REAL TIME LEARNING Navigating theSomali Political Economy inComplex Settings: A Case Study of Qansadere By Kevin Mackey, Country Director for WorldVision Somalia OCTOBER 2023
OVERVIEW | 2 In August 2023, World Vision Somalia (WVS) Country Director and the Ministers for Planning, Humanitarian Affairs, Health, Livestock, Agriculture, Water, Women, and Environment from the Southwest State (SWS) visited the conflict-affected district of Qansadere to meet with the local authorities, elders from the five clans, women and youth leaders to address issues related to a multi-year email campaign of unanimous complaints regarding the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The trip represents the second time since 2017, that WVS has mobilized the member state government to manage complaints emanating from the delivery of aid in thislocation. WVS has been operating in Somalia for over 30 years and is one of the mos t trusted partners on the ground with a strong understanding of the unique political economy and operating environment. With this case study, WVS has summarized the history and steps taken to navigate the political economy and minimize aid diversion in Qansadere to improve our practices and share learning with others. WVS is uniquely placed because of its broad footprint, local partner network, and engagement with key stakeholders at all levels to look at aid diversion holistically. As a result of our strategic, and embedded area-based programming, WVS builds long-term engagements with local communities and decision makers. This has allowed the organization to track complaints and feedback over a significant period, while being able to pivot programming to be responsive and adaptive. This case study highlights the need for strong stakeholder engagement and unpacking the socio-political economy over a continuous period in a given location. It also highlights the need to establish, monitor and adapt feedback mechanisms on an on-going basis to respond to the changing landscape of aid diversion in Somalia. WVS has been at the forefront of improving and strengthening targeting mechanisms and establishing multi-layered safeguards to ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable. RATIONALE The case-study aims to shed light on how WVS can leverage its core values of “we are partners” and “we are stewards” to navigate situations in a fragile context. The purpose of this case study is to consolidate the learning, analysis and actions led by WVS in navigating the political economy in Qansadere in its mission to deliver critical humanitarian, recovery and resilience programming over the past seven years. The analysis recognizes that “a company that is uncompromising in its ethics develops a reputation that serves as the best shield against bribery, and that this reputation is influenced by leadership or a lapse in leadership (McKinsey, Ravi Venkatesan). In Somalia, Transparency International (TI) notes, “Local elders consulted for the TI study told us that they know which organisations stick to their principles and which ones do not, and they welcome both for different purposes; the former for the benefits that they will bring to their area in terms of good quality aid programmes that benefit their people and the latter for the personal benefits that come to them." As per our organizational values, WVS works hard to be a principled organization known for the accountable delivery of quality programming. The analysis and recommendations shared in this case study bring a practitioner’s perspective as to how the organization uses contextual information to put in place mitigation measures to minimize aid diversion. It also provides staff working in low access locations with insights on how best to use existing tools to analyze and develop strategies to navigate complex, and evolving political economies. Overview Can we (ever) have an honest conversation about corruption and accountability in Somalia? - PeaceRep. August 2023
Overview Rationale cont'd Political economy is the interrelationship between political and economic systems. Like any economic theory, it aims to describe how societies direct the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of people 3 WVS has expatriate and local staff who have been with the program for 5-15 years with experience navigating the political economy. Under the leadership of the Country Director, WVS reflected on its experience in Qansadere to examine strategies employed over the years to understand and address challenges with the delivery of aid. This case-study methodology focuses on the implementation of different projects in the same location over time, to provide a holistic overview with key findings which can be applied in other contexts with similar dynamics. To look at the current challenge in Qansadere, the program analyzed key documents including the on-going Security Risk Assessment, Do No Harm analysis from 2017, Enterprise Risk Methodology and the Food Security Cluster 2018 Community-Based Targeting Guidelines, and the Analytical Framework for Targeting in Complex Contexts. This case study attempts to understand how the political economy of Somalia influences different delivery mechanisms and interventionsin Qansadere in order to develop mitigation strategies, undertake external engagement and garner buy-in for equitable resource-sharing, accountability and transparency since different delivery mechanisms and sector specific interventions are vulnerable to varying features of the broader and local political economy. The case study will contribute to greater transparency on what is working and gaps on the ground within Somalia. The more practitioners, donors, governments and the broader aid community can engage in dialogue about the complexities of providing aid, the more likely the integrity of the aid delivery system will be strengthened within Somalia. To effectively manage aid diversion, INGOs have toolsto enable them to (i) understand the actors, motivations, and drivers within the political economy where they work; (iii) develop and contextualize training methodologies to equip front-line staff with skills to navigate the dynamics of aid diversion (iii) design risk management systems to address entry points for aid diversion and develop strategies to mitigate these risks; (iv) ensure accountability to affected populations to monitor aid delivery and identify possible aid diversion; (v) build on long-standing local relationship with powerholders to build trust, promote behavior change and ensure equitable service delivery; (v) develop local, regional and global compliance systemsto investigate aid diversion events and hold agency management accountable when systems fail. These different tools, outlined in this case study collectively form a powerful toolkit to help navigate the political economy within fragile contexts and address underlying dynamics which drive aid diversion. The case study reemphasizes that while aid diversion itself isn’t new in Somalia, it is important to acknowledge existing gaps/weaknesses in coordination and the delivery of aid. WVS is committed to serving the most vulnerable while building the capacity of local actors to extend the impact of quality programming and assistance acrossthe country.ountryer METHODOLOGY Investopedia. Political Economy Definition, History, and Applications (investopedia.com)
Context World Vision in Qansadere Where We Work Since 1993, World Vision has been implementing a mix of emergency, recovery and resilience programming with a concentration of operations in southern Somalia. In 2012, the Ethiopian Defense Forces liberated Qansadere town, establishing a security bubble with a radius of approximately 10-15 kilometres and opening access to nearby villages. Soon after, the Federal Member State (FMS) of the Southwest established a local authority aligned to the government. Qansadere is an isolated government outpost blockaded by non-state actors with a vulnerable airstrip which receives only intermittent air service from private carriers and United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) helicopters. The blockade has hampered market development, as well as limited the Federal Member State’s ability to engage with local authorities. The town remains vulnerable to non-state actor infiltration and targeted attacks. Over the years, few International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)have sought to establish operations either directly or through the network of local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) with presence in the location. In 2017, WVS undertook a comprehensive Do-No-Harm (DNH) and Security Risk Analysis (SRA) to map actors, understand connectors and dividers, drivers of conflict and history of conflict. When carrying out DNH and SRA it is critical to understand historical events and political systems as they shape all other systems within a given context, including how individuals access systems and how systems are managed. Since 2017, the program in partnership with international and LNGOs and the Southwest State Ministry of Health has been delivering a mix of humanitarian and early recovery projects financed by multiple donors including the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID)Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), European Union (EU), World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Bank through the Somali Crisis Recovery Program. The WVS 2017 DNH/SRA noted that, Qansadere district has administration led by the District Commissioner (DC) and the district council is representative of the clans in Qansadhere constituency. 4 World Vision Somalia Overview 2022. Do No Harm Analysis and Security Overview 2017. https://anyflip.com/womt/lupk/ Muchunu, G., Bryld, E., Kamau, C., Bromand, S., Kisame, C., Oksiutycz-Munyawiri, A., Mohamed, M. (2023). Understanding systems in Mogadishu city. African Cities
Leadership/ManagemeFinance & Support Oversight OperationERM Dept. Global, Regional, Field Office Audit Dept. GNMImplementation Modalities: direct, via-LNGORegistration & Verification (e.g. LMMIntegration in the Political Economy and Inclusive CEnterprise Risk Management Risk Based Integrated Audit Quarterly internal audit of controls Quarterly Risk Register Review Project & program risk register Bi-Annual Senior Leader Team Review Global Audit Compliance Ranking De-segregation of DCross Check World Vision Somalia Risk Management Framework Security Department Security Risk Assessment & Do No Harm Continuous Awareness of Political Economy
ent Engagement Enabling Environment ns Oversight Global, Regional, National Incident Management Dept. Os, and via-Gov. Partners MS and/or SCOPE) Community-Based Engagement Integrated Incident Management Accountability to Affected Population M&E System (Process and Quality Monitoring) Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL)Oversight Structures Approaches Strategies Agency M&E Team Third-Party Monitor Help Desk & Complaints Box Grievance Response Mechanism Hotline Safeguards Awareness of project & benefits Ethic Points System Third Party Review & Role Assignment Global Regional and Field Office Investigative Capacity Interactive Voice Recording Two-Way Communication Post Distribution Monitoring Duties Cross Check Cross Check M&E, and Feedback Complaints, and Response Mechanisms
Context The Do No Harm Study Findings Clannism and clan cleavages Key Do No Harm Findings 5 Dynamic s Perceived unfair distribution of resources Power struggles within the elite Clan resource conflict Manipulation of clan identity by bigger clans to retain power and access resources. Sub clan issues take center-stage. Community does not like discussing clan/sub clan issues with outsiders Discrimination of minority clans in accessing employment opportunities and favoritismalong sub clan lines. Clan benefit supersedes need. A resource that seems to benefit one clan/sub clan creates tension as clans feel left out even if the group that has benefited is the one most in need. Individuals with power and influence prioritize self-interest, divide communities and compete with other influential individuals. Those involved in elite power struggles want their authority to be recognized, and want their interests catered at the expense of others. Clan conflicts are primarily related to competition over resources such as land, grazing rights, water, livestock theft, and resource transfer or fueled by revenge killings Most conflicts in Qansadere are caused by segregation and marginalization, and driven by inferiority-superiority complexes Marginalization and exclusion Clan Tree from WVS, ‘ 2017 Do No Harm Analysis ’ The DC was nominated by the Interim Southwest Administration (ISWA) authority and works under its guidelines. Qansadere district has six (6) sub villages under its imperative including, Koronbood, Hawalbarbaar, Duurey, Ufurow and Eesow. In Qansadere, the Gelledle clan is the dominant clan in the district, while other clans include, Luway, Yantaar, Hubeer and Aamid. However, the major conflicts in this community rise over the sharing and/or control of communal resources- importantly the pasture and agricultural lands and that existing clan-based local administration in the district was regarded as having a negative impact on the operations of the council. Although the system was meant to ensure that the various clans were represented in the local government, it was thought to influence nepotism and other inefficiencies.
4 World Vision Somalia Delivery Mechanisms and Intervention Vulnerabilities Over the years, WVS has implemented its interventions in Qansadere through three mechanisms: (i) the Somali Resilience Program (SomReP) consortium with sub-contracts to INGO partners who implement directly, (ii) subcontracts to LNGO partners, and (iii) sub-contracts to the Ministry of Health South West State (SWS). The program has implemented a range of interventions, including (i) community-level disaster risk reduction (DRR) planning; (ii) livelihood strengthening/diversification in-town/farming/livestock-keeping; (iii) conditional and unconditional multi-purpose cash via mobile transfer; (iv) economic work with skill diversification/savings groups; (v) water development/rehabilitation/upgrade; (vi) hygiene and sanitation promotions with health campaigns/latrine construction; and (vii) health and nutrition service delivery. At times, WVS has foregone interventions with a high risk of elite capture , such as voucher programming, due to its vulnerability to manipulations by powerful stakeholders in a place where market access is limited. Implementation from INGO partners INGO establishes own operation and/or lead INGO sub-contracts to other INGO who implements directly. Due to security risk(s) and/or cost, INGO might be limited in their ability to open sub offices staffed by their own employees and their ability to regularly monitor program delivery with their own employees emanating from other locations. Access to vulnerable communities in Somalia may often be limited due to levels of insecurity. , In Qansadere, access by staff outside of the immediate political economy, such as non-clan group affiliated Somalis and/or expatriates, could also be limited due to cost and insecurity. Should the INGO hire locally, they risk capture by powerful groups in the political economy who can field candidates for positions with higher levels of education and/or the government can frustrate hiring practices (often under the guise of security) to ensure that their preferred candidates access positions. Either way, the INGO is vulnerable to elite capture in the political economy, exposing itself to aid diversion which often takes the form of: (i) manipulation of facility, vendors and vehicle procurement; (ii) identification/selection of recipients of assistance; (iii) manipulation of construction contracting; and (iv) skimming of benefits and/or kick-backs to access benefits. Sub-contract with local NGO (LNGO) partners INGOs engage LNGOs to deliver projects on their behalf when it would be considered risky from a security perspective, time-consuming and/or more expensive to undertake direct implementation. LNGOs who are able to work in a fragile context like Qansadere either hail from the specific political economy, have linkages to it via clan networks or negotiate access into it. These different methods for gaining access have advantages, but also specific risks related to those described above, specifically (i) political elite capture of LNGO through staff hiring process; (ii) control of key processes which involve resources, specifically facility services and vehicle procurement; (iii) identification/selection of beneficiaries to the project; (iv) manipulation of construction contracting process; and (v) skimming of benefits and/or kick-backs to access benefits. Sub-contract with government: INGOs INGOs engage with government line-ministries to deliver specific sectoral interventions. INGOs engage with government for many of the same reasons they engage with LNGO partners: (i) build their institutional and technical capacity to lower the risk of fraud and corruption and to support localization. However, there are additional risks associated with partnering with government including the ability of the INGO to influence the government to strengthen systems and/or hire, discipline or replace poor performing staff. Government jobs are exposed to the same political economy pressures as experienced by INGO and LNGO at local level but with less ability to institute formal controls. There are additional layers of risk exposure to hiring government, due to patronage systems such as (i) clan power/resource sharing arrangement; (ii) hiring ministers, and department heads could seek to benefit their own constituencies. https://crespienrico.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/elite-capture.pdf Baczynska, G., Nichols, M., Ross, A. & Farge, E., (2023). Exclusive: EU temporarily holds back food aid in Somalia after UN finds widespread theft. https:// www.reuters.com/world/eu-temporarily-holds-back-food-aid-somalia-after-un-records-widespread-theft-2023-09-18/ Bryld, E. (2023). Aid theft in Somalia is not what you think. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/09/28/aid-theft-somaliaextortion-not
SECTION NAME | 7 Managing the Risks Enterprise Risk Management Summary The mechanisms by which the political economy influences interventions and can lead to aid diversion are very often specific to the interventions themselves and cannot be generalized. Corruption in health service delivery takes a different form and has different impactsthan diversion in food and cash assistance. Risk mitigation strategies such as the establishment of internal safeguards and external engagement strategies, and monitoring and accountability systems can also be different. The three (3) Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) tables below provides an intervention-by-intervention risk typology. Though not exhaustive, it provides insights into how the political economy could constrain aid delivery and measures NGOs can take to avert aid diversion and control fraud. World Vision Somalia implements ERM to pro-actively identify risks and impacts, establish risk mitigation strategies, and assess residual risk, recognizing that risks are dynamic. Internal audits confirm whether these risk treatments effectively mitigate risks. A meeting with camp and faith leaders in South West State.
Enterprise Risk Management Summary Intervention Risk Typology Impact Multi-Purpose Cash (MPC) Via Mobile Money conditional (i) Community Based Targeting (CBT) manipulated (ii) recipients pay a portion of benefit to gatekeeper (iii) people shirk work requirement (iv) staff under threat to verify poor quality works (v) retargeting process disrupts system dynamics and exposes staff to threat of violence (i) Most Vulnerable People (MVP) do not access assistance (ii) less benefit=food security goal hindered (iii) key assets not rehabilitated to standard=food security/resilience goals hindered (i) HotlineResponse boxes to (ii) Targetawarenescommun(iii) Crossroles (cos(iv) Post D(v) Extern(vi) WhatMPC Via Mobile Money unconditional (i) Community Based Targeting (CBT) manipulated (ii) recipients pay a portion of benefit to gatekeeper (iii) retargeting process disrupts system dynamics and exposes staff to threat and violence (i) MVP do not access assistance (ii) less benefit=food security goal hindered (iii) market price distortions (i) Hotlinesuggestio(ii) targetawarenescommun(iii) cross/(costly/ti(iv) regulaDistributiVouchers redeemed w/local vendors unconditional (i) local authority (LA) colludes/obliges with vendors to inflate value of goods and take a cut of the difference ii) vendors collude to inflate prices iii) vendors collude with beneficiaries from own clans for sales and sharing of profits (i) less efficient allocation of scarce resources (fewer Households (HHs) reached) ii) skewed sharing of resources in the community (i) Hotlinesuggestio(ii) targetawarenescommun(iii) cross/(costly/ti(iv) PDM *(v) avoidmarket co
8 Risk Mitigation Residual Risk/Dynamics es and call-out Interactive Voice e(IVR) systems and suggestion monitor ted outreach to MVP to create ss and open channels for two-way ication s/double-check of beneficiary stly/time consuming) Distribution Monitoring nal parties site visits to verify tsApp group to visually verify (i) MPC (conditional) via mobile transfer raises the time-cost of corruption by forcing exploiters to seek rents from each HH (ii) Controlling the quality of works is difficult as it requires unbiased, well-trained eyes-on-the-ground to verify works (iii) Staff risks intimidation by powerholders to validate works not to-standard es and call-out IVR systems and on boxes to monitor ted outreach to MVP to create ss and open channels for two-way ication /double-check of beneficiary roles me consuming) ar market price monitoring & Post ion Monitoring (PDM); (i) MPC (unconditional) via mobile transfer raises the time-cost of corruption by forcing exploiters to seek rents from each HH. es and call-out IVR systems and on boxes to monitor ted outreach to MVP to create ss and open channels for two-way ication /double-check of beneficiary roles me consuming) d voucher program under limited ompetition environment (i) Voucher programming is good for empowering local traders to service own markets, but difficult to control against manipulation by LA and business interests as they are intertwined.
Enterprise Risk Management Summary Intervention Risk Typology Impact Facility-based health/nutrition services (Government implementing partner) (i) Powerful, hostile clan manages facility which results in low service utilization of minority groups/MVP due to the clan discrimination (ii) Lack of qualified technical staff due to clan-based hiring leading to poor management and slow and low-quality service delivery (iii) clan oriented staffing empowered with less/no accountability system and staff skim off supplies and sell inputs to market actors (iv) LA and/or non-government repurposed service/drug supplies; (v) Non-gov-aligned groups seek health services at health facilities. (i) Poor health service coverage and low service utilization, MVP do not access services at the facility=poor health service reach=poor health for MVP, resulting in high morbidity and mortality risk (ii) stock-outs and reduced health service delivery (iii) inputs go to parties leading the conflict and do not contribute to health outcomes (iv) health service provider viewed as supporting non-gov actors resulting in Government pressure (i) Hotlinesuggestio(ii) procestechnical(iii) stockspot checstaff) (iv) DNH/understastructure(v) targetgroups (vi) advocMVP (vii) delibhealth facservice deHealth and nutrition outreach services (i) Local elites geographically target communities within their group or constituencies (ii) staff skim off supplies and sell (ii) supplies are stolen and sold to market actors (iv) LA and/or non-government repurpose drug supplies v) limited access to monitor by govt staff in outlying areas (i) marginalized groups in outlying villages fail to access health services (ii) stock-outs for mobile team=reduced health services delivery reach (iii) nutrition and drug supplies found with combatants causing reputational risk as well as health hazard (i) DNH/Munderstastructure(ii) targetgroups (iii) advocMVP (iv) moretheir “rigTraining to farmers and livestock keepers (i) only producers aligned local authority access training (i) farmers near or around safe zones – targeted (iii) disease outbreaks as farm and crop products intermingle (i) livelihoods of non-aligned groups are not supported to recover and develop and are therefore vulnerable to food insecurity and poor…..? ii) less coverage with many target groups missed (i) DNH/Munderstastructure(ii) targetgroups (iii) advocMVP Farm inputs and other supplies to (i) only producers aligned local authority access inputs (i) livelihoods of non-aligned groups are not supported to recover and develop (i) DNH/Mundersta
9 Risk Mitigation Residual Risk/Dynamics es and call-out IVR systems and on boxes to monitor ss monitoring, involving FMS staff -taking systems with frequent cks (preferably with FMS technical /MCTC+ARM analysis to nd group actors and power es and locations ted outreach to marginalized cacy to powerholders to include berate effort to train or reorient cility staff in key areas of health elivery. (i) Most health facilities are located in towns which are under the control of dominant clan(s) and government aligned forces which limits non-government access. Determining who is not coming for specific reasons is only likely revealed through Hotlines and/or IVR system. (ii) Govt staff is profiled as high risk and has a limited area of coverage, and are not easily granted access to areas where LNGO staff is allowed. MCTC+ARM analysis to nd group actors and power es and locations ted outreach to marginalized cacy to powerholders to include awareness to communities about ht” to health services (i) Govt staff are better positioned in fixed sites (safe buffer zones). When operating in mobile teams with limited access, there is reduced monitoring of outreach programs resulting in reduced efficacy in implementation due to inequitable distribution of health services. MCTC+ARM analysis to nd group actors and power es and locations ted outreach to marginalized cacy to powerholders to include (i) Due to insecurity, farmers in outlying areas where production is concentrated are missed out. (ii) Cost of transportation and logistics may be a limiting factor MCTC+ARM analysis to nd group actors and power (i) Government technical departments set benchmarks for
Enterprise Risk Management Summary Intervention Risk Typology Impact farmers and livestock keepers (seeds, tools, animal drugs, replacement shoats, etc.) (ii) staff skims off supplies and sell (iii) supplies are poorly stored (bad procurement) and spoil or get stolen iv) deliberate selection of more expensive supplies from LA affiliated clans and are therefore vulnerable to food insecurity (ii) more appropriately stored inputs ignored. structureoutreach(iii) advocMVP iv) agencysupplier c(v) more procuremConstruction (WASH, Livelihoods, Health, etc.) (i) staff collude with local authority to manipulate competitive procurement (ii) local authority rejects contractor (iii) local authorities threaten staff to select preferred contractors (iv) staff collude with contractors and/or own contractors (i) assets not developed or poorly developed, resulting in sub-optimal performance and rapid degradation (ii) asset quality and durability highly compromised leading to reputational risk and in some cases a hazard to beneficiaries (i) technicapprovedgovernm(ii) Joint aby Govt adonor Resource management committee (water source, livestock market, health post, etc.) (i) only HHs aligned to the group controlling the resources access it (ii) non-aligned groups access infrastructure but on different and often less favorable terms. (i) inequitable distribution of available resources – MVP get less quantities and have limited access to scarce resources (i) DelibemanagembeneficiaLocally procured suppliers of goods and services (hygiene and sanitation, fodder, water-trucking, farm tools, etc.) (i) staff collude with LA to manipulate competitive procurement (ii) LA rejects suppliers (iii) LA threaten staff to select preferred suppliers (iv) staff collude with suppliers and/or own suppliers (i) Poor quality goods and services procured resulting in failing to reach target objectives (i) Proof oand certifto a broa
10 Risk Mitigation Residual Risk/Dynamics es and locations (ii) targeted to marginalized groups cacy to powerholders to include y involvement in the selection of criteria, assessment and approvals awareness to powerholders on ment procedures and guidelines selection of farm inputs and supplies. (ii) Donor agencies participate in the shortlisting of pre –approved suppliers for consideration at local level cal guidelines developed and d by donor agency & federal ent approval /certification processes agencies and where possible (i) Govt technical departments and donor agency set the construction guidelines and pre-approve designs, and monitor to certify the construction works (directly where reachable and by TPM where not accessible) rate selection of resource ment committee to include ries from non-influential HHs (i) Participating community get involved in selection of resource mobilization committees ensuring the inclusion of MVP of quality of goods to be certified fication of goods services supplied der range of community coverage (i) Guidelines provided by technical and or government departments
11 WVS provides different channels through which beneficiaries can provide feedback and concerns regarding its interventions. These channels include face-to-face reporting to staff or partner staff, suggestion boxes and hotlines. In Qansadere, beneficiaries have four visible hotline options through which they can report their feedback: SomReP-3041, MARDO-3232, WFP-7140164, World Vision-364. Both WVS and the Somali Resilience Program (SomReP) hotlines have a call/text-out Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system to reach out to recipients of cash assistance whose numbers have been entered into the system. WVS partner staff from MARDO (Mandheer Relief and Development Organization) and Centre for Research and Integrated Development (CeRID) conduct regular awareness sessions on the existence of these mechanisms and how the community members can confidentially share their feedback regarding the project. When feedback is received, WV M&E assigns to the appropriate project manager who provides a response that is subsequently sent to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is then requested to confirm if they are happy with the response provided. Feedback not related to any World Vision intervention in the area is referred to the appropriate partner(s) for response. WV M&E team maintains a database of feedback, conducts ageing-analysis, identifies trends and presents analysis to management and leadership. WVS conducts regional monthly accountability meetings where all the program team members review progress on community accountability pillars including information provision, community participation, consultation and feedback and complaints mechanisms. During such meetings, team members review the latest feedback reports received and how they are being resolved including the specific timelines that feedback reports take to be resolved after being received, challenges being faced in the receiving and resolving feedback reports as well as the key action points required to improve the implementation of the Program Accountability Framework. WV also receives monthly summaries of the number of feedback reports received by its partners disaggregated by sector and their status (resolved/pending). This feeds into the regional monthly discussions highlighted. WV systems received nine (9) complaints and six requests for assistance in the food and cash sector with only two of the nine being resolved. Accountability, Aid Diversion and Fraud Control Systems Somali women line up to have their food voucher cards topped up with cash in Baidoa. WV receives a summary report from MARDO’s CRM system every end month, registering the typology of complaint and actions taken. In addition to internal systems, WV and WFP employ Third Party Monitors who monitor project activities and are mobilized for investigative actions related to sensitive complaints. In early 2023, WVI’s Global Internal Investigation Unit worked with in-country TPMs to craft an investigation independently. A common mechanism for registering discontent with aid delivery in Qansadere is the anonymous emails sent to various levels of the NGO hierarchy, and the UN and donor community. The claims emanating from this multi-year campaign cover a wide range of issues like misappropriation by NGO staff and government, unfair targeting and contracting practices, fraud, and denial of access to services. The frequency of these complaints emanate from multiple email addresses, flood different levels of the international community. Aging analysis is the analysis which is used to calculate the average number of days taken by the organization to follow up on complaints from the community.
World Vision's internal system of managing complaints WV's Ethics Point The Ethics Point system ensures that claims are registered in a centralized data repository, addressed in a timely manner and facilitates trend analysis, enabling the identifications of trends and pro-active management actions to put in place mitigation mechanisms. In the event that a case is assigned to the national office, the departmental head will lead the investigation process. The information enables management to identify gaps in training, policies and protocols. Due to complaints emanating from Qansadere in late 2022 via email, the country program requested that the WVI GIIU partner with its TPMs to investigate claims. The sheer volume of email complaints emanating from Qansadere overwhelms the Ethics Point system. Through process monitoring, claim-specific monitoring, and two GIIU actions, WVS has investigated these claims multiple times. None of the claims have ever been proven. Nonetheless, given WVI’s Zero Tolerance policy to fraud and corruption, the program is required to log all new email complaints into Ethics Point. The endless stream of complaints leads to a sense of fatigue within WVS, which raises the question whether it’s worth the effort to remain in this location? However, WV sees the investment as an going opportunity to address chronic issues related to aid diversion. Finally, WVI operates an Integrity & Protection Hotline (IPH ): a confidential telephone hotline and an online reporting tool available to staff, partners in the field, contractors and others wishing to report suspected illegal or unethical conduct by WVI or its personnel. For staff, IPH reports are a last resort, to be used when normal management processes do not work. No staff, partners or contractors have triggered this IPH hotline to date. World Vision many conflicts in Qansadere caused by segregation and marginalization, and driven by inferioritysuperiority complexes maintains the Ethics Point system which classifies reports, conducts aging analysis, closes reports, and collects metrics on incidents. The Ethics Point system is part of World Vision’s Integrated Incident Management System and provides visibility for global and country-level leadership through its incident reporting and case management pages into claims emanating at country level. The World Vision GIIU analyzes claims and assigns investigative actions to either global, regional and/or country-level focal points. Partnership policies are owned by different departments, and as such in the national office departmental heads take lead in responding to issues: 12 Ethics Point: Case Management Page: https://worldvision.ethicspointvp.com/custom/worldvision/irf/form_data.asp More on World Vision IPH Hotline:
World Vision Country Director on a joint field mission to Qansadere alongside Government officials from South West State. World Vision began operations in Qansadere in 2017 through 3 delivery mechanisms and a host of sector interventions: • WVS hosted SomReP sub-granted to INGO partner ADRA for a three-year period with resources from SIDA, SDC, FAO and EU to deliver community-based disaster risk and resilience planning, conditional cash for work, water point rehabilitation(such as boreholes and shallow wells), establishment of savings groups and training, and provision of seeds and tools to farmers to support recovery. • WVS sub-granted to the government partner Ministry of Health for a year-on-year period with resources from Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs to run the Mother Child Health facility, providing ante and post-natal care, basic diagnosis and treatment with drug supplies, immunization, health education and nutrition services and referral and infrastructure development. • III. WVS sub-granted to the LNGO partners MARDO, and CeRID for year-on-year period with resources from the Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs and World Food Program for the delivery of conditional and unconditional cash via mobile money transfer, water point rehabilitation, and hygiene and sanitation promotion, provision of seeds to support farming. WVS vets LNGO partners using a nine-capacity criteria matrix, assigning scores as to the strength of internal systems and technical capacity and putting forth recommendations to improve capacity. On a periodic basis, WVS reviews partners’ capacities to gauge their efforts to strengthen capacities and decide whether to continue with entity, increase/decrease resources under managementGlobal Power Claim styl 13
History of complaints History of Anonymous Complaints Very soon after the new LA was installed, all the SomReP consortium member agencies began to receive anonymous email complaints making numerous claims, including (i) exclusion of the most vulnerable in beneficiary selection; (ii) denial of services at the MCH, and (iii) improper hiring and contracting practices. The anonymous email campaign came to encompass a long email list, including UN, major donors and even UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. Communications emanated from multiple email addresses and were sent to any agencies working in the district. WV sent monitoring teams to follow up on the claims, however no evidence of claims could be substantiated. Email complaints triggered WVI’s GIIU to launch an investigation, the results of which found no evidence to support claims. Despite this, the email complaints continued. Responding to claims 2021 World Vision once again facilitated the government of the Southwest State to travel to Qansadere to open channels for the community to make their grievances known. No one stepped forward to offer new and/or more information during and after the meeting. As a result, the government issued a decree , requesting UN, NGOs, donor and others to disregard further communications from a group of emails related to the claims. WV Somalia continued operations in Qansadere through LNGO and government partners but the SomReP INGO partner closed offices, noting the difficulty of working in such a contentious governance environment and incessant allegations of undue interference on project activities by outside forces. In 2017, the Interim Administration of the Southwest State put in place a Local Authority (LA). The new LA and local administration tried to influence the delivery of aid through: (i) interference on beneficiary selection, specifically including people from local administration such as security forces into the beneficiary roles; (ii) interference in the selection of contractors to undertake borehole rehabilitation; and (iii) hiring of staff. An INGO implementing partner raised the issue to the FMS government, advocating for this layer of the government to intervene. Despite the FMS at-distance engagement, the LA and the local authority representatives continued to make demands. The SomReP and INGO partner took advantage of the project’s three-year life-cycles and stalled, not moving forward with beneficiary selection, contracting for borehole rehabilitation nor hire staff. After several months of de-facto suspension, the challenge was escalated to the SomReP consortium Chief of Party (CoP) who brought the issue again to the attention of the Ministers of Planning and Economic Development and Humanitarian Affairs in SWS, requesting them to intervene. WV started operations through BHA and WFP around this time and soon encountered interference from the LA. World Vision Somalia and SomReP INGO partner coordinated and facilitated the government of the SWS to visit the LAin Baidoa and Qansadere to discuss the issue. The pressure did not subside and the SomReP project approached the third year of it three-year cycle. The SomReP CoP took advantage of the World Vision German support office visit to Baidoa to escalate the level of pressure being exerted, once again engaging with the SWS Ministry of Planning and Humanitarian, this time threatening to halt interventions permanently and shift them to another location. The escalation step succeeded, and with time the Government of the SWS replaced the LA. The removal of the LA enabled INGO partner and WVS to complete beneficiary identification and contracting processes. 14 2021 Baseless Allegations Against Humanitarian Partners Southwest State. https://anyflip.com/womt/ihun/ l
History of Complaints of 2022 to 2023 Period WV has continued to deliver assistance with resources from BHA, WFP and starting in 2023, World Bank SCRP. Emails emanating from the same group continued to trickle in over the years, especially with the introduction of new phases of projects or new projects. The frequency of complaints continued during the 2022/2023 drought scale-up period. The tone also changed with one email claimant brandishing a handgun, demanding action be taken. World Vision Somalia and partner WFP coordinated information-sharing and launched independent and in parallel investigations. Once again, WVI triggered its GIIU which worked through TPMs to revisit the newest set of claims, undertaking HH surveys reaching 362 families of a targeted 6,630, a coverage which produces a 95% confidence level (+/- 5% marginal error). World Vision International investigators were tasked to probe, invite the claimants to bring forth additional information to substantiate their claims. Claimants made no effort to respond to entreaties and to engage despite the fact that they were assured their identities would be protected. Once again, no evidence to support the claims materialized. Responding to Claims 2023 World Vision Somalia engaged with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs SWS and the LA for Qansadere to share findings and to develop a new strategy. After a historical analysis and integrating clan dynamics analysis from the 2017 SRA/DNH report with the complaints in Qansadere, four scenarios were developed to attempt to identify the root causes. 15 Scenario 1 Of the five clans, the current resource allocation arrangement is perceived or is unfair with a smaller proportion of resources being made available to less powerful clans. In short, an unequal sharing of resources and/ marginalization was taking place. Scenario 2 Related to Scenario 1)- local (LNGO) partners have been captured by the elite and/or have own interests and divert resources to themselves and/or to service own constituencies in the Qansadere community. Scenario 3 The new LA hails from a different clan than the LA from the 2017 to 2019 period. The multi-year campaign of emails could be an effort by the out-of-power clan to undermine the legitimacy of current lead clan and return to political power. In short, the complaints could be a part of a political process which seeks to revisit the political leadership (control of the LA-ship) in the location. Scenario 4 The complaints could be emanating from non-government forces who have maintained a blockade on the location since the town was liberated in 2012. The multi-year campaign could be seen as a spoiler effort to degrade the legitimacy of the government of the SWS and encourage the NGO community to halt operations in the location, thus further isolating the location.
History of Anonymous complaints: Cont'd Led by the Minister of Agriculture, the government detailed the purpose of the mission, noting that the meeting was convened due to the high number of complaints received by government and World Vision. He noted that community members could speak up in the meeting and/or could reach out directly to organizers more discreetly with more information. Leaders of the clan were the first to speak up, insisting that the claims were false and that they emanated from people outside of Qansadere. Youth and women representatives also spoke up, noting that claims of marginalization and fraud were baseless and emanated from people outside the community. Elders, youth and women noted that they were happy with the aid delivery in their community. The Minister of Livestock who hails from the clans of Qansadere spoke to the fact that these claims were bringing shame on their clan. He implored community members to speak up and provide the government with information to address the issues, noting that the government has power to help those with concerns. The Minister of Agriculture recounted how this was not the first time the government has been called to Qansadere alongside NGOs to address anonymous complaints, and their efforts to travel to Qansadere when SomReP’s INGO partner and World Vision received complaints by anonymous email in 2019. He further noted that INGO partners later closed offices in Qansadere. He implored the community to equip the government with information to address the issues before other partners also leave. It seemed that the prospect of WVS and/or UN or NGOs leaving shifted the mood of the clan leaders who offered up more details of who they believed were sending the communications. One clan leader noted that the community does not have the resources to address this issue, but the government has the resources to do something about it - to which the government replied, we have power but not the information. A breakout group formed and intense discussions were held between the government and clan leaders. Several more ministers spoke, emphasizing their openness to listen to the challenges of aid delivery. The community insisted that they were happy with the support WVS and others were providing. The only issue raised was the need to activate some SCOPE cards which have ceased to work. The government agreed to look at the issue outside of the meeting. In the post-meeting debrief, the government noted that the community revealed it was the former LA and people associated with him who were responsible for the anonymous complaints. The local government noted that they will follow up with specific people and will write a directive, requesting NGOs, UN and donors to disregard emails emanating from specific email addresses. Recognizing that NGOs and the UN are not well-placed in the international system to undertake intelligencegathering to prove/disprove and act based on these scenarios, WV reached out to government and planned a new joint community engagement trip. Adopting the same engagement strategy as 2019, WVS and government aimed to open communication channels directly with the clan(s) and local administration in the location through a community meeting. Given the current access challenges, WVS, with support from WFP, facilitated the mobilization of the UNHAS helicopter. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, key line ministries that have projects in the location in the sectors of health, agriculture, humanitarian, women, water and environment, as well as the Minister of Livestock who hails from the Qansadere clan network were mobilized. 16 Whole-Community Meeting-2023 World Vision Somalia and the sector Ministers traveled to Qansadere to engage with the community. The highlevel of representation was a demonstration that: We take the complaints seriously. The trip benefited from government and NGO institutional memory, with the Minister of Agriculture (who was the former Minister of Health and supported the 2020 community engagement meeting) present and able to provide some perspective to his fellow ministers and the community. WV Somalia Country Director was also present. Clan, women and youth leaders, were, too. Part of the meeting was recorded, but cameras were turned off at some point to promote a safe space for open discussion.
Whole-Community Meeting-2023; Cont'd World Vision held a separate engagement meeting without government presence with clan leaders from the five (5) clans, where the Country Director probed the clan leaders’ understanding of their role in the targeting process, requested them to reflect on the current re-targeting process, during which the current caseload was dropped from 9,500 to 4,045 households in August 2023 and explained how they make decisions about who should receive assistance in conditions of high-need but reduced-resources. Moreover, World Vision probed both clan leaders and LNGO partner regarding the procedures they use to address situations where an individual has been put forward as a recipient of assistance but does not meet the beneficiary criteria. The Country Director urged leaders from the 5 clans to recognize that they are the gateway for their clan members (and others) to access humanitarian assistance and emphasized that with that duty and power, comes responsibility. As a result of this meeting, leaders from the five clans and LNGO partners: Articulated how they understood and supported the interpretation of vulnerability criteria to identify recipients of assistance. Noted that they have knowledge of who within each clan group meets the criteria. When probed as to the existence of a pre-arranged quota (resource-sharing arrangement), they remained vague. Noted that they have had cases whereby people were put forward as recipients of assistance and the LNGO have engaged with clan leaders to have them removed. Proffered that they knew why WV leadership and a high-level delegation from government had come to Qansadere. In brief, they knew that a stream of anonymous email complaints had been coming from people claiming to come from Qansadere to government, NGOs and others. Clan leaders stated that these emails emanate from people outside of the community and do not reflect what is going on the ground. World Vision meeting with Clan Leaders On August 28th 2023, the Southwest State (SWS) government sent a Joint Mission Statement addressed to NGOs, UN and donors, outlining their findings from the trip and requesting international partners to disregard claims emanating from the anonymous email campaign. Over the last few weeks, the e-mail campaign has once again, intensified including another email with a claimant brandishing a handgun, demanding immediate action be taken. This underscores the political instability in SWS, and reemphasizes the power of the political economy on aid delivery. 17 Clan members were encouraged to reflect on the value of charity and how they are called upon to help those most in need of assistance, including not only the needs of their clan and the resource arrangement of clans but also the needs of the voiceless to ensure they access assistance. SCOPE is WFP’s beneficiary and transfer management platform, a web- based application used for beneficiary registrations, intervention setups, distribution planning, Southwest State Government Joint Mission Statement. August 28th 2023. https://anyflip.com/womt/xhzt/
Analysis and Framing the Context World Vision 2017 Do No Harm report The World Vision 2017 DNH report provides insight into the actors and their motivations. The five clans which make up most of the town’s population have a history of resource competition with perceptions of unfairness in resource allocation, as well as identities of superiority and inferiority. On-going security risk analysis provides a backdrop within which these different actors engage with one another: the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Somali government forces hold a precarious grip on the town and infiltration by non-government forces is an ever-present threat. Broadening the security analysis to include the FMS, provides insights into what resources can be brought to bear to influence dynamics in Qansadere: blockaded by road and with air service limited to a few local carriers and the occasional UNHAS helicopter, the FMA government and INGO and UN’s ability to engage with local authorities and community is restricted. Enterprise Risk Management methodology outlines the NGOs’ response to the context: safeguards/risk treatment in key steps in interventions, occasional monitoring by INGO staff and/or third-party monitors, the use of a complaints response mechanism, including hotlines and IVR, and finally local and international fraud/corruption investigative mechanisms. The 2018 FSC Analytical Framework for Targeting in Complex Settings , is a framework whereby different analyses can be brought together to generate different questions to support the creation of overarching understanding and lead to key insights which can be replicated in different contexts. Every community and every targeting (operational environment) situation is unique. The analytical framework supports field staff to identify community dynamics they may encounter when working through informal and formal governance structures to identify the most vulnerable. This tool simplifies a complex set of dynamics which could impact the effectiveness of the targeting process and aid delivery. 18 By breaking down complex, overlapping dynamics into manageable categories, the tool assists field teams to strategize context-specific actions to reach the most vulnerable. https://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2023/oct/193413/south_west_state_in_the_grip_of_a_political_crisis_and_a_deteriorating_humanitarian_situation.aspx
Analysis and Framing the Context Security vehicles escort World Vision staff to provide protection during camp visits in Baidoa, Somalia. 1. Excess of Monopoly (knowledge about community composition, history, and violence) When NGOs lack access due to insecurity or other reasons, local powerholders have a monopoly over key information and internal and external military groups and clans have a monopoly, using the threat of violence to control, coerce and contest. This could include knowledge and information about: Community make-up, both in-group and out-group, (i.e., marginalized people) Resource allocation arrangements between clans Insights into how outsiders to the community, especially those with military capacities (ENDF, Al-Shabab, SNA, Federal Member State Government) influence power dynamics in the community and resource allocation outcomes. Insights on how soft and hard power impact the decision of local power holders 2. Excess of Decision-Making Power The traditional or formal decision rights of power holders regarding resource allocation to groups they recognize as important, and ignore groups which are lesser players are influenced by multi-layered motivations and the political economy. To understand the nuanced layers of decision making in complex settings, the FSC analytical framework looks at the following questions: What is the authority/decision-power of different clan groups and local authority, vis-a-vis the power of the formal power of the District Commissioner and/or Federal Member State? Of the clans, which is ascendant and controls the district council? What power does the District Commissioner have to shape the delivery of assistance? How is that power exercised (e.g., threats to staff, government decrees, banishment of uncooperative staff)? Within the competing clans, what's the decision power of leaders to decide who accesses assistance? Is it absolute and unchanging or ever-changing? 19 Food Security Cluster. 2018 Community Based Targeting Guidelines: Analytical Framework for Targeting in Complex Settings. Annex 21. https://anyflip.com/ womt/ itds/
Analysing and Framing the Context What are the resource sharing arrangements amongst the clan groups? What other groups are present within the clans (women, youth, etc.) who lack voice in clan dispensation decisions? What other groups exist outside the five clans within the community (occupational clans: blacksmiths, hunters, etc.) and do they have channels to influence access to assistance? Does the local policy goal of keeping-the-peace trump other NGO-driven considerations (e.g. need-based resource allocation)? Does the SWS Federal Member State have sufficient access and political will to address power/resourcesharing arrangements which leads to clan competition and contribute to marginalization? For example, is it more important to keep the community of Qansadere as an ally in the conflict with non-government forces rather than meddle in their internal power struggles (and therefore encourage them to change alliances)? What in-community and out-community mechanisms exist to influence the District Commissioner and the clan leaders? Has the local administration captured LNGO partners, and therefore controls access to information and delivery mechanisms for the provision of aid? Are there forums and/or mechanisms whereby less-powerful groups can make their needs and their perceptions known? Do NGO/UN staff follow-up feedback and complaints in a timely manner? Do NGO complaints response mechanisms and the feedback they mobilize cause power holders to target better and/or stop bad behavior? Do marginalized groups and NGO staff feel safe to raise issues? Does information from CRM and/or anonymous complaints generate sufficient information to enable project/ program review to unearth misappropriation and/or fraud? What pressure does the District Commissioner face which restricts his/her decision-making? Does the SWS Federal Member State have sufficient access and political will to address power/resource-sharing arrangements which lead to clan competition and contribute to marginalization? For example, is it more important to keep the community of Qansadere as an ally in the conflict with non-government forces rather than meddle in their internal power struggles (and therefore encourage them to change alliances)? Does keeping-the-peace and combating non-governmental forces trump addressing marginalization as a primary goal for local, member state and federal government actors? Thus, lessening the appetite of government to address the concerns (policy objectives) of the international community. Are there strategies in place/available that can “raise the stakes” and prompt Federal Member States and local actors to revisit resource-sharing arrangements and recalculate the important of existing policy goals over others? Are there interventions or levers available to the international community to motivate Federal Member States and local governments to govern aid better (i.e., to police aid diversion)? Is World Vision and/or its implementing partners perceived as unbiased deliverers of valued services or a corruptible institution which can be manipulated for gain by the powerful? 20 3. Lack of Accountability Looks at the informal and formal checks-and-balances amongst the powerful and also the channels of influence for the lesser player in the political economy. What levers exist for UN and NGO actors to use to nudge the political economy towards a more equitable resource-sharing arrangement?
Key Insights and Recommendations Breaking down context specific measures to address barriers to reaching the Most Vulnerable * Ust, asimus di a cumqui dollorest, omnimol uptatur, volupta venda volorumet impos natium resequatur. DNH analysis helps identify actors, dynamics and drivers of conflict and provides a framework to analyze scenarios Having a compliance officer, skilled in DNH investigative techniques and understanding how clan identities shape relations will strengthen the ability to analyze issues from different channels Perception survey will help agencies understand how they are viewed by the community, local authority and government Institutional memory at both NGO and government levels is important for analyzing information in time to develop strategies and design delivery mechanisms to target the root causes of challenges. It is important to understand the context and timescale of events and supports the formation and implementation of localized, contextualized strategies. Facilitating governance systems can enhance transparency, accountability and increase knowledge of international standards and best-practices, mobilize influential stakeholders, and put pressure on local stakeholders to examine resource-sharing arrangements. Taking actions to avert efforts to marginalize groups exposes staff members (to risk of reprisal. Mobilizing and engaging government is important to ensure staff safety. The UN and NGOs have two distinct roles: service provision and facilitation of community-to-community and government-to-citizen actions for planning. These actors have more resources (finance, logistical, and in some cases trust) than traditional local, member state and federal government and can leverage their role to facilitate dialogue within the political economy and nudge it towards an equitable equilibrium. Conduct 'Do No Harm Analysis’ and Perception Surveys Enable a Wider Perspective Facilitate Governance Systems Leverage Role & Influence This case study attempts to understand how the political economy influences different delivery mechanisms and interventions in Qansadere in order to develop mitigation strategies within WVS, undertake external engagement and garner buy-in at all levels to nudge key stakeholders towards more equitable resource-sharing arrangements, accountability and transparency. WVS presents the following key insights and recommendations to break down complex, overlapping dynamics into manageable categories to design context-specific measures to address barriers to reaching the most vulnerable communities. 21
22 Understand the Political Economy Conduct Routine Monitoring Establish Escalation Strategies Enhance Coordination The political economy is in constant flux as political actors respond to changing conditions and renegotiate power and resource sharing arrangements The services that international actors provide are embedded in the political economy These actors have the ability to influence the discussion between other actors within the system. Appealing to the sense of identity (clan) and/or social (family values) and religious (charity) obligations can encourage actors in the political economy to assess gaps and provide solutions. NGOs and UN should exhaust all avenues of monitoring, investigation and engagement before considering abandoning operations, otherwise they risk aiding the agenda of a select few motivated by political aims. Monitoring reports and complaints response mechanisms generate information for leaders and managers to adapt projects and not only identify cases of marginalization and fraud. Routine monitoring of INGO and LNGO partner capacity, including strength of internal systems can support analysis as on which safeguards can withstand pressures exerted by the political economy. Ensure escalation protocols and feedback systems are in place to elevate noncompliance with feedback systems that include clear, targeted messaging to management. Develop escalation strategies to “raise the stakes” on and/or raise visibility of bad behavior on/by local stakeholders can raise the cost of them engaging in these behaviors. Agency leaders should communicate organizational and humanitarian values to navigate complex environments. In dynamic political economies like Qansadere, claimants often make their grievances known to any-and-all NGO and UN actors. It is important that UN and NGOs coordinate responses. Strengthening capacity for internal investigation within organizations and sharing these experiences with stakeholders can broaden perspectives of analysis to address challenges.
World Vision is a relief, development, and advocacy organisationdedicated to working with children, families, and communities. We work with community members, supporting them to overcome poverty and injustice. Our aim is to lift poor and marginalised households out of the vicious cycle of dependence by addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability to environmental and socio-economic shocks.