NewsHawks 15 September 2023

Price US$1 Friday 15 September 2023 NEWS Zimbabwe continued insults rile Zambians Story on Page 5 NEWS Gukurahundi perpetrators can be charged under international law WHAT’S Story on Page 10 INSIDE SPORT Remembering Zim’s black amateur who once beat Tiger Woods Story on Page 52 ALSO INSIDE Zimbabwe on the Sadc radar Mnangagwa is treading on explosive political minefield

Page 2 News NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa is sitting on a simmering political volcano as it further emerges that soldiers voted against him at different barracks and on postal ballots on a wider scale than initially imagined. High-level sources told The NewsHawks that Mnangagwa lost to his close rival, main opposition CCC leader Nelson Chamisa in a number of barracks around the country and a significant portion of postal ballots. The Zimbabwe Election Commission (Zec) said out of the 18 000 registered voters who had applied for postal ballots, 17 000 were approved. The majority of these were security forces, including the army. Chamisa got a huge chunk of those votes. In the 2018 elections, police voted against Mnangagwa. He complained about this during campaigns. This comes as the recent elections once again showed Mnangagwa remains hugely unpopular compared to his party, the ruling Zanu PF. While Zanu PF got 62.9% of the National Assembly seats — 176 out of 280 — Mnangagwa got 52.6% of the vote with the advantages of incumbency, huge funding and support from the Central Intelligence Organisation-run outfit, by Forever Associates Zimbabwe (Faz). Main opposition CCC leader Nelson Chamisa got 44% basically running on empty. Although Mnangagwa increased his margin in percentage terms in the recent election — after moving from 50.8% to 52.6% — in real terms or hard numbers, his support actually declined by over 100 000 votes. In 2018, Mnangagwa got 2 460 463 votes compared to Chamisa’s 2 147 436, a difference of 313 027 votes. In the recent 2023 poll, the President had 2 350 111 votes and his rival 1 967 343 — a 110 352 votes decline for Mnangagwa. However, the gap between Mnangagwa and Chamisa widened from 313 027 votes in 2018 to 382 768 votes in the recent election, widely condemned as a sham. Similarly, Chamisa also declined by 180 093 votes in the recent election amid complaints of voter suppression, manipulation and vote-rigging by Faz. Zanu PF MPs performed better than Mnangagwa by a 10% margin. The National Assembly has 210 seats, but they go up to 280 when 60 proportional representation ones for women and 10 for youths are added. Zanu PF got 176 and the CCC 103 seats. The election in the Gutu West constituency was postponed after one of the candidates died shortly before the poll. In the Senate, Zanu PF has a majority after winning 33 and the CCC has 27 on proportional representation. There are also two senators representing the constituency of people living with disabilities and 18 traditional chiefs. The election outcome showed that Zanu PF remains far more popular than Mnangagwa amid results which are a virtual vote-of-noconfidence in him by the party and soldiers as he emerged a disputed winner without political legitimacy. Mnangagwa also lacks democratic and performance legitimacy amid isolation. The Southern African Development Community (Sadc) election observer mission rejected the outcome of Zimbabwe’s elections, saying they did not meet the benchmarks set by the country’s constitution, electoral law and its principles and guidelines governing democratic elections. “The recent elections gave us new and more insight in relation to President Mnangagwa. Firstly, he remains unpopular by a huge 10% gap compared to Zanu PF, his own party. Second, soldiers voted against him in various places and on postal ballots. Third, he got less votes in 2023 compared to 2018 in real or hard numbers by over 100 000 votes. Fourth, in electoral terms there was no consolidation on his part. Fifth, last but not least, the message from the party and the soldiers as voters is that they have no confidence in him. If his parMnangagwa is treading on explosive political minefield President Emmerson Mnangagwa

NewsHawks News Page 3 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 ty and soldiers lack confidence in him, then he is in serious trouble,” one security official told The NewsHawks. “In the final analysis, this means he won but he has big problems which will crystalise and unfold in months ahead. His party has no full confidence in him. The soldiers are unhappy and restless. He has also side-lined the army and replaced it with Faz, which has created tensions within the military. Sadc has rejected his re-election. He is isolated now compared to 2018. These are serious issues which can’t be ignored.” This comes as The NewsHawks recently reported that Mnangagwa lost at a polling station set up for soldiers from Pondoroza Barracks in Redcliff, Midlands province, during the August election. Since the 2017 military coup, the rank and file has complained that conditions of service have deteriorated in the face of devastating economic hardships and unfulfilled promises made during the military campaign to remove the late former president Robert Mugabe. Soldiers were promised improved working conditions and better pay. That did not materialise. If anything, the situation has deteriorated. Senior army officers are also said to be unsettled over Faz which covertly took over the running of the elections from the military and resulted in them being sidelined even though they put Mnangagwa in power in 2017. Before Zec set up Tent A at an open space in Rutendo near the Pondoroza Barracks, which was exclusive for soldiers from the camp to vote at, sources said military personnel had refused to vote inside the cantonment area as they feared being influenced to vote for Mnangagwa under duress. Tent A was for Redcliff constituency’s Ward 1. According to the results pasted at the polling station, Chamisa got 511 votes, while Mnangagwa got 213. At the same Tent A polling station, the CCC parliamentary candidate Lloyd Mukapiko polled 443 votes, beating his Zanu PF rival July Moyo who got 282 votes, showing soldiers also voted for the opposition. This pattern was repeated in many polling stations around the country, according to electoral sources. There were two other makeshift polling booths set up for the civilian voters at the same location where, again, Mnangagwa fared dismally against Chamisa. In Tent B, Chamisa got 362 and Mnangagwa 110, while in Tent C Chamisa polled 422 votes and Mnangagwa 106. In February, MPs in the previous parliament cornered Transport minister Felix Mhona, who at the time was the acting leader of government business in the National Assembly, and outgoing deputy Finance minister Clemence Chiduwa over an unfulfilled promise made to the military in 2020 for the construction of garrison shops inside the barracks to ensure soldiers got access to low-priced basic foodstuffs. In a post-cabinet media briefing in Harare on 26 February 2020, Finance minister Mthuli Ncube said cantonment shops would enable the army to be “issued with a card or credit limit to buy what they want monthly”. At that time, Zimbabweans, particularly civil servants, were enduring one of the worst economic crises which was characterised by acute shortages of fuel, electricity, foreign currency and basic goods such as maize-meal as well as cooking oil. Although Zimbabwe's annual consumer inflation dropped for a second consecutive month to 77.2% in August 2023, down from July's 101.3%, against the backdrop of a tight monetary policy measures to mop up excess liquidity, American independent economist Professor Steve Hanke says inflation is actually 640%. The official exchange rate is US$1:ZW$4 830, but the parallel market rate is at US$1: ZW$6 100, reflecting weak macro-economic fundamentals amid economic deterioration. While Mnangagwa controversially won, he is clearly treading on a political minefield. A recent Afrobarometer survey showed that a majority of Zimbabweans (65%) say the country is going in the wrong direction; a large majority (69%) say the economy is bad and 62% say the living conditions are bad and this constitutes an equal proportion from both the urban and rural areas. An overwhelming majority (85%) say the government has performed badly in addressing key issues such as unemployment, corruption, the economy and managing the economy. Manipulated elections are not the best indicator of a leader’s popularity and stability. For instance, after elections in Gabon, on 30 August 2023, a dramatic turn of events unfolded as military staged a coup, seizing control of the nation. This upheaval followed controversial elections in which deposed President Ali Bongo secured his third consecutive victory. The coup leaders made a public appearance on state television, where they announced the dissolution of state institutions and the complete closure of borders. In addition, President Ali Bongo found himself placed under house arrest. The military declared General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, the former head of the presidential guard, as the president of the transitional committee tasked with leading the country during this period of instability. In response to these events, hundreds of people took to the streets of the Gabonese capital, Libreville, to celebrate the military’s intervention. However, the international community, including the United Nations , the African Union, and notably France, the former colonial ruler of the country, strongly condemned the coup, which the people are supporting. Military coups were a regular occurrence in some parts of Africa in the decades after independence. Now, after a period of relative democratic stability and Zimbabwe’s November 2017 putsch, they are on the rise again. Zimbabwe set a wrong precedent, according for former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. The takeover in Gabon is just the latest in a string of coups that have taken place in recent years, and came just a month after soldiers took control in Niger. In 2022 there were two coup attempts in Burkina Faso, as well as failed coup attempts in Guinea Bissau, The Gambia and the island nation of Sao Tome and Principe. In 2021, there were six coup attempts in Africa, four of them successful. African Union chair Moussa Faki Mahamat, who grappled with the Zimbabwean coup in 2017, has expressed grave concern about "the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government". A study by two American researchers, Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, has identified over 200 such attempts in Africa since the 1950s. About half of these have been successful. Yet research shows that coups do not help to democratise countries and take them forward. Zimbabwe is also an example. Mnangagwa warned Zanu PF before the elections that a coup will not remove him. Zimbabwean soldiers voted against Mnangagwa in various places and on postal ballots.

Page 4 News NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 OWEN GAGARE THE Southern African Development Community (Sadc) is closely engaged on the Zimbabwe situation behind the scenes amid a frantic diplomatic lobby to boldly confront the country’s post-election crisis which has divided the nation and the region, while attracting international attention. This follows a report by the Sadc Election Observer Mission headed by Zambian politician Nevers Mumba which rejected Zimbabwe’s recent shambolic elections outcome. This sparked a fierce diplomatic row between Zambians and Zimbabweans. There are various secret consultations and lobbying going on to ensure the troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation meets before an extraordinary summit of the heads of state to deal with the Zimbabwe crisis. The Sadc troika is constituted by Namibia, Zambia and Tanzania. Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema is the chair. The Sadc troika of the summit entails the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, Angola, the current chair, and Zimbabwe, incoming chair. After the Zimbabwean situation, the organ troika will also deal with upcoming elections in Eswatini in September, Madagascar in November, DRC in December, South Africa in 2024 and Botswana next year. The Mumba mission says the outcome of Zimbabwe’s chaotic elections did not meet the country’s constitution, electoral law and the Sadc Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. This has caused a storm of political rhetoric, name-calling and threats between Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu PF and government officials and Zambian officials who took great exception to what Harare said about their leaders. There have been public confrontations between Zimbabwe and Zambia over the issue. After Mumba released his preliminary report rejecting the outcome of Zimbabwe’s elections, Zanu PF has gone on a rampage attacking him and Hichilema. Some of Zanu PF’s political heavyweights who have been involved in the ugly fight include War Veterans minister Chris Mutsvangwa, party treasurer-general Patrick Chinamasa and Justice minister Ziyambi Ziyambi. Zambian provincial minister for the Copperbelt Elisha Matambo has been drawn into the fight, accusing Chinamasa of admitting to killing the late Zambian leader Levy Mwanawasa and plotting to kill Hichilema. Matambo says they must proactively be stopped. Zanu PF sympathiser Rutendo Matinyarare, known for peddling pathologically false theories and lies on politics from his South African base, was accused by Zambian authorities of undermining their sovereignty and security after he claimed Mwanawasa was assassinated because he had tried to help the British to invade Zimbabwe when he was Sadc chair. Mwanawasa died in 2008 after an ugly fight with the late former president Robert Mugabe over the protracted Zimbabwe crisis. Chinamasa hit back at Matambo, saying his allegations that he had admitted to killing Mwanawasa and plotting to take out Hichilema were false, malicious and highly defamatory. Despite Zimbabwe’s noisy reaction, the Sadc report has been adopted by Hichilema and his troika. Sadc leaders agree with the report, which is why most of them stayed away from Mnangagwa’s recent inauguration. Only three of them came to Harare. A senior official from the Sadc headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana, said: “What I know is that there was supposed to be a virtual organ troika meeting this week, on Tuesday or Wednesday. Hichilema, who was on a state visit to China, was in touch with the Sadc chair, Angolan President Joao Lourenco. “The agenda of the meeting is clear: Zimbabwe’s election final report and Eswatini elections which are upcoming. The troika was also supposed to look into Zimbabwe’s opposition leader Nelson Chamisa’s petition to Sadc, together with that of Saviour Kasukuwere, who was disqualified from contesting the recent presidential election. “I am advised that in addition to Kasukuwere and Chamisa’s petitions, the Sadc secretariat has received numerous letters from other organisations in Zimbabwe all with evidence of Zec and Zanu PF election law breaches. “Most heads of state are happy with the Sadc report; that’s why they diplomatically did not attend the inauguration. Based on the findings of the engagement, there are various suggestions on the table including a Government of National Unity and an election re-run. The scenarios are difficult to determine as there are various meetings and negotiations going on. “I am advised Mnangagwa has a copy of the final report of the Sadc election observer mission. “Apparently, according to Sadc, if the issue is not resolved, Mnangagwa can’t assume Sadc chairmanship next year in August. Interestingly, Mnangagwa and his team think if he becomes chair, they will kill the report and stop any attempt to discuss Zimbabwe. So it’s a political game of thrones.” Zim on the Sadc radar Sadc election observer mission head Nevers Mumba

NewsHawks News Page 5 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA ZIMBABWE’S bid to mend relations with Zambia has faced a further setback after Zanu PF treasurer-general Patrick Chinamasa hurled more insults at the neighbouring country’s President Hakainde Hichilema and head of the Sadc Election Observer Mission Nevers Mumba. However, the Zambian leader says he will maintain a peaceful course. Zimbabwe’s leaders have been on a warpath against Hichilema and his government over the damning Sadc report which rejected the outcome of the shambolic recently held polls. In shocking remarks this week, Chinamasa piled more insults on Hichilema and Mumba, a former Zambian vice-president, who led the Southern Africa Development Community Election Observer Mission (SEOM), which for the first time raised gross irregularities in Zimbabwe’s polls. “Reverend Dr. Nevers Sikwila Mumba. Who is this man? People who don't know him were caught completely by surprise by his pronouncements as Head of SEOM (Sadc Electoral Observation Mission), purportedly on behalf of the Sadc team,” Chinamasa said on his official X account. “So unilateral, wayward, unprecedented, and unheard of, blatantly biased, uncouth, unSadc-like, unashamedly reading from a pro- Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) script, outdoing the sanctions-imposing countries in his condemnation of Zimbabwe and governance systems. Personally, I was the least surprised.” Added Chinamasa: “I berate myself for lacking the courage to publicly object to Mumba's appointment as Head of SEOM. I felt then that it was not prudent to cause unnecessary controversy that would mar the smooth management of our Harmonised Elections. I decided to take the path that would not rock the boat.” Giving reference to former Zambian president Levi Mwanawasa, Chinamasa said Hichilema would live to regret the regime change agenda which he said President Hichilema was pushing in appointing Mumba as head of the SEOM. “Like Mwanawasa before him, he will not succeed in his evil intent. He does not know what mettle Zimbabweans are made of. Mumba is a complete disgrace and an embarrassment to the region and the African Continent as a whole,” Chinamasa said. “It was very unwise and unpolitic for President Hichilema as Head of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security to appoint Mumba, a lackey of imperialism and neocolonialism with a known regime change background (against Zanu PF), to come and observe Zimbabwe's Harmonised Elections. "President Hichilema did, wittingly or unwittingly through Mumba's appointment, stoke the fires of Western-inspired regime change in Zimbabwe and will live to regret it.” Added Chinamasa: “Mwanawasa suffered a stroke, and that put an end to the regime change agenda as a SADC-initiated project at the behest of Tony Blair. Rev. Nevers Mumba is making a spirited attempt to take the regime change agenda from where Mwanawasa left it.” His remarks, construed to be death threats on Hichilema, have sparked protests in Zambia, widening the diplomatic chasm that has been growing since he toppled Zanu PF ally Edgar Lungu in an unusual electoral feat that has inspired opposition parties to notch surprise wins in the region. Mwanawasa’s death has been a raw nerve and subject to debate since 2008 amid suspicion of foul play. This week, Elisha Matambo, the minister of Zambia's Copperbelt province, said his government would petition international and regional bodies to look into the threats on Hichilema’s life. “I was thinking it was a lie, so I went to social media to see if these people really killed President Mwanawasa and if they were now coming for President Hichilema. And for sure, I found that. That is why I have agreed to come so that you receive the petitions. I have received the petitions to deal with the threats on the life of President Hakainde Hichilema,” Matamba said as he addressed ruling party supporters who presented him with a petition to deliver to Zambia’s foreign ministry to complain about the conduct of Zimbabwe’s leaders. “I have also read that they have agreed to killing President Mwanawasa! So you have asked me to take the petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that the petition can go to SADC, AU and UN. I will take the petition so this petition to AU, SADC and UN. If someone agrees that they killed another country’s leader, now they are trying to kill a sitting president, we cannot sit and watch.” In the Zambian Parliament this week, Hichilema said Zambia will maintain its founding father Kenneth Kaunda's pacifist foreign policy as it does not want conflict with anyone. He also reminded the region that some leaders from a neighbouring country are now insulting Zambians yet they were once refugees in Zambia. “We are not desirous of being part of conflict in our region. We as citizens must not encourage other countries in the region to pick fights with Zambia. You are doing the wrong. You want to bring trouble to your fellow citizen and to yourself,” Hichilema said. “This country does not want violence. We have a track record. We walk Kenneth Kaunda’s [KK] path, and will work hard to maintain that integrity KK set for us. We are the housing for refugees. All our neighbours, some of whom have become presidents, were housed here. Our credentials are clear.” Zambia has been Zimbabwe’s strategic ally since the liberation struggle, enabling Zimbabwean liberation movements, namely the Zapu and Zanu to use its territory for the training of freedom fighters. The country also provided refuge to Zimbabwean nationalists, and a considerable number of high-profile Zanu and Zapu nationalists, including President Mnangagwa. Chinamasa said that before Mwanawasa’s death from a stroke, he was cheered on by “sanctions-imposing countries” and had become very hostile towards Zimbabwe and Zanu PF and had allegedly agreed to a Tony Blair proposal to use Zambia as a base for the British military forces to launch an invasion on Zimbabwe. He said Mwanawasa demonstrated aggression towards Zimbabwe after he invited to Zambia the then leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, the late Morgan Tsvangirai, at the height of post-election instability. This was also at a time when Sadc leaders were heavily criticised for their silence on Zimbabwe’s disputed poll. However, in April 2008, Mwanawasa had called for an emergency Sadc summit in Lusaka Zambia, to find a solution to Zimbabwe’s political crisis that had been caused by the violent 2008 election. Mugabe stayed away. Tsvangirai attended, but did not join the Sadc leaders for the closed-door meetings as he was not a head of state. While Mugabe did not directly state reasons for snubbing the meeting in 2008 ahead of the bloody election run-off, Chinamasa this week said Mugabe was protesting Tsvangirai’s invitation to the meeting. “As Zimbabwe, we objected to the attendance of an opposition leader at a Summit of Heads of State. Our objection fell on deaf ears,” said Chinamasa. “President Mugabe decided to boycott the Summit and instead dispatched a four-Minister delegation to the Sadc Lusaka Heads of States Summit to engage Mwanawasa and dissuade him from the path to plunge Zimbabwe and the region into an Armageddon.” He added: “Mwanawasa's venom and hostility were evident and palpable, but in the early hours of Sunday, while not yielding his ground, Mwanawasa was purely out of respect for Cde Mnangagwa, beginning to treat the delegation with a modicum of civility.” As previously reported by The NewsHawks, since Hichilema came to power the Zimbabwean intelligence has been working hard to establish the nature of his relations with Chamisa and whether it involves financial support. “Their worry is on various fronts: diplomatic, political and geopolitical,” an intelligence source told The NewsHawks. Chinamasa insults rile Zambians Zanu PF treasurer-general Patrick Chinamasa (left) with Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema

Page 6 News NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA ZIMBABWEAN President Emmerson Mnangagwa has used a classic dictator's handbook to appoint his sons into cabinet in a brazen act of patronage, nepotism and cronyism, with a cloud of doubt hanging over the ability of many of the newly appointed ministers to efficiently execute their mandate. On Monday, Mnangagwa, who was re-elected in the disputed general elections, courted widespread derision after selecting a cabinet that has been condemned for being weak and having a nepotistic bent. He appointed into his new administration his son, David Kudakwashe Mnangagwa, nephew Tongai Mnangagwa and many of his cronies. Kudakwashe was appointed deputy Finance minister while Tongai landed the post of Tourism deputy minister without any known track records. Tongues are wagging that there are also many of his clan members and homeboys in his new administration such as cabinet secretary Misheck Sibanda who was initially appointed by the former president Robert Mugabe. Observers this week likened the appointments as a Marcos-style coterie of relatives, friends and cronies underpinned by clansmanship. They said for all his excesses in power, Mugabe rarely appointed his relatives, although in the twilight of his political career he put his nephew Patrick Zhuwao into his cabinet and catapulted son-in-law Simba Chikore to the helm of a key state institution. The observers said there were also a few other scarcely disguised nepotistic appointments, but not as brazen as Mnangagwa’s latest shocker. They said in this case, it is worse. One of Mnangagwa's twin sons is an army captain. His wife Auxillia, who has now surpassed Grace Mugabe in public flexing of the muscle of power, is sometimes sent on government business even though she is not a public official, for instance to Iran and Belarus. In so doing, Mnangagwa has effectively joined the likes of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, former US president Donald Trump, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and certainly Filipino kleptocrat Ferdinand Marcos, among others, in abusing power and office. This is in contrast to Kenyan President William Ruto who said recently that he will never appoint any family member to his government. Mnangagwa's nepotistic and appalling move smacks of corruption, kakistocracy, mediocracy and kleptocracy, the observers said. Kakistocracy basically means a government run by the least suitable or competent people, while kleptocracy is rule by thieves. Mnangagwa's action raises a number of critical issues which span the central question of meritocracy, "our time to eat mentality" that implies greed and corruption, governance, leadership succession and family dynasty. Besides, it is also an ethics and character issue on his part. Coupled with misrule, nepotism has been known to fuel heightened poverty and people's suffering. Even the "as long as they are qualified in their respective fields" refrain to justify the appointment of relatives to government offices is really concerning because it is still the President or another public official who will decide. As a result of the potential dire consequences of nepotism and family political dynasties, some countries have laws to prohibit the appointment of relatives into government. For instance, in the United States, there is an anti-nepotism law passed under President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. The opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance (UZA) has also criticised Mnangagwa’s cabinet, saying it fails to meet the expectations of many Zimbabweans who are suffering from a collapsing economy and a moribund local currency. “President Mnangagwa’s cabinet essentially is a reshuffling of the same team that spearheaded the current economic meltdown. This will not move the nation forward. To achieve international standards, the President’s cabinet should be a platform that taps into the experiences of its appointed ministers. Experience, however, does not refer to the number of years one has spent in cabinet or to age,” said the party in a statement. “He missed an opportunity to refocus government towards sustainable development. Appointing new qualified minds would bring new solutions to the myriad of challenges Zimbabwe is facing. Where are the youth in President Mnangagwa’s cabinet? The old generation should allow Zimbabwe’s young people to chart the way forward for future generations.” UZA has also criticised Mnangagwa’s penchant for appeasing elderly war veterans and loyalists, with over a third of cabinet ministers now over 60 years old, which the opposition party said is likely to hamper fresh ideas to promote development. “While UZA respects the cadres who sacrificed their lives for an independent Zimbabwe, we do not believe that 43 years after independence the country should remain in war mode. It's time for new blood,” read the statement. “Appointing 26 cabinet ministers and 10 provincial ministers in a country already burdened with economic malaise proves that either President Mnangagwa is out of touch with reality or has no regard for the voice of the people.” The party has also expressed concern over redundancy in government departments, which could have been merged to create fewer ministries. “UZA questions what the role of the minister responsible for provincial affairs is. What is the role of the Skills Audit Ministry? Could it not have been a department within another ministry?” The cabinet has also been under fire for being gender insensitive as it is made up of six women and 20 men, falling short of stakeholder efforts to achieve gender balance in the governance of Zimbabwe. “Women and girls constitute 52% of our country’s population yet they continue to be underrepresented across key sectors resulting in limited opportunities to influence policy and access economic and legal protections. Women are also highly impacted by cultural and patriarchal barriers,” UZA said. UZA is led by Elisabeth Valerio, the only woman on the presidential ballot in the just-ended elections. From kakistocracy to kleptocracy: Mnangagwa’s nepotism scandal Deputy Finance minister David Kudakwashe Mnangagwa

NewsHawks News Page 7 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government is heading for monumental failure in steering the country out of the grinding economic and political crises, political analysts have warned. Mnangagwa, who staged a smash-and-grab electoral victory in the 23 and 24 August elections that were largely condemned by the regional bloc Sadc, as well as other international observers, went on to appoint a cabinet populated by inexperienced officials in key sectors such as economy, energy, mines, local government, industry and commerce. The ministry of Finance and Investment Promotion was retained by Professor Mthuli Ncube, who has plunged the country into an economic abyss with the highest inflation rate in the world and a moribund local currency. Deputising Ncube is Mnangagwa’s son, Kudakwashe David Mnangagwa, who has no known qualifications or track record in economics beyond a tourism degree he earned barely a year ago from Lupane State University. The tourism and hospitality ministry, which was split from the tourism and environment portfolio, was assigned to a woman, Barbra Rwodzi, who has no international profile. Rwodzi is from Mnangagwa’s Midlands province. She is known for instigating violence at the Pan-African Parliament during a heated debate and back home for threatening a police officer in her constituency who had arrested a thug linked to her election campaign. Rwodzi will be deputised by a son of Mnangagwa’s sister/brother, Tongai Mnangagwa, with no known record as a captain of the tourism and hospitality sector. Tasked with running the Local Government ministry is former chief executive of Zvishavane-based platinum mining company Mimosa, Winston Chitando, who was the Mines minister in the last cabinet. He again does not hold solid experience in local government administration. What further disillusioned many is that individuals tasked with leading key line ministries were drawn from the list of the President’s family members, friends, clansmen, relatives and hangers-on. What has further aggravated the disillusionment is that ministers from the previous cabinet whose performance was below par were either reshuffled or retained in their portfolios. These include Sports minister Kirsty Coventry, who presided over the blacklisting of the country from international football, Finance minister Ncube and former Energy minister Soda Zhemu, who presided over 18-hour rolling power cuts which have since returned after a moratorium which was calculated at hoodwinking the people ahead of the just-ended elections. Political analyst Professor Stephen Chan from the University of London said the recycling of dead wood and underperforming ministers who failed dismally was a clear sign that the government will not deliver. “This cabinet is a collection of retreads, people who have failed before and those who are too young to have failed are there by virtue of being related by family ties to the President. It's a cabinet of cronies and nepotism. The reappointment of the minister of Finance sums it up. It was he who failed over the past five years,” Chan said. Political analyst Vivid Gwede concurred, saying: “The President has recycled the majority of ministers from the last five years. Some of them have clearly not been performing, which means Zimbabwe is likely to continue with mediocre performance. There is no clarity on what basis they have been retained, except that they are loyalists.” He added: “The question is: what will the President do this time around to make them produce the results?” Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe spokesperson Obert Masaraure said it is a cabinet of “certified” failures and “so it will not deliver”. “This is a Cabinet of certified failures and unqualified green horns and they will not produce anything short of a disaster. ED's (Mnangagwa) cabinet is not for the people but for himself and his close circle to achieve their selfish targets of power retention and primitive accumulation,” said Masaraure. “The change of personalities without the rewiring of the governance architecture will not change the outcome. Mnangagwa is still pursuing failed neoliberal policies and the outcome is predictable, the economy will continue to falter and social services will remain inaccessible.” He added: “The illegitimate Mnangagwa will continue to deploy the apparatus of violence to coerce the people. It is going to be a long five years for the people of Zimbabwe.” A glaring lack of meritocracy Minister of Information and Communications Technology Tatenda Mavetera

Page 8 News NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 HAZVINEI MWANAKA JOURNALISTS and media organisations have called on the newly appointed minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, Jenfan Muswere, to work towards enhancing professionalism, integrity and promoting a conducive media environment. Muswere was appointed on Monday, taking over from Monica Mutsvangwa who was posted to the Women’s Affairs ministry. Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe chapter’s national chairperson Golden Maunganidze said the new minister should be accommodative and be ready to listen to their concerns. Maunganidze is also the Misa regional chairperson. “We want the new minister to know that we had progressed fairly well with the former minister who used to keep her doors open and ready for dialogue and engagement with the media, especially each time the media would come up with issues, she was ready to accommodate and lend an ear for discussion,” Maunganidze told The NewsHawks. “So we continue to lobby and seek that trajectory going forward because that is the basis for understanding each other, understanding our concerns and the basis of knowing where we want to go as a country.” He added: “There should be no issues of polarisation, we do not want them and we want a minister who appreciates issues at hand, and when we are talking about issues at hand at the moment, we would like to press issues of regulation. We expect the minister to continue with the trajectory of coming up with media laws that allow journalists to operate freely and improve access to information by all, safety and security of the media guaranteed, especially by the government.” Maunganidze said issues of media pluralism and sincere diversity should be considered. George Maponga, the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (Zuj) president, said there is a need to continually liberalise the airwaves and to ensure adequate training of journalists in the broadcasting sector so that they are conversant with latest technologies in broadcasting. “We hope the new minister will carry on from where his predecessor left, especially with regards to progress that has been made in the liberalisation of broadcasting industry in Zimbabwe that resulted in the licensing of new commercial TV stations, community radio stations and also campus radio stations at our universities as part of efforts to entrench the learning and teaching of broadcast journalism in Zimbabwe,” Maponga said. “We also hope the new minister will tackle the issue of the National Employment Council (NEC) for the media industry. We want a standalone NEC for the media industry, particularly targeting media personnel so that at least big media companies generally have a certain benchmark for salaries of journalists.” Maponga is hopeful that the minister will take the establishment of the NEC as a matter of urgency, saying salaries across the media industry “are actually in a bad state”. He said if journalists are well remunerated like other professionals it will bring an end to the menace of brown envelopes or chequebook journalism and other corrupt practices that are undermining the integrity of the profession. “Journalists can also access national resources and venture into areas such as agriculture and mining. Mind you, they have families to feed like any other Zimbabwean so that when we talk about leaving no-one behind the media industry and its workers are not left behind,” said Maponga. However, he noted that the minister should quickly expedite the enactment of the Media Practitioners Bill which he hopes, among other outcomes, will entrench professionalism in the media industry. Maponga said there is a need for co-regulation where the Zimbabwe Media Commission will act as a final port of call in the event of disputes, among other issues. Media Alliance of Zimbabwe programmes manager Nigel Nyamutumbu said top of the minister's agenda should be a trust-building process in which there are deliberate policies and interventions that restore the credibility of the media. “The new Information minister comes on the back of criticism of the media, particularly how the state media conducted itself in covering the elections. Media monitoring reports assessed that the mainstream media was biased in favour of the incumbent and that there were challenges pertaining to access to information,” Nyamutumbu said. “There should be a policy thrust that is based on dialogue and consensus building in implementing reforms aimed at strengthening professionalism and restoring public trust in the media. This will, in part, deal with sustainability challenges that confront the media as a viable business enterprise.” However, he said it is notable that the minister is taking over when the regulators have issued licences to additional players, including community broadcasters — yet they are faced with sustainability challenges. “Beyond sustainability, the minister should sustain policy dialogues around strengthening self-regulation in a co-regulatory framework, conclude reforms to the Broadcasting Services Act and ensure the operating environment for the media is safe," said Nyamutumbu. A media lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University, Dr Alfandika Last, said the debate on co-regulation of the media needs to be finalised with urgency. “We welcome the coming in of the new minister, maybe a new broom may sweep cleaner,” Last said. “Naturally, we expect him to take over from where the previous minister left. The statutory Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) and all the media players, including those represented by the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe and some who are not represented, must be represented in discussions that should see co-regulation of the media in Zimbabwe.” Nkulumani Mlambo, the content manager of the Masvingo-based Midweek Watch weekly newspaper, said in other countries the media is supported by grants, but since the country cannot do that due to the scarcity of resources, there is a need for the new minister to encourage or persuade quasi-government institutions, ministries and the government itself to support the media equally through advertising support. “This will enable media houses to pay good salaries and be able to retain competent journalists. Of late, most journalists are venturing into public relations, leaving a big gap in the media industry as there are now too many novices, compromising quality,” said Mlambo. A freelance journalist, Sukuluhle Nepa Ndlovu, said there is a need for media reforms that are conducive to both the public and private media, adding there should not be discrimination from government, especially when the media is requesting for information. Info minister faces herculean task Information, Media and Broadcasting Services minister Jenfan Muswere

NewsHawks News Page 9 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA GOVERNMENT departments and parastatals have come under scrutiny, with Parliament being called to action after a new report has shown that they have been repeating serious failings in public finance management since 2015 while also flouting recommendations of the Auditor-General. Zimbabwe is wallowing in an economic crisis that has been largely attributed to bad governance and lack of transparency in public finance management. In several instances, these departments and parastatals have failed to provide records, accounts or financial statements for audit, forcing the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) to carry out audits a long time after the financial years have lapsed — raising questions on transparency. According to the new report titled: Review of the Auditor-General of Zimbabwe (2015-21) by legal think-tank Veritas, while the OAG has been pointing out administration failings at all levels of the government, significant weaknesses in governance, controls and record keeping have remained effectively unresolved, leading to financial loss. Veritas said while the evidence is overwhelming, it is for Parliament to determine a response to the findings, which OAG has been recommending over the past years. According to the report: “On a number of occasions, OAG drew attention to its concerns about both the proportion of audit findings that related to failures in governance, as well as the serious impacts and (in some cases) systemic nature of the failings identified.” The OAG’s findings included: “Failures by the government to appoint personnel to key posts such as Boards or executive positions, in some cases, for many years, leading to a lack of effective direction or oversight of the authorities concerned, lack of oversight and control; and financial irregularities, which arose in some cases because expenditure was incurred outside the remit of the body concerned, and in others because procurement processes were not followed, or expenditure could not be evidenced by proper records.” Veritas said the authorities have been slacking in implementing recommendations of the OAG since 2015. For instance, in 2016, the government had failed to fulfil 40% of the OAG’s recommendations, which rose to 55% in 2018. In 2019, 2020 and 2021, the government failed to fulfill 40%, 55% and 49% respectively of the AG’s report recommendations, compromising public finance management. According to the report, authorities have been repeatedly procuring goods which have subsequently not been delivered in a timely manner, or at all, raising questions on accountability. “In 2018, the OAG reported that the Zimbabwe Electrification Transmission and Distribution Company (Zetdc) has not taken delivery of transformers nine years after making a payment of US$4.9m to Pito Investments. The same contractor was also paid in advance an amount of US$561 935, by the Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC) in 2016 and did not deliver. "In a similar vein, the OAG identified that the ZPC paid ZW$196 000 in 2016 to York International for gas that — by the end of 2018 — had still not been received; the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) made an advance payment of maize worth ZW$1 million in 2016, which had not been delivered by 2018.” The analysis has also shown that the government has been repeatedly losing money due to weak or non-existent financial controls, which has seen funds being spent before the requisite approvals had been obtained, payments being made without supporting documentation; and basic failures in accounting. “This includes failures to consolidate accounts of subsidiaries and to properly record revenue and expenses, assets and liabilities. The OAG’s findings included; failures to maintain adequate accounting policies and procedures, often over a number of years (though, this may also have been indicative of poor governance; the fact that a number of parastatals may have been technically insolvent at the time of audit; and failures to segregate duties of officials charged with financial management, with the result that there may not have been appropriate oversight of their activities. “It is highly likely that pervasive weaknesses in financial controls will have contributed significantly to exposing the authorities concerned to serious risks of fraud, mismanagement and corruption,” reads the analysis. Parastatals have been incurring losses due to non-existent financial controls. For instance, in 2021 the OAG found that the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra) had not allocated US$1.6 billion to client accounts, such that some clients continued to accrue penalties after having paid their tax bills. Weak financial control systems and record keeping has also raised the risk of fraud and corruption, according to the analysis. “During its audits the OAG found a number of instances of fraud or potential corruption across the review period. It also identified significant weaknesses in controls in a large proportion of the authorities it reviewed that exposed the authorities concerned to substantial risks of fraud or corruption,” read the report. “During the 2018 review of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission the OAG noted that there were no supporting documents provided to validate expenditure and payables amounting to US$762 654 and US$254 476 presented in the financial statements; the Mining Promotion Corporation provided no supporting documentation for expenditure totalling ZIM$2.4m. In 2019, the OAG found discrepancies in relation to Mpilo Central Hospital between the physical quantity of inventory (that is, stock) counted and the records of inventory. Quantities that were confirmed were less than what was in the records, leaving a variance of inventory worth ZIM$3.4bn which management had not investigated, and; In 2019, the OAG found that the state-run Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals in Harare lost ZIM$878 784 due to fraudulent processing of cash for personal use. The fraudulent scheme involved an employee making unauthorised debit card payments from the bank account to various entities for his own benefit. Govt departments, parastatals rotten to the core, says Veritas National Railways of Zimbabwe head office in Bulawayo.

Page 10 News NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA WAR veterans have congratulated new minister for War Veterans and Liberation Struggle Affairs Chris Mutsvangwa on his appointment, but have told him to prioritise collaboration with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA). They said this will help to rebuild trust and foster a productive relationship while addressing their welfare issues. Mutsvangwa, who has been on a collision course with war veterans, made a surprise return to cabinet, after he was shoved out as ZNLWVA chairperson in April this year over accusations of unprofessionalism and failure to improve their livelihoods. War veterans have been a vital cog in Zanu PF’s electoral campaigns and have in some cases been accused of using brute force to bolster support for the ruling party, especially in the early 2000s. However, they have constantly been at loggerheads with the government over their welfare, which has been deteriorating following the erosion of their pensions and monthly drawdowns due to hyperinflation. Last month, the ZNLWVA also demanded that President Emmerson Mnangagwa include them in his development matrix, after his re-election in the disputed poll. This week, the war veterans' grouping reinforced its demands, this time to Mutsvangwa, while giving him a chance to mend the severed relations. “Congratulations on your appointment as the Cabinet Minister of Veterans of the Liberation Struggle Affairs in Zimbabwe. This esteemed role presents a valuable opportunity to make a significant impact on the lives of war veterans,” said the ZNLWVA interim executive committee’s publicity and information secretary, Edward Dube. “We recognise that there has been an unsynchronised relationship between the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA) leadership and the ministry in the past. However, we believe that by adopting an inclusive approach, you can rebuild trust and foster a productive collaboration.” ZNLWVA said the inclusive approach should address the needs of war veterans and ensure their overall well-being through policy development, advocacy and representation and access to benefits and support. The war veterans' grouping said Mutsvangwa should collaborate with the ZNLWVA to develop policies that directly address challenges faced by the former freedom fighters, by seeking recommendations based on their first-hand experiences. “The collaboration should recognize the ZNLWVA as a strong advocate for war veterans within the government. Emphasize that you value their role in safeguarding the interests of war veterans and commit to actively involving them in decision-making processes. By working together, you (Mutsvangwa) can effectively communicate and address the concerns, rights, and welfare of war veterans within the government structure,” reads the statement. “Collaborate with the ZNLWVA to ensure that war veterans have seamless access to the programmes and benefits administered by your ministry. Seek their input in designing and delivering benefits, while jointly identifying gaps and proposing improvements to enhance the support provided to war veterans.” The ZNLWVA says Mutsvangwa should also develop initiatives that promote entrepreneurship, skills development, and employment opportunities specifically designed for war veterans to sustain their livelihoods. The grouping has also demanded that Mutsvangwa ensure that social support and welfare services are made readily available to war veterans, which includes healthcare, counseling services, housing and other social welfare programmes. On land ownership, the ZNLWVA said Mutsvangwa should promote access to farming land and residential stands for war veterans. The grouping has also demanded for adjustments to the land tenure system that would see them having long-term access to land. The grouping said Mutsvangwa should also assist war veterans to access affordable housing loans, subsidies, or grants, while establishing partnerships with financial institutions to provide favourable funding terms. “The proposed partnership with the ZNLWVA can address the needs of war veterans and ensure their overall well-being through access to farming land. “Collaborate with the ZNLWVA to facilitate access to farming land for war veterans. Identify suitable agricultural land, provide necessary support in terms of land allocation, secure tenure rights, and assist war veterans with farming inputs, equipment, and training. By ensuring access to farming land, war veterans can engage in agricultural activities, secure a sustainable source of income, and contribute to food security and agricultural development in Zimbabwe,” read the statement. “Advocate for legislative reforms and policies that protect the land rights of war veterans. Collaborate with the ZNLWVA to address land disputes and ensure secure land ownership for war veterans. By securing land tenure rights, war veterans can have long-term access to land for farming, residential purposes, and other productive activities. "Provide agricultural support and training programmes for war veterans who have access to farming land. Collaborate with the ZNLWVA to offer technical assistance, capacity-building workshops, and knowledge-sharing platforms to enhance their farming skills, productivity, and sustainable agricultural practices. Facilitate partnerships with agricultural institutions and provide financial resources to support war veterans in their agricultural endeavours.” War vets' demands greet Mutsvangwa War Veterans and Liberation Struggle Affairs minister Chris Mutsvangwa

NewsHawks News Page 11 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 OWEN GAGARE PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa’s jittery administration has launched a vicious crackdown on the opposition to kill two birds with one stone — stopping any potential post-election revolt while aiming to get a two-thirds majority in Parliament via the backdoor — government officials say. A two-thirds majority is crucial for Mnangagwa, who desires to change the constitution to tighten his grip on power amid talk of possibly extending his tenure beyond 10 years. In the last parliamentary term Mnangagwa, through the Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment (No.2) Act changed the suprreme charter to remove the running mate close so that he has a pliant deputy, while giving himself greater control over cabinet, the Prosecutor-General and Public Protector. The Act permitted the President to promote judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court to a higher court on the recommendation of the JSC, without the need for public interviews, thereby opening the door to promotions on the basis of political suitability and cronyism. It allowed judges of the ConCourt and the Supreme Court to continue to serve beyond the current retirement age of 70, if the President, after consulting the JSC, consented to their doing so. This effectively stripped judges of their security of tenure, thus their independence, since they will hold office from year to year subject to the President’s whim. The crackdown is occurring at a time the police and other security agents are enforcing an unofficial curfew in Harare and Chitungwiza, which has seen security forces either forcing bars and restaurants to close at night or security forces attacking innocent citizens. Mnangagwa has claimed a disputed victory in the 23 and 24 August elections against his bitter rival, opposition CCC leader Nelson Chamisa, who has rejected the result as a “gigantic fraud” and a brazen subversion of the people’s will, compounding the incumbent’s legitimacy problem. The Southern African Development Community’s troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation has also rejected the outcome of Zimbabwe’s recent flawed elections, while other observers gave a sceptical endorsement. Mnangagwa scraped through by a wafer-thin 2.6%, marginally better than 2018, ahead of his close challenger Chamisa. The President got 52.6%, while Chamisa got 44%. Tensions between Zimbabwe and its regional neighbours, especially Zambia, as well as some international community members over the elections are also fueling the current situation. There is a regional uproar over Zimbabwe’s sham elections. Police this week arrested Phelandaba-Tshabalala legislator Gift Siziba and Bulawayo Central MP Surrender Kapoikilu on public order charges. Police also arrested Sunningdale CCC legislator Maureen Kademaunga and charged her with attempted murder, but the case was dismissed in court. Harare deputy mayor Kudzai Kadzombe was also arrested on a charge of assaulting a Zanu PF member on election day. Siziba, a Highlanders Football Club fan, was initially arrested for allegedly inciting the public violence which erupted on Sunday in a suspended explosive league match between topflight giants Highlanders and Dynamos at Barbourfields Stadium in Bulawayo last Sunday. He was arrested for merely posting a picture in a Highlanders jersey, with the caption; "We fear fokol!" on match day. However, it turned out that Siziba was being falsely accused of inciting the public disturbances on the basis of wrong information, as the photo in question was taken at the National Sports Stadium in Harare on 20 May 2023 when Highlanders played Cranborne Bullets. Police however re-arrested Siziba and preferred new charges against him. Law enforcement agents allege he unlawfully defaced election campaign posters belonging to Soneni Moyo, a CCC double candidate who was accused of being fielded by Forever Associates Zimbabwe, a shadowy intelligence-affiliated outfit to divide opposition votes. Zanu PF failed to get the two-thirds majority it sought in Parliament, winning 136 of the 209 National Assembly seats contested, while CCC got 73 seats. A by-election will be held in Gutu West following the death of independent candidate Christopher Mutonhori Rwodzi in the run up to the election. The threshold for obtaining a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly is 186, but Zanu PF managed to get 176 legislators in total. The National Assembly has a total of 280 members, that is 210 elected members, 60 women chosen under the proportional representation (PR) system and 10 youth quota seats. Zanu PF got 136 elected seats, 33 PR seats and seven youth quota seats, totalling 176. The CCC, on the other hand, managed 103 seats in total; 73 elected seats, 27 women PR seats and three under the youth quota. Parliamentarians are chosen in terms of section 124 of Zimbabwe’s constitution. The crackdown is occurring at a time former legislator and Zimbabwe’s foremost political prisoner Job Sikhala has been languishing in jail without trial since June 2022. Government officials say the crackdown is also happening because the Mnangagwa administration fears a post-election popular revolt over disputed results and the economic deterioration. Last Saturday, police raided a popular nightclub in Harare, Eclipse Bar & Grill, on Nelson Mandela Avenue/Third Street just before midnight and other nightclubs as part of the government post-election crackdown to contain simmering social unrest and pre-empt a feared opposition-led revolt. The country’s political and security environment is increasingly becoming repressive and volatile, with basic liberties under threat and more draconian legislation being introduced. The government — evidently paranoid and feeling under siege — is currently running a draconian security operation, mainly in the capital, an opposition stronghold, around the clock to prevent gatherings of people amid fears of an uprising and post-election violence over the disputed recent elections. Zimbabweans say their rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly are being increasingly threatened before, during and after the elections. After the “Patriotic Act” was signed into law in July, the situation is getting worse. It could deteriorate as the Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill, which will further undermine the right to freedom of association if adopted, will soon be signed into law. A source in the Office of the President and Cabinet says the Bill will soon be signed into law. “It will be signed into law soon,” the source said. The authorities have weaponised the law to persecute main opposition CCC members and supporters by subjecting them to arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions and unfair trials. Members of civil society groups are also subjected to arbitrary arrests. As the government escalates its crackdown, police are currently hunting down CCC national spokesperson Promise Mkwananzi over a 2020 court issue. The case was revived soon after Mkwananzi, previously arrested for political activism activities as the leader of pressure group Tajamuka/ Sesijikile, was appointed CCC spokesperson. Last week, police arrested and detained two Harare human rights lawyers Doug Coltart and Tapiwa Muchineripi representing opposition CCC members Womberaiishe Nhende and Sonele Mukhuhlani who were abducted and tortured by state security agents a fortnight ago. The lawyers were arrested on spurious charges of allegedly obstructing the course justice after they informed the police that the victims — their clients — were not fit to record statements due to their mental and physical condition, a position backed by doctors and nurses in attendance. At least 41 independent election monitors were arrested during the recent polls and their equipment seized by police. Realising that the 23 and 24 August general elections had degenerated into chaos and a farce, the government began deploying secret units of security forces, mainly law-and-order police, military intelligence and civilian intelligence, to assess the mood on the ground and manoeuvre to prevent a potential revolt, sources said. This involved a security threat analysis of the situation on the ground by intelligence services which concluded that the post-election environment is volatile, especially because Chamisa and his supporters believe the elections were stolen. Police confirmed the ongoing security operation in two public statements. One law-and-order police unit in plain clothes has been going around in Harare beating up people in bars and restaurants. Zimbabwe’s state security agency, Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) deputy director-general Gatsha Mazithulela was recently caught up in that operation. Mazithulela was assaulted in the early hours of 25 August by a law enforcement unit operating in suburban areas and town, violently closing bars and restaurants while forcing people to go home. Sources said Mazithulela was attacked at Zim Cafe Restaurant, which has two bars inside, at the corner of Kwame Nkrumah Avenue and Fifth Street in Harare, his favourite drinking place in the capital. After storming the bar, a 15-member state security squad, suspected to be military intelligence soldiers, viciously attacked Mazithulela, an academic who is one of the best scientists in the country and former pro-vice-chancellor at the National University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo, leaving him for dead. Zanu PF plots backdoor 2/3 majority Bulawayo Central MP Surrender Kapoikilu Bulawayo Central MP Surrender Kapoikilu

Page 12 NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 BRENNA MATENDERE PERPETRATORS of Gukurahundi massacres in Zimbabwe — many of whom have now died, including the principal architect former president Robert Mugabe, although some key ones still remain — can be held individually criminally liable under international criminal law, a prominent local human rights lawyer says. President Emmerson Mnangagwa is widely regarded as one of the perpetrators, although he has tried to deny personal criminal responsibility over the atrocities. Mnangagwa has of late been trying to resolve the issue, but his initiatives driven by the perpetrators have fallen flat so far. In a 49-page article titled Evaluating the Individual Criminal Responsibility of Gukurahundi Perpetrators under International Law, published by the Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Dr Siphosami Malunga says those who committed the heinous crimes can still be pursued and punished under international law. “In light of the fact that the atrocities committed in Matabeleland and Midlands between 1982 to 1987 constitute international crimes, Gukurahundi perpetrators of these crimes can be held individually criminally liable under (International Criminal Law) ICL,” Malunga says. “In this regard the amnesties granted under national law cannot shield perpetrators from prosecution.” In his article, which is part of his doctoral thesis, Malunga sought to evaluate the individual criminal responsibility (ICR) of Gukurahundi perpetrators under international law. Malunga, who is an international criminal lawyer, also deals with several concepts under which perpetrators can be held responsible and accountable for the killings. Individual criminal responsibility In evaluating individual criminal responsibility, Malunga assessed different modes of liability under international criminal law which include system criminality, commission, co-perpetration, multiple perpetrators, complicity and common purpose, instigation, ordering, planning, aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise, and command and superior responsibility. He applies different elements of these modes of liabilities to the perpetrators of atrocities committed in Matabeleland and Midlands in the 1980s. Although rooted in domestic law, the sui generis nature — uniqueness — of ICR to international law has been explained, as well as the influence it has had on international law jurisprudence through the decisions of international criminal tribunals. System criminality System criminality is used to explore the international crimes committed by the Five Brigade and other state security agencies. The research concludes that the top Zanu leadership, government and the military at the time were liable for co-perpetration, instigation, ordering, planning, aiding and abetting the genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as well as participating in a political and ethnic project design to crush the minority Ndebele population and Zapu supporters in pursuit of a one-party state. Malunga also evaluates the superior or command responsibility principle and finds that a civilian, a political and military leaders that had effective control over the actions of Five Brigade, the Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit and the Central Intelligence Organisation can also be held liable for the crimes committed by these security agencies as they had the authority to prevent and punish the commission of these crimes but failed to do so. The consequence of the establishment of ICR and superior and command responsibility for Gukurahundi perpetrators is an international obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish them for these international crimes via a range of options, including domestic, hybrid and international criminal tribunals. The criminal liability of Gukurahundi perpetrators is evaluated against the legal requirements garnered from conventions, jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals and the work of leading scholars. Firstly, the article provides an overview and historical development of the concept of ICR under international law. Secondly, it examines the theories of criminality under international law. Thirdly, it analyses the forms and modalities of ICR, including relevant specific crimes. Fourthly, it addresses the individual and superior responsibility of Gukurahundi perpetrators. Malunga says the atrocities have been categorised and classified as international crimes — namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity by several writers and international criminal law scholars. In light of the historical and scholarly evidence regarding the crimes, Malunga says it is necessary to interrogate the implications of this evidence on the question of criminal liability of perpetrators pursuant to the international legal obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes. International law provides for the ICR of perpetrators of international crimes and thus Malunga set out to assess whether ICR exists for Gukurahundi perpetrators for international crimes — war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Having established, in broad terms, how ICR with its collective elements has been adopted and affirmed on the international level, the concept of “system criminality”, a term that is often used when discussing ICR in international law, is dealt with. Malunga says system criminality emerged at Nuremberg where unprecedented crimes involved complex matrices. Post-Nuremberg, the issue of collective criminality became prominent. System criminality being systemic, is the fact that the crimes are committed not by one individual, but by a group of individuals. The mulGukurahundi perpetrators can be charged under international law Lawyer Siphosami Malunga News

NewsHawks Page 13 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 tiplicity of actors, each performing a part in the crime, make international crimes systemic and distinguishes them from common crimes. Commission This is a more serious form of criminal responsibility than, for instance, instigating or aiding and abetting. Commission may also occur through participation in the realisation of a common design of purpose. That is defined to include or distinguish perpetrators who physically committed the crime and those perpetrators who planned the crime. Co-perpetration Co-perpetration implies a “division of the essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime between two or more persons in a concerted manner”. Finally, essentiality of contribution is key and a person can be held accountable as co-perpetrator when he/she “could frustrate the commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task”. Malunga says: “. . . planning and designing an attack, supplying the weapons and ammunitions, exercising power to move troops to the field, coordinating and monitoring the activities of these troops implicates the top political and military leadership in Zanu and Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). “The Ministry of Defence, headed by Sydney Sekeramayi supplied the weapons and ammunition used by Five Brigade in committing atrocities. Also, the military leadership in the ZNA, such as the then Lieutenant-Colonel Perrance Shiri who commanded Five Brigade and was deputised by Lieutenant-General Edzai Chimonyo as well as Senior Assistant Police Commissioner Emelio Svaruka and subsequently succeeded by Brigadier-General Emilio Munemo, exercised power to move Five Brigade troops to the field. “The fact that after a meeting between the (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, CCJP) and Mugabe, when a dossier of atrocities being committed by Five Brigade was allegedly presented, there was a change in Five Brigade tactics which saw a decline in atrocities. “This indicates the degree of control that Mugabe had on the actions of Five Brigade. The prerequisite for co-perpetration is a common plan or agreement to commit a crime. In this regard it has been shown that the political leadership of Zanu sought to establish a one-party state and, in the process, eliminate Zapu political support, which was the biggest stumbling block to this objective. “This entails individuals such as the then Prime Minister Mugabe, and senior cabinet ministers such as the then Minister of Defence Sidney Sekeramayi and military leadership such the then Lieutenant Colonel Perence Shiri, Lieutenant-General Edzai Chimonyo, Senior Assistant Police Commissioner Emelio Svaruka and Brigadier-General Emilio Munemo, who allegedly designed and exercised a degree of control of the actions of Five Brigade pursuant to a common plan to eradicate ZAPU’s political support and establish a one-party state, are liable for co-perpetration of the crimes committed by Five Brigade”. Instigation Instigation requires that the instigator actually influence the perpetrator of the crime. A causal link is therefore required between the actions of the instigator and the actual commission of the crime or the criminal actions of the direct perpetrator. By virtue of the organised, widespread and systematic nature of international crimes, instigators of these crimes play a central role in their commission. There is no requirement for the instigator to be the architect, planner or primary designer of the crime, but it is necessary that the crime be committed as a result of the strong encouragement or persuasion by the instigator. To be punishable, instigation must constitute “a clear contributing factor to conduct of the direct perpetrator of the crime”. Malunga says: “It is clear that the top political leadership in Zanu instigated the attacks on the civilian Ndebele population by Five Brigade. Statements by senior cabinet ministers and, most importantly, Mugabe encouraged Five Brigade to go into the Ndebele civilian population and ‘plough and re-construct’. Taken together with the meaning of Gukurahundi, which is ‘the rain that blows away the chaff before the spring rains’ this suggests that the Ndebele population was the ‘rubbish’ which Five Brigade were intent on ploughing or washing away. “Also, after the 1985 election in which Zapu garnered fifteen parliamentary seats, Mugabe told his supporters to ‘go and uproot weeds from your garden’ and this statement was followed by mass violence towards Zapu supporters in Harare. Statements by the then Minister of State Security Emmerson Mnangagwa, in which he said that ‘the campaign against dissidents can only succeed if the infrastructure that nurtures them is destroyed’ saw Five Brigade attacking the Ndebele civilian population as the perceived infrastructure that nurtured dissidents. The then Minister of Home Affairs Enos Nkala also threatened to wipe out the Zapu leadership stating that the ‘...leadership must be hit so hard'.” Ordering Ordering constitutes an abuse of power in that a person occupying a position of power abuses his authority by ordering others to commit crimes. There is no requirement under international law for a formal relationship between the person who issues the order and the one who receives and carries it out. “It is evident that Mugabe had the authority to give Five Brigade orders,” Malunga says. Since Mugabe gave orders to ministers and army commanders, he was therefore liable for the crimes. “There is sufficient evidence that the orders by Mugabe and other alleged high-level Gukurahundi perpetrators had a substantial effect on or substantially contributed to the commission of crimes as envisaged by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals discussed above,” Malunga notes. Aiding and abetting There are two elements of aiding and abetting: first, the accused must lend practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support, and second, which must have had substantial effect. As to the first, aiding/abetting may occur at one or more of the three possible stages of the crime: planning, preparation, or execution. “The elements of aiding and abetting as summarised above implicate the top political and military leadership in Zanu and ZNA. As outlined above, the accused must lend practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support at one or more of the three possible stages of the crime namely planning, preparation, or execution,” he says. Command and superior responsibility The principle of command or superior responsibility is well-established in international law, Malunga says. Under the principle, a superior or commander is criminally responsible for acts committed by their subordinates if they knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. “Applying the elements and requirements of command or superior responsibility to Gukurahundi atrocities implicates all civilian, political and military leaders that wielded effective control over the members of Five Brigade who would be liable for all their crimes.” News

Page 14 NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 RUVIMBO MUCHENJE WHEN Sikhumbuzo Manduna left South Africa for Zimbabwe en route Zambia in his sleek orange Ford Ranger in early August on a business trip to attend to urgent haulage truck issues in Lusaka, he did not know he was heading for a stormy mission across the mighty Zambezi River. It was calm from Johannesburg to Harare all the way to Chirundu on the border with Zambia along the Beitbridge-Harare-Chirundu highway which is currently under renovation; the gateway and route to the interior from the south. Armed with all the documents needed for him to cross borders without any problems – his Ford Ranger is permitted to be driven in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia – Manduna crossed the Limpopo River through Beitbridge into Zimbabwe and spent a few days in the country on business before proceeding to Lusaka on 23 August. When he got to Chirundu, he thought it was going to be a simple procedural sail through into Zambia to meet freighters and loaders of goods for his trucks that ply the Johannesburg-Harare-Lusaka route to cut off superfluous middlemen who were charging unsustainable fees and associated costs for a cost-effective and smooth supply chain. “I left Johannesburg on 9 August and arrived in Zimbabwe the same day to check on my business interests there before proceeding to Zambia on 23 August. When I got to Chirundu, I was relaxed knowing that all my papers were in order. I was driving a Ford Ranger which I had bought through Capitec Bank. All the documents were in order, showing that I had permission from the bank to drive the car through South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia where I do business,” Manduna said. “When my turn came for me to present my papers at the border official, I confidently did so thinking it was just going to be a mere formality because I had everything needed and was pressed for time, but it wasn’t to be. I was ready to hand onto the border official my papers to avoid scrambling and wasting time, but she started asking me a barrage of questions about the car — asking who was the owner, where the papers were and whether or not it was a stolen, things like that. “After some moments, the lady took my papers into her office where she started calling; it would be three hours before she came back to me. At around 18:30 hours she called me into her office. Just when I thought the worst was over, the real ordeal was just about to begin. “Little did I know that for those three hours when she claimed she was checking my papers and verifying to ensure the car was not stolen, she had been organising police from Lusaka to come for me. “As we were arguing on the issue after I had presented my passport, car documents, bank papers, insurance records and company details since the vehicle was registered under my company, police arrived in style with blue lights in a Madza BT50; five police officers, three armed with AK-47 assault rifles. The customs officer pointed at me and said that is the guy claiming to be the car owner. I was shocked by what subsequently followed. Police pounced on me and said I was under arrest. I demanded that on top of the papers I had presented, I should be allowed to call my insurance firm and the agent I deal with, which I did. The insurance explained that the car was legitimately bought through Capitec and they had all the papers, which they were ready to send to the border officials if needs be. All that was rejected.” Manduna added: “Police then told me they were now taking me to Lusaka to deal with the matter because they suspected the car was stolen even when all documents showed that assumption was false. They drove me in their car as they refused me to even sit in my own car. When we got to Lusaka Central Police Station, I was told the boss named Chomba wanted to see me but it could only be the following day which meant I had to be detained in cells, which they did. I was removed from the cells the following day to see the said boss around 9:30am. “Upon his arrival, he was confrontational; he seized my car keys and the car itself, demanding that I should prove the vehicle was mine. I was told the arresting officer was Detective Constable Mthengwa. So we had to restart the process of providing documents all over again. I gave them all the documents, called my insurance firm and showed them emails between the bank and myself, proving that the car was bought through the bank which had to approve my driving of the vehicle outside South Africa into Zimbabwe, then Zambia. “Interpol was also brought into the fray. On Monday, 28 August, Captain Pieter De Villiers sent an email to Lusaka Central Police Station saying the car was not stolen. Remember I had been in detention for five days at that point without a charge. Arbitrary detention. Just imagine the pressure and anger.” De Villiers wrote to Lusaka police: “Very urgent. Manduna Skhumbuzo — ID8110315758184 — was arrested at Chirundu Border Post for possession of an allegedly stolen car and taken to Lusaka Central Police Station. Ford Ranger registration number: LC60PJ-GP, VIN (vehicle identification number) AFAPXXMJ2PPD17647 and engine number YN2QPPD17647 has a bearing on this matter. The vehicle is not listed as stolen in South Africa.” De Villiers then asked Zambian police to assist Manduna to get his car back that he indicated was owned by Capitec through which the driver was still paying for it. He said it was cleared by the bank to be driven out of South Africa from 9 August to 4 September. Documents show the car is registered under Manduna’s company Andiswa Phakade (Pty) Ltd whose address is 315 York Avenue, Ferndale, Randburg, Johannesburg. The company’s trucks park is in Middelburg, Mpumalanga. For seven days, Zambian police refused to release the Zimbabwean-born South African businessman despite providing them with all documents and support from his insurance company and Interpol. Manduna had no choice but to believe that the police were adamant because they wanted to be paid a bribe, which he did not do despite their behaviour suggesting that. “What else was I supposed to think other than they wanted to be bribed? I had provided them with everything they needed, including further documentation they did not even need. I had a valid South African passport; ID, driver's licence, certified copy of vehicle registration papers in the name of the bank and letter of authority from the registered owner of the vehicle — Andiswa Phakade. Because vehicle is still being financed through Capitec, I carried a letter of authority from the bank, which included dates of travel, together with the vehicle licence papers. I also later got police clearance and insurance confirmation. I even provided bank statements to prove everything was legit. Still they detained me.” SA-Zim businessman detained in Zambia for a week over a car A business journey to hell and back . . . Businessman Sikhumbuzo Manduna News

NewsHawks Page 15 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 “The question is: Why should people, a traveller and a businessman like me, be treated like that? Why? I’m doing business in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia; why should I be subjected to this ordeal when I have done nothing wrong and complied with all the requirements? Zambia must not allow its police to treat visitors, businesspeople, like that. This issue must be investigated and action must be taken to send a clear message that the country is governed by the constitution and the law, that there is rule of law and due process matter. “When a country is governed by the supremacy of the constitution, it means it is under rule of law. Surrounding factors such as access to justice, transparency and certainty in a country signify the existence of the rule of law. Due process comes into play once the country has assumed the supremacy of law. “Arbitrary detention of visitors or citizens for no good reason must not be allowed. There should be consequences for that. Today it’s me, tomorrow another person.” Manduna was only released on 31 August after he had hired a lawyer from Milner & Paul Legal Practitioners to fight his case. In a letter to the Inspector-General of Police, the lawyers raised the issue of “unlawful detention” and injustice, demanding their client’s release forthwith. “Our client, a Zimbabwean-born South African businessman has informed us that he was arrested by Zambian police at Chirundu Border Post on Wednesday, 23 August 2023 at gunpoint and taken to Lusaka Central Police Station where he has been in custody till now . . . without any formal charge and has not been taken to court or at all,” the lawyers said. When the lawyers’ letter got to the police, they told Manduna he was being released immediately. But the ordeal was not over at that point: He had to wait until the following day to get his car because they wanted to release under the cover of darkness, which he refused. “I eventually got my car on 1 September and immediately drove off to Zimbabwe en route South Africa. It was a nightmare; I suffered in detention for a week for absolutely nothing, which is totally unacceptable. No one deserves such cruel and inhuman treatment. Zambian authorities must take action against those rogue immigration/customs and police officers if they believe in the rule of law and due process.” One of Manduna’s trucks Manduna’s Ford Ranger News

Page 16 NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 FORMER Croco Motors boss Joseph Matinyarare’s properties have been forfeited to the state after a court established that he acquired them using the proceeds of crime between 2016 and 2020. The exchange rate in 2016 was US$1:ZW$1 but it depreciated over time. This was after Prosecutor-General (PG) Nelson Mutsonziwa filed an application for an order for civil forfeiture of property made in terms of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act. The property consists of two immovables and three motor vehicles. The application for an order for the civil forfeiture of his house in Southlea Park suburb was however dismissed. According to court documents, Matinyarare was a parts manager at Croco Holdings (Pvt) Ltd's Graniteside branch, Harare. The PG said Matinyarare engaged in conduct constituting or associated with serious criminal offences and, using the money obtained from such conduct, bought the property targeted for forfeiture. The PG submitted that he specifically used money realised from the sale of stolen car parts. Matinyarare is already appearing before the magistrates' court on a charge of fraud. It is alleged that he collected spare car parts from Croco Motors' group procurement department using a manual goods out note between September 2019 and September 2020 and, instead of entering the parts into the Croco Motors Graniteside stock, converted the same to his own use. The allegations are that the stock is valued at US$306 851.80. It also is common cause that Matinyarare is again appearing before the same court on a charge of theft. Allegations are that he stole motor vehicle spare parts belonging to his employer, between 1 January 2016 and September 2020. The value of the spare parts is given as ZW$103 656 448.03 of which ZW$8 850 605.05 worth of spare car parts is said to have been recovered. High Court judge Benjamin Chikowero said he was also convinced that Matinyarare had used the proceeds of crime to buy his properties. “Despite his protestations, I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that while employed as Croco Motors' parts manager Graniteside, Matinyarare, during the period in question, was involved in some kind of conduct constituting or associated with the theft of ZW$103 761 568.89 worth of motor vehicle spare parts belonging to his employer of which ZW$ 8 850 605 05 worth was recovered from him. “I have seen the Forensic Audit Report prepared by Caleb Mutsumba, the external auditor. He lays out the basis for his factual findings. “He explains why he concluded that it was Matinyarare who manipulated Croco Motors' system to facilitate the theft of the motor vehicle spare parts (stock) in question,” said the judge. The manipulation took the form of irregular "adjustments" of the stock in the system followed by the physical removal of such, hence the theft. The four factual findings made by the auditor were that there were deliberate "adjustments" of stock by Matinyarare as the identified "user" in the dealership system used by Croco Motors at the material time. There were no business, professional, or occupational reasons for those adjustments. The adjustments of the stock were unauthorised and had the effect of writing off stock from the system. No reasons were given on the more than 1 000 occasions that the stock was written off. The correspondence between physical stock and stock records indicated that what was removed from the system was correspondingly removed from the physical stock. The calculations by the auditor established that Matinyarare caused Croco Motors a financial prejudice of ZW$103 761 568.89 as at 30 October 2020. This amount represents the value of the stolen stock. Ruled the judge: “It is ordered that, the Toyota RAV 4X T4 Registration Number AA JOSTE, the Ford Registration number AFC 8278 and the IVECO Lorry 75E15 Flatbed Registration number AEX9419 be and are forfeited to the State. “Matinyarare shall within the next forty-eight hours do complete and sign all such papers and documents to transfer ownership of the property mentioned in paragraph 1 of this order to which the Sheriff of Zimbabwe, his deputy or assistant shall do so. “The third respondent (Registrar of motor vehicles) shall upon being called upon by the PG do all things and sign and complete all papers and documents necessary to register ownership of the property mentioned in paragraph 1 (Rav4 and Iveco) of this order in favour of the State. “The undivided 2.3250% share being share number 6 in a certain piece of land situate in the district of Salisbury called Stand 2494 Arlington Township measuring 3.0772 hectares held under Certificate of Consolidated Title Number 3111/2017 dated 20 August 2017 be and is forfeited to the State. “The first respondent (registrar of deeds) shall within the next forty-eight hours do all such things and sign and complete all papers and documents necessary to transfer title of the stand in favour of the State failing which the Sheriff of Zimbabwe, his deputy or assistant shall do so. “The registrar of deeds shall upon being called upon by the PG do all such things and complete and sign all papers and documents necessary to transfer title the house in favour of the State,” ruled the judge. Matinyarare denied effecting any irregular adjustments of stock in Croco Motors system. But the judge said this was a bare denial because it was not backed up by expert testimony to contradict what was submitted by the PG through the external auditor. Matinyarare claimed that the adjustment option was inactive, and could only be made with the participation of the Croco Motors information technology department. The judge however trashed his argument. “Considering the period that stock was adjusted, that this was done on more than one thousand occasions and the absence of any evidence that the first respondent reported to Croco Motors information technology department that the adjustment option was inactive, and that it therefore needed to be attended to, I do not accept that the adjustment option in the system was inactive, at all. “That the system could only be activated with the participation of Croco Motors information technology department suggests that it was staff from that department, working with the user of the system, who made the stock adjustments in question. “This suggests also that Matinyarare, even though he was both Croco Motors Graniteside parts manager and user of the system, was all the while ignorant of the stock adjustments. This is improbable. “The question that would arise is what then was he managing, if he, a user of the system, had no control over the movement of the stock both in the system and the physical stock itself.” Matinyarare did not dispute that the police, in the company of Croco Motors Graniteside employees, recovered motor vehicles spare parts worth US$8 850 605.05 from his house in Southlea Park. He insisted that the spare parts, recovered from him, belong to him. However, the court established that the parts belong to Croco Motors, having been identified through the special dealer code belonging to the company by its employees, hence the recovery of the same and the corresponding arrest of Matinyarare. “I think it illogical that the police would countenance a situation where Croco Motors' employees would identify the more than 400 recovered car parts through the Croco Motors dealer code if such code did not appear on those parts. “I think it even more improbable that the police would effect a recovery in those circumstances. “I am fortified in this regard by the fact that despite claiming that he purchased what was taken away from him from other suppliers because he was also involved in the business of buying and selling car parts, Matinyarare neither named those suppliers nor presented documentary evidence of him having purchased those items. “The recovery of the spare parts from his house corroborates the findings of the external auditor that the user of Croco Motors system, Matinyarare, irregularly adjusted stock in the system and stole such stock. “The foregoing simply means that Matinyarare, his spouse and the fourth respondent (Enerst Mukumba) are all not being truthful in saying, in another breath, that Matinyarare sold the Southlea Park property to Mukumba on 7 December 2020. “Any other conclusion would defy common sense and logic,” said the judge. With regards to his Arlington house, court papers show that as at 17 February 2021 Matinyarare had fully paid the purchase price, in the sum of US$677 430, inclusive of value-added tax in the sum of US$88 360-44. He however conceded that his salary as Croco Motors parts manager was insufficient to fund the purchase of this property. Matinyarare’s defence was that sometime in 2019 he obtained an interest-free loan of US$20 000 from Kefas Aleck Manda. He used the loan to pay the purchase price of the property under discussion. Manda is his brother. Manda's affidavits were placed before the judge but there was no evidence to support that this happened. Mukumba, who was joined to these proceedings on 8 March 2023, said he purchased Matinyarare’s Southlea Park house on 7 December 2020 for US$72 000. Matinyarare said he used the balance of US$52 000 (after repaying the US$20 000 loan) to develop the Arlington property. “There is overwhelming evidence that the Arlington property is proceeds of crime. I do not accept that Manda lent US$20 000 to the first respondent. It follows that I reject Matinyarare averments that he used the US$20 000 loan to pay the purchase price for the Arlington Property,” said the judge. The judge said this means that Matinyarare did not receive the averred loan, did not use the non-existent loan to pay the purchase price for the Arlington property, and did not refund that loan, as there was no loan to talk about in the first place. “The first respondent has thus failed to disclose and explain the source of funds used by him to acquire and develop the Arlington property. “I attribute his failure to knowledge on his part that the funding was illicit. The Arlington property, being proceeds of crime, will be forfeited to the state,” ruled the judge. The open market value of the property was put at US$115 000. — STAFF WRITER. Ex-Croco Motors boss property worth over ZW$100m forfeited News

NewsHawks Page 17 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 NATHAN GUMA AT a busy intersection along Seke Road, close to Arcadia suburb, some 2.9 kilometres outside Harare’s central business district, two men emerge from a makeshift bus terminus and dash towards a commuter omnibus that is headed for Sunningdale, a residential area some seven kilometres from the city centre. Wielding truncheons, they accelerate towards the minibus, confident that they have successfully cornered the omnibus. In time, they barricade the bus, and begin hitting the windscreen with the batons, while ordering the driver to disembark from the vehicle. With unease, he hesitates, and slowly winds up his window, ready to take off at the slightest chance — but, he is blocked by traffic. After some hesitation, he concedes, making way for the officer who shoves him aside, while ordering all passengers out. They complete the remaining four-kilometre journey on foot. In all the cat-and-mouse chase, it is the vulnerable stranded commuters who are bearing the brunt of inconvenience, since the police commenced an operation to arrest unroadworthy vehicles earlier this week. On Friday, police said they had made a total of 7 075 arrests, while impounding 3 308 vehicles in an operation codenamed “Tame the Traffic Jungle”, which is running between 12 to 26 September. A further 223 vehicles have also been impounded for moving around without registration plates. The operation is being carried out by the Police in conjunction with the Zimbabwe National Roads Administration (Zinara), Vehicle Inspectorate Department (VID), Traffic Safety Council of Zimbabwe (TSCZ) and urban councils. A snap survey by The NewsHawks this week showed that commuters have been bearing the brunt of the ongoing police-motorist war. For instance, at the commencement of the blitz on Tuesday, some commuters from Chitungwiza were forced to wait for transport more than a kilometre from their usual rank, leading to a hike in fares. In a crisis, motorists charge between US$3 and US$5 for a trip to Chitungwiza's Unit L area. “On Monday, they raked most of the omnibuses in the rank (Charge Office), including those that are registered under associations. Even ours is registered under the Sunningdale Transporters Association, but no one is safe. They are raking everyone. “It is hard to recognise them (police), for they are not usually clad in uniform. This means we have to be discriminate on who we pick on the road,” said a driver who spoke to The NewsHawks. Some commuters have had to trek for long distances into the central business district as they are being dropped off at non-strategic points. For instance, commuters from Warren Park are at times being dropped off at the Harare Showgrounds, which is a 2.5-kilometre walk to the city centre. In some instances, commuters have been caught up in violent dispersals by police, raising an outcry. However, according to a briefing by the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) seen by The NewsHawks, the blitz has been targeting motorists promoting lawlessness on roads countrywide. “Some drivers cause chaos on the roads by driving against one way, oncoming traffic, through red robots and lane violations. Pirate taxis commonly known as mushikashika and kombis have almost taken over the passenger service industry and are plying the roads with impunity. They recklessly drive through red robot-controlled intersections. “Heavy vehicles are crossing within towns and cities, disregarding the use of outlying designated routes, thereby causing congestion. Plateless motor vehicles are plying the country roads with impunity. It is difficult for law enforcement agency to identify owners of unregistered vehicles after committing such crimes as they are not on the Central Vehicle Registry (CVR) and CID (VTS) databases. “Some government vehicles and posh cars have joined the band wagon of not fitting registration plates and reckless driving practices. A lot of Public Service Vehicles are unroadworthy and do not have legal documents such as passenger insurance, route authority and certificate of fitness,” reads the memo. Police have also been intensifying their post-election crackdown to contain simmering social unrest. For instance, last week they raided a popular nightclub in Harare, Eclipse Bar & Grill, on Nelson Mandela Avenue/Third Street just before midnight as the government intensifies its post-election crackdown to contain simmering social unrest and pre-empt a feared opposition-led revolt. In the operation last week, police went around central Harare searching for open bars, clubs and restaurants. At Nando’s on Samora Machel Avenue, police details shouted at people should to leave and go home. They targeted customers ordering food at the 24-hour fast-food outlet. They have also been moving around residential suburbs ordering people to stay indoors. Police enforce traffic blitz, commuters feel the pinch News

Page 18 News NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 RUVIMBO MUCHENJE BULAWAYO'S newly-elected mayor, David Coltart, a veteran politician who once served as Education minister, has come up with a cocktail of measures to restore Zimbabwe's second-largest city to its former glory. He admits that it will not be a walk in the park, but he hopes that after his five-year term, the city will be better off than now. Refuse collection Bulawayo used to be one of the cleanest cities in Africa, but is now an eyesore. The city has been infested with street vendors and heaps of litter. Coltart has promised to take it one day at a time to restore cleanliness in the City of Kings. “My first priority is to try and clean up the city, it is in an absolutely disgusting state with litter everywhere, with open sewers and tied into that are several allegations of corruption. So we need to clean up the city and that involves working obviously with municipality departments and also dealing with local businesses and residents,” he said. He said the best way forward is to have everyone on board to clean the city. “Initially we have to adopt a character approach to ask the residents and businesses to clean up their own surroundings to help us, but, then inevitably we are going to have to move towards enforcement of the city bylaws where they are breached, that posts obligation to some residents not to litter and to keep their own premises tidy and clean and so that is an absolute priority,” said Coltart. Once clean, the city will ensure that the standard is maintained by incorperating recycling in refuse collection and punish all errant elements. “Obviously once we have had a go in cleaning up the city, we are going to try and keep the city clean and we have to look to recycling programmes whereby unemployed people who collect bottles and the like can be paid for the delivery of such plastic bottles. Hopefully, get them recycled and try to attract investment into the city of a private company that does recycling of plastic and then ultimately we are going to have to enforce the law, revisit the bylaws to make sure that there are stringent penalties imposed for people who litter and even harsher penalties for people who dump, for example building waste,” he said. Water Perennial water rationing has made life difficult for residents and business operators. This has been mainly because the city lies in a dry region, but Coltart says the city’s water supply should gradually improve. “Bulawayo’s water supply remains a constant worry and because of the relatively poor rains this past rainy season and because of the danger of El Niño forming in the Pacific and a drought, this is a major priority area,” There was much touting of the Second Republic’s efforts to build the Lake Gwayi-Shangani in order to ease the water crisis in the city, but Coltart says the dam will not offer the relief sought. “In truth, the Gwayi-Shangani project will not provide any short to medium term solution and so whilst we we are grateful that that dam is being built, the reality is that it's going to cost an enormous amount of money to pump water from Gwaye-Shangani to Bulawayo. “The initial capital cost of installing the pipeline is also going to be enormous and it does not appear as if central government has any meaningful plan in that regard. As I have said just now, even once the pipeline pumping stations are in, the cost of pumping water all the way from Gwayi-Shangani to Bulawayo is going to be essentially expensive,” said Coltart. His plan is to see how to maximise on the existing dam infrastructure. “So we have to look at our existing dams and our existing water reticulation system. I am told by our engineers that our water reticulation system is at least 40 years old. It is collapsing in many areas, it needs a programme of rehabilitation because there is a vast amount of water which is simply lost through leakages and the like,” said Coltart. “Then turning to the [existing] dams, there are proposals to try and utilise our largest dams efficiently, that is Insiza, and I have already started talking to our engineers to look into how that water can be utilised more effectively,” he added. He called for resilience and discipline in water use among residents as the plan takes shape. “So none of these issues are overnight solutions. We are going to have to encourage the residents of Bulawayo to save water in whatever way they can so that we do not face a crisis next year,” he added. Sewage Closely related to the issue of water is that of water reticulation and sewage that has become a menace in communities. “Tied to that is the issue that I have raised before, regarding our sewage works which are not functioning properly and the use of treated water which of course others use for human consumption but is used for such issues as keeping Barbourfields soccer stadium quickly watered along with, you know, school grounds and the like and that saves water and that needs to be addressed. Sanitation and health Sewage bursts are not only an eyesore and heavy on the nose, they are breeding grounds for diseases. Coltart has also promised to capacitate the city with the needed ambulances, taking into consideration the financial constraints. “Once we have stabilised matters, there are several pressing issues. The most pressing issue from a health perspective is to get our sewage plants running. I have been advised by our engineering department that most of our sewage plants are running way below capacity, we are discharging raw sewage into Umguza River, which is creating a really serious health hazard. So we need to tackle that. “Then tied into that is the issue of ambulances that we only have five of the city’s required number of ambulances functioning and only four fire engines against the city’s requirement of 10 and so that is an obvious area of priority; it needs to be addressed “Once we go beyond that, we have to start working on the city’s roads, and the city’s businesses and buildings and infrastructure after we have addressed these preliminary issues,” said Coltart. Corruption Bulawayo, like many other local authorities, has been at the centre of corruption storms, but Coltart will not have that in his team. “Tied to that is to address the scourge of corruption. I have received numerous reports regarding corruption. Of course I don’t know whether they are valid or not, but those reports are there and one of the first things I need to do is to look at existing contracts to then see how they were entered into and to make sure they were actually entered into correctly and where they haven’t and if we are able to legally try to terminate those contracts in the best interests of the citizens of Bulawayo,” he said. Mayor Coltart unpacks his vision for Bulawayo Bulawayo’s newly-elected mayor David Coltart

NewsHawks News Page 19 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 XXXXXXX SANDAWANA Mine, owned by Kuvimba Mining House (KMH), has been granted temporary relief after a private mining company, Avoseh Investments(Pvt) (Ltd), was interdicted from extracting lithium ore in its territory. The two companies are squabbling over boundaries, with Sandawana claiming that Avoseh is mining lithium from a 25-hectare block falling within its mining claim. Sandawana and Avoseh have two other cases filed separately pending before the High Court. In the latest development, Sandawana filed an urgent application at the High Court seeking an interdict against Avoseh, arguing that it is encroaching onto its claim. Sandawana, cited as the applicant in the court papers, has a registered mining claim 'Lith 15' (Registration Claim GM 8172 BM). On the other hand, Avoseh has a registered mining claim 'Sandawana AV8' (Registration Number 17332BM). As a result of the encroachment squabble, there is a mining area which is disputed between the two parties which each party claims to be its area. When the confrontation began, Sandawana approached the Midlands mining commissioner. This was after noticing that Avoseh was still extracting lithium from a disputed area. The provincial mining director then investigated the case and gave a determination in favour of Avoseh. This was on 24 April 2023. The commissioner said Sandawana had failed to maintain its beacons in breach of section 51(7) (beaconing of locations) of the Mines and Minerals Act. Sandawana was then ordered to confine itself to its original beacons. Sandawana then took the matter to the High Court for review. Sandawana in its appeal argued that the provincial mining director has no jurisdiction to determine the dispute and that his findings were grossly unreasonable. The mine also filed a court application for a declaratory order under case number HC 3572/23 seeking a nullification of the Avoseh claim. On the other hand, Avoseh also filed an application for a declaratory order under HC 4766/23 wherein it is seeking an order for the nullification of Sandawana’s 'Lith 15' mining claim. The three matters were consolidated under HC 4770/23 and are pending. It is on this basis that the applicant is seeking an anti-dissipation interdict in order to bar Avoseh from continuing with the extraction of lithium pending the determination of these matters. “The ground for this is that Avoseh’s claim was registered on ground which was not open to prospecting and pegging and that the registration was done in violation of the environmental management laws,” read court papers. Sandawana said it risks being prejudiced if Avoseh continues mining its lithium. In a recent judgment High Court judge, Justice Esther Muremba ordered Avoseh to stop its mining activities on the claim. “The applicant is perfectly entitled to bring an application for review to this court. “I am therefore satisfied that the applicant has thus established that it has a prima facie right to have the dispute between the parties determined to finality. “Clearly the interdict that the applicant is seeking is justified. The interdict is also important in that it protects the applicant's interests in the mineral pending the outcome of the review application. “It is common cause that right now the first respondent is continuing to mine on the disputed area. “If this continues, lithium being a finite resource will be exhausted. It means that if the judgment in the review matter turns in favour of the applicant, that judgment will be a brutum fulman (an ineffectual legal judgement). “Therefore, it is my considered view that it is necessary to grant the application so as to preserve the res litigiosa pendente lite. “I am satisfied that there is no other satisfactory remedy other than the interdict being sought which will preserve the res litigiosa (interim interdict for stay of execution) and immediately arrest the harm that the first respondent is causing,” she ruled. In opposing the application, Avoseh said it is carrying out all its mining operations lawfully. Avoseh said Sandawana must establish that it has “a prima facie right, even if open to doubt; that an infringement of such a right is imminent; that it will suffer irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted; that there is no other satisfactory remedy and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of such an interdict.” Avoseh also said for it to carry out mining operations on its mining claim, it satisfied all the requirements set out in the Mines and Minerals Act. It said as such it is carrying out all its mining operations lawfully. The respondent also submitted that an interdict cannot be granted to stop lawful conduct. Through its lawyers, Avoseh also argued that it has a clear right to the lithium ore that it is mining on its registered claim. Also cited as respondents in the matter were Mines permanent secretary, Mines minister and the Environmental Management Agency. Sandawana wins temporary relief

Page 20 NATHAN GUMA THE campaign by African civil society groups against trophy hunting, including the Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG), is gaining traction, with the Hunting Trophies (Import Prohibition) Bill that bans the importation of hunting trophies now at committee stage in the British House of Lords, The NewsHawks has learnt. In June, CNRG director Farai Maguwu was among 103 wildlife conservation experts throughout Africa — including Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe — who sent an open letter to members of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords, urging them to support a Bill to ban the importation of hunting trophies to the UK ahead of a parliamentary debate on the issue. While several pressure groups have been in support of the Bill, first passed by the House of Commons in March this year, the British trophy hunting industry has mounter a well-resourced counter lobby campaign in an attempt to preserve the practice of trophy imports. According to a committee stage briefing seen by The NewsHawks, the trophy industry has been positioning trophy hunting as “a necessary evil”, claiming that it generates vital revenue for community development and local conservation efforts. This has seen amendments to the Bill being proposed to allow hunters to continue to import trophies, including of endangered animals such as elephants, rhinos and polar bears, if they can meet certain criteria around purported "conservation benefit". However, civil society says trophy hunting has not been beneficial to host communities, worsening conflict and poverty. “The purported benefits of trophy hunting to local communities are highly exaggerated. Trophy hunting makes up only a tiny fraction of economic activity, estimated to be as low as 0.03% of GDP across 8 trophy hunting nations in southern Africa. Of this small percentage, often very little makes it to the local households,’ according to the committee stage briefing by civic society “Removal of animals can have ripple-effect negative conservation impacts, such as increases in infanticide in territories where male lions are killed, and the disruption of complex social or territorial structures of animals including African elephants and leopards. Trophy hunting has also been linked to other negative impacts including genetic erosion, as animals are taken out of the gene pool, and phenotypic changes (alterations of physical characteristics) e.g., horn size.” It added: “These impacts in turn can also compound other threats that species face, including climate change, habitat degradation and poaching. Trophy hunting industry claims that funds derived from trophy hunting reduce poaching, are also generally unfounded.” As previously reported by The NewsHawks, trophy hunting has been worsening human-wildlife conflict in Zimbabwe, while increasing the wanton killing of elephants. The country has been losing close to 1 000 elephants per year to killings, according to CNRG director Maguwu. “It is very serious in that every year we put up about 500 elephants for slaughter by trophy hunters. The hunters usually target the biggest of elephants in the herd and then take whatever they want as a trophy back to their country,” Maguwu told The NewsHawks. “It is a practice that is very much supported by many governments in Africa, and they say that it is meant to sponsor conservation. Governments give licences for people to come and do that. "So, this is a very endemic problem in that every year, at least 500 elephants are put up for trophy hunting. Add to that, we have got poachers which means that we may be losing at least 1 000 elephants per year. Very soon, elephants will be an endangered species.” Maguwu said local communities are also bearing the brunt of hunting and poaching activity. Zimbabwe has an estimated 82 000 elephants, which is more than twice the national target population envisaged in the 1980s. The population has grown exponentially since the 1990s, but illegal killings have continued. The increase in the elephant population has put a strain on resources and has led to increased conflict between elephants and humans. In 2022, a total of 60 people were killed by elephants in Zimbabwe, compared to 72 in all of 2021. Zimbabwe’s overtures to pull out of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites) have also been projected to increase the wanton slaughter of endangered species such as elephants and rhinoceros mostly by criminal syndicates. African groups oppose trophy hunting NewsHawks News Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 21 TAWANDA KAROMBO INNBUCKS started as an app to receive loose change at some restaurants. Now, it’s a licensed microfinance institution. InnBucks was launched as an app to pay back loose change at popular restaurants like Nando’s and Chicken Inn, amid a shortage of small denomination currency notes. Now, it offers digital payment services and loans. The app features a wide range of financial products and services, including savings accounts, mobile wallets, microloans, mobile banking, and value-added services such as airtime. It is Zimbabwe’s most popular free financial sector app on the Google Play store. On a chilly July afternoon in Chitungwiza, a town 25 kilometers from Harare, Tanaka Diza stood in a queue for nearly 20 minutes to withdraw US$20 in cash. This was not a queue at an automated teller machine or at the bank. Instead, it was outside a quick-service restaurant where Diza could get cash using Innbucks, an app launched in 2021 by restaurant operator Simbisa Brands to pay back loose change to customers. “Today, there was a short queue,” Diza told Rest of World. “I think it’s because of the increased popularity of the service. I prefer Innbucks because you can even use it to buy food and get change, and their charges are a bit reasonable.” Getting back loose change after a purchase is a big challenge in Zimbabwe, as there are no coins and few smaller denomination notes in circulation. To address this issue, traders and retailers would give out sweets, condoms, and coupons in the past. Innbucks was built to solve that challenge at Simbisa’s restaurants, which include the local outlets of Nando’s, Chicken Inn, and Steers. Over the years, however, InnBucks has become one of Zimbabwe’s most popular fintech platforms. It allows users to load money in dollars, make digital payments, transfer money to other Innbucks users, and even get loans. In 2022, Innbucks received a license through a partnership with Ndoro, a microfinance bank, which allowed it to operate as a deposit-taking financial institution. The app currently has 1.8 million users, Simbisa CEO Daisy Zinyemba told Rest of World. It ranks as Zimbabwe’s most popular free financial sector app on the Google Play store. “We offer a wide range of financial products and services, including savings accounts, the mobile wallet, microloans, mobile banking, and value-added services such as airtime,” Zinyemba said. “Users can pay for products and services through our various merchants, send and receive money from loved ones, buy airtime, and soon they will also be able to pay various bills like electricity, school fees, insurance, and many more.” According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Innbucks was one of only four financial institutions that reported profits in 2022. As per the central bank report, it has a core capital base of US$5.35 million, making it one of the largest financial institutions in the country. Several Zimbabweans, like 21-year-old Beatrice Kuwengwa, use the Innbucks app to pay their bills and make purchases. “I asked them to credit my change into my Innbucks wallet because I will use it later or send it to someone or buy airtime for myself,” she told Rest of World. “It’s better than being forced to buy something I don’t need from the restaurant because it then means I have spent money I did not want to use.” Digital wallets are wildly popular in Zimbabwe, where most of the population is currently unbanked. In a country of about 16 million people, only 5.9 million debit cards and fewer than 16 000 credit cards have been issued, according to Zimbabwe’s central bank. There are also fewer than 650 000 Internet banking users in the country. Meanwhile, an estimated 7.1 million mobile wallets are operational in Zimbabwe. When it comes to digital wallet services, Innbucks has gone beyond Simbisa’s restaurants. “We have Innbucks integrated and as a means of payments for our ride-hailing and delivery service,” Patrick Manyangadze, CEO and founder of ride-hailing and food delivery startup Hwindi, told Rest of World. “Innbucks removes the change issue as users are able to pay exactly what is charged. For us, as a company, we are also able to pay our drivers instantly.” Innbucks’ deepening reach in the fintech space has led to run-ins with regulators. In April 2022, Zimbabwe’s central bank shut it down over claims that it did not have proper licenses. The ban was lifted four months later after the app was granted a license to operate as a deposit-taking microfinance institution. Even as platforms like Innbucks — and its main rivals EcoCash and O’Mari — gain popularity in Zimbabwe, experts believe there’s still more work to be done to improve financial inclusion in the country. For instance, the central bank began issuing gold coins in 2022 and also announced a digital currency backed by gold earlier this year. “Agents and merchants must be connected to any of these platforms, and if there are no takers because of barriers such as poor network reach and limited smartphone penetration, then it will result in financial exclusion,” Kinyanjui Mungai, senior research analyst at the Centre for Financial Regulation and Inclusion (Cenfri), told Rest of World. “More needs to be done to boost digital financial inclusion in Zimbabwe and in developing the real economy and supporting businesses.” — Rest of World. How Zim’s biggest fast food firm became fintech solution NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 News

Page 22 International Investigative Stories A DATA leak from Finaport, an asset manager based in Zurich, shows the firm worked with clients that included politically exposed persons, two Russians accused of embezzling funds from a bank they owned, and a businessman accused of insurance fraud. On the surface, the client roster of the boutique Swiss investment firm Finaport Holding might appear exceptionally clean. Between 2017 and 2019, the company — which manages bank accounts, companies, and other assets for its wealthy clients — filed just two alerts of suspicious transactions to the Swiss regulator, according to an internal audit. Yet over that same period, Finaport represented over a dozen clients who had high-level political connections, were accused of corruption, or were facing criminal charges. These customers included a former Afghan minister fired amid corruption accusations, a Peruvian politician connected to the massive “Car Wash” bribery scandal, and the son of a former Uzbekistan intelligence chief. But many of those with the clearest red flags were Russian. Finaport said the information in the leak was an “arbitrary, out-of-date and incomplete selection,” and that “drawing conclusions from it for Finaport’s business activities leads to false and/or misleading insinuations.” Leaked correspondence showed that Finaport employees were willing to push back against due diligence requests from banks — sometimes in strong language. In 2016, when an employee of the investment bank Julius Baer wrote to Finaport to ask questions about the source of one client’s wealth, a senior Finaport employee wrote back with apparent incredulity. “This is not even ‘compliance’ – it’s pure harassment,” the employee wrote. “This is getting ridiculous… Where has the ‘can do’ spirit and common sense gone…? [The client] will be leaving with its assets to a Bank in [Liechtenstein] over the coming days. Shall I congratulate them?” Forwarding the exchange to a colleague, he wrote: “That’s the kind of crap they make us deal with.” (Finaport said the employee was frustrated because he had been asked for the same information multiple times and that it would be wrong to draw conclusions about “an insufficient compliance culture at Finaport or even breaches of due diligence from this one-off incident.”) With fewer than 50 employees, Finaport says its aim is to “preserve wealth and generate income” for its clients by “striving to invest in a highly ethical and sustainable way.” It was not possible to establish from the leak how many transactions Finaport oversees or processes for its clients every year. But compliance experts said many of the transactions found by reporters should have at least raised red flags, and prompted an alert to the Swiss Money Laundering Reporting Office, known as MROS. Swiss law requires wealth management firms like Finaport to report transactions to MROS if they have “reasonable ground to suspect that assets involved in the business relationship are connected to an offense,” or if funds or assets involved may be the “proceeds of a felony.” The leaked documents were posted International InvestigativeStories Missed red flags: Leak exposes Swiss firm’s work for clients accused of fraud, corruption NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 A Yugra Bank depositor protesting in Moscow. Credit: Nikolay Vinokurov / Alamy Stock Photo

International Investigative Stories Page 23 online briefly by Russian hacker group ALPHV in February. They were obtained by Swiss Television (RTS) and shared with reporters at OCCRP, Le Monde, and Der Spiegel. Reporters then obtained court records, searched commercial databases, and interviewed anti-money laundering experts, academics, and activists to corroborate and interpret the leaked data and to confirm the backgrounds of Finaport’s clients. Presented with some of the investigation’s findings, a Swiss compliance expert, who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of retaliation, said that asset managers have the same compliance obligations as banks, and that some of the due diligence checks done by Finaport were not up to the standards required by the Swiss financial authority. Reached for comment, Finaport said it was a “pure asset manager,” which “carries out asset management activities exclusively on the basis of powers of attorney limited to administrative actions.” It said that the company adhered to “all legal standards relevant to the company” and that its compliance with regulations was examined in annual audits. Finaport acknowledged that it had provided services to “a very small number of clients who were classified as Politically Exposed Persons.” “We had and have at all times a comprehensive picture of our clients and beneficial owners of the assets under management. We have always had and continue to have the necessary certainty that the assets under our management did not originate from predicate offenses to money laundering, or were under the control of criminal organizations,” it said. “When in doubt about this, we have consistently implemented the legal requirements for such situations.” Draining a Bank Leaked documents show that Finaport’s higher-risk clients were sent for additional review to Alexander Rabian, a lawyer at the Zurich firm Streichenberg who was chief adviser to Finaport’s compliance department. An internal email from 2018, seemingly explaining company procedures to a new employee, said that Rabian typically took “no more than 15-20 minutes to review” prospective client dossiers, as long as all the necessary documents were included. Contacted by reporters, Rabian said he had carried out “second reviews” of previous checks on potentially higher risk clients. “I always sent incomplete files back to the compliance department and customer advisers for completion, even several times if necessary. In some cases, it was in fact possible to study and assess a perfectly prepared file in 15 to 20 minutes — provided that the situation was simply manageable despite a possible increased risk,” he said, adding that it typically took much longer. The leaked documents show that one of the clients reviewed and approved by Rabian was the Swiss company Radamant Finance AG, owned by Belarusian-born father and son duo Yuri and Alexei Khotin. Nicknamed the “secret oligarchs” in Russian media reports, the Khotins owned more than one million square meters of Moscow property, including the Four Seasons hotel, according to a 2019 Forbes report. Through Radamant, the Khotins also owned a now-defunct Russian bank, Yugra Bank, which rose from a small regional lender to become one of the country’s larger banks under their management. A senior Finaport executive, Hellmut Schümperli, was appointed Radamant’s sole director in May 2016 after the company passed a “successful due diligence” process. An unsigned shareholders’ resolution dated November 29, 2016, authorized Schümperli to “execute” a series of 22 payments worth $587 million from Radamant’s account at Yugra to a Cypriot company called Bittos Logistics Enterprises Ltd. Reporters were unable to verify whether the resolution was ultimately approved, but Radamant’s financial records show the payments were made, and that the arrangement was discussed in multiple subsequent emails. The shareholders resolution says the money would be sent in connection with “agreements on purchase and sale of promissory notes ,” but offers no other details. At the time of the drafted resolution, the Khotins were allegedly draining Yugra of over two billion euros and stashing a fortune in Cyprus companies, according to claims made by the state deposit insurance agency in a civil case in a Russian District Court. The case is ongoing. Reporters found no evidence that Finaport would have known about the embezzlement accusations against the Khotins while they carried out the Bittos transfers. Tom Mayne, a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford specializing in anti-corruption regulations, said it was “difficult to see the economic rationale” of the transactions, given their size and structure. And, by mid-2017, it was clear that Yugra was in financial trouble. In July that year, the Russian Central Bank issued a statement saying it had revoked Yugra’s banking license. The story was picked up by Reuters, which reported the Central Bank’s claim that Yugra’s “business model was based on lending to projects linked to its owners, and that it had conducted suspect transfers.” By September 2018, Yugra was declared bankrupt. But Finaport continued to work with Radamant — and, by extension, the Khotins — until mid-2019. The suspension of Yugra’s license for suspected transfers and loans to its owners, and the financial collapse of the bank “should have been clear signs to Finaport that extra care should be taken regarding transactions related to Yugra, including enhanced due diligence,” Mayne said. But a leaked December 2018 document shows Finaport worked on an arrangement for Radamant to forgive Bittos’s debt in exchange for shares in three Cypriot companies. On paper, these three companies were valuable. Their annual reports claimed they owned the rights to eight oil fields in Russia, worth billions of dollars. But none of them, or their holding company, Hazapour Ltd., had a bank account or funds of their own, according to a separate email from Rabian. The reports also claim the companies obtained the rights to the oil fields for just 129 to 131 euros each in September and October 2018 — just as Yugra was going bust. The documents offer no explanation for the low price. In a separate letter found in the leak, Rabian worries about the legitimacy of the companies, their assets, and the deal. “Despite our repeated requests, no reliable information regarding the economic viability of [the three] companies has been sent to us,” Rabian wrote. He also noted that parties to the deal appeared to be closely linked to the Khotins, and suggested that the Khotins themselves may be behind Hazapour and the Cypriot firms. “The controllers / beneficial owners of [Hazapour] are identical to the controllers / beneficial owners of Radamant or are at least close to them,” he wrote, adding that “doubts may be raised as to whether Radamant’s acquisition of the shares in the companies was carried out in accordance with the principle of ‘dealing at arm’s length.’” Finaport cut its ties with Radamant in July 2019, though internal Finaport records show it did not raise any MROS alerts that year. Rabian continued to work on the deal in his capacity at Streichenberg law firm until at least 2021, leaked emails show. It is not clear if the deal was eventually concluded. When asked about specific clients, Finaport directors said they could not reply because they were “subject to professional secrecy protected by criminal law.” The Khotins did not respond to requests for comment. Multiple Identities A few months before the Russian Central Bank revoked Yugra’s banking license, it also suspended the licenses of insurance companies belonging to businessman Alexander Kondratenkov. Two years later, in August 2019, Russia’s Ministry of Justice charged Kondratenkov with embezzlement, alleging he had committed insurance fraud. The case is ongoing. (Kondratenkov did not respond to requests for comment.) By the time he was charged, Kondratenkov had fled. His current whereabouts are unknown. The leaked documents reveal how Finaport helped Kondratenkov set up Swiss bank accounts under a second, Chilean identity. In an October 2018 memo, a Finaport staff member managing Kondratenkov’s account explained that his client had one account at Bank UBP under his Russian name, and another at Bank Mirabaud under his newly-obtained Chilean name, Alexander Garcia Feskov. (According to the memo, the name was a variation on a combination of Kondratenkov’s Chilean-born father’s original name and his mother’s maiden name.) With Finaport’s help, he managed to move several million dollars from Russia to Switzerland and then into his “Garcia Feskov” accounts at Mirabaud, internal documents show. The leaked documents show Finaport started working with Kondratenkov, and helped him open bank accounts under his Chilean name, before press coverage of the allegations against him appeared. But by August 2019, Russian media had covered the case extensively. The newspaper Kommersant, seen as one of the country’s leading dailies, reported that Kondratenkov was charged with fraud “on a particularly large scale.” The reports apparently alarmed staff at Bank Mirabaud, who blocked an $800,000 transfer made on Kondratenkov’s behalf due to “compliance concerns.” Finaport wrote another memo, dated November 2019 and addressed to the bank, dismissing the news reports. Finaport said the Russian outlets covering the case were “junk” press, and claimed that Kondratenkov was not the owner of the company at the heart of the scandal. (A Russian court judgment this year confirmed that the company was in fact Kondratenkov’s.) Yet Mirabaud filed an alert to the Swiss anti-money laundering authorities in mid-November, and closed all Kondratenkov’s accounts between January and March 2020, according to a source close to the matter who was not authorized to speak on record. Even before the embezzlement accusations, Kondratenkov’s use of multiple identities should have been a red flag, a former agent at French anti-money laundering agency Tracfin told reporters after reviewing their findings. “Although it isn’t prohibited to have two passports, having two distinct identities is highly questionable,” the former agent said, requesting anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press. Kondratenkov’s trial is ongoing, and he is still wanted by Russian authorities. Russian media reports and court documents obtained by reporters have placed him variously in London and an upscale French Alpine town since 2020. Meanwhile, Finaport’s internal records show that the firm continued to classify Kondratenkov as a “low risk” client until at least May 2020, long after the charges against him in Russia became public knowledge. Leaked records show the firm was still working on behalf of his wife as recently as April 2022. Rabian, the lawyer, told reporters Kondratenkov was not currently a Finaport client. “On the basis of what we have been able to find in public sources, we have serious doubts as to whether Alexander Kondratenkov has been the subject of criminal proceedings in Russia that meet the guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights,” he added. Political Family One of Finaport’s most important clients, judging by the value of assets under its management, was Liubov Komissarenko. Born in Ukraine In 1977, Komissarenko had only just completed her studies in Moscow in the mid-2000s when she started setting up construction companies, including assembly service providers and a distributor of technical equipment for water supply. A Finaport due diligence document from 2022 said that Komissarenko had started out making windows before taking a bank loan to move into larger-scale developments. What it failed to mention was that her company has also received public contracts issued by a Russian stateowned company run by her romantic partner, Alexander Ponomarenko. (Not to be confused with the sanctioned billionaire port and banking businessman of the same name.) A 2018 “know your customer” form Komissarenko submitted to Finaport said the two had been “life partners” since 2003. A lawyer responding on behalf of one of Komissarenko’s German firms said the relationship ended “several years ago.” Ponomarenko was appointed the head of Russia’s largest sewage provider, Mosvodokanal, in 2012, which then gave Komissarenko’s company millions of euros worth of contracts. The lawyer responding for Komissarenko’s German firm denied that she benefited significantly from these contracts, and said that she made her wealth independently through real estate and construction. Ponomarenko did not respond to requests for comment. Komissarenko became a Finaport client in November 2014. Ponomarenko’s daughter Natalia became a client in December 2016, followed by Natalia’s husband in July 2017, then Andrey, Komissarenko’s son from an earlier marriage, in December 2017. By the end of 2022, the various Ponomarenko-linked bank accounts managed by Finaport held a total of $46 million. (None of the family members responded to requests for comment.) Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine put European bankers on even higher alert when offering services to Russian or Russia-linked clients. It has been “enormously dangerous” to open accounts or manage assets for Russian clients, Viktor Winkler, a sanctions expert and expert witness in Germany’s parliament, told OCCRP’s media partner Paper Trail Media. The “corridor” in which such services can legally take place is “very, very narrow,” Winkler said. “Within this enormously narrow corridor, comprehensive, exhaustive checks have to be made and numerous safeguards implemented.” In October 2022, an employee at the Swiss bank Reyl emailed concerns about incomplete information in Finaport’s due diligence file on Komissarenko — and particularly about her link to Ponomarenko. The email also flagged a public report that claimed Ponomarenko “helps [Komissarenko] in obtaining the necessary state contracts.” The Reyl staff member also noted that Finaport did not disclose that Komissarenko has Russian citizenship. It’s not clear from the leaked emails how Finaport responded or whether Reyl took any further action. Finaport declined to comment on specific clients. Reyl said that the bank “has always acted, and continues to act, in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations, and has no further comment.” Ponomarenko himself does not appear to have been a Finaport client. Since February 2022, Mosvodokanal has supported Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, including by encouraging its workers to go fight. One video posted on Vkontakte, a Russian social media platform, says that Mosvodokanal staff who sign up for military service will be given guarantees that their jobs will be safe until their return, and that they will enjoy “all the same benefits as military personnel.” “The company scrupulously follows the fate of all those at the front,” the video states. — Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 24 International Investigative Stories NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 Lindemann family returns 33 long-sought ancient statues to Cambodia Billionaire George Lindemann showcased his collection of Khmer treasures and passed them on to his children. But investigations by ICIJ and others traced many of his prized antiquities back to pillaged sacred sites. In one of the most significant repatriations of art to Cambodia from a private collection, the family of billionaire George Lindemann has agreed to turn over 33 ancient statues that officials say include stolen antiquities trafficked to the United States. Lindemann’s stockpile of Khmer relics was once hailed as “one of the greatest collections of Southeast Asian art in private hands.” But investigations by ICIJ and others revealed many of the 10th to 12th-century statues — which once adorned his Palm Beach mansion, and later his daughter’s home in San Francisco — were likely looted from Cambodian sacred sites and smuggled to the U.S. by disgraced art collector Douglas Latchford. For decades, Cambodia has been on a worldwide hunt for relics pillaged from the country during years of tumultuous civil war. Among the objects recovered from the Lindemann family, according to U.S. prosecutors, is a long-sought statue of Dhrishtadyumna stolen from a temple in Koh Ker, an ancient city known for its carved sandstone masterpieces. The agreement states that the family will voluntarily return the statutes and will not face criminal charges. It stipulates that prosecutors will void the deal if they determine the family “knowingly provided false, materially incomplete, or materially misleading information with respect to the location of the antiquities.” In 2022, an investigation by ICIJ, Finance Uncovered and the Washington Post matched several Khmer relics showcased in archival magazine photographs of Lindemann mansions to the Cambodian government’s list of most-wanted missing cultural treasures. A double-page spread in a 2021 edition of Architectural Digest showed the lush courtyard inside the San Francisco home of Lindemann’s daughter, Sloan Lindemann Barnett, and her husband, Roger Barnett, with a number of empty pedestals. ICIJ found that a set of Khmer stone heads, depicting gods and demons, had been edited out of the photo. “Some of these statues are of enormous historical and cultural importance to Cambodia and should be repatriated as soon as possible,” Phoeurng Sackona, the country’s minister of culture and fine arts, told ICIJ last year. In Cambodia’s national museum in Phnom Penh, the sandstone statue of Dhrishtadyumna, a celebrated warrior, is represented by a genuinely empty pedestal. The missing statue belongs to a set of nine depicting a battle from a Hindu epic, according to scholars. “It’s hard to overstate the importance of this statue to Cambodia,” Bradley Gordon, the head of Cambodia’s antiquities investigations team, told ICIJ. “It belongs in the national museum.” During ICIJ’s reporting, the Lindemann family did not respond to multiple requests for comment. Adam Lindemann, one of George Lindemann’s two sons, also did not respond to a request to comment on the repatriation. Lindemann senior, a gas and oil executive, died in 2018 aged 82. He and his wife, Frayda, were major forces in the art world as collectors and donors to museums such as New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photographs seen by the New York Times reportedly show the couple traveling to Cambodia in the 1990s to meet with Latchford and to acquire Khmer relics. The Lindemann family’s agreement with prosecutors comes amid a streak of high-profile returns and settlements tied to the British-born art collector, who oversaw a booming business selling relics taken from Cambodia and its neighboring countries — a trade prosecutors have alleged amounted to antiquities theft on a massive scale. Latchford died in 2020 but, in June, his estate agreed to pay $12 million and return a 7th-century bronze statue in a record forfeiture. In early 2022, tech billionaire James H. Clark, the co-founder of Netscape, agreed to return 35 relics from his private collection, including a monumental sandstone sculpture that once adorned Koh Ker and bronze sculptures from nearby Angkor Wat. All had passed through Latchford’s hands. Clark told ICIJ he had displayed the objects in a Miami Beach penthouse he owned before moving them to a Palm Beach storage unit, where they remained for more than a decade before he turned them over to authorities. “I kept wanting to bring parts of it out,” Clark said of the collection. “The decorator we’d use for any place we had, he wasn’t excited about it.” The push to recover allegedly stolen relics from private collections and some of the world’s top art institutions has been led by a team of Cambodian researchers who have worked closely with officials in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as well as prosecutors in New York. “It is an incredible feeling here in Cambodia as the news starts to spread,” Gordon, who heads the team, told ICIJ of the Lindemann return. “We have so much to learn from these artifacts, and we thank the Lindemanns for making the right decision.” — International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. A photo of the Lindemanns’ Palm Beach home, as featured in a 2008 edition of the Architectural Digest magazine.

Page 25 The NewsHawks is published on different content platforms by the NewsHawks Digital Media which is owned by Centre for Public Interest Journalism No. 100 Nelson Mandela Avenue Beverly Court, 6th floor Harare, Zimbabwe Trustees/Directors: Beatrice Mtetwa, Raphael Khumalo, Professor Wallace Chuma, Teldah Mawarire, Doug Coltart EDITORIAL STAFF: Managing Editor: Dumisani Muleya Assistant Editor: Brezh Malaba News Editor: Owen Gagare Digital Editor: Bernard Mpofu Reporters: Brenna Matendere, Ruvimbo Muchenje, Enock Muchinjo, Jonathan Mbiriyamveka, Nathan Guma Email: [email protected] SUB EDITORS: Mollen Chamisa, Gumisai Nyoni Business Development Officer: Nyasha Kahondo Cell: +263 71 937 1739 [email protected] Subscriptions & Distribution: +263 71 937 1739 Reaffirming the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and media freedom as the cornerstone of democracy and as a means of upholding human rights and liberties in the constitution; our mission is to hold power in its various forms and manifestations to account by exposing abuse of power and office, betrayals of public trust and corruption to ensure good governance and accountability in the public interest. CARTOON Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe The NewsHawks newspaper subscribes to the Code of Conduct that promotes truthful, accurate, fair and balanced news reporting. If we do not meet these standards, register your complaint with the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe at No.: 34, Colenbrander Rd, Milton Park, Harare. Telephone: 024-2778096 or 024-2778006, 24Hr Complaints Line: 0772 125 659 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] WhatsApp: 0772 125 658, Twitter: @vmcz Website: www.vmcz.co.zw, Facebook: vmcz Zimbabwe Hlupheko, Dambudzo Mnangagwa's nepotism Dumisani Muleya Hawk Eye NewsHawks Editorial & Opinion Issue 148, 15 September 2023 AFTER "winning" a shambolic election, Emmerson Mnangagwa has proceeded to appoint arguably Zimbabwe's worst cabinet since 1980, while unleashing a vicious crackdown on the political opposition. The brazen appointment of his son and nephew as deputy ministers has outraged even Zanu PF's most diehard supporters. Mnangagwa is moving from one calamity to another. Soon — and as the fragile economy is already reminding us — his electoral legitimacy deficit will find full expression in a performance legitimacy crisis, with devastating consequences for the country’s long-suffering citizens. Mnangagwa’s legitimacy crisis is largely manifesting in two catastrophic ways: firstly, the electoral legitimacy crisis which has tormented him as a direct consequence of his sham 2018 and 2023 "victories". Secondly, he is captain of a doomed ship, vulnerable to economic storms, political tsunamis, and now in real danger of a perilous shipwreck. At the basic level of governance, the Zanu PF regime has shown an astonishing incapacity to reform. It is spectacularly incapable of accomplishing the practical goals of sustainable economic stabilisation and growth. The nexus between legitimacy and good governance in the Zimbabwean context cannot be ignored. Zanu PF has perfected the art of stealing elections. Since 1980, it is difficult to point at any national election and say with certainty that it was free, fair and credible. Elections have become a hollow ritual for repeatedly legitimising and institutionalising a patently undemocratic regime. Delimotation is tinkered with, electoral law is subverted, the police arbitrarily ban opposition meetings, state media shuts out alternative voices, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission lacks independence. All this is deliberately tailored to achieve a predetermined electoral outcome: the perpetuation of Zanu PF misrule, by any means necessary. The persecution, arbitrary arrest and illegal detention of opposition MPs is meant to create a one-party state. After Nelson Chamisa and the CCC succeeded in preventing Zanu PF from clinching a two-thirds majority in Parliament, the ruling party's clueless hardliners have concluded that the only foolproof way of consolidating their system of autocracy is to decimate the opposition. They are convinced that without legislative or parliamentary opposition, Zanu PF would have carte blanche to entrench authoritarian kleptocracy. But at what cost to national survival? Mnangagwa is pushing the country deeper into dangerous strife. The arbitrary arrest of 10 opposition legislators and councillors in barely a week is alarming—further confirmation of Zimbabwe’s plunge into the cesspool of unmitigated dictatorship. In view of what is clearly a worsening crisis, the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) and the African Union should not continue wasting time in decisively tackling this matter before it is too late. The Sadc Election Observer Mission has demonstrated commendable leadership in compiling an objective, truthful and refreshingly honest report on Zimbabwe’s shambolic 23 and 24 August polls. That report is a reality that cannot be wished away by desperate Zanu PF propagandists. We have seen how some of the excitable apologists are now recklessly fomenting bilateral tensions between Zimbabwe and Zambia. Their efforts are in vain. The Sadc report is a multilateral regional document, not the product of a bilateral tiff as mischievously portrayed by unsophisticated agent provocateurs. Mnangagwa will not salvage legitimacy by crudely arresting and intimidating opposition legislators and councillors. Quite the opposite; the more he unleashes the coercive state apparatus and clumsy lawfare upon the opposition, the further he reduces his image into tatters. The world is watching. Impunity has limits

Page 26 New Perspectives LEADERS of the world's richest and most powerful countries attended the two-day G20 Summit in India's capital New Delhi on 9 and 10 September. The bloc currently accounts for 80% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and 75% of international trade. Its members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. This is the first time India hosted such a powerful group of world leaders. The capital was adorned with ornamental flowers and fountains at traffic roundabouts while public buildings and sidewalks were given a fresh coat of paint. But of importance are the signals from the messages of the world’s richest countries. In the realm of cold, hard facts, the G20 summit, while not without its merits such as the inclusion of the African Union, has, regrettably, left much to be desired. This gathering, when assessed in the context of two pressing and pivotal issues demanding the utmost attention from its participants of climate change and the intricate matter of sovereign debt restructuring, has been nothing short of lacklustre and disheartening. Despite exhaustive talks in past years, the G20 nations have yet to reach pragmatic and harmonious resolutions of both crucial matters. In the New Delhi declaration, there was a notable absence of fresh commitments to reduce coal usage compared to the previous Bali summit. However, the declaration did introduce the creation of a Green Hydrogen Innovation Centre, a pledge to triple renewable energy production by 2030, the initiation of a global biofuels alliance, and a shift in the discourse on finance from billions to trillions, signalling some progress on critical environmental fronts. Within the joint statement, the G20 summit grappled with an array of issues encompassing climate financing, the global debt conundrum, institutional overhauls like the World Bank, and the inception of a fresh “green development pact” among its member nations. What was once envisioned as a forum primarily aimed at tackling pressing concerns such as food security, debt governance, and climate transformation has morphed into a multifaceted arena for navigating the intricate tapestry of global geopolitics. The summit’s lofty aspirations have been marred by deepening schisms, most notably exemplified by the ongoing Ukrainian crisis. These divisions have hindered the G20 nations from forging a consensus, even on the most fundamental matters. The G20 summit marked a notable milestone with the inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member, symbolising a rare instance of consensus among global economic giants. Yet, despite this heartening development, concerns about the summit’s unity and the challenges surrounding the crafting of a joint declaration persist. It is a triumph for the AU, whose fully-fledged entry into the G20 is a significant accomplishment. China emerged as a prominent supporter of the AU’s G20 membership, emphasising the AU’s potential to assume a greater role in global governance. This admission stands as a beacon of progress toward the reforms advocated for in various spheres, including the United Nations Security Council and multilateral financial institutions. The G20’s welcoming embrace of the AU reflects a positive step towards a more inclusive and reformed global order. The heartening addition of the AU as a permanent member of the G20 marks a rare moment of consensus among the world’s major economic giants. Yet, it does not conceal the persistent concerns over unity and the hurdles in crafting a joint declaration that continue to loom large. The AU’s inclusion signifies progress, but it also serves as a reminder that even in the grand stage of global diplomacy, unity remains an elusive goal, and consensus often requires delicate manoeuvrings and compromise. Nevertheless, the road to a final statement was far from smooth, with the contentious matter of Russia’s actions in Ukraine causing friction. The compromise reached, while not ideal, allowed for an official statement to be signed off. However, achieving this consensus required a delicate dance, notably involving the tempering of language regarding Russia’s conflict in Ukraine. The recent G20 summit stands out as one of the most challenging in the forum’s nearly two-decade-long history. Crafting the declaration consumed nearly 20 days prior to the summit and an additional five on-site. Discord not only revolved around Ukraine but also spanned crucial concerns like climate change and the shift toward low-carbon energy. However, the Ukraine conflict proved to be the most contentious issue in these intricate negotiations. Until the eleventh hour, an unsettling void had occupied the joint statement regarding the Ukraine conflict at the G20 summit. The section dedicated to the “geopolitical situation” had eerily remained empty. European nations had been fervently pushing for strong language to denounce Russia’s incursion, but the stalwart opposition from Russia and China persuaded them from any mention of the war. Such diplomatic wrangling, emblematic of the complexities inherent in international gatherings, underscores the arduous task of balancing divergent interests and viewpoints within the G20’s ambit. It is a reminder that even within the realm of global diplomacy, the power of words and symbols carries immense weight, capable of shaping the narratives and directions of our interconnected world. Amid widespread scepticism, there hung a cloud of doubt over the release of a final communiqué at the G20 summit, a scenario that would have marked a historic departure and dealt a blow to the prestige of the G20 itself. However, defying all dire predictions, the leaders of the Group of 20 nations managed to piece together a consensus statement on the first day of the two-day summit, though not without revealing the deep-seated divisions within their ranks. The compromise on the Ukraine conflict’s vocabulary was notably diluted, a stark reminder of the palpable tensions among these global power players. The final statement, released just a day before the summit’s formal conclusion, emphasised the “human suffering and negative consequences of the conflict in Ukraine” without explicitly blaming and naming Russia. Instead, it invoked the UN charter, stressing that “all states should refrain from using force or threats to acquire territory, infringe on territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of any state, and deeming the use or threat of nuclear weapons unacceptable.” In stark contrast, the Bali declaration had directly referenced a UN resolution condemning “the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” and expressed that “most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine.” This shift in language reflects the intricate diplomatic squabble occurring within the G20, where achieving consensus often necessitates carefully chosen words that tread a fine line between acknowledging realities and preserving delicate relationships. In a dramatic move on the sidelines of the summit, India  unveiled a multinational rail and shipping endeavour connecting India, the Middle East, and Europe. This strategic corridor, involving India, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Israel, and the EU, poses a formidable challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to enhance trade, energy access, and digital connectivity in the region. Simultaneously, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, also announced a “Trans-African Corridor” linking Angola’s Lobito port with landlocked regions, including Kananga in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia’s copper-mining areas. US President Joe Biden lauded this African initiative as a “game-changing regional investment,” emphasising their collective significance as monumental strides forward. Interestingly, it appears that both the corridors have been announced by the US, in collaboration with India and the EU, in a haste to challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative without any proper working and planning. Notably, crucial project specifics such as funding, geographical locations, and timelines remain undisclosed, raising questions about the thoroughness of the planning process. As per Amos Hochstein, Biden’s coordinator for global infrastructure and energy security, over the next 60 days, dedicated working groups will craft a comprehensive plan and establish precise timelines. The initial phase will focus on pinpointing areas requiring investment and interconnecting physical infrastructure across nations. Hochstein assured that these plans will be implemented within the coming year, paving the way for financial arrangements and the commencement of construction. So, these corridors were announced in haste as an “election campaign” strategy as both Narendra Modi and Joe Biden face elections next year and both need a flashy slogan for their election campaigns. The G20 undeniably serves as a crucial platform for addressing global issues, and its character is evolving with the growing influence of developing nations like China, South Africa, India and other African countries. This expansion of voices within the G20 is diluting the once-unilateral dominance of Western narrative. In response, the US appears poised to assert itself, aiming to reclaim a commanding role within this multilateral mechanism, all in pursuit of its grand strategy of great-power competition. Many are cautious of the US attempts to mould the G20 to serve its own interests, seeing it as a bid to re-assert Western hegemony. As the world becomes more multipolar, the G20’s dynamics continue to shift, and the global stage becomes more complex, the path forward for international cooperation remains anything but straightforward. *About the writer: Kaduwo is a researcher and economist. Contact [email protected], call/WhatsApp +263773376128 Observations on G20 summit Econometrics HawksView Tinashe Kaduwo NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 26 NewsHawks Issue 76, 15 April 2022 Business MATTERS NewsHawks CURRENCIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE USD/JPY 109.29 +0.38 +0.35 GBP/USD 1.38 -0.014 -0.997 USD/CAD 1.229 +0.001 +0.07 USD/CHF 0.913 +0.005 +0.53 AUD/USD 0.771 -0.006 -0.76 COMMODITIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE *OIL 63.47 -1.54 -2.37 *GOLD 1,769.5 +1.2 +0.068 *SILVER 25.94 -0.145 -0.56 *PLATINUM 1,201.6 +4 +0.33 MARKETS *COPPER 4.458 -0.029 -0.65 BERNARD MPOFU SMARTING from a hotly-contested presidential election, Zimbabwean leader Emmerson Mnangagwa appointed his new cabinet and ordinarily there would be movers and shakers. Finance minister Mthuli Ncube has been appointed at the benevolence of Mnangagwa after he lost in Bulawayo's Cowdray Park constituency to the opposition CCC. When he was appointed in 2018, he did not have political clout. There was a stronger lobby by hawkish Zanu PF stalwarts seeking to block his appointment. He has come back more vulnerable. Analysts say although he has been retained as a technocrat, he is now a defeated election candidate and a presidential loyalist at the mercy of his boss. To make things worse, Mnangagwa has assigned his son to shadow Ncube. He will be forced to toe the line and listen to a deputy with no track record of financial engineering. His permanant secretary, George Guvamatanga, a seasoned banker, is a close ally of the President's top advisor Kuda Tagwirei and Ncube. This, according to critics, may render Ncube too powerless to rein in Tagwirei's interests should they cost an arm and a leg for Treasury. Critics say issues that need independepent policy will be difficult to implement. Leon Africa chief executive Tinashe Murapata says Ncube’s job is unenviable. “The man we must feel sorry for is Professor Mthuli, the new Minister of Finance and Investment promotion. Given a larger portfolio, yet a lame duck,” Murapata said. “He is expected to pass all knowledge to his apprentice, yet make no decision of his own. Everything that happens at Treasury, especially the closed-door meetings, will have a direct participant that reports back to the President. “The President made a snide remark during the election period, about local professors who can’t cook their own local mopani worm delicacy. Many interpretations were given, but I believe it only revealed the policy tensions between Treasury and the President.” With limited latitude to appoint just seven non-elected ministers, the odds of landing a non-constituency cabinet slot appeared daunting to many. But for some ministers such as Zimbabwe’s top diplomat Frederick Shava, retaining his portfolio was almost certain. After forming his first cabinet following the ouster of the long-serving former president Robert Mugabe, Mnangagwa handpicked a few “technocrats” to help him govern. Former Mimosa Mining Company chief executive and past Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe president Winstone Chitando was tasked with leading the Mines ministry. Olympic gold medalist Kirsty Coventry took charge of the Sports portfolio while Cambridge University-trained economist Ncube was trusted with the national purse. Amon Murwira, a full professor in aerospace earth observation, satellite remote sensing, geographic information science and global satellite navigation systems (GNSS), unmanned aerial vehicle (drone technology) applications and geospatial intelligence took oath of office to run the Higher and Tertiary Education ministry. Fast forward to 2023 election. Chitando and Ncube threw their hats into the ring, hoping to shake off the unelected minister’s tag. It paid off for Chitando after he narrowly beat veteran journalist Mathew Takaona for the Gutu seat. The same cannot be said for Ncube. After investing enormous resources, time and energy to win the hearts and minds of Cowdray Park residents, he lost. Critics say Ncube made a tactical error by contesting in a traditional opposition stronghold, the City of Bulawayo, instead of opting for a rural constituency. Now with the election gone despite calls challenging Mnangagwa’s legitimacy, Ncube, who has faced turbulence since his appointment, can expect more battles ahead. Being one of Mnangagwa’s blue-eyed boys, Ncube essentially retained his Treasury role albeit with a bit of tweaking to it. Before the polls, his ministry was officially known as Finance and Economic Development. Mnangagwa has since changed it to Finance and Investment Promotion. Judging by past United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad) statistics, Zimbabwe has a long way to go in catching up with regional peers in attracting foreign direct investment. A few months before the 23 August general elections, Ncube announced fiscal and monetary policy measures to save the Zimbabwe dollar from collapse, raising eyebrows over Treasury’s overlapping roles on traditional central bank duties. Among the measures, Treasury now funds the Zimbabwe dollar component of the 25% foreign currency surrendered by exporters, in order to eliminate the creation of additional money supply. The foreign currency collected from the 25% that is surrendered will now be collected by Treasury and utilised in servicing the foreign currency loans assumed from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Banks will no longer withhold any foreign currency surrendered by exporters, and all the liabilities to the banks will be settled through Treasury. Economists and market watchers say Ncube should focus on few important things to make Zimbabwe restore its yesteryear glory. Prosper Chitambara, a senior researcher at the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, a think-tank of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, said the head of Treasury should immediately focus on macro-economic stability, improving the investment climate, fiscal consolidation and taxation and an overhaul of state-owned enterprises. “We have faced macro-economic challenges for a long time, but over the past few months we have seen a bit of stability, but that stability must be sustained through both fiscal discipline and also monetary discipline,” Chitambara said “Stability is paramount. I think now is the time to roll our sleeves and begin in earnest to implement what we have agreed on, especially around governance and institutional reforms.” Tackling Zimbabwe’s debt is another isdue that Ncube will grapple with. Walking the talk on political reforms which are seen as an elephant in the living room when engaging with creditors and the international community is one hell of a test for Ncube. “The President feels ambushed by the debt arrears clearance and restructure,” Murapata contends. “Treasury dalliance with African Development Bank president Akinwumi Adesina and former Mozambique president Joaquim Chissano saw very scathing remarks from the gentlemen on economic and governance issues. The President does not like to be openly embarrassed or criticised. The chemistry between Mnangagwa and Chissano was weak to non-existent. Adesina, with his orthodox economics and dandy attire, would be equally off putting. “Treasury debt report missed the all-important narrative of a growing economy. In fact, it showed a declining economy in trouble. ZimStat's blended inflation makes no sense, least to a professor of mathematical finance. But this was done to assuage the principal. The President rewards mythmaking.” A few months before the elections, Mnangagwa said he preferred the mono-currency system to the current monetary system where the dollar now constitutes nearly 80% of all transactions. Ncube as an economist would not want this, fearing the worst could happen. But he has to toe the party line and sing the tune of ultra-nationalism. “In February 2019, the Government of Zimbabwe introduced a local currency as a mono-currency. They had a clean slate to manage the monetary affairs of the country,” Murapata said. “Within three years, the new currency had lost 99% of its value. Today it dithers, known for breaking world records as worst performing currency. Yet today, GOZ believes it can go it alone and restart the 2019 experiment of a new currency. Why should anyone believe that this time it will be different? Why is GOZ hell bent on this trodden road?” To demonstrate Ncube's losing influence, a few months before the elections, Mnangagwa blocked his proposal for a 10% tax on mining exports to pay arrears on the country’s debt overhang — which makes it difficult for the government to borrow more money — fearing that it might lead to a sudden dwindling of exports and the resultant revenue decline. President rewards mythmaking as Mthuli Ncube retains post Finance minister Mthuli Ncube

Page 28 Companies & Markets NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023 BERNARD MPOFU THE Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) says South Africa is now more strategically positioned to fully realise the benefits of the continent’s free trade area than neighbouring Zimbabwe due to Pretoria's deepened relations with Brics. Brics is an acronym referring to the developing countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which are identified as rising economic powers. Other countries that have expressed interest in joining include Argentina, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain and Indonesia, along with two nations from East Africa and one from West Africa. Zimbabwe, which endured two decades of Western isolation, is now looking elsewhere to stimulate economic growth. The southern African country is upping its dependence on Brics countries as a source of much-needed financial support after concessional funding from traditional international financial institutions (IFIs) dried up due to non-payment of arrears. Last month, South Africa hosted the Brics summit and Zimbabwe has expressed interest in joining the group as the country seeks to promote South-South cooperation. SouthSouth cooperation refers to the technical cooperation among developing countries in the Global South. “South Africa is now strategically positioned to leverage on Brics to extend this advantage over other AfCFTA [African Continental Free Trade Area] countries. Brics has an interest in the AfCFTA and they see South Africa as one of the gateways into the region, especially by taking advantage of market access opportunities to be availed to South Africa,” the CZI says in its post-Brics summit report. “Russia is also shifting its attention away from countries that were part of those that imposed sanctions on it and they are interested in developing the capacity of Brics countries to match the G7 and G20 countries for them to be at least competitive partners. Thus, it is offering technical support, including ensuring that logistics in Brics countries become innovation driven, for example railways and shipping industries for ease of trade among the Brics countries. This means that South Africa can enhance its competitiveness well ahead of Zimbabwe by having this support from Russia, given that logistics are also a significant cost driver.” The CZI noted tgat Brics is also trying to help member countries advance in the digital economy, with the focus being now in ensuring that a skills base emerges that is able to drive the future anchor for growth, which is 6G network-based industrialisation. “The Brics countries are currently working on strategies to deepen agriculture trade among themselves. It was noted that one of the reasons as to why the trade is generally low is that there are phytosanitary barriers to trade and these are being looked at across the countries with a view to removing them,” the CZI notes. “Ensuring that there are no barriers to trade in agriculture products is thus one of the agenda items under Brics. This also means that as South Africa works on improving its trade environment to suit Brics countries, it can easily get some competitive advantage over Zimbabwe-produced products.” ZIMBABWE’S property sector took a knock during the first six months of the year as the country battled a floundering economy, industry experts have said. Rising inflation, a weakening domestic currency and power outages slowed down economic growth, prompting the authorities to introduce a cocktail of measures to restore stability. Ahead of a property sector conference slated for next month, experts and players have called for strong policy which promotes inclusivity. The 2023 edition of Zimbabwe’s most prominent real estate and property conference, ZIMREAL, will be held on 27 September. The event will bring together property developers, investors and practitioners from both the private and public sectors. The theme for this year’s conference is “thriving across uncertainties” — a timely conversation whose focus will be navigating an operating environment that has been beset with currency volatility, inflation and subdued confidence. “The state of the economy in the first half of the year, mirrors developments in the real estate sector which has not been spared the economic headwinds that have had an effect on rental income,” said Siza Masuku, a real estate expert with Knight Frank. “However, we have seen a number of corporates, such as financial institutions, channelling significant investments into suburban office developments as a way of hedging their balance sheets. There is also an intensification by institutional investors and other high-networth individuals towards the development of cluster houses, showing the resilience of the real sector during this period.” Kenneth Sharpe, chief executive of WestProp Holdings, said the resilience means the sector has the potential to underpin overall economic recovery. “The growth trajectory for Zimbabwe resides within the real estate sector. Apart from performing its time-honoured role of an unmatched store of value, property development has a multiplier effect on the entire construction value chain,” he said. “For example, it can create employment across the board in allied industries, including brick moulding, cement and furniture manufacturing, timber and steel supply, amongst others. “We believe that bringing together private developers and investment experts, who have expertise, talent and the right risk appetite, with government and public officials, responsible for creating the enabling and conducive policy environment, will see the sector grow in leaps and bounds,” Sharpe said. Masuku said he expects the upcoming conference to provide insights on how investors and developers can leverage opportunities to preserve their rental income. “With the national housing backlog standing at more than 1.5 million, investment in affordable low-cost housing remains key, and we have noted that a sub-sector of upmarket residential cluster developments is also growing and is a good investment,” Masuku explained. “Smaller-sized industrial space of up to 500 square metres remains in demand. Refurbishment and reconfiguration of existing stock into smaller units is also a good opportunity to enhance rent income.” Topics on the conference agenda include real estate investment trusts (REITs), tourism real estate, infrastructure development and commercial retail property. — STAFF WRITER. Property sector takes a knock: Experts SA leverages on Brics ties to reap AfCTA benefits

NewsHawks Companies & Markets Page 29 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 BERNRAD MPOFU THE extension of a duty-free waiver on basic commodity imports will lead to a sharp decline in sales for fast-moving consumer goods businesses such as Hippo Valley as debate on protectionism rages on. Rising inflation and a weakening dollar prompted the government to temporarily suspend duty on basic goods like sugar. But some manufacturers are now raising the red flag, saying such measures may paralyse the domestic industry. Zimbabwe’s sugarcane is grown under canal irrigation in the lowveld area with 80% of production coming from Triangle Sugar Estate and Hippo Valley Estate. The main irrigation dams for the sugar industry are Tugwi-Mukosi and Mutirikwi. Experts say dam levels are marginally lower in 2023 relative to 2022 but sufficient for irrigation purposes for the next two seasons. According to a new research note on agriculture by IH Securities, Zimbabwe currently has 19 varieties of sugarcane, with 450-500 hectares dedicated to the production of seed cane to replace 12% of cane area annually. Area under cultivation for sugar cane increased 6.7% to 79 722 hectares for the 2022/2023 farming season. 3 300 hectares of new sugarcane fields to the initial 4 000ha are being developed under the Kilimanjaro project which will contribute to production upside in the medium term. Cane production in 2023/2024 is estimated at 3.45 million metric tonnes (mt), with 2% of the harvest going to ethanol production while the balance goes to sugar mills. “Total industry sugar production for the 2023/24 season is forecasted at 457,210mt, up 4.56% year-on-year,” IH says. “However, the re-instatement of import duty suspension on basic goods is likely to continue to hamper domestic sugar sales for local processing companies.” The two main sugar mills in the country are based at Hippo Valley Estates and Triangle Estates with a combined installed milling capacity of 4.8 million metric tonnes of sugar cane and sugar production capacity of 640,000mt “National sugar production over the past 20 seasons has been averaging 422,000mt, pointing to under-utilisation of capacity. The average sugar/cane ratio in the industry is 12.1%. Zimbabwe consumes 24kg per capita of sugar versus peers at 17.2kg/capita. Domestic sugar demand has been largely impacted by import duty suspension on basic goods, including sugar,” the report says. According to Hippo Valley Estates, 5% of local market share was lost to import brands due to pricing advantage. Exports of raw sugar were largely supported by the Kenyan market, absorbing 60,630MT of a total 86,617MT in the 2020/21 season. Kenya has since reduced its duty-free import quota, with Zimbabwean exports to the country dropping to nil. Consequently, aggregate raw sugar exports fell 77% to 19,992 for the 2021/22 season. RAYMOND Ackerman, the South African retail tycoon and founder of Pick n Pay, has died aged 92. He leaves his wife, Wendy, children Gareth, Kathy, Suzanne and Jonathan, his 12 grandchildren, and four great-grandchildren. Ackerman came from a retailing family with his father, having founded Ackermans after World War I. He founded Pick n Pay in 1967 along with Wendy after buying four stores in Cape Town. From the outset, he lived by the values that the customer was queen. These values guided the business for over 56 years, and today the Pick n Pay Group serves millions of customers in more than 2 000 stores across South Africa and seven other African countries. By the end of the 1970s, he was active in the newly-established Urban Foundation, becoming a prominent champion of equal opportunity policies and merit-based salaries and wages, and increasingly critical of government’s homelands policy, the Group Areas Act and Job Reservation. He was also critical of sanctions, in the belief that they destroyed jobs and deepened poverty. In 2004, Ackerman established the Raymond Ackerman Academy for Entrepreneurial Development in partnership with UCT, which was later joined by the University of Johannesburg. Well over 1 000 graduates have come through the Academy through the combined programme in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The academy has produced hundreds of new business owners, many of them offering employment to others, while well over 400 of its graduates are now gainfully employed. The programme has now been centralised in Joburg and has expanded to an online offering accessible to students across the continent. In 2009, he was the founder of the Raymond Ackerman Golf Academy at the Clovelly Country Club, where aside from teaching the discipline and techniques of golf, the youth are provided with access to emotional support and life skills, as well as school and homework assistance. By the time Ackerman finally retired and handed the chairman’s reins to son Gareth, Pick n Pay was operating 20 hypermarkets and 402 supermarkets across South Africa, while group turnover stood at almost R50 billion. — IOL. ‘Duty-free imports to derail local firms’ Life, times of Pick n Pay founder Raymond Ackerman: 1931-2023 Pick n Pay founder Raymond Ackerman

Page 30 News Analysis BRENNA MATENDERE PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government is heading for monumental failure in steering the country out of the grinding economic and political crises, political analysts have warned. Mnangagwa, who staged a smash-and-grab electoral victory in the 23 and 24 August elections that were largely condemned by the regional bloc Sadc as well as other international observers, went on to appoint a cabinet populated by inexperienced officials in key sectors such as economy, energy, mines, local government, industry and commerce. The ministry of Finance and Investment Promotion was retained by Professor Mthuli Ncube, who has plunged the country into an economic abyss with the highest inflation rate in the world and a moribund local currency. Deputising Ncube is Mnangagwa’s son, Kudakwashe David Mnangagwa, who has no known qualifications or track record in economics beyond a tourism degree he earned barely a year ago from Lupane State University. The tourism and hospitality ministry, which was split from the tourism and environment portfolio, was assigned to a woman, Barbra Rwodzi, who has no international profile. Rwodzi is from Mnangagwa’s Midlands province. She is known for instigating violence at the Pan-African Parliament during a heated debate and back home for threatening a police officer in her constituency who had arrested a thug linked to her election campaign. Rwodzi will be deputised by a son of Mnangagwa’s sister/brother, Tongai Mnangagwa, with no known record as a captain of the tourism and hospitality sector. Tasked with running the Local Government ministry is former chief executive of Zvishavane-based platinum mining company Mimosa, Winston Chitando, who was the Mines minister in the last cabinet. He again does not hold solid experience in local government administration. What further disillusioned many is that individuals tasked with leading key line ministries were drawn from the list of the President’s family members, friends, clansmen, relatives and hangers-on. What has further aggravated the disillusionment is that ministers from the previous cabinet whose performance was below par were either reshuffled or retained in their portfolios. These include Sports minister Kirsty Coventry, who presided over the blacklisting of the country from international football, Finance minister Ncube and former Energy minister Soda Zhemu, who presided over 18- hour rolling power cuts which have since returned after a moratorium which was calculated at hoodwinking the people ahead of the just-ended elections. Political analyst Professor Stephen Chan from the University of London said the recycling of dead wood and underperforming ministers who failed dismally was a clear sign that the government will not deliver. “This cabinet is a collection of retreads, people who have failed before and those who are too young to have failed are there by virtue of being related by family ties to the President. It's a cabinet of cronies and nepotism. The reappointment of the minister of Finance sums it up. It was he who failed over the past five years,” Chan said. Political analyst Vivid Gwede concurred, saying:  “The President has recycled the majority of ministers from the last five years. Some of them have clearly not been performing, which means Zimbabwe is likely to continue with mediocre performance. There is no clarity on what basis they have been retained, except that they are loyalists.” He added: “The question is: what will the President do this time around to make them produce the results?” Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe spokesperson Obert Masaraure said it is a cabinet of “certified” failures and “so it will not deliver”. “This is a Cabinet of certified failures and unqualified green horns and they will not produce anything short of a disaster. ED's (Mnangagwa) cabinet is not for the people but for himself and his close circle to achieve their selfish targets of power retention and primitive accumulation,” said Masaraure. “The change of personalities without the rewiring of the governance architecture will not change the outcome. Mnangagwa is still pursuing failed neoliberal policies and the outcome is predictable, the economy will continue to falter and social services will remain inaccessible.” He added: “The illegitimate Mnangagwa will continue to deploy the apparatus of violence to coerce the people. It is going to be a long five years for the people of Zimbabwe.” Mnangagwa’s administration headed for monumental failure President Emmerson Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

DARLINGTON CHIDARARA Introduction AFRICAN states have been urged to take the business and human rights agenda seriously. Professor Damilola Olawuyi, the chair of the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, said this whilst opening the second edition of the African Business and Human Rights Forum. He acknowledged the positive developments that have taken place across the continent in the past 12 months, with three countries adopting their national action plans on business and human rights, but challenged the states to do even better and aim higher. The African Business and Human Rights Forum is an annual event convening stakeholders across Africa for constructive dialogue and peer-learning on how to strengthen responsible business and corporate accountability in the region. Governments' representatives, civil society organisations, communities, human rights defenders, trade unions, business enterprises, industry associations, employers’ organisations, international organisations, national and regional human rights institutions, journalists, lawyers, activists, and academia convened in numbers from 5-7 September in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The merting was held at the magnificent African Union Headquarters to facilitate a robust and multi-stakeholder dialogue based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) that will foster joint action to prevent, mitigate and remediate business-related human rights and environmental abuses. The UNGPs are directed at states and companies. The principles clarify their respective duties and responsibilities to protect and respect human rights in the context of business activities and the need to ensure access to an effective remedy for those whose rights have been adversely affected by such activities. In Africa, the extraction of minerals and mega agricultural projects have wreaked havoc to the human rights of host communities, impacting on their long-term economic sustainability, environmental, socio-economic, and cultural rights. For many of these host communities, extraction of minerals has led to several human rights violations. Evidence in several research pieces and reports across the region has revealed the dire human rights record of transnational companies operating in these sectors and this human rights record in Africa’s mining sector mainly is set to worsen as the demand for transitional/strategic minerals increase and Zimbabwe cannot be spared as the country has Africa’s largest lithium reserves. Recognising that many developing countries who play host to these powerful multi-national corporates lack comprehensive laws to protect the host communities from the powerful corporates, the "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy" framework was developed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the UNGPs in June 2011. Seeing this as an important step towards protection of host communities from corporates, in June 2014, Ecuador and South Africa presented to the UN Human Rights Council a resolution proposing an international legally binding instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights. This led to the establishment of an open-ended inter-governmental working group (IGWG) with the mandate to negotiate an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (LBI). Ever since, the IGWG has been leading the negotiations and in 2023 they will be conducting their 9th session reviewing an already existing draft in October this year in Geneva, Switzerland. Zimbabwe is a country with no reputable history when it comes to business and human rights issues. From the gold sector to the discovery of Marange diamonds, the black granite sector in Mutoko to agribusinesses in Chisumbanje where sugar cane farmers are up in arms against Tongaat Hulett and, most recently, the Chilonga case, have all shared a trail of similar human rights violations such as forced evictions, forcible grabbing of land and uncompensated relocations, degraded environment, and labour rights violations, among other infractions. It is unfortunate that Zimbabwe's legal framework, for example in the mining sector, is now too outdated and tired and seeks to advance maximum extraction of mineral resources while failing to protect the human rights of host communities. The human rights of communities are protected by other laws external to those of the mining sector. This is not only the case in Zimbabwe’s but also many other African countries, hence the rationale behind the UNGPs and the drive towards NAPs and the need for an internationally binding instrument on BHR. The question that comes naturally is why is it important to value human rights in the context of business? Besides the obvious one that human rights are enshrined in Zimbabwe’s Bill of Rights, and it is the duty of the state and private entities to respect and protect human rights, the markets where we sell our resources have become sensitive to BHR issues. European states have even placed a duty on trans-national corporations operating or buying products from the Global South to engage in due diligence processes and make sure they are buying responsibly sourced raw material and products. If the producing countries are not doing good or not taking reasonable steps to address human rights issues, the producers run a risk of being shunned by the best of markets with the best value and may end up trading their resources for a song and lose the much-needed foreign currency as the only available markets will be the ones that close eyes to responsible sourcing yet buying at low value. While the African Business and Human Rights Forum is a welcome initiative, talk alone without real action will make it an ineffective platform. The fight against corporate impunity can only be won with local perspectives and solutions, as correctly dubbed in this year’s theme: “For Africa, From Africa.” Africa is indeed endowed with vast mineral resources and can end poverty, hunger, and social injustices by dismantling natural resource theft and extraction that disregards human rights and places importance on profits over people. Zimbabwe’s new government must ensure that it supports the BHR agenda by adequately resourcing constitutional institutions that implement this agenda such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission. The newly elected parliamentarians must also ensure that we align our mining laws and land laws to the Bill of Rights to reflect the BHR agenda. No doubt, the world trends on due diligence are clear and Zimbabwe needs to ensure that her minerals or agricultural produce are sourced in a responsible manner. The issues of getting a social licence before business ventures such as mining commences needs to be taken seriously. In order to avoid the conflict minerals tag or irresponsibly sourced products, Zimbabwe must adopt the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and work towards its own national action plan on their implementation just like what Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria have done. There is hope and room for improvement as Zimbabwe recently formed a new government. In addition,   Zimbabwe was properly represented at the forum with a rich and mixed bag of participants coming from local civil society organisations such as the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association, international non-governmental organisations in the form of ActionAid Zimbabwe, communities from mining areas of Mutoko, labour unions, government representatives and  others who all pledged to work towards achieving the goals of the forum and to push the BHR agenda. As the world gears up for the October negotiations in Geneva where a legally binding instrument must be hammered out, Africa has to strengthen its position and speak with one voice towards Afrocentric solutions and Zimbabwe must join the party by sending representatives to these important negotiations. *About the writer: Darlington Chidarara is a projects coordinator at ActionAid International Zimbabwe and leads work on business and human rights.  He writes here in his personal capacity and can be reached at: [email protected] Reframing Issues Page 31 Professor Damilola Olawuyi Crucial to scrutinise nexus between human rights, corporate responsibility NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 32 Reframing Issues IBBO MANDAZA/ TONY REELER AS with all elections since 2000, the 2023 harmonised elections have ended in dispute. Contrary to all previous elections, excepting 2008, these elections have resulted in dispute both internally and externally: Zimbabweans are clear that the elections were not free, fair or credible, and for the first time, African and other international observers are in agreement that the elections failed the test of best practice. The one critical thing these elections were hoped to achieve was no dispute, and that the country could move on to resolving its economic problems and its international pariah status. As Joaquim Chissano expressed this, "The crisis in the country is having terrible consequences for the region as Zimbabwe lies at the heart of southern Africa." However, the problem remains. Not only is Zimbabwe itself in dispute with the Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) rejecting the election, but also Zimbabwean civil society and a huge section of the citizenry, but there are signs that there is growing dispute within Sadc itself over both the elections and what to do about it. This outcome was entirely predictable as we pointed out eight months ago, suggesting that Zimbabwe has reached a Lancaster House moment. The improbability that any election in the context of a securocrat state would resolve the Zimbabwe crisis is a point that we have made repeatedly since 2016: not even the coup and the belief that there was a New Dispensation has changed this reality. The same point was made more recently. Dealing with the fallout of this is election cannot lead to a simple binary position: accept it or reject it. The stakes for the country and the region are far too high, which was the primary motivation for the Arrears Clearance and Debt Relief Process, and the decision to address the three main stumbling blocks to international re-engagement and economic stability – economy, GOVERNANCE, and land (property rights). It would seem probable that the strategy is now sunk – certainly arrested – by the major failure in governance that the election has demonstrated. Furthermore, this cannot be a situation that is pre-empted by Zimbabwe nor can the spirit of Sadc, reflected in the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation be ignored. Indeed, the whole notion behind the establishment of the Organ was to deal with crisis and conflict within the region. The Sadc report established that there is a crisis in Zimbabwe. It was in recognition of all of this that the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC) launched a petition in the aftermath of the election. We do not pretend that the process and the indicators proposed in the petition are the only solution, but we are certain that continued polarisation within Zimbabwe, and the possibility of polarisation within Sadc, will continue in the absence of a substantive dialogue. Such dialogue is the modus vivendi in Sadc and Africa for resolving dispute: political problems require political solutions, not narrow legal determinations. The petition, now signed by 65 880 (and overwhelmingly by Zimbabweans at home and in the diaspora) outlined a series of steps towards resolving the crisis: ·       The establishment of an Eminent Persons Group, tasked with negotiating the establishment of a Transitional Government, composed of political parties and other major citizen groupings. ·       The negotiations must be broad-based, including political parties, civil society, churches, labour, women, and other citizen groupings. ·       The Transitional Government should set up with a clear and specific set of reforms that must be achieved. The reform process should lead in time to an election beyond dispute nationally, primarily, but also without dispute regionally, continentally, and internationally. In essence, the proposal is very simple. Rather than foster dispute nationally, regionally, continentally, and internationally, face the Lancaster House moment, and begin an internationally brokered dialogue on a solution that is acceptable to all Zimbabweans. Sadc should mandate an Eminent Person’s Group (EPG) to begin the dialogue process with all stakeholders in Zimbabwe. We suggest an African EPG composed of Kgalema Montlanthe (Sadc), Jakaya Kikwete (Eat African Community) and Olusegun Obasanjo (Ecowas) to lead this process, fully supported by Sadc. This will reflect the African Union broadly: Eastern Western and Southern. This initiative will require the concerted (and united) efforts of the whole Sadc community, and especially the “reluctant hegemon”, as Adam Habib once termed South Africa in reference to its foreign policy. The dialogue will undoubtedly be lengthy and difficult, and thus it is imperative that it begin as soon as possible, most importantly because the economic crisis in Zimbabwe requires international support, and it is probable that this could occur if the country as a whole was committed to a frank and honest dialogue. *About the writers: Professor Ibbo Mandaza and Tony Reeler are co-conveners of the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC). They are the sponsors of the petition, which has been forwarded to the chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, as well as to the of the chair of the AU and the international community in general. Voters wait in a queue to cast their votes at a polling station in Harare onWednesday 23 August 2023. /Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi, AP Zim post election crisis: What’s to be done now? NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 33 ARNOLD TSUNGA A LOT of questions have arisen on the new cabinet appointed by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. There is not much that falls on questioning the legal basis of the President’s decision. It is a settled issue that, in terms of the law, he has discretion to decide who he wants to appoint or remove from a ministerial position. Ministers serve at the pleasure of the President. The legal basis is therefore not the issue. It is consideration of national questions and national best interests that the debate centres on. Looking at the names of his appointees, it looks like the President has settled for continuity, suggesting that he is happy with the performance of the old cabinet. Many people will have expected him to introduce younger and possibly newer ministers and retain only a very few old ones. As it is, he looks like his main pre-occupation was reinforcing and consolidating his power rather than looking at a cabinet that can introduce fresh perspectives and innovation. So it is a business-as-usual cabinet and the policy thrust of the government is unlikely to change. Zimbabweans have to brace themselves for five years of the same direction in all fundamental aspects of national governance and national policies. It therefore looks to many like a lost opportunity to get new people who will introduce fresh ideas, perspectives and ways to do government business. New ministers bring different expertise, experiences, backgrounds and acquaintances and this could result in finding potentially new ways of resolving problems and challenges bedevilling society. New ministers could mean improved representation of diverse groups as a more inclusive and more representative government is established. The inclusiveness could address gender, regional, ethnic, technical-background-type of considerations to get a balanced cabinet that inspires more confidence in the public. New ministers could mean that everyone gets on their toes in order to better perform and not be complacent and to employ an I-have-seen-it-all attitude in dealing with the national questions in an ever-changing and fast-paced context. In a country whose development is crippled by the acute weight of systemic and systematic grand corruption and patronage, retaining the old ministers will not inspire confidence in the public that the President is determined during his last term of office to deal a decisive blow to end corruption and cronyism and create a new basis for a clean and corruption-free government.  Instead, people will be excused for concluding that the President and the people he has surrounded himself with believe that they benefit more from a corrupt and leaking system than from a system that entrenches accountable governance and gives agency to the masses to hold leaders to account. In any case, new ministers will naturally feel that they are being watched in their performance by the President and the public. They will not take the public for granted and will work harder to impress and retain their positions based on performance legitimacy. This raises questions on whether the President rewarded loyalty ahead of competence in the selection of ministers or a bit of loyalty while compromising a little bit by appointing those very few, that if not appointed, could cause intra-party problems for him. In which case whatever the motivation was, merit as is usual in all political parties, counts for nothing. In a fast-changing environment where the world is now so interconnected in a way that has never been witnessed before and where multilateral institutions, though necessary and important, no longer adequately serve the interests and needs of our societies, new ministers who have not been previously cushioned and trapped by governmental power and opulence are likely to imagine and adapt policies to make Zimbabwe more globally competitive. New ministers may get to engage with the diaspora and see the diaspora as a potential resource for our country and craft policies that tap into this resource that contributes to around a quarter of the national gross domestic product. Old ministers may continue to treat the diaspora with contempt and suspicion while benefitting from their selfless contribution to the national economy. Many people will not have wanted the President to rely on old ministers who have been taken advantage of by some countries and unscrupulous local and international investors to be vehicles and facilitators of money laundering and industrial-scale looting of finite national resources in a way that potentially brings political reputational cost to the President in the eyes of the public. That the President ultimately suffers reputational political cost for failures of government is borne by reference to the fact that in the just-ended elections and results reported by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (and disputed by the main opposition political party), it was clear that the President did not perform as well as his party, meaning that the voters have capacity to distinguish what the President is accountable for and what he is not. They almost punished him, going by Zec’s disputed figures. This must have been understood to be a need to change the team and try to get better performance by the government and make the population less restive. New ministers may also introduce inter-generational consensus and talent development on the national question. As it is, appointing old ministers, some of whom have never experienced life outside of government, may create strong resentment between generations in Zimbabwe. We have what many are referring to as a lost generation born after Independence, who have never earned a salary or gotten a payslip. In their minds, they see the problems of Zimbabwe as domination by an old generation that has absolutely no care about the younger generation and the generations of the future. They see the old generation wielding power, as a generation that is drunk with feelings of entitlement and that is prepared to take the country down with them in complete violation of the reasons why the liberation struggle was fought for in the first place. In the end, the President will have done better striking a balance between new entrants and retaining a few old ministers whose role is critical for retaining institutional memory. The good thing is that the President has a prerogative to reshuffle the cabinet should the public show signs of agitation at the failure of government to deliver goods, services and opportunities to the people of Zimbabwe.  *About the writer: Arnold Tsunga is the principal managing partner of Tsunga Law International and convenor of Civic Space Network-Africa. Mnangagwa cabinet reflects continuity and consolidation, not reform, change Deputy Minister of Tourism Tongai Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 34 Reframing Issues Introduction THE renowned  Zimbabwean academic, author and publisher Dr Ibbo Mandaza together with prominent researcher Tony Reeler on 31 August launched an online petition. The petition is titled “A Call for Political  Settlement in Zimbabwe!”. This online petition calls for the establishment of a dialogue platform that will lead to the conception of a national transitional authority. This online petition has so far garnered 36 490 signatories, which is quite a disappointing figure, considering the gravity of the socio-economic and political  crisis engulfing Zimbabwe. This online petition has been necessitated by the latest round of inconclusive and illegitimate elections that took place on 23 and 24 August 2023. The 2023 harmonised elections have been widely and universally condemned as a sham and a charade that fails to satisfy the Southern African Development Community (Sadc), African Union (AU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) and the universal international standards and guidelines regarding holding of  free, fair and credible elections. Therefore, Mandaza`s clarion call for the establishment of a dialogue platform that should act as a midwife to the birth of a national transitional authority, is a continuing  pattern  to try to find the elusive  panacea to the 23-year-old socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. Therefore, this opinion piece will attempt to analyse the efficacy or lack thereof of Mandaza`s prescription to the current problems afflicting the body politic of Zimbabwe. This necessitates looking into the current political landscape and the latest developments  both in Zimbabwe and in the Sadc region so that the chances of the likely success of Mandaza`s antidote to the Zimbabwean crisis can be objectively analysed. Moreover, in analysing whether the National Transitional Authority is the pragmatic and realistic mechanism to tame this runaway 23-year-old crisis, a comparative analysis will be conducted by reflecting on previous national transitional mechanisms adopted in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Moreover, I shall pick some of Mandaza`s significant pointers in his roadmap towards a National Transitional Authority and analyse them on their own merit. The dynamics of a National Transitional Authority Mandaza has been a fervent disciple of a National Transitional Authority. In fact, he has been religiously and dogmatically advocating the National Transitional Authority for more than 10 years. Mandaza has been arguing, inter alia, that in order for Zimbabwe to fully discard its pariah state tag and move forward in a progressive trajectory, it needed a two-year hiatus  from the divisive, polarising and zero-sum games of electoral politics of winner-eats-it-all and eats-itnow. Accordingly, Mandaza argues that the post-2000 electoral cycles have succeeded in  reproducing and recycling the same legitimacy crisis and socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. Mandaza's calls for dialogue and a National Transitional Authority had also found resonance among an albeit small section of the Zimbabwean community. Notably, the former Finance minister in the Government of National Unity, Tendai Biti, has also added his voice and political weight to this cause. In a Twitter Spaces discussion on X, Biti highlighted that Zimbabwe needs a soft landing in order to arrest its endemic legitimacy crisis and socio-economic and political crisis. Therefore, a comprehensive and  inclusive dialogue was of paramount importance and a national necessity. Needless to say, the concept of a National Transitional Authority or a transitional government is not an alien or novel concept in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has experimented before with the mechanism of a transitional authority. During the heightened and volatile period of Lancaster House constitutional negotiations that were held between September 1979 till December 1979, a transitional authority was put in place to take charge of the national affairs of the then Rhodesian government. Lord Christopher Soames was appointed the governor of Rhodesia from December 1979 till April 1980. His primary objective was to oversee the ceasefire period  and the transition of Rhodesia to independent Zimbabwe. Accordingly, Soames became the mediator and arbiter of the transitional process that led to the 1980 elections and the independent period. The four-month transitional government led by Soames was an important mechanism that provided the necessary platform for warring parties who had signed the Lancaster House constitutional conference agreement to conduct their electoral and political business without destroying the fragile peace process. For instance, Soames' administration prevented Bishop Abel Is a National Transitional Authority feasible in Zim? President Emmerson Mnangagwa Taona B. Denhere NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 35 Muzorewa, who was the controversial prime minister of the then Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from abusing the power and advantage of incumbency. This was important because it allowed the main political parties who contested the 1980 elections to participate on a relatively level playing field, without Bishop Muzorewa abusing state institutions. Regrettably, in post-independence Zimbabwe, we have witnessed Zanu PF abusing the power of incumbency by unfairly advantaging itself over opposition. Consequently, this has been one of the key drivers of the legitimacy crisis in Zimbabwe, since 2000. Therefore, Mandaza and others believe that the present multifaceted crisis engulfing and ravaging the Zimbabwean polity should be tackled in a manner similar to how the Rhodesian crisis was tackled between September 1979 through to April 1980. That is, the 23 year old constitutional, political and socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe demands a regional, if not international, dialogue and negotiation conference. However, the prevailing political and regional developments may militate against establishing such a regional or domestic forum to resolve this 23-yearold crisis. For, instance despite the seriousness of the crisis in Zimbabwe, there are not enough push and pull factors that forced the recalcitrant Ian Smith, senior Rhodesian military leaders and Bishop  Muzorewa to the negotiating table with the two  nationalist liberation movements Zanu and Zapu at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979. The sweetheart internal settlement deal between Muzorewa and Smith was made politically and diplomatically untenable by the ferocious armed struggle which continued unabated. This was coupled with the refusal by the United States government of president Jimmy Carter to recognise the Muzorewa government and thereby maintain the sanctions regime on Rhodesia. Crucially, the lack of British government recognition of the Muzorewa regime as a bonafide and independent African government also made it impossible for Smith and Muzorewa to avoid the talks in London for the peaceful resolution of the unwinnable Rhodesian civil  war. Let us fast forward to the present crisis. There is no serious and considerable pressure being exerted by the main opposition Citizens' Coalition For Change (CCC) together with civil society to make the situation politically untenable for the Zanu PF government in the similar way the nationalist guerilla movements, namely Zanu and Zapu, exerted pressure on Smith and Muzorewa. The opposition CCC and civil society movements have so far not engaged in any form of coordinated peaceful protests or civil disobedience to put pressure on the Zanu PF government to reconsider its contested and controversial position on its self-proclaimed electoral victory. Also, we have not seen the CCC's diplomatic strategy, despite having accumulated unprecedented diplomatic goodwill from Sadc, the AU and Comesa since the end of the 2023 harmonised elections. The CCC has not yet  capitalised on this diplomatic goodwill. As a result, the party has not made serious headways on the regional and continental diplomatic circuit to bring pressure to bear on the beleaguered Zanu PF regime. The absence of such a form of resistance and pressure has invariably led to Zanu PF adopting a business-as-usual approach. This has resulted in President Emmerson Mnangagwa arrogantly going it alone by appointing his cabinet. Moreover, we are witnessing the continued extrajudicial arrest of newly elected CCC councillors and legislators on trumped-up charges. The CCC says more than 10 of its officials have been arrested within a week. They include Kudzai Kadzombe, Gift Ostallos Siziba and Maureen Kademaunga. Also, in one of his public addresses a few days ago President Mnangagwa, in a dismissive and patronising tone, ridiculed his main challenger Nelson Chamisa. This shows Mnangagwa's lack of magnanimity  and rapprochement  towards the CCC and Chamisa. Therefore, these developments do show that the Zanu PF government and Mnangagwa are not willing to open any avenues towards dialogue or a negotiated settlement. Mandaza provided useful and brilliant points in his roadmap towards a National Transitional Authority and a remedial mechanism to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe. For instance, during a recent interview with Trevor Ncube he reinforced that he has identified possible interlocutors to lead this proposed dialogue and formation of  a National Transitional Authority. The mediators include former presidents of Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, namely Olesugun Obasanjo, Uhuru Kenyatta and Jakaya Kikwete, respectively. However, the challenge here has to do with how well they are familiar with the nuances of  challenges and complexities of the  problems affecting Zimbabwe. This is especially the case for Kenyatta and Kikwete, who seem not to have intricate and precise knowledge of the Zimbabwean crisis. As for Obasanjo, he is no stranger to the Zimbabwean crisis and was once involved in the mediation processes in January 2002 involving the late Robert Mugabe and the late Morgan Tsvangirai. Furthermore, Obasanjo had also voiced his opinion about the mistakes and pitfalls of the 14 November 2017 coup d'etat. Therefore, it is crucial for would-be mediators to the dialogue and political settlement to be individuals who are  well versed and well experienced with the situation and crisis in Zimbabwe. For example, the former South African president Thabo Mbeki b3gan mediating the Zimbabwean crisis around 2005. Despite his biases towards Zanu PF, nonetheless by the time he mediated during the Global Political Agreement of 2009, Mbeki had vast experience and insider knowledge of the Zimbabwean crisis. Furthermore, in his interview Mandaza proposed that the National Transitional Authority should be led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. This is an attempt by Mandaza to provide a soft landing for President Mnangagwa and his fellow Chimurenga aristocrats so that they do not feel ostracised from the whole process and such that they can have a role to play in negotiating and protecting  their interests and concerns. However, this is problematic in some ways, because Mnangagwa is not Frederik de Klerk or Mikhail Gorbachev, who became born-again democrats  and thereby acted as progressive transformative leaders who headed transitional authorities that ushered in multiparty political pluralism and participatory democracy in their respective countries. Accordingly, President Mnangagwa came across more like Pieter W Botha or Slobodan Milosevic, who were hardliner transactional authoritarians.  Moreover, Mnangagwa is on record as saying that “2030 ndenge ndichipo”, that is 2030 I will still be around and in power. This is coupled with the fact that there is higher possibility that President Mnangagwa might attempt to extend his term beyond the 2028 constitutional limit. Therefore, it is inconceivable that Mnangagwa could become willing to take a transitional role that will consign him to  the backwaters of retirement. Another significant takeaway from Mandaza`s interview was that he is strongly advocating a National Transitional Authority as opposed to a Government of National Unity. This is quite understandable, because Zimbabwe has experimented before with a Government of National Unity. From 2019 till 2013, there was a coalition government between president  Mugabe, prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Professor Arthur Mutambara. Notwithstanding the remarkable socio-economic improvements in the livelihoods of the ordinary people during the life of the GNU, regrettably the power-sharing government failed to produce far-reaching, transformative and progressive socio-economic reforms and political reforms. Consequently, the GNU became an elite pact in which hitherto opposition leaders were co-opted into Zanu PF and state clientelistic and patronage networks. Hence they lost track of the reform agenda and left the GNU without making much headway in reforming the state. Notwithstanding the highlighted challenges, Mandaza`s skeletal blueprint towards a National Transitional Authority has got some important takeaways and points. For instance, in arguing against a GNU, Mandaza is proposing a multifaceted and broad-based negotiation forum and mechanism. Thus, Mandaza wants a big tent concept to the idea of a National Transitional Authority whereby various stakeholders, including the churches, civil society, political parties, trade unions, women's groups and other citizen groups play a pivotal role. This is an inclusive approach which is different to the elitist and exclusionary approach used to come up with the 2009 GNU. However, the challenges come to the modalities and the logistics of  selecting and organising such large and disparate organisations and groupings to find a common understanding. Since different groups and factions will have competitive and contradicting positions and ideas. Another important point in Mandaza`s roadmap is the stabilisation of the economy through adoption of pro-poor policies. This is about restoration of the fiscal contract between the government and the citizenry. Citizens are empowered through sound economic policies in which their taxes and contributions are channelled towards improving the livelihoods of the poor. This requires vigorously tackling the scourge of corruption and the dismantling of the mafia-like cartel networks which are fuelling illicit financial flows. There was also an emphasis that the National Transitional Authority will aim to restore the social contract. This involves restoration of democratic constitutionalism, through respecting the rule of law by the government and respecting human rights and civil liberties. This is fundamental, considering that, right now, there is a systematic pattern of state-sanctioned crackdown on opposition supporters and leaders who are being discriminately arrested and charged on frivolous grounds by the state. Furthermore, Mandaza argues that the transitional government that will be put in place must aim to radically and comprehensively overhaul the electoral system and the legislation that underpins it. This is a fundamental reform to undertake because the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) has over the years conspired to undermine the electoral process by recycling fraudulent and sham elections. Therefore, a root-and-branch reform framework around the management and administration of elections is essential, in order to address the legitimacy question. Conclusion Zimbabwe's 23-year-old socio-economic and political crisis is showing no signs of relenting. The inconclusive, illegitimate and widely condemned 23 and 24 August 2023 elections have pushed Zimbabwe further into the abyss of  illegitimacy and pariah state. Therefore, the notion of a National Transitional Authority, designed to stop this downward spiral, is a noble proposition. However, and despite some of the potential socio-economic and political benefits that may accrue from a transitional government, nonetheless, the conduct and actions of President Mnangagwa and Zanu PF so far clearly shows that they are not receptive to that idea. Moreover, the CCC and Chamisa have not made a strong and robust case for a national transitional government both domestically and regionally and as well as continentally. *About the writer: Taona Blessing Denhere is a human rights and international development lawyer. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 36 Reframing Issues Book Excerpt from: In Search of the Elusive Zimbabwean Dream, Volume III (Ideas & Solutions) Author: Professor Arthur G.O. Mutambara PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa’s new Cabinet shocked many because of the crass ethnicity and primitive clansmanship, which degenerated into the shameful appointment of direct relatives. Well, I am surprised; folks were surprised! Why and how did you expect anything different? As I explain in my book: “Emmerson Mnangagwa is a primitive and shameless tribalist without the contrived subtlety, nuances and sophistication which were the hallmark of Mugabe’s tribal machinations.” What has been the role of ethnicity in Zimbabwean politics? What is going on? An excerpt of the book is instructive. Here we go: As I join the GNU, I am pretty naive about the extent of ethnicity in our politics. A few stories and remarks from Robert Mugabe shake me out of that naiveté. One such narration goes as follows: “When I crossed into Mozambique with Edgar Tekere on 4 April 1975, one of my immediate personal objectives was to go to Ghana and see where my son Nhamodzenyika was buried. Hence, at the first opportunity in 1976, I headed to Ghana through London. While in London, I was put under siege by my Zezuru friends, who included Tichaona Jokonya, Alois Mangwende and Enos Chikowore: ‘What are you doing in a political party of the Karangas and Manyikas? Leave that party and go and work with Abel Muzorewa in the ANC (later to be transformed into UANC).’ This was the Zezuru position after all the ZANU infighting in Zambia, which led to Herbert Chitepo’s death on 18 March 1975. Most Zezerus had left ZANU with Nathan Shamuyarira in 1971 to form FROLIZI with another Zezuru leader — ZAPU’s former Vice President — James Chikerema. The top leadership of ZANU’s Dare ReChimurenga (ZANU’s War Council) from 1972 to 1975 now mainly consisted of Karangas and Manyikas. ‘No, no, let us not do that,’ I remonstrated with them. I literally begged them. ‘You only make it worse. As Zezurus, let us stay in and organise from within. In fact, those of you who left, must all come back to ZANU!’” That is Bona's son in his own words! While I am enjoying this riveting historical account, I am shocked and flabbergasted by the crass and shameless acceptance of ethnicity (pejoratively referred to as tribalism) as a principle, value and framework of analysis and organisation. Before proceeding, it is imperative to interrogate the term tribalism. It is discredited as a productive concept in political science because it presupposes: primitiveness and savagery; ancient hatreds and irrational violence; and post-colonial return to pre-colonial savagery. On the other hand, ethnicity is a better term. It is more productive. Ethnic groups are not from antiquity; ethnic groups are a product of post-18th-century modernity. Nevertheless, all this ethnicity versus tribalism discourse is an exercise in the pursuit of political correctness. I am not interested in all that gibberish. Using ethnicity (or tribalism) as a primary tool of political organisation is hugely problematic. In the above London account, Mugabe is directly and unashamedly asserting his identification with, and commitment to, Zezuru ethnicity to me! When I look back, historically, it all adds up. When Shamuyarira and Chikerema formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in 1971, they say that the leader of the new party is Robert Mugabe — then in detention in Rhodesia with other nationalists — who will replace both Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole. FROLIZI is derisively dubbed the ‘Zezuru Front’. Furthermore, as Robert Mugabe consolidates his leadership of ZANU after the Mgagao Declaration of October 1975, the Geneva Conference of 1976, and the ZANU Chimoio Conference of March 1977 which confirms him as ZANU leader, there is a flood of Zezuru politicians who rejoin ZANU, while others join for the first time. Politics of ethnicity in Zimbabwe: From the frying pan into the fire From left: Former prime minister Arthur Mutambara, President Emmerson Mnangagwa and former minister Orbert Mpofu. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 37 Thus, the construction of the Zezuru hegemony, which will dominate the independent state of Zimbabwe for 37 years, has started in earnest with Robert Mugabe as the cunning and sophisticated architect. In other conversations, Mugabe also casually refers to Zezuru dominance in certain areas as an accepted norm: “Mashonaland East, you cannot penetrate it given Solomon Mujuru and Ray Kaukonde’s stranglehold on it. Their grip on the province is total and unequivocal.” It is also clear that at the attainment of National Independence (maybe even before), Mugabe and Mujuru collude and conspire to set up a Zezuru hegemony in Zimbabwe, which starts to falter 26 years after independence when Mujuru senses it is prudent for Mugabe to retire and appoint a Zezuru successor — preferably his wife. He feels an old and progressively unpopular Mugabe is neither good for the Zezuru hegemony nor his vast business interests. The fight that ensues between Mugabe and Mujuru is ostensibly a Zezuru civil war, where Mujuru felt Mugabe was putting his megalomaniac and narcissistic ambitions ahead of Zezuru aspirations. It turns out that the historical alliance between Mujuru and Mugabe is more than just sheer ethnicity – it is familial! The two are related as Joice Mujuru narrates to Blessing-Miles Tendi in his Mujuru biography The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: “My husband and Mugabe were distantly related. A young girl called Nhemasve from Solomon’s clan was given to Mugabe’s clan. This is how clans built bonds in the past, by intermarrying. It is said that this girl, Nhemasve, is the one who gave birth to the line of Mugabes which Robert Mugabe belongs to. Solomon and Mugabe kept this relationship secret. Solomon always said to me that with Sithole removed as leader, according to the ZANU hierarchy, as Secretary General Mugabe was supposed to succeed Sithole, so he was entitled to become the leader anyway. But Solomon also said Mugabe being his distant relative also influenced his decision to make sure Mugabe became the leader.” So, there we have it from Joice Mujuru — Robert Mugabe and Solomon Mujuru are related. Of course, both Mugabe and Mujuru keep this association secretive which speaks volumes about its sordid and malignant utility to them. Shameful. My fears and perturbation of the prevalence of unbridled tribalism in our politics are also confirmed by narratives about ZANU-PF heavyweights who are chased away from farms acquired during the land reform programme in the Mashonaland provinces just because they come from other regions. Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa is kicked off a farm in Mazowe and has to settle in Headlands, Manicaland — his home province. Cabinet Minister Paul Mangwana is shown the way back to Masvingo, while Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Dr Mariyawanda Nzuwah, is brazenly advised to go back to Malawi. He is only saved and protected by the intervention of Vice President Joseph Msika. To have these stories narrated to me, and variously and unequivocally confirmed by our ZANU-PF Cabinet colleagues, breaks my heart. Really? So, crass ethnicity constitutes the core of our national politics. It is part of our collective political DNA. Sad. As I write these memoirs, tribalism, which remains a retrogressive feature of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme, particularly in the Mashonaland provinces, continues to surface. More ethnic rot is exposed in an article in the NewsDay of 12 December 2019 titled ‘Land row exposes Ministers’ tribal storm’: A retired colonel who is a ZIPRA war veteran has accused the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Retired Air Marshal Perrance Shiri, of taking a farm he has occupied for 17 years on tribal grounds and giving it to Home Affairs Minister Kazembe. In his letter, Ngwenya said he was disheartened and shocked by the persistence and frantic efforts by the two Ministers to remove him from Collingwood Farm, also called Southwell Farm, in Mashonaland Central on tribal grounds. “I’m disheartened and shocked by your persistence and frantic efforts of tribally trying to remove me from Mashonaland again with a pretext of farm downsizing," Ngwenya said. He further narrated that in 2002 he was allocated Mashona-Kop Farm in Mashonaland East but was chased away by a former Minister and told to look for a farm in Matabeleland. Right up to his demise in the coup d’état of November 2017, Mugabe continues to manifest his Zezuru tribal inclinations by packing the Cabinet and party with his Zezuru underlings, allowing his wife – Grace Mugabe – and her sycophants to publicly sing the shameful song: ‘Zezuru Unconquerable’, while pushing for Sydney Sekeramayi as his successor, deputised by his wife – two unashamed Zezurus. Furthermore, during the coup d’état in November 2017 itself, he tries to cut a Zezuru deal with General Constantino Chiwenga, to no avail. What is worse is that the coup d’état brings into power Emmerson Mnangagwa, who is a primitive tribalist without the contrived subtlety, nuances and sophistication which were the hallmark of Mugabe’s tribal machinations in the early part of his leadership. At least Mugabe was a nationalist who professed affinity for Pan-Africanism. There are none of these redeeming virtues in his successor. As I complete these reflections in January 2023, Emmerson has crudely and unashamedly filled up all key government positions with his incompetent and clueless direct relatives, corrupt and directionless associates, and subservient cronies from the Midlands Province. Beyond that, he is only interested in Karanga folks to the exclusion of other ethnic groups. Brazen and crass tribalism. Pathetic. There is utter disgust within Mnangagwa’s own party — ZANU-PF — and the country at large. I guess, in terms of ethnic politics, (with rise of Mnangagwa) Zimbabwe has jumped from the frying pan into the fire. Mnangagwa’s approach to national and governmental affairs is driven purely by the politics of clansmen and cronies – the Mberengwa mafia. How shameful. Sadly and unfortunately, as an American opponent and a victim of Zezuru hegemony, Emmerson Mnangagwa has learnt nothing. In fact, he has chosen the dangerous path of constructing his own Karanga hegemony; or is it a primitive Midlands clansmanship? As I conclude these memoirs in January 2023, I am surprised by Emmerson’s inability to learn from recent history. Clearly, this will not end well. In our beloved Zimbabwe, there is no place for a primitive unintelligent tribalist – an unsophisticated clumsy clansman. Our country deserves a better leader. This is an excerpt from the book: In Search of the Elusive Zimbabwean Dream, Volume III (Ideas & Solutions), By Professor Arthur G.O. Mutambara. *About the author: Prof Arthur G.O. Mutambara is the director and full professor of the Institute for the Future of Knowledge (IFK) at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa. Former prime minister Arthur Mutambara with President Emmerson Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 38 Reframing Issues World News WITH former television personality Tatenda Mavetera thrown into the mix, one needs very little imagination to describe Zimbabwe's cabinet that was sworn into office early this week following a sham election. And with two Mutsvangwas, six women and three Mnangagwas, ED's latest executive is basically a Studio 263 cabinet of sorts! There has been a furore over his latest appointments not only because he appointed his sons as ministers but by dint of the clueless greenhorns therein, some of them given to the naive frailty of plagiarism through copy and paste. Once again, and for the second time in five years, Mnangagwa has made the usual boob of appointing as ministers a higher threshold of non-elected MPs  as he should, leading to some of them being ministers for only 24 hours, as he did in 2018. The monumental boob, the second one in five years, speaks volumes not only about the so-called President but of the calibre of the team around him, including one George Charamba, he of the high verbiage who communicates like a 1980s upper top student out to impress at the school assembly. Not surprisingly, ED's highly Karangised ministerial team comprises nine ministers who all come from Gutu. These are Winston Chitando, Barbra Rwodzi, Yeukai Simbanehavi, Amon Murwira, John Paradza, Obert Mazungunye, Tatenda Mavetera, Anxious Masuka and Lovemore Matuke. For some, perhaps it is still fresh information that ED is simply a clanist, a base politician given to nepotism by dint of his close family members, clansmen, clanswomen as well as his Karanga tribesmen and tribeswomen he has foisted to top positions in both the party and the state since 2017. Now with his Studio 263 cabinet of two Mutsvangwas, six women and three Mnangangwas, ED has simply confirmed his thespian and nepotist credentials  as a tribalist director of this tragi-comic soap. But readers of this column will recall that I have previously unmasked this village EDiot  masquerading as Zimbabwe's Head of State for his clan and filial proclivities. ED  is just but a brazen nepotist who not only steals elections but stuffs the entire State and party institutions with children, cousins, nephews and aunties. Some have hinted that all indications point to the fact that Mnangagwa may have deliberately sworn in this clueless cabinet well aware that these are temporary appointments pending either a fresh election or an inclusive government brokered by Sadc. For him, maybe he fancies this so-called cmllabinet simply as window-dressers, temporary appointments pendind a decisive SA resolution on Zimbabwe, much like the temporary cabin one erects on his/ hee stand before he builds the actual house. Dear reader, following the 2017 coup and the stolen elections of 2018, I walked you through the list of relatives, brothers, cousins, nieces, uncles and long-time factionalists that ED had appointed into the party and government, some of whom have surfaced yet again in this clueless cabinet of thespian comedians. Mnangagwa's appointments early this week of his children, clansmen, clanswomen and factionalists have simply reinforced what I wrote a few years ago when I revealed to you, my esteemed readers, the network of relatives factionalists and  acolytes that the Croc had stuffed into the party and government since 2017 when he putsched his way into power. In April 2021, I wrote the following piece where I revealed Mnangagwa's vast and intricate network of  his family, friends and relatives mainly of his  Karanga tribe that he has stuffed into the top echelons of the party, government and quasi-State institutions. Mnangagwa and his primitive ethnic villagisation of the party and State We currently live in the brave, digital 21st century but in Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe finds itself saddled with an analogue Mnangagwa’s network of ethnic  cronies, family, relatives at work Luke Tamborinyoka First Lady Auxillia Mnangagwa retracing former first lady Grace Mugabe’s footsteps. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 39 authoritarian leader still pursuing the primitive politics of tribalism, regionalism, cronyism and villagism. He has pursued rchaic politics synonymous with the age of the Munhumutapa Empire and others at the time. This instalment seeks to show that Mnangagwa, acting like a typical village clansman, who somehow ended up vested with state power, has systematically brought in family and a mainly Karanga clique from the Midlands and Masvingo provinces — a tribal coterie that has now been purposely deployed or retained in strategic party and State institutions as part of the regional and tribal politics of our so-called new dispensation. It is a sad tale of Zuze comes to town, the story of the primitive commoner who brings his all to the city. In our case, Mnangagwa has brought relatives and cronies to the cradle of national power so they can share with him his privileged but stolen hour in the sun. The mentality is crude, yet clear: It is our time to eat.Mugabe did it. His cronies and sister Sabina’s sons, including Leo Mugabe, were variously deployed to strategic institutions, while Patrick Zhuwao was a Cabinet minister in his uncle’s final hour. Mugabe’s son-in-law, Simba Chikore, was deployed to head Air Zimbabwe and went on to form Zim Airways using public funds, while his other brotherin-law, Sydney Gata, husband to his sister Regina, was in charge at the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, the country’s power utility. Others from the Mugabe family were seconded as executives to quasi-Slstate institutions such as the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board and the Zimbabwe National Road Authority while Innocent Matibiri was the second-in command at the Zimbabwe Republic Police. There were other relatives in state institutions, including in ministries and institutions like the national prosecution or Attorney-General’s office. At the time of his ouster, Mugabe’s wife, Grace, was the Zanu PF women’s league boss and was fancying her chances of occupying the highest office in the land. Other non-state actors like businessman Philip Chiyangwa also name-dropped, calling themselves Gushungo, Mugabe’s clan name, to get favours from the State. Of course, not all of Mugabe’s relatives benefitted from his rule. Some like Adam Molai, who is married to the Mugabe family, made their money in the private sector. However, this naked nepotism and cronyism was rampant under Mugabe and that was one of the many reasons ED and company removed him from office. But Mnangagwa claimed his so-called new dispensation was a break with this past — a dark and insidious past characterised by unadulterated clan and village politics. But Mnangagwa’s promise was blatantly misleading. He has, in fact, entrenched and deepened the culture of tribalism and cronyism, showing he is Mugabe’s best student indeed. In Mnangagwa’s case, it has been a systematic plot to use family, acolytes, tribesmen and cronies to take over arms and institutions of the State for self-aggrandisement. We were in an equally insidious, socalled Second Republic or is it now third Republic in which Mnangagwa’s clansmen and tribesmen, nieces and nephews, friends and associates have all been strategically placed across a vast array of State and quasi-State institutions to protect and entrench narrow personal and clique interests. Tribesmen and cronies, mainly from his Masvingo and  Midlands home provinces, have been deployed, jointly and severally, to strategic spaces in both party and government. It is so blatant and shameless that it leaves Zimbabweans genuinely interested in appreciating diversity and nation-building cringing. For a President to sit down and appoint his sons, village boys and tribal cronies as ministers and other key government officials in this day and age is cringeworthy. Village politics at play It all starts right from his village. While the Midlands is Mnangagwa’s adopted home province where he pursues his farming and mining interests, the man was born in the Mangwana area of Chivi in Masvingo province. That is what he considers his original home. That informs his politics and national or party deployment policy. For instance, it is no wonder that Paul Mangwana, a fellow villager and close associate sits in the Zanu PF Politburo, while the brother Ndavaningi Nick Mangwana was brought in from the United Kingdom to become the chief government spokesperson in his capacity as the permanent secretary in the ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services. Jasper Mangwana is a  Commissioner  in the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) while Lovedale Mangwana has been the incessant litigant recently used by Mnangagwa to judicialise our politics and to corruptly remove competition from the ballot paper. Upon his appointment as Vice-President under Mugabe, Mnangagwa bequeathed his Chirumhanzu-Zibagwe parliamentary seat to his wife Auxilia ,while his nephew Tongai and Kudakwashe David, both Mnangagwas, are now Ministers of Government. ED simply believes in keeping it all in the family. Prominent lawyer Edwin Manikai is part of Mnangagwa’s ethnic networks from Chivi as well. His mother is a MaMoyo. In fact, insiders say his mother and Mnangagwa’s mother are siblings. Manikai is the chair of the Presidential Advisory Council. True, cousins and brothers have always advised each other — only this time Mnangagwa has institutionalised and ekavsted brotherly advice to State level! Josiah Dunhira Hungwe, yet another Chivi homeboy, was always a close ally of Mnangagwa since the heady days of Zanu PF maverick Eddison Zvobgo’s era. Today, Vincent Hungwe, Mnangagwa’s Chivi homeboy, from the Vuranda area, is the chairperson of the Public Service Commission, responsible for the entire civil service of Zimbabwe. Talk of the petty family, village and tribal politics. Others have derisively referred to Mnangagwa’s regime as Moyo, Sibanda & Associates, given the intricate filial, totemic and tribal links of the key characters in the State. Before former Foreign Affairs minister Sibusiso Moyo’s death, there was him in the network, his cousin brother Elson Moyo, who is the Air Force of Zimbabwe commander, Central Intelligence Oragnisation (CIO) boss Director-General Isaac Moyo, Military Intelligence chief Thomas Moyo and Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander General Philip Valerio Sibanda — indeed Moyos and Sibandas — all from the Midlands. The Sibandas are part of Mnangagwa’s family. Some of Mnangagwa’s family members also use the name Sibanda, derived from their Shumba totem. In Ndebele, Sibanda denotes Shumba in Shona. It is no wonder therefore that upon Constantino Chiwenga’s appointment as Vice- President, Mnangagwa appointed his cousin Phillip Valerio Sibanda as commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. That is why there were genuine concerns when Mnangagwa at one point mulled appointing Valerio to take over as the co-Vice-President after Kembo Mohadi was forced to resign through well-choreographed state-sanctioned CIO leaks on his adulterous shenanigans. Valerio Sibanda was ZAPU so there would not have been any allegations of flouring the Deputy Minister of Tourism Tongai Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 40 Obituary unity accord, even though the army chief is his brother. With a member of the family in charge of the county’s armed services in the aftermath of the coup, Sibanda’s appointment could be regarded as having been an overt case of coup-proofing in case the army got excited again as they had been in November 2017. With a family member now in charge of the country’s armoury, any fears of yet another coup in the immediate to short term might have been sufficiently allayed. Now that the restlessness in that regard appears to have been quelled with the attendant appointment of pliant brigadiers-general and key army staff across the board, Mnangagwa’s cousin was at one point seriously considered to go higher to checkmate the other Vice-President with the same military credentials. And since the Sibandas are Mnangagwa’s cousins, it must come as no surprise therefore that Misheck Sibanda, another homeboy and relative of the President, was retained as the chief secretary to the President and Cabinet, even after the coup. This strategic post has been retained in the family. The Rushwayas and Mnangagwa  The Rushwayas are Mnangagwa’s blood relatives. They are his nephews and nieces. Martin Rushwaya, a nephew, is currently the Deputy Chief Secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet responsible for administration and finance. The same Martin Rushwaya is a close relation to Henrietta Rushwaya and Helliet Rushwaya. After the 2018 election, Helliet was appointed chief executive officer at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation entrusted with running government and the party’s propaganda, while Henrietta is that lady who was arrested at the airport with six kilogrammes of gold while in the company of a team of Mnangagwa’s personal bodyguards that included one Stephen Tserayi. Henrietta is back at work at the Zimbabwe Miners’ Federation, despite facing serious charges that have since collapsed like a deck of cards, charges which expose the massive leakages in the country’s extractive industry.  Dear reader,  I hope it is all making sense now.  The Moyos in key positions  Mnangagwa’s mother is a MaMoyo and the Moyos are his maternal uncles. Obediah Moyo, a maternal uncle, was appointed minister of Health and Child Care in the early days of the previous administration but was later suspended from  government following his arrest on corruption charges. Isaac Moyo, yet another maternal uncle of Mnangagwa, was recalled from South Africa where he was serving as the country’s ambassador. He is now the head of the CIO, while Elson Moyo, yet another maternal uncle, took over from the late Perrance Shiri and is now the head of the Air Force of Zimbabwe. In the ministry of Agriculture, Shiri was replaced by yet another Mnangagwa ally and clansman, Anxious Masuka.All of Mnangagwa’s anxiety in the agricultural sector may have now been quashed as the highly political Pfumvudza programme is firmly in the hands of his faction loyalist and Karanga tribesman. Masuka was retained as Agriculture Minister early this week. And still on the Moyos: July Moyo, for long the Lacoste faction’s chief strategist, has just yet again just been retained a Cabinet Minister but with a different portfolio. SB Moyo, the deceased minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, was also an uncle, but being a soldier, his allegiance was more to Chiwenga and this may yet explain a lot of imponderables, maybe including why he is not with us today. Mnangagwa has always had political interests in Kwekwe, where he “discovered” Owen Muda Ncube, who began as a _mushurugwi_ , a machete-wielding mining thug who represented Mnangagwa’s mining interests in the town. Today, Mnangagwa has brought his _mukorokoza_ into government yet again as Provincial Affairs Minister after being temporarily shunted into political Siberia when he was fired as State Security Minister. They say fate is a capricious woman. By dint of tribal and factional connections, Mudha has morphed from being a machete wielding _mukorokoza_ into a besuited  Minister of government. Tribesmen in Cabinet  Apart from the Moyos, his maternal uncles appointed in the early days of Mnangagwa’s administration and allies such as Masuka and Muda Ncube, other Karanga homeboys that have yet again been retained in Cabinet include Mines minister Winston Chitando from Gutu Central and Professor Amon Murwira from Nzuwa village in the same Gutu area. Gutu has provided nine Ministers this time aroujd. Another Karanga from Zvishavane and a long-time ally of Mnangagwa is the infamous Willowgate convicted criminal, Frederick Shava. Cabinet meetings may yet begin to look like clan or tribal meetings. In the Mnangagwa compound there are three ministers while two other Cabinet ministers can be found on  Christopher Muttsvangwa's matrimonial bed! If Mnangagwa’s relative dies, the whole government, certainly Cabinet, might have to be suspended. Everyone would be attending the funeral as they are:either relatives, tribesmen  or close friends. Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri may be a Manicaland godmother and a key Mnangagwa ally who speaks with a fluent Manyika accent, but she is a Karanga from Masvingo whose father went to Manicaland as an agricultural extension worker _(mudhumeni/umlimisi)_ and settled in the province. As shall be explained later, it was Muchinguri-Kashiri who was influential in the appointment of her own niece the late Ellen Gwaradzimba and the current Provincial Affairs Minister for 24 hours, Nokuthula Matsikenyeri. Nokuthula is yet another Karanga homegirl, who just happens to have been married into a Manyika family in Chimanimani. And here, I have not yet mentioned Ziyambi Ziyambi a fellow Karanga retained as Justice Minister. That he transacts his politics in another province in Mashonaland may yet cloud the toxic tribal and factional nature of his appointment. In the party’s key commissariat department, after Engelbert Rugeje, a soldier and a fellow Karanga from Masvingo who is a Chiwenga loyalist, began to show leanings towards the military faction of the party, and Mnangagwa was quick to slot in yet another Karanga and a Midlander from Gokwe, Victor Matemadanda. Indeed, for some time, Mnangagwa fancied himself the victor in the battle for the control of the soul of the party, which is the party’s commissariat department that is in charge of all party structures. Matemadanda was later retired. Other key Mnangagwa cronies  Douglas Munatsi The late Douglas Munatsi was yet another of Mnangagwa’s cronies, representing a vast array of the dear leader’s financial and commercial interests. Munatsi, appointed chairperson of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency and who died in mysterious circumstances, was implicated as having been part of the team that used its financial muscle to capture both The Financial Gazette and The Daily News that are now parroting the views of the State, leaving Zimpapers’ major titles like The Herald and The Chronicle green with envy. It was during the capture of this stable  that former Daily News editor Stan Gama unceremoniously left the newspaper as more pliable editors were put at the helm to protect Mnangagwa’s narrow political interests. At a personal level, I am greatly pained by the blatant capture of the two newspapers, The Daily News and The Financial Gazette, having served as news editor at both newspapers during the era of audacious journalism when the independent press was truly David Kudakwashe Mnangagwa NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 41 independent of the political interests of the ruling elite. I miss our golden time in the media when we used the vocation of journalism to hold government accountable and not to shamelessly parrot the selfish interests of the ruling elite.  Kuda Tagwirei Kuda Tagwireyi, the de facto Prime Minister of our land and business magnate whose finger is in every pie of the State, has his roots in Mulauzi village under chief Nhema in Shurugwi. Tagwirei is not only a tribesmen of the dear leader, but his beloved acolyte with the licence to dabble in every lucrative deal or enterprise within the State, from fuel to bus procurement and the sourcing and supply of fertilisers. He is the financial point man and he is the human embodiment of the phenomenon of State capture in Zimbabwe.  Midlands political dynamics It is always tragic when presumed national leaders descend from the lofty heights of true nationalists in the mould of the great Joshua Nkomo to the plumbing depths of tribalism, regionalism and villagism. Notwithstanding his roots in the Chivi area in Masvingo province, Mnangagwa now fancies himself a Midlands godfather and even the  defections overseen by Mavima a few years ago had a regional tilt to them. Blessing Chebundo, who almost ended Mnangagwa’s political career before Mugabe came to his rescue, is from Kwekwe, while my sister Lillian Timveos is from Zvishavane in the Midlands province. It depicts the sheer poverty of Mnangagwa’s politics that even the much-vaunted defections have failed to rise above the very limited regional precincts that have always defined the pettiness of his politics.  The late Oliver Chidawu  Mnangagwa has always serially and deliberately “exported” his Karanga allies to other provinces on party and/or government mission. He may claim he has always transacted his politics in Harare, but Harare’s now deceased provincial affairs minister Chidawu was Mnangagwa’s Karanga tribal ally.  Monica Mavhunga Mavhunga, now a Minister of government  having been  provincial Affairs Minister for Mash. Central province, may have been married in her former province of service, but has her roots in Mnangagwa’s home province. Mary Mliswa-Chikoka Temba Mliswa’s sister is a former    minister of Provincial Affairs in Mashonaland West. Mary, the oten-pampered girl is originally from Mliswa village in the Gamwa section, Shamba circuit in ward 5 of Shurugwi South. Mliswa and Mnangagwa are of the Shumba totem and Mary’s periodic deployment to strategic political spaces begins to make sense from the perspective of her roots in Shurugwi and the totemic connection with ED..  Mike Madiro Mike Madiro, a Mnangagwa ally since the Dinyane days in 2004, is Mnangagwa’s Karanga homeboy originally from Masvingo. Mnangagwa  appointed him the deputy minister of Transport in the previous Cabinet. Madiro was the Manicaland provincial chairperson in 2004 and travelled to Tsholotsho to do Mnangagwa’s bidding at the ill-fated Dinyane meeting where the ambitious gladiator failed to gatecrash into the presidium as Vice-President. Madiro’s  appointment ias Minister in the last government, was a reward for a long journey travelled together.  Gwaradzimba and Matsikenyeri Muchinguri-Kashiri was an aunt or a tete to the late Gwaradzimba, whom she pushed to be the Manicaland governor. Upon her death, Muchinguri-Kashiri pushed for Matsikenyeri, yet another Karanga homegirl from Masvingo who just happened to be married into a Chimanimani family to succeed her.  Matsikinyeri was recently appointed as Provincial Affairs Minister but only  for 24 hours due to the legal ineptitude of the appointing authority. Joe Biggie Matiza It is strongly believed within Zanu PF circles that the late Joel Biggie Matiza, who was Transport Minister and Zanu PF Mashonaland East provincial chairperson, was a Karanga with roots in Masvingo. Those in the know say being Karanga is a key decision factor in Mnangagwa’s cheap tribal politics and he has deployed his tribesmen, clansmen and clanswomen to go and lead the party and government in other provinces. The list above is not exhaustive, but it just gives a glimpse of the tribal nature of Mnangagwa’s politics and political behaviour. Jacob Mudenda Another former Zanu PF provincial chair who also went to the same ill-fated meeting Tsholotsho meeting 19 years ago to root for Mnangagwa is one Jacob Mudenda. The former provincial chairperson for Matabeleland North province has just been allowed, yet again, to retain his position as Speaker of Parliament to represent the enduring Lacoste interests in the August House. More than anything, the retention of the Speakership is the due reward for an unstinting loyalty. Obligingly, he playied his own part in the recalling of elected MPs from parliament. In fact, in the previous Parliament, Mudenda was the personification of the capture of parliament in the furtherance of a dastardly agenda to promote a one-party state in this our beloved country. Other Mnangagwa acolytesĺ. George Charamba Charamba is now the deputy chief secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet. He was also retained as Presidential spokesperson. I have written in a previous instalment that Charanba has always been a key Mnangagwa ally. At the ill-fated Tsholotsho meeting in 2004, it was Charamba, as permanent secretary in the ministry of Information and Publicity, who abused government funds to pay for the helicopter that carried the Zanu PF provincial chairpersons to the meeting in Tsholotsho. Charamba paid ZW$9 780 750 for the helicopter and even secured clearance for it. Charamba also wrote Mnangagwa’s Tsholotsho speech, which was eventually delivered by Patrick Chinamasa  Patrick Chinamasa Chinamasa is one of Mnangagwa’s allies who is drawing a salary and perks equivalent to that of a Cabinet minister. Chinamasa is representing Mnangagwa’s political interests at party headquarters, together with Obert Mpofu, the party’s secretary for administration.  Obert Mpofu Mpofu is a key Mnangagwa ally in the industry of nefarious deals. Mnangagwa was the minister of Defence at the time the army got involved in diamond mining, while Obert Mpofu was Mines minister. The two may have some knowledge on the plunder of diamonds and other minerals. Mnangagwa’s name is specifically mentioned in a United Nations report S/2002/1146 as having been part of the elite network that plundered mineral resources in the DRC.  Neville Coetzee  Contrary to propaganda that has repeatedly been parroted, it is none other than Mnangagwa who has proved to be a front for white capital interests. The late John Bredenkamp, Omanian fugitive Ahmed Said Thamer al Shanfari, Billy Rautenbach and other shadowy capitalists have always been Mnangagwa’s key business associates over the years. Mnangagwa has been mired in a scandal in which he has decided to displace a minority tribe in Chilonga so that his friend Coetzee can grow lucerne grass for his dairy cows. For Mnangagwa, a white crony’s grass is more important than his fellow citizens!  Conclusion  Mnangagwa's appointment of his children, Mr and Mrs Mutsvangwa and a cast accociations of family, relatives, friends and acolytes has simply confirmed that the man is a primitive tribesman. A villagist. In short, Mnangagwa’s family, tribesmen, clansmen and elite cronies are now firmly embedded in the upper echelons of the vast labyrinth of party and State power, representing mainly the parochial political and avaricious interests of a small, factional and largely tribal cabal. The list and names alluded to in this treatise is not exhaustive and Mnangagwa’s filialisation and  villagisation of the party and the State may turn out to be an interesting area of study fully deserving of a comprehensive research effort. An academic thesis. During the Mugabe era, Mnangagwa was certainly biding his time, strenuously working for the moment to foist his own tribesmen and clansmen on the entire body politic. The evidence of the human resource spread across party and government shows that he may well have achieved his mission in this regard, not to mention the deliberate appointments he has made in the police force and the brigadiers-general he has appointed to fractionally and tribally tame a stubborn military. Remember one of  his sons is a senior army officer, a colonel. Thabani Vusa Mpofu, a Midlander and a presumed Mnangagwa relative, is now in charge of the Special Anti-Corruption Unit in the President’s Office. Ironically, it is Vusa Mpofu's own appointment that may yet be the special case of corruption and cronyism deserving of a thorough and robust investigation. All these years as Mnangagwa fought by fair and foul means to achieve the Presidency, it now appears he was working only for an opportunity to bring  his family, cronies and tribal associates into the top echelons of the party and government. He was waiting for his time to bring his own retinue of close associates, kinsmen, kinswomen, cousins and nieces to the dining table so that they could all jointly and severally plunder the country’s resources. In the words of musician Leonard Karikoga Zhakata, the acolytes have all been called in to enjoy the honeycomb, a sumptuous dinner at the poor taxpayer’s expense: Dai ndaive ini ndigere paye, Deno ndaive ini ndiripo paye, Ndairidza huwi, ndodaidzira vamwe vangu, Kuno kwaita dovi vakomana, Huyai mose, huyai tinombore..., Now that the clansman has stolen State power, his children, family members, fellow tribesmen and tribeswomen are today gathered at the dinner table, voraciously partaking to the national honeycomb. The nation may bark, as I am currently doing through this epistle, but the tribesmen and the cronies are quietly enjoying their pilfered meal, in strict conformity to the dictates of prudent table manners that exhort silence during the eating hour! But for how long will this last? Only time will tell. In the meantime, dear readers, behold Mr Mnangagwa's Studio 263 Cabinet! NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 42 Reframing Issues DR HAZEL CAMERON THE International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s historic judgment in the  Akayesu Judgment  established that rape and other forms of sexual violence can be an actus reus of genocide as defined by the United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II. The Akayesu Judgment  therefore provides a logical framework to analyze a hidden episode of extreme post-colonial state violence in the newly independent Zimbabwe, namely a state policy of mass atrocities in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands, targeting the minority Ndebele ethnic group during Operation Gukurahundi. The specific foci of this study are the patterns of mass rape and sexual violence in the military operation between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors from throughout Matabeleland, this study provides a critical new lens on Operation Gukurahundi  through its identification of uniform systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence across Matabeleland. The article concludes that the patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence identified in this study are indicative of a state policy of systematic genocidal rape between 1983 and 1984, deployed with the intent and effect to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group, namely the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe, thereby fulfilling every condition of the Genocide Convention principles of genocide. “Never again” becomes more than a slogan: It’s a prayer, a promise, a vow. There will never again be hatred, people say. Never again jail and torture. Never again the suffering of innocent people, or the shooting of starving, frightened, terrified children. And never again the glorification of base, ugly, dark violence. It’s a prayer. (Wiesel 2012: 77) Inflicting injury and harm Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (United Nations 1948, UNGC) [hereafter Genocide Convention] defines genocide as meaning specific acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group and includes deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. The Genocide Convention does not explicitly enumerate rape as one of the listed acts of genocide; however, the judgement of  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established in 1994 by the United Nations to prosecute those allegedly responsible for crimes of genocide and other gross violations of human rights in Rwanda, reached the unprecedented conclusion that rape can be an act of genocide (Akayesu 1998). The ICTR recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda and noted the intersectionality of the crime of genocidal rape and how genocidal rape during the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda targeted certain women because of their ethnicity (ibid.). The  Akayesu Judgement was pivotal in advancing the discourse around rape as an act of genocide (see, for example,  Mackinnon 1994; Allen 1996; Sharlach 2000; Reid-Cunningham 2008;  De Brouwer & Chu 2009; Bergoffen 2012; Smith 2013; Di Caro 2019). The  Akayesu Judgment  also determined that although the act of genocidal rape by the Hutu genocidaires was to destroy a particular group, the outcome of the act was the infliction of serious injury and harm (Akayesu 1998: 731). Furthermore, the ICTR acknowledged that, although “the group” is of principle concern to the crime of genocide, genocidal rape is one of the worst ways of inflicting harm and injury on an individual member of that group and that genocidal rape was conceivably the most efficient and grave way of inflicting injury and harm on individual Tutsi women, thereby advancing the destruction of the whole Tutsi group (Russell-Brown 2003: 352). The definition of rape and the findings of the Akayesu Judgment established that rape can be an actus reus of genocide, whereby rape was not perceived to be sexual in nature but rather as a weapon of state harm, a violent act perpetrated against a member of a group with the intent of destroying that group. The ICTR Trial Chamber also affirmed in its substantive legal findings that rape might constitute genocide as deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcula ted to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (ibid.: 505–506) and as imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group (ibid.: 507). The Rwandan genocide must also be understood as taking place within the context of a civil war, and to this end a rich body of literature exists that evidences the prevalence of sexual violence in war (Siefert 1994; Jamieson 1999) and other conflict zones (Heineman 2011). But genocide can also be a “peacetime crime” (Basaglia 1987;  Scheper-Hughes 2002). Indeed, there is a growing body of literature and documentary film, which characterises as genocide, mass atrocities perpetrated during a peace-time joint state military and intelligence campaign known as Operation Gukurahundi in the newly independent Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1987 (see, for example,  Vambe 2012;  Coltart 2016;  Centre for Innovation and Technology (CITE) 2019;  Mpofu 2019;  Genocide Watch 2021;  Dube 2021;  Ncube 2021;  Mpofu 2021; Sibanda 2021; Tshuma & Ndlovu 2022; Khumalo 2019). To date there has been no rigorous criminological study of the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, during which rape and sexual violence were rampant. The legal findings of the ICTR, however, namely that rape can be an actus reus of genocide, provides a logical framework within which to explore whether the perpetration of rape and other forms of state violence during the operation were official state policy, intended to destroy in part the Ndebele group, by “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (United Nations 1948). Developing what can be usefully described as a “rape as an act of genocide framework” is of significant epistemological advantage to this study, as it facilitates conclusions to be drawn on whether the sexual crimes of Operation Gukurahundi constitute genocide in accord with the definition of the Genocide Convention, as clarified in the Akayesu Judgment of 1998; namely that rape is defined as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. (Akayesu 1998: 598). The sexual crimes of Operation Gukurahundi which are explored in Operation Gukurahundi: A policy of genocidal rape Gukurahundi Memorial. In her latest study focusing on Gukurahundi and rape, British scholar Dr Hazel Cameron, a criminologist and a lecturer of Peace and Conflict Studies within the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews, speaks to survivors. With her main research interests being state crime; global elite bystanders to crimes of the powerful; political violence; torture; genocide; war crimes; and crimes against humanity, Cameron sheds new light on the atrocities which still haunt Zimbabwe to this day. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 43 this article are: public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults; forced witnessing of the rape of female and male family members; rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing; forced intrafamilial rape; forced bestiality; forced nudity; targeting the womb of pregnant women; internment in concentration camps for purposes of sexual servitude; forced pregnancy; and genital mutilation. Sexual violence is not a phenomenon exclusively directed at women in genocide. Evidence has established that men are also at risk of sexual violence during a genocide (Kaitesi 2013). The agreed definition of rape in the  Akayesu Judgment  is gender neutral and will be interpreted herein to be applicable to both male and female victims, although males as victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence were not explicitly considered by the ICTR prosecution (Di Caro 2019). Listening to the Survivors It was clear that four decades after the peak period of Gukurahundi violence, one’s ability to gather original comprehensive data on the state crimes under examination would be a challenge. The atrocity continues to be unacknowledged by the government of Zimbabwe, and many survivors continue to live in fear of state reprisals should they speak about their Gukurahundi experiences. Having researched the crimes of Gukurahundi from a macro level for a number of years, I found myself in the position of being able to contact gatekeepers both within Zimbabwe and beyond its borders, who were able to put me in contact with 36 individuals, who were direct victims of and/or witnesses to the atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi. Arrangements were made for all interviews to be conducted in South Africa (2017–2020) to reduce risks of harm to the participants. Interviews with the participants ranged from two to six hours in length. Each interviewee talked of their own direct experiences as opposed to hearsay. To assess the extent to which anecdotal reports may reflect any form of systematic violence, rather than isolated incidents, the author established a recruitment method that would reduce the chance of merely gathering information obtained from one, or a few areas, or from only one type of demographic. The resulting set of data shows an even geographical distribution of origin across Matabeleland (Figure 1). Distribution of interview participants place of residence between 1983–1984. The pinpointing of locations is merely an indicator of the general area they lived, but is not precise so to protect the identity of the survivors. Furthermore, the data set, gathered from 36 survivors between 2017– 2020, none of whom were known to each other, exhibits an equal division of male and females, and a well distributed age-range, namely 11–37 years in 1983. Hence, the data reported here are unlikely to be subject to a significant sampling bias and, conversely, are likely to reflect the patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence conducted during Operation Gukurahundi throughout Matabeleland. As will be discussed later in this article, the in-depth survivor interviews coincided to a remarkable degree both in the type and the extent of state crimes experienced, which would indicate that memory bias is not a limitation of this study. Conversely, the converging patterns emerging from distinct individual interviews provides cross-validation between sources, yielding a high overall quality of documentation provided by the collective dataset. The participants are referred to in this report with a pseudonym, and where pertinent, will be referred to as “survivors” rather than “victims” out of respect for the many affected communities, families and individuals both within and outside Zimbabwe, who are courageously and silently living their lives resiliently and have not succumbed to the intents of their victimizers. This project adhered to the  British Sociological Association Statement of Practice (2017). Operation Gukurahundi In March 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, secured over 60 per cent of the vote in the founding independence elections. The main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, secured less than 25 per cent of the vote. The rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU expressed itself as a crude binary between the Shona who formed a decisive majority in Zimbabwe and from whom Mugabe drew his support, and the Ndebele, who constituted less than one fifth of the population and upon whom ZAPU drew its support. On 20 January 1983, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe launched Operation Gukurahundi in Matabeleland with the stated objective of ridding the country of “dissidents” (see Alexander 1998; Kriger 2003). Notably, the so-called dissidents, an “amorphous amalgamation of disaffected [ZAPU] ex-combatants, disillusioned radicals, and more than a few common criminals” (Berkeley 1986: 7) were “very few in number” (Roger  Martin, 2018), and no more than 400 in the entire country (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) & Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) 1997: 37;  Dabengwa 2018). “The attrition rate was very high, with approximately 75 percent being killed captured or fleeing to Botswana” (Roger Martin, 2018). At the heart of Operation Gukurahundi was a strategy of state ordered terror targeting the minority Ndebele, perpetrated by a 4,000 strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA), and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Operation Gukurahundi, effected by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army and the Central Intelligence Organization, were overseen by the Joint High Command (JHC), headed by the incumbent President of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, Operation Gukurahundi did not come to an end until December 1987 with the signing of the national unity accord between former President Mugabe and leader of the political opposition party ZAPU, and the merging of the two parties, namely ZAPU and ZANU to form ZANU–PF. Some commentators argue that President Robert Mugabe’s rationale underpinning Operation Gukurahundi was his drive to destroy his political opposition (ZAPU) and establish a one-party state rather than to destroy the Ndebele people (Tshuma & Ndlovu 2022: 386). However, from the outset, it was evident that the Fifth Brigade were not interested in finding the negligible numbers of dissidents. Although targets included party officials of the political opposition ZAPU and former cadres of its political wing ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army), by far the overwhelming number of persons targeted were the innocent non-combatant civilian population of Matabeleland who belonged to the minority Ndebele ethnic group. In 1983, armed with AK47s, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands.  3  Their presence in any area was accompanied by extreme patterns of violence that included execution of individuals with a political profile and/or status within the community, in combination with killings, severe beatings, torture and massacres of non-political non-combatant civilians (Cameron 2017). The focus of the operation shifted away from Matabeleland North (MN) to Matabeleland South (MS) in February 1984, where extreme patterns of state violence continued. There were, however, some new strategies deployed by Operation Gukurahundi in Matabeleland South, as the state introduced a harsh curfew that permitted food to be used as a political and military weapon of coercion, torture, punishment and death against the Ndebele population. The deprivation of food supplies, which formed a significant element of this state campaign, deliberately brought between 350 000 and 400 000 people to the extreme edge of starvation in contravention of international law. The governments food embargo caused the death of Ndebele men, women and children from starvation and dehydration as well as through injuries and illness exacerbated by hunger and malnutrition induced by the government’s strict curfew and forced starvation (Cameron 2018). The year 1984 in Matabeleland South also heralded a significant increase in the use of internment in concentration camps, where persons with and without political profiles would be subjected to torture and other cruel inhuman acts that sometimes resulted in death. Within the first 28 days of the operation, the Fifth Brigade of Operation Gukurahundi, in their distinctive red berets and army camouflage uniform, were thought to have eliminated somewhere between 3,000–5,000 Ndebele civilians (Doran 2017: 431). Estimates vary as to the total number of non-combatant civilians who were deliberately massacred during the entire period of Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is “no fewer than 10,000 and no more than 20,000” (Eppel 2011). However, Dan Stannard, who was the Director Internal of the CIO during the period being examined in this study, believes that the number of Ndebele killed may be closer to between 30,000 and 50,000 (Onslow 2008). As a senior member of Zimbabwe’s CIO that worked jointly with the military in Matabeleland, one may anticipate that he would have had access to relatively accurate field intelligence regarding the approximate number of fatalities. To date, there has been no rigorous criminological study of the patterns of state crimes that were perpetrated under the umbrella of Operation Gukurahundi between 1983 and 1987. The state’s use of rape and other forms of sexual violence has also remained hidden from scrutiny and, until now, has not been the subject of any programme of analytical research. The present article seeks to fill this knowledge gap through the analysis of original primary data gathered directly from survivors, providing a rich dataset documenting the experiences of a sample of both named and unnamed victims with the aim of delineating the extent and nature of rape and sexual violence directed at the Ndebele during the peak period of the violence in 1983–1984. *About the writer: Hazel Cameron is a criminologist and a lecturer of Peace and Conflict Studies within the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews. She was awarded  her PhD at the University of Liverpool in July 2010. Main research interests include state crime; global elite bystanders to crimes of the powerful; political violence; torture; genocide; war crimes; and crimes against humanity. She has spent over a decade undertaking fieldwork in Rwanda. She is currently researching the rationale of UK and US foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during a period of extreme violence that took place in the Matabeleland region of the newly independent Zimbabwe. /File photo NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 44 Reframing Issues SIPHOSAMI MALUNGA THE aim of this article is to evaluate whether individual criminal responsibility (ICR) is attributable to perpetrators of the Gukurahundi atrocities committed in Matabeleland and Midlands, Zimbabwe, between 1983 and 1987. The criminal liability of Gukurahundi perpetrators is evaluated against the legal requirements garnered from conventions, jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals and the work of leading scholars. Firstly, the article provides an overview and historical development of the concept of ICR under international law. Second, it examines the theories of criminality under international law. Third, it analyses the forms and modalities of ICR including relevant specific crimes. Fourth, it evaluates the individual and superior responsibility of Gukurahundi perpetrators. A crucial feature of international criminal law is the legal obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes. The article therefore explores the different ways in which ICR could be attributed to perpetrators of the Gukurahundi international crimes. The author sets out to advance knowledge and understanding of possible mechanisms to hold perpetrators of the Gukurahundi atrocities criminally accountable under international law. Although influenced by and modelled on domestic notions of criminal liability, individual criminal responsibility (ICR) in international law is unique. Despite significant domestic criminal law doctrinal influences, ICR under international law, can be distinguished from its domestic model. Scholars have analysed the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of ICR under international law. Intrinsically, ICR is shaped by the unique nature of international crimes. Extrinsically, it is influenced by the continuous development of international criminal law (ICL) and jurisprudence from the international criminal tribunals (ICTs). A crucial feature of ICL is the overriding imperative to hold perpetrators of international crimes personally culpable and to explore different ways in which this could be achieved by drawing from domestic notions of criminal liability and also applying new unique forms based on ICL. The jurisprudence of the international courts, from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court (ICC) supports this overriding objective. The commission of atrocities by the Five Brigade (Gukurahundi) in Zimbabwe has been discussed and substantiated in several reports and scholarly works by historians. The atrocities have been categorised and classified as international crimes — namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity by several writers and international criminal law scholars. In light of the historical and scholarly evidence regarding the Gukurahundi crimes in Matabeleland, it is necessary to interrogate the implications of this evidence on the question of criminal liability of perpetrators of these crimes pursuant to the international legal obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes. In light of this argument, what are the implications of such findings under international law? Under national law, including Zimbabwean law, the position is straightforward: the 1988 Amnesty that was issued notwithstanding the atrocities, and if proved, all serious violations of national criminal law by the Gukurahundi perpetrators would attract ICR subject to permissible defences. The 1988 Amnesty aimed at shielding perpetrators from any criminal responsibility. International law provides for the ICR of perpetrators of international crimes and the aim of this article is therefore to evaluate whether ICR exists for the alleged Gukurahundi perpetrators for international crimes (war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (CAH). This article will analyse the concept of ICR under international law and evaluate its applicability to the alleged Gukurahundi perpetrators. The article will begin with an overview of ICR under international law, followed by a review of the historical development of ICR under international law. An examination of the theories of criminality under international law follows. An analysis of the forms and modalities of ICR is then undertaken. An evaluation of the individual and superior responsibility of alleged Gukurahundi perpetrators based on the key legal concepts, principles and legal precedent is undertaken to evaluate whether ICR is attributable to alleged perpetrators of Gukurahundi international crimes. An overview of ICR Under ICL, accountability for international crimes requires that ICR be established with respect to alleged perpetrators. The nature of the involvement in international crimes is vital in weighing various levels of criminal responsibility, establishing guilt and meeting appropriate punishment. ICL sets out two forms of criminal responsibility: individual responsibility and command or superior responsibility. ICR is established for any individual who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of an international crime. The concept of commission will be discussed later. The objective elements for establishing ICR for international crimes are that any of the prohibited acts must be committed with knowledge and intent. While each international crime carries its distinct elements or requirements for ICR, there is a common subjective requirement for all crimes. The subjective element Evaluating individual criminal responsibility of Gukurahundi perpetrators under international law This is the first instalment of Dr Siphosami Malunga’s 49-page article Evaluating the Individual Criminal Responsibility of Gukurahundi Perpetrators Under International Law published in Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa which The NewsHawks is serialising starting this week. The article is part of his doctoral thesis. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 45 requires that the perpetrator knowingly commits the crime in the sense that they must understand the overall context in which their act occurs. In order to be liable, the perpetrator must have actual and constructive knowledge that their act(s) is or are part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and pursuant to a plan; or that it is designed to bring about the destruction of a group, and that the crime is committed against civilians for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, respectively. Such knowledge can be inferred or implied from circumstances, and it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator was aware of the policy or plan. Knowledge can also be inferred from a variety of factors, including political and historical circumstances in which the acts occur, the role and functions of the perpetrator at the time of the commission of the crimes in question, their rank and responsibilities in the political and military hierarchy, the widespread nature and seriousness of the crimes committed, the nature of the crimes and their notoriety. Applying this to the Gukurahundi international crimes, members of Five Brigade who allegedly directly committed atrocities, government, intelligence and military officials at all levels who designed, planned, ordered and directly or indirectly aided or encouraged the operation could be held liable under this requirement. This category of alleged perpetrators would include all ministers and military commanders involved in conceiving and executing the operation. The criminal responsibility of different actors ranging from political, military, paramilitary, intelligence and civilian will be discussed in relation to each specific international crime committed by the Gukurahundi. Individual criminal responsibility Various scholars provide an authoritative, compelling and comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of ICR under international law, highlighting its important origins and foundation in national criminal legal systems, and discussing its historical development. At an international level, the adoption of the doctrine signalled a break with the long-held doctrine of state responsibility enshrined in the Act of State doctrine, which is based on the common law principle of non-interference in other states’ affairs. This break was facilitated by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg which abandoned the concept of immunity of state officials in favour of ICR. The adoption of ICR was encapsulated by the IMT at Nuremberg in its judgment that ‘crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract legal entities.’ The United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution affirming the principles of international law acknowledged in the Charter of the IMT Tribunal and in the judgment of this Tribunal. Four years later in 1950 the International Law Commission (ILC) reaffirmed ICR under international law by presenting seven principles. The principles underscored ICR to be observed in the drafting of the Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind. The aforementioned principles have codified to a certain extent the concept of ICR and some scholars have also argued that the promulgation of the seven Nuremberg principles by the ILC signalled that they had formed part of customary international law and therefore become binding on the international community. Furthermore, the Nuremberg principles have been used as a foundation by statutes of ad hoc tribunals and treaties such as the Rome Statute which has entrenched ICR in the text of the statute with content substantially expanded and clearer on the concept. Finally, some scholars have argued that the principles have played a guiding role in the development of the concept of universal jurisdiction under international law. Yet another key development for ICR was the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) in 1948 which provided for ICR under Articles 3 and 4. This entails that ICR is applicable to everyone and reaffirms the findings at IMT that heads of state and government as well as other government officials cannot hide behind the state for international crimes such as genocide. Next to reaffirm ICR were the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 First Additional Protocol (AP I), which create an obligation on states to punish serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) amounting to ‘grave breaches’ and require state parties to ‘enact legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for persons” who violate the Geneva Conventions.’ Further affirmation came from the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention) which provides for ICR under Article 4. The Committee against Torture (CAT) in its general comment reaffirms that it recognises ICR, as this is a key aspect of the non-derogability of the prohibition of torture. CAT states that in relation to torture ‘subordinates may not seek refuge in superior authority and should be held to account individually.’ Additionally, Article 5 of the Torture Convention requires states to either prosecute or extradite an alleged offender and this supplements Article 4 in the sense that it provides for universal jurisdiction which in itself is a manifestation of ICR. Most recently, the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals have reaffirmed the concept of ICR, whilst the jurisprudence of the Tribunals helped further ‘codify’ the doctrine. Article 6 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Article 7(2) the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statutes respectively provide for ICR. Crucially, the adoption of the doctrine in the ICTY Statute was influenced by the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations which serves as a Commentary to the ICTY Statute. Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and Article 29(1) of the Law of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) also provide for ICR. The most recent significant reaffirmation of the doctrine of ICR can be found in Articles 1 and 25 of the Rome Statute. The aforementioned international treaties and conventions and statutes setting up the ad hoc tribunals as well as the ICC demonstrate the gradual universal codification of the concept of ICR under international law. Although the concept of ICR is now undisputed under international law, it remains unsettled whether there are any exceptions to this concept. On one hand, there is a view that there are no exceptions to ICR for international crimes and individuals cannot use amnesties granted by states or immunity as a result of the offices they occupy to evade accountability. On the other hand, there is a view that functional immunity, which is immunity granted to heads of states and state officials acting on behalf of the state in the course of their duties, extends to all international crimes without exception, thereby shielding the perpetrator from ICR. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other domestic courts have often rejected to apply universal jurisdiction to international crimes on the basis of such immunity. However, while other international tribunals and ICL have developed to confirm the waiver of personal immunity for international crimes before international courts, it is recognised under customary international law and before the African regional level (under the African Criminal Court once it comes into operation) and domestic courts, which will shield sitting heads of states from ICR. The South African High Court has held in Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (Al Bashir case), that ordinarily heads of state enjoy immunity under customary international law but that this immunity is excluded or waived in relation to crimes and obligations under the Rome Statute and waiver by the UNSC. In this regard, it can be argued that with respect to Al-Bashir, where the ICC found that he did not possess personal immunity as the UNSC, in referring to Bashir, a sitting head of state to the ICC, removed his personal immunity. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Al- Bashir held that it was ‘unable to identify a rule in customary international law that would exclude immunity for Heads of State when their arrest is sought for international crimes by another State, even when the arrest is sought on behalf of an international court, including, specifically, this Court.’ However, it is clear that from the inception of the concept of ICR at IMT that such immunity in relation to international crimes had been rejected, a position affirmed by the subsequent Nuremberg principles by the ILC. As the foregoing section shows, the doctrine of ICR is undisputed under international law and now constitutes customary international law, as was held by the SCSL in Fofana and Kondewa. IHL scholars also argue that from state practice that ICR for international crimes is part of customary international law. For this reason, its applicability is therefore universally recognised. Both state and ICR may be triggered by state officials who violate international law as determined by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija which held that, ‘in addition to individual criminal liability, state responsibility may ensue as a result of state officials engaging in torture or failing to prevent torture or punish torturers. Sliedregt identifies three major developments in the trajectory of criminal responsibility and argues that there has been a shift from focusing on the perpetrator’s state of mind to the perpetrator’s conduct and hereby embracing concepts such as strict and vicarious liability where the accused is held liable for the conduct itself, regardless of the state of mind. Additionally, Sliedregt posits that criminal responsibility has broadened from the perpetrator being held accountable for committing the act themselves to committing it through another. In this regard, non-tangible support may also suffice as the actus reus of the crime matrix. Having established, in broad terms that ICR with its collective elements, has been adopted and affirmed on the international level, the concept of ‘system criminality,’ a term that is often used when discussing ICR in international law will be examined forthwith. To be continued… *About the writer: Dr Malunga is an international criminal lawyer. NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 46 Reframing Issues The undignified trend of African migration: A crime against Africans EDMUND TEREM UGAR DURING a recent lunchtime lecture series organised by the South Africa-United Kingdom bilateral chair at the University of the Witwatersrand Humanities Graduate Centre in August, Professor Benard Matolino, an expert in African Philosophy, in his talk entitled "Mis-governance in Africa: A crime against humanity," strongly asserted that the prevailing pattern of current African migration amounts to a crime against Africans. Matolino posits that the extensive movement of Africans within the continent and towards more prosperous regions like the Global North and certain developed nations in the Global South is a direct consequence of Africa’s profound socio-economic and political failures. Matolino contends that the incapability of many African states has reduced the aspirations of ordinary Africans to mere survival, pushing them to seek alternatives elsewhere. Matolino provocatively argues that this frantic search for survival outside of the continent’s dire circumstances should be categorised as a crime perpetuated by African leaders against ordinary citizens. He draws parallels between the present situation and past historical atrocities, such as slavery, apartheid, and genocide, which dehumanised individuals and stripped them of their dignity. In this case, Matolino implicates the African political elite for institutionalising poverty, suffering, and adversity, ultimately compelling ordinary Africans to seek survival beyond their homelands. This article resonates with Matolino’s assertion, underscoring its validity through an analysis of the substantial wave of migrants originating from Nigeria. To better contextualise my position, I first present a concise overview of migration. To provide a clear definition of migration, it is a prerequisite that I clearly state here that  migration  is multifaceted in the sense that people migrate for various reasons. However, in this particular article, I am concerned with the current tumultuous wave of migration from Nigeria, which is a result of the daunting socio-economic situation in the country, characterised by poverty and high cost of living. In short, I am concerned with force migration, but not the force migration that is propelled by wars and conflicts but by poverty and starvation. The UN delineates migration as the relocation of individuals from one place to another in pursuit of an environment conducive to living and working. People migrate due to a spectrum of factors encompassing economic, political, social, and cultural motivations. According to UN data, the number of migrants stood at 244 million in 2015 and rose to 281 million by 2020. While international migration has become a global phenomenon, historical trends depict migrations as a dominant trend of Europeans between 1 600 and 2 000, particularly Europeans moving within their colonial territories driven by political and economic rationales. Economic migration has recently gained significant scholarly attention due to the substantial number of individuals migrating for economic reasons. These economic migrants traverse borders, carrying their skills and expertise to pursue employment opportunities in foreign nations. For instance, in 2019, the UN registered a total of 169 million migrant workers distributed across various continents. Nonetheless, the surge of African migrants towards the Global North has triggered alarm due to the perilous journeys many undertake, risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. According to the World Migration Report, migration has long been ingrained in the African narrative, as the continent has historically witnessed a mobile population. However, over the last two decades, Africans have been deliberately leaving their homelands in search of survival due to the deteriorating conditions prevalent in their respective countries. For instance, the attempted voyage of 1.8 million Africans between 2014 to 2018 to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea resulted in an estimated 17 000 fatalities. It’s crucial to clarify that African migrants constitute a minority within the global migrant population, accounting for only 14% of the global migration population, followed by Europe with 24% and Asia, the highest with 41%. However, my focus remains on comprehending the underlying motivations driving African migration, especially from Nigeria and Zimbabwe, in the current social milieu, which often assumes an undignified and desperate form. Moreover, it’s evident that African migration is laden with pain, suffering, and despair. Some of the African migrants seek refuge outside their continent, often disregarding the potential consequences awaiting them in their chosen destinations. At the moment, intuitively, one can argue that some migrants, especially from Nigeria and Zimbabwe, are more concerned with escaping the hardships of their home countries than the challenges they might encounter abroad. Consequently, some are willing to risk illegal entry into foreign countries, particularly those who remain within the African continent. In a report dated August 10, CNN disclosed the discovery of four Nigerians found hidden beneath a cargo vessel travelling from Nigeria. They were unaware of its destination, believing it was headed for Europe when, in reality, it was travelling to Brazil. These men endured 14 days in appalling conditions in the Atlantic Ocean, driven by their desperate bid to escape the poverty, suffering, and adversity prevailing in Nigeria. This narrative, though distressing, mirrors the aspirations of numerous Nigerians today. The term "Japa," signifying escape or flight, has gained traction in Nigerian migration discourse and is frequently used, particularly among the youth, to express their desire to flee the country. Foreign embassies in Nigeria, especially Canadian, the UK, the US, and Australia, continuously witness an inundation of visa applications from Nigerians seeking to escape their homeland. In 2022, Nigerians constituted the largest immigrant group in the UK and represented a significant portion of the growing stream of African migrants. The impetus behind this massive migration from Nigeria is the widespread suffering, hardship, and economic distress plaguing the nation. Nigeria, despite being an oil-producing nation, contends with an unbearable cost of living that strains the resources of its citizens. With petrol prices hovering around N600–700 (almost a dollar) per litre, this reality is exacerbated by a minimum wage of N30 000 per month. Basic necessities like groceries have experienced massive price hikes in the span of three months. The Nigerian currency’s alarming depreciation equates to US$1/N784.50, which renders the monthly earnings of many households at US$39 per month. The present suffering and hardship experienced by Nigerians, which have fueled the exodus, cannot be immediately attributed to a crime committed by their political leaders. This is because the newly elected government could assert that they are attempting to rebuild the economy after inheriting a legacy of misguided policies, such as fuel subsidies. The administration could argue that their initial months in power involved tough economic decisions aimed at propelling the nation towards growth. One such decision was the elimination of fuel subsidies. However, on closer examination, the ongoing plight of Nigerians can indeed be regarded as a severe and hellish crime against Nigerian citizens. This is because those bearing the brunt of these hardships are everyday citizens. For example, during a televised session of the Nigerian Senate, the Senate President was observed discussing financial arrangements to ensure the holiday enjoyment of the legislatures. Furthermore, this same legislative body triviliases the suffering of ordinary Nigerians during their deliberations while also seeking an exorbitant N70 billion for furniture allowances in a nation where the average citizen struggles to secure a proper meal. This disregard for the hardships faced by ordinary Nigerians epitomises a systematic injustice against those living on the margins of their homeland. Regrettably, this scenario is not unique to Nigeria alone; it extends across numerous African countries. While everyday citizens of nations like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Cameroon, and others endure economic hardships, political elites and their families revel in opulence. This pattern can be perceived as a systematic form of oppression that propels citizens from many African nations to seek refuge elsewhere. Finally, according to reports from The Economist and Statista, Africa’s population is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050, making it the fastest-growing young population globally. However, this demographic distinction prompts an inquiry into the significance of this youthfulness amidst the paucity of fundamental social amenities such as education, infrastructure, clean water, electricity, and healthcare. The benefits of being a youthful population are overshadowed by the reality of pervasive unemployment, extensive numbers of out-of-school children, compromised healthcare systems, and an ensuing cycle of migration. This unfortunate outcome is a direct result of the leadership's incompetence across Africa, which has instigated the present indignity of migrants leaving the continent. I unequivocally state that African leaders must be held accountable for this grievous crime against their own. — IOL. The UN has said there are millions of migrants across the world. File picture: Ben Stansall/AFP NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Reframing Issues Page 47 KRISTINA SKIERKA/ AISHA MOHAMMED MUSSA THE fabric of our global food system is fraying under the strain of climate change and an ever-expanding population. To prevent it from unraveling, we must embrace distributed renewable-energy solutions, which are critical for reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, boosting resilience and productivity, and cutting costs. Failure to do so would jeopardise efforts to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and threaten our very survival. Halfway to the 2030 deadline, progress toward the SDGs –  conceived as a “shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet” – is lagging significantly. In July, the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development  in New York and the UN Food Systems Summit +2 Stocktaking Moment  in Rome underscored the importance of ensuring access to modern energy (SDG 7) and achieving zero hunger (SDG 2), respectively. When it comes to strengthening the long-term resilience and adaptability of the global food system, these two objectives are interlinked. Translating this into public policies has taken on new urgency, given that rapid global warming, population growth, public-health crises, volatile energy markets, and conflict have exposed the food system’s unique vulnerabilities and shortcomings. Past solutions and approaches will no longer work; on the contrary, they contributed to the current problems. Previously, concerns about food supply – including high prices during the 2008 global financial crisis – invariably led to agricultural intensification and mechanisation, as well as an increase in land use. As a result, agribusiness (including the production, transport, and storage of food) today accounts for roughly  one-third of all GHG emissions, which in turn threaten the future of agriculture. While the effects of climate change are felt throughout the global food system, they are disproportionately borne by those least responsible for the problem: smallholder farmers in the Global South. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa, which relies on rainfed agriculture, already  experiences  one-third of the world’s droughts and is vulnerable to higher temperatures and other extreme weather. The International Monetary Fund has found that a single drought can lower an African country’s medium-term economic-growth potential by one percentage point. That conclusion reflects agriculture’s central role in the developing world: in some of the least-developed countries, it accounts for  more than 25% of GDP, while 52% of employed people in sub-Saharan Africa are  active in the sector. Given this, achieving sustainable and climate-friendly food production in the Global South could lead to significant welfare improvements. This will require a shift to distributed renewable energy, which can be used in primary production, post-harvest processing, storage, and cooking – the agricultural activities that tend to consume the most energy in developing countries. To be sure, decentralised renewable energy is not a panacea. But it could contribute significantly to stabilising the global food system by lowering energy costs, a crucial factor for boosting productivity; by facilitating financing for productive applications, which could democratize access to yield-enhancing technologies; and by reducing GHG emissions and promoting climate-change adaptation. Last but not least, reducing reliance on fossil fuels and decentralising energy production can help shift global power dynamics within the food system. Solar-powered irrigation, for example, has significantly improved water access and enabled multiple cropping cycles, increasing productivity and reducing GHG emissions. Solar-powered pumps have boosted farmers’ incomes by  more than 50% in India and led to significant increases in yields in Rwanda. The Ethiopian ministry of Irrigation and Lowlands — which one of us heads — recently banned the import of diesel irrigation pumps to support the rapid transition to renewable-energy solutions. In sub-Saharan Africa, solar milling machines could make grinding grain into flour more efficient, affordable, and sustainable. Additionally, the expansion of mini-grids to power post-harvest processes can bring more economic and environmental benefits by enabling communities to preserve their produce locally. Cold storage and refrigeration are crucial for extending shelf life, reducing food loss, and maintaining product quality. Decentralised cold-storage solutions that are powered by renewable energy could improve market access and reduce spoilage for smallholder farmers and remote communities. By converting existing infrastructure to renewable energy sources, we can cut GHG emissions and make cold chains more environmentally friendly and affordable. All the above examples demonstrate the diverse applications of distributed renewable energy, and each solution contributes to a more resilient, sustainable, and climate-friendly food system. By scaling up these innovations, we can address the energy challenges faced by smallholder farmers, processors, and consumers while reducing our carbon footprint. Reinforcing the fabric of our global food system requires a new framework designed to reduce land use, enhance productivity, minimise food loss, and cut GHG emissions. Renewable energy must be its foundation. Otherwise, developing countries will be unable to raise agricultural yields and end hunger, stop and reverse environmental degradation, or democratise energy access. — Project Syndicate. *About the writers: Kristina Skierka is chief executive of Power for All. Aisha Mohammed Mussa is minister of Irrigation and Lowlands of Ethiopia. The key to sustainable food systems Achieving zero hunger, one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), requires meeting another SDG: ensuring access to modern energy. In particular, the future of agriculture in the Global South depends on distributed renewable-energy solutions to address the challenges faced by smallholder farmers. Tomato field NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

JONATHAN MBIRIYAMVEKA ZIMBABWE’S premier annual digital media conference, the Hub Unconference, is back with an exciting lineup of speakers from four different African countries. The Hub Unconference is a free-entry event that happens on the sidelines of the annual Shoko Festival, Zimbabwe’s longest-running celebration of urban culture, which is being held this year under the theme #TheTakeBack. It will run from 28 to 29 September at Moto Republik in Harare. This year, the Hub Unconference will tackle new trends in content creation, civic tech and progressive activism in the age of artificial intelligence (AI). Organisers said the 9th edition of the Hub Unconference had assumed a new format which will see the conference running for two days. The programming consists of an exciting cocktail of fireside chats, lighting talks, panel discussions and masterclasses. There will be cutting edge talks by Christopher Kayonga and Timothy Chemonges from Open Parly UG (Uganda), Cayley Clifford from Africa Check (South Africa), Christine Rupiah from The Continent (South Africa), Peter Kimani from CODE for Africa (Kenya), Joscar Amondi from Social Technology Movement (Kenya), Mark Kuggundu from Defend Defenders (Uganda) and leading Zimbabwean academic Professor Admire Mare. The masterclasses will focus on many topical issues and trends, including graphic design, fact checking, TikTok content and documentary making. Added to this, the Africa Satire Convention will see some of the leading satirists in the country and on the continent taking part. The Africa Satire Convention will look at the power of satire in influencing the youths to participate in public processes like registering to vote. The Open Data Africa Summit will bring bloggers, academics, leading activists and developers drawn from Africa’s leading open data initiatives from countries such as Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe who will participate in various panel discussions such as journalism in the age of AI and an Open Parly Africa panel discussion that will focus on media innovation in a captured environment. The Open Data Africa Summit is being hosted with support from the Consortium to Protect Human Rights, Civic Freedoms and Media Development in sub-saharan Africa (Charm Africa). The Charm Consortium has seven members, namely Wits Journalism, Réseau des Femmes Leaders pour le Développement (RFLD), Defend Defenders, Civil Rights Defenders, Civicus, Fojo Media Institute and Magamba Network. In the past editions, the Hub Unconference has hosted prominent local and international speakers such as Alice McCool (The Guardian UK),  Robyn Kriel (CNN), Raheela Mohammed (Al Jazeera) and Lindiwe Zulu from the ANC, among many others. Both the Hub Unconference and Shoko Festival are projects of Magamba Network, Africa’s trailblazing creative and digital media organisation. STYLE TRAVEL BOOKS ARTS MOTORING Porsche just got angrier Being a Fashion Model Life&Style Page 48 Issue 148, 15 September 2023 Shoko Festival the Hub Unconference takes new format Nutty O is expected to perform at the Hub Unconference

People & Places Page 49 President Mnangagwa turns 80 NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023

Page 50 Sport Sport NewsHawks Issue 148, 15 September 2023