NewsHawks 29 March 2024

Price US$1 Friday 29 March 2024 NEWS Army blocks Mnangagwa’s ambitious third term plans Story on Page 7 NEWS Court throws out ex-minister’s appeal WHAT’S Story on Page 22 INSIDE SPORT ‘We need to be true to our DNA, but with proficient set-piece’ Story on Page 50 ALSO INSIDE Tshabangu reaps rewards, lives large Nssa chair in US$10m IT system scandal

Page 2 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE STATUTORY pension fund, National Social Security Authority (Nssa) chairman Emmanuel Fundira is embroiled in a US$10 million ICT social security system scandal involving local software company Twenty Third Century Systems (TTCS) (Pvt), documents seen by The NewsHawks show. TTCS, which is based in Newlands in Harare, provides technology and software solutions. It was linked Germany multinational SAP, a market leader in enterprise software application, and South Africa’s EOH Holdings, which are tech giants, until 2019. Now they are at war with each other. Strategically placed sources say Fundira is accused of brazen and corrupt abuse of office as he railroads the Nssa board, which includes Merjury Chinyemba, Tarusenga Chitemere, Shepherd Mundondo, Grace Mathe, Timothy Nherudzo, Chipo Ndudzo and Beatrice Ncube, into restoring a cancelled software system contract that cost Nsaa US$10 445 582.00. This resulted in Nssa taking legal action against TTCS and a counter lawsuit. Fundira wants the court cases to be hastily withdrawn and a new contract issued without responsibility and care for pensioners’ funds already sunk into botched deal. The abortive Nssa-TTCS tender was widely described as a grand heist. Nssa paid over US$10 million for the dysfunctional system, but has nothing to show for it. Documents show Fundira has used his power — through what is called “chairman’s action” — to pressure the board into reviving a deal in which the pension fund has already lost more than US$10 million. He wants the contract restored at all costs and has been forcefully demanding that it be done urgently, suggesting a vested personal interest. The issue has divided Nssa management and rattled government officials aware of the attempt to create further exposure for the US$1.2 billion pension fund through a contract which may fail again. What is alarming, according to the documents, is that Fundira also wants Nssa to stop its court action against TTCS, while paying it more money. Court papers show Nssa is arguing that the contract was invalid or alternatively there was a breach of the agreement signed on 31 October 2013, hence invalidity. It wants US$10 million payment in damages for breach of contract plus interest at a rate of 5% per annum with effect from 31 December 2017. For its part, TTCS is claiming US$7 369 326 against Nssa for maintenance fees and software licences. The matter is at pre-trial conference stage. Despite these two cases, which have been consolidated by the court due to similar cause of action by related parties, Fundira wants Nssa to revive the old deal and immediately pay TTCS about US$2 million extra to come back amid unresolved previous complaints of failure. A Ministry of Public Service official told The NewsHawks: “Basically, Fundira wants TTCS to be given a renew contract even if they failed to deliver. Nssa paid above US$10 million, but must now pay again, with US$2 million immediately released to the same company which bungled the project. This is a brazenly corrupt deal. “On 7 December 2023, the board met with TTCS representatives to discuss the SAP system that Nssa had acquired sometime in 2013 for a cost in excess of US$10 million. Nssa paid for the system in full. At the meeting, TTCS indicated they were ready to resuscitate the system at an estimated cost of US$1 880 000 and would require about 1 054 days to restore the system. The provision of annual maintenance would be 22% of the value of the software — which means about US$880 000.” Further, Fundira wants Nssa to drop its legal action against his close associate Henry Chikova, a former director for benefits, schemes planning and research at the pension fund. Nssa was suing Chikova, who now works at the public service, for deliberate misinformation, impropriety and gaslighting colleagues which led to the awarding of the tender to an undeserving supplier — TTCS which had lost to against another company, Integra, but later clawed back as it charged US$10.4 million as opposed to its competitor’s US$17.8 million. Fundira wants charges against Chikova dropped so that he makes him Nssa general manager — the management boss — to implement his new US$10 million deal. Nssa management has already been told to drop charges against Chikova in preparation for his return as the boss at the company where he left under a cloud of impropriety and corruption suspicions, costing the company millions. The pension fund is due to recruit a new general manager next month to replace Arthur Manase who resigned last year facing over 30 charges of corruption. Applications closed on 31 March. Charles Shava, Nssa director of occupational safety and health, is the acting general manager. He is one of the applicants for the substantive top job, together with Chikova and Nssa director of corporate affairs David Makwara, among a few others. Fundira is pushing for Chikova to become Nssa boss through a manipulated recruitment process. He has even tried to hire some human resources consultants to conduct sham interviews to legitimise his imposition of his own person to implement the US$10 million deal. After his appointment as Nssa chair in May last year, Fundira has been aggressively trying to revive the US$10 million contract, directing this must be done together with an immediate payment of US$1.9 million to TTCS, a company in the courts with the pension fund over non-performance and failure of the system. TTCS installed various systems in state enterprises amid controversy, forcing government to stop using its services, particularly around 2019 when it was still in a partnership with listed South African technology solutions group, EOH Holdings, one of Africa’s largest technology services providers. EOH is facing a series of corporate governance failures and irregularities, including unsubstantiated payments, tender irregularities and other unethical business practices which are primarily limited to the public sector business centralised in EOH Mthombo and some EOH employees. A number of rogue and corrupt former EOH Holdings employees and directors almost destroyed an entire group through tender fraud with state organisations such as the SA National Defence Force and the Department of Water and Sanitation. TTCS is also entangled in controversy with its other former partner, Germany multinational software giant SAP amid allegations that it used code names and set up a shelf company in Botswana to circumvent European Union sanctions imposed on the Zimbabwean government from 2002. TTCS is claiming approximately R1 billion (US$54.2 million) from SAP for revenue losses resulting from the software giant terminating their agreements in 2019. The Harare-based TTCS wrote to the United States Stock Exchange in 2021, accusing SAP of being involved in a scheme to circumvent EU sanctions against it. “This was a clear effort on the part of SAP to avoid having to comply with the various sanctions and to continue doing business in Zimbabwe despite the sanctions,” Ernest Zvinavashe, managing executive at TTCS, was quoted as saying. “To date, TTCS Global does not have a single Botswana customer. Its sole purpose was to contract with SAP to supply SAP software solutions to Zimbabwean customers, through TTCS.” AP global public relations head Marcus Winkler told the Sunday Times of South Africa that the termination of its agreements with TTCS in 2019 was the result of an extensive investigation. “SAP is currently in litigation with TTCS Nssa chairperson Emmanuel Fundira Nssa chair in US$10m IT system scandal

NewsHawks News Page 3 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 over SAP’s decision to terminate them. We do not comment on pending litigation,” he said. The German-based software giant has also been in trouble in South Africa recently. In January 2024, court documents revealed how SAP allegedly bribed Eskom officials to retain business with it and other parastatals. The United States government brought the allegations against SAP. Fundira’s deal also reeks of corruption. Nssa itself is redolent with rot. “Nssa and TTCS entered into an agreement in 2013 for the supply and installation of an ICT system for the pension fund. However, due to some disagreements during the implementation process, Nssa terminated the contract in December 2017 over failure by the service provider to deliver and overpricing issues despite numerous pleas from TTCS for more time to implement the SAP system,” one document says. “After the appointment of Fundira in May last year, the board met on 7 December 2023 to discuss the issue. Fundira imposed the TTCS issue on the meeting, which was not on the agenda, and used what is he calls ‘chairman’s action’ to foist a resolution which says the deal must be revived with US$2 million paid immediately. TTCS and Nssa management then met on 11 January 2024 for further engagement. The Nssa board met again on 13 February 2024 and resolved that the pension fund should engage TTCS to resuscitate the SAP system. Pending litigation against TTCS and Chikova is now going to be withdrawn to facilitate the deal. The way Fundira is pushing for the revival of the contract and clearance of charges against Chikova whom he wants as general manager shows he has a vested interest in this. It’s abuse of office, cronyism and corruption writ large.” Background Essentially, there is a raging dispute between Nssa and TTCS dating back to 2017. In 2012, Nssa advertised a public tender for the supply and implementation of ICT social security system. As a result of the bidding process, Nssa and TTCS signed a supply and implementation contract on 31 October 2013. After that, Nssa paid TTCS a total of US$10 445 582.00. Disagreements, however, erupted over implementation. Subsequently, Nssa sued TTCS in HC 7384/20 seeking a declaratur that the contract entered into by the parties is unlawful and invalid and for restitution of the amount paid pursuant to the alleged illegal contract. Nssa is also suing Leadbake Enterprises, Blessmore Chanakira, Auxillia Danayi Munyeza and Chikova in a bid to sell properties in Borrowdale which were used as collateral. Liability on Chikova was based on negligent performance of duty. The alternative claim by Nssa is based on breach of contract, that is, in the event the court finds the contract to be valid. The defendants raised a special plea and exception to the summons. The special plea was struck off the roll High Court Justice Joseph Chilimbe on 26 October 2022. In respect to case HC 1148/22, TTCS sued Nssa based on a deal born out of the 31 October 2013 contract, that is the end-user licence agreement entered into by the parties on 20 December 2013. The two cases have been consolidated and are pending in the courts. Fundira has directed Nssa to withdraw the cases and concentrate on giving TTCS a new deal. The project, which was started way back in 2016, experienced  a two-and-a-half year delay. The ICT SAP system specifically relating to the National Pension Scheme went live eight years ago with the remaining module relating to the Workers Compensation Fund projected to go live on 1 May 2016. The contract was cancelled in 2017 due to non-performance. The revived tender is bound to gobble more millions from Nssa, while pensioners’ continue to wallow in poverty. When contacted for comment, Fundira said he was travelling on transit and could not respond to questions sent to him. “I am currently out of the country and airborne as we chat and shall be away on business till the end of the month and therefore unable to assist in this regard. In this case, my vice chairman Ms M Chinyemba and or AGM Dr Charles Shava may be able to assist as they see fit. Kindest regards,” he told The NewsHawks via WhatsApp. Nssa acting general manager Charles Shava said he could not comment and directed questions to Fundira. 23rd Century Systems Head of Sales Eugene Muzvidziwa invited The NewsHawks for an interview.

Page 4 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 NATHAN GUMA NATIONAL Social Security Authority (Nssa) chairperson Emmanuel Fundira is abusing his position to ensure Dr Henry Chikova’s return to the statutory pension fund as its boss to revive a botched multi-million deal in which the pension fund lost US$10.4 million. Ministry of Public Service sources say Fundira is pulling out all the stops for Chikova to come back despite leaving the pension fund in controversial circumstances over the bungled US$10.4 million ICT social security system contract by local technology business solutions provider Twenty Third Century Systems As a result, the Nssa chairperson is demanding that the pension fund withdraw charges against Chikova emanating from the failed costly deal. Simultaneously, Fundira is also trying to manipulate Nssa’s recruitment process for a new general manager to get Chikova appointed the next boss without following the required procedures, the sources say. The Nssa chairperson has even gone to the extent of hiring his own team of human resources experts to manage the recruitment process to ensure Chikova gets the job. Chikova left Nssa as director (benefits, schemes planning and research) and acting general manager under a cloud of controversy seven years ago — in January 2017 — having worked there for 22 years in social security administration, planning and research. Chikova now works for the Public Service Commission. He was blamed for lobbying for Twenty Third Century Systems to get the US$10.4 million ICT social security system and subsequently presiding over its failed implementation. As project director, he was responsible for the contract and its execution. After the shoddy job, Nssa sued Twenty Third Century Systems and four others, including Chikova, for their roles in the deal. Now Fundira is demanding that charges against Chikova be dropped. He has gone to the extent of pressuring the board and management to ensure that Chikova is cleared of the charges for him to be eligible to apply for the Nssa top job and revive the US$10.4 million.  Chikova has already applied for the post. The application deadline was 31 March and a new boss will be appointed soon. Sources say Chikova has been assured he will get the job. A document obtained by The NewsHawks, dated 15 March, shows how Fundira has been pushing for Chikova’s return and has ordered that acting general manager Charles Shava “do everything necessary” to implement the “chairman’s action”. “The authority issued summons against Twenty Third Century Systems, Leadbake Enterprises, Blessmore Chanakira, Auxillia Danayi Munyeza and Dr Henry Chikova sometime in December 2020,” the document says. “The claim was arising from Nssa’s cancellation of an agreement of supply of an ICT system. The board took note that the authority in January 2017 executed a retrenchment agreement whose clause 10 stated that the parties agreed to release each other from all claims, liabilities and obligations of any nature and kind attributable to or otherwise arising from the conduct of an employee during the employer/ employee relationship. “In light of the agreement, the board decided that the authority withdraws its claim against Dr Chikova.” This shows Fundira is brazenly abusing office and power to drop charges against Chikova in a bid to hire him as the next Nssa boss to revive the US$10.4 million tender. Chikova served as Nssa acting general manager before Elizabeth Chitiga. Before the legal action, Mutumbwa Mugabe & Partners law firm wrote to Chikova asking him to show cause why Nssa should not institute a claim against him for the recovery of losses it had suffered due to the questionable US$10.4 contract and his equally questionable conduct. At the time, Chikova led a Nssa delegation to Europe and, upon return, recommended TTCS get the tender. “You were the head of the NSSA delegation which visited certain locations in Europe and upon your return, you reported that TTCS had fulfilled the said requirement. It has transpired that your report contained a falsehood in that TTCS had not been involved at all the sites visited by your delegation,” charged the lawyers. “The misrepresentation caused the authority to contract with a supplier which did not have the requisite qualifications and has resulted in Nssa suffering heavy loss.” The lawyers said the tender process violated section 7 (1) of the Procurement Regulations, Statutory Instrument 171 of 2002 as the contract was awarded without the authority of the then State Procurement Board or the chairperson of the agency. “Further, there was no satisfaction of the cumulative requirements of Section 7 (2) (a) — (f). At all material times, you as the director of benefits, schemes planning and research, were the head of the user department of the social security system… As project director, you were responsible for the contract and its implementation,” said the lawyers. Fundira is accused of brazen and corrupt abuse of office as he railroads the Nssa board, which includes Merjury Chinyemba, Tarusenga Chitemere, Shepherd Mundondo, Grace Mathe, Timothy Nherudzo, Chipo Ndudzo and Beatrice Ncube, into restoring a cancelled software system contract that cost Nsaa US$10 445 582. He wants TTCS to be given a renewed IT system contract even if the company failed to deliver. Nssa paid US$10.4 million for the system, but must now pay again to resuscitate it, with US$2 million immediately released to the same company which bungled the project in the first place. On 7 December 2023, its board met with TTCS representatives to discuss the SAP system revival. Nssa had acquired the system in 2013 for a cost in excess of US$10 million. Nssa paid for the system in full. At the meeting, TTCS indicated it was ready to resuscitate the system at an estimated cost of US$1 880 000 and would require about 1 054 days to restore the system. The provision of annual maintenance would be 22% of the value of the software — which means about US$880 000. Essentially, there is a raging dispute between Nssa and TTCS dating back to 2017. In 2012, Nssa advertised a public tender for the supply and implementation of ICT social security system. As a result of the bidding process, Nssa and TTCS signed a supply and implementation contract on 31 October 2013. After that, Nssa paid TTCS a total of US$10 445 582. Disagreements, however, erupted over implementation and the contract was cancelled. Subsequently, Nssa sued TTCS in Hich Court case 7384/20 seeking a declaratur that the contract entered into by the parties was unlawful and invalid, and for restitution. It is also suing Leadbake, Chanakira, Auxillia and Chikova in a bid to sell properties in Harare's Borrowdale suburb which were used as collateral. Contacted for comment, Chikova sent a message: I'll call you back. Corruption echoes ring as Fundira pushes for Chikova NSSA return Former Nssa director Benefits, Schemes Planning and Research Henry Chikova

NewsHawks Re-run Page 5 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE A MOVE by National Social Security Authority (Nssa) chairperson Emmanuel Fundira (pictured) to start a fresh round of “eating” — looting — at the U$1.2 billion statutory pension fund by securing a new luxury car for himself while pensioners get peanuts has been thwarted by the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). Fundira, who is Nssa non-executive chair and thus not entitled to a car, had connived with former Public Service minister Paul Mavima to get a US$200 000 Land Rover Defender for personal use under the guise of having a car to tour the pension fund’s various projects around the country. “Fundira has now returned the car, a Land Rover Defender. It is parked at Nssa at the moment,” a Public Service ministry official said. “The chairman, who is non-executive, says he was given permission by Mavima to go ahead and get the car. A non-executive chairperson is not entitled to a condition of service vehicle. So this means this was an irregular or even corrupt deal. “After that, Fundira wanted chief secretary to cabinet Misheck Sibanda to regularise the deal, but he refused. However, OPC joined the fray and ordered him to return the car. He brought it back a few days ago. It’s now in the basement.” Mavima was close to Fundira, a hotelier, safari operator and group chief executive of privately-owned Astoc Leisure Group. When he was appointed Nssa chair in May, Fundira promised a clean-up at the corruption-ridden organisation, but he has done nothing much. Mavima has now been removed from the ministry and appointed a minister of State in OPC responsible for skills audit. He left Nssa under a cloud of corruption involving a US$400 000 Borrowdale house scandal. In 2015, Fundira was removed as Allied Timbers board chair amid a donation by the company to Zanu PF which never reached its intended beneficiary. Previously, he was chairperson of Allied Timbers, African Sun Limited, and the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority. He was president of the Safari Operators’ Association of Zimbabwe. He has also served as director at Safari Club International and African Wildlife Consultative Forum. The Fundira car fiasco came as Nssa has presented to the OPC its forensic audit which unearths corruption and names individuals implicated in the pension fund’s latest scandals, setting the stage for President Emmerson Mnangagwa to act. Mnangagwa has already acted by removing Mavima from the Public Service where he was in charge of Nssa, although he then put him directly under his wings. Nssa is a US$1.2 billion statutory pension fund. It has 109 properties across the country. The current Nssa forensic audit was conducted by AMG Global Chartered Accountants (Zimbabwe). It focuses on a wide scope of corruption issues, ranging from corporate governance, abuse of office and power, and self-aggrandisement at the expense of struggling poor pensioners. The critical issues include fraudulent property deals and acquisitions, abuse of office and duty, company vehicles, foreign trips and holiday allowances. Nssa board members last year reportedly flew to Kenya — paying themselves huge allowances — for a week-long training workshop that could have been held locally to save money, as pensioners continue to receive peanuts and wallow in untold poverty. NSSA chairperson ordered to surrender luxury vehicle

Page 6 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 AFTER the arrest of National Security Authority (Nssa) director of investments and properties Brian Murewa last week — more than a year on the run — by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (Zacc) on fraud and corruption charges, attention is now firmly on former Public Service minister Paul Mavima and ex-Nssa boss Arthur Manase. Mavima, now deployed to a new obscure portfolio called ministry of Skills Audit and Development after last year's general elections, and Manase were implicated in some dodgy deals at Nssa. Members of the public are closely watching if Zacc will arrest them after the arraignment of Murewa as they were also involved in the minister's US$400 000 corrupt house deal exposed by The NewsHawks. Government insiders say if Mavima and Manase are not held to account, then Zacc's integrity and credibility will take a further knock. Murewa, who has been on the run for over a year before his recent return from South Africa, was arrested during a raid at his Borrowdale home in Harare last week. As first reported by The NewsHawks in February last year, Murewa escaped to South Africa with Zacc in hot pursuit over a corruption case involving Mavima who illegally and corruptly bought a house in Quinnington, Borrowdale, Harare, for US$400 000 using Nssa pensioners' funds. The minister was removed from Public Service and deployed to the ministry of Skills Audit and Development after last year's general elections. Murewa was the agent of the deal executed under the watch of Manase who left last year in July under a dark cloud of corruption following a long period on suspension. Manase faced over 30 charges of corruption. A Nssa forensic audit into a series of corrupt deals at the fund has recommended that Zacc deal with Manase. On 26 February 2023, The NewsHawks first reported: "The National Social Security Authority (Nssa) investments and properties director Brian Murewa has fled Zimbabwe to South Africa to escape imminent arrest for helping Public Service minister Paul Mavima to corruptly buy a house in Quinnington, Borrowdale, Harare, for US$400 000." There were no due process and board approvals to buy the minister's Quinnington house, Stand No. 218 Lot A1, amid fraudulent financial engineering for private benefit by Murewa. Although the house was valued at US$350 000, US$400 000 was paid by Nssa in October 2022, creating room for an extra US$50 000 for rent-seeking to go into private pockets. Murewa was also involved in another corrupt deal in Kariba. On the Kariba real estate deal, original investigations by The NewsHawks (later confirmed by the Nssa forensic audit report seen by our reporters) showed Murewa misrepresented to the Nssa board the true cost of the 2 783-square metre Fishermans Rest Lodge which has six bedrooms, four bathrooms, main en suite, swimming pool and entertainment area, among other features. While seeking board approval, Murewa pegged the purchase price at US$240 000, fully aware that the public advert for the property was US$220 000. He purposely made an offer of US$240 000 despite it being valued US$220 000 by the seller, Pam Golding Properties. The agreement of sale and Pam Golding Properties records show the property was eventually purchased for US$215 000. This means the price was inflated by US$25 000. However, Murewa ensured that US$244 000 was paid for the property, ballooning the financial prejudice to Nssa to US$29 000. At some point, Murewa wanted to pay US$252 631.59. Apart from misrepresenting the price to the board, Murewa also inflated it to US$240 000. He then initiated the transfer of US$300 000 on 13 January 2022. His arrest brings Mavima and Manase into the spotlight. — STAFF WRITER. All eyes on minister after arrest of NSSA director Former Public Service minister Paul Mavima Former Nssa boss Arthur Manase

NewsHawks News Page 7 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE ZIMBABWEAN Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga and the military's post-election political strategy blocked President Emmerson Mnangagwa's third-term ambitions. This forced him to come out clean to say he will not seek to manipulate the constitution to hang onto power as demanded by his supporters. Mnangagwa sidelined the army during last year's general elections and used the state security service, Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)-run Forever Associates Zimbabwe (Faz), to win the polls, fearing internal sabotage. However, military commanders always said behind the scenes after the elections Mnangagwa and Faz would be stopped in their tracks. Now his CIO-driven project has come unstuck, grinding to a screeching halt as the army backs Chiwenga to take over. Chiwenga recently influenced key military appointments, including that of his closest ally Lieutenant-General Anselem Sanyatwe as Zimbabwe National Army commander. Mnangagwa had in 2019 removed Sanyatwe and posted him to Tanzania as ambassador amid purges of the military in the aftermath of the 2017 military coup which first brought him to power. Although Chiwenga showed his clear intention to become the next Zimbabwean president during his high-profile wedding to Miniyothabo Baloyi last December more than at any other time before, Mnangagwa did not give up his push for a third term by proxy. He did it while leaving room for political plausible deniability. Clearly, he has been giving mixed signals about it. Until recently, Mnangagwa tried to use Zanu PF youths to push for a third term, saying he will still be there in 2030 — the same approach they used in 2018 for him to seek re-election in 2023. Their campaign for a third term was open and Mnangagwa did not distance himself from it until it became clear that it would be politically ill-fated to do so. Having tested the waters and found them dangerously deep, Mnangagwa is now beating a hasty retreat while posturing as a stickler for the constitution and rule of law. Yet his re-election was riddled with unconstitutional issues and illegalities. With Chiwenga on the political ascendancy, backed by the army, Mnangagwa says he does not have intentions of running for a third term. He says there is “no iota of evidence” where the ruling Zanu PF has pushed for something that violates the constitution. Mnangagwa said Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy that abides by the dictates of the law. In an exclusive question-and-answer interview with Brick by Brick magazine editors Munyaradzi Huni and Baffour Ankomah, Mnangagwa denied third-term ambitions. “Well, I am very happy that Zimbabweans are very imaginative,” he said. “They can imagine about anything, which shows there is democracy in the country, you see. “But we in Zanu PF are very democratic and we obey the constitution. “There is not an iota of evidence where Zanu PF or I, as President, has ever expressed the violation of our constitution. But we allow people to dream properly or widely. They will still wake up and find things are working and the constitution hasn’t changed.” In terms of the constitution, extending presidential term limits would require amending section 91 of the constitution, which disqualifies a person “for election as President or appointment as Vice-President if he or she has already held office as President for two terms, whether continuous or not, and for the purpose of this sub-section three or more years’ service is deemed to be a full term”. Amending the constitution requires a twothirds parliamnetray majority, which Zanu PF now has through the backdoor in the National Assembly and technically in the Senate, courtesy to opposition political impostor Sengezo Tshabangu and goons behind him. However, section 328 (7) bars an incumbent from benefitting from such a constitutional change. It says: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an amendment to a term-limit provision the effect of which is to extend the length of time that a person may hold or occupy any public office, does not apply in relation to any person who held or occupied that office, or an equivalent office, at any time before the amendment.” This means such a change can only benefit future presidents. Besides, section 328 (7) can only be amended through a referendum as set out under section 328 (9) of the constitution. Previously, Mnangagwa told ZTN Prime before last year's elections: “I am going for my second term . . . this is my last term." Army blocks Mnangagwa’s ambitious third term plans Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga

Page 8 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 SINCE helping Zanu PF get a two-thirds parliamentary majority in the House of Assembly to enable it to amend the constitution following last year's general while decimating the opposition and undermining democracy, self-proclaimed CCC secretary-general Sengezo Tshabangu has been reaping the rewards and living the life. He is now a senator through the back door. Tshabangu now drives a brand new Toyota Fortuner, a luxury Japanese mid-sized SUV manufactured since 2004. The photo in this shows Tshabangu's South African registered white Toyota Fortuner. The picture was taken by a NewsHawks citizen journalist last week at Crowne Plaza Hotel in Harare where Tshabangu was staying. He usually stays at that hotel whenever in Harare, and even during the recalls which were openly supported by Zanu PF, government — the executive, parliament and the judiciary as well — as state security agents. And besides, Tshabangu is now rubbing shoulders with elected representatives, government officials and the country’s top political elites. He has been basking in the vainglory of recalls of elected MPs, senators and councillors, as well as mayors. Recently, Tshabangu gleefully rubbed shoulders with Mnangagwa at the official commissioning of the Pupu Battle National Monument in Lupane, Matabeleland North province. So the recalls have been hugely politically and materially profitable to Tshabangu. The greatest loser in all this is the people and democracy. Tshabangu reaps rewards, lives large

NewsHawks News Page 9 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE RESERVE Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu once served in Zanu PF structures as Masvingo provincial party treasurer and is a close associate of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, also a relative. The two worked closely together when Mnangagwa was in charge of the ruling party business empire the Democratic Republic of Congo war of 1998-2002. Positing on his social media X handle on 4 April, former Tourism minister Walter Mzembi disclosed that Mushayavanhu once held the portfolio of provincial treasurer for Zanu PF in Masvingo. Both Muzembi and Mushayavanhu are from Masvingo. “The most encouraging attribute out of the recent appointment of the new Reserve Bank Governor Dr John Mushayavanhu is his quiet and calculating disposition. He is a reserved character, and second guessed most of the time. In his brief stint as Treasurer for Zanu PF Masvingo Province he never uttered a word, after three meetings he concluded he had made the wrong decision to accept the co-option and quit quietly to pursue his banking career,” he said. “I would like to give him a chance starting from tomorrow and I am sure he won't rush to say if I don't get it right in six months, fire me like both his predecessor & current Minister of Finance and then stay for years after failing. Kugona basa kuriita (success comes from hard work)”. Mushayavanhu was FBC Holdings (FBCH) chief executive before his appointment. In the corridors of power, Mushayavanhu is known as Mnangagwa’s close and trusted business associate, having worked with him in the nexus between Zanu PF companies, local business circles and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) investment adventures during the Congo War from 1998-2002. Mnangagwa — Mugabe’s point man on the war even though he was not Defence minister then — and Zimbabwe’s military networks through Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (Osleg) and associated companies were accused by the United Nations of looting the DRC. In 2008, the United States sanctioned Thamer Bin Saeed Ahmed Al-Shanfari, an Omani national with close ties to the Mugabe regime and his top officials then, as well as his company, Oryx Natural Resources, which mined diamonds in the DRC. Zimbabwe’s military company Osleg (Pvt) Ltd was also sanctioned. Al-Shanfari has since fled Zimbabwe running from some unresolved local crimes. Given his closeness to Mnangagwa, Mushayavanhu was certain to replace his namesake John Mangudya. Before his appointment, Mnangagwa’s political allies were so impatient that they wanted Mushayavanhu to replace Mangudya in 2019 when his first term ended. There was a big fight for Mangudya to get a second term. Mnangagwa however allowed Mangudya to finish his term. A quiet veteran banker who likes operating in the shadows, like the President himself, Mushayavanhu has been Mnangagwa’s close business and personal associate for a long time. They have worked together behind the scenes on private sector deals, Zanu PF business networks, including the formation of FBC which was initiated by the ruling party, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through the bank on which they were both directors for the Great Lakes country’s operation. An insider told The NewsHawks Mushayavanhu is part of Mnangagwa’s business team. “Their business network is big and wide, and includes the Joshi family (Manharlal Chiunilal and Jayant Chiunilal Joshi) that Mnangagwa worked with at Zanu PF when he was still party treasurer and secretary for administration. Mushayavanhu worked with the Joshi family at the bank and on the Zuva Petroleum deal when it acquired assets worth over US$29 million from Masawara plc. Masawara had bought the assets from BP & Shell in Zimbabwe,” said a source. Mnangagwa’s cabinet appointments, civil service deployments and control of strategic positions have placed his clansmen from the Midlands and Masvingo in control, fuelling undesirable ethnic tensions. RBZ chief has Zanu PF credentials RBZ governor John Mushayavanhu

Page 10 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Stop fleecing clients, banks told BERNARD MPOFU THE Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has ordered all commercial banks to stop levying service charges on individual accounts with balances of US$100 or less, amid public outcry that the service fees were discouraging savings. Banks traditionally earn the bulk of their income from interest charged on loans instead of service charges. But in Zimbabwe, the financial institutions have taken a cautious approach to lending, citing policy inconsistency and limited access to capital for on-lending. Over the years, the authorities have used moral suasion to entice the fragile financial services sector to make adjustments on high fees after public complaints. Moral suasion is the act of persuading a person or group to act in a certain way through rhetorical appeals, persuasion, or implicit and explicit threats — as opposed to the use of outright coercion or physical force. In economics, it is sometimes used in reference to central banks. “There has been an outcry as far as bank charges are concerned. Again I used to be in the commercial banking sector, I stand guilty as charged,” central bank governor John Mushayavanhu told journalists during the presentation of the Monetary Policy Statement. “But we cannot continue to have a situation where a tobacco farmer from Chiendambuya sells their tobacco, uses the money and maybe leaves US$100 in their account. By the time they come next season, the money is now minus 100. What happened to US$100? “So, with immediate effect banks will not charge monthly bank maintenance or service charges for individual bank accounts with a conservative daily balance of US$100 and below or its equivalent in ZiG for a period of up to 30 days. At least if you leave your US$100 in your account, end of season you should find it in your account beginning of next season.” Mushayavanhu said the apex bank has reviewed the bank policy rate from 130% per annum to 20% per annum consistent with the new monetary policy framework. The overnight accommodation interest rate has been set at 5% above the bank policy rate and the bank deposit facility interest rate at 7.5% below the bank policy rate, thus giving the starting interest rate corridor of between 11% to 25% per annum, he said. “The bank policy rate and the corresponding interest rate corridor will be reviewed by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) from time to time in line with inflation developments. “Minimum savings and time deposits interest rates on ZiG are set at 9% and 7.5% below the bank deposit facility rate of 12.5%, respectively. Minimum interest rates on FCA deposits remain unchanged at 1% and 2.5% for savings and time deposits, respectively.” Last December, Finance secretary George Guvamatanga issued local financial institutions a month-long ultimatum to reduce service charges. Guvamatanga told delegates attending a post-budget breakfast meeting that the authorities are concerned over the increase of non-funded income on the books of banking institutions. Non-interest income is bank and creditor income derived primarily from fees, including deposit and transaction fees, insufficient funds (NSF) fees, annual fees, monthly account service charges, inactivity fees, check and deposit slip fees, and so on. Credit card issuers also charge penalty fees, including late fees and over-the-limit fees. Institutions charge fees that generate non-interest income as a way of increasing revenue and ensuring liquidity in the event of increased default rates. Finance secretary George Guvamatanga

NewsHawks News Page 11 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Economy simply needs confidence NATHAN GUMA ACTIONAid Zimbabwe, an international non-governmental organisation, has expressed concern over the introduction of the new ZiG currency, saying the country risks falling into an economic abyss as the government seeks a temporary solution to long-standing problems at the expense of providing the much-needed confidence and reforms to ensure economic growth and stability. ActionAid is a global federation working with over 41 million people in more than 71 countries. It advocates social justice, gender equality, and poverty eradication, striving for a just, fair, and sustainable world. Zimbabwe has replaced its battered local currency which was on a freefall with a new unit called ZiG in a bid to stem currency volatility and runaway exchange rate-driven inflation. Zimbabwe, reeling from a protracted economic crisis for over two decades and an attendant currency turmoil amid stratospheric inflation, has had several different versions of the local currency before such as the bearer cheques, traveller's cheques, special agrocheques and bond notes. Hyperinflation exploded in 2008, reaching some of the highest levels ever seen, leading to an economic meltdown, falling standards of living and total disruption of the marketplace. Zimbabwe's 2008 hyperinflation saw the country’s monthly inflation climbing to 79.6 billion percent, while the annual rate of increase surged to 89.7 sextillion percent in mid-November 2008. The local currency, which was on a tailspin, dramatically lost 95% of its value since the beginning of December last year, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In response to the introduction of the new currency, ActionAid said the government should put in place modalities that restore confidence in the economy. “ActionAid Zimbabwe stands firm in its commitment to the economic well-being of Zimbabweans. We have closely monitored the recent announcement regarding the introduction of the new Structured currency called Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) with deep concern,” ActionAid said in a statement. “While the initiative may be presented as a solution to Zimbabwe’s economic challenges, we believe that what Zimbabweans truly need is the restoration of confidence in the economy, not the introduction of yet another currency. “For years, Zimbabwe has grappled with the consequences of currency instability. We have witnessed the introduction of various currencies, each accompanied by promises of economic recovery. However, the reality on the ground has often fallen short of these promises, leaving Zimbabweans vulnerable to economic uncertainty and hardship.” ActionAid said the government should prioritise measures that will help rebuild trust in the economy, which include fostering an environment that is conducive to investment, promoting accountability and good governance, and prioritising the needs of ordinary Zimbabweans. "The introduction of the ZiG currency risks repeating the mistakes of the past. Instead of addressing the root causes of our economic challenges, it offers a temporary fix that fails to inspire confidence among Zimbabweans. We believe that true economic recovery can only be achieved through comprehensive reforms that address issues such as corruption, mismanagement, and lack of transparency. “ActionAid Zimbabwe calls on the government to prioritise measures that will rebuild trust in the economy. This includes fostering an environment that is conducive to investment, promoting accountability and good governance, and prioritising the needs of ordinary Zimbabweans. We urge policymakers to engage in meaningful dialogue with stakeholders from all sectors of society to develop sustainable solutions that will benefit the entire nation.” ActionAid said Zimbabwe requires a fundamental shift towards a more inclusive and equitable economy, through genuine reform and commitment to the well-being of all citizens. “As an organisation dedicated to social justice and poverty eradication, ActionAid Zimbabwe remains committed to advocating for the rights and interests of the most vulnerable members of our society. We will continue to monitor developments related to the ZiG currency and will work tirelessly to ensure that the voices of ordinary Zimbabweans are heard, and their concerns addressed,” ActionAid said in a statement. “We reiterate that what Zimbabweans need is not just a new currency, but a fundamental shift towards a more inclusive and equitable economy. Only through genuine reform and commitment to the well-being of all citizens can we truly build a prosperous future for Zimbabwe.” According to the 2024 Monetary Policy Statement presented by new central bank governor John Mushayavanhu, the ZiG currency shall be backed by a composite basket of reserves comprising foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold), received by the Reserve Bank as part of in-kind royalties and kept in the vaults of the bank. Foreign currency balances are projected to be accumulated through market purchases from the 25% surrender requirements, as well as sale of some precious metals received as royalties. “As at 5 April 2024, the bank’s reserve asset holdings comprise of US$100 million in cash and 2 522kg of gold (worth US$185 million) to back the entire local currency component of reserve money which currently stands at ZW$2.6 trillion requiring full (100%) cover of gold and cash reserves amounting to US$90 million. “The total amount of gold and cash reserve holdings of US$285 million represents more than 3 times cover for the ZiG currency being issued.” Zimbabwe has been reeling from a protracted economic crisis for over two decades.

Page 12 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BERNARD MPOFU THE introduction of the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) currency has triggered panic on the market as some informal retailers immediately began rejecting bond notes or opted to inflate prices following the announcement. Zimbabwe’s central bank has outlined how it plans to roll out the new structured currency as the economically-troubled nation, which gained global notoriety in 2008 for printing one-hundred-trillion-dollar notes, attempts to restore the value of the domestic currency but the news has stoked inflation overnight. With over 80% of total transaction being carried out in hard currencies, most retailers and service providers were now shunning the Zimbabwe dollar for a more stable United States dollar or South African rand as a medium of exchange. While the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is yet to conduct public awareness campaigns for the new currency, market confidence in the new monetary unit appears to be low. New central bank governor John Mushayavanhu said the currency, which on Friday traded at US$1:ZiG 13.5616, will replace bond notes which had been in the system since 2016. Before Mushayavanhu’s presentation of the much-anticipated Monetary Policy Statement, retailers in both the formal sector were asking for ZW$3 500 as an equivalent of US$0.50. But after the news of a new currency filtered through, US50 cents is now worth ZW$5 000 bond notes as arbitrage seekers cash in before the phasing out of the old currency later this month. By Monday afternoon, some retailers were now demanding up to ZW$10 000 for goods worth US$1. Mushayavanhu said banks would query depositors depositing ZW$100 000 or more in bond notes on why they kept this money. The money is less than US$5 on the parallel market. As the launch day progressed, mobile phone subscribers were inundated with messages informing them of service disruptions later that day for the currency changeover. As of Monday, mobile network operators like EcoCash had fully completed reconfiguring their systems. Bankers' Association of Zimbabwe chief executive Fanwell Mutogo told The NewsHawks that the configuration of banking systems is expected to be completed by Tuesday. “All banks are diligently working on the conversion from ZWL to ZiG, and we are hoping most banks will be back online on the ZiG platform by the end of the day tomorrow (Tuesday),” he said. “Members of the public who do not have bank accounts were given the window to deposit the old bank notes with POSB and AFC within 21 says, and yes, we believe those holding on to the old notes will certainly deposit within the stipulated time frame.” Here is how the apex bank will roll out the new notes: l With effect from 5 April 2024, banks shall convert the current Zimbabwe dollar balances into the new currency which shall be called Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) to foster simplicity, certainty, and predictability in monetary and financial affairs. The new currency will co-circulate with other foreign currencies in the economy; l The swap rate will be guided by the closing interbank exchange rate and the price of gold as at 5 April 2024. The swap rate shall be used to make legitimate conversions of all ZW$ deposits in the banking sector; all ZW$ loans and advances made by the sector; ZW$ Treasury Bills; all outstanding auction allotments; all export surrender obligations; all prices of goods and services in ZW$; and any other ZW$ denominated obligations; l On conversion of all current ZW$ balances, banks are directed to rename all the current ZW$ accounts as ZiG accounts. Goldbacked digital token (GBDT) accounts will no longer be called ZiG accounts but will be known as GBDT accounts. l All ZW$ notes and coins held by account holders will be credited into their ZiG accounts using the applicable conversion factor. The banks will continue to accept these deposits for a period of 21 days after 5 April 2024; l The Reserve Bank has made special arrangements for those without bank accounts to swap their ZW$ notes and coins at POSB and AFC Commercial Bank within 21 days after 5 April 2024; and l In instances where the cash holding to be exchanged is above ZW$100 000, banks shall apply the requisite know your customer (KYC) and customer due diligence (CDD) principles. Some informal retailers immediately began rejecting bond notes after the introduction of ZiG. ZiG triggers market chaos

NewsHawks News Page 13 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BERNARD MPOFU INCOMING Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu has undertaken to break with the past after promising to stop running the money printing press and disengage from quasi-fiscal operations as the apex bank seeks to defend the value of the new structured currency. The country on Friday introduced a new gold-backed currency called ZiG — the name stands for "Zimbabwe Gold" — as the authorities battle to stabilise an economy that has lurched from crisis to crisis for more than two decades. Launching the new notes whose smallest is ZiG1 and largest ZiG200, central bank governor Mushayavanhu said the new unit would be backed by the country’s foreign currency reserves and a basket of precious metals dominated by gold. Gold is the country’s single largest foreign currency earner followed by tobacco. “We want a solid and stable national currency in this country,” Mushayavanhu told journalists attending the Monetary Policy Statement presentation. “It does not help to print money. Certainly under my watch it is not going to happen.” The ZiG replaces a Zimbabwe dollar, the RTGS, that had lost over 70%  of its value so far this year. The central bank chief said Zimbabweans have 21 days to exchange old, inflation-ravaged bond notes for the new currency, adding that the greenback which accounts for 85% of transactions will remain legal tender until 2030. The former FBC Holdings chief executive, christened "John the Second" on social media after succeeding John Mangudya at the Reserve Bank, committed to ensuring that the amount of local currency in circulation was backed by equivalent value in precious minerals — mainly gold — or foreign exchange, in order to prevent the currency losing value like its predecessors. He said the Reserve Bank will consistently maintain a “comfortable and steady buffer” of foreign reserves to ensure that the new currency is at all times fully covered by reserves. The new ZiG banknotes, according to Mushayavanhu, come in denominations of between 1 and 200. Coins will also be introduced to overcome the shortage of US coins, which has seen people receive change in sweets, small pieces of chocolate and ballpoint pens. “ZiG shall at all times be anchored and fully backed by a composite basket of reserves comprising foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold), received by the Reserve Bank as part of in-kind royalties and kept in the vaults of the Bank. Foreign currency balances will be accumulated through market purchases from the 25% surrender requirements as well as sale of some precious metals received as royalties,” the central bank chief said. “Once the currency and exchange rate have stabilised and the supplementary support measures in this new Monetary Policy Framework have been implemented, inflation expectations should be firmly anchored towards the observed trend of domestic USD inflation, which is expected to be below 1% monthover-month and between 2 and 5% annually.” But not everyone was convinced that the ZiG will mark the beginning of monetary stability in Zimbabwe.  “This is just a clever way of cutting zeros,” said Gift Mugano, a Harare-based economist and director at the Centre for African Governance Development at Durban University of Technology in South Africa. Mugano said that for Zimbabwe to have a stable currency, the government first needed to bring its spending in line with what it raises through taxes and other income. Otherwise, he said, Mushayavanhu, like his predecessors, will struggle to resist pressure from the government to turn on the printing presses. “Every governor would aspire not to print money, would wish not to print money,” Mugano said. “But my observation is that the Treasury, the minister of Finance, is the driver of money supply.” Zimbabwe has tried a variety of means to stabilise its currency since 2008, when the bank was printing ZW$10 trillion notes as inflation ran out of control. The country ditched its local currency in 2009 for a basket of currencies mainly dominated by the United States dollar to stem inflation. Plans to bring back the domestic currency have over the years triggered several cycles of currency volatility and spiralling inflation. John the Second promises clean break from the past RBZ governor John Mushayavanhu

Page 14 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BERNARD MPOFU THE new Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) coins which incoming Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu says will be launched in due course will be worthless, meaningless and too costly to mint, after it emerged that the smallest bank note printed by the apex bank is worth just US7 cents, The NewsHawks has established. Authorities have ditched bond notes due to loss in value triggered by chronic high inflation for a new currency which they say will be backed by foreign currency reserves and precious metals. The unstable macroeconomic environment prompted the government to extend the multi-currency system to 2030. With official figures showing that over 80% of transactions are now being conducted in hard currency, shortages of lower United States denominations became a nagging headache for the transacting public. “ZiG notes and coins shall be issued in denominations made up of 1ZiG, 2ZiG, 5ZiG, 10ZiG, 20Zig, 50ZiG, 100ZiG, and 200ZiG which will be distributed through the normal banking channels. The coins shall be introduced in due course,” Mushayavanhu said during the presentation of the much-delayed Monetary Policy Statement. However, using the opening exchange rate which he said shall be determined by the prevailing closing interbank exchange rate as at 5 April and the London PM Fix price of gold as at 4 April 2024, the lowest bank note is worth a dime. The central bank chief said intervening exchange rate shall be determined by the inflation differential between ZiG and USD inflation rates and the movement in the price of the basket of precious minerals held as reserves. The weights will be determined by the composition of reserve assets. Using the opening rate of US$1: ZiG13.5616, the country’s smallest denomination of ZiG1 is equivalent to just US7 cents, meaning that the proposed smallest coin which will be a quarter ZiG will be worthless at its launch. Traditionally, central banks in more stable economies generate additional income through the minting of coins or printing money — seigniorage. In simple terms, seigniorage is a source of revenue for governments as the value of money printed is generally higher than the cost of producing it. As is obvious, if the currency produced is valued more than the cost involved in its production, the government earns a profit. If the cost involved in its production crosses its value, then the government suffers a loss. In Zimbabwe’s case, the government will not gain anything from minting the coins which will be meaningless as their utility will not be justified. Coins costly and needless Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

NewsHawks News Page 15 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BERNARD MPOFU THE launch of the gold-backed structured currency has stirred debate on the adequacy of Zimbabwe’s paltry foreign currency reserves while at the same time exposing the country’s holdings as a meagre fraction of those held by regional peers despite the country being home to a vast mineral endowment, The NewsHawks has learnt. To shore up confidence in the currency, incoming central bank governor John Mushayavanhu said the country’s new currency, Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG), will be fully backed by Zimbabwe’s reserves of US dollars and precious metals, particularly gold. He also pledged to end a long-running practice of the bank issuing more money to finance government spending. He said foreign currency balances will be accumulated through market purchases from the 25% surrender requirements as well as sale of some precious metals received as royalties. “As at 5 April 2024, the Bank’s reserve asset holdings comprise of USD100 million in cash and 2 522 kg of gold (worth US$185 million) to back the entire local currency component of reserve money which currently stands at ZW$2.6 trillion requiring full (100%) cover of gold and cash reserves amounting to US$90 million,” Mushayavanhu said. “The total amount of gold and cash reserve holdings of US$285 million represents more than 3 times cover for the ZiG currency being issued.” This has stirred debate on the adequacy of the reserves in anchoring the new currency given that regional peers with far more stable economies had more in their vaults. Critics say at current levels this is not any different from the US$200 million loan facility from Afrexim Bank which the government hyped when it launched bond notes in 2016. Bonds notes are currently on their death bed and will be demonetised by month-end. Ahed of the launch, an independent Zimbabwean economist and director at the Centre for African Governance Development at Durban University of Technology in South Africa, Gift Mugano, said Zimbabwe had insufficient reserves to back the new currency. “Our total reserves is estimated at US$291.8 million if we factor in the additional US$100 which has been announced by the RBZ. This year, we are anticipating to import goods worths US$9 billion, that is, US$750m per month,” Mugano posted on micro-blogging site X. “Our reserves (2.6 tons + US$100m) = US$291.8m can only cover 11.7 days of the months if we are not exporting anything. In short, our reserves are not enough to give us at least one month import cover. “Basic economic theory tells us that we must have at least six (6) months import cover to guarantee currency stability if all things are equal. This is a priori requirement. In our case we have approx 1/3 month cover! This is not enough to support the structured currency even if we are still going to receive forex inflows from exports, diaspora remittances, credit, etc.” All of Zimbabwe's neighbours, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, have foreign exchange reserves running into billions each. Compare Zimbabwe's US$575 million reserves with those of its demographically small, yet well-run neighbouring country Botswana which has foreign currency reserves of about US$5 billion, for instance. Botswana has US$4.8 billion in foreign exchange reserves. This is more than eight times bigger than Zimbabwe's reserves. If Botswana adds its diamond reserves to the equation, its reserves become well over 10 times more than Zimbabwe's. For context, Botswana's foreign exchange reserves increased to US$4.8 billion in November last year from US$4.7 billion in October 2023. Foreign exchange reserves in Botswana averaged US$6.9 billion from 1998 to 2023, reaching an all-time high of US$10.3 billion in April 2008 when Zimbabwe was reeling under an economic meltdown and hyperinflation due to leadership, governance and policy failures. Botswana's reserves hit a record low of US$4.1 billion in September of 2022, worrying that country's leaders. Reserves play an important role in countries’ overall defences against shocks mainly during economic crisis. Persistence Gwanyanya, a Harare-based economist and member of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's Monetary Policy Committee, however defended the government’s position, saying Zimbabwe had adequate reserves. “We are in a multi-currency system and more than 80% of transactions are in US dollars and as such all the importers, I hear they talk about the import cover — the importers have the opportunity and access to foreign currency from the domestic transactions for use in their import requirements,” Gwanyanya told The NewsHawks on the sidelines of the Monetary Policy Statement launch. “The question about reserves does not arise in a multicurrency and specifically in our situation where even the ZiG money is fully covered by what we have in reserves.” Countries with adequate reserves generally avoid huge declines in national output and consumption, and are able to handle outflows of capital without experiencing a crisis. However, holding reserves also entails costs, both directly for each individual country, and globally through macroeconomic imbalances. Economists and international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund say the traditional rules of thumb that have been used to guide reserve adequacy say countries should hold reserves covering 100% of shortterm debt or the equivalent of three months’ worth of imports. At peak in the 1990s, Zimbabwe used to have more than three months' import cover before the country plunged deep into a prolonged crisis which has destroyed the economy and impoverished the people. An empirical analysis by the International Monetary Fund suggests that three months of import cover remains broadly appropriate for countries with flexible exchange rates, given estimated benefits provided by reserves in reducing both the probability and impact of shocks. Its analysis also suggests that countries with good institutions and policies need lower levels of reserves. Economic commentators say Zimbabwe's deteriorating economic problems cannot be resolved by merely launching a new currency and bleating about its measly reserves. Compared to its neighbours, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, Zimbabwe’s reserves are paltry. Paltry forex reserves spark debate

Page 16 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE'S central bank has outlined how it plans to roll out the new structured currency as the economically-troubled nation which gained global notoriety in 2008 for printing one-hundred-trillion-dollar notes attempts to restore the value of the domestic currency. With over 80% of total transactions being conducted in hard currencies, most retailers and service providers were now shunning the Zimbabwe dollar for a more stable United States dollar or South African rand as a medium of exchange. New Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu said the currency which on Friday traded at US$1: ZiG 13.5616 will replace bond notes which had been in the system since 2016. Here is how the apex bank will roll out the new notes: l With effect from 5 April 2024, banks shall convert the current Zimbabwe dollar balances into the new currency which shall be called Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) to foster simplicity, certainty, and predictability in monetary and financial affairs. The new currency will co-circulate with other foreign currencies in the economy. l The swap rate will be guided by the closing interbank exchange rate and the price of gold as at 5 April 2024. The swap rate shall be used to make legitimate conversions of all ZW$ deposits in the banking sector; all ZW$ loans and advances made by the sector; ZW$ Treasury Bills; all outstanding auction allotments; all export surrender obligations; all prices of goods and services in ZW$; and any other ZW$ denominated obligations. l On conversion of all current ZW$ balances, banks are directed to rename all the current ZW$ accounts as ZiG accounts. Gold-backed Digital Token (GBDT) accounts will no longer be called ZiG accounts but will be known as GBDT accounts. l All ZW$ notes and coins held by account holders will be credited into their ZiG accounts using the applicable conversion factor. The banks will continue to accept these deposits for a period of 21 days after 5 April 2024. l The Reserve Bank has made special arrangements for those without bank accounts to swap their ZW$ notes and coins at POSB and AFC Commercial Bank within 21 days after 5 April 2024. l In instances where the cash holding to be exchanged is above ZW$100 000, banks shall apply the requisite know your customer (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD) principles. How the ZiG will enter market ZiG notes

NewsHawks News Page 17 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE THE Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Amalgamated Rural Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (Artuz) have expressed grave concern over the new structured currency, saying it has the potential to plunge them further into poverty and erode pensions as happened in the past when such currency reforms are introduced. ZCTU secretary-general Japhet Moyo told The NewsHawks that the structured currency will not be any different from the previous currencies introduced before. “We have been there before — from agro bonds, bearer cheque, bond notes, RTGS, nostro, ZWL, to gold coins, among other attempts to improve the economy and tame inflation — to no avail. Once beaten, twice shy. As most Zimbabweans are aware, since Independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented no less than 30 economic blueprints and these blueprints have dismally failed to extract ourselves from the problems the country is facing.  “In the process, Zimbabweans and workers have lost everything they have worked for their entire life — from pensions, insurances policies and savings. The ZCTU feels that, once again, through the impending 'structured currency', Zimbabweans are being led down the garden path by the promises that yield nothing but disillusionment,” he said. Moyo reiterated that what is more worrying to labour is this lack of consultation on serious policy issues. He said there is nothing to lose but everything to gain in national ownership of programmes. “The government is exhorted to lead and coordinate policy formulation, with effective stakeholder participation to engender national ownership. In the absence of national ownership, the chances of programme success are severely limited. What is unfolding in Zimbabwe is most worrying where the government has a silo mentality. “How do we expect to succeed when programmes are being rolled out without stakeholder participation? How can government  approve such a fundamental policy on currency without stakeholder participation and ownership? What then is the purpose of such high-sounding platforms like the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF)?” he asked. “As ZCTU, we urge government to always institute comprehensive stakeholder consultations as the basis for moving forward and addressing the myriad of challenges bedeviling the economy. This 'we know it all' syndrome must come to an end.” Obert Masaraure, the Artuz president, said mutation of the local currency and “mysterious promises of monetary stability” are worrying. “Whilst we acknowledge the need for a strong local currency for macroeconomic development, we express serious concern over the lack of integrity in the operations of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion and the government of Zimbabwe. As a teacher trade union, we represent a sector that relies solely on monetary transactions and any hiccups in the administration of money is a direct attack on the livelihoods of teachers and other workers in general. “Our worries over the announced changes in the monetary regimes used in the country are not without cause or justification. Workers, like other users of monetary transactions in the country, have the most horrific historical experiences of livelihoods, savings, and investments, lost in a flash when such monetary changes were made and dubious value accredited to a worthless currency,” he said. “So, it is a very worrying moment for our sector as we risk having our meagre earnings further eroded. Most government workers, including teachers, are putting their money in social investments such as purchasing and developing residential stands, poultry and goat farming, as a survival tactic in the harsh economic conditions, and all these have monetary value pegged in US dollars, as a store of value.” As part of the solution, the workers want the government to fully dollarise. “We demand that all salaries of government workers be pegged to the US dollar to the last cent. All facets of the economy have dollarised and keeping a façade of local currency whose value is not certain as a component of remuneration for civil servants is hypocritical. The introduction of a new currency should be done where value of earnings is not in dispute and the exchange into another currency fluid,” said Masaraure. The government has said the structured currency will be backed by gold and will stabilise the money market. Structured currency to breed more misery — Rural teachers, ZCTU ZCTU secretary-general Japhet Moyo

Page 18 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE GOVERNMENT’S unsophisticated propaganda that Zimbabwe had attained food security has been exposed by the biting hunger crisis which compelled President Emmerson Mnangagwa to declare the El Niño-induced drought a state of national disaster on Wednesday. The whole of last year, President Mnangagwa repeatedly boasted that Zimbabwe had attained food security and as early as last month when there was an official opening of a grain milling plant co-owned by his younger brother Patrick Mnangagwa and businessman Douglas Kwande, the government maintained its position that Zimbabwe was food secure. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) defines food security as existing when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are four main dimensions to food security, namely that the food must be physically available, the food must be economically affordable to all people, the food must be nutritionally balanced, and these three must be stable over a period of time. In his campaign speeches ahead of last year’s general elections, Mnangagwa said Zimbabwe was on course to achieving food security to the extent that non-governmental organisations distributing food aid would be rendered redundant. “In spite of sanctions imposed on us by some Western countries, Zimbabwe has been the fastest-growing economy in the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) for the past three years. All sectors — mining, construction, manufacturing, and tourism are all growing,” Mnangagwa told a Harare rally on 9 August. He added that his agricultural policy called Pfumvudza/Intwasa had succeded. “We are confident that in spite of climate change, we will be food secure because we have built dams and are promoting irrigation to give us enough food each year,” he said. But a day before his Harare rally, the WFP representative and country director Francesca Erdelmann had warned that Zimbabwe’s poor population still suffered from food insecurity. “While the country celebrates the availability of adequate cereal stocks to meet the overall national requirements, we also acknowledge that many poor households struggle to meet their food needs,” Erdelmann said. On 29 July 2023, Mnangagwa was also quoted as saying: "Forget about the maize surplus. We have that alright. Forget about the fiscal surplus. That’s no longer breaking news. For the first time ever, we have a wheat surplus of 40 000 metric tonnes. How about that? Does anyone still doubt these results that speak for themselves?" Agriculture minister Anxious Masuka, whom Mnangagwa rated as the best in his cabinet for two consecutive years on several occasions, also misled the nation that Zimbabwe was food secure. Continuing with the unstrategic propaganda, last month the acting leader of government business in Parliament and Skills Audit minister Paul Mavima maintained that the country was food secure. He pushed back on repeated questions by legislators after their visit to grain silos in Banket showed that the state granaries were empty and with no reserves as claimed by government officials. However, in an embarrassing somersault, Mnangagwa on Wednesday pleaded with various sectors including donors, churches and foreign-based citizens to help Zimbabwe with food he estimated at US$2 billion. "By this declaration, I also call upon all Zimbabweans of goodwill, including those in the diaspora, the international community, United Nations agencies, development and humanitarian partners, international financial institutions, the private sector, churches and other faith-based organisations, as well as individuals, to generously donate towards ameliorating this state of national disaster," he said. According to the WFP, up to a third of Zimbabweans in urban areas are unable to afford a nutritious diet, and programmes by the European Union, WFP and other development programmes have been assisting vulnerable communities to be food secure through mobile money stipends, agricultural support programmes and food handouts. Speaking to The NewsHawks on Thursday this week, a renowned food expert said: “In reality, Zimbabwe is far from attaining a semblance of food security. You can check the annual hunger statistics, from the likes of ZimStat, ZimVac, World Food Programme and the World Bank. Government has failed to: sufficiently develop Zimbabwe's irrigation capacity; implement agricultural policies that place farmers (particularly small-scale farmers) at the centre of the food security agenda; incentivise farmers to expand the production of drought-tolerant small grains like sorghum and millet; tackle corruption in the agriculture value chain, for instance Command Agriculture looters went scot-free. Propaganda has its limits; what is needed in the food security discourse is honest and pragmatic leadership.” According to fresh figures from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the cost of food in Zimbabwe increased 84.4% in February of 2024 over the same month in the previous year. Last year, the World Bank confirmed that Zimbabwe had the highest food price inflation in the world. But the country has seen more shocking prices after the turn of the millennium. Food price inflation averaged 1540753.44% from 2003 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 353131459.30% in July of 2008 and a record low of -15.1% in December of 2009. According to the World Bank’s February 2024 update on food inflation, Zimbabwe led the pack in Africa, with food inflation at a staggering 26% year-on-year, followed closely by Egypt at 18% and Guinea at 7%. The statistics showed that Zimbabwe, Egypt, and Malawi are on the top 10 list of food inflation hardest-hit nations globally. Speaking to The NewsHawks, National Consumer Rights Association (NACORA) coordinator Effie Ncube said it is a pity that the government all along told the nation that the country was food secure when apparently it was not. He said from the FAO definition of food security, it is clear that Zimbabwe has not been food secure for decades now. “This is not cyclical food inadequacy that follows a poor harvest or some adverse weather conditions here and there. We call this chronic food insecurity. “The grain in farms, regardless of how plentiful it is, does not amount to food security. To be of any meaning, it must be available and affordable to all people at all times. Therefore people who are too poor to buy food can never be deemed food secure just because the farms hold plentiful harvest,” he said. Ncube also pointed out that it is always important for the government to share the accurate picture with citizens so that they can prepare accordingly, adding that misleading information is completely unhelpful and eats into the credibility of public officials. “Next time the government talks about roads or the new currency, people won't trust what they are being told. They will think that it is another false story. Investors too want truthful information from public officials as it is on the strength of the information given that they make decisions to invest. Once investors discover that the government does not always tell the truth, they begin to doubt everything coming from it,” he said. “Besides, truthful information is crucial for democratic governance. Propaganda is for authoritarian societies that are frightened of informed citizens. In advanced democracies, which unfortunately Zimbabwe is not, public officials who give misleading information are held accountable. We must move in that direction.” Ncube stressed that the declaration of national disaster should have come earlier. “Coming months late, we have already lost thousands of livestock. That said, we should now utilise the opportunity presented by the declaration of a national disaster to mobilise local and international resources for an effective response. “We must save people and the remaining livestock. However, beyond this disaster, we must work our economy so that people have stable and adequate incomes for their households. Incomes have been declining for a long time now. “Many households are not on three meals a day. We must stop this and rebuild. Poverty should be addressed and ensure long-term food security that is resilient to seasonal droughts. We also need currency stability as the volatility of prices and exchange rates affects the food security of millions of people,” he said. Hunger doesn’t respect propaganda

NewsHawks News Page 19 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 NATHAN GUMA TOP companies in Zimbabwe mining gold, chrome, diamond and platinum have jointly disbursed only US$20 million in corporate social investments between 2018 and 2022, against generated revenue of US$5.5 billion, amid indications of a worsening resource curse, The NewsHawks has learnt. This is happening at a time when mining communities have been crying foul over the non-payment of royalties by mining companies, while locals wallow in poverty. For example, living conditions have continued to worsen at the resettlement facility in Arda Transau — where people who were forcibly moved from the Chiadzwa diamond fields were relocated — with communities failing to access water, while subjected to untold poverty. Key infrastructure, such as Marange Clinic, has also been continually dilapidating, raising an outcry from watchdogs. In 2007, the government declared the diamond fields protected areas under the Protected Places and Areas Act (PPAA) to pave the way for the exploitation of the gems. While promises were made to improve the livelihoods of the resettled families, most of the promises are yet to be fulfilled. Findings by the Sivio Institute’s Mining Revenue Monitoring Index (MRMI) which tracks 10 mining companies, US$20 344 000 was given as corporate social responsibility, against revenue US$5.5 billion. The MRMI enhances understanding of the mineral’s financial contribution of the mining sector to the country’s social development. According to the index, gold mining companies Caledonia Blanket Mine, Falcon Gold, Kuvimba Mining House, RioZim and the Zimbabwe Mining Development Company (ZMDC) paid US$2 million in corporate social responsibility against US$313 in net profits and a tax payment of US$30. The index also tracked revenue for three companies mining platinum; Mimosa, Unki and Zimplats, who racked US$3 billion in net profits, with US$497 million paid in tax and US$13 million paid to corporate social investments. Diamond mining companies RioZim, Anjin and the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Mining Company (ZCDC) produced 15 million carats in the period under review, raking in US$896 million gross revenue, US$65 million net profit, while US$5 million was paid to corporate social investments. Chrome mining companies Applebridge and Zimasco paid US$344 000 in corporate social investment. Tensions are still rising in the Chiadzwa diamond-rich fields, with locals and civil society demanding transparency in the disbursement of royalties by the government and mining companies to the local community. According to the Zimbabwe Diamond Policy (ZDC), which governs the extraction of the precious mineral, companies in the extractive industry are supposed to give 5% of their profits to the community for developmental purposes. The state-owned Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) and Chinese company Anjin have been operating in the area. More communities have been reeling under poor mining practices, with the residents of Raylton suburb in Hwange last year staging a demonstration over heavy dust pollution by mining companies whose heavy vehicles pass through residential areas, raising dust, which the locals fear could lead to a health disaster. Villagers in Dinde area of Hwange district have also been resisting a coal-mining project spearheaded by Chinese-run Beifa Investments, which is projected to displace an estimated 600 families and damage the environment. A total of 206 million tonnes of coal were discovered during exploration in the area. The mine will have a lifespan of 14 years. A governance watchdog, the Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG), says corporate social responsibility (CSR) is becoming a hollow slogan in Zimbabwe. “CSR is almost dead because if you go to all mining areas in Zimbabwe, maybe with the exception of Zimplats, almost all the companies are surrounded by communities that are facing immense poverty. For example, roads are being destroyed by mining trucks. They do not even have the decency to repair the infrastructure,” said Farai Maguwu, CNRG executive director. “And then, there is dishonesty by all mining companies in terms of disbursing revenues to the communities. That is where the error begins in that, when they give the community, say US$20 000, it is US$20 000 of what? So, communities are given crumbs that fall off the table by the mining companies.” Maguwu also said mining companies have been making fake promises on improving their communities of operation. “When you look at Marange, I think the trick is to keep the community hoping until the last carat is taken out of the ground. They have been promising to give the community royalties since 2021. Until now, nothing has been done. So the plan is to hoodwink two people in the community and promise them something, and the goalposts keep changing!” Maguwu said mining companies should be compelled to give back to communities by an act of law. “When we use the word CSR, it is a wrong word. They should not do this as an act of charity. They must pay for the damage hence it should be at law. Companies should be compelled to pay a certain percentage, but there should be honesty on how much they are earning every year,” Maguwu said. “CSR be an obligation, and not an act of charity. Because, it is undeniable that when mining is taking place, the community pays a cost in terms of degradation that the community has to deal with, during and after the mining itself. Communities continue to pay. They must breathe dust coming from the mines. They drink polluted water and they die. The fact that no one is talking about the health impacts of mining does not mean that people are not dying because of mining.” Centre for Research and Development (CRD) director James Mupfumi agrees with Maguwu and says the Mines and Minerals Act should be amended to allow communities to enter into binding agreements with respective mining companies. “CSR in Zimbabwe is not obligatory and mining entities are not legally bound to commit funds to community development. What needs to be done is a new Mines and Minerals Act that oblige mining entities to enter into community development agreements (CDAs) with host communities,” Mupfumi said. Corporate social investment expert Dr Andrew Chikowore says Parliament should craft legislation to guide companies and ensure that communities benefit from local resources. “It is imperative to establish robust legislation governing the operations of mining companies in Zimbabwe, specifically regarding CSR. This would compel companies to fulfill their pledges and engage effectively in social responsibility efforts,” Chikowore told The NewsHawks. Chikowore said it is important to strengthen the capacity of regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Management Agency (Ema), to monitor and enforce compliance with environmental regulations, to hold companies accountable for their mining activities, including rehabilitation of mined areas.  “Far and wide, community share ownership trusts (CSOT) have been criticised for failing to have representatives from special interest groups, failure to engage communities in decision making, transparency on how received pledges were used and corruption, among others,” Chikowore said. “Therefore, CSOTs need to be capacitated and strengthened so that they improve their transparency, governance systems and be accountable to deliver social development. CSOTs should be capacitated with business management skills to promote diversification and promote their sustainability. “Additionally, CSOTs need to be empowered with enhanced transparency, governance structures, and accountability mechanisms to effectively deliver on social development projects. Capacity-building initiatives aimed at equipping CSOTs with business management skills would promote diversification and ensure their long-term sustainability in driving community development.” Mining firms sell dummy on social investment

Page 20 NewsHawks News Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 THE Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra) has won a Supreme Court appeal against one Bruno Takawira who was contesting payment of import duty for his top-of-the-range vehicle, arguing that the law says he should be exempted for being physically handicapped. Takawira had paid US$63 378 for the vehicle before he apporached the High Court demanding a refund. The Bulawayo High Court ruled in his favour, noting that Zimra had flouted the law by making Takawira to pay. Aggrieved, Zimra filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court, which granted an order compelling it to reimburse Takawira US$63 378 being duty for the importation of a motor vehicle. The basis of the application before the High Court was that on 24 January 2022, Takawira was granted exemption by a Zimra official from paying import duty on a Toyota Land Cruiser that he intended to buy in South Africa. The application for suspension had been made and granted in terms of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] as read with the Customs and Excise (Suspension) Regulation, 2003 (Statutory Instrument 257 of 2003) as amended by Statutory Instrument 101 of 2011. Following the granting of the application for suspension, Takawira proceeded to have the motor vehicle brought in for clearance and imported into Zimbabwe on 28 February 2022. However, his suspension was rejected at Beitbridge Border Post, the port of entry, on the basis that the suspension had been granted in violation of the Customs and Excise (Suspension) Amendment Regulations Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022 (Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022) which was promulgated on 17 January 2022. In terms of Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022, the maximum limit of the value of a motor vehicle that can be imported duty free by a physically challenged person is US$40 000. His vehicle was valued at R2 129 000 which exceeded that prescribed duty-free limit. Takawira however proceeded to pay the duty in question so as to avoid the seizure of the motor vehicle. In motivating the application,Takawira argued that it was unfair for Zimra to withdraw the suspension of duty. It was his case that, as a member of the public who had relied on a suspension letter issued by the appellant’s official, he was entitled to administrative conduct that was procedurally fair and just. He insisted that Zimra was bound by the letter of suspension. The application was opposed by the appellant which argued that, at the time the suspension was granted, Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022 had already come into effect. Zimra said since the value of Takawira’s vehicle exceeded US$40 000, it did not qualify for the suspension. The High Court ruled in Takawira’s favour, noting that Zimra could not withdraw a letter of suspension which was issued by one of its officials during the course of his duties. Further, the High Court found that the letter of suspension, once issued, remained valid up to the time the motor vehicle was imported into Zimbabwe. It also found that the law did not apply retrospectively unless the words of the relevant legislation expressly provided so. The ruling prompted Zimra to file an appeal at the Supreme Court. In its grounds of appeal Zimra said: “The court a quo erred at law in finding that the suspension of duty had been lawfully given when in fact the suspension was granted contrary to section 6 of Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022. “The court a quo erred at law and fact in finding that all the requirements for the granting of the suspension of duty were met at the time the duty suspension letter was given.” It also said the High Court erred at law in finding that Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022 had been applied retrospectively by Takawira and also that it was wrong in granting an order for the refund of customs duty when duty had been collected in terms of the law. Takawira insisted that the High Court was correct in finding that once the appellant had made a decision to grant the suspension of duty, it could not thereafter withdraw the suspension as it had become functus officio. The court noted that initially there was no limit placed on the value of a motor vehicle that could be imported duty free by a physically handicapped person. The Supreme Court however noted that this was subsequently amended by Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022 on 17 January 2022 by the insertion, inter alia, of sub-section 6 which provides that the maximum import value for any motor vehicle to benefit under this suspension is US$40 000. The amendment had the effect of imposing a limit on the value of a motor vehicle that could be imported duty free by a physically handicapped person. “It is an elementary principle of law that anything done contrary to the dictates of law is a nullity,” said the bench chaired by Justice Elizabeth Gwaunza. Gwaunza siad Takawira was granted a suspension of duty on 24 January 2022 in terms of section 4 of the Customs and Excise (Suspension) Regulation, 2003 (Statutory Instrument 257 of 2003) as amended by Statutory Instrument 101 of 2011. She said it was evident that the letter of suspension of duty was issued after the amendment of the law had come into effect on 17 January 2022. “It follows therefore that the suspension of duty granted to the respondent was granted contrary to S.I. 257 of 2003 as amended by S.I. 10 of 2022,” she said. The grant of suspension of duty contrary to Statutory Instrument 257 of 2003 as amended by Statutory Instrument 10 of 2022 did not obviate the respondent’s obligation to pay the requisite duty. She ruled in favour of Zimra, saying: “The court a quo erred in finding to the contrary. The appeal therefore has merit.” — STAFF WRITER. Disabled man’s bid for Zimra duty exemption hits brick wall

NewsHawks Page 21 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 News NATHAN GUMA LAWMAKERS have poked holes into the 2023 National Peace and Reconciliation (NPRC) report, saying it has failed the litmus test of resolving Zimbabwe’s political and electoral crisis since the Gukurahundi era. The NPRC, set up in 2013, was supposed to be dissolved last year at the close of the 9th Parliament before the August 2023 general elections, after it lapsed its 10-year tenure in accordance with section 251 (1) of the national constitution. In its report, the NPRC said it received 105 new cases in 2023, with 75.4% (104) being resolved following investigations conducted in various provinces. The report also shows that Masvingo province received the highest number of complaints, accounting for 25% of the total complaints, followed by Mashonaland East with 21%. Bulawayo province had no report followed by the Midlands where three cases, representing for 0.03%, were recorded. The NPRC said it conducted peace education and election peace observations before the electoral period, and engaged political parties through multi-party liaison committee meetings which were convened by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec). However, MPs have torn into the report, saying it did little to resolve long-standing political conflict, while failing to mend the country’s polarised environment. “The commission ought to have interrogated much more deeply the issue of negative peace and positive peace to ascertain whether the 2023 elections were peaceful or not. On page nine, the report applauds traditional leaders for promoting peace and [the report] fails to acknowledge the fact that traditional leaders were often abused and reduced to political commissars of the ruling party,” said CCC proportional representation MP for Harare, Gladys Hlatywayo. “A case in point was the much-publicised Honourable Senator Chief Charumbira’s contravention of section 281 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe by participating in partisan politics and openly declaring allegiance to the ruling party. He further went on to disregard a High Court order that had rebuked him for his conduct and directed him to withdraw his statements. Various civil society organisations, including New Zimbabwe Trust and Zimbabwe Peace Society, also reported the partisan distribution of government inputs and food aid by some traditional leaders.” Hlatywayo shot down the NPRC’s claim that political parties in Zimbabwe had free campaigns, with the CCC, then led by former leader Nelson Chamisa having more than 140 rallies that were banned and violently disrupted. The bans saw the police commander of the 2023 general elections, Commissioner Ndofandaedza Jaboon, writing a Memorandum on 8 July saying that rallies must not be banned out of partisan whim as that triggers political tensions and discredits the electoral process and elections. Jaboon said rallies should only be stopped when there are compelling reasons in terms of the law. Hlatywayo said the NPRC failed to deal with past injustices, including the 1980-86 Gukurahundi genocide in Matabeleland and the Midlands in which an estimated 20 000 people were killed. Other past violent epochs include the 2008 post-election violence where civil society organisations reported that more than 500 opposition activists were brutally murdered in cold blood. “The commission failed to undertake any activities that were aimed at establishing the truth of what happened in past and present conflicts. No reparations were made to the victims of past human rights abuses,” Hlatywayo said. “The commission also failed to establish guarantees for non-recurrence through deliberately ensuring the existence of strong and independent institutions. Political violence also continues to ravage society with impunity.” The Zanu PF legislator for Hurungwe East, Kangausaru Chenjerai, added his voice, saying the NPRC has a gender bias, thus disregarding the experiences of women and persons with disability within marginalised communities. “We must actively seek out their narrative and ensure their voices are heard loud and clear in the reconciliation process. Research by UN Women emphasises the importance of gender sensitivity approach to peacebuilding. When women are included in the dialogue, peace agreements tend to be more sustainable. “I want to applaud the commission on its overwhelming strides in resolving 104 reported conflict cases out of 138 cases. Most of these conflicts have been instigated by early child marriages and abuse. Such efforts show the commitment of the Commission towards peaceful community committed to development. Kangausaru said should consider training women for facilitators ensuring officers possess the skills, competence and knowledge to conduct gender sensitivity dialogue, while reaching out to women's groups and disability groups within marginalised communities. Warren Park MP Shakespear Hamauswa said there should be an inclusive platform to promote peace.  “If you see 47% of the reports going to NPRC and being political conflicts, it is therefore cause for a genuine and legitimate platform for political parties to actually sit down and discuss the kind of Zimbabwe which is good for everyone. In the report we also noted that the NPRC is now departing from function (d) as outlined in the constitution, which defines the functions of the NPRC. These call for the NPRC to create a platform for national dialogue, especially for political parties.  “Therefore, without that, we are not going to have lasting peace in this country. If you check and take a cue from the international politics, the reason why the United Nations survived is because the bigger elements were involved. The bigger political players were involved. If political players are not taking part, we are not going to see the commission doing its work.” Organised violence and torture cases were recorded before and after the general elections, with more cases being recorded against prominent opposition members. For instance, in August 2023, CCC member Tinashe Chitsunge was killed in politically-motivated violence by suspected Zanu PF activists at a rally in Harare's Glen Norah suburb, sparking a public outcry. Eyewitness accounts said he was stoned to death while trying to flee from a Zanu PF mob. In November, CCC youth quota MP Takudzwa Ngadziore was saved by a seven-minute-long Facebook Live video he was recording after learning that he was being followed by AK47-wielding assailants. Ngadziore was found tortured, battered and naked, also allegedly injected with an unknown substance before being dumped in the Christon Bank area near Mazowe, a few kilometres from Harare. A sack was placed over his head, after which the assailants proceeded to thoroughly beat him up as the vehicle drove away. Despite the clear video footage showing his attackers, no arrests have been made. In December, cleric Tapfumaneyi Masaya was abducted, tortured and killed in Mabvuku, Harare, while campaigning for the Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) candidate Munyaradzi Kufahakutizwi, who was recalled from Parliament by self-proclaimed secretary-general Sengezo Tshabangu. Kufahakutizwi, who was barred from contesting the polls, was replaced by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ally, the Zanu PF gold baron Pedzai "Scott" Sakupwanya. NPRC report: Lawmakers poke holes CCC proportional representation MP for Harare, Gladys Hlatywayo

Page 22 NewsHawks News Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 THE Supreme Court has thrown out an appeal by former Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare minister Petronella Kagonye who was seeking to have her conviction and sentencing set aside. Kagonye was convicted on a charge of theft of trust property on 8 June 2022 after she failed to account for 20 laptops that were meant for a donation in her then constituency. She was however granted bail pending appeal by the High Court. A three-judge Supreme Court bench comprising justices Susan Mavangira, George Chiweshe and Samuel Kudya ruled that Kagonye was correctly convicted by the trial court. The judges also said it remains common cause that the laptops were never accounted for, as such the High Court was not wrong in throwing out her appeal. “The laptops constituted trust property in keeping with her request of 20 June 2018 upon which she mandated Evans (her brother) to collect them from POTRAZ [Posts and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe]. “She neither handed over the property to the intended beneficiaries nor utilised it for its intended purpose. “In these circumstances, the court a quo correctly upheld her conviction by the trial court, on the charge of theft of trust property. “We therefore find the six grounds of appeal that were raised against her conviction to be devoid of merit,” the court ruled. Kagonye was also charged with fraud. After a full trial, she was found guilty as charged. The allegation as set out in the outline of the state case was that during the period extending from 1 June 2018 to 12 July 2020, Kagonye wrote a letter to the ministry of Information, Communication Technology requesting computers to donate to schools in Goromonzi South. On 20 June 2018, the then minister, Supa Mandiwanzira, wrote a letter to Potraz requesting that it facilitate a donation of computers through its e-Learning project, to Goromonzi South schools. Potraz donated 20 computers for Goromonzi South constituency schools. The computers were collected by Kagonye’s brother, who also served as her driver, on her behalf. The brother signed the collection form. Potraz made follow-ups on the donation with Kagonye and the computers could not be accounted for. No school in Goromonzi South confirmed receipt of any of the donated computers, thereby showing that Goromonzi South schools had been permanently deprived of the computers donated to them by Potraz. The value of the stolen computers was given as US$8 000 and nothing was recovered. Kagonye confirmed having received the laptops but stated that when the laptops were collected by Evans, they were handed over to the campaign committee and that she was present only on two occasions when two of the laptops were distributed. However, at the time the remaining laptops were handed over to the beneficiaries she had left the country. In support of this, copies of her visa and passport pages were tendered as exhibits during trial. Her defence was that the request for computers was not the same as a request for laptops. She said that unlike the request for computers, which computers were to be donated to schools, the request for laptops was meant for the less privileged people. Kagonye indicated that the laptops had been distributed to students during her campaigns but failed to account for the laptops through their serial numbers. Such information was never recorded for purposes of accountability and her explanation was that she did not think that such information was required by Potraz. She was then found guilty and was jailed 36 months imprisonment, with 12 months suspended on condition of good behaviour. The court would have suspended only six months but due to the fact    that she is a female offender with a child below five years, 12 months was justified. The magistrate further suspended eight months on condition of restitution, leaving her to serve 16 months. Aggrieved by the ruling, Kagonye mounted an appeal at the High Court, arguing, among other things, that the computers were not trust property. The High Court ruled that the judgment was correctly handed down. The court further found that it was common cause that the appellant did not deliver the 20 laptops to the schools in Goromonzi and that she dealt with those laptops in a manner contrary to the trust agreement. It was also confirmed that under all the circumstances, the judgment of the trial court demonstrated that all the issues raised in the appeal against conviction had been properly decided against Kagonye and that the appeal against conviction was completely devoid of merit. Kagonye then approached the Supreme Court complaining that the High Court erred in failing to find that the sentence imposed on her was grossly outrageous and induced a sense of shock. The Supreme Court however threw her appeal out, ruling that Kagonye purported to distinguish between laptops and  computers, a distinction that state witness Dewera said is of no consequence. “Going by her distinction between computers and laptops, she sent Evans (her brother) to go and collect computers, not laptops. “Her authority for Evans to do the collection should, if her adopted stance was to be believed, have been for the collection of laptops and not computers as reflected in the document that she signed. “She had made a request for computers to donate to schools. Her request was acceded to in line with the e-learning programme. “She sent Evans to go to collect the computers. These could not have been anything but trust property,” said the Supreme Court. “The trial court cannot be faulted for disbelieving the appellant (Kagonye) whose evidence it found to be 'filled with  inconsistencies' and for finding that her guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt. “A fortiori, the court a quo cannot be faulted for agreeing with the trial court and finding that all the issues raised in the appeal against conviction before it had been properly decided against the appellant. “Three laptops were given to two students and one to a school for physically challenged children. Seventeen laptops have never been accounted for. “The appellant initially told the trial court that she had a record of where all the laptops went and that it was with her secretary but the secretary’s evidence did not confirm this.” The court said, clearly, on the evidence found by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court a quo, the essential elements for theft of trust property prescribed in a contravention of section 113 (2) of the criminal code were satisfied. Court throws out ex-minister’s appeal Former Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare minister Petronella Kagonye

NewsHawks Page 23 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 News BRENNA MATENDERE THE continued existence of the moribund National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) which has scandalously failed to resolve sensitive national conflicts such as the Gukurahundi genocide and the 2008 election massacres has come under the spotlight, with a leading human rights activist challenging the allocation of public funds to the entity. Seasoned human rights defender Jestina Mukoko recently approached the courts seeking a declaratory order to have the commission disbanded for overstaying its 10-year constitutional mandate. Mukoko was abducted by state security agents on 3 December 2008 and spent 21 days incommunicado, but no justice was delivered by relevant institutions while the then State Security minister Didymus Mutasa refused to disclose the names of her violators. The latest High Court application filed on Mukoko's behalf by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum is dated 20 March 2024. Finance minister Mthuli Ncube, Parliament of Zimbabwe and Attorney-General Virginia Mabhiza are cited as respondents. Part of the application reads: “This is an application for a declarator in terms of section 14 of the High Court Act in terms of which I seek relief in the following terms: That the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission established in terms of section 251 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe has ceased to exist as of the 23rd of August 2023 and therefore; “That the purported allocation of public funds in terms of the National Budget Statement of 2024 to the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission is unlawful and is thus null and void. No Order as to costs.” Outlining her locus standi, Mukoko told the court that the respondents have flagrantly acted outside the law in allocating financial resources in the 2024 National Budget outside the law to an entity that does not exist at law. “I allege that their actions are contrary to the dictates of the law as set out in the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19]. They are also imprudent, uneconomic and lack transparency thus in direct violation of tenets of public financial management in terms of our Constitution particularly in terms of section 298(1)(d). “I believe that I have a direct and substantial interest in the expenditure of public funds being a registered taxpayer in Zimbabwe and thus a contributor to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. I am also a citizen of Zimbabwe who is ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe,” submitted Mukoko. She added that she had dedicated the greater part of her life to public service as a human rights and peace practitioner in Zimbabwe and is an active citizen with a well-known record of advocating for the upholding of laws and constitutional values and keeping public servants accountable to the people. “My driving force, at a very basic level, may very well be section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which provides that Zimbabwe is founded on the respect for the following values and principles (inter alia): Supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms and good governance.” She submitted that Ncube, who presented the budget, erred in allocating funds to the NPRC, with Parliament caught off side when it passed the budget. Mabhiza is cited for failing to advise the government on the illegality of funding the NPRC after its term expired which is part of her mandate as the top lawyer of the state. “It is prayed for that the Court declare that the NPRC has ceased to exist by the interpretation of section 251 of the Constitution and therefore that any allocation to it of public funds is unlawful, null and void. “This application stands to benefit the generality of the Zimbabwean public and thus I do not pray for costs and neither do I believe costs should be sought against me. I am aware that our Courts have been seized with the interpretation of section 251(1) of the Constitution before for which there is no determination on the merits to date. I believe that a pronouncement of the Court on this issue stands to make the law certain,” further reads Mukoko’s application. She insisted that it is not within the confines of the Public Finance Management Act for the first respondent or any of the respondents to allocate financial resources to an entity which does not exist in terms of the law. She added that there is no law that allows public expenditure in favour of the NPRC, saying this event is contrary to section 17 of the above-mentioned Act. The NPRC at its commencement was led by former Speaker of Parliament Cyril Ndebele who died in 2016. The body was mandated to deal with post-conflict healing and reconciliation. Retired judge Selo Nare took over in 2018, but in all these years, the entity failed to effectively hold to account perpetrators of major conflicts in post-independence Zimbabwe. The conflicts include the Gukurahundi genocide. President Emmerson Mnangagwa is implicated in the massacres which claimed the lives of 20 000 civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. The NPRC also failed to deliver any healing and reconciliation for the bloody political violence conflict of 2008 in which hundreds of opposition MDC supporters were killed as the late President Robert Mugabe pushed for a grinding victory after being outpolled by the late Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round of the election. There was also Operation Murambatsvina which left countless citizens homeless after their houses were demolished by a rampaging state. Mukoko challenges continued funding of peace commission Human rights defender Jestina Mukoko

Page 24 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Book title: Politics On the Edge—A Memoir From Within. Author: Rory Stewart. Publisher: Jonathan Cape. Reviewer: The NewsHawks. A NEW autobiography by Rory Stewart—who was Britain's minister for Africa and became the first foreign dignitary to be received by Emmerson Mnangagwa in the aftermath of the dramatic military coup which toppled Zimbabwe’s longtime ruler Robert Mugabe—is providing fresh insights into London's futile policy of appeasement which has failed to bear fruit in Harare. In his remarkable 464-page book, Politics On the Edge—A Memoir From Within, Stewart recounts the frenetic moments surrounding Mugabe’s ouster, at least through the eyes of the British. Stewart's account essentially confirms that, ahead of the November 2017 coup and the 2018 general elections, the then British ambassador to Zimbabwe, Catriona Laing, misled her government into believing that Mnangagwa was a pragmatist who would steer the country in a good direction. As correctly reported by The NewsHawks for years, Laing made it her mission to nurse the former British colony back to international respectability. But the gamble did not pay off because Mnangagwa and his Zanu PF are incapable of reform. Laing was the United Kingdom's ambassador to Zimbabwe from 2014 to 2018 and had a frontrow seat during the transition from the Mugabe administration to the Mnangagwa regime while naively backing Zanu PF and misleading London. For decades, Britain had failed dismally in its efforts to either influence or dislodge Mugabe. As far as Laing was concerned, Mugabe's ouster in November 2017 presented a glorious opportunity to reset London's fraught relationship with Harare. Despite the well-documented misgivings on Mnangagwa’s capacity to usher in a new era divorced from human rights violations, corruption and economic mismanagement, Laing — who would later become Britain's top diplomat in Nigeria from 2018 to 2023 — allowed her enthusiasm for Mnangagwa to cloud her judgment. In recent years, British lawmakers have accused her of failing to give objective reports on the real situation on the ground ahead of the coup and the 2018 elections. Biggest cheerleader Stewart sheds light into the behind-the-scenes discussions which shaped the British government's stance towards the 2017 coup. London was accused by some political analysts of playing the role of a leading cheerleader to Mnangagwa’s ascendancy. "When Mugabe was toppled in a coup d’état, I learned it in a tweet from the BBC in the early hours of the morning. No one from the Foreign Office had thought to inform me." He proceeds to recount Ambassador Laing's appraisal of Britain's Foreign Office via video link. She openly rooted for Mnangagwa’s, suggesting that the British government support him. To avoid alienating Mnangagwa — a politician she had cultivated ties with — she told her government to avoid describing Mugabe’s ouster as a coup. "She described the military trucks in the streets, and ran through what the evacuation plans would be. She said that it seemed the veteran Zimbabwean powerbroker Emmerson Mnangagwa would be taking over, and she implied we should endorse him, and above all not alienate him by describing what had happened as a coup d’état," narrates Stewart. He continues: "All this — although she was too polite quite to say it on the video conference — felt like a coup by her. The ambassador had made an immense effort to get to know Emmerson Mnangagwa. She had been criticised for doing so by White farmers, and human rights activists who associated him with land confiscations and torture. She had been criticised for it by the opposition who felt she was too close to the regime, and she had been criticised by me as well. But if, as seemed likely, Mnangagwa became president, she was the only ambassador who had really built a relationship with him." Stewart says he did not agree with the idea of supporting Mnangagwa unconditionally without extracting a raft of concessions from him, particularly on governance, human rights and democratic elections. But Laing was dismissive of the idea; she was convinced that the opposition, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, was now a spent force and a total waste of time. Laing's video link presentation to the Foreign Office on Zimbabwe’s coup quickly degenerated into a back-and-forth session with Stewart. He was not in concurrence with her unmitigated support for Mnangagwa. Stewart felt that this was an opportunity for the British government to spell out its expectations for the post-Mugabe era. "Even I knew that this was a bad moment to start a debate about Emmerson ‘the crocodile’ Mnangagwa. But then in the Foreign Office it never seemed to be the right moment to start a debate. So I asked what conditions we were setting Mnangagwa before supporting him. She paused. Everyone around the table stared at me as though they could not quite work out what I was suggesting. ‘For example,’ I said, ‘it seems important the opposition are given a fair shot at the elections'. 'The opposition cannot win the elections,’ interrupted the ambassador. ‘Even more reason why Mnangagwa should be willing to give them a fair shot.’ ‘Morgan Tsvangirai is finished — he cannot win the elections.’ For a moment, I was tempted to start an argument about that too — and try to make the case for the old man, whom I liked — but I let that go. Instead, I repeated that the very weakness of the opposition meant that Mnangagwa had no reason to avoid fair elections. ‘We should set clear requirements — a dozen requirements? Does that seem right?’ Someone nodded, and then looking at the other immobile faces, stopped nodding. ‘I don’t know how many. But conditions anyway.’ ‘What kind of conditions?’ asked the ambassador." Stewart adds: "The meeting seemed increasingly to consist simply of me and her. ‘First, letting expatriate Zimbabweans vote …’ ‘Mnangagwa will never allow that …’ ‘Second, clearing up the voter registration. Third, international observers. Look, could someone try to work up a list? And then in return we need carrots and sticks — the carrots I think are using our position at the IMF to authorise an emergency loan to stabilise the economy; we could bring investment, and we could increase development aid. Could someone reach out to our director at the IMF and see whether that is plausible? And perhaps to the US'." The permanent secretary in Britain's Foreign Office, Simon McDonald, did not consider Zimbabwe a foreign policy priority, Stewart says. Laing's stance prevailed, after she managed to convince London that Stewart's approach could undermine a glorious opportunity for Britain to reset its troubled relationship with Zimbabwe. "This encounter was reported back to Sir Simon McDonald, the permanent secretary in the Foreign Office. Zimbabwe was not something he spent much time thinking about. But insofar as he did, he did not think it was a priority — certainly not compared to getting the Treasury to invest more in our embassies in Asia and for that matter the Middle East. (He was an Arabist.) He told his friends, who then told me, that I was an idealist, and that he didn’t like junior ministers trying to create policy. The ambassador followed up with her own messages to London, formal and informal, arguing that I was undermining the opportunity to reset a more positive relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe through Mnangagwa." Can a "crocodile" reform? Stewart was not done, though. He figured out that the best way of tackling the Zimbabwe issue was for him to travel to Harare and see for himself the situation on the ground. This explains how he became the first foreign minister to be received by Mnangagwa in the post-coup period. Britain's minister for Africa was so sceptical of Mnangagwa’s so-called transformative potential that he even placed a bet against the envisaged rebirth of the man nicknamed "the crocodile". Mnangagwa would not hold democratic elections, he argued, much to the chagrin of Ambassador Laing who continued asking the British establishment to give the Zimbabwean strongman a chance. "My first night in Harare began with a dinner. The ambassador had invited a group of Zimbabwean civil society activists who were so positive about Mnangagwa that I ended up, in a coarse breach of diplomatic protocol, betting a pastor $50 that Mnangagwa would not hold fair elections. After dinner, the ambassador said I risked wrecking the relationship she had built with Mnangagwa. She did not like my emphasising, even in private, that he had been imprisoned for murder as a child, or that he had run Mugabe’s secret service. She did not think there was much point in pushing him to reform. I replied that I felt she was prizing our access, more than our influence. She looked, however, at my first draft of election conditions, and accompanied me to present them to the US and EU ambassadors in Harare and then to my meeting with the new president." Stewart says that in his meeting with President Mnangagwa, he spoke about the importance of credible elections, including allowing foreign-based Zimbabweans to vote in the 2018 general elections. Mnangagwa simply smiled. It was a telling reaction; Zimbabwe would not only proceed to hold yet another discredited election but also continue resisting calls for the diaspora vote. "I was the first foreign minister from any country to meet Mnangagwa after his inauguration. This great hope of new civilian government strode in surrounded by generals in uniform...I tried to be as clear and specific as I could about improvements to the elections — including allowing expatriate Zimbabweans to vote. And he — thirty years older than me, and a veteran of forty years of liberation politics — simply smiled." It was not long before Mnangagwa spectacularly squandered the immense international goodwill and soon returned to his default settings. On 1 August 2018, he deployed soldiers who murdered unarmed civilians on the streets of Harare. The mask had fallen. Looking back, Stewart laments the failure of "the British system" to make a difference in Zimbabwe. "A few weeks later, I was reshuffled out of the Foreign Office, and Mnangagwa was able to secure international financial support without implementing any fundamental economic or democratic reforms. He ran an election on his own terms and won. Zimbabwe collapsed back into inflation, instability and oneparty brutality. Our ambassador was promoted. It was difficult to know whether my attempts to push for improvements in the elections had simply been, as Simon McDonald continued to say, ‘idealistic and naïve’. Or whether the problem was that the British system hadn’t wanted to try." Elections in Zimbabwe — viewed from the twin perspectives of a constitutional imperative and an instrument of foreign policy — have been a massive flop. Mnangagwa's international diplomatic re-engagement project is in tatters. Economic crisis and the subversion of the will of the masses are continuing unabated. Seven years later, Ambassador Catriona Laing has still not admitted that she was dead wrong on Mnangagwa's willingness to reform. But she does not have to; Rory Stewart has already exposed her monumental miscalculation in his remarkable book. Epic naivete of British policy on Zim

NewsHawks News Page 25 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 KELVIN JAKACHIRA IN KIGALI, RWANDA AMID growing signs of thawing diplomatic relations between Rwanda and South Africa, President Paul Kagame has hailed Pretoria for helping his country to find its feet in the devastating aftermath of the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 which claimed the lives of over one million people in 100 days of bloodletting. On his part, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa was among world leaders who attended the 30th commemorations of the genocide against the Tutsi, under the theme Kwibuka30, held on Sunday in Kigali. Ramaphosa later held a Press conference where he revealed “wrinkles” in the relationship between South and Rwanda were being “straightened out”. At the commemorations, Kagame paid tribute to South Africa, thanking the southern African country for standing with a shattered Rwanda that had been reduced to ground zero in the aftermath of the genocide. While recognising countries that helped Rwanda during its dark days, Kagame made special reference to South Africa, thanking the country for its contribution towards Rwanda’s recovery from the genocide against the Tutsi. “A notable example of solidarity came to us from South Africa, one among many,” Kagame said. The Rwandan leader said as South Africa ended apartheid and elected Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president, in Rwanda the last genocide of the 20th century was being carried out. He said the new South Africa paid for Cuban doctors to help rebuild Rwanda’s shattered health system, and opened up its universities to Rwandan students. Kagame said among the hundreds of Rwandan students who benefitted from South Africa’s generosity were orphaned survivors; others were the children of perpetrators; and many were neither. “Most have gone on to become leaders in our country in different fields. Today, they live a completely new life,” he said. Kagame’s kind words for South Africa and Ramaphosa’s presence at the Kwibuka30 signals a thawing of relations between the two countries which have faced periods of strain since 2013. Both countries had diplomatic tit-for-tat when both countries expelled diplomats from each other following the mysterious killing of Rwanda’s former head of intelligence Patrick Karegeya at an upmarket hotel in Johannesburg. Pretoria accused the Rwandan government of involvement in the assassination, an accusation that was vehemently denied by Kigali. South Africa was accused of blocking Rwandan citizens from entering its country. The two states have moved to normalise relations, but with no major breakthrough. However, the deployment of a Southern African Development Community intervention force in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) further strained relations between Kigali and Pretoria. The Sadc force is led by South Africa. Rwanda expressed disquiet with the deployment, saying the South African-led Sadc force would work hand in glove with the genocidal Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FLDR), an ally of the DRC. FLDR is made up of remnants of the perpetrators of the genocide against the Tutsi. The FLDR is also involved in the killing of Congolese Tutsis in eastern DRC in what has been described as another genocide being perpetrated against the Tutsi. The FLDR is fighting to topple the government of Rwanda led by President Paul Kagame. South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania have committed troops to the Sadc mission in the eastern DRC known as the Sadc Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). Rwanda Defence Forces spokesperson Colonel Simon Kabera told journalists that the context around their concern about SAMIDRC was that they would be fighting alongside the genocidal Democratic Forces for the FLDR, an ally of the DRC. Kabera highlighted that FLDR was bent on distabilising Rwanda and as such, when SAMIDRC works with them, it presents a challenge. At the Press conference held after the commemorations, Ramaphosa noted with happiness Kagame’s tribute to South Africa, saying: “That in many ways goes to demonstrate a very good and special relationship between our two countries. A relationship, which over the years, yes, has faced some challenges. He and I, from the time I became President have always sought to find ways of straightening out the wrinkles in our relationship and last night I had an extensive discussion with him about how we can refashion our relationship and on a bilateral basis deal with some of the issues that have to do with visas that have to do with travel and we believe that definitely we are going to get on the way of rekindling, rebuilding that relationship. I say rekindling because that is a relationship that is in existence and relationships between countries sometimes they face challenges and they wrinkle up but those wrinkles will be straightened out.” Speaking on the DRC issues, Ramaphosa said: “Yes, we did speak about challenges that are prevailing now as a result of the situation in the eastern part of the DRC and how the region, Sadc can work towards installing peace.” “We all agreed that peace was an essential component of fostering the development of this part of the continent and that in doing so we should bring the conflicts happening in the eastern part of the DRC to an end and also whatever actions that are going on to also destabilise Rwanda through the incursions of the FDLR.” He added: "There are a number of forces that operate in this area and we agree that a peaceful political solution is the best option to any military action.” Rwanda, South Africa in diplomatic rapprochement Rwandan President Paul Kagame

Page 26 News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Legal Insights THE Committee to Protect Journalists on Wednesday welcomed South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s signing into law a bill that abolishes criminal defamation, and urged authorities to reform other problematic laws that threaten press freedom in the country. On April 3, Ramaphosa signed the Judicial Matters Amendment Act (2023), which includes a provision repealing “the common law relating to the crime of defamation,” according to news reports and a statement by the president’s office. The South African parliament forwarded the bill to Ramaphosa for signature after approving it in December last year. South Africa becomes the latest country in southern Africa to decriminalize defamation, following its neighbors Zimbabwe (2016) and Lesotho (2018). Other countries in the Southern Africa Development Community regional bloc which continue to use criminal defamation against journalists include Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to CPJ research. “The long-awaited repeal of the crime of defamation in South Africa is an important victory for press freedom and hopefully will reverberate positively across other parts of the region, such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where defamation continues to be used to criminalize journalism,” said Angela Quintal, head of CPJ’s Africa program, in New York. “South African authorities should also move swiftly to reform other laws, as well as draft legislation that threaten, or have the potential to undermine media freedom and the public’s right to information.” South Africa’s parliament voted to abolish the common law crime of defamation, which is based on Roman Dutch Law and court precedents, on December 6, 2023 after decades of advocacy by the press, media lawyers, and civil society activists who argued that there were other remedies that did not involve prosecution or jail, such as civil defamation lawsuits for aggrieved parties who believed their reputations were impugned. The 2013 conviction of newspaper journalist Cecil Motsepe was the most recent case in which a South African journalist was found guilty of criminal defamation, according to a guide on South African media law by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, a philanthropic body that works to advance press freedom. The conviction was overturned on appeal in 2014, although the court ruled that criminal defamation remained constitutional. CPJ was among a group of organizations that filed an amicus brief in support of Motsepe, arguing for the decriminalization of defamation in South Africa. Despite the repeal of criminal defamation, several problematic laws remain, including the Cybercrimes Act, according to press freedom advocates. In a 2022 Universal Periodic Review submission, CPJ and four other partner organizations urged South African authorities to amend the Cybercrimes Act, which lacks public interest overrides for journalists and could affect the ability to publish leaked information. The organizations also called for reform of the Protected Disclosures Act in order to strengthen protection for whistleblowers and the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, which criminalizes speech on broad terms and which commentators fear could undermine public debate. That bill is pending presidential approval. Justice Deputy Minister John Jeffery told CPJ by phone that the lack of a public interest override was not raised during public submissions about the proposed Cybercrimes Act. The justice department was not averse to making changes to draft laws if threats to press freedom arose, and it had done so previously, even when journalists had raised concerns at the eleventh hour. Civil society groups also raised concerns about the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill currently before Parliament arguing in December last year that it posed a threat to democracy. When the bill was first tabled in December last year, critics feared that the power given to state security to vet individuals who accessed national key points, including the public broadcaster, SABC, was a threat to journalists’ independence. Although several amendments were subsequently made, free expression groups remain concerned that SABC journalists could still be targeted on the pretext that the intelligence services were establishing their trustworthiness. The National Assembly approved the revised bill last week, and it is now before the National Council of Provinces for processing. State Security Agency spokesperson Sipho Mbhele did not respond to CPJ’s requests by messaging PP and telephone calls for comment. Caroline James, the AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism’s advocacy coordinator, told CPJ by phone there were also other laws and draft legislation that indirectly affect media freedom, contributing to a lack of transparency and restricting access to information for journalists and the public. These include the Protection of Personal Information Act and Public Procurement Bill. Quintal is a non-executive board member of amaBhungane. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South African courts have generally acted as a bulwark against threats to press freedom, including striking down efforts to legally gag the media or to judicially harass journalists. South Africa abolishes criminal defamation South African President Cyril Ramaphosa

International Investigative Stories Page 27 DESPITE repeated rounds of sanctions, the notorious arms dealer Slobodan Tešić remains a dominant player in Serbia’s weapons trade. A leaked chat and other evidence suggests he has taken over a company that once answered to his top competitor. Selling weapons to a warlord, allegedly paying “large bribes” to secure contracts, and courting clients with luxury vacations have landed Slobodan Tešić on numerous blacklists over the years. But that has never stopped the Serbian weapons dealer from brokering deals. Despite various rounds of international sanctions, 65-year-old Tešić has remained at the heart of the arms trade in Serbia. Now, a leaked chat and other evidence obtained by OCCRP’s Serbian partner KRIK suggests Tešić has further expanded his dominance by poaching an ally of his longtime competitor. The maneuver — in which he appears to have secretly taken over a new proxy company without leaving a paper trail — also sheds light on the shadowy ways in which Tešić manages to keep a foothold in the arms trade. And the global implications of his expansion are far-reaching. Serbia, which mainly exports small arms and ammunition, has a history of letting its exports slip into the wrong hands. The country is required by treaty to halt arms exports that are likely to be diverted or used to violate humanitarian law. But it has frequently failed to do so; Serbian-made weapons have in recent years been spotted on the battlefields in Yemen and Syria, in the hands of Cameroon soldiers accused of systematic violations, and with an Islamic State affiliate in the Sahel. In 2022, the country was also criticized by the U.N. for supplying rockets to Myanmar’s military dictators after their bloody coup. “They are exporting into extremely high-risk markets from a human rights perspective,” said Patrick Wilsen, Amnesty International’s Researcher on Military, Security and Policing issues. He added that his organization’s efforts to alert the Serbian government to instances of diversion have gone unanswered. Tešić’s dominance may not bode well for the future either — the dealer first fell afoul of international trade sanctions for selling weapons to former Liberian president Charles Taylor in the early 2000s. Taylor, whose rebel army murdered, pillaged and raped their way across Sierra Leone, was later declared a war criminal, while Tešić was blacklisted by the United Nations and barred from international travel until 2013. (He has never been charged with a crime in Serbia related to weapons smuggling or arms dealing.) In his approach to dealmaking, Tešić remains a “product of the ’90s,” according to Balkan military analyst Aleksandar Radić, referring to an era in which Serbia faced Western sanctions as it waged war against its neighbors during the collapse of Yugoslavia. Tešić was shaped by those “murky times and complicated dealings in the acquisition of weapons and military equipment,” Radić said. The result, he added, is a man who has never stopped pushing the limits on who he is willing to sell to — and what he will do to secure the deals. Such bold disregard has apparently led to bold success. According to a former employee of Serbia’s stateowned arms trading company Yugoimport, Tešić is now the linchpin of a sector that is largely dominated by the state. “His influence in state institutions and [weapons] industry factories has become unavoidable,” said Aleksandar Milovanović, who used to work for Yugoimport’s security department. Experts say this would not be possible without the backing of the regime of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who is accused of tightly controlling the country with a strongman style of rule. Radić, the military analyst, described Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) as the “key factor which shapes him [Tešić] as he is.” . “SNS has now made it possible for him to become the absolute number one,” he said. In a written response to reporters, Tešić denied having taken over a new proxy company linked to his competition. He also described it as his business interest to maintain good relations with those in power. International InvestigativeStories Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić (center) after winning the first round of presidential elections at the Serbian Progressive Party headquarters in Belgrade, Serbia. NewsHawks 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Sanctions haven’t stopped notorious Serbian arms merchant Slobodan Tešic

Page 28 While he declined to describe his role in the industry in detail, he said he had aligned his businesses to comply with the sanctions against him. “Also, in accordance with my age and position, it is no longer necessary for me to be the owner of a company or be operationally engaged in business,” he wrote. “These 40 years, having made contacts all over the world, today I can open doors for others, and create business by connecting and helping many… Sometimes, I can make a small or medium-sized company big with one call.” Working From the Shadows Despite his outsized influence, Tešić keeps a low profile in Belgrade and little is known about the extent of his riches. His name will not be found on any current arms deals, either. That’s because he and his associates are the target of U.S. sanctions, which prevent them from carrying out business with U.S. entities — major players in the arms trade. Washington first blacklisted Tešić in 2017 describing him as one of “the biggest dealers of arms and munitions in the Balkans.” The U.S. accused him of bribing officials in various countries to secure contracts, as well as taking potential clients on luxury vacations or paying for their children’s educations abroad. (In his comments to reporters, Tešić rejected all allegations of corruption, and blamed the sanctions against him on rumors and bad press spread by saboteurs. He said he faced no legal investigations for “corrupting anyone, anywhere.”) Tešić responded by apparently setting up a network of proxy firms, but the workaround didn’t last for long. In late 2019, the U.S. sanctioned nine more Tešić associates and nine companies that it said were providing fronts to sell weapons on Tešić’s behalf. U.S. authorities also seized nearly $34 million sent by the alleged front companies to American bank accounts. Tešić had reportedly left a paper trail that allowed U.S. authorities to connect the dots: His sanctioned firms had reached out to companies that owed them money and instructed them to pay the debts to the new proxy companies. In the meantime, the U.K. also put Tešić under sanctions in 2022 for allegedly bribing Bosnia’s former chief state prosecutor, as well as the country’s former defense minister. (Tešić said he was preparing a legal team to initiate “checks and procedures” against the measure, which he described as “disappointing.”) And now, new evidence obtained by KRIK and OCCRP suggests he might have benefited from another secretive arrangement. This time, the maneuver also delivered a blow to his longtime rival. For the last decade or more, one of Tešić’s top competitors has been the fellow Serbian weapons dealer Petar Crnogorac. In recent years, however, Crnogorac’s businesses have struggled. Since 2019, his companies CPR Impex and Tehnoremont have sunk deeper into losses, according to their financial statements. In 2018, one of Crnogorac’s business partners, Milorad Pušica, set up a new arms trading company, but that also proved to be a loss. The following year Pušica, who is also a prominent member of the SNS party, had to loan the new firm, M.M.P. Consulting, thousands of euros in to save it from bankruptcy, the company’s financial statements show. Meanwhile, at the end of 2019, Tešić’s proxy network was taken out by the second round of U.S. sanctions. Not long after, Crnogorac appears to have grown suspicious that his partner Pušica had shifted alliances. In a leaked WhatsApp chat from March 2020 obtained by KRIK and OCCRP, Crnogorac asked Pušica: “Did you give any contracts to ST [Slobodan Tešić] for the… Edepro [Serbian weapon factory] goods”. He got a surprising answer. “I sold my company,” Pušica texted back. “Who the fuck did you sell your company to?” asked Crnogorac. “Who else could give me money for my torments and suffering,” Pušica responded. A source who was privy to the discussion, who asked not to be named, said the messages suggested the buyer was Tešić — though he denies this. “I don’t know why Milorad Pušica, whom I have known for a long time, would claim that I bought something from him that I did not,” Tešić wrote in his response to reporters. Pušica and Crnogorac did not respond to requests to comment. However, two other sources in the weapons industry in Serbia, both speaking on condition of anonymity, independently confirmed to reporters that Tešić had indeed taken over Pušica’s M.M.P. Consulting. The firm’s surge in business is an additional clue. According to records from the Serbian business registry, Pušica never formally sold his company. It remains registered in his name. However, shortly after the chat, the firm began to show significant financial activity, taking in the equivalent of $36 million of income from ammunition sales in 2020 and 2021, compared to zero income the year prior. In 2022, it earned $3.1 million. M.M.P. Consulting also made several housekeeping changes after the March 2020 WhatsApp exchange that indicate there may have been a change in leadership behind the scenes. Pušica started using Tešić’s longtime lawyers that year and, five months after the chat, M.M.P Consulting signed a contract to rent a state-owned villa in Dedinje, an upscale diplomatic neighborhood of Belgrade. Tešić or companies connected to him have rented two other state-owned villas in the neighborhood, while he and his wife also own another villa nearby. When reporters visited the villa rented by M.M.P Consulting, they found what looked to be a recently renovated high-end residence, with no sign of office activity. No one answered when reporters rang the gate of the multi-story house — which the firm is renting for the below-market price of 1,500 euros per month. But in the driveway sat a Range Rover whose license plate ended with Pušica’s initials, MP. The company’s official address on the other side of town, meanwhile, is a locked and abandoned office building. Several other changes in M.M.P Consulting’s business activity further connect the firm to Tešić. Trade data shows that in 2020 Pušica started doing most of his business with the state factory Prvi Partizan, which Tešić companies have previously bought from. When reached for comment, Prvi Partizan said its contracts with clients were confidential. The company also took a $426,500 loan that year from Valir, a weapons firm that has had several ties to known Tešić collaborators. In 2022, Balkan Insight reported this firm too was secretly linked to Tešić and saw a major boost in revenue after allegedly coming under his sway. After inking deals to sell ammunition to the Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of the National Guard and the Turkish Defense Ministry, M.M.P. Consulting hired several firms to handle the deliveries. Reporters contacted the owner of one of the transport companies, Croatian businessman Zvonko Biljecki, to ask about the deal. He declined to discuss it, but when asked if he had negotiated with Tešić when dealing with M.M.P. consulting, he said, “Yes.” Tešić said he did not know Biljecki or his company. Asked whether he helped Pušica or M.M.P. Consulting broker deals, Tešić said: “[my] name, recommendation, contact — it opens doors. Today I do it with many friends and help many companies.” “In accordance with the restrictions I have at the moment, due to sanctions, this is my currently active and main role in the arms sector,” he added. The Politics of Arms Experts say Tešić has made efforts to align himself with the ruling SNS party. While he was also close to previous governments in the 2000s, Tešić focused on building “good connections’’ after the SNS came to power in 2012, said Momir Stojanović, a retired general and former member of parliament for SNS. After SNS won its first election in 2012, Tešić’s daughter Danijela started working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where her boss, Foreign Minister Ivan Mrkić, gave the green light when the UN sought Serbia’s opinion on removing Tešić from its blacklist. Soon after, Tešić was given a diplomatic passport, a privilege normally reserved for high-ranking state officials. Mrkić said he granted the passport because Tešić was “very successful in exporting Serbian products.” Tesic’s apparent high-level support from the ruling party also came to light during a major recent court case in which Serbian and Montenegrin police officers were accused of revealing confidential information while involved with a narco-smuggling network. Text messages presented in the indictment show officers discussing information they had found in their files about a person of interest. “He is not an official collaborator [with Serbian intelligence, but] he must be with someone since Tešić is there,” said one officer. “Tešić Slobodan, Vucic’s man, main man for export of weapons. Billionaire.” Tešić and his wife have previously donated to the Dragica Nikolic Foundation, which was established by the wife of former Serbian president Tomislav Nikolic, who is also from the SNS. And when President Vučić visited Serb families in Kosovo in 2018 with promises of help, a donation came soon after: a government website said tractors were donated by a Belgrade businessman named Slobodan Tešić — presumably the arms dealer. The most recent confirmation of the government’s close relationship with Tešić came last year, when Serbia’s then-intelligence chief Alexandar Vulin was sanctioned by the U.S. for a series of allegedly “corrupt and destabilizing” acts. One of those was maintaining a “mutually-beneficial relationship” with Tešić that facilitated “illegal” arms shipments across the country’s borders. Vulin did not respond to requests to comment for this story, while Tešić described their relationship as “very correct.” “My goal in my job is that all government officials who, in accordance with the law, are involved in decision-making when it comes to dealing with armaments, have good relations with my company and me,” Tešić wrote. — Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. International Investigative Stories The state-owned villa that M.M.P. Consulting started renting in Belgrade’s diplomatic quarter shortly after Tešić’s alleged takeover of the firm. NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024

Page 29 The only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history – Friedrich Hegel THIS is perhaps one of the most alarming books on the current state of the world to have come out in recent years. To set the scene, the authors describe in chilling detail how Zimbabwe went from 20% inflation in 1997 to 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000% in 2008. I might have left out a few zeros there, but you get the point. The cause was entirely political – and, hence, avoidable. “The Zimbabwean government lived beyond its means for years, spending more than it could really afford on government programmes, including war and social security.” It attempted to solve this problem with rampant money printing. “Money printing gathered momentum and fuelled an inflation frenzy, which poured down economic ruin upon millions of ordinary people. It ultimately led to the Zimbabwe dollar being abandoned as a currency beginning at the end of 2008.” But Zimbabwe’s experience is not unique. In fact, money printing has become a global phenomenon that always, always leads to inflation and impoverishment. Nor is there any easy escape for the governments of the US, Britain, Europe and Japan – whose printing machines have been fired into hyper-drive since the financial collapse of 2008. US government debt has grown by a teeth-clattering $6,5 trillion since 2008. That’s a 70% expansion of the money supply in five years, all of it legitimised by the so-called “Quantitative easing” programmes initiated by the US administration during this time. Other major economies are likewise racing to expand their money supplies in an effort to keep the financial system afloat. “These countries are steadily adopting the dangerous policies that ultimately proved disastrous in Zimbabwe,” say the authors. As if this were not bad enough, governments everywhere are making it increasingly difficult for ordinary citizens to conduct business and acquire and use private property without heavy oversight, regulation and taxation. And as governments struggle with their own enormous debts, the temptation to increase taxes is ever-present. In March 2013, bank customers in Cyprus with deposits larger than €100,000 had their money confiscated to bail out the Cypriot banks. The EU has already tabled a directive that would allow it to follow the Cyprus model to rescue European banks should they fail, while the US, Britain and Canada have adopted similar proposals. These countries also have their eye on private pension funds which they intend to plunder as public pension funds start to run dry. This is exactly what happened in Zimbabwe. While a Zimbabwe-style land grab is unlikely in the developed world, a covert land grab is already underway. This is happening as a part of the Quantitative Easing programmes, where central banks print money to purchase mortgage-backed securities. As people foreclose, these properties end up in the hands of the central banks – a form of land nationalisation. While a Zimbabwe-style land grab is unlikely in the developed world, a covert land grab is already underway. This is happening as a part of the Quantitative Easing programmes, where central banks print money to purchase mortgage-backed securities. As people foreclose, these properties end up in the hands of the central banks – a form of land nationalisation. A global financial collapse is in the air. How long will it take? There’s no easy answer to that question. It took Zimbabwe 11 years to collapse after the start of its aggressive money printing programme. In pre-World War 2 Germany, it took nine years. If this seems terribly bleak – and it is – there are boundless opportunities that arise in a Zimbabwe-style hyper-inflationary environment. This book ends with a survival plan for those who want to avoid the coming crash. For those Zimbabweans who crossed the Limpopo to South Africa, their lives improved immediately. The lessons of Zimbabwe ring true for people all over the world: cash in your pension funds and invest in something that is worthwhile; do not keep too much cash in the banks, and invest in hard assets that will appreciate as inflation accelerates; have a second passport; grow food and barter. “Money printing and the collapse of confidence in your nation’s currency may be the greatest risk – and the greatest opportunity – you could face in your life. You can learn from those who have gone before. Make sure you are prepared.” The book is written by two Johannesburg-based writers, Philip Haslam and Russell Lamberti, who is co-founder of the Ludwig von Mises Institute of South Africa. Both are clearly from the “Austrian school of economics” of which von Mises was the founder. In brief, Austrian economists argue in favour of unbridled free markets, and that involves removing central banks for the economic life of any country. Given the events unfolding before our eyes – in Zimbabwe and closer to home – the argument for removing central banks has never been more urgent. — Professional Career Services. The NewsHawks is published on different content platforms by the NewsHawks Digital Media which is owned by Centre for Public Interest Journalism No. 100 Nelson Mandela Avenue Beverly Court, 6th floor Harare, Zimbabwe Trustees/Directors: Beatrice Mtetwa, Raphael Khumalo, Professor Wallace Chuma, Teldah Mawarire, Doug Coltart EDITORIAL STAFF: Managing Editor: Dumisani Muleya Assistant Editor: Brezh Malaba News Editor: Owen Gagare Digital Editor: Bernard Mpofu Reporters: Brenna Matendere, Ruvimbo Muchenje, Enock Muchinjo, Jonathan Mbiriyamveka, Nathan Guma Email: [email protected] SUB EDITORS: Mollen Chamisa, Gumisai Nyoni Business Development Officer: Nyasha Kahondo Cell: +263 71 937 1739 [email protected] Subscriptions & Distribution: +263 71 937 1739 Reaffirming the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and me- dia freedom as the cornerstone of democracy and as a means of upholding human rights and liberties in the constitution; our mission is to hold power in its various forms and manifestations to account by exposing abuse of power and office, betrayals of public trust and corruption to ensure good governance and accountability in the public interest. CARTOON Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe The NewsHawks newspaper subscribes to the Code of Conduct that promotes truthful, accurate, fair and balanced news reporting. If we do not meet these standards, register your complaint with the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe at No.: 34, Colenbrander Rd, Milton Park, Harare. Telephone: 024-2778096 or 024-2778006, 24Hr Complaints Line: 0772 125 659 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] WhatsApp: 0772 125 658, Twitter: @vmcz Website: www.vmcz.co.zw, Facebook: vmcz Zimbabwe When money destroys nations Dumisani Muleya Hawk Eye NewsHawks Editorial & Opinion 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 WHAT Zimbabwe urgently needs is not yet another currency gimmick but confidence and trust in the governance of this troubled country. The ill-fated decision to change the name of the wretched currency from the Zimbabwe dollar to the ZiG (Zimbabwe Gold) is ample evidence of the utter cluelesness of medieval political charlatans masquerading as leaders in the 21st century. Those who are old enough will recall 14 November 1997—a day so catastrophic it was dubbed Black Friday. On that day, which is etched in the annals of this country's economic history, the Zimbabwe dollar crashed and has never recovered. For 27 long years, since that ignominious day, our rulers have lurched from one crisis to another, fumbling in the dark for elusive solutions. From Black Friday to ZiGgy Friday, we have learnt nothing — is that not a fact? Here we are, in 2024. Chronic high inflation — itself a festering symptom of leadership failure — has spectacularly decimated the value of the Zimdollar. It would be wishful thinking to assume that the ZiG is immune to this deep-seated debilitating malady. The introduction of the "new" currency is a desperate attempt to close the stable door after the horses have already bolted. You cannot simply slash a string of zeros from a worthless currency and suddenly pretend to have created the strongest monetary unit in southern Africa. By what alchemy? How many times will the long-suffering people of Zimbabwe watch helplessly as their savings, livelihoods, salaries and pensions are wiped out at the stroke of a pen by uncaring elites? We are witnessing yet another grand heist on the poverty-stricken masses. In the absence of the restoration of confidence in the governance of the country, attaining long-term economic stability will prove a toll order. The incoming Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor, John Mushayavanhu — nicknamed John the Second — faces the same old principal-agent dilemma and it will be interesting to see whether he is independently minded enough or has the courage of his convictions to push back on the ruinous demands of wayward political meddlers. It is trite economics that a strong and stable economy relies not just on the currency itself, but also on the broader governance structures, monetary policies, and economic fundamentals of a country. Without trust and confidence in the governance and economic policies of Zimbabwe, simply introducing a new ZiG currency will not be enough to address underlying issues. Tinkering with the symptoms while conveniently ignoring the underlying issues cannot lead to a cure. What are the underlying issues? Well, you do not need a PhD in statecraft to untangle this puzzle. Zimbabwe’s tragedy is the logical outcome of a volatile mix of leadership failure, corruption-induced poverty and authoritarian kleptocracy. A currency from planet Mars will not cure these maladies. There are no shortcuts to socio-economic prosperity. Ultimately, Zimbabwe must craft a comprehensive approach that combines structural economic reforms, good governance practices, democratic reforms and effective monetary policies to support the long-term health of the economy. This is the only way of restoring confidence among citizens and investors. From Black Friday to ZiGgy Friday

Page 30 New Perspectives NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Back to basics THE Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe delivered the highly anticipated 2024 Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) amidst a multi-currency system characterised by exchange rate and inflation volatility. Throughout 2023, the central bank maintained a tight monetary policy stance typified by high interest rates, stringent liquidity management and management of foreign exchange to foster price and exchange rate stability. Regardless, the prospects of the local currency remained under pressure under the multi-currency system due to exchange rate and inflation volatilities. Although the parallel rate premium was maintained below 30% for the greater part of the second half of 2023, the trend reversed, with the premium widening to above 50% in December and January, driven by excessive demand for foreign exchange. Official monthly inflation eased from a peak of 12.1% in June 2023 to an average of 2.1% up to December 2023 because of the contractionary measures implemented by the central bank and government. However, this year has seen resurgence, with inflation peaking at 55.3% in March 2024, driven by rapid local currency depreciation. The domestic economy is estimated to have grown by 5.5% in 2023, down from 6.5% in 2022, buoyed by agriculture, mining, information communication technology and tourism. The ongoing El Niño-induced drought is impacting on the domestic economy’s growth trajectory however, with growth in 2024 forecast at 3.5%. Globally, economic growth is forecast to remain stable at 3.1% in 2024, with tight fiscal and monetary policies stunting growth in advanced economies. Global inflation is forecast to decline steadily from 6.9% in 2023 to 5.8% in 2024 due to tight monetary policies and easing commodity prices. The domestic economy continues to operate amid increased underlying global risks and vulnerabilities because of tight global financial conditions, geopolitical tensions and extreme weather events. Money supply dynamics Local currency constituted less than 20% of total money supply, reflective of the level of dollarisation of the economy. Reserve money stock stood at ZW$2.02 trillion as at December 2023 from ZW$1.06tn in June 2023, reflecting ZW$748.44 billion expansion in statutory reserves. Statutory reserves were bolstered by the change in reserve requirement ratio and growth in deposit base, resulting in statutory reserves constituting 98% of total reserve money. Broad money stock was ZW$18.87tn as at year end from ZWL$14.27tn in June 2023 due to expansion in transferable deposits. The central bank attributes the 708.87% year-on-year growth in broad money stock to a surge in foreign currency deposits in the banking sector, which was supported by steady foreign currency receipts. As at year-end, foreign currency deposits, local currency deposits and local currency in circulation constituted 83.01%, 16.94% and 0.05% of money stock, respectively. By January 2024, money stock stood at ZW$29.25tn, a 55% surge on the year-end figure, attributed to the impact of exchange rate movements. Banking sector performance The central bank notes that the sector experienced general stability in the face of shocks emanating from a dynamic operating environment. Increased confidence in the sector was evidenced by sustained growth in foreign currency deposits in correspondent banks from circa US$400 million in 2018 to US$2.4bn in 2023. Average capital adequacy ratio for the sector at 37.34% remained above the regulatory minimum of 12%. All 18 banking institutions reported core capital levels in compliance with minimum capital requirements. Asset quality remained satisfactory with a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 2.09%, which is well within the internationally accepted 5% threshold. The improvement in NPL ratio from 3.62% as at June 2023 reflects sound credit management practices and internal controls within the banking sector. Aggregate core capital increased to ZW$6.31tn in December 2023 from ZWL$5.05tn in December 2022 due to organic growth. Increased dollarisation levels and prohibitive ZWL interest rates skewed the market towards foreign currency-denominated loans, accounting for 84.67% of sector’s loan book, whilst 72.68% of lending was to the productive sector. Non-interest income accounted for 84.27% of sector’s total income as at December 2033, but our observation is that 47.56% was in the form of revaluation gains, which are non-cash. Recalibration of monetary policy framework During the first quarter of 2024, the ZWL depreciated by 74% against the greenback on the interbank market, whereas the parallel market rate depreciated by 70%. On this backdrop, the Monetary Policy Statement's main focus is on immediate measures necessary to boost demand for local currency, with the aim to re-anchor price and exchange rate stability and re-monetise local currency as a reliable medium of exchange and store of value. The policy is anchored on the following five policy measures. Introduction of new structured currency The Monetary Policy Statement is accompanied by Statutory Instrument 60 of 2024, introducing Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) which is anchored by a composite of foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold) held as reserves by the central bank. 1 ZiG is equivalent to 1mg of gold. Banks are to convert all Zimbabwe dollar balances into ZiG at a swap rate determined by the closing interbank rate as at 5 April 2024 and London OM Fix price of gold as at 4 April 2024. ZiG will co-circulate with other foreign currencies in the economy. Anchoring local currency on reserves backed by gold and foreign currency balances: The bank can only issue domestic notes and coins backed by the basket mix of hard currency (currently US$100m cash) and foreign-currency-denominated assets (gold worth US$185m at present). The total ZWL component of reserve money is ZW$2.6tn, estimated by the Bank to be equivalent to US$90m. Therefore, the reserve holdings currently with the bank represent roughly three times cover for the local currency being issued. Efficient and optimal money supply management This will entail containment of reserve money growth within limits of growth in gold and foreign currency reserves as well as discontinuation of quasi-fiscal activities and alignment of interest rates. Bank policy rates have been reviewed downwards to 20% per annum from 130% per annum to reflect the new currency dynamics. Adoption of a market-determined exchange rate system The bank has discontinued the auction system and replaced it with an interbank foreign exchange market under a willing-buyer-willing-seller trading arrangement. The bank will provide trading liquidity to the market using the 25% export surrender proceeds to support the foreign exchange management system to guarantee successful restoration of currency and exchange rate stability. Other support measures and obligations in response to market demands: Measures to boost demand for ZiG in the market will include a mandatory requirement for companies to settle at least 50% of their tax obligations on quarterly payment dates (QPDs) in ZiG. Our thoughts The economy has been moving towards full dollarisation, with over 80% of transactions conducted in US dollars as reduced confidence in the ZWL dwindled its market share. Businesses are predominantly funding themselves in foreign currency, evidenced by the high proportion of foreign-currency-denominated loans in the banking sector. In our view, these new measures reflect efforts to preserve the current status quo in terms of the multi-currency regime and are unlikely to interfere with functioning of other currencies as they affect roughly 20% of money supply. The lack of further interference with foreign currency retention ratios for exporters is critical given the vulnerabilities posed by the ongoing drought and falling commodity prices. The requirement for 50% of QPD payments to be in ZiG creates steady demand for ZiG, which should theoretically strengthen it. We therefore expect a relatively stable USD: ZiG rate for as long as ZiG remains anchored. The economy will likely remain pseudo-dollarised in the short-to-medium term, which is vital for stability, with the extent of migration to ZiG based on confidence. It is likely however that some form of parallel market will emerge as a significant portion of the population remains unbanked and it is yet to be seen what level the parallel rate will settle at. The bank did note recovery of foreign currency inflows during the first two months of 2024, suggesting healthy growth of reserves. Whilst an anchored currency theoretically restricts money supply growth thereby arresting inflation, key downside risks remain discipline in maintaining tight money supply and vulnerabilities to fluctuations in gold prices and supply. In addition, the currency is inflexible, which may affect the ability to finance the 25% surrender portions or large infrastructure projects. Entities carrying ZWL obligations will however lose the hyperinflationary reprieve that erodes the real value of their obligations with this crystallisation of loan values, possibly exerting pressure on them. The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange will need to rebase to the new currency, which may result in initial distortions in valuations. The uncertainty around performance of ZiG compels us to lean more towards defensive stocks with strong dividend policies in case valuations remain distorted, impacting capital gains. In our IH Universe, presenting high dividend yields are Delta (6.7%), Simbisa (5.2%) and Axia (11.2%). — INTER HORIZONS SECURITIES. ZiG: The Zim economy is well over 80% dollarised

Business MATTERS NewsHawks CURRENCIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE USD/JPY 109.29 +0.38 +0.35 GBP/USD 1.38 -0.014 -0.997 USD/CAD 1.229 +0.001 +0.07 USD/CHF 0.913 +0.005 +0.53 AUD/USD 0.771 -0.006 -0.76 COMMODITIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE *OIL 63.47 -1.54 -2.37 *GOLD 1,769.5 +1.2 +0.068 *SILVER 25.94 -0.145 -0.56 *PLATINUM 1,201.6 +4 +0.33 MARKETS *COPPER 4.458 -0.029 -0.65 BERNARD MPOFU THE African Development Bank (AfDB) says Zimbabwe remains lowly ranked on governance compared to regional peers despite slightly improving over the last 10 years. After taking over from the late former longtime leader Robert Mugabe following a military-assisted transition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa promised to break with the past and undertook to adopt a raft of neo-liberal reforms. Mnangagwa’s administration, which is currently ineligible to access concessional funding from multilateral lenders due to non-payment of arrears, is desperate to normalise relations with its creditors as a first step towards re-joining the family of nations. Critics however say Zimbabwe is now under the jackboot of repression as the authorities descend on the opposition and civil society organisations. According to the new African Development Bank 2024-2026 Country Brief on Zimbabwe, the lowly rating was attributed to poor scores in transparency, accountability, corruption in the public sector, and weaknesses in public administration. “Zimbabwe’s governance indicators have slightly improved but remain weak,” says the AfDB. “The Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score for Zimbabwe improved from 2.11 in 2013 to 2.7 in 2020 (the highest registered so far) but remained below the Africa average of 3.5 which implies continued weak governance systems.” The 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance gave Zimbabwe an overall score of 48.1/100, with a ranking of 29 out of 54 African countries, representing an improvement from 45.7 in 2014. The improved scores were due to progress in the security and rule of law indicator (42.9 in 2014 to 46.4 in 2022), foundations for economic opportunities indicator (47.2 in 2014 to 52.9 in 2022), and human development indicator (52.4 in 2014 to 54.1 in 2022). The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score for Zimbabwe improved to 24/100 in 2023 ranking it 149/180 countries from 23/100 and a ranking of 157/180 countries in 2021. In March 2022, Zimbabwe was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list and is making progress on strengthening its Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework following the implementation of legislative and policy reforms by the government of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe held general elections last August which saw Mnangagwa clinch a controversial wafer-thin win over his rival Nelson Chamisa. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission declared the winner of the Presidential race with 52.6% of the presidential votes, while the main opposition leader, Chamisa of the Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC), was second with 44% of the total votes cast. A total of 210 parliamentary seats were contested and the Zanu PF obtained 136 parliamentary seats against 73 seats for the CCC. The CCC did not endorse the outcome of these elections, but did not contest the results in court within the stipulated time frame. Hence Mnangagwa was sworn in as President of Zimbabwe for a second five-year term of office on 4 September 2023. Zim remains lowly-ranked on governance record: AfDB

BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE is planning to launch a mineral commodity exchange by the end of 2024 as the southern African nation pins its hope on the capital-intensive mining sector to spur economic growth, The NewsHawks has established. Mining is the country’s major foreign currency earner, accounting for over 50% of export shipments. Despite this, only a few major mining companies are listed locally, with experts saying the country has limited capital and incentives for them to be on the registers of local bourses. The proposed commodities exchange which will be run by the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange is expected to be established in a special economic zone and will operate using the United States dollar. In addition, investors will benefit from reduced tax rates and easy repatriation of dividends and profits. Foreign investors will also look to unlock easy access to diversified commodity portfolios currently traded on the VFEX such as stocks and bonds. The move by VFEX comes at a time when the trading of African mineral commodities has predominantly taken place on foreign exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Dubai Gold and Commodities Exchange (DGCX). The few existing commodity exchanges in Africa trade primarily in soft commodities. Arthur Gwarimbo, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe internal audit manager, told The NewsHawks on the sidelines of a training workshop held in Headlands this week that the Finance ministry is currently reviewing the draft regulations of the proposed exchange. “With the regards with the progress we have made so far of launching the commodities market exchange, as MMCZ, we are working in conjunction with the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange to set up the exchange,” Gwarimbo said. “To date we have compiled the ground rules and regulations which will govern the operation of the commodities exchange and these have been submitted to treasury. They are looking into them and after they're satisfied with the whole process, they will then submit them for approval with other relevant structures so that we start implementing the commodities exchange. Hopefully by end of this year we should have launched the commodities exchange.” Commodities exchanges are where trading takes place for physical goods, also known as commodities. Agricultural products fall under the scope of soft commodities while minerals are deemed hard commodities. In a typical mineral commodities exchange, investors can trade in minerals and enter into spot transactions for immediate delivery of the mineral commodity, or derivatives transactions with forward, futures, and options instruments. The commodity market allows a wide range of market participants to gain access to a centralised and liquid location. Participants include outright suppliers and producers, focusing on obtaining or simply selling the commodity while others may be looking at it as a way to hedge against a certain exposure in the same product or another. Speculators and investors are also present in the commodities market, betting on a rise or fall in prices while others may hold commodities to protect their portfolio against adverse market conditions. Market watchers say this comes in handy given the current price shocks being experienced in the mining industry. Page 32 Companies & Markets NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE has emerged as the outlier within the region as the country battles with a huge debt overhang currently retarding economic development, a new report by the African Development Bank (AfDB) has shown. Official figures show that Zimbabwe’s total public debt amounts to US$17.69 billion (81.3% of gross domestic product) as of 30 September 2023 . External debt stands at US$12.69 billion (58.3% of GDP) and domestic debt at US$5.0 (23% of GDP). Multilateral debt amounts to US$3.1 billion, while bilateral debt amounts to US$6.0 billion. Arrears and penalties amounting to US$7 billion or 32% of GDP represent 76% of total multilateral and bilateral debt. “Zimbabwe is currently the only Regional Member Country (RMC) that is in arrears with the Bank,” a new report by the regional bank reads. “As of 31st December 2023, Zimbabwe’s debt to the AfDB amounted to US$755.48m (about 2.0% of GDP). Since 2022 the AfDB has been leading Zimbabwe’s arrears clearance and debt resolution process, which is aimed at finding solutions to the country’s debt challenges. The country’s debt position remains unsustainable and continues to strain the implementation of the National Development Plan 1. “The long outstanding debt and accumulated arrears has negatively impacted the country and its people. This has manifested in limited progress in human development.” The monetary policy, the AfDB says, remains a major source of macroeconomic instability. The country has a multi-currency monetary policy with the US dollar and Zimbabwe dollar as the main official currencies for domestic transactions. The US dollar is the preferred currency, especially as a store of value. An auction-based exchange rate system is in place, but the shortages of foreign currency have given rise to a flourishing parallel market, resulting in wide premiums between the official rates and parallel market rates. Since 2022 the economy has also been characterised by high inflation that reached a peak of 285% in June 2022, mainly triggered by exchange rate depreciation. In 2023, the government introduced a blended inflation rate that combines US$ and ZW$ prices on a ratio of 80% to 20%, for US$ and ZW$, respectively, and rebased its inflation estimates to the year 2020. This change in inflation measurement resulted in a significant reduction in officially recorded inflation rates. The annual blended inflation stood at 34.8% in January 2024 from 175.8% in June 2023. According to the Government Public Debt report of November 2023, the country’s total public debt amounts to US$17.69 billion (81.3% of GDP) as of 30 th September 2023. The government has committed to clearing its arrears with multilateral and Paris Club creditors. In December 2021, the government adopted the Arrears Clearance, Debt Relief and Restructuring Strategy (ACDRRS) to help resolve the longstanding debt challenges. In 2022, the government adopted the Central Pin Strategy (CPS) to implement the ACDRRS and to strengthen re-engagement with the international community. The CPS has three pillars, namely economic reforms, political reforms, and government’s commitments to compensate former commercial farmers, including the Bilateral Promotion, Partnership Agreement (BIPPA) farmers whose farms were acquired under the fast-track land reform programme. The AfDB through the Transitional Support Facility (TSF) is providing technical assistance and advisory support on arrears clearance and debt resolution to the GoZ. Upon request from President Mnangagwa, AfDB president Akinwumi Adesina led this process, while the former president of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano is the facilitator. Only southern African nation with huge continental arrears Mineral commodity exchange to be launched by year-end AfDB president Akinwumi Adesina

NewsHawks Companies & Markets Page 33 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 MORRIS BISHI EXECUTIVES at Bikita Rural District Council dissolved a private company, Bikita Hanyanya Investments (Pvt) Ltd, which was collecting revenue on behalf of the local authority for nearly two years immediately after the arrival of an investigating team from the ministry of Local Government on 12 February 2024. After the closure of the company which occurred in the middle of the night, the management of the firm blocked bank accounts which were used by the company in a bid to evade scrutiny by a team from the parent ministry. The company was owned by council but running as a separate entity. The arrival of an investigative team from the ministry of Local Government led to the death of chief executive officer Peter Chibi on 11 March through suicide by taking a poisonous substance. Bikita Hanyanya, which commenced operations in early 2022, was running Pambudzi Lodge, a council conservancy in Save Valley, Mukondo Mine. The company was also enforcing traffic by-laws collecting parking revenue, as well as collecting revenue from vendors and businesses operating in and around Nyika Growth Point. The private company was registered on 3 June 2021 with the late chief executive Chibi and finance director Never Mavhuna holding 50% of its shares each. In early 2022, Bikita Rural District Council was in the eye of a storm after the local authority acquired top-of-the-range vehicles for its executives without approval from the government at a cost of US$380 000. Bikita Business Association chairperson Charles Musimiki told The NewsHawks that local residents and businesspeople were shocked to note that a company which used to collect revenue on behalf of council suddenly disappeared. He said it is their prayer as ratepayers that the matter be fully investigated and all culprits held answerable for their actions. "We are still surprised at how Bikita Hanyanya, a company owned by council, disappeared and we don't know what happened. Its disappearance is a sign which shows that it was operating for the benefit of certain people. It is our hope that authorities will make sure that all those who benefitted from our funds should be brought to book," said Musimiki. Bikita Residents and Ratepayers Association spokesperson Lucky Mukomondero said the changing of staff and receipt books from Bikita Hanyanya to Bikita Rural District Council overnight exonerates residents who raised alarm against the formation of the company in 2022. He said an independent audit should investigate the private company so that it can be exposed. "We protested after the formation of this company and its unclear closure exonerates our 2022 actions. Authorities should bring bring auditors to extensively look into the books of this company. We suspect that money was being embezzled, depriving us of the much-needed service delivery," said Mukomondero. Bikita Rural District Council chairperson Thomas Mataga told The NewsHawks that Bikita Hanyanya was closed after it was realised that its operations were not beneficial to the local authority and an audit will soon be instituted into its operations.  He confirmed that an investigative team from ministry of Local Government was recently at his local authority and they are yet to hear the outcome of their visit. Finance director Never Mavhuna, who is also a director of Bikita Hanyanya, was evasive when this reporter called him for a comment. He asked this reporter the destination of the information he was asking for. "Are you investigating me and why are you asking information about that company? What is your motive in asking me all those questions? Can you forward your questions to our email address so that we can look into the issue," said Mavhuna. A councillor within the local authority told The NewsHawks that the closure of the company was done at midnight on 12 February when investigators from the ministry arrived. He said on 13 February CBZ and ZB banks accounts which were used by the company were blocked and council took over the collection of revenue. Bikita dissolves company under corruption cloud

Page 34 Companies & Markets NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 NATHAN GUMA WHEN the government slapped a ban on chromium ore exports in 2011 and 2021, the main purpose was to support the domestic ferrochrome industry through support of downstream mining companies while boosting the economy. However, an analysis titled Export Restrictions on Minerals and Metals: Estimation and Analysis of Supply Chain Effects from Zimbabwe’s Chromium Ore Export Ban conducted by international economists Anna Perry and Samantha Schreiber of the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) has shown that the bans have weighed on the mining industry with a considerable decrease in production and chrome prices since the first ban in 2011. In 2021, the government placed a ban on chrome ore exports to support the domestic ferrochrome industry, which saw a drop in chrome ore prices by 10.53% while the quantity of Zimbabwe chromium ore sent to downstream companies rose by 10.21%. Ferrochromium production, and the quantity of total Zimbabwe chromium ore production fell by 42.67%, while the price of ferrochromium from Zimbabwe fell by 4.96%. The quantity of Zimbabwe ferrochromium increased by 16.58%, while the price of Chinese ferrochromium rose by 0.82% and the quantity of Chinese ferrochromium production fell by 1.14%. According to the analysis, Zimbabwean ferrochromium producers are estimated to receive a greater benefit from the export ban in 2021 in terms of larger estimated percent increase in ferrochromium production — about 16.6% in 2021 compared to 14.7% in 2011. However, producers in China are estimated to experience a larger decline in production in 2021 (1.1% reduction compared to 0.8% reduction in 2011). “Several factors explain these differences. First, the estimated chromium ore cost share in Zimbabwe ferrochromium production has increased in recent years, so changes in the chromium industry have larger impacts on the ferrochromium industry,” reads the analysis. “Second, Zimbabwe contributed a larger share of world chromium production in 2020, producing 4.5% of total world production compared to 1.9% in 2010. Coupled with the fact that Zimbabwe exports roughly 50% of its chromium ore production in non-ban years, the 2021 ban is estimated to have a larger impact on global chromium and ferrochromium trade relative to 2011.” The effects are also similar to those after the government placed a ban on chromium ore and concentrates exports to push domestic chromium ore producers to develop downstream production capacity for ferrochromium in 2011. While the government gave producers 18 months to establish smelting capabilities, the ban, however, did not successfully spur downstream development, which saw chromium ore output decrease by 64.8%, and two major producers—Zim Alloys and the Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company (Zimasco)—shut down. According to the analysis, the government lifted the ban in 2015 after no notable increase in smelted chrome production. In 2016, the export value of chromium ore (HS 2610.00) from Zimbabwe rebounded and continued to increase for several years, peaking as the third-largest global exporter at US$94.1 million (3.5% of global export value) in 2018. The findings have shown that downstream domestic ferrochromium producers increased their purchasing of Zimbabwean chromium ore by about 14.7%, while total chromium ore production in Zimbabwe decreased 45% as export destinations were no longer available to producers. “This led to a price decrease for Zimbabwean ferrochromium (4.7%) and an increase in Zimbabwean ferrochromium quantity of production (15.2%) as more inputs were exclusively available and at a cheaper price, akin to a positive supply shift. “Chinese ferrochromium producers, on the other hand, experienced a modest decline in production quantities (less than 1%) as relatively less chromium ore inputs were available.” Zimbabwe’s chromium ore has an estimated average mineral content of 48%, which is priced at a premium relative to South African metallurgical grade concentrate. This higher content is ideal for ferrochromium processing, as ferrochromium contains between 50 and 70% chromium. Global chromite production doubled in the last decade, largely due to capacity expansion of chromite mining in South Africa and Zimbabwe driven by chromium price spikes in 2016- 2017 and rising ferrochromium and stainless steel demand. In 2019, South Africa and Turkey accounted for roughly 38% and 22% of the 44.8 million metric tonnes of chromite produced globally, respectively, while Zimbabwe was the sixth-largest producer globally, with roughly 1.5 million metric tonnes of chromite produced, or 3.5% of the global total. Chromium is a hard, gray metal mostly used in the steel industry as an alloying element because of its hardness and corrosion resistance. More than 95% of chromium consumption is in metallurgical applications. Of metallurgical chromium demand, 78% is attributed to stainless steel production. Ferrochromium, an alloy form of chromium, is essential in the manufacture of stainless steel, which has higher relative chromium content and — as such — corrosion resistance compared to other steel forms. Most stainless steel contains roughly 18% chromium and is required to contain a minimum of 10.5% chromium. Niche chromium chemical and refined metal account for 3% of global chromium consumption, with downstream applications including leather tanning, metal finishing, wood preservatives, paints, and glazes. Kazakhstan, South Africa, and India collectively hold nearly 95% of reported global reserves of chromium ore. However, Zimbabwe is reported to hold roughly 12% of global reserves of high-grade chromium ore, second only to South Africa. Export ban crippled chrome sector

NewsHawks The Banker Page 35 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 CIRCULAR TO CLIENTS EXCHANGE CONTROL DIRECTIVE RZ56/2024 DATED 08 APRIL 2024 Reference is made to the Monetary Policy Statement issued by the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on 5 April 2024. 1. In order to facilitate the introduction of the structured currency and operationalise the foreign exchange policies contained in the Statement, Exchange Control, hereby issues this Exchange Control Directive to provide administrative guidance and compliance parameters to Authorised Dealers. POLICY MEASURE WHAT THIS MEANS/IMPACT ON CLIENTS 2 Discontinuation of the Foreign Exchange Auction System 2.1 Authorised Dealers are advised that the Foreign Exchange Auction System (FEAS) that was last held on 12 December 2023 has been officially discontinued effective 8 April 2024. 3 Treatment of Outstanding Auction Allotments 3.1 3.2 All auction allotments arrears that accumulated from non-funding by the auction will be refunded to recipients at the current inter-bank exchange rate. To allow the new structured currency system to start on a clean slate, the refund will entail conversion of all outstanding auction allotments into a 2-year ZiG denominated investment instrument at an interest rate of 7.5% per annum. The Reserve Bank Financial Markets Division will communicate with banks on the respective implementation framework. For Exchange Control purposes, the conversion of foreign exchange auction allotment arrears to ZiG denominated investment instruments expunges the foreign exchange obligation and liability from the Reserve Bank. Similarly, the conversion also gives the beneficiary the benefit of value preservation in holding the investment instrument. 4 Treatment of Outstanding Payments on Surrender Obligations 4.1 All outstanding payments for foreign exchange purchased by Treasury under the 25% surrender requirement will be converted, using the prevailing US$/ZiG exchange rate, into a ZiG-denominated investment instrument with a tenor of one (1) year at an interest rate of 7.5% per annum. The Reserve Bank Financial Markets Division will communicate with banks on the respective implementation framework 5 Adoption of a Market-Determined Exchange Rate System 5.1 5.2 5.3 The Reserve Bank has adopted a market determined exchange rate system under the Willing-Buyer-WiIIing-Seller (WBWS) trading arrangement. Under the Willing-Buyer-WilIing-Seller trading arrangement, Authorised Dealers (banks) and Bureaux de Change shall purchase foreign currency from willing sellers at a market determined exchange rate for onward sale to willing buyers (importers). Purchase of foreign currency by importers under this foreign exchange trading arrangement shall strictly be to fund bonafide external obligations. In administering this foreign exchange trading arrangement, Authorised Dealers are reminded to serve customers on a first come-first served basis and desist from matchmaking of buyers and sellers of foreign currency. In all cases, Authorised Dealers must apply Know Your Customer (KYC), Customer Due Diligence (CDD) principles as well as uphold Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) principles 6 Foreign Currency Pipeline Demand 6.1 To enable the establishment of the immediate foreign exchange payment requirements from Authorised Dealers’ clients requests already submitted as at 08 April 2024, Authorised Dealers are requested to furnish Exchange Control with a Foreign Currency pipeline up to June 2024. The information should be submitted to Exchange Control by 1600hrs, Tuesday, 09 April 2024. 7 Standardised Foreign Currency Retention Thresholds 7.1 7.2 7.3 Foreign currency retention thresholds remain standardised at 75% across all sectors, except for small-scale gold producers who shall continue to retain 100% of their gold sale proceeds. Authorised Dealers and all exporting entities are required to adhere to these standardized foreign currency retention thresholds. All previously granted exemptions shall however run up to maturity and there shall be no renewals. In this regard Authorised Dealers are required to furnish Exchange Control with the following information on each running authority no later than 12 April 2024: - i. Authority number/reference letter (e.g. Exchange Control, Financial Markets etc); ii. Date authority granted. iii. Purpose of the authority (application of funds); iv. Validity (duration) of the authority. v. Amount approved to be raised under the authority. vi. Amount raised to date; and vii.Balance remaining to cover the purpose in (iii) above. 8 Facilitation of Trading on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Victoria Falls Stock Exchange by Non-Residents 8.1 8.2 Authorised Dealers are required to facilitate the opening of Non-Resident Transitory Accounts denominated in ZiG to facilitate trading of shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange by non-resident investors. In the same vein, Authorised Dealers are also required to facilitate the opening of Non-Resident Transitory Accounts denominated in Foreign Currency to facilitate trading of shares on the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange by non-resident investors. 9 Threshold for the Export of Domestic Currency 9.1 The threshold for the export of domestic currency (ZiG) remains at the equivalent of US$1,000. The relevant Statutory Instrument shall be promulgated in due course. For further clarification on these measures, please do not hesitate to contact your Relationship Managers.

Page 36 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 JOHN MUSHAYAVANHU THIS recalibrated monetary policy framework aims to address the current state of price and exchange rate instability in the economy. It is informed by two strategic policy pillars of restoring price and exchange rate stability, and re-monetising the local currency for it to serve its role as a medium of exchange and a store of value in a multi-currency system. The policy seeks to rebuild market confidence and trust, as well as Bank policy credibility. Global Economic Developments and Outlook • Global growth is forecasted to be steady at 3.1% in 2023 and 2024, respectively, albeit well below historical average growth rates. • Global risks and vulnerabilities have increased on account of tight monetary and financial conditions, funding squeeze, intensifying geo-political tensions, growing adverse weather events, and supply chain disruptions. • The underlying global risks are likely to weigh down global growth prospects with spill-over effects on the domestic economy. Domestic Economic Conditions • The domestic economy has been characterised by high inflation, as well as exchange rate and currency instability. • Despite these setbacks, the economy has remained resilient, with an anticipated positive growth trajectory, albeit lower than the initially anticipated growth of 3.5% in 2024 due to the impact of the El-Nino induced drought which has turned out to be more severe than initially envisaged. • By addressing the impact of currency and exchange rate instability on potential growth, this Monetary Policy Framework's concomitant stability-restoration measures will provide the desired boost to the country’s economic growth prospects. • On the external front, performance remains favourable with an estimated current account surplus of US$125.6 million in 2023. • In the last nine months, inflationary pressures have dissipated, as seen by the decline in the annual inflation rate from 30.9% in June to 17.8% in October 2023. However, due to market speculation and adverse inflation expectations, there has been growing volatility in the exchange rate, with annual inflation registering a rebound, increasing from 26.5% in December 2023 to 34.8% in January 2024, and further increasing to 55.3% in March 2024. • This Monetary Policy Framework re-affirms the Reserve Bank's antiinflationary commitment. The key macroeconomic and financial statistics underpinning the Monetary Policy decisions point to strong macroeconomic fundamentals in the economy, notwithstanding the high inflationary pressures, driven by the exchange rate passthrough on domestic prices.  Currency and Exchange Rate Stability: • Currency and exchange rate instability has largely been driven by: • High demand for foreign currency as a store of value. • Reduced confidence due to continued currency volatility in recent months, and the widening margin between the interbank and parallel market exchange rates. • Reduced use of the local currency for domestic transactions. • Lack of certainty and predictability on the exchange rate front. • In view of the above, the Reserve Bank will introduce a market determined foreign exchange management system which links the local currency to a composite basket of reserve assets comprised of precious minerals (mainly gold) and foreign currency balances. Financial Sector Stability: • The banking sector has remained safe and sound, with sufficient buffers for capital and liquidity, good asset quality, and sustained profitability. • Accordingly, the Reserve Bank's oversight and financial surveillance framework will be reinforced to improve the current state of the financial sector and foster a culture of discipline and compliance. Money Supply Growth: • Unchecked base money growth causes inflation and undermines the stability of the exchange rate. • With this framework, the Bank intends to strategically manage money supply growth through a disciplined culture in sync with improved economic activity and increased reserves in the form of precious minerals (mainly gold) and foreign currency balances. Foreign Exchange Mobilisation and Reserve Accumulation: • The Reserve Bank will consistently maintain a comfortable and steady buffer of foreign reserves to ensure that the new currency is at all times fully covered by reserves. • Foreign exchange mobilisation and accumulation will be a key focus of the new monetary policy framework.  ÑFinancial sector surveillance will be strengthened in order to stop foreign exchange leakages. Promoting Increased Demand for the Local Currency: • The economy has, of late, been moving towards full dollarisation, as the US dollar has continued to dominate the weaker ZW$, with over 80% of market transactions currently conducted in US dollars. • The public outcry over excessive bank charges, problem of change, rejection of soiled US$ notes, and the inconvenience of small ZW$ denominations has rendered the local currency ineffective as a store of value and means of exchange. • Increased demand for the local currency will enhance its stability and role as a store of value and medium of exchange. • This Monetary Policy Statement has introduced new measures to increase demand for the local currency. • Following the recalibration of the Bank’s policymaking framework, the New Monetary Policy measures are intended to achieve RBZ governor issues Monetary Policy Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu. pic: Aaron Ufumeli

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 37 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 the following objectives which are consistent with regional and global best practices: a) A solid and stable national currency. b) A stable and sustainable exchange rate. c) Robust policy credibility and restoration of market confidence. d) A stable and sustainable macro economy as enshrined in Vision 2030 and NDS1. • The new policy framework will be implemented sequentially to ensure lasting stability, certainty, and predictability thereby achieving the desired impact on financial, monetary, currency, and exchange rate stability. • The sequential approach will be anchored on five policy measures: a) Adoption of a market-determined exchange rate system. b) Efficient and optimal money supply management. c) Introduction of a new structured currency Anchoring local currency on reserves backed by gold and foreign currency balances. Other support measures and obligations in response to market demands. 1. Adoption of Market Determined Exchange Rate System • The auction system has been replaced by a refined interbank foreign exchange market under a willing-buyer-willing-seller (WBWS) trading arrangement. Following this development, a transparent price discovery mechanism is now in place in the interbank market. • The Bank will continue to provide trading liquidity to the market using the 25% surrender proceeds from exports. 2. Efficient and Optimal Money Supply Management • The Bank’s money supply management policy thrust will ensure that reserve money growth is contained within the limits of growth in gold and foreign currency reserves. • The Bank will continue to maintain a tight monetary policy stance to ensure sustainability of the monetary anchor. • Efficient management of liquidity and money supply will entail the discontinuation of all Quasi-Fiscal Activities, and alignment of interest rates with positive real rates and exchange rate expectations. • The Bank will strictly adhere to Statutory limits on Bank Lending to the Government. Introduction of New Structured Currency • The Reserve Bank is introducing a structured currency which is generally defined as a currency that is pegged to a specific exchange rate or currency basket and backed by a bundle of foreign exchange assets (potentially including gold). This means that a Central Bank can only issue domestic notes and coins when fully backed by a foreign “reserve” currency or foreign exchange assets and that the currency is fully convertible into the reserve currency on demand. • The structured currency being introduced is anchored by a composite basket of foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold) held as reserves for this purpose by the Reserve Bank. • The strong macroeconomic fundamentals currently prevailing in the economy, as reflected by persistent surpluses in the balance of payments, fiscal sustainability, and a bullish mining sector will support the local currency. Currency Conversion and Swap • With effect from 5 April 2024, banks shall convert the current Zimbabwe dollar balances into the new currency which shall be called Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) to foster simplicity, certainty, and predictability in monetary and financial affairs. The new currency will co-circulate with other foreign currencies in the economy. • The swap rate will be guided by the closing interbank exchange rate and the price of gold as at 5 April 2024. The swap rate shall be used to make legitimate conversions of all ZW$ deposits in the banking sector; all ZW$ loans and advances made by the sector; ZW$ treasury bills; all outstanding auction allotments; all export surrender obligations; all prices of goods and services in ZW$; and any other ZW$ denominated obligations. • On conversion of all current ZW$ balances, banks are directed to rename all the current ZW$ accounts as ZiG accounts. Goldbacked Digital Token (GBDT) accounts will no longer be called ZiG accounts but will be known as GBDT accounts. • All ZW$ notes and coins held by account holders will be credited into their ZiG accounts using the applicable conversion factor. The banks will continue to accept these deposits for a period of 21 days after 5 April 2024. • The Reserve Bank has made special arrangements for those without bank accounts to swap their ZW$ notes and coins at POSB and AFC Commercial Bank within 21 days after 5 April 2024. • In instances where the cash holding to be exchanged is above ZW$100,000, banks shall apply the requisite know your customer (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD) principles.  Issuance of New Bank Notes and Coins • ZiG notes and coins shall be issued in denominations made up of 1ZiG, 2ZiG, 5ZiG, 10ZiG, 20Zig, 50ZiG, 100ZiG, and 200ZiG which will be distributed through the normal banking channels. The coins shall be introduced in due course. 3.3. Anchor of the Currency • ZiG shall at all times be anchored and fully backed by a composite basket of reserves comprising foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold), received by the Reserve Bank as part of in-kind royalties and kept in the vaults of the Bank. Foreign currency balances will be accumulated through market purchases from the 25% surrender requirements as well as sale of some precious metals received as royalties. • As at 5 April 2024, the Bank’s reserve asset holdings comprise of USD 100 million in cash and 2,522 kg of gold (worth US$185 million) to back the entire local currency component of reserve money which currently stands at ZW$2.6 trillion requiring full (100%) cover of gold and cash reserves amounting to US$90 million. The total amount of gold and cash reserve holdings of US$285 million represents more than 3 times cover for the ZiG currency being issued. 3.4. Exchange Rate Management System • The starting exchange rate shall be determined by the prevailing closing interbank exchange rate as at 5 April and the London PM Fix price of gold at 4 April 2024. • The intervening exchange rate shall be determined by the inflation differential between ZiG and USD inflation rates and the movement in the price of the basket of precious minerals held as reserves. The weights will be determined by the composition of reserve assets. 3.5. Foreign Exchange Liquidity Management • The Bank will use 50% of the foreign currency proceeds from surrender requirements for strategic interventions in the foreign exchange interbank market. The remaining foreign currency will be available to satisfy the Government’s foreign currency obligations in exchange for ZiG and to build foreign exchange reserves for the Reserve Bank. • Foreign currency retention thresholds remain standardised at 75% across all sectors except for small-scale gold producers. 3.6. Interest Rate Policy • The Bank has recalibrated the Bank policy rate from 130% per annum to 20% per annum consistent with the new monetary policy framework. • The overnight accommodation interest rate has been set at 5% above the Bank policy rate and the Bank deposit facility interest rate at 7.5% below the Bank policy rate, thus giving the starting interest rate corridor of between 11% to 25% per annum. • The Bank policy rate and the corresponding interest rate corridor will be reviewed by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) from time to time in line with inflation developments. • Minimum savings and time deposits interest rates on ZiG are set at 9% and 7.5% below the Bank deposit facility rate of 12.5%, respectively. Minimum interest rates on FCA deposits remain unchanged at 1% and 2.5% for savings and time deposits, respectively. Open Market Operations (OMO) • Going forward, open market operations will be carried out to ensure that reserve money will always be fully backed by a corresponding composite basket of reserve assets comprising precious minerals (predominantly gold) and foreign currency balances. • All the current non-interest-bearing non-negotiable certificates of deposits (NNCDs) in ZiG beyond the optimal liquidity level and those encumbered by existing foreign currency structures will be converted into tenors of 1 year and above. Statutory Reserve Requirements • The statutory reserve requirements for demand deposits in ZiG and savings and time deposits in ZiG remain standardised at 15% and 5%, respectively. • In order to foster continued financial sector stability in the face of increased lending in foreign currency, measures will be put in place to enhance  foreign exchange liquidity, moderate foreign currency exposures and mitigate against payment gridlocks in the banking sector. • In this regard, the Bank is increasing the statutory reserve ratio for foreign currency demand deposits from 15% to 20% with effect from 8 April 2024. • The statutory reserve requirements for foreign currency time and savings deposits shall, however, remain at the current level of 5%. Treasury Bills Denominated in ZW$ • All treasury bills previously issued in ZW$ will be converted to ZiG and the rate adjusted accordingly. Alleviating Bank Charges • Banks will not charge monthly bank maintenance or service charges for individual bank accounts with a conservative daily balance of US$100 and below or its equivalent in ZiG for a period of up to 30 days. Other Supporting Measures and Bank Obligations • The following measures will be strictly implemented to support the new monetary policy framework: Promoting Increased Demand for the Local Currency • Statutory Instrument 218 of 2023 restored the use of multicurrency in the settlement of any transactions until 31 December 2030. • Accordingly, measures will be put in place to gradually promote the increased use of the new structured currency as we move towards 2030. • In order to foster demand for the local currency, Government will make it mandatory for companies to settle at least 50% of their tax obligations on Quarterly Payments Dates (QPDs) in ZiG. • The Bank will continue with its strict liquidity management in order to mitigate against shocks that cause spikes in the exchange rate. Auction Allotments Obligations • Following the introduction of a refined interbank foreign exchange market under the willing-buyer willing-seller trading arrangement, all outstanding auction allotments will be converted into ZiG and issued out as NNCDs at  the current interbank exchange rate, with a maturity of 24 months at an interest rate of 7.5% per annum. • This process will allow the beneficiaries to maintain the value of their proceeds under the new framework. Outstanding Payments for Auction Surrender Obligations • All outstanding payments for foreign exchange purchased by Treasury under the 25% surrender requirement will be converted to a ZiG denominated instrument with a tenor of one (1) year at an interest rate of 7.5% per annum. 4.4. Gold Coins and Gold Backed Digital Tokens • Gold coins and Gold backed digital tokens shall continue to be used as investment instruments and to manage liquidity in the economy, with a view to stabilising the currency and exchange rate. • As already indicated above, the gold-backed digital tokens (GBDT) will no longer be called ZiG but GBDT. 4.5. Reconfiguration of National Payment Systems • By April 8, 2024, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), who are essential to the National Financial Inclusion Strategy, will also be expected to ensure that all their customers can effortlessly transition from ZW$ wallets to ZiG wallets. Domestic Pricing of Goods and Services • Once the local currency is redenominated in Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG), all domestic traders are expected to consistently modify their pricing systems in line with the currency reforms. • With immediate effect, prices for goods and services shall be converted using the conversion rate and thereafter quoted in ZiG, for the transacting public’s convenience. • Within seven days from 5 April 2024, all entities other than banks and MNOs are expected to have completed the configuration of their systems to conduct business in ZiG. Inflation Outlook • Once the currency and exchange rate have stabilised and the supplementary support measures in this new Monetary Policy Framework have been implemented, inflation expectations should be firmly anchored towards the observed trend of domestic USD inflation, which is expected to be below 1% month-over-month and between 2 and 5% annually. • Compared to the recent past, when the economy was growing in an inflationary environment, growth prospects will be more favourable with the anticipated exchange rate and price stability. The Key Takeaways - 2024 Monetary Policy Statement • The Bank has introduced a new monetary policy framework that is envisaged to foster stability, simplicity, certainty, and predictability in the execution of the country’s monetary and financial affairs. • Precisely, the new framework will re-monetize the local currency and enhance its functions as a medium of exchange and store of value.

Page 38 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 MIKE MAHARREY ON 5 April, Zimbabwean officials introduced a gold-backed currency in an effort to stabilise the economy. But the root of the country’s problem remains – the government. The ZiG (Zimbabwe gold) will replace the Zimbabwe dollar (RTGS) over the next month. The currency will be a “structured currency” backed primarily by gold but also by other forex reserves including dollars. Central bank governor John Mushayavanhu said the ZiG would be set at “a market-determined exchange rate.” The ZiG currency will reportedly be introduced at a rate of 13.56 per US dollar. The currency will be available in denominations of 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 100, and 200 ZiG. The country will also mint coins. Currently, most transactions in Zimbabwe use US dollars. The greenback will remain legal tender in the country. Due to a major coin shortage, Zimbabweans have resorted to using candy and chewing gum as change. The rollout of the ZiG was expected to happen quickly. According to  a statement released last Saturday, “The banking sector and Payment Systems Providers (PSP) have made satisfactory progress in converting the ZW$ balances into Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG).” “The conversion process will continue for other economic sectors until Friday, 12 April 2024. Thereafter, the Reserve Bank expects that all the online payment platforms will be operating smoothly for all transactions in the economy.” Zimbabweans will have 21 days to exchange RTGS for ZiG. Zimbabwe reportedly holds about 1.1 tonnes of gold in the country, with another 1.5 tonnes abroad. The central bank also has US$100 million in cash along with diamonds and other precious minerals. Mushayavanhu said the reserves total US$285 million, "more than three times cover for the ZiG currency being issued". History of monetary malfeasance  Zimbabwe is hoping the goldbacked currency will stabilise the country’s financial system. It is currently straining under rampant inflation. The RTGS has lost about 800% of its value against the dollar in 2023 alone. Hyperinflation wiped out the value of the Zimbabwe dollar in the early 2000s. In 2009, the government abandoned its own currency and adopted foreign currencies–primarily the US dollar (or, more accurately, the Federal Reserve Note). The African nation reintroduced the Zimbabwe dollar also known as the bond note in 2016. It was to be backed by the US dollar loan facility. Then-central bank governor John Mangudya swore the new Zimbabwe dollar would remain on par with the greenback. But the bond note crashed when the government once again began printing excess money. By mid-July 2019, price inflation had increased to 175%. As  Business Insider Africa  put it, “Zimbabwe continues to bear the scars of hyperinflation endured during the extended leadership of Robert Mugabe.” New currency, same problem Backing the Zimbabwe currency with gold is a great idea, but the ZiG will collapse just like previous Zimbabwean currencies if the government does not change its ways. Putting the Zimbabwe dollar on a gold standard would theoretically slam the door on the Zimbabwe government’s inflationary policies. Backing currency with a hard asset limits money creation. The government cannot create more US dollars unless it gets more gold. A gold standard puts a natural brake on monetary expansion. This would benefit Zimbabweans who would enjoy a stable currency and could maintain their purchasing power over time. But this is not the same as owning physical gold and using it as money. A gold-backed paper currency is still fiat. The limitation on monetary expansion imposed by backing a currency with gold or silver is only as good as the discipline of those who control it. In other words, the success of the ZiG with require fiscal discipline on the part of the government. It cannott rely on money printing to support its spending. Therein lies the rub. Government people tend to quickly abandon any pretense of linking the currency to gold when they discover it puts the kibosh on expanding their power. Economist Godfrey Kanyenze made this very point in an interview with the BBC: "We now end up in the same place where we started — where assurances are being given to the market that the government will live within its means. The political culture has not changed — the critical point is discipline on the part of the authorities." The bottom line is if the government continues to print money to pay its bills, nothing will fundamentally change in Zimbabwe — gold or no gold.    The problem is there is nothing to stop the government from changing the “market-determined exchange rate.” This is exactly what President Franklin D. Roosevelt did in the US. In 1934, he increased the government’s fixed price for gold from US$20.67 to US$35 per ounce. This effectively increased the value of gold on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet by 69% and allowed the government to print more money within the law that was intended to prevent excessive money creation. Simply put, pegging the currency to gold will not prevent debasement if the government constantly raises the peg. As economist Milton Friedman once said, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.” In other words, if a country is experiencing  price inflation  and currency depreciation, it is ultimately the government’s fault. Price inflation is a symptom of monetary inflation — government creating more and more currency to prop up spending. During Zimbabwe's first round of hyperinflation, the government was printing money to finance Mugabe’s military involvement in the Congo. It was also allegedly creating currency to pay for government corruption and to fill the pockets of politicians and their buddies. More recently,  Al Jazeera  reported, “The printing of new money by the central bank has also worsened the situation, reversing gains made in the past two years that saw inflation decrease from a peak of 800% in 2020 to 60% in January [2023].” The rollout of the ZiG could indicate that Zimbabwe officials have finally learned their lesson and are making a sincere effort to reform the country’s financial system. But given history — not just in Zimbabwe but all over the world — I’m skeptical. Only time will tell if the government has truly changed its ways. — Money Metals. *About the writer: Mike Maharrey  is a journalist and market analyst for  MoneyMetals.com  with over a decade of experience in precious metals. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting from the University of Kentucky and a Bachelor of Arts in journalism from the University of South Florida. Gold-backed currency won't solve Zimbabwe's fundamental problem

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 39 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 MARIA MARCHETTI-MECER/ SONTO MADONSELA Political instability and economic decline in Zimbabwe have accelerated migration to South Africa in the last two decades. Because of the overriding socio-economic focus of the migration, people often fail to understand the effects on the migrants and their families. This extract from the  book  Transnational Families in Africa shows how migrants mitigate the disruption to bonds with the families they leave. The impact of migration on individuals and families is complex, with many challenges and constraints, as well as some opportunities. One important dimension of this complexity requires us to understand the impact of migration on transnational family relationships, in both the destination country and the country of origin. This is the kind of disruption we see in the story of Chipo, who reported one underlying paradox in the phenomenon of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa: the breakdown of the family system as a consequence of the attempt to rescue this same family. This phenomenon is illustrated throughout our data, so that the story of one of the 20 participants we tell here is, in many ways, representative of the other families in the study. This story began as one of hope for a better future and pride in being able to take care of loved ones. But the parent-child bond was put under great strain because of separation and distance. Chipo’s story Forty-year-old Chipo’s story gives the perspective of a parent forced to leave a child behind in order to provide for him. She had to leave her seven-year-old son in the care of her elderly mother to look for work and further her studies in South Africa. She constantly agonises over what the impact on her relationship with her son will be in the years to come. She describes her move as follows: It was mostly in search of greener pastures. Her words reiterate the idealised and aspirational view that many Zimbabwean migrants initially have of South Africa. She stressed the important role of technology in maintaining relationships with family left behind. WhatsApp is the preferred means of staying connected with the family: We’ve got a a family WhatsApp group for myself, my mother and my brother so we constantly keep updated on any family issues. Even in the morning, if it’s good morning, if it’s Scripture, if it’s anything … that’s how we know that we are connected. So every morning we say good morning, how did you sleep? And things like that and then in the afternoon or if there’s anything, any issues or if there’s … yeah, any issues, that’s how we keep connected and communicate. The role of technology WhatsApp groups seem to be a way to recreate family interactions in transnational families and facilitate everyday family interactions. They have been shown to be highly effective in building and maintaining kinship relationships at a distance. Their use indicates what it means to be a family existing in a digital habitat. Virtual proximity may be achieved through these groups, which helps to fulfil the desire to remain a connected family despite physical distance. However, technology is not without its challenges. In many cases, these are associated with cost. Chipo described how she used text messaging and voice recording instead of video calling because of the high cost of data: It’s mostly texting and voice recordings like let’s say for … especially in Zimbabwe where data is a bit expensive. So, video calls they are not … really, we don’t use them that much. Profound asymmetries were noted between the home country and destination country, with communication being  cheaper for migrants  than for their families. Different types of information and communication technology (ICT) are available primarily to affluent families and people  who live in urban areas. The result is that the migrants’ ability to stay connected with left-behind family may be compromised by prohibitive costs and a lack of ICT infrastructure. It may also be that the high cost of data potentially affects relationship-building, especially in situations where children are not old enough to understand text messages, and would benefit from video and voice calling, which offer an important visual presence and an easier way to share emotional connection. Despite these difficulties, there was a shared sense among the 20 participants that ICT allowed migrants to continue a relationship of care with their distant family members. Different levels and types of care are exchanged by participants. For example, Chipo found it easier to offer medical care to family members via ICT, because she was able to seek out medical advice and other forms of practical care in South Africa. It is also more convenient for her to coordinate everything, as she does not want to overwork her elderly mother, who is already taking care of her son. This includes arranging for a pharmacy in South Africa to provide medical advice to her family in Zimbabwe: Let’s say for example … in the past weeks my son had a bit of a temperature and a runny tummy … So I had to co-ordinate … the medication. ICT is also used for providing other practical forms of care such as access to groceries. What is not said Thus the exchange of care in transnational families goes beyond sending financial remittances, as it includes health and practical needs. What is said and what is not said through virtual communication is also a key issue – as an act of care, people may hide information from one another. Chipo describes how once, when her son was ill, her mother did not tell her. Such silence was particularly stressful in retrospect, given the COVID-19 pandemic: And then I was told that my son had a constant cough and all. And that was before I understood any thing about COVID-19 and things like that … But my mother told me maybe a week later that your son has got this constant cough and … so I got so upset to say you’re only telling me now, my son could be dying and you’re only telling me now – why didn’t you tell me the first day that he had? A growing gap Chipo deemed visits very important to close the information gap, which she did not believe could be easily bridged by the use of ICT: But for holidays I’d prefer that he comes through, and they also come through and because you might do video calls, you might do voice notes but there’s still that gap. You need to see them physically and spend time with them so yeah. So it’s both. In a time of global distress and uncertainty, it appeared that families needed to stay connected more frequently and more urgently. Generally, despite the advantages of ICT and the creative ways in which technology has been used, there was a sense of loss in Chipo’s relationship with her son: And maybe one thing … in as much as technology is assisting … I feel that even the bond between me and my son will (change) over time if things remain like this … The gap will be bigger and bigger over time. Why this matters Chipo’s story speaks of migrants leaving their loved ones behind in order to rescue the family from financial difficulties. Their leaving causes an inevitable sense of rupture in the very family they want to protect. This implies that, although the children of migrant parents appear to receive better financial support than the children of non-migrant families, there are also heart wrenching challenges in dealing with distance, as well as a realistic worry that the separation will damage relationships. — The Conversation. *About the writers: Maria Marchetti-Mercer is professor of psychology and assistant dean of research: Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Sonto Madonsela is a PhD candidate, psychology, University of the Witwatersrand. Siko Moyo, a counselling psychologist at the University of the Witwatersrand, contributed to the research and this article. Zimbabwean migration to SA: How technology helps keep families together

Page 40 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 THE mystery surrounding the fate of 19th century Ndebele King Lobengula — son of the nation's founder King Mzilikazi — is still a moot historical event to Ndebele people, some Zimbabweans and scholars, as well as the media within and outside present-day Zimbabwe. It is a major subject of debate, dispute and uncertainty in some political and social circles. Just like the origins of the Ndebele State itself, Lobengula's fateful demise is still being discussed, investigated and hotly contested up to this day. To some it is just a historical enquiry out of academic curiosity and enterprise, to others an important cultural issue that needs closure and yet to other people it is a critical matter related to current politics in Zimbabwe. Others, especially colonial fortune-hunters, were deeply interested in it and embarked on endless wild goose chases (many expeditions were thus undertaken) as they thought Lobengula disappeared with a huge gold treasure trove which, if found, would be like a small El Dorado, a mythical gold city discovery. Of course, some people think it is just irrelevant to their current situation, especially in a country like Zimbabwe reeling under political and economic problems affecting their survival. But then again contemporary politics of Ndebele history and identity — some intellectuals like Professor Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni call it particularism, and by extension, how this relates to national politics in Zimbabwe today — remain critical to nation-building dynamics and the crisis facing the country. Thus Lobengula's story revived and retold has current political ramifications, which is why the government, together with its credulous followers, for the longest time, has deliberately tried to downplay or even to negate (the sugar myth fable is about that) his well-documented anti-colonial heroics - until now. The issue of Lobengula's statue, a popular demand in Bulawayo which locals call the City of Kings after his father and him, for instance, quickly triggers some discomfort in Harare and agitation in certain social circles. While this issue is a sub-set of national politics, it has continued to haunt both the project of nation-building which has ended up unravelling along the faultlines of Shona-Ndebele ethnicities (which are more of social constructs than common genealogical ethnic groups) as the process became entangled in ethnic tensions and violence of the 1980s, complaints of marginalisation as well as low-intensity rivalries which continue unabated, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni puts it. Some people find this uncomfortable to discuss, but that is Zimbabwe's current reality which cannot be wished away. Yet amid all this the Lobengula mystery remains unresolved and perhaps will never be. It is conventionally presumed that Lobengula died in late 1893 or early 1894; there is no certainty, however, and there is a strong belief that he had crossed the Zambezi River and found refuge among Zambian Paramount Chief Mpezeni's Ngoni people who shared the same Nguni origins with him. Mpezeni is a descendant of Zwangendaba Jele who left present-day KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa around the same time as Soshangane Nxumalo and Mzilikazi Khumalo in the 1820s at the height of Mfecane, times of trouble triggered by Zulu King Shaka's empire-building wars. Zwangendaba went as far as Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania via some parts of Zimbabwe; Soshangane into Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe; and Mzilikazi into south-western Zimbabwe via Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia. There are many hypotheses of how Lobengula died. Colonial administrators and scholars say he was killed soon after the Battle of Pupu, the Shangani Patrol or Wilson Patrol on 4 December 1893 where British imperial forces were annihilated by the General Mtshane Khumalo-commanded Imbizo regiment, Lobengula's last line of defence. Some Western scholars say he committed suicide; others say he died of smallpox and yet some claim he was killed after the historic battle officially monumentalised by government last week in Lupane, Matabeleland North province. Ndebele folklore in general simply says he "disappeared", some people say he died in Binga under Chief Pashu Sianganza in the Sanjana hills in desperate flight, but the now dominant theory — which was given new life by a government delegation which went to Zambia on an exploratory mission recently — is that he died in Chipata in eastern Zambia under Mpezeni and was buried at Sanjika Cave in line with Ndebele customs. None of the stories are new, but they keep on coming back, sometimes repackaged and persuasive. Renowned historian or rather storyteller Pathisa Nyathi recently led a delegation comprising the Khumalo clan and government officials to Zambia on a fact-finding mission. President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who claims his great grandfather Mbengo fought at the legendary Battle of Pupu, funded the trip. The delegation claims to have found that Lobengula lived among the Ngoni people under Mpezeni after the collapse of the Ndebele State upon colonial invasion in 1890, leading to the Anglo-Ndebele War in 1893. From that trip, the delegation claims the feisty Ndebele monarch took four months to reach Zambia after the Battle of Pupu, where he settled among Mpezeni's people in Chipata, about 100km from Malawi's border. They say his escape and exfiltration of present-day Zimbabwe was aided and abetted by Chief Pashu, who helped him cross the mighty Zambezi River into Zambia. They claim Lobengula's escorts decoyed colonial pursuers by killing Magwegwe Fuyana, his prime minister in current governance parlance, and placing his artifacts on his purported grave to hoodwink them into believing he had died. Forever determined to unravel that story, Nyathi on 22 March, accompanied by Lobengula's descendent, Midard Khumalo, former Matabeleland South provincial administrator, National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe researcher Dr Senzeni Khumalo, and Deputy Chief Secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet in Charge of Social Service, Reverend Paul Damasane, embarked on the fact-finding mission to Zambia to ascertain Lobengula's fate. Zimbabwe's ambassador to Zambia Charity Charamba and her counterpart representing the country in Malawi Dr Nancy Saungweme facilitated some engagements, particularly meeting Mpezeni who is said to have confirmed Lobengula lived with them, died and was buried there. "Beyond Pupu, what happened to the King? That is the question that we need to answer," said Nyathi, as he chronicled to the state-controlled Chronicle newspaper how Lobengula sought refuge among the Ngoni people and died there. "The King never disappeared, but crossed the Zambezi River and settled in Chipata after four months and he lived with the Ngoni people for four years. So, when we arrived they confirmed they knew King Lobengula. "They told us they were disappointed because we came too late, when the people who actually saw him had already passed on. King Lobengula died in 1897." Nyathi said they established Lobengula was laid to rest at Sanjika Cave. He said Mpezeni's people also showed them the site where Lobengula was buried, although they only ended 800 metres away. "But even when he died, the exact spot was kept a closely guarded secret but to some of us that is not a problem. Some cultures will use archaeology, others will use geo-physical surveys and Africans do these things their own way," Nyathi said. Now, there are several issues which emerge out of this new assertion by Nyathi's delegation claiming to have resolved a 131-year historical mystery. To start with, Nyathi — who is a great storyteller of Ndebele history — and his delegation never found any new evidence at all to warrant their vague conclusion and noise to have resolved the Lobengula mystery. They never even saw the site where Lobengula was allegedly buried. Assuming it was there, they stood 800 metres, almost a kilometre, away, making it impossible to see the cave where he was interred. Even with a pair of binoculars, they would not have seen the burial cave which is 131 years old from that distance. What Mpezeni and his people told them is not new. That narrative has been there for as long as the mystery existed. What is needed now is to scientifically and scholarly test that hypothesis and see if there is any truth in it at all. All these other theories also need to be tested through established scientific and scholarly research methods. The study of mysteries like Lobengula's fate falls under various disciplines, depending on the nature of the mystery itself. Some of the sub-fields and disciplines that engage in such research include detective or investigative approaches, although this is usually used in resolving criminal cases by gathering evidence, interviewing witnesses, and employing various techniques to unravel the truth behind a crime. Then there is archaeological research. Archaeologists explore ancient civilisations and study artifacts, ruins, and historical sites to understand and solve mysteries related to past cultures, their practices, and artifacts. Some investigators use scientific methods and tools to study and analyse reported paranormal events, which is another approach. Cryptozoologists study creatures that are rumoured or speculated to exist without scientific evidence. And then there are historians, who typically work in museums, archives, historical societies, and research organisations, who can study and analyse historical events, documents, and accounts to uncover and understand past mysteries. They often focus on unresolved historical questions, enigmatic figures, or unexplained phenomena from the past. Ndebele society, like many other societies, is full of those mysteries. Even simple things like who was Mzilikazi's mother have now become mysteries, with different stories, sometimes self-serving, told. For instance, some historians and the Ndiweni clan claim Mzilikazi's mother was from their Amangwe sub-ethnic group, while the common historical trope is that she was Zwide kaLanga's daughter Nompethu. Studying mysteries requires a curious and open mind, credible hypotheses, critical thinking skills, research and investigative capacity, and a willingness to explore beyond the known. In this case, the problem with this new claim is that Nyathi has always believed, as shown by his writings and pronouncements, that Lobengula fled to Mpezeni and died there. So Nyathi simply led the delegation on a self-fulfilling prophecy errand, not a scholarly or scientific research mission. The end result: Lobengula's fate mystery deepens and remains unresolved. — The NewsHawks. Lobengula fate mystery deepens

NewsHawks Reframing Issues Page 41 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 TAFADZWANASHE MABHAUDHI DROUGHT disasters in southern Africa are mainly attributed to a lack of preparedness, inadequate response and mitigation and poor risk reduction measures. With little to no preparation for drought disasters, such as the failure of the staple maize crop, the only option after the disaster hits is delayed relief action. Because of climate change, the El Niño-induced impacts on southern Africa — dry spells, low and erratic rainfall and elevated temperatures, and floods — are becoming more intense and prolonged. These are well-studied and can be mitigated by taking proactive measures. The looming crises are real and require immediate intervention. But governments in southern Africa often act only when events unfold. They focus on reactive post-disaster recovery, often supported by the international community. This is why impoverished communities in the region are repeatedly exposed to natural disasters. The current El Niño phase, which has caused drought in the region, was announced at the end of 2022. From the onset, it was predicted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to be a strong El Niño with likely impacts on food production, water scarcity and public health. Southern Africa depends heavily on agriculture for food and livelihood options, which makes it highly vulnerable to El Niño.  Climate experts urged the region to be prepared. As a professor of climate change, food systems and health, I believe that the impacts of remaining unprepared for disasters such as those caused by El Niño will be severe for children, women, the elderly and other vulnerable groups. Research has also shown that repeated exposure to disasters by the same vulnerable communities exposes them to mental health problems, such as depression. The region is poorly prepared because governments do not invest enough in weather monitoring, and they lack comprehensive strategies to prepare for disasters. Government disaster policies are often incoherent and information is not communicated. There is a need to be clearer about who does what and coordinate preparations for disasters better. Southern Africa’s ability to cope with natural disasters In southern African countries, there are low adaptive capacity and high vulnerability levels. Low adaptive capacity refers to people’s or a system’s ability to cope and adjust to changes such as those caused by climate change.  Poverty and inequality  — a feature of the region — leave people less able to cope with climate change impacts and more vulnerable to harm. Across the region, the number of weather stations has been declining for more than 24 years. Where they exist, they tend to be old and outdated, reducing the region’s ability to monitor weather changes. This means there is a lack of real-time and long-term data for developing early warning systems and early action capability, which in turn means that southern African governments react to disasters, such as flash floods, only after they occur. There are other problems too. Limited proactive disaster risk reduction strategies and the failure of governments to invest in climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies means that southern African countries have less resilience against natural disasters. Policy incoherence is another problem. Policies meant to achieve similar goals are developed in isolation from each other, with divergent objectives and action plans that are not well implemented. For example, about 54% of surface weather stations in Africa are outdated and  unable to capture accurate weather data. Finally, the countries lack appropriate ways to communicate well in advance to people that floods or droughts are coming. For example, information is often communicated via social media, which is inaccessible to most people in rural areas. A lack of effective response capabilities compounds this, where disaster management officials lack the equipment and trained persons to help affected communities cope with an emergency or a disaster. How to prepare The reality of climate change is that the frequency and intensity of  extreme weather events  are increasing. Given this reality, what can countries do to build preparedness, anticipation, early warning, and action so that they are not always “unprepared”? El Niño affects water, food and energy supplies. It can cause health and environmental disasters. Therefore, greater coordination and collaboration across water, energy, food, environment and health sectors and across governments is needed. Southern Africa needs integrated proactive disaster response strategies and implementation plans that define the actions to be taken, by whom, and when. The plans must make it clear who has responsibility for coordinating responses to disasters. Water, energy, food, environment and health sectors need to work together to come up with joint plans and decisions to manage the risk of disasters. Early warning systems for all  are needed. These include sending effective information about the climate changes to everyone involved; proactive disaster response; and disaster management plans from farmer to country level. This also includes providing agricultural advisories to farmers so they can take early action. To achieve this, governments and the private sector must prioritise climate action in development plans. Together, they will need to allocate enough funding to enable weather offices to monitor, predict disasters and issue early warnings. Additionally, equipment and capacity development is needed to upskill people involved in disaster management, including extension workers, to be able to receive warnings, translate them and help affected communities to manage disasters. — The Conversation. *About the writer: Tafadzwanashe Mabhaudhi is professor of climate change, food systems and health in the Centre on Climate Change and Planetary Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Britain. El Niño disasters: Governments know what’s coming, but are unprepared – what must change El Niño droughts are becoming regular features in southern Africa. Image: Bloomberg

Page 42 Reframing Issues NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 THOMAS MANDRUP The Southern African Development Community (Sadc) military mission in Mozambique  (Samim), which was deployed on 15 July 2021 to fight the Islamic insurgents terrorising the northern Cabo Delgado province since 2017, is scheduled to end by June 2024. Mozambican security forces will then take full responsibility for security. We asked military science and defence expert Thomas Mandrup, who has published a paper on the situation after a recent ground visit, to evaluate the mission. Why did the military mission in Mozambique intervene? The jihadist insurgency by the group now calling itself Al Sunnah had been spreading rapidly in the Cabo Delgado province  from late 2019. Sadc member states had been putting pressure on the Mozambican government to allow a regional military intervention to prevent the insurgency from spreading in the region. Their fear was that Islamic State (Isis), to which the extremists are affiliated, would get a bridgehead from which they could expand their operations. More than  850 000 civilians  had been forced to flee their homes after violent attacks by the extremists. The insurgency caused the suspension of a US$60 billion investment in a liquefied natural gas project led by multinational energy giants TotalEnergies, ENI and Exxon. The hope had been that the development would drive local, national and regional economic growth. The Sadc decided to deploy a combined force of 2 210 troops. The mission is dominated by a South African contingent of 1 495 soldiers. Other troops come from Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia and Angola. The thinking was that they would eliminate the Al-Sunnah presence in its area of operation. How successful was the mission? What were the challenges? The Sadc military mission had several main strategic objectives: • neutralising the extremists • assisting the  Mozambique Defence Armed Forces  in planning and undertaking operations • training and advising the Mozambique forces. The Sadc member states also planned to supplement the military efforts with humanitarian aid and even development projects to sustain the progress made by the mission. An internal assessment report was presented at the July 2023 meeting of the then Sadc leadership troika (Zambia, Namibia and South Africa). It concluded that the Sadc mission had achieved its objective of reducing the insurgents’ capacity and assisting the Mozambican military. In addition, 570 000 internally displaced people had returned to their homes by August 2023, as the security situation had improved. However, since the second half of 2023, the number of attacks has increased, leading to a rise in the number of displaced people. Samim has found it difficult to fulfil its mandate of training the Mozambican force because they couldn’t identify their training needs. The development and humanitarian efforts have been limited at best. The assessment report also concluded that the mission had suffered because it was never given the capabilities outlined in the initial Sadc pre-mission report of April 2021. Firstly, the force was smaller than initially recommended. It never went beyond 2 200, a far cry from the mandated 2 900. The mission lacked numbers and capabilities in terms of air, naval and ground assets. Lack of funding was key to the mission’s limited size and capabilities. Secondly, coordination and joint operations with the Rwandan forces, which had been deployed in July 2021, the Sadc force and the Mozambican security forces have been problematic. For example, they had different communication equipment and the soldiers spoke different languages. Thirdly, intelligence gathering capabilities were weak. Insufficient information before operations commenced increased the danger to troops and civilians. Fourth, intelligence and operational information was frequently leaked to the extremists. What lessons can be learnt from the operation? An outside intervening force must have the full backing of the host nation. And it must understand the area and situation it’s being deployed into. The Mozambican government and military have not always worked with the mission. Seemingly hidden agendas, or different priorities, have hampered the mission. The Mozambican government’s delayed and timid response to the growth of the insurgency from its beginning raises a number of questions: • why was its response so slow and insufficient? • why did it oppose regional involvement for so long? • why has the Sadc mission at times found it difficult to strike at the core of the insurgents? The difficult political situation in the capital, Maputo, notably factional battles inside the governing  Frelimo  and the fallout over the huge 2013-2014  Tuna bonds corruption scandal, hampered the mission. During my recent fieldwork several interviewees even suggested that a faction of Frelimo had at times supported the insurgents. In addition, strong personal, political and economic interests affected operational realities. Frelimo has strong ties to the region going back to the war of independence against Portugal, and later the civil war between Renamo and Frelimo. The cleavages from the civil war have never been really solved and are still visible. It was clear that the Mozambican government didn’t have a clear plan to address the many causes of conflict. For example, it did not understand why the insurgency had attracted support from large sections of the local population. Many people living in Cabo Delgado view the Mozambican state as removed from their everyday realities. Some even see the government as illegitimate and the cause of their suffering. An effective stabilisation effort needs various interventions – military, socioeconomic and political – to resolve the difficult conditions people are living under. The Sadc mission was starved of the capabilities and numbers needed to be an effective fighting force. The local population considered it less effective than, for instance, the Rwandan force, which was also better equipped and trained. What needs to happen Insurgency activities are once again  on the rise in Cabo Delgado. The risk is that the extremists will once again take a stronger foothold there since the issues that led to the conflict in the first place remain unresolved. The Sadc mission shows how difficult and costly it is to launch and run a large scale military operation, especially if the host government is not taking full ownership and supporting the operation. The Sadc operation can only create “space” for the political solutions to be found. In addition, the Mozambican government and its security force have shown only limited signs of improved capacity. It is uncertain that they are ready to take over the full responsibility for security after June 2024, when the Sadc soldiers leave. — The Conversation. *About the interviewee: Thomas Mandrup is associate professor, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership In Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Jihadism in Mozambique: Southern African forces are leaving with mixed results South African soldiers await instructions to jump.

ALBERT RUDATSIMBURWA SOME days ago, Rwanda’s High Court rejected Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza’s appeal to be rehabilitated from past convictions of terrorism and genocide denial. She was hoping to be eligible to run in the forthcoming July presidential elections. Nowhere has a court decision come under more attack than among Western media and commentators. They decided to consider it as a “political” ruling from a court of justice because they see Ingabire as “the main opposition politician”. Every news cast I read or saw about the story was only citing Western commentators or eventually Rwandans who were introduced as opposition in exile. What Rwandans in Rwanda thought about it was apparently not worth consideration. Or is it because Ingabire is primarily a “Western mediatic product”? So, who is Ingabire in the real world, outside the pages and studios of Western news organisations? One cannot discuss Rwandan politics without considering the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi. Despite the fact that it has been called “the last genocide of the 20th century”, many Westerners still read it as “tribal war”. Of course, none of them would think of the Holocaust as tribal war. The Jews who were the victims of the Nazi in Germany were Germans and had always been just as much as their fellow Christian citizens and persecutors. After the war and the defeat of the Nazi, no one in the Western world would have advocated to remember the fallen Nazi as victims during Holocaust commemorations, and neither would have anyone tried to push or accept the “neo-Nazi” agenda inside the Bundestag even 30 years after the Holocaust. Not even today. The Tutsi who were the targets and the victims of the genocide in Rwanda were also Rwandans and had always been, like the perpetrators. Just like the Jews were marked with a yellow star of David, so were the Tutsi marked with their IDs. They were also listed from where they lived, worked, or studied, by the state and local administration. But who is Ingabire? Ingabire was born in a family of genocidaires, both her father and mother were notorious for this. The latter was known to have smashed newborns’ heads on the wall and killing pregnant women. Being born into a PARMEHUTU (The Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement) family, the ideology of genocide was tradition. The succeeding governments had since independence adopted a kind of “apartheid” ideology and built a segregated society in which “Hutu” had all rights while Tutsi were second-class citizens in all fields from education to labour force, together with complete political exclusion. The Tutsi lived in their home country Rwanda with the threat of being exterminated. Although Ingabire is, of course, not the only offspring of planners and perpetrators of genocide. It is to be stressed that the post-genocide government has emphasised that crime, including the crime of genocide lies with the individual who commits it. And, mindful of how difficult it is likely to be for such children, they have been given support they needed to come to terms with their family history, and there has been an effective awareness campaign to make sure they don’t suffer from any stigma. Yet, inevitably, some choose to follow in their parents’ footsteps and Ingabire is one of them. She was not in Rwanda during the genocide against the Tutsi, but she joined the defeated genocidaire forces in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), as soon as 1995. In the refugee camp of Mugunga in eastern Congo, the defeated military of the former Rwandan army with the Interahamwe militias as also the exiled politicians organised a congress and created the “RDR” party (Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Retour) with notorious military and civil genocidaires as founders, such as Theoneste Bagosora, the chief organiser of the killings who was sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to 35 years in prison for more than five counts of genocide including rape, murder, and outrages on human dignity. Ingabire was chosen to become the first president of the party on 3 April 1995. She hadn’t been present during the genocide against the Tutsi and wouldn’t therefore have to fear any international prosecutorial procedures against her, unlike the majority of the “founding fathers”. Ten years after, the RDR had morphed into the FDLR and had restarted their terror in Eastern DRC, and the political wing was named FDU-Inkingi, with Ingabire remaining their leader. All along, her “political” itinerary, Ingabire remained in close relation with genocidaire armed groups. She was named in different UN Group of Experts Reports on DRC in relationship with the infamous FDLR. She eventually travelled back to Rwanda in 2010 after 16 years. Although she hadn’t been a media star prior to her return, she was suddenly making so many headlines in Western media. The dramatic perspectives immediately introduced her as a mother who tore herself away from her eightyear-old son to travel miles away to a country she hadn’t lived in for almost two decades, to run for the presidency. The lead narrative was that of a “presidential candidate” and “top opposition politician,” even before she submitted her candidature to the electoral commission- which she never did, by the way. The international media kept the course as she herself didn’t refrain to self-incriminate with public criminal offences. At her arrival, she visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial and publicly requested that a similar memorial should be built for the “Hutu victims of crimes against humanity”. It would be like asking for a memorial for the fallen Germans killed by the Allies during the Second World War. This is in Rwanda a crime of genocide denial as it implies a rewriting of history that relegates the genocide to a “tribal war” with Hutu killing Tutsi but also Tutsi killing Hutu. The theory, invented by the perpetrators and supporters, the “double genocide” theory, which is in fact the denial of the genocide, is the last stage of the 10 stages that define genocide. Meanwhile, the number two in in her party, Joseph Ntawangundi, who accompanied her on her return, was tried and found guilty after he confessed on his participation in the genocide. He had already been sentenced in absentia. Despite his confession, the first one to cry foul when he was arrested was Ingabire. She had said that she and her assistant were targeted by the government for political reasons. She would later get arrested herself a few months later. During Ingabire’s trial, the prosecution provided evidence of her complicity with anti-Rwanda terror groups from Rwanda’s and Dutch investigation. The evidence, part of which was found at her home in the Netherlands, includes money transfers to FDLR leaders and signed resolutions with the same terrorist group to create a new armed group, with a mission to topple the Rwandan government. She was convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison, but this sentence was increased to 15 years on appeal. In 2018, she was granted a presidential pardon after writing a letter begging for pardon to President Paul Kagame. This pardon was not a unique favour for her alone. She was pardoned with 2 000 other detainees who had asked for the same. In fact, this is an annual presidential prerogative. Despite the past conviction, Ingabire kept spreading genocide propaganda, but carefully selecting her words to avoid another trial. Besides this, she understood very well that by positioning herself as a political leader, the West would actually believe that. She had a symbiotic relationship with the Western media that was desperate of trying to support “democratic” transition in post-genocide Rwanda. Ingabire has managed to masquerade behind local YouTube channels and the Western media as a changed woman, but she kept her toxic extremist ideas about Rwanda and its leadership. Since FDU-Inkingi was indicated in the P5 terrorist group operating in the DRC by the UN Group of Experts, she renamed it to DALFA-Umurinzi. In reality, the manifesto remains the same as the former and the RDR created in the jungle. Nevertheless, one fact remains. From the time she had been sentenced for terrorism and genocide denial, she can never be eligible for running for presidency in any lawful country. But opinion leaders and makers are “surprised” that her request for rehabilitation was denied by the court. The West’s desperation to find alternative leadership for Rwanda leads to their understanding that they are ready to embrace genocide deniers and the re-introduction of genocide ideology in Rwanda’s politics. This would have never happened with Germany. Ingabire remains the “de facto” leader of the unrepentant genocidaires that have been evading justice for three decades. Giving her the status of “prominent opposition leader” is de facto embracing the ideology of those genocidaires. The obsession of term limits and change has pushed Western opinion makers to indulge grave criminality like genocide denial and advocate to allow even those who promote genocide ideology as the democratic alternative. Isn’t this pure racism? If the West really thinks a former convict of terrorism and genocide denial is eligible to run for the presidency, then let them practice that in their countries. In Rwanda, such a person belongs in prison. *About the writer: Albert Rudatsimburwa is a Rwandan journalist and political commentator. NewsHawks Africa News Page 43 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 How Victoire Ingabire is synonymous with the genocide and why the West cheers her on Victoire Ingabire

CATARINA DEMONY Summary • Africa and Caribbean join forces in fight for reparations • African Union to draw up its own white paper on reparations • Leaders consider push for special tribunal on slavery • US to decide on a tribunal when "developed and established" SUPPORT is building among Africa and Caribbean nations for the creation of an international tribunal on atrocities dating to the transatlantic trade of enslaved people, with the United States backing a UN panel at the heart of the effort. A tribunal, modelled on other adhoc courts such as the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals after World War Two, was proposed last year. It has now gained traction within a broader slavery reparations movement, Reuters reporting based on interviews with a dozen people reveals. Formally recommended in June by the U.N. Permanent Forum on People of African Descent, the idea of a special tribunal has been explored further at African and Caribbean regional bodies, said Eric Phillips, a vice-chair of the slavery reparations commission for the Caribbean Community, Caricom, which groups 15 member states. The scope of any tribunal has not been determined but the UN Forum recommended in a preliminary report that it should address reparations for enslavement, apartheid, genocide, and colonialism. Advocates, including within Caricom and the African Union (AU), which groups 55 nations across the continent, are working to build wider backing for the idea among UN members, Phillips said. A special UN tribunal would help establish legal norms for complex international and historical reparations claims, its supporters say. Opponents of reparations argue, among other things, that contemporary states and institutions should not be held responsible for historical slavery. Even its supporters recognise that establishing an international tribunal for slavery will not be easy. There are "huge obstacles," said Martin Okumu-Masiga, secretary-general of the Africa Judges and Jurists Forum (AJJF), which is providing reparations-related advice to the AU. Hurdles include obtaining the cooperation of nations that were involved in the trade of enslaved people and the legal complexities of finding responsible parties and determining remedies. "These things happened many years ago and historical records and evidence can be challenging to access and even verify," Okumo-Masiga said. Unlike the Nuremberg trials, nobody directly involved in transatlantic slavery is alive. Asked about the idea of a tribunal, a spokesperson for the British Foreign Office acknowledged the country's role in transatlantic slavery, but said it had no plan to pay reparations. Instead, past wrongs should be tackled by learning lessons from history and tackling "today's challenges," the spokesperson said. However, advocates for reparations say Western countries and institutions that continue to benefit from the wealth slavery generated should be held accountable, particularly given ongoing legacies of racial discrimination. A tribunal would help establish an "official record of history," said Brian Kagoro, a Zimbabwean lawyer who has been advocating for reparations for over two decades. Racism, impoverishment and economic underdevelopment are linked to the longstanding consequences of transatlantic slavery from the United States to Europe and the African continent, according to UN studies. "These legacies are alive and well," said Clive Lewis, a British Labour MP and a descendant of people enslaved in the Caribbean nation of Grenada. Black people "live in poorer and more polluted areas, they have worse diets, they have worse educational outcomes... because structural racism is embedded deep." Nigeria in favour The proposal for a tribunal was discussed in November at a reparations summit in Ghana attended by African and Caribbean leaders. The Ghana summit ended with a commitment to explore judicial routes, including "litigation options". Africa's most populous nation, Nigeria, is in favour of the push for a tribunal, Foreign minister Yusuf Tuggar told Reuters in February, saying the country would support the idea "until it becomes a reality." In Grenada, where hundreds of thousands were enslaved, Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell is "in full support," a spokesperson said, describing the tribunal as a Caricom-led initiative. Phillips said the work to establish a tribunal would have to take place through the United Nations system and include conversations with countries, including Portugal, Britain, France, Spain, Netherlands and Denmark, that were involved in trading enslaved people to the Caribbean and other regions. Reuters could not establish how many countries in Africa and the Caribbean were likely to support the idea. Among the tribunal's most vocal advocates is Justin Hansford, a Howard University law professor backed by the US State Department to serve at the UN Forum. He said the idea will be discussed at the forum's third session, starting 16 April, due to be attended by 50 or more nations. Hansford then plans to travel to Africa to lobby for further support, with the goal of raising the proposal with stronger backing during the UN General Assembly in September, he told Reuters. "A lot of my work now is to try to help make it a reality," he said of the tribunal, saying it could take three to five years to get it off the ground. Phillips said the goal was to garner enough support by 2025. The United States, which has financed the UN Forum, "will make a decision on the tribunal when it has been developed and established," a US State Department spokesperson said. "However, the United States strongly supports" the forum's work, the spokesperson added. Regarding reparations, "the complexity of the issue, legal challenges, and differing perspectives among Caribbean nations present significant challenges," the spokesperson said. The UN leadership has now come out in support for reparations, which have been used in other circumstances to offset large moral and economic debts, such as to Japanese Americans interned by the United States during World War Two and to families of Holocaust survivors. "We call for reparatory justice frameworks, to help overcome generations of exclusion and discrimination," UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres said on 25 March, in his most direct public comments yet on the issue. Guterres' office did not respond to a request for comment about a possible tribunal. "No country with a legacy of enslavement, the trade in enslaved Africans, or colonialism has fully reckoned with the past, or comprehensively accounted for the impacts on the lives of people of African descent today," said Liz Throssell, spokesperson for the UN Human Rights office, in response to a question about the tribunal. The Netherlands apologised for its role in transatlantic slavery last year and announced a roughly US$200 million fund to address that past. A spokesperson for the foreign ministry said it was not aware of the discussions around a tribunal and could not respond to questions. The French government declined to comment. The governments of Portugal, Spain and Denmark did not respond to requests for comment. Claimants and defendants The push for a tribunal stems in part from a belief that claims need to be enshrined in a legal framework, said Okumu-Masiga, of the Africa Judges and Jurists Forum. Several institutions, including the European Union, have concluded that transatlantic slavery was a crime against humanity. After the 1940s Nuremberg trials, the UN formalised the structure of special tribunals — criminal courts set up on an ad-hoc basis to investigate serious international crimes, such as crimes against humanity. The UN has since established two: one to prosecute those responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide and another to prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals were established by the UN Security Council, however the International Criminal Court, another international UN tribunal, was founded through a General Assembly resolution, a possible route for a slavery reparations tribunal, Hansford said. Okumu-Masiga said affected countries, descendents of enslaved people and indigenous groups could be potential claimants, while defendants could include nations and institutions with historic links to slavery or even descendants of enslavers. An international tribunal is not the only judicial path available. At a summit of Caribbean countries in February this year, the gathered prime ministers and presidents proposed working with the AU to request an ICJ advisory legal opinion on reparations through the UN General Assembly, a source familiar with the matter at Caricom said. Makmid Kamara, founder of the Accra-based civil society group Reforms Initiatives that works with the AU on reparatory justice, said decisions on which route to take would be made based on that advisory by the ICJ. Reparations movement From the 15th to the late 19th century, at least 12.5 million enslaved Africans were forcibly transported by mainly European but also US and Brazilian-flagged ships and sold into slavery. Before pushing for the abolition of slavery, Britain transported an estimated 3.2 million people, the most active European country after Portugal, which enslaved nearly 6 million. Those who survived the brutal voyage ended up toiling on plantations under inhumane conditions in the Americas, mostly in Brazil, the Caribbean and the United States, while others profited from their labour. Calls for reparations started with enslaved people themselves. "They ran away, they raised their voices in songs of protests, they fought wars of resistance," said Verene A. Sheperd, director of the centre for reparation research at the University of West Indies. The movement later garnered support from quarters as varied as US civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. and the Caribbean's Rastafarians. In the past year, some of the world's largest institutions have added their voices. Ghana led efforts to get African support for formally pursuing reparations, with Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa also taking up the cause, said Kamara. Most discussion has focused on transatlantic trafficking, Hansford and Phillips said, rather than the older trans-Saharan trade to the Islamic world, estimated to have transported several million enslaved Africans. What reparations would consist of in practice is debated. Some, including in the United States, have pushed for individual payments to descendants of enslaved people. Caricom, in a 2014 plan, called for debt cancellation and support from European nations to tackle public health and economic crises. The AU decision to join Caricom has given new heft to the campaign, said Jasmine Mickens, a US- based strategist for social movements who specialises in reparations. The AU is now developing Africa's own white paper on what reparations might look like, said Okumu-Masiga. "We have a global community behind this message," said Mickens, who attended the Ghana event. "That's something this movement has never seen before." Page 44 Africa News NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Slavery Tribunal? Africa and Caribbean unite on reparations A protester holds a sign during a rally to demand that the United Kingdom make reparations for slavery, ahead of a visit to Jamaica by the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge as part of their tour of the Caribbean, outside the British High Commission, in Kingston, Jamaica March 22, 2022. Image: Reuters

NewsHawks Africa News Page 45 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 CLIMATE crisis has far-reaching consequences beyond the environment, significantly impacting the psychological well-being of individuals worldwide. The association between climate change and extreme weather events, as well as environmental disruptions, can trigger a range of mental health disorders. It is important to recognize that climate change is primarily driven by human activities that release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. These activities encompass various actions such as burning fossil fuels, deforestation, industrial processes, agricultural and livestock practices, land use changes and waste management. The cumulative effects of these activities lead to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, resulting in the trapping of heat and subsequent global warming and climate-related phenomena. The effects of climate change are not limited to specific regions; even countries like Zimbabwe have witnessed shifts in weather patterns in recent years. These changes have necessitated the implementation of various mitigation measures to cope with the challenges. By being aware of the potential mental health issues associated with climate change, we can navigate ways to promote resilience, adaptation and offer robust social support in the face of this global challenge. This article aims to delve into the psychological impact of climate change and shed light on the various mental health consequences. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Climate-related disasters such as cyclones, floods, droughts, wildfires and hurricanes result in significant loss of loved ones and personal belongings. The grief associated with this kind of loss can be very traumatic and contribute to the development of PTSD. PTSD causes disruption in daily functioning and strains relationships. Depending on the frequency and intensity of the weather events, survivors often develop different symptoms which can be grouped into four categories, namely avoidance, negative alterations in cognition and mood, intrusion and alterations in arousal and reactivity. It is of paramount importance to note that the duration and severity of these symptoms differ from one individual to another. There are also risk factors that increase the likelihood of PTSD after a traumatic experience. History of previous trauma, inadequate or lack of social support and the presence of additional stressors are some of them. Survivors of climate change disasters are recommended to seek professional help such as psychotherapy and medication in order to get effective and appropriate treatment. Depression The disturbances that come as a result of climate crisis may be too hard for some individuals to accept and live with. Natural disasters, extreme weather events and changes in temperatures or rainfall patterns have a psychological bearing on humankind. The loss of livelihoods and familiar landscapes, areas becoming uninhabitant resulting in forced migration lead to hopelessness and grief. Displacements often cause family disintegration, social disconnection, loss of identity and a diminished sense of well-being. For people who are deeply connected to nature, experiencing the destruction of ecosystems and witnessing other species becoming extinct can stimulate feelings of sadness which contribute to depression. In addition, climate change also contributes to scarcity, impacting the availability of goods and resources. The scarcity can be that of food, water, energy, natural resources and livable land. Being exposed to all this tends to make people depressed. These people often show depressive symptoms such as persistent sadness, losing interest in activities that were once enjoyable, fatigue, changes in sleep patterns, difficulties in concentrating, suicide ideation, engaging in self-harm activities, restlessness and irritability. It is advisable for an individual to seek help if the symptoms persist for at least two or more weeks and there is significant interference with daily functioning. Eco-anxiety It is common for any individual to be worried whenever there is a disruption or change in the climate that one believes to be normal or familiar with. In recent years, climate change has been rife, consequently affecting people’s mental health. Due to the climate crisis, many people experience chronic fear, prolonged distress, worry and preoccupations about the future and this is termed eco-anxiety. Some people may feel overwhelmed by probable long-term consequences of climate change. The causes and triggers of eco-anxiety include witnessing or experiencing the impact of weather events which can be land degradation, loss or threats to human life and disturbances of ecosystems among other things. Media coverage on climate-related disasters and scientific reports coupled with lack of control are also major contributors. Different coping strategies can help to manage and alleviate eco-anxiety. These include getting social support, practicing self-care, seeking professional help and setting boundaries on media consumption. Substance-related and addictive disorders The climate crisis can contribute to a wide range of negative impacts, including environmental disruptions, property damage, increased stress levels, job losses and reduced agricultural productivity which can ultimately lead to malnutrition. In the face of such calamities, some individuals may turn to drug and substance abuse as a coping mechanism to temporarily escape the harsh realities they are facing. However, it is important to recognize that these behaviors are detrimental and provide only temporary relief. Substance-related and addictive disorders encompass various forms, such as alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, stimulant use disorder, opioid use disorder, sedative, hypnotic, hallucinogen use disorder and tobacco use disorder. Engaging in substance abuse can have adverse effects on individuals’ lives. They may withdraw from social activities and experience a sense of alienation from their surroundings and relationships. Moreover, substance and alcohol abuse can impair judgment, cognitive functioning and impulse control. These cognitive impairments can further exacerbate the negative consequences of climate change by hindering individuals’ ability to make informed decisions and adapt to changing circumstances effectively. Conclusion The climate crisis poses not only an environmental tragedy but also a substantial threat to the psychological well-being of individuals and communities. It is imperative to acknowledge and address the psychological dimensions of climate change in order to develop comprehensive and inclusive strategies that effectively mitigate and adapt to its effects. By integrating mental health considerations into climate change policies, supporting initiatives that foster resilience and cultivating community support networks, we can aim to safeguard and promote the psychological well-being of individuals amidst the rapid changes occurring in our world. *About the writer: Tsitsi Kunonga is a Master of Science (counselling psychology) student at Great Zimbabwe University. Psychological toll of climate change: Effects of climate change on mental health Tsitsi Kunonga Engaging in substance abuse can have adverse effects on individuals’ lives.

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STYLE TRAVEL BOOKS ARTS MOTORING Porsche just got angrier Being a Fashion Model Life&Style Page 47 Issue 172, 29 March 2024 JONATHAN MBIRIYAMVEKA FIRST LADY Auxillia Mnangagwa was recently presented with a fake Dominic Benhura sculpture at the popular Cookout Showcase at the University of Zimbabwe. Tourism and Hospitality Industry minister Barbara Rwodzi, who was the guest, received the sculptures on behalf of Mnangagwa on 19 March 2024 at the University of Zimbabwe. The poor imitation, done by an anonymous sculptor, depicts a mother and her child. It was originally done by the world-renowned Zimbabwean sculptor Benhura, but this imitation–with the faces and arms–betrays the original work. Benhura’s masterpieces are adored worldwide for his signature symmetry and style that does not reproduce his subjects in exact images. He has pursued creative imagination art for many decades. When he does pieces of people and wildlife, Benhura creates unidentifiable forms, but does not refine them like other artists. This is the style that has seen him touring many countries and exhibiting in some of the world’s largest galleries. Contacted for comment, Benhura said it was unfair to gift the First Lady with counterfeit work. “It's a bad copy, even the finishing says it all,” Benhura said. “It is a definite fake. Well, I feel it is wrong for whoever initiated that to give the mother of the nation a fake stone.” Fake Benhura work has flooded the resort town of Victoria Falls as con artists mass produce some of his masterpieces to earn a quick buck. For Benhura is takes months to produce one sculpture and, even then, he does not replicate his pieces but evolve with each sculpture and theme. Informed art collectors who visit Victoria Falls are having to contact Benhura first before they buy fake stones. Piracy in stone sculpture has become rampant with con artists eking out a living in copying art produced by world-renowned sculptors, the likes of Benhura and Lazarus Takawira. Zimbabwe will host the first-ever UN Tourism Africa Gastronomy Showcase from 26 to 28 July 2024 in Victoria Falls. It was through the efforts of the First Lady that Zimbabwe was given the opportunity to host it. In addition to this, UN Tourism also availed scholarships to 100 students in the field of tourism.  Zimbabwe was given the opportunity to build a UN Tourism Academy for the Sadc region in Victoria Falls. This is meant to enhance the tourism and culinary skills for students. The Traditional Cookout programme is a concept which was introduced by Mrs Mnangagwa. In 2023, the Cookout programme was elevated further to Sadc Regional Gastronomy competitions and the inaugural event was successfully held in Masvingo with eight countries participating: Zimbabwe, Botswana, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi and Nigeria. Many countries including Spain, Italy, China and France use gastronomy as a major driver of their economies. Ultimately, that is what Zimbabwe is aiming at, to be the gastronomy powerhouse in Africa. According to UN Tourism (2023) statistics, tourism generated US$1.4 trillion in revenue globally whilst spending on food-related activities is estimated to account for 40% of global tourism expenditure. First Lady Auxillia Mnangagwa presented with fake Benhura sculpture Left dominic benhira original piece and right a Fake piece

Page 48 People & Places Investigative journalism training seminar NewsHawks Issue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 PROMINENT Kenyan investigative journalist John-Allan Namu conducted a refresher course for mid-career Zimbabwean journalists, including few veterans, at Harare Polytechnic earlier this week. Namu took the journalists through the basics of investigative journalism, from hypothesis, justification, planning, source mapping, timelines, funding and writing, as well as packaging and distribution. He also engaged local journalists on the utility and pitfalls of social media. Social media platforms are essential for open source investigations due to their widespread use and real-time nature. They allow the collection and analysis of large volumes of user-generated data invaluable in investigative journalism. By using social media platforms such as X (Twitter), Facebook, and Instagram, journalists can gather valuable information on a particular subject or event under investigation. Yet journalists have to navigate through a minefield of rumours, unreliable information and lies to thoroughly verify authenticity of sources, newsmakers and details. This is increasingly becoming a huge problem, particularly with the advent or growing use of Artificial Intelligence tools, and deepfakes. Deepfake artificial intelligence technology is used to create convincing digital image, audio and video hoaxes. To overcome these challenges, journalists should employ robust investigative techniques and verification processes. Afterall, journalism is a discipline of verification. By cross-checking information from multiple sources, fact-checking, and using reliable tools, reporters can mitigate risks associated with information overload and misinformation, as well as disinformation. Namu covered these issues in detail during his presentation. The Kenyan is a multiple award-winning investigative journalist, trainer and moderator. He is CEO of Africa Uncensored, an investigative and in-depth journalism production house based in Nairobi, Kenya. Africa Uncensored’s ambition is to be the premier source of unique, important and incisive journalism. Prior to co-founding Africa Uncensored, he was the special projects editor at the Kenya Television Network, heading a team of the country’s best television investigative journalists. Funded by Swedish media institute, Fojo, whose mandate is to professionalise journalism through institutional and individual capacity building, the three-day training workshop, is facilitated by Namu, assisted by The NewsHawks managing editor Dumisani Muleya, a local award-winning investigative journalist, veteran journalist Tawanda Majoni, founder of Information for Development Trust, as well as Harare Polytechnic lecturers, including Terrence Antonio, Tatenda Chitagu and Admire Masuku, among others. It is attended by seasoned, mid-career and upcoming journalists from across different media houses and cities in the country.

LAST month, world football ruling body Fifa declined to answer a pertinent question posed by a Zimbabwean football website, which had written to enquire if the temporary leadership governing the country’s national association will have its term extended after it expires in June. It appeared to me like a straightforward question to respond to, so the non-committal tone of Fifa gives away strong hint: that the so-called normalisation committee (NC) of Zifa is likely to stay in office longer than its initially specified one-year tenure. There are quite a few indicators towards a new mandate for the NC’s head, Lincoln Mutasa, and his lieutenants. The one that sticks out is the snail's pace on the roadmap to the election of a new substantive executive of Zifa. Constitutional amendments, and the overhauling of domestic structures across the country, will determine whether Zimbabwe is ready to usher in new elected football leaders to replace the old Zifa board sacked over two years ago. Some three months away from this target, there has been little movement on that front, leaving Mutasa and his team likely to get the nod again from Zurich. If this scenario unfolds, it will of course come as a lifeline for the members of the NC and their close associates, because of the financial comfort that has been guaranteed by Fifa’s deep pockets over the past nine months they’ve been in control. But as much as it will boost bank accounts, an extension could turn out to be a poisoned chalice because of the ill-informed decisions the NC has made since it was first thrust into office by Fifa in July last year. The NC has flatly rejected rational decision-making during their current tenure, arguing rather thoughtlessly that as an interim committee they shouldn’t be making binding decisions as these will have a bearing on their eventual successors. The biggest mistake of the NC, so far, is the stubborn refusal to listen to sound advice after Baltemar Brito made a huge impression as Zimbabwe’s caretaker coach during last November’s World Cup qualifiers against Nigeria and Rwanda. For a knowledgeable coach who has been an assistant to no less a brilliant gaffer than José Mourinho at top European clubs, the refreshing early signs were evident in those two drawn matches four months ago that the Brazil-born Brito had established good chemistry with all the players that Zimbabwe is attempting to build a firm foundation on – both European-groomed and locally-based. There was little disagreement in Zimbabwe that Brito would, sooner than later, unlock the winning formula for this country if given time to continue with his exciting Warriors project. Alas, Brito and his assistants from Europe were told in no certain terms that their services were no longer required. Senselessly not for the reason that they had failed their test, but because Zimbabwean club giants Highlanders – the fulltime employer of Brito and his assistants – had chosen not to renew their contracts at the end of last year. With two important June World Cup qualifiers requiring methodical preparation under the guidance of a capable coach – and given Brito’s obvious ability – reasons by the NC why the ex-Porto and Chelsea trainer couldn’t be retained as national coach varied clumsily with each interrogation by reporters. But it was clear that the NC didn’t see what everybody else had seen in Brito because it is a committee stuck in the old ways of doing things, trapped in a past when it was okay to gather a national team squad on ad hoc basis every time, with a different set of coaches. We now can all see that the NC didn’t believe in the logic of having a substantive coach in place, four months before resumption of competitive action. Surely a national federation worth its salt cannot fail to see the value of such global practice – not in this professional era when international football coaches do so much more than selecting players or issue instructions on match-day. Evidently, modern-day football is alien to this NC. And now, the NC has created deeper problems for itself in trying to correct its own mistakes. Making Norman Mapeza the Warriors’ caretaker coach, for yet another spell in the coaching career of the former Zimbabwe captain, was a gamble that backfired badly at the recently-concluded four-nation tournament in Malawi. I wouldn’t put is past the NC that they had hoped for Mapeza to produce something special in Malawi so they could present him to the nation for June’s World Cup qualifiers. Re-appointing Mapeza for June’s crucial battles, had things gone according to plan in Lilongwe, would kind of make up for the Brito gaffe on the part of the NC. The Malawi trip has instead achieved the opposite effect and, frankly speaking – the NC knows – Mapeza can’t be the man in the Warriors dug-out come June. The latest attempt to package Mapeza as a national team coach has ended in shame, again, and the red card he was shown in the 3-1 defeat to Kenya in the final on Tuesday just sums it all up. Due to Mapeza’s ineptness in approach on Tuesday, perhaps desperation to prove his legion of doubters wrong, Zimbabwe lost while trying to win a friendly contest they ought to have played with freedom and adventurousness in pursuit of the right combinations ahead of more important games to come. Mapeza’s biggest downfall on this tour was putting his personal interests ahead of those of the players and the nation. Some diaspora players – credit to the NC for convincing such an encouraging number to answer the motherland’s call – were not fielded at all in the two matches in Malawi as Mapeza went more for the results than the quest to shape a great Warriors team for the future. But this is all part of the NC’s litany of bungling actions coming back to bite them. The uncomfortable but right question to ask the NC now is: who will be the next coach of the Warriors come June? Norman Mapeza again? Yet another caretaker coach, a third one in seven months? It’s a really problematic question. But the problems are all of the NC’s making, to be honest. *This opinion first appeared on www.sportscast.co.zw Sport Page 49 Zifa NC has really dug itself into a hole, right before our very eyes Norman Mapeza NewsHawks 1ssue 172, 29 Marxh 2024 Enock Muchinjo HawkZone

ENOCK MUCHINJO NEW Zimbabwe rugby coach Piet Benade will maintain the country’s traditional style of rugby, based on flair and speed, but says the Sables must work on their set-piece frailty if they are to be competitive in the Africa Cup in July and stay in contention for a place at the next World Cup. 42-year-old Benade must keep the Sables in the top-four of this year’s eight-team Africa Cup in Uganda for the Sables to have a chance at qualifying for the 2027 World Cup — and he is aware of the threat posed by closest rivals, especially if his Zimbabwean side doesn’t strengthen its weaker areas. “We need to be true to our DNA and play a fast, powerful running brand of rugby, but backed up by a technically proficient set-piece,” Benade told The NewsHawks this week. “There are things that happen in Test rugby that are very different from what happens in other rugby. This is magnified when you look at things in Zimbabwean context. We are blessed with genetically fast athletes who are agile and explosive and this is evident in the style of play you will see at schools and clubs. Very little importance is given to set-pieces, scrumming, mauling and tactical kicking. You can watch a whole day of the Under-20 league and not see a single team using a lineout drive. We enjoy open play where we use our athleticism and agility. We will need to embrace and accept the fact that to be competitive at Test level, we need to change our mindset and get a few more of these components working regularly at the senior level.” Benade admitted that Zimbabwe’s domestic league is not at a level at the moment to draw players who can win games against some of the best sides in Africa, thereby the need to cast the selection net wide. “There is a very large number of extremely talented Zimbabweans spread out all over the world,” he said. “Many are professionals, earning a living for their families in top European leagues. We will do everything we can to ensure the strongest side is assembled to represent Zimbabwe in July. The cost implications of getting top foreign-based players is very significant. We have a team of people working very hard to raise funds to assist these players in coming to play for the national team. We aim to have a blend of local and foreign-based players by the time we get to July. What we cannot allow to happen is that local-based players are neglected or left behind. Local-based players must be worked with weekly and have pathways to contracts in places like Europe, as many of our players have done over the past few years…massive credit needs to be given to both Uganda and Kenya, who have created thriving local leagues where many players are professional, very active and well coached by professionals.” The former Western Province and Pumas flyhalf — who earned a handful of Test caps for Zimbabwe — is becoming a head coach at Test level for the first time, although he was an assistant under outgoing Sables gaffer Brendan Dawson. Benade has previously coached at his old Cape Town club, False Bay, and at Old Hararians back home in Zimbabwe. He also took charge of Rondebosch and Wynberg Boys High Schools in the Cape area. But the youthful new Sables tactician does not believe the jump from club and schoolboy level, to international rugby, is a handicap in modern rugby. “There seems to be a trend recently at clubs, especially that the coaches have become a lot younger as the game has changed very dramatically over the last 15 years or so,” Benade remarked. “Modern training and coaching methods are far removed from those (of) 20 years ago that often it’s the slightly younger generation of coaches which don’t need to unlearn, or to move with the times as we sort of emerged from those changing methods as players. The leap or gap between coaching schools or clubs might not be as big as we may think. The top school setups in South Africa are at an extremely high and professional level. Coaches at top schools are often in the top bracket of coaches in South Africa. Top clubs again are run very professionally with great minds and methods being tried and tested. Being in this environment for the last 15 years, I think has put me in a good position to be able to help. As far as the players you are coaching, compared to schools and clubs, it’s easy to improve a club player new to rugby by 50 percent. The more difficult challenge is improving a top elite player by another three or five percent.” Benade has set up an equally youthful backroom staff that has former Sables front-rower Kevin Nqindi as scrum coach. Fortune Chipendu, one of the most capped players in Zimbabwean rugby history, will take care of the line-out. National Sevens team head coach Ricky Chirengende is the defence, breakdown and backline coach. TJ Chifokoyo, another ex-Sables forward, has been retained as team manager. “These local coaches will be guided and supported by their specialist consultants who are currently in high-performance environments in South Africa,” said Benade. NEWS $60 Covid tariff for visitors & tourists CULTURE Community radio regulations under review @NewsHawksLive TheNewsHawks www.thenewshawks.com Thursday 1 October 2020 WHAT’S INSIDE ALSO INSIDE Finance Ministy wipes out $3.2 Billion depositors funds Zim's latest land cStory on Page 3 Story on Page 8 Chamisa reacout to Khupe Unofficial president calls for emergeFriday 29 March 2024 This Zifa NC has really dug itself into a hole ALSO INSIDE Sports ‘We need to be true to our DNA, but with proficient set-piece’ Piet Benade is becoming a Test coach for the first time.