sought condonation for the unapproved expenditure. According to the Bill, in 2015 Treasury exceeded the national budget by US$25 305 741, which ballooned to US$1 490 888 789 in 2016 and trebled to US$4 562 064 124 in 2017. The government overshot the budget by US$3 560 343 130 in 2018. The government is yet to provide an explanation, hence the need for transparency. News Analysis Govt's opaque deals burden taxpayers NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 President Emmerson Mnangagwa

Critical Thinking Page 33 Why cholera continues to threaten many African countries MANY African countries are periodically affected by outbreaks of cholera. For instance, Malawi’s current outbreak, the  worst  in two decades, has claimed  hundreds  of lives and forced the closure of schools and many businesses. Cholera deaths have now been  reported in South Africa too. Microbiologist Sam Kariuki, the director of Kenya’s Medical Research Institute, explains what cholera is and why it is so hard to control in Africa. Why is cholera still such a big issue for African countries? Cholera is a disease caused and spread by bacteria — specifically Vibrio cholerae — which you can get by eating or drinking contaminated food or water. It’s an  old disease  which has mostly  affected  developing countries, many of which are in Africa. Between 2014 and 2021 Africa  accounted for  21% of cholera cases and 80% of deaths reported globally. In several African countries, cholera is the leading cause of severe diarrhoea. In 2021, the World Health Organisation  reported  that Africa experienced its highest ever reported numbers – more than 137 000 cases and 4 062 deaths in 19 countries. It has persisted in Africa partly because of  worsening  sanitation, poor and unreliable water supplies and worsening socio-economic conditions. For instance, when people’s incomes can’t keep up with inflation they’ll move to more affordable housing – often this is in congested, unsanitary settings where water and other hygiene services are already stretched to the limit. In addition, in the last decade, many African countries have witnessed an  upsurge in population migration  to urban areas in search of livelihoods. Many of these people end up in poor urban slums where water and sanitation infrastructure remains a challenge. Displaced populations — a major concern in several African countries — are also very vulnerable to water and food contamination. It’s important to control cholera because it can cause severe illness and death. In mild cases cholera can be managed through oral rehydration salts to replace lost fluids and electrolytes. Severe cases may require antibiotic treatment. It’s vital to diagnose and treat cases quickly – cholera can kill within hours if untreated. In 2015, it was  estimated that  over one million cases in 44 African countries resulted in an economic burden of US$130 million from cholera-related illness and its treatment. What’s missing in the response? African governments must acknowledge that the burden of cholera is huge. In my opinion, governments in endemic areas don’t recognise cholera as a major issue until there’s a big outbreak, when it’s out of control. They treat it as a once off. The burden of cholera could get worse unless governments put measures in place to control and prevent outbreaks. They need to address water and hygiene infrastructure. There must also be community engagement. For instance, widespread messaging that encourages hand washing, boiling water and other preventive measures. Community health  extension workers are key in getting these messages across and distributing supplies during an outbreak. For the most vulnerable populations we must apply oral cholera vaccines. Data on cholera hotspots from surveillance studies will be vital to ensure critical populations are targeted first. There are various brands and variation of the oral cholera vaccine, and they are all easy to administer because they are taken orally. They have an effectiveness rate of between 60% to 80% but require a yearly booster. There’s not been a concerted vaccination campaign in many countries, however, because governments are not taking the prevention and control of the disease seriously. Finally, the issue of drug resistance needs to be addressed. Drug resistance has made it possible for these cholera strains to stay longer in the environment. I was part of a team that conducted a study in Kenya which found that bacteria that causes cholera has become resistant to some antibiotics. Some types of drug resistance are caused by a natural interaction of the  Vibrio cholerae bacteria with other drug resistant bacteria in the environment. The overuse of antibiotics also contributes to drug resistance. Government agencies should develop ways to monitor the use of antibiotics and restrict their prescription. Regulation of antibiotic use in animals should also be improved. Healthcare workers also need to be trained in the proper use of antibiotics. Have there been any recent advances? One important one has been the development of rapid diagnostic tests that can be used by health workers in the field. These kits are available at costs far lower than lab culture costs. Using them makes it possible to confirm outbreaks promptly so treatment can be initiated. In addition, more countries are now adopting the oral cholera vaccine for prevention and control. What is lacking is a concerted effort for all endemic countries – which I consider to be all countries in sub-Saharan Africa – to have joint measures to tackle cross-border transmission and persistence of cholera outbreaks. Some countries are still in denial about outbreaks. This is partly due to fears about repercussions on trade and tourism. But in an interconnected world this attitude isn’t helpful. I am optimistic that we can control cholera in African settings. In the short term this could be done through raising awareness among vulnerable populations and interventions like the oral cholera vaccine. In the long term African countries need improved water hygiene infrastructure, housing and enhanced socioeconomic conditions. But there must be a strong will by relevant government ministries to work together to realise these goals. — The Conversation. *About the interviewee: Samuel Kariuki is chief research scientist and director of the Centre for Microbiology Research at the Kenya Medical Research Institute. Cholera is a disease caused and spread by bacteria, specifically Vibrio cholerae. NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023

Page 34 Reframing Issues SAPES/RAU Background Since 2000, and to some extent prior to 2000, Zimbabwe has a history of disputed elections. The consequences for the country since 2000 have been dire, leading to the imposition of sanctions and targeted restrictions on individuals and companies, and exacerbating the complexities created by the withdrawal of financial support by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the late 1990s. Unacceptable elections have led to a crisis of legitimacy for the government, ameliorated to a small extent with the Global Political Agreement in 2008 and during the period of the Inclusive Government between 2009 and 2013. Elections were not the only precipitant for international opprobrium. The violations of property rights under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) were also an issue of concern for the international community and the Commonwealth prior to Zimbabwe’s withdrawal. However, elections and human rights – for the two were frequently correlated – remained front and centre of the concerns about the legitimacy of the Zimbabwe state. These concerns led to a brief period of euphoria in the immediate aftermath of the coup in 2017, and the ascension of Emmerson Mnangagwa, as the head of the “Third Republic” and a “New Dispensation”. This euphoria dissipated quickly with yet another disputed election in 2018, the violence that re-emerged on the streets in 2018 after the elections, as well as the violence that was meted out to protestors in the demonstrations and protests in 2019. Since 2018, Zimbabwe, and Zimbabweans citizens, has experienced a continual slide in the economy, the collapsing of public goods and services, rampant food insecurity — not only in the rural areas — and growing evidence of massive corruption by elite groups in the country. Zimbabwe is now the most politically polarised country out of 34 African countries and receives negative evaluations on virtually every indicator of country performance. Thus, the stakes for this forthcoming election are higher than at any point since 2000, and the extent of the needed reforms are enormous. How enormous can be gathered by the comment from Dr Akinwumi A. Adesina, president of the African Development Bank Group, at the recently concluded conference on moves to alleviate the country’s debt crisis: “The governance working group would allow us to tackle and make measurable progress on critical issues of freedom of speech, human rights protection, and implementation of laws in line with the constitution, as well as the implementation of the Motlanthe commission of inquiry and compensation of victims. And we must show progress on the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (Zidera). All of which should make for peaceful, free, and fair elections. They will also remove headwinds on our path to arrears clearance and debt resolution.” The big question raised by these remarks lies in the conditions perceived to be necessary for peaceful, free, and fair elections. Are these pre-conditions in place for 2023? Can these elections remove the headwinds? This was the question addressed in an audit of the pre-election climate, and in nine Policy Dialogues held by the Sapes Trust and the Research and Advocacy Unit (Rau). Beginning last year, in August 2022, the series has examined all aspects of the pre-election climate, and this report on the series provides the overall conclusions. A wide range of experts — Zimbabwean, regional, and international — were invited to share their views; the Dialogues were recorded, posted on YouTube, transcribed, and Policy Briefs on each Dialogue produced. Auditing the Pre-Election Process The notion of undertaking a pre-election audit of Zimbabwe’s fitness to hold elections began in 2021 with a Sapes Policy Dialogue in November 2021. Dr Daniel Callingaert, an international expert on elections, outlined in his keynote presentation the ways in which authoritarian states undermine elections. Based on his authoritative analysis in 2006, he outlined the many ways in which rigging can take place, the so-called constructive rigging as termed by Jonathan Moyo. By contrast, there is too often an overweening emphasis on anticipatory rigging – the use of violence, intimidation, threats, hate speech, clientelism, etc. This has in the past, apart from 2002 and 2008, meant that an election in Zimbabwe is judged on very narrow criteria, and the extent to which the violence was likely to overturn the scale of the victory. For example, without any evidence that the result itself is the product of manipulation, and in the context of a massive victory for Zanu PF, as was the case in 2005 and 2013, demonstrations that there was extensive violence, intimidation, and treating raise concerns but these are deemed insufficient to require rejecting the result. Furthermore, when election petitions are not dealt with in an impartial manner, by delaying them until they are no longer relevant — as was the case in 2000 and 2002 — or dealing with them in an excessively peremptory fashion – as was seen in 2016 – then the probability of deciding whether an election has meet international best practice becomes remote. However, many of the signs of an election going wrong are evident long before the poll and a thorough going audit can raise the bar on the acceptance of an election. This was the purpose of these policy dialogues: bringing international and domestic experts together to examine what Andreas Schedler has called the Menu of Manipulation. The series began with the proviBest practices in elections: Can Zimbabwe meet these in 2023? Members from Zanu PF party. NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023

Reframing Issues Page 35 sion of very useful framework for the audit. Outlined by Dr Phillan Zamchiya, this framework consists of five main pillars, within which every aspect of electoral process could be tested for its adequacy, both technical and political, and conclusions reached about the stability of the overall structure and process of the election. The five pillars are described below, and then examined against the evidence provided to the Policy Dialogues. The five pillars At the outset it must be noted that all the five pillars are not separate, but overlap in one respect or another, as well as being an integrated system: the absence of any single pillar will provide the basis for a claiming a flawed election. Information This pillar refers to the ability of citizens to obtain all kinds of information, and not merely the openness of the media to reflecting the multiple perspectives of the electoral contestants. Here it is evident that the partisan nature of the state press and media is a major limitation on the ability of Zimbabwean citizens to hear and understand what the various political parties are offering for governing the country. This has been an endless complaint from multiple observer missions, opposition political parties, and citizens generally, and has been a continual recommendation by international observer groups. It also refers to the ability of citizens to engage with politicians and attend meetings and rallies without fear and constraint. The banning of meetings and rallies of the Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) is an obvious (and recurrent) feature of the Zimbabwean electoral landscape. This links directly to the second pillar, Inclusion. The issue being addressed here is the extent to which the basic freedoms are present for citizens in the pre-election period: speech, assembly, and association. Inclusion Inclusion refers to the notion that elections are about free and equal participation in the electoral process. It refers to the ability of citizens to register as voters, to obtain information (directly and indirectly), to be free from intimidation and violence, and for all forms of treating to be absent. Inclusion has been a major problem over the past two decades, as well as in past decades since independence, let alone the denial of the vote to most Zimbabweans in the colonial era. Dr Zamchiya pointed out that denial of inclusion has been growing since the election process gathered steam. Organised violence and torture (OVT) has been increasing since January 2022, with Zanu PF supporters and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) responsible for 78% of the alleged violations, and opposition political parties responsible for less than 2% of documented violations. There is also the technical issue around Delimitation and the process of ensuring that every constituency and ward has balanced numbers so that all citizens are ensured equal opportunity and gerrymandering is prevented. The major issue being addressed here is at the heart of most previous elections: the extent to which political violence, intimidation, hate speech, etc. are present in this current pre-election period. The overlap with Information is obvious. Insulation Insulation refers to both the ability to freely register as a voter and to freely vote, which have been problems in most elections in the past two decades. Currently, there are problems in registering as voters, with indications that the numbers registering are low. This is partly due to the perception that elections are never free and fair, and the difficulty in obtaining identity documents, the prerequisite for registering. The ability to obtain an identity document is a major problem as this lies outside the control of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec). However, the impediments to registering were alleviated in 2013, mostly through lifting the requirement to prove residence by affidavit. Freely voting is another matter, and the occasion where Inclusion is most strongly affected by intimation and violence, most particularly in the rural areas. Here the partisan role of traditional leaders is a serious problem, and the frank disregard of the Constitution by traditional leaders to be non-partisan a matter of continuous concern over the past 23 years. It is evident again that there is overlap with Inclusion, and here the major issue is the adherence to the constitutional requirements in section 155 that citizens can exercise their rights in elections: (2) The State must take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to ensure that effect is given to the principles set out in subsection (1) and, in particular, must: (a) ensure that all eligible citizens, that is to say the citizens qualified under the Fourth Schedule, are registered as voters; (b) ensure that every citizen who is eligible to vote in an election or referendum has an opportunity to cast a vote, and must facilitate voting by persons with disabilities or special needs; 4. Integrity Integrity refers to the impartiality and accountability of the election management body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec). There are many signs that Zec is not impartial as is required by the Constitution, including the significant numbers of military personnel working in the institution. However, it is not merely Zec that must be impartial in the electoral process: all government agencies must be impartial, and this is doubtful in the aftermath of the coup. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) must be firmly under civilian control and politically impartial as required by the Constitution. Integrity requires all institutions to evince impartiality and accountability through the entire electoral cycle, covering all the antecedent conditions for the vote, the counting and reporting of the outcome, and through to the transparent and impartial dealing with disputes by the courts. Here the impartiality of the election management body is addressed, and obviously this, or the lack of it, has a crucial effect on the outcome of elections, and the conformity with regional and international best practices. 5. Irreversibility Irreversibility refers to several things. Firstly, that there is no reversing or tampering with results: the count and the outcome must reflect the will of the people. Secondly, it refers to the acceptance of the results by the loser. Here the outcome of the 2008 elections remains a dramatic example of non-irreversibility; where there was a result indicating that political power had shifted; where even the narrow victory of the MDC should have been graciously accepted (and supported by the region and the continent); but a violent second round resulted in the repudiation of the popular vote. To this might be added the spurious recall of the MDC MPs elected in 2018, and the disenfranchisement of nearly one million voters. Irreversibility also deals with the judicial process in the management of disputes; effectively the extent to which the courts, both lower and higher, are wholly independent in dealing with disputes. Here the history of dispute management since 2000 is not reassuring, and the preelection audit looks at whether things have changed ahead of 2023. The initial conclusions from this presentation in August 2022 of the five Pillars, and a preliminary assessment, were not reassuring. The two discussants pointed to the numerous recommendations, by both local and international observers, following the 2018 elections. Zimbabwean civil society, and especially the ERC and ZESN, immediately began the process of trying to get the government and Zec to address the many gaps in the electoral process, particularly the alignment of the Electoral Act with the requirements of the Constitution. Draft Bills have been prepared, but these have made very little progress, and with only seven months before elections in 2023, this became critically urgent. The reform process will have significant effect in improving Integrity. There were also extensive inputs of a range of issues that significantly affect the five pillars, and raised in August 2022: • The lack of independence in Zec remains a significant concern. • Voter registration remains a concern, both because of the low uptake by citizens and the difficulties in getting identity documents. • The non-availability of the voters’ roll, and the impeding of independent audits remains a problem as in the past. • Voter education remains constrained and unduly controlled. • The extreme political polarisation in Zimbabwe creates unfavourable political tensions for the holding of peaceful elections, as well as making the likelihood of a level playing field remote. So, using these five Pillars, the Election Policy Dialogue series undertook a further eight virtual discussions, and this report provides a summary of the major points made during the discussions and the conclusions reached. The topics covered are provided in Appendix 2. Assessment of the five pillars As pointed out above, the data for this assessment is based on the transcribed expert views of the presenters and discussants to the nine Policy Dialogues, which were briefly summarised in nine Policy Briefs. Information Information has two important aspects. Firstly, the provision of accurate news and analysis to the general citizenry, and obviously the ability of those in the press and media to investigate and report on elections. Multiple recommendations have been made by domestic and international observers about the need to ensure a non-partisan state-owned press and media. After all, the state press and media are paid for by the citizenry, and hence should be open to including all. This has not happened as was pointed out by many speakers, but, of even greater concern, was the pointing out the degree to which journalists self-censor out of fear, and the risks in reporting and attending public meetings. It was evident from the discussions that the freedoms of expression, movement, and association are severely restricted for the independent press and media. The equally important aspect of Information, that of the citizens’ participation in elections, is also a matter of deep concern. Citizens have a right to freely attend meetings and rallies without fear, but it is evident that this is not possible presently, as meetings of the CCC are banned or disrupted, sometimes violently. The levels of hate speech, and the casting of opposition political parties as enemies precludes the notion that this is a competition to persuade the citizenry which party has the best policies to govern the country and meet their aspirations. It is replaced, as all pointed out, by a process that bears a greater resemblance to war than elections, and small wonder that citizens both fear elections and elect not to participate other than by voting. Information has also been impeded by the process over the passing of the Private Voluntary Organisations Bill, and the disruption of normal civic activities in anticipation of the civic space been severely curtailed. The most serious implication of the PVO Act will be its effect on domestic observation of elections and the inhibiting of independent collection of data – especially about the counting of votes – about the election. The regulatory framework being proposed for registration is so burdensome that none of the domestic observer groups will be able to deploy observers in any meaningful way, and this will have a powerful knock-on effect on international observation. Quite clearly the conditions for Information being an effective Pillar for a bona fide election are wholly absent. Inclusion The issues around Inclusion were front and centre in every discussion, beginning with an assessment of the by-elections held in March 2022. From the beginning in August 2022, the participants were very clear that several key impediments to inclusion were already evident: • The impunity of state institutions. • The partisan behaviour of traditional leaders. • The partisan nature of institutions, such as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), that should be tasked with ensuring Inclusion and Insulation. • The role of youth militia. These concerns were repeatedly raised, and not only in the two Dialogues that explicitly examined political violence. Political violence, and all the other methods of inhibiting free participation in elections – intimidation, hate speech, partisan access to resources, and judicial harassment – were all flagged as continuing, and in the most recent Dialogue, February 2023, the participants were unanimous that this was all worsening. They were all deeply concerned about the partisan behaviour of traditional leaders, and the frank statements by traditional leaders about support for Zanu PF in flagrant violation of the Constitution. A particular point was made in several Dialogues about the President of the Council of Chiefs, Fortune Charumbira, has remained obstinately (and publicly) partisan, despite being in contempt of a court order, emphasising all the concerns about impunity. Most recently, there the statement by the former Vice-President, Kembo Mohadi, clearly in violation of the Constitution, that villagers would be “frog marched” to vote for Zanu PF. The complaints about traditional leaders bolster the views about impunity as the Constitution is clear in Section 281(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 “(2) Traditional leaders must not- (a) be members of any political NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023

Page 36 party or in any way participate in partisan politics; (b) act in a partisan manner (c) further the interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any persons.” The most startling input on the impediments to Inclusion came from speaker in the second Dialogue on political violence: it was startling because it came from a former member of Zanu PF. As Dr Shumba pointed out: “Now, crucial to understand the issue of violence is to understand the systems that are deployed by Zanu PF during elections and just before the election process. There is active intelligence work that takes place in identifying potential opponents to disable them, strengthen them, weaken them, and ensure that they do not even have the resources to participate. If we tend to just look at the violence in terms of the physical beatings, killings, and so forth, we will be focusing on a major segment of it or meeting the other work of violence that is committed by Zanu PF, by the police, by the intelligence, and the military. We may not physically identify these people because they don’t do it in their regalia or uniforms, they get embedded in the systems structures of Zanu PF: more particularly the military, they work with the commissariat department to identify and discipline those of other views”. This assessment of the degree to which citizens are excluded through political violence in all its manifestations was repeatedly endorsed and amplified by multiple examples throughout the series. It can be quite simply concluded that, when it comes to Inclusion, no such thing exists for the Zimbabwean citizen who holds any different views from Zanu PF and will face considerable threat in exercising his or her freedoms in participating in elections. Insulation Insulation is yet another key Pillar and has extensive overlap with Inclusion. As with the latter, Insulation applies across the whole electoral process, right to the process of voting and counting the votes. Critical to Insulation is the ability of citizens to both register and cast their votes. The former has been an enormous problem in the past, but, since 2013, the tedious and discriminatory procedures have lifted. However, as is pointed out in more detail in the section on Integrity, the right to register has been impeded by the difficulty in getting the requisite identity documents necessary for registration as a voter. This has shifted the bureaucratic burden from one state agency to another, but the effect is the same. There were several comments that there was discrimination in favour of rural residents in getting access to identity documents and registering as voters. The actual process of voting is rarely impeded in elections, and, not since 2002, have there been reports of political violence on the polling day. However, it is evident that actual voting depends on easy access to polling stations, and here there have been continuous complaints about the allocation of polling stations between rural and urban areas, and often the very long delays for urban voters. Of course, the many points made by the discussants throughout the webinar series about the inhibitory effects of political violence in all its forms indicate that voting can be affected way ahead of the actual poll: what is called “anticipatory” rigging. It is important to pay careful attention to the counting because a lack of transparent counting leads to easy allegations that this is rigged. In the discussions around the Kenyan elections, it was important to learn that organisations, the press, and media were able to release results as they came in, and, whilst this led to some controversy, it was also evident that this also cooled the temperature. Problems over counting have occurred in past Zimbabwean elections, most dramatically in 2008, and there have always been allegations about bias in counting. The most recent election in 2018 raised the problems again, and as covered in comprehensive detail in ExcelGate, the shenanigans over resorting to counting the V11 returns as opposed to the mere calculation of the V23 returns, only 10 forms. This was inadequately dealt with in the election petition process in the Constitutional Court, and, as pointed out in ExcelGate, the flagrant violation of the Electoral Act (Chapter 2:13) by Zec of the legal requirements for the transmission of results. The point about the subversion of the counting process in 2018 was raised by one of the discussants, making the point about the inadequate treatment of this very important case by the Constitutional Court. Perhaps the biggest issue when it comes to Insulation is the need to improve the transparency of the counting process and remove the insistence that only Zec is entitled to publish results. In most countries, results are released as they come in, and this, in Zimbabwe, comes when the V11 is signed off at a polling station by all the relevant parties and is posted outside the polling station. Since this is now public – and legally public – there can be no possible reason that political parties, civic organisations, and the press should be entitled to collate these results and publish the results themselves. This avoids accusations about rigging, creates confidence in the electoral management body, and increases the likelihood that losing parties will accept the outcome; in fact, such a process frequently leads to political parties and candidates conceding elections, even before the final results are available, since the evidence of loss is apparent to all. The comparison with Kenya in its last election showed how how different can be the process. It is evident from all the discussions that there are significant problems with insulation and that none of these have been sufficiently addressed. As was pointed out by one presenter, there is little evidence that the recommendations by local and international observers have been taken on board by either Zec or the government. This raises the important role of election observation. The importance of election observation emerged throughout the Dialogues but given special attention in one Dialogue. Of importance was the role assigned to observation given by organisations such as the African Union and Sadc, but also by most reputable observer groups, all of which have comprehensive procedures for observation. However, it was pointed out repeatedly that the role of domestic observers is crucial for the effectiveness of outside observers since few of the latter can provide the breadth of cover or the extended time that can domestic observers. In this regard, frequent comment was made about the probability that the Private Voluntary Organisations Act will seriously impede domestic observation through the burdensome conditions imposed on NGOs. With weak and handicapped domestic observation, international observation will become weaker too. A serious question here is whether international observation should take place at all if it is evident that there can be no credible domestic process. Integrity Integrity, as briefly explained above, mostly refers to the conduct of the electoral management body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec). The lack of Integrity of Zec was raised continuously in the Dialogues. It was a major concern from the very first Dialogue in August 2022, as the discussants pointed out the following: • The lack of independence in Zec remains a significant concern. There were frequent references to the apparently partisan affiliation of some of the commissioners, and to the presence of staff who have unclear affiliation to the military. • Voter registration remains a concern, both because of the low uptake by citizens and the difficulties in getting identity documents. • The non-availability of the voters’ roll, and the impeding of independent audits remains a problem as in the past. • Voter education remains constrained and unduly controlled. It was evident in the subsequent Dialogues that little had changed in the following eight months. Whilst there was rhetoric from Zec about increasing voters’ registration, no-one in the Dialogues was in agreement. The continual perspective was that Zec was partisan and unaccountable. Concerns were raised about the composition of Zec, its lack of transparency and accountability, the continued bias in registration, and the issues around the accessing and independent auditing of the voters’ roll. As for registration itself, it was evident that the major impediment to registration lies in the difficulties in obtaining identity documents. Although not under the control of Zec, access to IDs is under the control of the government through the Office of the Registrar-General, and there is little evidence that this office is making a strong effort to ensure that citizens are able to register through making such access easy. There is the recent disclosure that 21% of the youth do not have IDs. According to the Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZimStat), 951 994 young persons between the ages of 16 and 34 years do not have IDs.16 A responsible electoral management body would provide extreme pressure, through the government, on the Registrar-General’s office to ensure that the requirements of the Constitution — that it made be made easy to register in order to vote — were complied with. The biggest complaints about the Integrity of Zec emerged in the two examinations of delimitation. In the first Dialogue in October 2022, and the comparison with Kenya, the best practices for delimitation were canvassed, and an expert keynote presentation by Staffan Darnolf outlined the basis upon which Kenya has approached this. The Kenyan process was based on five principles: 1. Impartiality: The boundary authority should be a nonpartisan, independent, and professional body. 2. Equality: The populations of constituencies should be as equal as possible to provide voters with equality of voting strength. 3. Representativeness: Constituencies should be drawn taking into account cohesive communities, defined by such factors as administrative boundaries, geographic features, and communities of interest. 4. Non-discrimination: The delimitation process should be devoid of electoral boundary manipulation that discriminates against voters on account of race, colour, language, religion, or related status; and 5. Transparency: The delimitation process should as transparent and accessible to the public as possible. The Zimbabwean discussants were deeply pessimistic that Zec would come close to approximating these principles in its delimitation, and so it proved. By the second Dialogue on delimitation in January 2023, and the publication of the preliminary delimitation report by Zec, it was evident that the process was in shambles.18 Apart from the complete absence of transparency, it seemed obvious that every other principle had been ignored. For example, when it comes to equality, and the Constitutional requirement that all constituencies be equal, and only vary by 20% overall from the national average, Zec had interpreted this to mean 20% above and below, resulting in 40% variance from the national average. It was likely that the process has violated the Constitution, as has been pointed out by Veritas — both during the Dialogue and subsequently. The ensuing furore over the delimitation led to a majority (7) of the Zec commissioners refusing to sign the report — a dismal prospect for an election management body about to run a national election — and a court challenge on the report. It is instructive, and highly relevant to the pillar on Irreversibility, that the legal challenge was dismissed by a full bench of the Constitutional Court without a full judgement.20 This evokes for many the decision by Justice Hlatshwayo on the electoral petition on the 2002 Presidential election: application dismissed, judgement to follow, and never a judgement seen to date. It will be instructive to see whether this judgement of the Constitutional Court emerges before the poll later this year, or only after when it will have no effect on the poll. It should be noted, however, that a second case is being entertained by the court on the same issue, and it will be important to see whether this application receives the same treatment or not. There were repeated concerns over the lack of access to the voters’ roll, and the claims by Zec that this was to prevent manipulation of the roll. This spurious argument was based on fears about hacking but ignored the obvious issue: the content of the roll is under full control of Zec, any audit could only use the roll provided, and no audit of the roll could alter details held on Zec’s computers that are presumably secure against hacking. Since a copy has been leaked and shows multiple errors – as Team Pachedu has shown – this only raises concerns about the veracity of the roll and raises all the concerns that were seen in previous audits on the 2008 and 2013 rolls. Thus, it seems evident on all the available evidence, and the views of the experts consulted, that Zec wholly fails the test of Integrity, and in its seriously divided state, there can be no confidence that it can run an election that meets the test of best practices. Irreversibility In no election since 2000 has the losing party accepted the result, and for every election, opposition parties and candidates have sought relief from the courts. Thus, in a climate when there is little confidence in the election process, elections are frequently violent, and the whole counting process is completely opaque, it can almost be guaranteed that the courts will have a crucial role in elections. Above there is brief reference to this already taking place, and the Constitutional Court dismissing a potentially critical complaint about delimitation without giving a judgement on the merits of the NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Reframing Issues

Page 37 case. During the Policy Dialogues, a contrast was made between Kenya and Zimbabwe over election petitions. It was evident from the reports of Zimbabweans, who observed the recent Kenyan elections, that one serious improvement in Kenya was that the court now had the complete confidence of the citizenry. In the opinion of former Chief Justice, Willy Mutunga, this was due in part to the new Kenyan Constitution, but also to the more assertive role the courts had adopted in dealing with issues related to elections, as well as much greater transparency by the courts. Additionally, there had been a serious “cleansing” of the judiciary after 2007. The result was that a comprehensive analysis on the election – and dealing with the conflict within the election management body – ensured that the outcome was acceptable to all, even the losing candidate. However, as was pointed out by Willy Mutunga , losing parties will always dispute the outcome, even if only politically, as such dispute is linked to maintaining the support base of the losing party. By contrast, Irreversibility in Zimbabwe has been wholly unsatisfactory. Two trends have been observed. The first is the delaying of proceedings such that the petition falls away due to passage of time, as was the case with all the thirty odd petitions brought after the 2000 parliamentary elections. The effect of the delay was that all the candidates challenged completed their term of office in 2005.23 A similar delay was experienced for the Presidential poll in 2002, but this judicial process also demonstrated a second failing by the courts, that of dismissing the first part of the petition – crucial constitutional irregularities – without a subsequent judgement. In fact, the judgement has never been delivered. The petition in 2018 met a similar fate: that of an abbreviated process that did not allow comprehensive discussion of critical issues, particularly the matter of Zec reverting to the V11 data and ignoring the legal chain of election result compilation. This was described in considerable detail in ExcelGate. Since there is no appeal from the decision of the Constitutional Court in election petitions, the alleged violations of the Constitution and the Electoral Act become irrelevant and there is no pressure for reform of Zec. A further example of delaying legal process such that the cause of action falls away comes with the decision over the unconstitutional appointment of five extra ministers in 2009. This was challenged in the courts, the application dismissed, appealed, but never completed before the end of the Inclusive Government in 2013. As for the role of the courts in mediating disputes in the pre-election period, there was concern over the abuses around bail, with Job Sikhala being the most egregious example, and the acceptance by the judicial process of the contempt by Fortune Charumbira. All of this suggests that there can be little confidence in a non-partisan role by the courts over elections and creates the strong probability that strict adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law cannot be expected. Conclusions A key issue in any audit of the pre-election processes is the extent to which the process looks like it is conforming to best practices. Here there are two guidelines that should be directing the preparation for elections: the Sadc Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of the African Union. We do not attempt any formal assessment of Zimbabwe’s conformity with these standards, but rather draw some conclusions from the comparisons made between Kenya and Zimbabwe, as well as conclusions drawn from the analyses provided by the experts, largely based on their assessment of compliance with Zimbabwe’s own standards, the Constitution, and the Electoral Act. A major point in the final discussion was over the publication of results and the final authority of Zec in publishing results. The point was made that once the count has taken place, the returning officer and the party representatives have agreed on the result, and the V11 form is posted outside the polling station, should the general public, the press, and observers not be entitled to collect and collate results as they come in? This is common practice in many countries, and, as pointed out in one Dialogue, occurred in Kenya. There was disagreement over the desirability of independent collating and reporting on results. One view was that this is desirable and leads to greater confidence in the electoral process, whilst the contrary view was that this will lead to dispute and be left only to Zec. An additional point raised was the lack of a transitional mechanism in finalising the election and the establishing the government, as is increasingly the case in many countries. This describes a set of legal procedures to be followed after the final count, and not merely declaring the winner and swearing in the president. Comparison with Best Practices Some of the most telling conclusions came from a comparison on best practices emerging from contrasting Zimbabwe with Kenya, two countries that have experienced violent and repudiated elections in the past and having to put in place coalition governments to reform ahead of the next elections. This was covered in three of the Dialogues. The first examined the recently completed (2022) Kenyan elections with the just-completed by-elections in Zimbabwe. The presenter and the discussants — all Zimbabwean — who had observed both elections were in no doubt that Kenya has shown great improvement on every one of the Pillars. Issues around the independence of the electoral management body, the dealing with electoral disputes in the pre-election period, the role of the press and media, and the transparency of counting were highlighted with approval of the Kenyan process and criticised in Zimbabwe. The second examined the role of the courts in Kenya and Zimbabwe in dealing with electoral disputes, and particularly the contrast between the Kenyan Supreme Court and the Constitutional and Supreme Court in Zimbabwe. This contrasted the careful process of amending the constitution in Kenya, and the careful (and successful) treatment of the dispute over the Kenyan Presidential poll in 2022. Crucially, it was evident that the Kenyan reform process has resulted in the creation of deep trust in the courts by the citizens in Kenya. By contrast, the detailing of the Zimbabwean courts’ treatment of electoral disputes was shown to be woefully lacking in any evidence of impartiality or credible attention to the importance of electoral disputes. It was also worth noting that the decision by the Kenyan Supreme Court resulted in the losing candidate accepting the result of the poll, thus obviating claims about the illegitimacy of the government and creating political instability. The third was the examination of the delimitation processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe, and the demonstration of how seriously Kenya has addressed this, setting up clear principles for delimitation and providing the confidence in the electorate and political parties that no room for gerrymandering was possible. The discussants were less complimentary about the Zimbabwean process, and even less so in the second discussion after the draft delimitation report has been release by Zec in February 2023. Fourthly, it was evident throughout that there were multiple concerns about the transparency and accountability of Zec, and how this has led to a widespread lack of confidence in Zec. This was amplified by the demonstration that a very large number of recommendations were made by domestic and international observers - by one estimate 115 of these – with some very crucial reforms required: • Ensuring complete independence of Zec from government oversight. • Complete alignment of the Electoral act with the Constitution. • Control of assisted voting, as this was still evident in by-elections in 2022 –between 10% to 15% of voters were “ assisted”. • The role of the state media and press. • Ensuring the non-partisan status of traditional leaders, which now is getting worse not better. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that Zimbabwe, as in the past, falls way short of regional and continental best practices, and it does not require this judgement to made at the end of the poll. Here it should be remembered that the National Democratic Institute (NDI) was pilloried in 2000 for producing a pre-election report and alleging that the election could not be free or fair. The criticism was that this was a precipitate assessment, but subsequently the Commonwealth and others came to the same conclusion after the poll, so the NDI prediction was not off the mark. Is Zimbabwe ready for elections? The short answer is that this audit suggests that there cannot be any confidence in the forthcoming elections. The conclusions for each of the pillars is that there are severe deficits for each and every one of these, and the examination of how each pillar reinforces each other amplified this. In many ways, the pre-election process looks worse than it did in 2018, and many forms of bad electoral practices not seen in the past two elections - in 2013 and 2018 – have returned with memories of the very bad elections in 2000, 2002, and 2008. Primary amongst these is the rising political violence and the association with groups supporting the campaign for the presidency, as well as increasing reports of militia groups operating. This is all linked to intimidation, forced membership of Zanu PF, and clientilism on a massive scale. Unlike 2018, opposition political parties, and mainly the CCC, are having rallies banned, even having meetings in private houses disrupted, attendees arrested, and even lawyers assaulted. The levels of hate speech have increased, some of which are so egregious that they warrant arrest and prosecution. There is harassment and legal intimidation of political opponents, with one member being charged and found guilty of a non-existent law. The blatant partisanship of traditional leaders is yet another negative indicator. It is also a matter of extreme concern that so few of the youth have been able to register as voters: that one in four do not have identity documents that would enable them to register and vote is a serious matter. Whether this is due to the difficulties in obtaining documents or is added to by the total lack of political trust by the youth, it still raises that problem about the legitimacy of the government to be elected. The narrow, legalistic approach by the government and Zec to elections does nothing for establishing legitimacy. This flows from the consent of the governed, not from the narrow determination that the rules were followed in a parsimonious fashion: elected governments establish their legitimacy through the demonstration from the widest possible participation in voting, not just that they obtained a majority. Legitimacy also flows from the demonstration that the game was fair, the referee was nonpartisan, and the outcome can be validated by impartial scrutiny. None of this is present in 2023, and the only prediction that can be made is the result once again will fail the test of acceptability, both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, the intention to produce a “landslide” victory for Zanu PF will fail also the test of credibility since none of the conditions that are a pre-requisite for a free and fair election are present now, and there is no possibility that all the desperately needed reforms are possible in the next three months. When the Election Policy Dialogue series began last year there were possibly 10 months in which reforms could have been undertaken, but this is no longer possible. This pre-election audit indicates that the conditions for a free and fair election are absent, and there is little possibility that the multiple reforms necessary can be achieved in the little time remaining. Thus, the kinds of recommendations that can be made must focus on what must be done to deal with a flawed election. There seems little doubt now, with the decision by the Constitutional Court dismissing the application to set aside the delimitation,25 that elections will take place, underlining the concerns raised in the Elections Policy Dialogue about all the secrecy around setting the date for the elections this year. If the hopes that an election can cure the coup and restore the country to legitimacy and international re-engagement cannot be met, then the focus must shift to a more political process, and one in which the international community – regional, continental, and international – must play a significant part. The consequences for Zimbabwe and the region are too serious for it to be business as usual following another failed Zimbabwean election: as pointed out elsewhere, Zimbabwe has reached its “Lancaster” moment. The desperate citizens deserve better than more form without content, and a serious intervention to lift them from increasing penury and hardship. — Rau. *About the writers: Sapes Trust is an independent organisation that seeks to nurture social science research, teaching, policy dialogue, networking and publications in the southern African region and beyond, through specific programmes, but with the deliberate intent to impact on policy and assist in the sustainable development of the region. The Research and Advocacy Unit (Rau) is an independent non-governmental organisation whose mission is: “To conduct research on human rights and governance issues, particularly those pertaining to women, children and State institutions, with a view to bringing about policy changes which promote a democratic culture within Zimbabwe”. NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Reframing Issues

Page 38 Special Focus on Food Prices NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Food for thought Food Security Blog Brezh Malaba Scary… The ongoing inflation spiral is evoking memories of the catastrophic hyperinflation of 2008 which wiped out savings, pensions and salaries. Déjà vu…In May 2023, the biggest bank note in Zimbabwe is currently the ZW$100, worth less than 0.03 US cents, and you would be lucky to afiord one tiny sweet in any shop in Harare. THE 01 THE “Milk has become a luxury product to us. We can’t afiord it,” says Carol Tanyaradzwa (25), a resident of Mbare, Harare’s oldest high-density suburb where low-income earners are locked in a daily struggle for survival. The mother-of-one reveals that malnutrition is on the rise and children are particularly vulnerable. “Food prices are going up almost every day. The [exchange] rate is changing daily. It’s scary. We’re just as good as doomed,” she adds, with a palpable sense of helplessness. Mbare suburb resident Carol Tanyaradzwa (right) narrates the hardships caused by high food prices. Pic: Brezh Malaba. The collapse of the beleaguered Zimbabwe dollar — which has depreciated by more than 90% in May alone — is piling on the misery. Some supermarkets are now barring shoppers from using Zimdollars when buying certain products. Customers without ready access to United States dollars are left stranded. Price tsunami leaves citizens hungry for answers Price surge leaves citizens hungry for answers

NewsHawks Special Focus on Food Prices Page 39 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Crazy prices Quick dashboard 1. Families skipping meals 2. Children malnourished, stunted 3. Food basket unafiordable In recent months, a thorny question has dominated discussions on Zimbabwe`s dire economic situation: Why does this country have one of the highest food price inflation rates in the world? Food price inflation is at the heart of the cost-of-living crisis which has left families hungry, children malnourished and millions of citizens at the mercy of a serious food security problem. Zimbabwe`s domestic food price inflation — measured as year-on-year change in the food component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) — is unbearably high. In 2022, going into 2023, the country recorded the highest food price inflation in the world, scaling 353% in September 2022, ahead of Lebanon, according to the World Bank. In some grocery stores which The NewsHawks has visited, hard-pressed shoppers were forlornly abandoning their baskets and trollies just before reaching the much-dreaded checkout point. It has become a sign of the times: a shopping basket abruptly dumped by a spooked shopper at the last minute in the vicinity of the paypoint. There is often a furtive glance accompanied by a look of guilty nervousness – as if the shopper is checking whether the shop assistants have spotted this shameful act of basket dumping. The heart wants decent food, but the wallet does not allow. Supermarket aisles are often fraught with tension and unease. Sombre-faced shoppers appear anguished as they calculate the cost of the paltry items they manage to put in their baskets. The once simple task of grocery shopping has become a nightmare, a tough test of financial endurance that many cannot bear. Some customers linger, scanning the shelves, hoping for a miracle that never comes. Those who manage to leave with a few items clutched in their hands feel the weight of guilt on their shoulders, knowing that they are the lucky ones that managed to navigate the energy-sapping maze of high prices and poverty. At some grocery stores, we came across cooking oil shelves written: “Only sold in USD”. At some shops, certain alcoholic beverages were being sold exclusively in US dollars. These are the brutal realities on the ground, far removed from the cozy world of powerful politicians and bureaucrats sitting in their air-conditioned offces on Samora Machel Avenue. A manager at a leading retail chain told The NewsHawks that companies have been forced by the crash of the Zimdollar to resort to what is the called replacement cost pricing model, a tactic in which they peg prices on the basis of anticipated exchange rate and inflation movements. “Some people in government prefer to call it economic sabotage, speculation and arbitrage. They fail to understand one thing: if we don’t resort to the replacement cost pricing model, we will simply fail to replenish our stock and our businesses will shut down. This is a matter of business survival.” CONTINUED NEXT PAGE 02 THE

Page 40 NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Not all abandoned baskets are overflowing with luxuries; many contain basic items like bread, sugar, beef and even cheap salt. Tough…A trolley abandoned by a shopper near the tills at OK supermarket in Ard-Mbare, Harare. Zimbabwean consumers are hungry for answers: Why is food so expensive? How will people survive on Zimdollar income when shops are demanding payment in US dollars? Why are prices rising faster in Zimbabwe than in war-torn countries? The questions are endless. Consumers feel powerless at the hands of ruthless capitalists in a food value chain driven by the profit motive. THE What’s going on? Mnangagwa screams sabotage 03 President Emmerson Mnangagwa (right) with African Development Bank president Akinwumi Adesina in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 23 May 2023. On 21 May 2023, President Emmerson Mnangagwa accused big companies of creating “a web of agents” in the informal sector “who sell goods exclusively in foreign currency!” Using strong language, the President complained that such companies are back-stabbing and betraying the government by showing ingratitude for the immense support they continue receiving from the state. After all, the business operators enjoy access to foreign currency at favourable rates at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s weekly forex auctions, Mnangagwa said. He vowed to take action against the unnamed private companies. But the business sector, on the other hand, refuses to take the blame for the economic turmoil. On 9 May 2023, cabinet issued a statement announcing that the government is “concerned by the spiraling prices of 14 basic goods especially bread, flour, cooking oil and mealie-meal”. It added: “The minister of Industry and Commerce is already engaging the concerned stakeholders including manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and other associations on the matter. Given the urgency of the matter, cabinet has set up a committee to quickly investigate, monitor and make appropriate recommendations to cabinet with a view to bringing sanity to the situation.” Economic commentators remarked that the spike in prices is caused by well-known factors — namely the printing of money by the central bank and the harmful charade of maintaining an overly artificial foreign currency exchange rate — meaning that this so-called oficial investigation into prices is a total waste of time. The runaway prices have certainly rattled the corridors of power, with oficials dreading what is threatening to be “the return of the zeros” — evoking memories of the catastrophic hyperinflation of 2006-2008 which poverty-stricken communities are yet to fully recovered from. Special Focus on Food Prices

NewsHawks Page 41 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 On 11 May 2023, with the government essentially accusing the business sector of irresponsible pricing, Finance minister Mthuli Ncube lifted all restrictions on the importation of basic foodstufis. “In order to enhance the supply of basic goods to the public, all basic goods will no longer be subject to import licences, and will also come into the country free of import duties and taxes,” said the minister in a statement that left local food producers grumbling in discontent. The directive means citizens with access to foreign currency can now import basic groceries for their own use. The government hopes this will help counter the spike in prices by retailers. Munyaradzi Hwengwere, chairperson of Buy Zimbabwe, an organisation which promotes the manufacture and consumption of local products, has encouraged all economic stakeholders to approach the volatile situation in a pragmatic and rational manner to preserve the national interest. However, some hard-pressed consumers have lauded the government, saying Zimbabwean retailers and manufacturers have been fleecing the public. 04 Drastic action THE 04 Source: World Bank, 8 May 2023. TOP TEN COUNTRIES HIT HARDEST BY FOOD INFLATION (NORMAL% YOY) Source: World Bank, 25 September 2022. 1. Zimbabwe 2. Lebanon 3. Venezuela 4. Sri Lanka 5. Turkey 7. Iran 8. Argentina 9. Moldova 10. Ethopia Rwanda 353% 240% 131% 91% 90% 81% 66% 38% 36% 34% TOP TEN COUNTRIES HIT HARDEST BY FOOD INFLATION (NORMAL% YOY) 1. Lebanon 2. Argentina 3. Zimbabwe 4. Iran 5. Turkey 6. Egypt 7. Rwanda 8. Suriname 9. Lao PDR 10. Ghana 352% 107% 102% 73% 67% 63% 63% 59% 51% 51% Special Focus on Food Prices

Page 42 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 The blame game On 15 May 2023, Consumer Council of Zimbabwe executive director Rosemary Mpofu bluntly told a state radio discussion that consumers were sufiering due to the “greed” of some players in the business sector. There was a dramatic moment during the panel discussion when an agitated listener called in and bluntly labelled business operators “thieves” who are fleecing consumers. “Let’s make sure that consumers are protected,” Mpofu remarked. Kurai Matsheza, the president of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), pushed back, saying people should focus on the root causes of the pricing mayhem and not just the symptoms. “We’re sorry to hear that some people are calling business operators thieves. We’re greatly worried about the hardships consumers are experiencing. We, too, are facing diffculties. But we’re saying if the nation is experiencing a headache, we must solve the root cause of that headache instead of tinkering with symptoms. Economics Professor Gift Mugano said the spiking of prices is being caused by two main factors. “What we are seeing now are symptoms. Prices are just the result of a particular underlying problem — in this instance we’re talking about printing of money. I was talking of excessive liquidity. There are two things: excessive liquidity and printing of money. It’s not a secret that money supply is increasing from the central bank,” Mugano explained. With the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe increasingly under pressure to contain inflationary pressures, Persistence Gwanyanya, an economist and member of the central bank’s Monetary Policy Committee, was succinct in his characterisation of the problem in early May: “Being a central bank governor is one of the toughest jobs in Zimbabwe today.” Commentators say the country cannot tame prices as long as the economic fundamentals are shaky. These include prolonged electricity blackouts which have saddled industry and commerce with additional expenses eating into profitability. Experts say the Reserve Bank’s 25% export retention must be scrapped, in view of the fact that the economy is now all but dollarised. Almost everyone has enough foreign currency to finance imports, therefore the 25% export retention has become burdensome and unnecessary. The export retention’s continuation is feeding into money supply. Economic fundamentals 05 Special Focus on Food Prices

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 43 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 At the beginning of April 2023, Finance minister Professor Mthuli Ncube announced that the government had blacklisted 13 companies from supplying it with products and services after investigations revealed they were passing the Zimdollars they earn from the public purse to the parallel market. In e fiect, the government — through its contractors and suppliers — has become a major driver of domestic inflationary pressures. Mugano argues that the government should desist from paying its contractors and suppliers in Zimdollars, because these companies are rushing to exchange the money into US dollars soon after receiving payment. This stokes currency volatility, further weakening the vulnerable Zimdollar. “There’s need for more work on the liquidity management side from the budget by government. The ministry of Finance might want to consider upping the threshold they are using to pay service providers, to reduce pressure on the parallel market. What is happening now is that when the [exchange] rate goes up, prices go up — and you blame business, but there’s excessive liquidity.” Zimdollar collapse: govt to blame Worthless...The Zimdollar has crashed, pushing up prices, with President Mnangagwa accusing the business sector of betraying the government. Illustration by Ben Moto. 06 THE The printing of money by the central bank has flooded the economy with excessive liquidity. This has led to the depreciation of the Zimdollar, eroding its purchasing power. As a result, people would rather hold foreign currency, thereby reducing demand for local currency. As our investigation can confirm, there is a direct relationship between money supply and exchange rate in Zimbabwe. In our analysis, to test whether there is a relationship between money supply and the exchange rate, data relating to the movement in money supply growth and the exchange rate was collated for the period from March 2022 to March 2023. Pouring petrol into fire Special Focus on Food Prices

Page 44 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 07 THE Between March 2022 and March 2023, the oficial Zimdollar exchange rate depreciated by 553% (year-on-year) from ZW$142: US$1 to ZW$930:US$1 (see graph and table). Over that same period, broad money supply increased significantly by 442% from ZW$589 billion in March 2022 to ZW$3.195 trillion in March 2023. The statistical correlation coeficient is 0.989. This demonstrates the strength and direction of the relationship between the increase in the printing of money and the depreciation of the Zimdollar. Even when expressed in terms of the percentage movement in both money supply and the exchange rate, it can be observed that the two variables were moving in tandem, posting positive growth over the period March 2022 to March 2023. Economic experts say, to curtail excessive money supply growth, the government should desist from using broad money supply expansion as a means of financing its budget deficits whenever the authorities fail to raise enough money from tax revenue collections. Economist Tinashe Murapata says the printing of money is likely to increase, considering that this is election year. "This level of printing is unprecedented and reveals deep-seated problems in government. Remember, February printing was not yet election printing. Election printing only started in May." The smoking gun Graph and table: Brezh Malaba. Data: RBZ. Special Focus on Food Prices

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 45 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Steep depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar against the US dollar continues to be a major factor in food pricing. The Zimdollar has been so volatile that there are at least three separate exchange rates: the o ficial, interbank and parallel. Although most workers earn their income predominantly in Zimdollars in an economy wracked by chronic high inflation, goods and services are increasingly priced in US dollars. As the free-falling local currency continues plunging, retailers are left groping in the dark for elusive solutions to a pricing nightmare that stubbornly refuses to go away. During a one-week period in April 2023, the Zimdollar lost value to the US dollar by more than 70% on the parallel market, reaching US$1: ZW$2 100. The rate has since inched closer to US$1: ZW$3 000. The implosion highlights waning confidence in the local unit. Against this backdrop, a January 2023 survey by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) found that almost 80% of transactions for food purchases are in US dollars, with the rest in Zimbabwe dollars. Considering that most Zimbabweans earn their wages locally (see graph below), their buying power is limited. On 6 May 2023, Dhiraj Sharma, a senior economist at the World Bank, said the Zimbabwe dollar is rapidly losing value, with 97% of transactions for basic commodities being conducted in US dollars. Sharma presented these findings from the poverty, income, consumption and expenditure (PICES) surveys conducted between July 2020 and January 2023 via telephone interviews by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) in partnership with the World Bank and the United Nations Children`s Fund. Nine rounds of the PICES survey were conducted during the period. Currency volatility SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN ROUND 9 (% OF HOUSEHOLDS) 15 12 10 9 5 33 2 1 0 Wage of employment of household members Assistance from family within the country Non-farm family business Remittances from abroad Assistance from the Government Pension Income from properties, investments or savings Assistance from NGOs/charitable organisation Assistance from other non-family individuals Unemployment benefits 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Source: ZimStat, PICES 9 surveys (July 2020-January 2023). 08 THE Special Focus on Food Prices

Page 46 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 In recent years, many have come to realise that the food security debate has been fixated on crop production and agricultural commodity trade, while paying scant attention to the “hidden middle” segments of the agri-food value chain constituting crop processing, transportation and retail. Supermarket chains, wholesalers and agro-food processing giants — which constitute what Ian Scoones and other economic policy experts call the “hidden middle” — deserve greater scrutiny in the food security discourse. The nexus between the profits of corporate giants and food prices needs to be examined. More worryingly, consumers feel abandoned by the government. Prominent economist Thomas Reardon estimates that this “midstream” — a huge chunk of private sector players equivalent to between 30% and 40% of the agri-food value chains in developing countries — is hidden from mainstream debate on food security. Some agricultural experts now believe that the food security discourse will remain woefully distorted as long as these “hidden” segments of the agri-food value chain are not properly accorded the scrutiny they deserve. Scoones, a professor at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, who has extensively studied Zimbabwean agriculture, has drawn attention to the “unrecognized but vast ‘hidden middle’ of private sector businesses operating in Africa between agricultural producers and food consumers”. This hidden middle comprises a whole range of private actors providing transport, trading, brokerage, finance, storage, warehousing, food processing and so on. In Zimbabwe, policymakers have rarely paid attention to the role of private sector players in the food industry. Focus is mostly on farmers, grain millers and retailers. Scoones believes this must worry us because around 80% of Africa’s food consumption is marketed and handled mostly through private operators. In the circumstances, it is important to thoroughly scrutinise the complex web of often informal players in the agri-food value chain as these new value networks can no longer be ignored. The hidden middle THE 09 Caption: Farmer Gomes Sande, based in the Concession area, says feeding the nation is tough work, made more dificult by economic instability. Picture: Brezh Malaba. Special Focus on Food Prices

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 47 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 Tension between government and corporate sector Innscor Africa Limited is one of the most dominant players in corporate Zimbabwe, owning businesses ranging from fast-food, stockfeed to groceries. In 2022, the Competition and Tarifi Commission (CTC) ordered Innscor to sell its shares in Probrands — a leading producer of groceries — and pay a fine equivalent to US$9.1 million. The CTC accused Innscor of failing to notify the regulator of its acquisition of the stake in Probrands. Through its investment vehicle Ashram, Innscor bought 39.2% shareholding in Probrands in 2016. Two years later, Probrands sold its dairy business to Prodairy, a new entity 50.1% owned by Innscor. The CTC flagged Innscor`s market dominance, saying the corporate giant now enjoyed unfair competition, considering that Innscor already controls National Foods, the largest processor of basic foodstufis in Zimbabwe. The regulator was concerned about what are called the unilateral efiects potentially arising from horizontal mergers. The anti-trust case provided insights into the rarely scrutinised “hidden middle” segment of the food value chain. The CTC said the deal “substantially lessened competition by according Probrands/National Foods the ability to exercise market power as a result of the lower competitive constraints between the merging parties. This merger created a single firm with anti-competitive efiects as well as substantial market power with long lasting consequences on consumers.” The CTC added that the deal “substantially lessened competition by according Probrands/National Foods the ability to exercise market power as a result of the lower competitive constraints between the merging parties. This merger created a single firm with anti-competitive efiects as well as substantial market power with long lasting consequences on consumers.” But, as we reveal today, Innscor is fighting back. The company appealed to the High Court, in line with existing competition law which allows market players to appeal the CTC’s rulings by lodging an appeal directly at the High Court. The CTC declined to comment on the matter, telling The NewsHawks that the case is sub judice. THE 10 Special Focus on Food Prices

Page 48 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023 When the Covid-19 pandemic ended, many were hopeful that food supply would improve. In Zimbabwe, those hopes have been dashed by high food price inflation. *Extreme poverty levels still very high despite slight improvement from 43% in October 2021 to 42% in January 2023. *Severe or moderate food insecurity increased from 38% to 40% in that period. The proportion of the population facing severe food insecurity in urban areas has remained constant at 8% from March 2021 to January 2023, according to the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat). Moderate to severe food insecurity in urban areas has ranged between 35% and 42%. National food insecurity EXTREME POVERTY THE EXTREME POVERTY RATE DECLINED SLIGHTLY, FROM 43 PERCENT IN 2021 TO42 PERCENT IN 2022 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 4% 2017 April/May, 2019 Sept, 2019 Sept/Oct, 2021 December 2022 Jan 2023 10% 17% 15% 13% National Rural Urban FOOD INSECURITY IN URBAN AREAS MARCH 2021 TO DECEMBER 22 TO JANUARY 2023 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 8 42 38 35 8 8 MAR-21 SEPT-OCT-21 DEC 22 JAN 23 Severely food insecurity Severely or moderately food insecurity Source: ZimStat. Urban food insecurity 11 THE Special Focus on Food Prices

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 49 Issue 133, 26 May 2023 The Competition and Tari fi Commission, a statutory body, says the are five solutions for tackling Zimbabwe’s price madness: a) Liberalise the exchange rate to allow market forces to determine prices and attain e ffciency. This measure is unlikely to lead to increases in prices as manufacturers prices are pegged in US$ and indexed to the parallel market, b) Properly fund the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to purchase export surrender which appears to be a major driver of money supply growth. All surrender purchases must be done in a money supply neutral manner. We recommend that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development publishes the amount that will be allocated to the Reserve Bank for this purpose and how this will be raised by the Ministry. c) Government should carefully manage large payments to contractors to avoid surges in local currency liquidity. d) The Reserve Bank must monitor all sources of money supply growth to contain change rate movements. Exchange rate movements are heavily linked to pricing models of manufacturing companies, e) Reverse the opening of imports in the short run to protect the gains once realised by the local industry on the following products; mealie meal, tooth paste and washing Economic experts are convinced that Zimbabwe’s food price inflation crisis can be solved through: prudent economic management including but not limited to freely floating the exchange rate: and curbing the excessive printing of money; increased agricultural productivity; development of transport infrastructure; e ffcient use of land, technological innovation; and market-based policy interventions. These steps could help increase food production, stabilise supply and demand, and ultimately decrease food price inflation, promoting economic growth in the long run. This work was conceived and created by Brezh Malaba, Bertha Foundation Fellow 2023, with the support of the Bertha Foundation and produced by The NewsHawks, Pictures by Brezh Malaba, Design by Tapiwa Nyakabau Conclusion Credits THE 12 Special Focus on Food Prices

Page 50 Reframing Issues Less than 10% of the workers in sub-Saharan Africa save for old age, the lowest rate for any region in the world. That implies most of the breadwinners today won’t be able to afford basic items after retirement. A pension plan is meant to commit employers to make regular savings so that employees will continue to earn after retirement. The Conversation Africa asked Owen Nyang'oro, a financial economist, about Africa’s pensions and why they need to be fixed. What’s the state of sub-Saharan Africa’s pension savings? In a  recent study  of retirement savings in sub-Saharan Africa (other than the francophone countries), we established that the continent’s pension funds are diverse in architecture, coverage and performance. But they mostly lag behind in reforms compared to other regions. Pension savings are also low compared to other regions. Only 19.8% of people above statutory retirement age receive a pension in sub-Saharan Africa, and just 8.9% of the labour force  is covered by pension schemes. This is much lower than the global average where 77.5% of people above statutory age and 53.7% of workers have pension coverage. Pension schemes in sub-Saharan African countries are characterised by low contributions due to low earnings, high informality, high financial illiteracy levels and lack of proper information about the benefits of adequate contributions for future pension withdrawals. Market data  shows that South Africa, with pension fund assets valued at about US$330.3 billion in 2019 (latest country update), is the continent’s top performer in absolute terms. Nigeria, which had assets worth US$32.6 billion, Kenya with US$13.7 billion and Namibia with US$13.3 billion were the  other top pension savers in 2021. Countries with low pension savings at the end of 2021 included Mozambique with US$224 million, Zambia (US$745 million) and Angola (US$861 million). But in proportion to the size of the economy, the best performers in 2019 included Namibia (95.4%), South Africa (82.6%) and Botswana (51.9%). Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana trailed with pension assets below 10% of their gross domestic product. Generally, Africa’s pension assets are very small compared to the 2021 retirement funds of say, the United States (US$40.0 trillion) or the United Kingdom (US$3.8 trillion). What’s peculiar about Africa’s population? The majority of the population is young and fertility rates are high. The old-age dependency ratio (the number of elderly people for every economically active person) is low 91% of sub-Saharan African workers don’t save for old age compared to other regions, averaging 5.5 in 2022, and the ageing population is small but increasing. The annual population growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa was 2.5% in 2022, which is more than three times the global annual average of 0.8%. With much  younger populations  and relatively  high population growth rates, the number of dependants in sub-Saharan African countries is increasing at a slightly faster rate, and over time the numbers of elderly people needing social support will also rise. It is projected that the number of elderly persons in the region will grow at  annual rates above 3% between 2022 and 2050. The concern is that  only one in five  people of pensionable age receives an old-age pension compared to over three in four people globally. High levels of unemployment and the large  size of the informal sector — which accounts for over 89.2% of the labour work force — mean that the elderly will continue to face income challenges. Households are also becoming smaller and changing from multi-generational (made up of grandparents, parents, children and grandchildren) which offer social support to the elderly, to skipped-generation (where grandparents live with grandchildren in the absence of parents) or one-generation (where the elderly live by themselves). What are the benefits of a good pension system? The primary goal of pension savings is to provide income and livelihood in old age. However, pension savings can also be mobilised to finance productive activities and improve living standards. The continent’s annual infrastructure funding gap (the difference between resources required and what’s available) is  estimated at between US$68 billion and US$108 billion. Resources to meet the infrastructure gap could be mobilised from pension funds. This requires good governance and removal of any regulatory obstacles. Pension funds can also support development of capital markets and improve ease of trade in the capital market through their investment activities. Pension funds can also reduce public borrowing, and improve efficiency of the labour market by creating incentives for formalisation of businesses. How should countries improve pension savings? African governments can boost pension savings in four ways: • Increase pension participation and coverage by including the unemployed and those in the informal sector. This could be achieved through a targeted universal pension scheme and greater financial literacy. The countries should have a mix of universal schemes and schemes with payroll deductions and employer contributions. • Bundling pensions with other products. Bundling pensions with other products such as life insurance cover, and even matching contributions to encourage greater participation and long-term savings in pension funds. Favourable tax considerations can also enhance the growth of contributions and assets of pension funds. • Use of technology. Leverage innovations in digital technology to increase pension savings. The region accounts for 53% of active mobile money accounts in 2021. Use of digital technology could increase coverage, especially in the informal sector. It can make enrolment and contribution to pension funds easier. • Review regulatory frameworks of the pension sector to open it up to the unserved population. There is also a need to streamline management of pensions and minimise costs of administration, especially for private pensions. This will allow pension funds to extend investments to other assets, including foreign ones, to improve returns. Sub-Saharan African countries are likely to gain from a well-developed pension system that provides adequate income to the elderly. This will in turn reduce the need for social protection, provide financing for infrastructure development, and support the development of capital markets. All this calls for deliberate reforms to facilitate growth of pension savings. Countries should prioritise pensions within their development plans, address informality in the labour market and take advantage of technological advancements and the youthful population. A well-developed pension system will improve the region’s financial stability through reduced budgetary strain as funds become available for development. It could also open up capital markets and improve the labour market, thus leading to growth. — The Conversation. *About the interviewee: Owen Nyang'oro is a lecturer at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. NewsHawks Issue 133, 26 May 2023