2021-ENG

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

2021AND ESTONIA

Translation by Margus Elings, Refiner Translations OÜ
Editing by Scott Abel, Tekstikoda OÜ
Design: Taivo Org
Illustrations: Joosep Maripuu, Taivo Org, Bigstock, Shutterstock, Scanpix

ISSN 2613-3261 (print)
ISSN 2613-327X (online)

CONTENTS

Foreword 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Russia’s foreign policy 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
From crisis to crisis:
30 years of Russian policy in its ‘Near Abroad’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The standoff between the Belarusian government
and its people 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lukashenka’s departure is a prerequisite for
economic reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Russia in search of a new head of state for Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Violent upheaval in the Caucasus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Russia in Africa: ambitions and reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Russia’s domestic politics and economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2020 constitutional amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Increasing domestic tensions and the Kremlin’s response . . . . 35
Russia’s socio-economic downturn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Russian Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
‘New type’ of airborne assault units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
The ‘Belarus military district’ – military cooperation
between Russia and Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Russian special services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
GRU psychological operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Russian special services’ influence operations in cyberspace . . . 65

Growing pressure from China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chinese influence operations move to the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Sinicising Chinese technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
China and Russia – a practical partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

2 Foreword

FOREWORD

This is the Estonian Foreign MIKK MARRAN
Intelligence Service’s sixth Director General of the Estonian
annual report. The reason why Foreign Intelligence Service
we continue with this tradition remains
the same – to offer the public both cultivated image of derzhava (a great
in Estonia and abroad an expert view power), both at home and abroad, the
of the security environment and the past year once again showed us the
threats our service deals with. Consid- fragility and controversy of Russia’s
ering Estonia’s geopolitical situation, influence in its neighbouring region. It
the range of topics should not come as is clear that the dictatorship in Bela-
a surprise. rus, nurtured by its eastern neighbour,
has no long-term perspective, and we
The year 2020 was a good lesson for must be prepared for another year of
anyone making predictions. Like every- unexpected developments. The events
one else, when finalising last year’s in the South Caucasus have signifi-
report in January, we failed to predict cantly increased Russia’s influence in
how strong an impact the pandemic the region, but have also cast doubt
would have on global developments. on Russia’s ability – and motivation
Although we have lived in a changed – to guarantee stability. A disparity
world for the last 12 months in many between image building and actual
ways, the security environment around influence is also visible in Russia’s
us has largely remained the same. activities in Africa.
National interests and patterns of be-
haviour do not change overnight. Still,
the coronavirus crisis offered new op-
portunities for authoritarian regimes to
exert influence and accelerated already
existing trends. We could say that in a
time of universal mask-wearing, some
masks also fell off.

In this report, we take a closer look
at Moscow’s view of international
trends. Despite the Kremlin’s carefully

F oreword 3

Over the last year, Russia’s most sig- THE CORONAVIRUS
nificant domestic developments along- CRISIS OFFERED NEW
side the coronavirus crisis included OPPORTUNITIES FOR
constitutional amendments introduced AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
by executing a mediocre maskirovka, TO EXERT INFLUENCE. IN A
as well as growing tensions in the re- TIME OF UNIVERSAL MASK-
gions and an assassination attempt on WEARING, SOME MASKS
the opposition leader Alexei Navalny. ALSO FELL OFF.
Dramatic fluctuations in oil prices in
the first half of the year and ongoing but a topical issue. We also take a look
international sanctions have in turn at the Russian special services’ “best
raised questions about the sustaina- practices” in cyberwarfare against
bility of Russia’s economic model. In democracies.
a situation where the average Russian
has experienced falling living standards As always in recent years, we cannot
for years, widespread protests should ignore China, whose activities raise
not be ruled out. At any rate, we are new security issues every year. We talk
seeing increasing signs of disapproval. about China’s increasingly confron-
tational foreign policy, as well as its
This report also delves into the military influence operations and the threats
exercise Zapad, where the Russian and of ‘sinicising’ Chinese technology. Like
Belarusian armed forces train for large- our partners, we, too, keep a close eye
scale war against NATO in the Baltic on China’s tightening co-operation
and Far North region. We also look at with Russia, a relationship mostly
key developments within the Russian dominated by Beijing.
armed forces, such as efforts to mod-
ernise the airborne forces. The crisis in While we live in a complex security en-
Belarus led us to analyse the co-opera- vironment, I remain confident that the
tion between the Russian and Belaru- Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service,
sian Union State’s armed forces – the with its domestic and international
area where Minsk and Moscow have partners, will be able to provide deci-
achieved the greatest level of integra- sion-makers with the necessary aware-
tion over the decades. As concerns the ness and sufficient early warning.
Russian special services, this time we
focus on GRU psychological opera- Bonne lecture!
tions – well-forgotten old practices,
rather than anything completely new,

4 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN
POLICY

 Foreign policy during the pandemic: the Eurasian SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU, CC BY 4.0
Economic Union Summit in May 2020

Russia expects the COVID-19 pandemic to weaken Western

unity.

Despite creating some limita- Russia acknowledges that the trend
tions, the COVID-19 pandemic towards multipolarity leads to a great-
has not changed Russia’s long- er risk of conflict, as the major powers
term strategic goals. On the contrary, increasingly compete for resources and
the Kremlin believes that the pandemic spheres of influence.
will accelerate two trends that Russia
itself is working to promote: a transi- Regardless, Russia expects to benefit
tion towards multipolarity in interna- from this trend, as it sees multipolar-
tional relations and declining Western ity as an opportunity to increase its
influence on the global stage. room for geopolitical manoeuvring,

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 5

 An example of the Russian-initiated
smear campaign on social media
against the Oxford-AstraZeneca
vaccine

especially at the expense of Western In the longer term, Russia’s goal with
powers. the EU is to get the sanctions relaxed
or lifted without making any conces-
The Russian leadership believes that sions in return. However, Russia’s
the global epidemic will force the behaviour remains cynical, as illustrated
West to focus on domestic policy and by its response to the poisoning of
economic problems, cause populist and Alexei Navalny, the investigation into
extremist movements to emerge, and the downing of flight MH17, cyber-
ultimately undermine the values-based attacks on Western institutions and
and institutional unity of Western so- assassinations associated with the
cieties. For its part, Russia is prepared Russian special services in European
to add fuel to the flames to encourage cities in recent years.
these trends. Therefore, 2021 will
again see Russian influence operations The inauguration of President Joe
designed to create and deepen divides B­ iden will not significantly change
within and between Western socie- Russia’s agenda towards the US – it
ties, including at the EU level. This will will remain largely confrontational. Still,
include attempts to discredit West- Russia will likely try to take advantage
ern-produced COVID-19 vaccines, as of arms control negotiations and the
with the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine, extension of the New START treaty to
which Russian propaganda labelled appear as a constructive partner while
as a “monkey vaccine”, followed by retaining its massive superiority in
attempts to spread this information in non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Western media. With these smear cam-
paigns, Russia hopes, on the one hand,
to create a more favourable position for
its own vaccines on the world market
and, on the other hand, to promote
its strategic ambition to show itself as
being the first among the major powers
to provide a solution to the COVID-19
crisis.

6 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS:
30 YEARS OF RUSSIAN POLICY
IN ITS ‘NEAR ABROAD’

While Russia seeks to undermine Western influence on the
international stage, it is important to keep an eye on Russia’s
neighbouring region, where the Kremlin’s policy is aimed at
establishing itself as the dominant force.

The Kremlin’s strategic priority is its A major power’s desire to establish
neighbouring region, where Ukraine itself as a leader in its neighbouring
and Belarus are the priority countries region is understandable, especially if
in maintaining Russia’s sphere of influ- aimed at promoting stability and eco-
ence. Since the collapse of the Soviet nomic development. However, looking
Union, Russia has strived to secure at the regional situation in Russia’s
economic and military dominance in neighbourhood 30 years after the
the region and deflect any interference collapse of the Soviet Union – except
by competing international powers. At for the Baltic States – a legitimate
the same time, the Nagorno-Karabakh question arises: Where are the stability
conflict, which escalated in September and economic development? Almost all
2020 and claimed thousands of lives, the countries in the region are weighed
showed that multipolarity will inevita- down by territorial conflict or internal
bly reach Russia’s own backyard, as it crisis (see map on pages 8-9). Whence
has happened in the South Caucasus this drastic difference from the Eastern
with Turkey firmly asserting itself in European and Baltic countries now
the region’s balance of power. Also, integrated into the EU and NATO?
China has stepped up its political influ-
ence in Central Asia, as a side effect of A proverb perfectly characterises
economic investment. Russia’s activities in its immediate

THE SIDE EFFECTS OF MULTIPOLARITY: RUSSIA MUST
ACKNOWLEDGE GROWING TURKISH AND CHINESE
INFLUENCE IN ITS NEIGHBOURING REGION.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 7

 South Ossetia is separated from Georgia by Russian-installed SO URCE: S ERG EI BO BY LEV / TASS
barbed wire fences

neighbourhood – you reap what you territorial disputes, ethnic confronta-
sow. Russia has consistently sought to tions and domestic crises, posing a
use its political, economic and military major obstacle to socio-economic and
leverage to impede these countries’ in- political development. And this trend
tegrating and developing relations with appears to be deteriorating – in 2020
Euro-Atlantic organisations. To this alone, we saw the Nagorno-Karabakh
end, Russia works against establishing conflict as well as the domestic crises
the rule of law, civil society and free in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan escalate.
elections in its neighbouring countries, Considering that Russia’s policies
fearing that democratic ideas might in the neighbouring region remain
also catch on among the Russian pop- unchanged and do not contribute to
ulation. Russia’s ruling elite sees these establishing democratic principles and
ideas as an existential threat to the free elections, the coming years will
survival of its “power vertical”. highly likely bring new crises in the
region, creating both direct and indirect
As a result, much of Russia’s neigh- security threats for Estonia and more
bouring region is still plagued by broadly for Europe.

8 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS
AND CRISES IN RUSSIA’S
NEIGHBOURING REGION

VBaellgaeruvesne
UWlaidteussplikreuaddpprrootteessttids ajand a
rdiiogmiseissetniceckrrisiiissjfõohllkorwalitng the
AflalegkrsaanntdlyefrrLauudkaušleenntkparesidential
kealescutkiosnvrõigltgsietdudin favour of
pArleysaikdseannddivraLliumkiasstheejänrkeal.

DDoonnbbaassss
UUkkrraaiinnaiatnertreirtroitoorriuymu,nmdeisr tohneVene
ockounptraotlsoiofoRnuijsõsuidanudoecckuopnytrinoglli all.
Tfoerrcrietso.oCriouvmeriltVReunsesmiaanamvailirtjaartyud
spõrejasliennecekoinhatlhoeletke.rritory.

TTrraannssnnisisttrriaia KCrriimmmea
sTdMtfMReõeahorujcoaefrlstadilltoidtsconoeiotvaeRorovarnrukaiiVtutosnmoeesmhrrntiiyalraeiie.illtnrtomarVolircetoeayooknranri.peuytkrmmreouosna,nle.tamdnrOoeacivsrlveleiadoiralnetinlkl. sVUVBUmbieelkyllknniaarlrRaiceepatikmmaueninrasaSaayinsaeaatibanaeakprr.Mtiaarodeinstougrodurlsetiottthuaoaaresbinrluaeymnmsddeoõe,ikacjnramtcseelutilasie.hpdereiaietudd

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 9

‘CONTROLLED INSTABILITY’

It is in Russia’s interests to keep its neighbouring » limited relations with the West
region in a state of fragile balance. Therefore, » territorial conflict, with Russia as the kingpin
Russia wants to see the following features in its » Russian troop presence in the form of a
neighbouring countries and seeks to maintain or
help instigate them: military base or otherwise

» limited development of the rule of law These conditions allow Russia to manipulate the
» absence of free elections regional level of escalation as it deems necessary
» repressed civil society but consequently create a permanent risk of
conflict in the region.

AAbbkhhaaazsiiaa
GGeeoorrggiaiantteerrrrititooorryiuumnd, emridseon
fdacetfoacRtuosVsieannecmoanatrkool.nOtrvoelrlitall.
RTuesrrsiitaonormiuimlitailrVyepnreemseanaceavinalitkhe
tseõrrjaitloinrye.kohalolek.

SLoõuutnhaO-Osssesteieatia KKyõrgrgyõzsztsatann
tRfGahaadGeucvleeelost.aootfrsTlaegriikeagRrciarrntisurainotiõsmtotjsVtoeareiioyerlalrii.rrntnrniiaiteuetorcmomyokoronayriplihaturVureamoknesloolnde.,nleeneOmtmrckrvie.odsealeiralonitn 2DaRtvl0oloõei2miiiggmm0aiesutuspiinsteorieurecnandssckeidrpooikersnfernidesisitixsiifdasto4elüeln.elnüolosddewikiicvvsittenaotiaoglovitnmobti thrlieeisel-at2be4d0uijnOä2ygric0nettlgo,obbeyr
thuelaptuosliltikicuasl phaärätliteesoinstpmoiwseesr..

NMaäggoir-nKoa-rKabaraahbhakh
umaTpAtseVennretgieerrdsdarrimsnrisaeidieAteittreooinmouzetrancoeshinale.arrelei.abilagsudaasiamjniuiaõ.jscas,AjpAeanplualls.aiNicthneRteeoeeerusbvnbskseadeoonsmitafdhiowamažbavneaeleapoeammrtelnnea2abiiklA0ctievteerr2araarkm0rir2hedyi,et0eulounpv2rsiai0ianaalvglauelnsee

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

10 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

THE STANDOFF BETWEEN THE
BELARUSIAN GOVERNMENT AND
ITS PEOPLE

Unprecedented protests in Belarus are eroding the regime’s

foundations.

In 2020, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s voters mainly in the rural areas, was the
plans for a smooth transition to his first to be arrested. Next was Babaryka,
sixth presidency failed. Already unhappy the preferred candidate among voters in
with the low standard of living, Belaru- the cities, who managed to gather four
sians had grown weary with Lukashen- times the required 100,000 support
ka after his 26 years in office. In the signatures, which is the registration
spring, the president’s indifference to- threshold for a presidential candidate.
wards the COVID-19 crisis caused public Tsapkala left the country, realising that
dissatisfaction to escalate further. his arrest was imminent.

The presidential election saw Lukashen- Representatives of the regime as-
ka’s hitherto seemingly unshakable po- sumed that eliminating the competition
sition threatened by the emergence of would pave the way for Lukashenka’s
three main rivals: Viktar Babaryka, the re-election. They did not expect that
former head of Belgazprombank, Valery the nomination of Tsikhanouski’s wife,
Tsapkala, a former diplomat and leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, would cause
of the Belarus High Tech Park, and a large portion of the support for the
Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a popular blogger. ousted candidates to unite behind her
They gave people hope that change was candidacy. The authorities’ repressive
possible in Belarus, despite the country actions against the people involved in
having remained in Lukashenka’s iron her campaign, her supporters, and the
grip for over two decades. This was un- journalists who covered their activities
derlined by the fact that both Babaryka had the unexpected effect of boosting
and Tsapkala belong in the country’s Tsikhanouskaya’s popularity.
elite and represent dissatisfaction with-
in Lukashenka’s own camp. The politically heated summer culmi-
nated in the presidential election on 9
Lukashenka’s decision to eliminate August, as Lukashenka declared him-
the three rivals from the competition self the winner with 80.2% of the votes.
before the election betrayed a fear for Due to massive vote-rigging at the
his dictatorship’s survival. Tsikhanouski, polling stations, even the Central Elec-
who became popular with Lukashenka’s tion Commission could not know the

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 11

 Belarusian women play a
key role in anti-government
protests

SOURCE: EPA / STRINGER

actual support figures for Lukashenka themselves from the elite and power
and Tsikhanouskaya. Belarusians, who structures to join the protesters. There
had attended or seen footage from have been strikes in state-owned enter-
Tsikhanouskaya’s crowded campaign prises. Indeed, more than the protests,
events, felt more clearly than ever that Lukashenka feared workers’ strikes, as
their votes had not counted. They came these would hit the regime’s reputation
to the streets in numbers unseen in as well as the country’s economy.
the country’s recent history. Protests
became a new daily reality in Belarus. Lukashenka is not one to relinquish
power voluntarily. He quickly recovers
The irresponsible behaviour of the after each setback. His competitors are
authorities towards human health behind bars. The well-financed power
during the first wave of the coronavirus structures received generous bonuses
outbreak intensified the politicisation of for suppressing the protests. The civil
the population. While the demonstra- service does not want to risk uncer-
tions seen in recent years have tended tainty and therefore, remain loyal to
to avoid politics, this time there was a Lukashenka.
clear demand for Lukashenka’s resigna-
tion and a new election. The People’s Assembly in February
2021 was Lukashenka’s attempt to put
The election events showed that on a spectacle of a social dialogue on
Belarusian society is changing, and the the country’s future and to bide his time
authorities are unable to adapt. The to regain control. However, in the eyes
regime is struggling to find the means of a significant part of the population,
to quell dissent, save for NKVD-style Lukashenka has lost his legitimacy
intimidation, brutal violence and mass as president and Belarus has turned
arrests. Such methods create more towards change. Even if the protests
dissatisfaction, even in the “pow- subside, Belarusians will not calm down
er vertical”; officials have distanced until Lukashenka has left office.

12 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

LUKASHENKA’S DEPARTURE
IS A PREREQUISITE FOR
ECONOMIC REFORMS

Improving living standards in Belarus would require economic
reforms, which would inevitably cause a social crisis.

The root cause of Belarus’s low stand- There are no good options available for
ard of living is its failure to carry out a sharp reorientation of Belarusian ag-
economic reforms following the break- ricultural exports; the close proximity
up of the Soviet Union. Belarus has an of EU markets means that selling food
externally subsidised state economy outside the Russian market would re-
based on socialist planning principles, quire adapting to a highly competitive
which has reached the end of its life. environment and improving production
As social modernisation has been efficiency, which takes time. Without
artificially delayed for decades, reforms the Russian market, structural reform
would cause a shock. in this sector would force 5-6% of the
electorate to change jobs, a painful
The Belarusian economy is heavily process for many, which would likely
dependent on Russia. All but a few turn them against the new power after
economic sectors are under Russian such an upheaval. Other industries
influence, either in terms of export would have better prospects of finding
output, import input or credit. Such new export markets (including subcon-
dependence can only be shed through tracting for industrial producers), and
long-term purposeful action, which the negative social impact of reforms
requires political will. would be smaller for them.

As well as the overall dependence on Belarus’s oil and IT sectors, which
foreign trade with Russia, it is impor- have received a lot of media attention,
tant to recognise that the single largest do not face as formidable a reform
area of activity in the Belarusian econ- challenge as the agriculture and food
omy is the combination of the food industry, nor do they share the same
industry and related agriculture, whose socio-political significance because
exports are aimed solely at the Russian their contributions to employment and
market. GDP are modest.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 13

THE STRUCTURE OF BELARUS'S ECONOMY

16%

14% Summary of agriculture and food industry

12% Wholesale and retail trade, services

Share of GDP by economic sector Construction

10%

Real estate services

8% Transport and communications

Agriculture and forestry

6%

Chemical industry Food industry

4% Financial services Production of machinery and equipment

Production of Electricity, gas and water supply

2% building materials Other manufactured articles

Public utility and social services
Metals industry

Production of coke Paper, cellulose timber and wood products
and petroleum products Production of transport vehicles
0%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%

Share of the labour force

The agriculture and food industries form Belarus’s largest group of industries in terms of
their combined impact on both employment and GDP.

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

A key economic issue concerning for the labour force released as a result
Belarus’s political process is the speed of structural reforms will depend on
at which the country will manage to the choices of Belarusian voters in the
reform its labour market. Whether and next elections.
where new employment will be found

UNLOCKING BELARUS’S FUTURE WILL REQUIRE A MAJOR
OVERHAUL OF ITS LABOUR MARKET – HUNDREDS OF

THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WILL NEED NEW EMPLOYMENT.

14 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF A NEW
HEAD OF STATE FOR BELARUS

Russia is unsure about how to keep Belarus in its sphere of
influence after a controlled transfer of power.

The tried-and-tested relationship protests, Russia’s leadership decided
between the Kremlin and Alyaksandr to take control of the media conversa-
Lukashenka spanning the past 26 tion about the events in Belarus. RT
years shows that Russia has always (formerly Russia Today) propagandists
supported Lukashenka in elections, were sent to Belarus to spin a narra-
despite occasional tensions. Lukashen- tive of a Western attack on Belarusian
ka has kept the strategically important sovereignty. Russian security opera-
neighbour under control, ensuring tives were also placed on the ground
that it remains in Russia’s sphere of to curb the protests and disrupt their
influence and preventing its integration organization.
with the West.
Russia’s political and financial assis-
The scale and duration of the protests tance to Belarus comes with special
following the presidential election in conditions attached. Russia conducted
Belarus came as an unpleasant surprise a thorough audit of Belarus’s public fi-
to the Russian leadership. After initial nances before granting the loan assis-
confusion, the Kremlin decided to con- tance agreed in September 2020; one
tinue to publicly support Lukashenka as of the major criticisms was unjustified
the legitimate president, at least in the internal security spending.
short term. Over the years, Lukashenka
has monopolised relations with Russia While it extends a helping hand, Russia
in Belarus, which means that Russia is simultaneously using the political
is unable to find another candidate to crisis in Belarus and Lukashenka’s
replace him quickly. At the height of the weakened domestic and foreign policy

THE LONGER THE KREMLIN BACKS ALYAKSANDR
LUKASHENKA, THE MORE IT RISKS BELARUSIANS’

ALIENATION FROM RUSSIA.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 15

 After initial confusion, the
Kremlin decided to continue
to support Lukashenka, at
least in the short term

SOURCE: VALERY SHARIFULIN /
TA S S

position to expand its interests and the attitude of Belarusians towards
strengthen its influence in Belarus. Russia, which has so far been posi-
The country is being pressured to draft tive. But Russia also wants to avoid
constitutional amendments that Russia Lukashenka being ousted by protesters
believes would calm the street protests at all costs, which could encourage the
and allow for a controlled change of people in Russia to follow suit. Russia
power. It would be in Russia’s interests would like to see Lukashenka’s succes-
to have a weak president and several sor to be predictable and loyal to the
centres of power vying for the Kremlin’s Kremlin. However, there are no easy
attention, forming a pool from which to solutions for Russia to ensure that
find people loyal to the Kremlin. the successor is aligned with Russia’s
interests, while also preventing the
The Kremlin knows that continued strengthening of Western influence in
support for Lukashenka jeopardises Belarus.

16 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA CONTINUES ITS
AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

Russia is pressuring Ukraine to recognise the representatives
of the occupying forces as legitimate negotiating partners.

Russia’s occupation of Crimea contin- in the Trilateral Contact Group, Rus-
ues, and no progress has been made sia is putting pressure on Ukraine
towards a settlement of the conflict to recognise the occupying forces’
in eastern Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s representatives as legitimate partners,
efforts. Although armed clashes along which is obviously unacceptable to
the Donbass “contact line” are signif- Ukraine.
icantly fewer after another ceasefire,
in force from 27 July 2020, there is no The Russian side is increasingly
political solution in sight. blaming Ukraine for withdrawing from
the Minsk agreements, most recent-
The reintegration of the occupied Don- ly finding a pretext during the local
bass into Ukraine under the conditions elections in Ukraine, criticising the
demanded by Russia is unacceptable Ukrainian parliament’s decision to rule
to the Ukrainian authorities. However, out elections in the occupied Donbass.
Russia is playing for time, expecting Although Ukraine would have been
that an unresolved conflict will sooner prepared to consider holding elections
or later force the Ukrainian leadership in the eastern occupied territories, this
to make concessions. is not conceivable under conditions
that make it impossible to comply with
The Normandy Summit on 9 Decem- Ukrainian law.
ber 2019 has not been followed up,
and many of the agreements reached The reality in the occupied territories of
there have not been implemented. In eastern Ukraine is determined by the
the negotiations to resolve the conflict occupying powers, which can restore

RUSSIA IS PLAYING FOR TIME, EXPECTING THAT AN
UNRESOLVED CONFLICT WILL SOONER OR LATER FORCE
THE UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 17

RUSSIAN FORCES IN EASTERN UKRAINE
– 1st AND 2nd ARMY CORPS

Kramatorsk

Lugansk

Gorlivka Debaltseve xxx 2nd Army Corps

UKRAINE

Donetsk
xxx

1st Army Corps

Personnel:
35 000

RUSSIA Tanks:
481

Armoured
vehicles:
914

Taganrog Artillery:
720
Mariupol
MRLs:
The occupying forces are equipped with tanks, armoured 202
vehicles, artillery and multiple rocket launchers in
quantities that only a few European nations can match.

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

18 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

military pressure on Ukraine at any to accept Russia’s occupation of Crimea
time with the help of Russian-led and and the resolution of the conflict in
equipped armed forces. The occupying eastern Ukraine on the terms dictated
forces have tanks, armoured vehicles, by Russia. In Belarus’s case, Russia has
artillery and multiple rocket launchers warned Western powers against inter-
(MRLs) in quantities that only a few fering in the country’s internal affairs
European nations can match (see map while imposing no such restriction on
and table). The presence of such a itself when it comes to Ukraine.
threat in the occupied part of Ukraine,
a European nation, is a clear sign of In the run-up to elections in Ukraine,
Russia’s unwillingness to renounce the Russian leadership has extended
aggression. particular hospitality to the politicians
of the Ukrainian Opposition Platform
The situation in eastern Ukraine and – For Life. President Putin’s longtime
the search for a solution to the conflict acquaintance, Ukrainian oligarch and
have unjustifiably sidelined the issue member of parliament Viktor Med-
of the occupation of Crimea. Russia vedchuk, is a frequent visitor with the
feels confident and has not made the Russian head of state. Before the 25
slightest concessions on Crimea. On
the contrary, using the difficulties with
freshwater supply to Crimea, Russia
is seeking to present the victim as the
perpetrator, condemning Ukraine for
shutting off the water canal supplying
Crimea in 2014. Russia is attempting
to turn the Crimean water supply issue
into a domestic policy divide in Ukraine,
creating the illusion that Russia could
make concessions in the Donbass if
Ukraine restored the water supply.

Russia fully supports pro-Russian forc-
es in Ukrainian politics, who are willing

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 19

 Ukrainian opposition politician
Viktor Medvedchuk in a meeting
with Russian President Vladimir
Putin on 6 October 2020

SO URCE: ALEX EI DRUZ HI NI N / TASS

October 2020 local elections in Ukraine, that Ukrainians should look to Russia
Medvedchuk was one of the few to be for security and development. Med-
granted an audience with Putin, other- vedchuk also promoted the Russian
wise wary of face-to-face meetings due coronavirus vaccine, claiming he had
to the coronavirus threat. After such achieved immunity with the help of
meetings, the main message sent to the excellent Russian formula while on
the public is a declaration of the insep- holiday in Crimea and asked Putin to
arable destinies and close ties between allocate vaccine to Ukraine. This way
Ukraine and Russia. Medvedchuk became a part of Russia’s
massive vaccine campaign and put
The visit by Medvedchuk, who con- pressure on the Ukrainian government,
trols an extensive media network in as a vaccine procurement from Russia
Ukraine, was intended to influence the would come with political strings
Ukrainian electorate, convincing them attached. Medvedchuk also managed
to negotiate a promise to loosen the
sanctions against Ukraine from the
Russian president; indeed, only a week
later, Russia exempted three Ukrainian
companies from restrictions.

With such unabashed influence activ-
ities, Russia hopes to help Ukrainian
political forces that would prefer to
gravitate towards Moscow and oppose
Ukraine’s chosen European path.

RUSSIA SUPPORTS UKRAINIAN POLITICAL FORCES
THAT GRAVITATE TOWARDS MOSCOW.

20 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

VIOLENT UPHEAVAL IN THE
CAUCASUS

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in a significantly
increased Russian military presence in the South Caucasus.

On Sunday morning, 27 September THE REASONS AND
2020, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces PRECONDITIONS FOR
launched an offensive in the Na- GOING TO WAR
gorno-Karabakh conflict zone. Armeni-
an and Nagorno-Karabakh units were The accepted view is that war breaks
hit by massive indirect artillery fire out when there are the readiness,
along the entire contact line, followed capability and opportunity to start
by an armour offensive. The defenders military action. This means that one
were initially able to hold their posi- side of the conflict is prepared to
tions, but the outcome of the conflict, use military force, deems its military
which lasted almost six weeks, was capabilities sufficient to succeed on
clear – Armenia suffered a military the battlefield and sees a favourable
defeat. With a ceasefire agreement window of opportunity.
that came into force in the early hours
of 10 November 2020, Azerbaijan Before starting hostilities in Na-
regained control of a large part of gorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani
Nagorno-Karabakh itself and seven leadership was convinced that the
districts surrounding the separatist conflict would not be resolved through
region. These are areas that the central negotiations, at least not in a way it
government of Azerbaijan lost to Ar- considered acceptable. At the same
menia in the First Nagorno-Karabakh time, Azerbaijan had been purposefully
War ending in 1994. A status quo last- investing in developing its military ca-
ing more than a quarter of a century pabilities for years. Arms and defence
had been broken with a major political procurements had been accompanied
upheaval for the South Caucasus more by large-scale military exercises and
broadly. Turkish-backed training, which to-
gether had significantly improved the

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 21

NAGORNO-KARABAKH AFTER THE CEASEFIRE

GEORGIA RUSSIA

Yerevan AZERBAIJAN

ARMENIA Stepanakert

TURKEY

IRAN

areas under Armenian control and secured by Russian peacekeepers following the cease re agreement
areas once again controlled by Azerbaijan following the cease re agreement
the administrative boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast under the Soviet Union

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

22 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

 Alongside reconnaissance and attack drones, SOURCE: ARMENIAN MINISTRY OF

traditional indirect fire played an important role in the DEFENCE VIA REUTERS

Nagorno-Karabakh war. The photograph shows an

Armenian fighter operating a D-30 howitzer

Azerbaijani Armed Forces’ military Two other factors probably played a
capabilities. role in Azerbaijani long-term think-
ing. First, Armenia’s growing defence
The last necessary condition – a fa- budget and rearmament efforts – in
vourable opportunity – was presented another five years, Azerbaijan might
by a combination of several factors. not have enjoyed the military superiori-
The most important of these was the ty it did in autumn 2020.
Turkish political leadership’s readiness
to support Azerbaijan both politically Second, the COVID-19 pandemic and
and militarily, at a time when Armenia the accompanying economic crisis
and its strategic ally Russia had been would have likely affected Azerbaijan’s
hit hard by the coronavirus pandem- domestic political stability – growing
ic. The Western powers, too, were dissatisfaction in society might have
preoccupied with the fight against called into question President Ilham
the coronavirus, economic issues and Aliyev’s holding on to power. A military
domestic policy. victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, on the

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 23

other hand, represented a historic THE SECOND NAGORNO-
achievement for Azerbaijanis and will KARABAKH WAR WAS
continue to legitimise the country’s ALSO A DEFEAT
current political system for years to FOR INTERNATIONAL
come. ORGANISATIONS AND THE
POST-COLD WAR SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE IN GENERAL.

POLITICAL by both Armenia itself and the wider
CONSEQUENCES international community. Neverthe-
less, Armenia lost the war. This could
The main consequence of the Sec- jeopardise Russia’s credibility as a
ond Nagorno-Karabakh War is the guarantor of the security of its allies in
strengthening of Russian and Turk- the future.
ish influence in the South Caucasus.
Russia’s military presence in the Turkey, in turn, has emerged as a
region has grown significantly. Within regional powerhouse shaping the po-
Azerbaijan’s territory, who won the litical situation in the South Caucasus.
conflict on the battlefield, there now is And in addition to a Russian presence,
an enclave secured by Russian peace- there is now a permanent Turkish mili-
keepers, a solution that both Armenia tary presence on Azerbaijani territory.
and Azerbaijan had previously opposed
for years. Furthermore, Armenia will be As well as Armenia, the Second Na-
increasingly dependent on Russia, with gorno-Karabakh War was also a defeat
the safety of the Armenians remaining for international organisations and the
in Nagorno-Karabakh and the military post-Cold War security architecture in
security of Armenia itself now directly general, because two major regional
dependent on Russia’s goodwill. This powers essentially decided the out-
will affect Armenia’s domestic and come of the war. The content and style
foreign policy in the future. On the of this agreement are reminiscent
other hand, the course and outcome of of the spheres-of-influence thinking
the war also involve risks for Russia. and power politics that characterised
Armenia’s alliance with Russia was international relations in the 19th and
seen as a strategic security guarantee 20th centuries.

24 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA IN AFRICA:
AMBITIONS AND REALITY

 President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Vladimir SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU /
Putin at the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi CC BY 4.0

Leaning on Africa, Russia projects itself as a great power,
its geopolitical worldview firmly set on demonstrating the
nation’s influence.

In recent years, the Kremlin has Russia’s growing interest in Africa
increasingly focused on Africa, which was illustrated by the first Russia-­
offers opportunities for both strategic Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019, which
and tactical advances – achievements received wide media coverage, making
to show off Russia’s prominence and promises to double Russia’s trade with
importance. Africa in the next five years. Vladimir

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 25

RUSSIA’S TOP TRADING PARTNERS VS ITS MAIN
TRADING PARTNERS IN AFRICA (2019)

China 110 919

Germany 53 161

Belarus 33 346
...

Egypt 6246

Algeria 3394

Morocco 1277

South Africa 1108

Senegal 715

Tunisia 657

Nigeria 421

Togo 400

Sudan 275

Côte d'Ivoire 275
...

0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000

million USD

SO URCE: I NT ER NAT I O NAL T RADE CENT R E

Putin and Egypt’s President Abdel African debts to Russia were written
Fattah el-Sisi, then Chairperson of the off.
African Union, opened the emphatical-
ly grand affair. All African nations were Having advertised its campaign to
represented, most of them at the level expand influence in Africa at the Sochi
of head of state. According to official Summit, Russia has since lost mo-
announcements, more than 50 trade mentum in its advance towards these
agreements worth about 12.5 billion objectives.
US dollars were signed in Sochi. As a
symbolic step, 20 billion US dollars of Russia’s trade volumes in Africa
remain modest compared to several

26 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

 Russian military conglomerate Rostec representative SOURCE: ALGERIAN
Dmitry Shugaev in a meeting with Algeria’s National Army NAT I O NAL T ELEVI S I O N
Chief of Staff Saïd Chengriha in Algeria, September 2020

major powers, which enjoy a significant According to the Stockholm Interna-
lead on the continent. Although Russia tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
increased its exports to Africa by 18% Africa accounts for 17% of Russia’s
and imports by 11% in 2018, trade arms exports. The biggest recipient of
flows have since been on a down- Russian arms in Africa is Algeria, with
ward trend. The already much smaller which Russia has a strategic partner-
volume of African trade compared to ship agreement, covering three key
China and Western countries dropped areas - military, energy and politics.
from $20 billion to $17 billion in 2019 Another important partner is Egypt
and reached only $5.8 billion in the due to its strategic position between
first half of 2020. Africa and the Middle East. Russia has
successfully built a well-established
Due to limited resources and strategic and multi-layered relationship with
interests, Russia’s focus is on cooper- Egypt in both military cooperation and
ation with the North African countries energy. However, Russia’s trade flows
along the EU’s southern border. with Egypt are on a downward trend,

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 27

as with other North African countries. the guise of offering assistance to
Rosatom’s construction of Egypt’s conflict-affected countries or fighting
first nuclear power plant in El Dabaa piracy and terrorism.
has stalled, as Egypt postponed the
issuance of a construction licence until The region also interests Russia from
2021. Progress on the 525-hectare a long-term strategic perspective,
Russian Industrial Zone within the the objective being to counteract the
Suez Canal Economic Zone, part of West’s political, military and economic
President el-Sisi’s large-scale Suez influence. Russia is engaging local
Canal expansion project, is also slow. circles active in civil society in order
The project involves tax advantages to increase its influence and carry out
promised by Egypt and would be an activities opposed to the West. For
export platform to Africa for Russian example, in Mali, several organisations
automotive, oil and gas industries. actively disseminate pro-Russian
messages and conduct information
Another strategically important loca- campaigns against France and the
tion for Russia is Libya, which would West more broadly. One of these is the
offer Russia the opportunity to deploy Groupe Des Patriotes Du Mali, which
units on NATO’s southern flank and has publicly declared its goal of devel-
provide greater flexibility for operations oping close ties with Russia. However,
in the Mediterranean. Libya’s situation the impact of such organisations
is volatile, and Russia aspires to be a remains insignificant, and Russia does
key player in the peace negotiations not really have the ability to mobilise
and the country’s political process. large numbers of people in Mali with
As in Syria, Russia hopes to establish the support of local activists.
itself in Libya’s most lucrative sectors
(e.g. infrastructure and energy) once Seeking to gain better control over the
the conflict is resolved. region, Russia is making the most of
the opportunities available to expand
Sub-Saharan Africa is less important its activities, increase its influence over
to Russia. It focuses on arms exports decision-making processes and “man-
and economic relations there, especial- age” conflicts. As in Libya, Russia is
ly in the mining, energy and agricul- actively “resolving” the conflict in the
tural sectors. Russia often acts under Central African Republic (CAR), where

28 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

 BRDM-2 armoured personnel carriers, a gift from SOURCE: CAMILLE LAFFONT / AFP
Russia to CAR, on show in Bangui in October 2020

favourable conditions are being created Companies associated with oligarch
for expanding business opportuni- Yevgeny Prigozhin have been operating
ties with the support of the Russian in the CAR since 2017. The Russian
authorities. Under the guise of defend- leadership has provided him with
ing the interests of the CAR, Russia is the opportunity to enter into lucra-
reaping the benefits from getting UN tive business agreements regarding
sanctions eased, thus cultivating an minerals and other raw materials. In
image of a great power that assists return, Prigozhin is expanding Rus-
African countries and pushes through sia’s influence in the CAR. Since 2017,
vital decisions for their populations. under pressure from Russia, the UN
In reality, Russia’s activities in the has gradually eased the sanctions
CAR are driven mainly by its business imposed on the CAR in 2013, and
interests. with the approval of the UN Sanctions

OVERESTIMATING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION,
RUSSIA HAS FAILED TO REACH ITS
OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 29

EXPANDING ITS SUPPORT AT THE UN

Another reason Russia is stepping of Crimea (UNGAR 68/262). Only 19 of
up cooperation with African countries the 54 African countries voted in favour
is to secure their support at the UN of the resolution; Sudan and Zimbabwe
on issues that are important to Rus- voted against it. In the past, Russia
sia. African nations represent over a has secured a favourable outcome for
quarter of the vote in the UN General Zimbabwe and Sudan by vetoing sanc-
Assembly. They are a useful ally to tions against them. In 2018, when the
help swing the vote Russia’s way on resolution calling for the withdrawal of
decisions concerning, for example, Russian troops from Crimea (UNGAR
Syria or Ukraine. In 2014, 58 countries, 73/194) was voted on, even more Afri-
including Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, can countries were absent or abstained.
Rwanda and Gabon, abstained from Among them were 18 countries that
voting in the General Assembly on a had supported UNGAR 68/262, includ-
resolution condemning the annexation ing the CAR and Libya.

Committee and based on cooperation private sector, the expansion requires
agreements with the CAR, Russia has no significant investment or resourc-
begun supporting the Central African es from the state. Private operators
Armed Forces (FACA) with weapons allow for flexible administrative
and training. Enhancing defence coop- ­arrangements and have no formal ties
eration with the CAR, increasing arms to their country. This allows Russia
exports and providing security services to deny its involvement altogether if
has also enabled a Prigozhin-affiliated necessary. If the situation in the host
company to benefit from the easing country deteriorates and Russia is
of restrictions on mining operations, ­unable to contribute effectively to con-
and extract diamonds more safely and flict resolution, it can withdraw without
export them more easily. much difficulty, leaving the situation
for others to sort out, and thereby
It is convenient for Russia to rely on adding to instability throughout the
private corporations to expand its region.
influence in Africa; financed by the

30 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC
POLITICS AND
ECONOMY

A regime that is closely tied to an ageing autocrat is
showing growing signs of fatigue. The system seems to
lack ideas as well as energy and opportunities for elegant
political manoeuvring.

SOURCE: ALEXEI DRUZHININ / AP

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 31

2020 CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS

By changing the constitution, the Kremlin legitimised the
current president remaining in power after the 2024 election.

Questions and speculation concerning structures. The resetting, or “zeroing”,
the future of Vladimir Putin and, more of Putin’s presidential terms to date
broadly, Russia’s power structures also came as a surprise to the majority
after 2024 have been around for of Russian society; quite a few people,
some time. The solution arrived with especially among the middle classes in
constitutional amendments. It proved large cities, had hoped that the end of
a disappointment for policy observ- Putin’s presidency in 2024 would ush-
ers expecting some brilliant political er in at least some positive changes in
manoeuvre worthy of the momen- the country’s political system.
tousness of this “2024 problem”. A
day before the State Duma was due The constitutional amendments’
to finish considering the draft amend- main goal was to give the incumbent
ments a simple addition was made: president the right to run again in
a presidential candidate’s previous 2024. The rest of the amendments
terms in office before the amendments and proposals made during the
entered into force would be discount- discussions were above all a cover to
ed, removing this formal obstacle to disguise the initiative’s real purpose,
Putin’s running for another presidency. which was kept from the public for as
Most political analysts had expected long as possible. The constitutional
that Putin would continue to hold on amendments also included clauses
to his de facto powers after 2024, aimed solely at increasing the reform’s
but the simple resetting of previous popularity, such as the indexation of
presidential terms had been considered pensions and social benefits. However,
unlikely due to its lack of sophistica- these were worked out in a way that
tion and questionable legitimacy. The did nothing to actually reinforce social
most widely held expectation was that guarantees. Alongside this hollow
a new position would be created for rhetoric, several amendments were
the current president employing some made to strengthen the president’s
cosmetic reshuffling of the power power; these did not add anything to

32 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Putin’s existing powers but simply presidential powers. However, leading
enshrined in the constitution some de up to the second reading, a number of
facto presidential powers already in proposed amendments were publicised
place. A case in point is the weakening through a State Duma committee and
of the institution of the prime minister; a special working group; the bulk of
in the future, the president can remove these was of questionable legal value
the prime minister separately from but conveyed generally accessible
the cabinet. Moreover, the president ideological statements. By continually
will appoint the foreign minister and keeping these in the media, an attempt
ministers in charge of security and law was made to create the illusion of a
enforcement, subject only to consulta- broad-based discussion, once again
tion with the Federation Council. muddying the waters. By the time the
issue of “zeroing” Putin’s previous
The public narrative concerning the terms was put on the table, many had
constitutional amendments repeatedly already forgotten that amendments
underwent carefully deliberated chang- announced at the first reading had in-
es of direction to avoid people’s atten- creased presidential powers. The lead-
tion focusing on inconvenient issues ership’s desire to hide until the very
for the ruling elite; the main objective last minute Putin’s intention to stay
was to conceal the restructuring’s in power also showed that the ruling
ultimate goal for as long as possible. elite is distinctly aware of the society’s
For example, when first introducing growing weariness with the regime.
the idea of constitutional changes in
a speech to the Federal Assembly in Although the current legislation did
January, President Putin referred to not require a referendum on these
the need to increase the parliament’s specific constitutional amendments,
role, although the proposals in the the Russian leadership was determined
president’s first package of amend- to hold one anyway – to legitimise
ments only concerned increasing the Putin’s continuing as president after
presidential powers. The first package the 2024 elections. Therefore it was
also included a proposal to expand the important to gain majority support
State Council’s role, which led to spec- for the amendments in an official
ulation about Putin’s intention to step vote. Despite the official success story
in as head of the State Council from – 77.92% of voters supported the
2024, and diverted attention away amendments – many regions report-
from the proposals to strengthen the edly experienced serious problems

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 33

PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN’S APPROVAL
RATING UNTIL NOVEMBER 2020

The rating is based on VTsIOM’s surveys in which respondents were asked an open-ended
question to name politicians whom they trust to make important government decisions.

80 2009-2011 2012-2013 2014-2015 2016-2020
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

2006-2008
0

SO U RC E: RUSS IAN PUB LI C O P I NI O N R ES EARCH CENT R E (VTsI O M )

achieving a satisfactory result in the unjust system of power would last
referendum, as well as witnessing indefinitely as a result of the zeroing.
the population’s growing weariness It is also worth noting that the most
with the ruling elite and Vladimir important background factor inciting
Putin. Some hitherto pro-regime the protest vote was the influence of
voter groups showed their dissatis- the new media. Published sociological
faction in the form of an unusually research also points to a significant
large protest vote. The protest voters decline in Putin’s support in recent
were mainly opposed to the zeroing of years. Examples include the approv-
previous presidential terms. They also al ratings published by the Russian
cited opposition to Putin personally, P­ ublic Opinion Research Center
dissatisfaction with the principle that ­(VTsIOM), an organisation with an
one person should remain in power for above-a­ verage relationship with the
so long, and the fact that the existing Russian authorities.

34 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Vladimir Putin very likely intends to avoided a swell of internal tensions
start a new term as president in 2024. among the elite due to the chang-
He could only be forced to abandon es. However, given Putin’s age, the
this plan by a sudden serious health solution is strictly temporary; in the
issue or growing popular opposition longer term, the question of what the
beyond a critical level that the author- regime’s operational logic and the hier-
ities can no longer control. The events archy of power will be like after Putin’s
of 2020 represent a guarantee for departure will still build tensions within
the continuation of the status quo for the elite. Increasing tensions among
Russia’s ruling elite. For most of them, the ruling elite are, of course, only
the news of Putin’s plan to continue one of the threats that Putin’s regime
was positive, as this would ensure the was hoping to alleviate by resolving
continuation of the current system the “2024 problem” early. Given the
of power and way of life beyond the population’s growing weariness with
2024 election. Any fundamental the current power elite and deepening
changes could affect the balance of critical moods, it was safer for the
power within the elite, which the more authorities to address the key aspects
conservative among them would prob- of Putin’s continuation in office – a
ably want to avoid. By resolving the possible cause for protest – as early
2024 problem well in time, Putin also and unexpectedly as possible.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS WAS TO ALLOW VLADIMIR PUTIN TO

RUN FOR REELECTION IN 2024. THE REST
WAS MOSTLY A COVER TO DISGUISE THE REAL

PURPOSE OF THE INITIATIVE.

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 35

INCREASING DOMESTIC TENSIONS
AND THE KREMLIN’S RESPONSE

Increasing tensions combined with the regime’s rigidity and
limited methods create preconditions for domestic political
crises. The stagnant regime’s ability to respond and adapt will
only deteriorate over the next decade, further complicating
the situation.

Growing domestic political tensions shook his image as a strong leader. In
have characterised life in Russia this context, it is especially important
throughout recent years, and 2020 was to consider the changes in the Russian
no exception, as general dissatisfac- media space over the last decade: the
tion and moods critical of the regime share of online media in Russians’ me-
were exacerbated by the effects of the dia consumption has steadily increased,
COVID-19 epidemic and the accompa- while television watching and the
nying restrictions. In addition to the viewers’ trust in this hitherto important
socio-economic effects, the outbreak pillar of the regime has been steadily
of the virus brought the shortcomings declining. It is increasingly difficult for
of the Russian medical system to the the Kremlin to assert its own interpreta-
public’s attention more than usual (see tion of events in the much more diverse
graph on page 39); the weaknesses online media. It is worth noting that,
and questionable leadership skills of according to a Levada Centre survey,
the political elite also became more the number of respondents who place
visible in the time of crisis. From the more trust in TV as a news source has
very beginning of the first major wave consistently declined, while trust in
of infections, the president was clearly online sources and social media has
reluctant to act decisively and take re- been going up.
sponsibility. During both the spring and
autumn outbreak, President Putin un- The methods and rationale of the
derlined the regional leaders’ responsi- Russian power elite in controlling do-
bility, conveniently reserving for himself mestic political tensions have remained
the role of an overseer. The president’s unchanged – the main emphasis is
apparent personal fear of the virus also on intimidating and, if necessary,
directly subduing the regime’s critics

36 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

THE MAIN INFORMATION CHANNELS AND MOST TRUSTED
NEWS SOURCES AMONG THE RUSSIAN POPULATION

100 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2018 2020 2020
90 March August January August
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

0
2009

Television is the main information channel The internet and social media are the main
information channel
Television is the most trusted information
channel The internet and social media are the most trusted
information channel

SOURCE: LEVADA CENTRE

and opposition activists; the pressure to all voters: becoming more popular
applied by the authorities has increased than Kremlin-backed candidates and
with each year. The central government deviating from the central government’s
is also looking more and more on edge, agenda will sooner or later bring grave
in many cases overreacting in ways consequences. Unfortunately for the
that have been counterproductive. For Kremlin, it turned out the conditions
example, replacing the governor of on the ground had been misjudged,
the Khabarovsk Krai was intended to resulting in several months of sharp
create a more favourable setting for confrontation with the region’s popula-
the central government in the autumn tion, which attracted unwanted atten-
2020 regional elections; the forced tion across the nation.
removal on murder charges of the top
official elected on the back of protest Another overreaction by the Russian
votes was expected to send a message power elite – the poisoning of Alexei

RU SS I A’S D O M EST I C P O L I T I C S A N D ECO N O M Y 37

Navalny by the FSB – had much more also arise in Russia in the near future, or
serious and far-reaching consequenc- how much time and room for manoeu-
es. The very strong pressure from the vring the central government has left. It
Russian authorities on Navalny’s organ- is important to note here that the accu-
isations, which intensified significantly mulation of dissatisfaction leading up to
from the summer of 2019, left no doubt a regime change is not a linear process.
that the Kremlin perceived him as a On the contrary, political activities and
serious threat. With increased domestic the social situation can either slow it
tensions, the Kremlin decided to use down or escalate it. However, it is safe
even more radical solutions than before. to say that the changed attitude in so-
The assassination attempt on a leading ciety and growing moods critical of the
opposition politician demonstrated the government have already significantly
Kremlin’s deteriorating environmental altered the face and logic of the Russian
perception – it clearly failed to fully regime. Repressive measures have now
predict the impact of such an event on become the primary tool for maintain-
Russia’s international position. When ing and defending power.
the events came to light, Russia’s
behaviour, especially the chosen PR In 2021, the main challenge for Russia’s
strategy, at times gave the impression ruling elite will be to achieve a suitable
that the decision-makers had simply result in the State Duma election amidst
lost the plot. This was also the case heightened political tensions in the
with the Kremlin’s justifications for country. The upcoming election will also
jailing Navalny on his return to Russia. show the extent to which Navalny’s poi-
soning helped to make the domestic po-
In 2020, yet more legislative amend- litical environment more convenient for
ments further restricting the already the Kremlin and keep opposition activity
very limited opportunities for opposition in check. The undoubted goal of those
activities and expressing civic opinions in power is to achieve a State Duma
were introduced. Notable examples majority for United Russia, ideally a
include extending the scope of the constitutional majority. It is possible that
“foreign agents” law and the amend- new players will be added to the list of
ments concerning the rules for public systemic, or controlled, opposition par-
gatherings. ties that are allowed to run for the State
Duma; several new systemic opposition
The growing domestic political dis- parties were established in 2020, three
satisfaction of recent years raises the of which also made it to regional parlia-
question whether a situation similar to ments in the autumn elections, paving
that in Belarus in autumn 2020 might

38 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

NEW PLAYERS ON THE KREMLIN-
CURATED POLITICAL SCENE

In the autumn 2020 regional elections, three new systemic opposition parties –
New People, For the Truth and the Green Alternative – were elected to regional par-
liaments, paving the way for them to run in the forthcoming State Duma election.
In addition to these three, other new parties were formed at the Kremlin’s initiative
in the first months of 2020, but have so far remained less active. In early 2021,
For the Truth announced plans to join A Just Russia, another systemic opposition
party.

the way for them to run in the State Alternative party, which focuses on envi-
Duma election. By introducing new po- ronmental issues. However, given that
litical parties to elections, the Kremlin’s recasting the protagonist’s role in this
political technologists hope, on the one national democracy spectacle is not an
hand, to renew the systemic opposition, option; the essential condition for select-
and on the other hand, to divide the ing groups or individuals for supporting
protest votes against United Russia roles is that they must not be or become
between different parties within the sys- too attractive to the electorate and
temic opposition. Moreover, many of the threaten to overshadow the protago-
new systemic opposition parties have nist. With these requirements in place,
been set up to channel the mood of this any attempt to renew the ruling elite’s
or that specific group of voters critical of political landscape is bound to have only
the regime; examples include the Green a limited impact.

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 39

HEALTHY LIFE EXPECTANCY AND
PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE

Healthy life expectancy Japan
75

Spain France

73 Cyprus Italy Australia Switzerland
South Korea Israel Norway

Portugal Austria Sweden
Greece Finland Denmark

71 Slovenia United Germany
Kingdom

Czech Republic

69 China Poland Qatar

Slovakia USA
Estonia Baltic states’ average
Caucasus states’ average
67 Hungary
Central Asian states’ average
Latvia
Lithuania

Kyrgyzstan
65 Georgia

Uzbekistan
Ukraine

Russia
63 Kazakhstan

Indonesia Russia’s health care system is glaringly inefficient: despite a 2 or 3 times
Turkmenistan higher public health expenditure, healthy life expectancy remains at the
same level with Central Asian countries.
61 Egypt
A vivid account of the Russian health care system’s extremely backward
India situation emerges from a Russian Accounts Chamber report’s section on
59 Iraq medical institutions providing paediatric primary care:

Pakistan » 30% of medical institutions completely lack a water supply;
57 Congo » 52% of medical institutions lack a hot water supply;
» 35% of medical institutions lack a sewerage connection;
Angola » 41% of medical institutions lack central heating.

55 Haiti 2000 $ 3000 $ 4000 $ 5000 $ 6000 $ 7000 $ 8000 $ 9000 $ 10 000 $
0 $ 1000 $ Health expenditure per capita per year

SO URC E: H EALTH EX P ENDI T UR E 2 0 12 -16 AVERAG E, W HO DATA FO R 2 0 16

40 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIA’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN

In 2020, the economic crisis was accompanied by the Russian
population’s rapid income loss.

The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has Due to the rapid spread of the corona-
sharply highlighted the Russian virus, the Kremlin was forced to impose
economy’s structural weaknesses, the a “non-working period” from 30 March
main factors being over-reliance on the to 12 May on the vast majority of com-
export of energy carriers, an uncertain panies and institutions, combined with
investment climate and the public an obligation to maintain staff salaries.
sector’s excessive involvement in the However, this proved overwhelming for
economy. For Russia, the situation is many businesses, as state aid meas-
further complicated because the coun- ures provided only partial relief.
try’s economy had not yet recovered
from the previous crisis in 2014-15. According to Russia’s federal statistics
service, Rosstat, the country’s GDP fell
The plunging oil prices on the world by 8% in the second quarter of 2020.
market caused by the pandemic During the second wave of COVID-19,
reduced Russia’s export volumes by the Kremlin has sought to avoid impos-
almost a third in the first half of 2020. ing severe quarantine measures so as
Revenues from the oil and gas sec- not to repeat the second quarter’s dark
tor to the Russian state budget also scenario. In 2020 as a whole, Russia’s
decreased by a third compared to the economy is predicted to shrink by about
first half of 2019, significantly hamper- 4%. While growth may be restored from
ing the country’s ability to implement the second half of 2021, as the virus
effective economic measures to fight recedes, it is likely to be relatively slow,
the crisis. The ongoing economic crisis given the build-up of systemic econom-
hit all sectors of the Russian economy ic problems.
hard. In addition to declining export
earnings, domestic consumption also One of the main goals of the Russian
contracted against the background of government’s economic policy during
rising unemployment and falling real the crisis has been to maintain the
income. country’s foreign currency reserves as

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 41

AVERAGE GROSS MONTHLY WAGES

2006-2020, USD Average gross monthly wages 2006-20 (USD)

2000

Estonia

1500

1000 Russia
500

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

SO URCES : ROSSTAT, STAT I ST I CS ESTO NI A

much as possible, not to spend them sharply due to rising unemployment
on economic stimulus or social bene- and wage cuts. According to Rosstat,
fits. To cover the state budget deficit Russians’ real incomes decreased
and public investment needs, the tax by 4.3% year on year in the first
burden on business has been stepped nine months of 2020. According to
up, and government internal borrowing forecasts, the population’s annual
has been significantly increased. This real i­ncome in 2020 will be 10% lower
policy will certainly not contribute to than in 2013. Therefore, Russia’s
economic recovery. living standards have essentially
­stagnated for a whole decade (see
The Russian population’s socio-­ figure).
economic situation has deteriorated

RUSSIA’S LIVING STANDARDS HAVE
STAGNATED FOR A DECADE.

42 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Percentage of respondents RUSSIAN POPULATION’S RAPID LOSS OF
INCOME DURING THE CRISIS

Russia’s population groups by monthly income, February-June 2020, RUB
Russia’s population groups by monthly income, February-June 2020, RUB

40

February
June

30

20

10

0

Up to 5,000 5,000-15,000 15,000-25,000 25,000-35,000 35,000-50,000 50,000-100,000

SOURCE: ROSGOSSTRAKH ZHIZN

In February 2020, the Russian insurance earning a salary corresponding to a mid-
provider Rosgosstrakh Zhizn, with the help of dle-class living standard of 50,000–100,000
the Perspektiva research centre, conducted a roubles per month, and their share had de-
sociological survey on people’s income, asking creased by 4% compared to February. In June
the respondents to state their average monthly 2020, 8.1% of respondents had to cope with
income per household member. The survey extreme poverty, i.e. up to 5,000 roubles per
was repeated in June to assess the impact of month, and their share had increased by 1.2 per
the COVID-19 epidemic on people’s income. cent. Although this study is unlikely to coincide
with the official wage statistics and does not
The results showed that in June almost 73% take into account income earned in the shadow
of the population placed themselves in the economy, it does show a clear trend – the
low-income bracket of up to 25,000 roubles; current economic crisis has rapidly reduced the
the share of people in this income group had income of Russia’s middle class and pushed
increased by 9.1 percentage points since Feb- more families to the brink of poverty.
ruary. Only 3.5% of the respondents reported

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 43

According to Russia’s official statistics, other economic and political tensions
as of the end of June 2020, 19.9 mil- entangling Russia, and the massive
lion people, or 13.5% of the country’s money printing by the Russian central
population, lived below the subsistence bank. If the economic crisis drags on,
minimum (11,468 roubles or about 128 Russia’s financial sector may also face
euros per month). Year on year, this major difficulties.
number had increased by 1.3 million.
These statistics also took into account Russia’s stagnated economic perfor-
the emergency social benefits paid in mance is mainly due to the govern-
connection with the COVID-19 pan- ment’s unwillingness to reform the
demic, mainly to families with chil- existing state-capitalist model. This
dren. According to the government’s has been accompanied by reduced
socio-economic development forecast, competition in the economy, ineffi-
the real income of the population cient governance and corruption, as
should return to the 3% growth path in well as a decline in investment activity.
2021 and maintain positive dynamics The West’s economic sanctions in
in the following years as well. How- response to the Kremlin’s aggressive
ever, this may be an overly optimistic foreign policy and the changes taking
projection based on the expectation place in the global energy market also
that COVID-19 will be a short-term have a significant negative impact
phenomenon. In addition, Russians are on Russia’s economic performance.
facing accelerating inflation caused by President Putin’s "national projects"
the weakening rouble. In addition to investment programme, outlined in
Western sanctions and oil prices, the his 2018 ‘May Decrees’, is unlikely to
rouble is also negatively affected by meet the expectations placed on it

RUSSIA’S STAGNATED ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IS
CAUSED BY THE GOVERNMENT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO

REFORM THE EXISTING STATE-CAPITALIST MODEL.

44 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIA’S GDP COMPARED WITH
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES AND SELECTED
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

70 000 Oil price 120
60 000 Developed economies IMF forecast
50 000
40 000 Estonia 100
30 000 Russia
20 000 80
10 000 Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan 60
GDP per capita (USD)
Oil price (Brent USD/bbl) 40

20

00
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025

According to the IMF’s forecast published in October 2020, Russia’s economic develop-
ment will continue to be almost twice as slow as the world economy average after the
pandemic, causing Russia’s nominal GDP per capita to fall below Kazakhstan’s by 2025,
ending up on a par with Turkmenistan.

SOURCE: IMF

regarding accelerating the economy, is likely to befall Russia’s plan for its
as it does not seize the real opportu- socio-economic development goals, the
nities or address the actual needs of deadlines for which the government
the Russian market. According to IMF was forced to postpone from 2024 to
forecasts (see figure), the same fate 2030 due to the COVID-19 crisis.

T he R ussian A rmed Forces 45

THE RUSSIAN ARMED
FORCES

Despite the pandemic, Russia
will continue to focus on
its military advantages in
Europe, including testing
them in the Zapad 2021
military exercise.

Without the public being made aware  The Russian Minister of Defence SOURCE: MIL.RU /
of this, the Russian Armed Forces presents measures against CC BY 4.0
also experienced an extensive spread COVID-19 to the ministry’s
of COVID-19 in 2020. The training for leadership on 27 November 2020
spring conscripts was delayed due
to the procedures employed against Moreover, Russia shows no sign of
the spread of the virus. The reported having revised its long-term strategy for
cases and deaths also included senior the armed forces, which is to increase
officers, generals and admirals. Whole readiness for a full-scale confrontation
units and crews were quarantined. with NATO. Regional superiority is still
clearly a top priority for Russia, in terms
However, the Russian Armed Forces’ of the establishing of new military units
long term development and key capa- and the modernisation and deployment
bilities cannot be said to have suffered of missile techologies.
significantly due to the virus. The usual
number of conscripts was recruited Examples include a new tank regiment
and the annual major military exercise (2019) and motor rifle division (2020)
– this time Kavkaz 2020 – took place created in the Kaliningrad Oblast. The
on the typical scale. The customary
strategic nuclear exercise was post-
poned by two months primarily due
to the coronavirus restrictions, but did
take place in December.

46 T he R ussian A rmed Forces

motor rifle division is the sixth consec- systems in Europe and the resulting
utive new division established by the change in the balance of power. The
Russian Armed Forces in the western Russian leadership remains concerned
direction within the past seven years. about US missile defence system Aegis
Russia is also deploying the 120 km Ashore facilities in Europe, which in
range Bal coastal defence missile sys- Russia’s view would prevent it from
tems along the Gulf of Finland’s coast. being able to threaten NATO with a
nuclear attack.
While strengthening its conventional
military capabilities, Russia is also To this end, Russian foreign policy
increasing the versatility of its forces, resorts to influence activities and
such as reforming the Airborne Forces deception. In September 2019, Rus-
(VDV) described below, as an emerging sian President Vladimir Putin sent a
new trend. In the future, VDV units are letter to several countries’ leaders,
expected to be able to carry out tasks including NATO member states and
across the entire spectrum of military China, proposing a moratorium on the
engagement, from local conflict to deployment of INF intermediate-range
large-scale conventional warfare. missiles in Europe. Moreover, Putin
declared that Russia would be willing to
Until now, the Russian Armed Forces do this unilaterally. At the same time,
have taken it for granted that regional since 2017, three battalions equipped
superiority in terms of short- and medi- with the new medium-range missile
um-range missile systems and com- system 9M729 (the reason for the clash
plete superiority in terms of tactical nu- over the INF Treaty) have been deployed
clear warheads are the cornerstones of in the European portion of Russia.
their military power in Europe. However, Imposing a formal moratorium to set an
with the termination of the INF Treaty, example would therefore not require any
the Russian national defence leadership real concessions from Russia but would
has begun to worry about maintain- perpetuate its complete missile superi-
ing this superiority. Russia is trying to ority in Europe, where NATO countries
prevent the deployment of US missile currently have no surface-to-surface

THE MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION IN THE KALININGRAD OBLAST
IS THE SIXTH NEW DIVISION ESTABLISHED ON RUSSIA’S
WESTERN BORDER WITHIN THE PAST SEVEN YEARS.

T he R ussian A rmed Forces 47

 An amphibious landing on the island
of Hogland in August 2020

SOURCE: MIL.RU / CC BY 4.0

short-range missile systems, let alone transponders switched off, and recon-
medium-range ones. Once again, naissance flights have not ceased.
Russia is presenting itself as being open
to cooperation by offering concessions In 2021, another major exercise in
that only appear as such. the European direction, Zapad 2021,
traditionally a rehearsal for a conflict
Russia also continues to apply decep- with NATO in the Baltic Sea region, is
tion in its foreign policy against NATO expected. The exercise cannot be ig-
as a whole to weaken the alliance nored by Estonia and NATO, as Russia
and transatlantic relations. In May will deploy tens of thousands of troops
2020, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei along the borders of the Baltic states.
Lavrov sent a letter to NATO Secre- The Russian Air Force flight activity
tary General Jens Stoltenberg calling over the Baltic Sea will increase sig-
for the suspension of major military nificantly, and Russia is likely to move
exercises along the “line of contact” additional warships from the Black Sea
and suggesting that transponders on and Northern Fleets to the region. As
military flights be switched on. Similar in the previous exercise, Zapad 2017,
calls from Russian high-ranking military Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army is likely
personnel followed. In reality, there was to deploy some of its forces to Belarus
no significant change, only reduced as part of the Regional Grouping of
press coverage of the exercises. Despite Forces of Belarus and Russia.
its apparent foreign policy initiative,
Russia continued military exercises in However, this year’s exercise, Zapad
its Western Military District on a more 2021, may be unprecedented in more
or less ordinary scale. At the end of
August 2020, the Russian 6th Com-
bined Arms Army and the Baltic Fleet
conducted their first joint exercise in the
Gulf of Finland, in the immediate vicinity
of Estonia’s northeastern border, which
included an amphibious landing on the
island of Hogland. Russian military
aircraft also continue flying with their

48 T he R ussian A rmed Forces

ways than one. First, the structure THE LOCATIONS
of the exercise may be affected by OF MISSILE
the course of events in Belarus. The BRIGADES AND
Belarusian Armed Forces and the RANGES OF THE
Regional Grouping of Forces of Belarus ISKANDER-M
and Russia have traditionally played MISSILES
a critical role in Russia’s operational ON RUSSIA’S
plans for the western direction. Due WESTERN
to their close integration with the BORDER
Russian armed forces, the Belarusian
forces may be currently called Russia’s "Iskander-M"
“Belarus Military District”. However, in
the event of a significant deepening of
the domestic political crisis, or political
reforms, in Belarus, adjustments to
Russia’s military exercise scenarios or
military planning in relation to NATO
may prove necessary.

Another interesting aspect to look
out for in the Zapad 2021 exercise is
China’s possible participation in the
Zapad series for the first time. China
has taken part in Russia’s annual stra-
tegic exercises since Vostok 2018. If
China also confirms its participation in
Zapad 2021, it will be intriguing to see
how the Chinese armed forces define
their role in a military operation against
NATO in Europe. However, a military
alliance between Russia and China will
not materialise anytime soon, due to a
lack of interest on China’s part.