Thinking Like A Lawyer

INDEX

Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Company, Barak, Aharon, 150n
98–99, 116, 215–217 Bentham, Jeremy, 3, 42–43, 117–118, 149–

Alexander, Larry, 39n, 53n, 68n, 96n 150, 210–211
Allen, Ronald, 204n, 222n “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 220–222
Ambiguity, distinguished from vagueness, Bingham, Joseph, 134
Blackmun, Harry, 182
162n Brandeis, Louis, 10n, 43, 49
Analogical reasoning, 85–102; distinguished Brandenburg v. Ohio, 68
Brewer, Scott, 71n, 92n, 216n
from precedent, 85–91; as incremental Breyer, Stephen, 82, 83, 194n, 216
decision-making, 100–102; nature of, 86– Brown v. Board of Education, 60, 64, 176,
90, 98–99; and similarity, 92–95; skepti-
cism about, 96–100; use in legal argu- 203, 212–213, 217
ment, 5, 85–102 Burden of proof, 167, 219–224; distin-
Analogy. See Analogical reasoning
Aristotle, 28, 119 guished from burden of persuasion, 223–
Arnold, Thurman, 134 224; distinguished from burden of pro-
Artificial reason of the law, 2 duction, 223
Atiyah, P. S., 40, 41n, 61n Bush v. Gore, 83, 215
Attitudinal view of Supreme Court decision-
making, 3, 139–140 Calabresi, Guido, 106n
Authorities. See Sources, legal Candor, judicial, 173–175
Authority, 61–84; binding and persuasive, Cardozo, Benjamin, 43, 45, 53, 112, 126, 182
distinguished, 67–76; content-indepen- Categorization in law, 48–49, 141–142
dent nature of, 62–64; controversies Certiorari, 172
about, 64–66; and deference, 230; Chapman, Bruce, 104
H. L. A. Hart on, 62n; in law, 6, 61–84; Church of the Holy Trinity, United States v.,
legitimacy of, 64–66, 67n; mandatory
and optional, 68–72; nature of, 61–66; 25–28, 29, 32, 228
optional (see Sources, legal); persuasive Cicero, 120–121
(see Authority: binding and persuasive, Citation of authority, 67–73. See also Au-
distinguished); sources and, 66–67. See
also Sources, legal thority; Sources, legal
Availability heuristic, 110–111, 199 Civil law, contrasted with common law,

106–108
Cohen, Felix, 134

235

INDEX

Coke, Edward, 2, 8 law, 203–205; legislative and
Common law, 103–123; and availability adjudicative, 217n; presumptions and,
224–228
heuristic, 110–111; Bentham on, 117– Faigman, David, 204n
118; change in, 112–116; contrasted with Flood v. Kuhn, 56, 182
civil law, 106–108; custom in, 116; evolu- Foreign law. See Sources, legal
tion of, 106n; historical origins of, 103– Formalism, 29–35, 228–229
106; judicial opinions and, 171; reason- Frank, Jerome, 3, 127–130, 147, 205. See
ing and decision-making in, 104–116; ret- also Legal Realism
roactivity of, 114–115; role of judge in, Fried, Charles, 2n
108–110; rules and, 104–106, 117–118; Friedman, Richard, 129n, 204n
skepticism about, 117–119; “Working It- Fuller, Lon, 19n, 39n, 65n, 105, 152–157,
self Pure,” 105, 117 163, 164
Cook, Walter Wheeler, 134
Critical Legal Studies, 144–147 Golding, M. P., 78n, 178n
Goodhart, Arthur, 50–51, 81
Defeasibility. See Rules: defeasibility of Green, Leon, 134, 141, 145, 147
Deference, 229–233; compared to authority, Green, Leslie, 65n
Greenawalt, Kent, 65n, 78n, 97n, 178n
230–231; and standards of review, 231– Griswold v. Connecticut, 88–90, 177
232
Dicta, 55–56, 181–184. See also Holding of Hadfield, Gillian, 106n
a case Hard cases, 21, 24, 157. See also Easy cases
Discretion, 190–194 Harlan, John Marshall, 89
Donoghue v. Stevenson, 46, 51, 93–94, 101, Hart, H. L. A., 6n, 19, 81, 104n, 105, 107n,
203
Douglas, William O., 132n 152–157, 165
Dudley & Stephens, R. v., 203 Hartnett, Edward, 198n
Dworkin, Ronald, 33n, 114–115, 118, 158, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 39–
161
40, 44, 113–114, 217
Easy cases, 20–22, 24, 137, 139, 157. See Holding of a case, 54–57, 180–184. See also
also Hard cases
Dicta; Ratio decidendi
Economics, law and, 113n, 145 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 42, 48–49, 88,
Eisenberg, Melvin, 98n, 105n, 215, 217
Epstein, Richard, 106n 104, 125–127, 132, 141–142
Equity, 119–123; Aristotle on, 28, 119–120; Horwitz, Morton, 129n
Hughes, Charles Evans, 131n, 143
Cicero on, 120–121; historical origins of, Hurd, Heidi, 64n
119–122; modern conception of, 122– Hutcheson, Joseph, 128–129, 147
123; Selden on, 122–123
Eskridge, William, 87n, 150n Indeterminacy, 157–162
Evidence: critiques of law of, 210–212; Free International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 54–
Proof idea, 210–211; juries and, 206; law
of, 209–212 55, 57

Facts: adversarial process and, 207–208; in Jackson, Robert, 149
appellate courts, 212–218; determina- Juries: cognitive deficiencies of, 208n; role
tions of, 206–212; distinguished from
of, 206–208, 219
Jurisdiction, 5, 229–230

236

INDEX

Kennedy, Anthony, 80, 89 McKillop, Bron, 207n
Kennedy, Duncan, 145 Miranda v. Arizona, 89–90, 196–197, 199,
Kirby, United States v., 26, 28, 32, 156, 228
Koch, Charles, 191 201
Koppelman, Andrew, 87n Monahan, John, 213n
Kress, Kenneth, 115n Moore, Underhill, 133

Lamond, Grant, 85n Napoleonic Code, 107
Law: as closed system, claims of, 5–6; for- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 54, 57,

mality of, 29–35 213–214, 217
Lawrence v. Texas, 80 “No Vehicles in the Park” rule, 19–20, 152–
Lederman, Leandra, 22n
Legal Realism, 3, 49, 74, 124–147, 174; 157, 161, 191

“bad man” and, 142; breakfast and, 129, Obedience: distinguished from persuasion,
134, 174; distinguished from Scandina- 38–40; to law, 38n
vian Realism, 124n; doctrinal indetermi-
nacy, 134–137; doctrinal justification Obiter dicta. See Dicta
and, 134–137, 144; empirical aspect of, O’Connor, Sandra Day, 178
132–134, 138–142; Jerome Frank on (see Oliphant, Herman, 134
Frank, Jerome); “hunches” and, 128; Open texture, 163
Karl Llewellyn on (see Llewellyn, Karl); Opinions, judicial, 171–187; language in,
origins of, 124–127; particularism and,
130n, 131; prediction and, 126–127, 134, 179, 181; structure of, 172–173; unpub-
142–143; rationalization and, 128, 131, lished, 77–78, 172, 185–187; use and
174 nonuse of, 184–187; without precedential
Leiter, Brian, 132n, 174n effect, 186–187
Levi, Edward, 85n, 92n Orality, British tradition of, 217n
Llewellyn, Karl, 3, 17n, 49, 74, 131–134,
136–138, 145, 147, 160, 161n. See also Paper Chase, The, 1
Legal Realism Pardo, Michael, 204n
Lochner v. New York, 30, 88, 126n Plato, 8n, 11–12
Locke, United States v., 10, 18, 29, 30, 32, Plessy v. Ferguson, 60
62, 65, 150, 164, 229 Political science research on Supreme Court
Loving v. Virginia, 86
Lowenstein, John, 153n decision-making, 3, 139–140
Lyons, David, 47n Posner, Richard, 65n, 67n, 68n, 96n, 105,

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 45– 137n, 140n, 216n
46, 51–52, 57, 59, 62, 63, 68, 93–94, Pound, Roscoe, 126, 129n
101, 112, 114, 182 Practice Statement on Judicial Precedent, 59
Precedent, 6, 36–60; authority of, 62; bind-
Manning, John, 164n
Mansfield, Lord, 105, 112, 116 ingness of, 57, 67–74, 75–76, 181;
Mapp v. Ohio, 60, 214, 217 Brandeis on, 43; in civil law, 107; distin-
Marbury v. Madison, 56 guished from analogy, 85–91; distinguish-
Margin of appreciation, 191, 231 ing, 57–60; horizontal and vertical (see
Marshall, Thurgood, 30 Precedent: vertical and horizontal); identi-
fication of, 44–54; justification for, 41–
44; mandatory, 69, 88; optional, 69;
overruling, 57–60, 76; persuasive, 38, 69;
vertical and horizontal, 36–37, 41–42,
57. See also Stare decisis

237

INDEX

Presumptions, 167, 224–229; legal and fac- Scalia, Antonin, 31n, 41n, 79, 81, 119n,
tual, 228–229; principled decision- 160n
making, 78n, 177–178; rebuttable and
irrebuttable, 225–227 Scandinavian Realism, 124n
Schlegel, John Henry, 133n
Principles, 115 Selden, John, 122–123
Psychological perspectives on legal reason- Selection effect, 13n, 22–23, 89, 137, 157,

ing, 3, 110–111, 199 184–185
Pufendorf, Samuel von, 155, 164 Sentencing guidelines, 194
Shapiro, Scott, 64n, 65n
Radin, Max, 134 Shelley v. Kraemer, 178
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 44–45, 101, 203 Simpson, A. W. B., 81n
Ratio decidendi, 50, 53, 173, 180. See also Sinclair, Michael, 137n
Singer, Joseph William, 146n
Holding of a case; Precedent: identifica- Skokie, free speech controversy in, 95, 97–
tion of
Raz, Joseph, 61n, 63n, 65n 98
Realism. See Legal Realism Socrates, 64
Reasons, 63–64; commitments of, 179–180; Socratic method, 8–10
content-independent, 63; first-order and Solan, Lawrence, 159n
second-order, 63n; generality of, 175– Solomon, 119–120
180; in judicial opinions, 172; rarity of, Sources, legal, 67–73, 77–84; foreign, 79–
175–176
Rehnquist, William, 183n 80; prohibited, 77–80; secondary, 80–81.
Retroactivity. See Common law See also Authority
Riggs v. Palmer, 33–34, 58, 114–115, 228 Spellman, Barbara, 85n, 86n
Roe v. Wade, 41, 42, 44, 57, 62, 88–89, 197 Standards. See Rules: and standards
Roman law, 107, 120–121 Standards of review, 231–232
Rubin, Paul, 106 Stare decisis, 37, 42n, 59n, 90; Bentham on,
Rule of Law, 10–12, 164–165, 195 42–43; history of, 42n; Justice Cardozo
Rules: Aristotle on (see Aristotle); and au- on, 43; Justice Holmes on, 42; Justice
thority, 61–62; background justifications Scalia on, 41n; Supreme Court on, 60. See
of, 15–18, 24–25; core and fringe of, 19– also Precedent
23, 152–154; defeasibility of, 104–105, Statutory construction. See Statutory inter-
166; distinguished from standards, 188– pretation
202; as generalizations, 24–29; interpre- Statutory interpretation, 148–170; absur-
tation of, 18; in judicial opinions, 179, dity and, 156, 163–167; canons of, 136,
196–200; Karl Llewellyn on, 131–132; in 167–170; “Golden Rule,” 165; intentions
law, 6, 13–35, 103; legal realists on (see of legislators in, 159–160; purpose of
Legal Realism); literal meaning of, 25–26, statute and, 160–161; role of text in,
31–32, 155–156, 167; open texture of, 151–158, 160, 167; scrivener’s error and,
162; overinclusiveness of, 26–28; per se, 165n
193; plain meaning of (see Rules: literal Stevens, John Paul, 83
meaning of); precision of, 192; and stan- Stewart, Potter, 88–89
dards, 188–202; straightforward applica- Stewart v. Dutra Barge Co., 20–22, 24
tion of (see Easy cases); Story, Joseph, 166
underinclusiveness of, 27–28 Strauss, David, 149n
Rylands v. Fletcher, 101, 206 Sturges, Wesley, 134
Summers, Robert S., 29n, 33n, 61n

238

INDEX

Sunstein, Cass, 92n, 100n, 111n, 180n, Wasserstrom, Richard, 61n, 131n
198n Weinreb, Lloyd, 85n, 92n, 99n, 216n
Westen, Peter, 97n
Supreme Court: bases of decision, 3, 139– White, Byron, 89, 183n
140; caseload, 23, 89, 139–140, 171 Williams, Glanville, 181, 183
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 200
Tushnet, Mark, 147 Wolf v. Colorado, 60

Vagueness, 152–153n, 157, 159, 162, 189, Yablon, Charles, 129n
200–202. See also Indeterminacy Yntema, Hessel, 134

Walker, Laurens, 213n
Warner, Richard, 96n

239