Realtime Lessons Learnt World Bank Somali Crisis Recovery Program (SCRP) 2022

Realtime Lesson
Learning World Bank

SCRP Process

World Bank

Presenter Kevin Mackey
SomReP Chief of Party
[email protected]

SCRP Design Invited for
Process Flow concept note

CAAP- prioritized SomReP PIU Alignment of
interventions Concept Reviews concept note
Concept with, federal
Note standards & state-
Note
prioritized
FGS: FloodNDP 9 SWS Disaster interventions and Contract
Impact NeedsResilience & Recovery FrameworkRecovery negotiations
Assessment locations
KeyAssessment Process Finalized
Somali Crisis 2020 2021 Site and sector Revised SomReP
Recover prioritization SomReP Contract
Project- Sector prioritization Proposal
P173315 and approach process Performance
Standardized Agreement
consultation process Process activity packages Annual Plan
Product
JL Disaster Assessment Budget TBD
Recovery conventions
Assessment Target Locations
Process2020 2021

SCRP Program Scope

• Targets 18 flood-affected districts in three member states;
• The Government PIU/UNOPS “seem” to be splitting this opportunity up between

SomReP, BRCiS and Nexus (though we are not clear);
• We have been scoped for all 18 flood-affected districts, however, we “seem” to have

bJaeleasnqsueil;ected for the districts of (i) Buale, (ii) Jimane, (iii) Jilib, (iv) Gabeharey; and (v)
• aPgrorigcrualmtumraal tuicsefo)pcruosghraams n; arrowed. It is now clearly a Health/Nutrition/WASH(human
• 18-month potential timeframe;
• These are complex locations. Through our mapping exercise, some of our members have

clear capacity/value-addition for some locations; other locations are “more open”;
• Ionneuterhdaesbcialointmyd ticnoognimdteapxyltes-amwseseenstwsiminlletbhneet)sr;eeqlouceasttieodnsto(sdpeevceifloicpal“lycaopuatcliintyinsgtarteeamchenatn”dhsiogmhlieghsotirntg,

World Bank SCRP- Realtime Lessons Learnt:
Design and Process (1)

• Poor communication between Min. Finance (PIU) and sector line ministries

• Sector line ministries continue to push for priorities AFTER RFB is issued- feeling that RFB does not meet their quality standards for their sector;
• NwoithguinidtahneceRFtBo)t.he intensity of engagement and level of support SomReP to undertake with line ministries (however, no resources are to be allocated for their facilitation

• Design based on “maximizing reach” rather than “building resilience”

• High target figures agreed to between government and World Bank are the main drivers of the design of RFB and the subsequent designs presented by the SomReP.
Sector allocations and activity packages are selected to maximize reach (not based on best practices);

• Therefore, sub-optional programming with very limited layering and likely impact.
• A lot of people receive something
• Sub-optimal programming leads to technical clash with sector line ministries who do not understand/accept that reach is the main driver of the activity packages;

• Poor communication between Federal and Member State regarding design

• FMS MoPEID is not aware of RFB issued to SomReP;
• FMS line ministries believe there is scope to influence the design AFTER the RFB is issued (not the case);
• FMS do not fully appreciate that the design corresponds to flood of 2017 (not the current drought crisis);

• Likely implementation challenges:

• Given poor communication between federal and FMS, FMS will likely try re-negotiate with SomReP to change the scope of work once the contract is signed;
• Efforts for SomReP to engage with FMS in design process related to RFB have been discouraged by PIU.
• A(vlillldaegseiganndcogmropuopn)ewntillabree “ashceignhalryiopoblaitsiecadl”parsowceesshave been restricted in terms of communication with FMS regarding the RFB, therefore, once project begins targeting
• cFoendfelricatl sMhooPuEldIDFMisSadstvaokceahtionlgdeforsr hLNavGeOdsifafsesroecnitatoepdinwioitnhs trheegiarrcdoinngstwituheonschieosultdoibmepilnecmluednetd(ea.sg.imthpeleymmeignhtitnhgapvaertonwenrsLiNnGthOes olipnpkeodrtutonitthye, isrepttoinlitgicuapl paaptoorteanngtiealsayrseteamosf);
• a(rlelolactaetido)n…bLeimtwiteeednesnetcrtyoprso;in(itiis) ftoarrgLeNtGinOg aonf dspceivciilfiscoccoiemtymtuoniintfieosr;m key components of the project: (i) identification of LNGO partners; (ii) sector priorities and resource

World Bank SCRP- Realtime Lessons Learnt:
RFB Negotiations and Contract (2)

• Four rounds of budget negotiations (death by a thousand papercuts);
• Both SomReP and BRCiS are stalled;
• Challenge 1: How consortia present budget information, especially staffing

vs inputs;
• Challenge 2: Contract language, especially obligations related to

verification of completed works (the worst of both a Cooperative
Agreement and Contract methods);
• We are not sure if we are encountering:

• Government acting in bad faith so process collapses and they select LNGOs they
prefer instead of consortia obligated through loan agreement;

• Government acting in good faith but lacking understanding of contracts and/or
leadership to move negotiations forward