Chinese Rebellions - spf.org

Asian Voices :
Promoting Dialogue Between the US and Asia

Chinese Rebellions

by

Mr. Ian Buruma

Author and Journalist

November 29, 2001

Seminar Transcript

Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Washington, DC

Chinese Rebellions

by
Mr. Ian Buruma

Ian Buruma: Since this is a rather intimate China’s Confucian Past
gathering, with your permission I’ll be a little
less formal and talk to you from the table and One of the arguments for this view is that
not stand up there at the pulpit like a preacher. authoritarianism in one form or another suits
China is a slightly non-topic at the moment. If the Chinese tradition. That historically they’ve
we’d been sitting here two years ago, we always had strong authoritarian central gov-
would probably be fretting about the coming ernments, and the Confucian system is often
war with China or the coming collapse of invoked, and that this fits the way of govern-
China or the coming something of China, but ing things in China. And that anything else is
at least we’d be fretting. Now we’re fretting a sort of alien imposition and one would be an
about other things. arrogant Western neo-colonialist to think that
a more open democratic system would be
Stability in China equally or perhaps more suitable.

Nonetheless, China now is a valued member The assumptions behind this view of Chinese
of the coalition, is still being discussed here politics are several. I’m interested in these
and there, and in increasingly positive terms, assumptions and that’s part of the reason I
which is a change from before. China is being wrote this book, Bad Elements. One of the
contrasted with India as a kind of success assumptions is that politics follow or reflect a
story. India is seen as at least economically a kind of monolithic culture, that you have a
disaster and the Chinese appear to be forging cultural tradition in a particular area of the
ahead more and more. China is thought to be world and therefore the politics should be read
by many businessmen who flocked to invest as a kind of reflection of that tradition, of that
there, diplomats who are based there and culture, that the culture produces a particular
commentators outside China as a place that is set of political institutions. Since China is not
basically stable. Britain, it’s logical that it would have pro-
duced a different way of governing the nation.
The people who believe that also usually
believe that the reason for its seeming stability This idea that politics reflects culture is of
is that it has a party, one party in the govern- course also a Chinese one, and I would
ment that is still firmly in control of things. argue it’s one of the problems with China. It’s
They would argue, and one hears this argu- not China alone, but all countries with a
ment often, that the Chinese or China is too Confucian past tend to have this, but China in
big, too diverse, too backward in education particular. Namely the idea that the govern-
and so on, to be able to handle a different ment in power, and this was true of imperial
kind of system yet, and that some form of China just as much as it is today under the
authoritarianism is necessary because other- Communist Party. The assumption is that the
wise you wouldn’t have the stability that we government is not simply there to wield tem-
have today. We’d have chaos, people would poral political power, to govern political insti-
mayhem in the streets, people wouldn’t know tutions, but it’s also the source, the guardian
how to handle it, they would be at each other’s perhaps, of Chinese tradition, of spiritual life,
throats, and so on and so forth. of ethics and so on. The Mandarinate are the

1

kind of scribes, the scholar-gentlemen or the Myth of “One China”
scribes — used to be, the scribes to define and
promote and articulate the ethics and the spir- One of the reasons in this book that I looked
itual background of Chinese culture that is not just at the People’s Republic of China but
reflected in the government. that I looked at the whole Chinese-speaking
world, including Taiwan and Singapore and
In other words, there is a kind of cosmic idea Hong Kong, was to show what a myth this
of politics which goes back centuries. The really is. That there isn’t just one China and
idea, namely, that the people who rule China there isn’t just one Chinese tradition, and that
are not simply politicians or officials, they are indeed even people who come from the same
— as the emperors were — literally people cultural tradition in different historical circum-
who mediate between heaven and earth. It’s a stances can go to completely different political
system where ethics and politics and culture directions. The Taiwanese, the Singaporeans,
and so on are all bound up together. So in a the Hong Kong Chinese and the Chinese in the
way, church and state in China have never PRC are all Chinese, but all these different
really been separated. parts of the Chinese-speaking world have
different politics. In other words, this alone is
Since governments, and I think in this way the a demonstration, I think, of how careful one
communist government really isn’t so differ- should be with drawing direct links between
ent from imperial governments, even though cultural tradition and particular political
in other ways it’s very different, but since gov- arrangements.
ernments to this day set themselves up as the
guardians of what it is to be China, of an idea The country that appears to be in the forefront
of China, of Chinese civilization as a whole, of this view that authoritarian politics repre-
it’s very easy for them to depict dissidents and sent particular Chinese values or Chinese civ-
those who challenge their power and who ilization is also the smallest of them all, and
rebel as anti-Chinese. They’re not just anti- that is Singapore. Even though the promoters
government, by being against the government and defenders of the Singapore government,
they’re against China. So it’s suggested quite which is, like the Chinese one, a de facto one-
deliberately by the government, since the gov- party state, don’t speak of Chinese values,
ernment justifies its power by being the they speak of Asian values — for very obvious
guardian of civilization. reasons, since the majority of Singaporeans
may be ethnically Chinese, but there are still
This also bedevils, I think, a lot of the rebels Tamils and Malays and others to consider.
themselves, because a lot of the dissidents and So to speak of Chinese values would be a
rebels against the governments of the day see mistake. But in fact, when people talk about
themselves not simply as rebels against a Asian values in Singapore, they do mean
particular set of political arrangements, they Chinese values.
see themselves often as saviors of Chinese
civilization, who have to change not only the I think it is in fact a kind of vulgarized version
politics but also the ethics and the spiritual of Confucianism that they have in mind, and
life and the whole caboodle. It has to be — a in fact it doesn’t bear a great deal of relation to
revolution is often almost of a cosmic nature. the origins of Confucianism at all. The idea,
It’s not just politics that has to be changed but for example, that it is within the Confucian
everything that is associated with it. So to be tradition for people to obey their rulers and not
a rebel in China is not simply to be a political to criticize them and so on, which is often an
rebel, it’s often to be a kind of savior of idea that is promoted in Singapore, couldn’t be
Chinese civilization. further from Confucius’ own original ideas.
He said quite clearly that it was the duty of the

2

scholar-gentleman to criticize his ruler if he kind of authoritarianism, is that there is
saw the ruler departing from the truth or mak- another part of the Chinese world that has of
ing mistakes. This is not something that is late gone into a very different direction,
encouraged in Singapore, of course. namely Taiwan. Taiwan is an example of
Chinese people actually successfully making
The problem, I think, in Singapore is that the transition from an authoritarian regime to
many of the people who speak of Chinese a democratic one. I think it’s something for
tradition or Asian values often have very little which they are insufficiently congratulated. It
idea of what they’re talking about. They’re is profoundly irritating to authoritarians in
often English-educated people who’ve read a other parts of the Chinese-speaking world
little bit about Chinese culture in English- because it disproves their view of what it is to
language books, but often have very little be Chinese, or what it is to rule Chinese people.
idea. It is a tool, they use it, it is a form of
propaganda. I think the reason why Taiwan and also Hong
Kong, if they had had the chance, the reason
Moreover, I think the generation of Lee Kuan that they’ve made this successful transition to
Yew, the former prime minister whose shadow more democratic politics actually has a lot to
still hovers over almost every aspect of life do with this idea of China or Chinese politics
and guards the so-called garden state, that I being not simply politics but a system of ethics
think what he associates with Asian values, and the whole cosmic view of the world. I say
namely discipline, authoritarianism, the idea this because the Taiwanese dissidents in a
that Asian people are not yet ready for democ- sense were liberated from the idea that they
racy and otherwise you have chaos and so on, had to save China. They weren’t interested in
is largely derived from the British colonial tra- saving China.
dition. It is a kind of translation of British
colonial ideas that he imbibed and people of The dissidents in Taiwan, who were often in
his generation — Mahathir is another example exile in the United States or in jail in Taiwan,
— imbibed in their youth and now call Asian, when they fought the KMT, the Kuomintang,
whereas in fact these are colonial prejudices, the nationalists who’d come from mainland
which they inherited and twisted. China to Taiwan in the late 1940s, their goal
was not to save China, it was simply to free the
Nonetheless, the idea that a strong authoritar- so-called native Taiwanese, those whose
ian government is the only thing that stands ancestors had come to Taiwan three hundred
between civilization and chaos is something years ago, from the authoritarian government
that the People’s Action Party government in of the mainlanders who ran the KMT. So it
Singapore has in common, I think, with the was the KMT that pretended to stand for
Communist Party in China. Indeed, there is Chinese civilization, quite literally.
something Chinese about that. It’s fairly easy
to do in Singapore because the idea to give One of the justifications for KMT rule in
middle-class, ethnically Chinese people the Taiwan was that they saw themselves as the
idea that they’re surrounded by Malays who at true guardians of Chinese culture and Chinese
the drop of a hat will run amok and that you tradition, and the idea was always that the
need a strong government to keep order, Maoists had smashed Chinese culture and
would be deeply appealing to them. there was this one place where Chinese culture
was still being preserved. This was very much
Democratic Politics in Taiwan politicized and used as a justification for KMT
rule and KMT aspirations ultimately to rule
What is a little irritating to the Singaporeans, the whole of China. None of this interested
or at least the Singaporeans who uphold this the Taiwanese dissidents particularly. For

3

them to be branded as anti-Chinese, which prominent in 1989 during the Tiananmen
they sometimes were by the KMT, didn’t demonstrations as one of the people who acted
bother them at all. In fact, being anti-Chinese as a kind of funnel for Hong Kong funds and
for them was in some ways an advantage. Hong Kong help for the students in the square
in Beijing. He was a ubiquitous figure with
Another way in which this manifested itself sort of lots of curly hair and schmoozing the
was the fact that they would often use their square and so on. After the crackdown in
history as a former Japanese colony against Beijing, he was also very active in getting the
the pretensions of the mainlanders who’d Chinese student leaders out. But since then,
come over from China and pretended to stand he’d moved to Taipei.
for the Chinese culture. When I went around
interviewing a lot of these people, who are I went to his office, where he runs a television
now in their sixties and seventies usually and station, and I asked him about this strange
speak perfect Japanese still, one thing that phenomenon, about the native Taiwanese
was – in fact, Taiwan is perhaps the one always going on about how terrible the
country of Japanophiles in Asia, which is Chinese are and how awful China is and how
quite unusual. much better Japan was and how different they
are and so on. I asked him for his views and
Rosy-Tinted Version of Colonial History he said, this is all nonsense of course. The
Taiwanese, they’re just like the mainland
What was so interesting and striking is how Chinese, they’re unruly, they spit in the
often they would give me a completely rosy- streets, they disobey traffic rules, they have no
tinted version of Japanese colonial history. idea of the rule of law, democracy means noth-
They would say very often, unprompted, how ing to them, and so on and so forth. But, he
much better life had been under the Japanese, said, the Hong Kong Chinese of course are
they at least had an idea of order and fair play quite different. They’re civilized, they under-
and the rule of law. Yes, they were harsh and stand the rule of law, it’s orderly and so on. Of
Taiwanese were second-class citizens, but at course, you know why this is, he said to me. I
least it was a functioning modern society and said, no I didn’t, although I knew what was
everything good had been learned from the coming. He said, it’s because we were under
Japanese. Unlike these mainlanders — and the British.
often they wouldn’t even say mainlanders,
they would often say, unlike these Chinese — Sense of Distrust Among
who spit in the streets and don’t obey traffic Educated Chinese
rules and are unruly and disorderly and horri-
ble in every way. They wanted to be more like This shows the sort of extraordinary sense of
the Japanese. Of course, this is not an accurate distrust, in a way, in themselves that I found
description or even an accurate memory of among educated Chinese. So-called ordinary
what it was really like to be under the people, on the whole, don’t fret about tradition
Japanese, but it was used as a way to really or civilization or identity, it is an elite preoc-
oppose mainlander Chinese rule. cupation. But one of the striking things, which
I vaguely knew but it became much more
One of the more extraordinary moments in obvious to me after interviewing a lot of peo-
researching my book was one afternoon, it ple, is how close nationalism and a sense of
was during one of the elections in Taiwan, and superiority was to a sense of self-flagellation.
I went to see an old friend of mine from Hong The same people who would lecture you,
Kong, who was called John Shum. He used to indeed, because Chinese intellectuals rather
be a very famous figure, he was a comedian in like to lecture, particularly foreigners, but only
Hong Kong movies. He became politically foreigners — they would lecture you on the

4

ancient civilization, the superiority of China, macy was left in the late ‘80s was completely
the deep feelings and so on. But the same smashed in 1989 when the government turned
person in a different mood could very quickly its tanks on its own people.
flip into the story about everything about
China is terrible, the Chinese are hateful Without ideological legitimacy, without the
people, they lie to each other. legitimacy of a dogma based on ethics and
behavior and being the guardian of Chinese
I think the way to explain this is that the culture and so on, what is left? Just two
assumption of being the Middle Kingdom, and things. One is the promise that everybody’s
indeed having the most ancient and therefore going to get richer. Well, three things. One is
superior civilization, is so deep that it comes the traditional one that it’s the only way to pre-
as a great sense of humiliation to see that serve order. Two is that everybody’s going to
China has sunk to the level of a third world get richer. Well, not everybody is getting
country. So the self-flagellation is as extreme richer or going to get richer, and there will be
as the sense of superiority. One can flip into economic crises in China inevitably, as they
the other very quickly. occur everywhere. A government that has no
legitimacy is not well placed to cope with a
To conclude my remarks, and perhaps provoke crisis, because it has no flexibility. People
comment here and then from you, I would like don’t really believe in its right to rule anyway.
to go back to what I said in the beginning and If things go wrong economically and people
raise the question once more. Is it true that feel left behind and left out and impoverished,
benign authoritarianism in the form of one- things could get very ugly indeed. I think that
party rule — perhaps the word benign doesn’t the likelihood of violent upheavals in the
really apply — authoritarianism in the form of countryside and among unemployed workers
one-party rule is the only way to preserve and so on are not unlikely.
stability in China? And that any kind of
transition to something else, something more The only other form of legitimacy that would
democratic, would be chaotic and that the be left would be the nasty kind of ethnic
price would be too high to pay and the country nationalism, which is already much in evi-
wouldn’t be ready for it and so on? dence, and which would deflect domestic
unrest into belligerency abroad. In the first
Authoritarian Government place against Taiwan, I would say, and that
not China’s Solution would lead to all kinds of other unpleasant-
ness. Unfortunately, the kind of nationalism
I’m, of course, not convinced of this. I would that is now abroad in China is actually not
argue, in fact, the opposite. I think that, again, based on ancient Chinese culture at all, even
it has to do with this cosmic justification of though some of its proponents might think so.
political rule, of the right to rule. The legiti- It is based on equally European ideas as the
macy of the Communist Party government democratic ones. It is the mostly German idea
before was as much based on dogma as impe- of the nation-state as a kind of ethnic family
rial governments were before them, except and the idea of blood and soil and so on, which
that nobody believes in the dogma anymore. is not a traditionally Chinese one but came
Even people, members of the Communist really in the late nineteenth century, influ-
Party on the whole don’t believe in Marxism, enced by Europeans, mostly German thinkers.
let alone Maoism. It is still a Leninist party It’s precisely the kind of view of society that
and the system of government is still that of a the Japanese adopted after the Meiji restora-
communist government, but communism is tion and became more and more extreme, also
not really enough anymore to give the govern- often as the result of economic crises, and
ment any legitimacy. What ideological legiti- ended up in belligerency abroad. It is not to be

5

hoped that the Chinese will go that route, but current system is not only possible — not only
it is certainly not to be dismissed either. desirable but possible.

In other words, and I would conclude with The issue is how to get it, because Ian’s
that, I would turn it around. People who say remarks, he said in the long run a democratic
that one-party authoritarian rule is the guaran- system will be the true guarantor of peace and
tor of stability in China, I think in the long run order in China. I personally believe this.
— in the short run it might be a messy process, Many people in China believe this. But in the
inevitably it will be. But in the long run, a long run — the problem is the short run, the
democratic, more representative system will transition itself, will be so fraught with uncer-
be the only guarantor of stability in China. tainty and very possibly upheaval that even if
Thank you very much. you have a transition you may not end up
getting it. Here’s why I think that even though
Minxin Pei: It’s embarrassing to confess that democratic institutions are compatible with
not having read Ian Buruma’s book and having Chinese history or Chinese tradition, and I
read only a very brief book review of the think democratic institutions are increasingly
book, I presumed, now it seems it turns out embraced by a rising number of Chinese peo-
incorrectly, that he was going to talk about the ple, the real challenge for China is not to instill
overseas Chinese dissident community. Did the idea of democracy but to find practical
you cover that community in your book? ways of instituting democratic institutions.

Buruma: This is — you mean in America in Transition to Democracy
particular? Yes, yes, sure.
China’s transition to democracy will most
Pei: So I prepared my remarks focusing on likely face enormous challenges, for the fol-
that particular group. Now, after listening lowing reasons. First of all, the size of a coun-
to his remarks, I find myself rather unprepared try does matter. I think if you look at large
to deal with the central issue he has raised, countries, large countries tend to have more
which is really the idea of the one-party problems, because of diversity, because of his-
system of authoritarian rule as the guarantor of torical accumulated tensions, and also because
stability in China. Let me just first briefly of ethnic problems. The example of Taiwan is
address the issue of authoritarianism and encouraging, but I’m not going to bet the farm
stability in China, then I think say some- that China’s evolution will evolve a la Taiwan,
thing about the role of dissidents, overseas because Taiwan after all took fifty years to
dissidents, in Chinese politics or the future move to where it was and from a much more
evolution of China. favorable base. China’s smallest province is
larger than Taiwan, if we exclude Beijing,
Communist Party Shanghai and Tianjin, these three municipali-
Cannot Guarantee Stability ties. So even though I think theory does not
provide a lot of support for the idea that size
I think few serious people in China outside somehow will influence politics, but in reality
the Communist Party or even inside the it does.
Communist Party would treat the idea that
China’s peace and stability can be guaranteed Second, I think the current regime is particu-
only by the Chinese Communist Party. I think larly poorly prepared or equipped to deal with
even though the party itself would like to use a democratic challenge. Most importantly
this as one of the claims to rule, the people I because this is a regime that has not really
meet in China who do look beyond the current faced up to its own misdeeds, if not atrocities,
phase believe that something other than the in its fifty years of rule, so as a result a lot of

6

historical issues have not been addressed. If them. Many people ask whether they are
the Soviet collapse is an example, a period of going to be an effective force in the future
Chinese glasnost is likely to unleash a flood- evolution of China. My own assessment is
gate of grievances and anger and recrimina- that is not, because if their record of the last
tion, and you may likely see an evaporation of ten years — because a real Chinese political
legitimacy, rather than a gradual erosion of diaspora did not come into being before
legitimacy. That situation is most likely to be Tiananmen and before the exiles following
destabilizing, rather than enhancing stability. Tiananmen, largely because they have not
been effective in either influencing American
Also, over the last twenty years, this party’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China. On several
single-minded focus on developing the econ- critical issues they did not play a decisive role
omy has ironically undermined its political or any role, any discernible role in changing
capacity, especially the capacity to mobilize American foreign policy. Also, they have
public support at the most critical junctures. been fairly ineffective in influencing Ameri-
So if you look at how this party has dealt with can public opinion, for a variety of reasons.
serious challenges to its rule, 1989 and most They have not been able to organize support
recently the Falun Gong movement, it has not among the overseas Chinese community at
relied on trying to mobilize public support large. So the diaspora itself is isolated in key
through various political organizations or metropolitan areas. Finally, they have not
mechanisms, but rather has used the military been able to influence events and develop-
and the security forces to maintain rule. That ments in China.
actually shows the weakness rather than the
strength of the current regime. So in the event I think the reasons for their ineffectiveness are
that in a democratic transition rising chal- both structural and also internal to the special
lenges threaten the survival of the regime, characteristics of a diaspora political move-
you’re not going to have a peaceful resolution. ment. I think structurally speaking, such
groups — the Chinese diaspora is not that
I think finally, in the case of China, we have to different from other political diaspora groups.
recognize the uniqueness of the Chinese state. Once they are uprooted from their own coun-
The Chinese state is a party state, which tries, they find their voices very limited, their
means that if you take away the Chinese resources very scarce, and their ability to
Communist Party there is no state. So if the sustain themselves both politically and
Communist Party should collapse, there is a financially overseas is very limited.
failed state. There’s no state there. So you
will, I think, in that situation likely to have But in the case of the Chinese diaspora, I don’t
chaos. I’m not saying that the claim that the know how extensively you analyzed their
Communist Party guarantees the peace in actions in this country, I think they ought to
China because it is the Communist Party. I blame some of their own conduct and prac-
think even though on its face this claim may tices for their lack of effectiveness. First of
sound true, if you look behind this claim the all, I think there’s a strong personality conflict
problems are caused by the Communist Party in this community. Factions proliferate and
itself, rather than by Chinese history or many strong characters do not like to compro-
Chinese reality. mise with each other and reach some sort of
cohesive arrangement in order to maximize
Role of Chinese Dissidents their voice and effectiveness.

Finally, I want to say something about over- I’ve observed them in action myself, and I like
seas dissidents, even though your book is to joke that once a communist, always a com-
about them, in your talk you did not mention munist, because the way they deal with each

7

other is not that different from the way the The descriptions are always sharply etched
Communist Party deals with these dissidents and they are sometimes deliciously skewered,
within China. Also, I think personal failures but never without underlying sympathy and
of leaders in terms of as it collapses. I’m not seriousness. The chapter on Wei Jingsheng is
going to mention any particular examples. very fine and the chapter on Singapore is
especially fine. I know both of these subjects
So in the future, I think when China does very well, but to my pleasure and to my
undergo this very treacherous process to surprise I found things I did not know before.
democratic rule, the limited ability of this
group to influence China’s events will be very This book deals with serious issues and during
limited because the longer the exile lasts the Ian’s brief talk he asked the pertinent ques-
more forgotten and the less relevant they will tions. I had prepared for myself for four areas
become. New social and political elites will to comment on, but Ian brought up so many
emerge in China who will have their own basis new subjects, which I wanted to comment on,
of support and the overseas diaspora will be so I think I will truncate some of those things
simply cut off. and cut short some other comments. It is, of
course, much more fun to disagree with Ian,
Second, I think Chinese nationalism will play especially when it’s done over a fine meal. So
a role, because a democratic China does not I will start with disagreeing with some of
necessarily mean a less nationalistic China. the issues.
Of course, in this country we have a different
name for nationalism; we call it patriotism. Cultural Determination
Overseas dissidents’ association with so-
called anti-China forces will undermine their This question of cultural determination, if you
acceptability within China. are of one culture therefore you will always be
one way. This is, at the moment, a very popu-
Finally, when there’s a regime change in lar issue, a very popular concern. I understand
China, the overseas dissidents will have to that Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash of
compete with other voices and groups inside Civilizations is flying off the bookshelf. I hate
China. They just cannot simply return to to see this man being enriched by bad ideas,
China and claim power. All you need to do is but they are very bad ideas. Cultures are not
look at what happened to the Soviet exiles about ideas. Culture is about values. If a cul-
who returned to a democratic Russia and ture can maintain the proper values, then their
promptly disappeared from the political scene culture will be more successful.
and the attention of the West. I’m fairly con-
fident that if China becomes democratic and There was at one time that some Islamic cul-
the overseas dissidents want to return, what tures were far in advance of Western culture. I
will be waiting for them will not be the fate of would argue that Western civilization did not
the Taiwanese dissidents, but rather the fate of begin until there was separation of church
the Soviet dissidents. Thank you. from state. Until the nineteenth century, China
basically run parallel in terms of wealth and
Dimon Liu: Good evening. I have left teach- development with Western civilization.
ing university too long ago now to indulge in
two-handed analysis, on the one hand and then Now, the question is that why did China not
on the other hand. I will give it to you straight. develop? Why did China not have a Renais-
I like this book very much and I recommend it sance? Of course, there are other serious
to you. Ian writes about these rebels as char- intellectuals who point a finger at me and say,
acters and he encapsulates their personality other ancient civilizations, once it’s deterio-
and their concerns very well, very succinctly. rated you can never come back. Look at the

8

Egyptians. I won’t mention his name; he’s one adopted communism because they felt that
of the most well known intellectuals in this was the quickest way to westernization, to
country, look at Western civilization. It did modernity, as if that can be achieved by some
come back. It did have a Renaissance in the kind of magic. Mao’s idea of magical social-
sixteenth century. Why shouldn’t China? ism is pretty bizarre, but there is nothing mod-
ern about it.
China’s Inability to Achieve Modernity
So the question here is, what is modernity?
The question is that what is it about Chinese The concern here again and again by Ian, by
civilization, what is it about modernity that is President Bush, the first President Bush, by
so unachievable by China? Why is it not the many of the Sinologists, by my friend Pei
Chinese are able to adopt modernity? Of Minxin here, is stability, stability, stability. As
course, Ian says, the Chinese ought to have if stability itself is the goal, is the reward. No.
copied the Japanese. The Japanese have been There are different kinds of stability. There
able to do it. My argument is that I’m not sure can be the stability of death. There can be the
the Japanese have been able to do it. I don’t stability that enables people to go on to live
think Japan has a very interesting democracy. creative lives.
I’m being very provocative here, you can
yell at me. One of the reasons China has lagged behind is
because it has lost its ability to be creative. If
This has something to do with the definition of you lost freedom, you lose ability to become
modernity. Lenin once said, you may have creative. If you cease to be creative, the only
electricity, then you have a modern society. thing you can do is follow other people’s
As one of my relatives would have put it, you behind, you copy other people’s creations. A
can teach a monkey how to use electricity, but small place like Singapore can copy others.
a monkey is not about to invent electricity. A big place like China cannot. But the irony is,
the ruler in Zhong Nanhai advocates Singa-
Here again, Ian argues the Kuomintang, the pore as the model to copy, as if this man in
Nationalists, were the embodiment of the Zhong Nanhai had effectively bound the feet
essentialness of Chineseness, the Chinese of this great big person as the mainland. So
cosmic order, the Chinese idea of a state. this giant, this 1,200-pound gorilla is walk-
Then he argues along the same lines with the ing around with bound feet. How can it
communists, that again the communists go anywhere and be anything but comical
embody this unchanging idea of what China and pathetic?
is. I don’t think so. I think that both the cre-
ation of the Nationalist Party and the creation Inefficient Nature of Democracy
of the Communist Party was in fact China’s
attempt of Westernization. Both of those ideas Let’s talk about transition. How do you move
were essentially European. from point A to point B? How do you become
a democracy, which is the model that’s most
In 1919, the famous May 4 movement had this effective in protecting freedom? Many authori-
famous slogan — even Fang Lizhi, the famous tarians have argued with me, democracy is
dissident, the first thing he did when he left the really lousy because it’s so inefficient. I like
American embassy, when he gave his first democracy because it is inefficient. It is so inef-
talk to the West in Paris, was talk about total ficient that it banned the ruler from being abu-
westernization. They explicitly reject China’s sive to the people. There are so many checks
past. The Nationalists adopted nationalism and balances on the government itself that the
because they felt that was the quickest way to people’s freedoms are better protected. I like
westernization. The Chinese Communists democracy precisely because it is inefficient.

9

Not all democracies are alike. There are bet- off in one chop. If you chop it off section by
ter democracies and there are worse democra- section, you will simply lengthen the suffering
cies. In fact, Taiwan’s democracy now is more of the dog.
interesting and more dynamic than Japan’s
democracy, and certainly more creative. I Finally, I would have liked to have talked
have been a long-time defender of India’s something about the rebels, but since I don’t
democracy. Compare Indian democracy to have any more time I will reserve that in the
China’s tyranny, the people of India are far question and answer period.
better off. Fewer of them die, both from
hunger and from abuses. But as a democracy, Q&A
Indian democracy is pretty lousy, when you
compare it to more dynamic ones in the United G. John Ikenberry: Thank you very much.
States, more creative ones. We’re going to open it up, in the spirit of
democracy, and take a few questions or com-
A comment simply on the transition, how do ments from the floor. Please identify yourself
you move from point A to point B, not men- and then we’ll throw it back to Ian Buruma,
tioning what kind of model of democracy who will respond and perhaps weave some of
you’ve got. Anybody who argues about a his reactions to the discussant comments into
slow transition, I will tell you he is not a his remarks.
democrat. At least he’s not a serious demo-
crat. Confucius actually — nobody reads him Questioner: I’m with the Japanese newspa-
at all, not even the Sinologists, certainly not per Sankei Shimbun. I recently lived in China,
the Mandarins. The way they did it to I spent two years. One of the many slogans
Confucius is that they make everybody read that probably said something — that probably
them and take an examination. That is the way related to the Chinese Communist Party’s
the rulers of China robbed the Confucians of legitimacy or professed legitimacy is the one
their backbone. They paid them very well, called “spiritual civilization.” Usually it’s
they forced them to memorize. As one of my accompanied by or preceded by the word
relatives would have put it, even a monkey can “socialism.” So the socialism part is very easy
pass those examinations if he has a good mem- for me to understand, but spiritual civilization
ory. The Mandarins became a tool of oppres- as a Chinese Communist Party slogan is a bit
sion of the people. If that is the case, you intriguing to me.
cannot have a creative society. For a thousand
years, there was no major invention from I asked many of my Chinese friends what it is,
China, even though the thousand years before what it means. One of the answers I get is
China was incredibly inventive. simply it would mean not to get involved in
any bribery. But maybe some of you can shed
The point I’m making is that you’ve got to light on this matter.
make the transition, you have to make it
quickly. Confucius has said very clearly, you Buruma: The way I would interpret it is what
want to change your society, you can change I was trying to talk about, is how politics and
the direction of society in one day. He can the justification, and the legitimacy of rule is
complete the change in three years. To put it claimed, because the rulers claim not only to
in a more colorful way, the advice that Milton be governing secular, temporal, political insti-
Friedman had given to George Young in tutions but also indeed be the guardians of
reforming the economy. If you’re going to spiritual civilization. I clearly expressed
chop the tail of the dog off, don’t chop it sec- myself badly in my talk, because I think I was
tion by section, because each time you chop it slightly misunderstood. I didn’t say that either
the pain is the same. You chop the whole tail the KMT or the Communist Party actually did

10

represent anything that can be described as the country; you become modern. The Chi-
Chinese civilization, all I’m saying is that they nese Communists or the National Socialists
claimed to represent it. In the case of the adopted this idea, getting rich would make you
KMT, claimed to represent traditional culture; modern. I’m not sure that would actually
in the case of the Communist Party, an alter- make you modern, but that was the idea and
native to it, but an equally ethical or spiritual that was the idea of you spread around the
one. I was talking about claims, not actuali- lucre, the money around, everybody’s corrupt.
ties. But I think that the idea of spiritual civi- Then this mutual corruption would make the
lization fits in very well with that rather regime survive. But no spiritual purity is
Confucian idea of being the source of morals going to save that.
and ethics as well as political governance.
Questioner: I was very struck by the fact that
Pei: Ian is interested in ideas and their role in one could listen to the presentations by Ian
politics. I’m a political scientist and I have a Buruma and Minxin Pei, which were very dif-
much more practical interpretation of this ferent in their emphases, and yet conclude that
phrase, “socialist spiritual civilization.” It was there was no logical disagreement between
invented around the mid-1980s as a result of them. One might say that one was speaking to
the leadership’s own anxiety about the unin- the long-term, to broader principles — Ian
tended consequences of market reforms. Buruma — while Minxin was pointing to the
Their idea is to borrow the market economy practical difficulties of the transition in the
without having the attached political, spiritual short term. I wonder if I can try to tease out
or social values. The analogy they used is how whether there are any more fundamental
to — when you open the windows some flies differences. I wonder if Ian Buruma might say
are going to come in. So you have to invent something about what he sees as the prospect
your own flyswatters. So the “socialist spiri- of mechanisms by which there could be a
tual civilization” is supposed to be a set of val- transition in the relatively short term.
ues yet to be defined and identified and found,
to counter the bourgeois liberalism, which is Then from Minxin I’m wondering — it seems
really a catchall phrase for all kinds of things to me there’s an implication in what you were
Western, other than technology, market eco- saying that the transition would be easier later
nomics and things considered materially use- on, but I wonder why and when. Precisely
ful for China. because all the grievances you spoke of that
were building up, it seems to me one could
Liu: I think it is much better to understand it make the case that therefore the longer it’s
in the way from how — to look at how the delayed the worse the problem’s going to be.
Chinese Communist Party had evolved.
Historically, the Communist Party is made up Buruma: I agree with you, I think the longer
of two factions and is a very uncomfortable it is delayed the worse the problems will be. I
mix. One is the National Socialist and the think it’s a colonial idea that the people aren’t
other Social Democrats. The two have never ready. The people are perfectly ready. The
really gotten along very well. In the case of assumption is always that the people have to
China, the Social Democrats had always lost. be more educated. There’s a very strange
Gorbachev is a Social Democrat and he won in thing going on here in China. Those who tend
the end because he had a lot of help from the to defend the status quo point to the village
West. In China, consistently it has been the elections — isn’t that a great beginning, they
National Socialists that have won. say. It’s very odd that the people who have
instituted the village elections are the very
The idea of modernity also shifted. First it people who often say first you need the popu-
was Lenin’s phrase “electricity.” You electrify lation to be educated, they have to be more

11

sophisticated, they have to understand what elections — and here I don’t agree with Ian’s
democracy is and so on, otherwise they make characterization of village elections as shams.
big mistakes. The truth is it’s very mixed. I think eventually
China will have a so-called Chinese democ-
If that’s the case, why are the only people who racy. Certain parts of China are likely to be
have the vote in China the least educated semi-failed societies where other parts of
people, in tiny villages and rural areas? Of China can be striving, vibrant democracies,
course, village elections in my opinion are because China itself is a continent. The diver-
rather a sham, but yes, I think the longer it’s sity of conditions does not allow us to make
postponed the worse it is bound to be. easy generalizations.

No Great Obstacles to Democracy But in terms of transition, I do see three to five
years as a window for incremental changes to
I don’t think that there are great cultural, tradi- be initiated, in order to minimize long-term
tional or other obstacles to the transition. It is risks. If on the other hand those steps are not
a question of political will. If, let us say, taken, then the risks of regime collapse and
assume, that in 1989 the party had split under post-transition or transitional collapse will be
pressure of the demonstrations, and a moder- very high.
ate faction had won and had been forced to
concede that in six months there would be Liu: I’d like to make one point on this.
elections and parties were allowed to be Actually, to construct democracy is a very dif-
formed and so on. I see no reason why that ferent process than incremental. You do have
would have ended in disaster. But by the same to have a kind of consensus among people in
token, I don’t see the Chinese Communist the position to make changes. One of the rea-
Party going that route anytime soon. sons why China always has so many difficul-
ties is because tyranny itself had curtailed the
Gorbachev has been a disaster for China, open discussion, the open debate, on how to
because — and by the way, Gorbachev is not a construct democracy. The tragedy of the
Social Democrat, he was a Communist who Chinese rebels of the last 150 years is that one
thought he was going to save the Communist generation does not share the same ideas as the
Party by introducing all kinds of reforms that in next generation, always, a generation rebelled
the end led to political suicide. But that’s pre- on their own separate from the subsequent
cisely because he did that, the Chinese Com- generation. There is no mutual communica-
munist Party realized that’s not the way they tion, there is no forum where such discussion
want to go. So I don’t see it happening in the can go on reasonably. The debates are not
short term, but I agree with you that it would be conducted in a way that is conducive to
desirable if it happened in the short term. creating consensus.

Pei: Very quickly, I think the longer it delays It is not as if there — you actually don’t need
the big move – because democratic transition that many people to create change. If you look
consists of many types of policy adjustments, at the Americans who created democracy, here
institutional reforms, it’s not really one bang. in the United States 200 years ago, there’s not
You don’t say I declare democracy, tomorrow a whole lot of them. But they had a forum to
China is a democracy. That would indeed be a create a series of papers called the Federalist
sham and a likely nonviable democracy. I Papers, where they laid out what needs to be
would say that if the current government in done. There’s no such thing in China. It can-
China does not implement incremental steps not be done in China, because a majority of
toward a more open political system, such as the debate on how to construct democracy
expanding the village elections to township would be debased.

12

Ikenberry: I want to ask a question, take the the party, you cannot get the beginnings of
privilege of the chair. I wanted to see whether civil society.
Ian could respond to Minxin’s point about
party and state being collapsed into each other Questioner: I think that the gentleman here
in China and how would democracy emerge if about the democratic question and John’s
in effect the party collapsed and were question actually summed up some of my
destroyed in some way by events. What is the main points, but nonetheless I’ll ask you a
character of the political, sociological infra- question. First of all, Ian’s statement that
structure of the society, of the country, that democracy will be the long-term guarantor for
would allow for pluralistic parties and the kind stability. Very sobering statement, I like it
of competitive structure of democracy to very much. But when I listen to Minxin’s so-
emerge? Is there enough of a civil society and called pragmatic diagnosis of the problem and
what would be its modalities or its access grievances, it looks like we are talking about
points? how to reach Korean unification. Everybody’s
talking about we must have it, but nobody
Buruma: I don’t think that China in this sense knows how to reach it.
is unique, because after all the same was true
in the Soviet Union and in other communist Seeing the process of Korean democratization
societies in other parts of the world. As soon as well as Taiwan, also maybe remotely
as you have room for more parties, you can Japan, I think this Asian, Confucian, whatever
construct a state fairly easy based on demo- civilization background, revolution or changes
cratic institutions. The question is where you are not coming from the under, it’s coming
get that kind of room. I don’t think that the from the upper, so-called socioeconomic
Communist Party is prepared to do that. political elite.

The reason I said that the village elections, If the Chinese are moving from point A to the
why I’m skeptical about them, is that they’re a other side to achieve democracy, my question
mechanism to make Communist Party rule is basically, is there some kind of a hidden or
more efficient, not to create more pluralism. under the surface, very angry, frustrated elite
The reason is the central party wants a more within the party, within the military, that can
reliable channel to remote rural areas, so that maybe make some kind of a — I shouldn’t say
people can choose their own candidates but network, but at least some kind of a meeting
those candidates all have to be subservient to point, gathering consensus, that we cannot
the party. Once it gets beyond the county- continue this way. In a sense, is there any kind
township level, then it will get interesting. of hope or maybe space for them to really start
Once it becomes — the areas where people some kind of small agitation toward a bigger
can vote become large enough that they can’t agitation, particularly within the military? I
simply vote for local personalities but where think that’s the very interesting question I
you actually do need parties, then you start would like to ask the both of you.
getting the beginnings of a multi-party system.
I think for that reason the Chinese Communist Buruma: It is a very crucial question. I think
Party is not likely to tolerate that. the problem is, as far as democratization is
concerned and the elite being sort of the van-
Civil society is, I think, a much-abused term, guard of this — in 1989, you saw a glimmer-
but it tends to come up with a more pluralist, ing of what is possible. But as you say, in
open system. As long as the party in power Confucian societies with a Confucian back-
crushes every attempt of community, of organ- ground, in Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea,
ization, whether it’s of a religious, cultural or Japan and so on, all show this, the people who
political nature, that is not under the control of govern these societies tend to be very good as

13

assiduously co-opting the elite behind the gov- of China, but then at the same time so ultra-
ernment by giving them a sort of niche, by nationalistic. I’m wondering if it’s going
making it worth their while to be conservative to become a big problem if China becomes
about the status quo. democratized.

That’s exactly what the Chinese Communist Buruma: I think as a Japanese, if you look at
Party now is trying to do too, by incorporating your own modern history, you’ll find an
business people, by making into sort of a mid- answer to this, which is that Japan — again, I
dle-class party, as it were, which is a very odd expressed myself badly in my talk. If I gave
aspiration for a Communist Party, but that’s the impression I was saying China should
what they’re doing. They’re doing really what copy Japan, I was saying exactly the opposite.
the PAP has done in Singapore and what the It is not to be hoped that China will go the
liberal democrats have done in Japan, is take same route as Japan, because Japan in the late
as many people of the elite and make it worth nineteenth century, after the Meiji restoration,
their while to become conservative. the elite was faced with different models of
how to go, how to modernize and democratize
I think for a long time that could actually work society. One was the sort of Anglo-French
in China, and they buy the elite off, as it were. model, which was essentially republican and
Not necessarily crudely with cash, but by giving had a national identity based on citizenship
them a place in the way the society is governed. and rights and so on. The other one was the
more German model, which was to take poli-
Questioner: I work for a Japanese news tics out of public life, rule in an authoritarian
agency, Kyodo. I lived in China and Hong way and give people a sense of cohesion by
Kong for years and covered extensively the stressing the nation as a family, ultra-national-
area. My question is that, mainland China and ism, nativism, blood and soil and so on.
Hong Kong democracy activists are so nation-
alistic, with the exception of Taiwanese people When intellectuals start to talk that kind of
and activists — by the way, I totally agree with language, it’s often out of political frustration,
Ms. Liu, that democracy is thriving on that I think. It’s precisely if you take the politics
island. I see real democracy there. But when out of public discourse and when it becomes
I look at the attitudes of those mainland and impossible for people to be citizens and feel
Hong Kong democracy activists, it is so out of that their citizenship in a democratic manner is
my imagination. There are few activists that what defines them, then they start going in the
told me that it is better to demolish Taiwan if other direction and start stressing ethnic
they become independent. They still talk about nationalism, racialism and so on. I think that’s
democracy of their own. what happened between the 1880s and 1945 in
Japan. It could very well happen in China
In the case of Hong Kong, with the exception again. Chinese intellectuals are as vulnerable
of Mr. Martin Lee and Ms. Emily Lau, the rep- to that kind of stuff as intellectuals unfortu-
resentative democracy activists are so nation- nately are everywhere.
alistic. I was in Hong Kong from ‘96 to ‘97.
There was a Diaoyutai (islands claimed by Liu: I’d like to add to this. When we look at
China and Japan) movement, as we remember. the construction of democracy it is always a
The whole place became hysterical about that. elite equation, regardless of what society you
They didn’t even talk about this handover, look at. In England during the Magna Carta,
they talked about this Diaoyutai. I couldn’t it was still nobles. If we look at Benjamin
talk with them rationally. It was my biggest Franklin and George Washington and Jeffer-
question from them, why those people, very son, they were the elite of the society. To
democratic people about the idea of the future change a society, it doesn’t matter what culture

14

one subscribes to or one chooses, it’s always country. If you talk to some labor unions here,
the elite that is able to make the change. until China does not have a communist gov-
Really for any society, if you want to look at ernment, it’s not a legitimate state. This very
the future, you look at the rebels. You do not strong anti-communism is very strong here.
look at the middle class. You look at the mid-
dle class for stability, you look at the rebels for So you have this distrust of China, and I’m
the future of change. If your public discourse wondering, these are people who, particularly
is truncated, as you have watched in Chinese labor union and human rights groups, who
society, either in Hong Kong or Singapore or claim to have the best interests of the Chinese at
mainland China, then I do not think you get heart, yet they’re very opposed to the idea of the
the best of the discourse. It cannot simply say Chinese communist state. But how do Chinese
that is the nature of the Chinese people. The dissidents view such people? I understand
nature has been suppressed. when the U.S. bombed the embassy during the
war in Yugoslavia there was a lot of anger
Pei: Just one possible explanation of politics. among normal, rank-and-file Chinese citizens.
That is, although I do not believe that such
nationalist sentiments are fake, I do believe But what is the view of Chinese, your average
that political considerations play a role in the dissident, toward this kind of American
feverish pitch of nationalism. In the case of activist who doesn’t even see the state as legit-
China, patriotist sentiments or speeches or acts imate but professes to want to have democracy
are the only kind of things that — the only in China? How do they view such people?
things the citizens can engage in without fear-
ing reprisal from the government. In fact, they Pei: I think if you talk about labor unions,
can be more patriotic than the government. So their involvement in China-related issues is
in a way, it’s some kind of politics practiced very suspect because of the involvement of
against a repressive government, which really self-interest. I’ve been observing them for
forbids them to express themselves in most quite some time, and I do not believe they
other areas. really care about China. They care about their
jobs. So their criticism of Chinese policies is
Questioner: My question has to do with what hypocritical to me, even though I do not con-
Japan has called gaiatsu, or foreign pressure. sider myself a dissident. As for others, I think
A couple weeks ago, there were some speakers American officials who have somewhat a dark
here, one former, rather senior American offi- view of China’s future, I think they’re entitled
cial who was talking about the presence in the to those views.
U.S. government of very strong animosity
toward China, and up to September 11 China’s uncertainty does represent serious
extreme suspicion of Chinese motivations on policy challenges to American national inter-
the world stage, a view of China as an enemy, ests. Of course, we disagree as to where China
a future enemy to the United States. Although is going, but this does not mean that those peo-
this has changed a bit, he was saying that this ple should not be allowed to voice a somewhat
sense is still there among various levels of more skeptical view about China.
government, different agencies.
Questioner: I was wondering about the inter-
You also have here, a year ago or so there was play between culture and politics. Is it possi-
a very strong movement of labor unions, pro- ble to have a democracy without changing the
Taiwan groups, others, against China becom- culture first, if it’s really going to be a partici-
ing a member of WTO and becoming a normal patory, creative democracy? You started off
trading partner with the U.S. Their view is your talk by saying that politics and culture
very much that China is not even a legitimate need to be separated.

15

Buruma: But there are plenty of examples of determine politics. I personally see cultural
countries, which went from dictatorship to determination as a very primitive idea. If you
functioning democracies which didn’t go look at Spain, Spanish culture is thriving
through huge cultural changes. Is that so? under democracy much better than it was
Did Korean culture fundamentally change under Franco. In 1992, precisely when this
from the early ‘80s to the late ‘80s? Korean idea of cultural determination came from
culture – then we use culture in such a loose Britain, I went to the Oxford University debat-
way that one wonders what it still means. ing society to argue the point that culture does
Also, democracy flourishes in places of such not necessarily determine politics. If you’re
varied cultural traditions and backgrounds and interested, I’ll give you my debating notes.
histories and so on, that it seems that demo-
cratic institutions as such are rather neutral as Questioner: When you look to certain histor-
far as culture or religion is concerned. In ical examples, such as the rebellions in the
theory, they can operate anywhere. movements in the 1960s in America or even
1920s America, or perhaps Falun Gong, in
That’s precisely what I’m arguing against, is which different cultural — not cultural, but
this idea that you first have to change the value systems, and you equate it — you said
whole culture or the spiritual life. For exam- culture is about values, not about ideas. That
ple, several people I’ve written about in my those represent threats in themselves, so that
book have taken exactly that view. They perhaps the link between culture and politics is
started off as Maoists, lost their faith in closer than it seems. What do you think?
Maoism, often came over here and then
became Christian evangelicals, arguing that Ikenberry: Any final thoughts from our
China can only have democracy once every panelists on that issue?
Chinese has been converted to Christianity,
which is an extreme version of what you’re Buruma: I’m thought-out.
suggesting. So I think that’s the wrong way of
looking at things. Ikenberry: I think that is a sentiment widely
shared and so we are going to wrap up. Will
Liu: When you ask a question like that, you please join me in thanking Ian Buruma
the underlying question is does a culture and our discussants. (End)

16

About the Panelists

Main Speaker Mr. Ian Buruma is an author and journalist based in London. He writes
political and cultural commentary on Asia for The New York Review of
Books, The New York Times Magazine, The New Republic and The
Guardian. Mr. Buruma also has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson
Institute for the Humanities in Washington D.C. He was educated in the
Netherlands and Japan. Mr. Buruma is the author of Bad Elements: Among
the Rebels, Dissidents, and Democrats of Greater China (2001), The
Missionary and the Libertine: Love and War in East and West (2001), The
Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (1994), God’s
Dust: A Modern Asian Journey (1989), and Behind the Mask: On Sexual
Demons, Sacred Mothers, Transvestites, Gangsters, Drifters, and Other
Japanese Cultural Heroes (1984).

Discussants Ms. Dimon Liu is an author on China and a human rights activist whose
areas of expertise are China, human rights and democracy. She was the for-
mer executive director of the Committee for Policy Studies and the
Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy. Ms. Liu has been involved
in human rights issues since 1972 and recently organized a campaign that
helped to free several scholars from imprisonment in China. She received
a B.A. in architecture from the Pratt Institute and a Diploma in Develop-
ment Planning from University College, London University. Ms. Liu’s
articles on human rights have appeared in many journals and newspapers
including The Asian Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs and Newsday.

Moderator Dr. Minxin Pei is a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, he was a
professor in the politics department at Princeton University. He has
received numerous awards, including the Olin Faculty Fellowship, the
National Fellowship of the Hoover Institution and the Robert S.
MacNamara Fellowship of the World Bank. Dr. Pei received a Ph.D. in
political science from Harvard University. He has written From Reform to
Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union
(1994). Dr. Pei also has published articles in Foreign Affairs, The New York
Times and The Los Angeles Times.

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at
Georgetown University. Additionally, he was a Senior Associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow
Wilson Center for International Scholars. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of
numerous publications, including, State Power and World Markets: The
International Political Economy (forthcoming), After Victory: Institutions,
Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (2000),
and Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American
Government (1988).

17