1/2026 FROM CRISIS TO LEGITIMACY:STABILITY POLICINGIN FRAGILE ENVIRONMENTSFROM CRISIS TO LEGITIMACY:STABILITY POLICINGIN FRAGILE ENVIRONMENTS Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units - Sub Iure ad Pacem tuendam Milites Paro
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their trajectories to methodologies for integrating civilian and police components intocrisis-management operations; from understanding the dynamics that can lead tomass tragedies to the challenges of countering violent extremism and hybrid threatsin fragile contexts.The common thread is clear: stability is built by strengthening legitimate institutions,local capacities, and trust between communities and security forces. It is a gradualcommitment, founded on common standards, training, mentoring, and accountability;as well as on the courage to recognize mistakes, learn from them, and translate thatlearning into doctrine useful to those who will operate after us.You will find not slogans, but arguments. Not certainties, but well-posed questions andoperational proposals. Doctrine is consolidated by measuring itself against reality,accepting its complexity, and investing in training, interoperability, and thetransparent evaluation of results.We thank the authors for their intellectual generosity and the readers for their trust:your feedback is an essential part of this journey. We want these pages to helpilluminate difficult choices, avoid mistakes already made, and build, step by step, thesecurity of the people we are called to protect. Because peace is not an event: it is acompetence. And competence grows when experience becomes knowledge andknowledge is translated into action.FOREWORDin an era of complex crises, Stability Policing requiresmethod, vision, and humility. This issue of theCOESPU Magazine pursues a shared objective: toconsolidate a community of practice that, throughdialogue among operational experience, research,and doctrine, produces concrete tools for conflictprevention, the protection of communities, and thestrengthening of the rule of law. The following pagesoffer complementary perspectives on issues that arecrucial for international security and for StabilityPolicing: from the critical analysis of missions andLt. Col. Stefano BORTONEManaging Editor3DEnjoy the reading.ear Readers,
EDITORIAL TEAMIMAGES AND ARTWORK SOURCESCoESPU Magazine TeamAuthors are indicated in single captionsDRAFTING, COMPOSITION, GRAPHICS, EDITINGLt. Col. Stefano BortoneLt. (Res.) Fabrizio SergiCWO Massimiliano DimicheleOR-4 Marco BenvegnùMr. Denis RizzottiMANAGING EDITORLt. Col. Stefano BortoneMAGAZINE EDITOR IN CHIEFBG Andrea ParisPUBLISHERCoESPU, Via Medici, 87Zip: 36100, Vicenza ITTel.: (+39) 0444 932111EDITORIAL BOARDCol. Joseph Gardener BruhlProf. Salvatore CiminiProf. Paolo ForadoriProf. Gian Luca ForestiProf. Laris GaiserCol. Nicola Roberto LerarioProf. Marco LombardiLt. Col. Filippo MilaniPh.D. Desirée PangercProf. Sara Pennicino4
DDEPUTY COMMANDANT’S CORNER EPUTY COMMANDANT’S CORNERTABLE OF CONTENTSFFEATURES SECTION EATURES SECTIONMINUSTAH: ANATOMY OF A FORETOLD FAILURE AND DOCTRINAL LESSONS FORSTABILITY POLICINGS .........................................................................................................7TTRAINING & COURSES RAINING & COURSESOONSITE VISITS NSITE VISITSAAROUND THE WORLD ROUND THE WORLDSTABILITY POLICING AS A TOOL FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENTAND PEACEKEEPINGWAS THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE A MALTHUSIAN CATASTROPHE?SECURITY IN SOMALIA: UN, EU, AND AFRICAN UNION’S COUNTERTERRORISMAPPROACHES & THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA....................................................34....................................................36....................................................40....................................................445................................21...........................................................................................................15.....................27
FFEATURES SECTION EATURES SECTION6
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,deployed from 2004 to 2017 and tragically testedby the 2010 earthquake andthe choleraoutbreakstands as one of the most instructive andcontroversial cases for those concerned with thedoctrine and employment of stability policing. Thefield experience exposed a nexus of structural andcontingent factors: institutional fragility, externalinterference, the penetration of criminal networks,strategic design errors, and grave fractures oflegitimacy due to the handling of the public healthemergency and instances of sexual exploitation .Within this framework, the action of Formed PoliceUnits and the Italian contribution to coordinationwith non‑governmental organizations provedessential for day‑to‑day security and assistance tothe population , yet they did not suffice to reversethe course of a mission that, in hindsight, seemedmarkedbya“foretoldfailure.”12 345The UN Security Council established the UnitedNations Stabilization Mission in Haiti by Resolution1542of 30April 2004,withoperationaldeploymentbeginning in May of the same year and themandate ending on 15 October 2017. Its statedobjectives were to support public order, createsecurity conditions for an inclusive political process,protect UN personnel, and facilitate security sectorreform.After2017,themissionwas replacedby theUnited Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haitiuntil October 2019; since 2019 the United NationsIntegrated Office in Haiti has been active . For overadecade,militaryandpoliceforces fromnumerouscountriesoperatedacrossalloftheisland’s6MINUSTAH: Anatomy of a foretoldfailure and doctrinal lessons forStability PolicingMINUSTAH: Anatomy of a foretoldfailure and doctrinal lessons forStability Policingby Stefano Bortonedepartmentsundermultinationalleadership,withasignificant presence of Formed Police Units,includingtheItalianCarabiniericontribution .7MINUSTAH’s police disposition included FormedPolice Units (FPUs) tasked with public order, riotcontrol, protection of sensitive sites, escorts,high‑intensity operations, and support to theHaitian National Police (HNP). Italy contributed aCarabinieri FPU (approximately 120 personnel), aformation characterized by a dual military‑policecapability, interoperability with EUROGENDFORpartners, and a strong inclination towardcommunity‑oriented policing and intelligence‑ledpolicing in complex urban environments. Theheadquarters in Port‑au‑Prince coordinatedmilitary, police, and civilian components, with apresenceinalloftheisland’smaindepartments.7Ph: Lt. Col Stefano Bortone
Despite the progressive containment of somegangs in specific phases of the mission, theequilibrium remains fragile: between 2018 and2021, homicides increased by 113% andkidnappings by 1,236%, with around 200 gangscontrolling large urban areas and logistical nodes .Haiti has often been described as a “Republic ofNGOs.” International cooperation mobilizedhundreds of organizations, essential in thehumanitarian response after the 12 January 2010earthquake,inWASH,health,shelter,andeconomicrecovery activities . In this ecosystem, the missionwas called upon to conduct delicate civil‑militarycoordination (CIMIC) to avoid duplication andensure the security of aid workers, with animportant role for FPUs in protecting convoys,health sites, and logistics hubs. However, threeelements undermined the structural effectivenessof the mission‑NGO relationship: fragmentation ofinter‑cluster coordination; the tendency to bypassweakened Haitian institutions (risking limitedownership); and the politicization of humanitarianaccess inareas controlledby gangs. The absenceofa clear “civiliancompact”withsharedmilestones forstrengthening the HNPandthe justice sectormadeprogressonthegroundintermittent.89Before 2010, the prevailing health risk wasrepresented by endemic diseases such as malaria,addressed through prevention campaigns,drainage, distribution of mosquito nets, andpharmacological support. On 12 January 2010, amagnitude 7.0 earthquake devastated thePort‑au‑Prince area and surrounding departments,caused hundreds of thousands of casualties, anddisplaced over a million people. Within weeks, itbecame necessary to transform the operationalposture: protection of sensitive sites, security oflogistics nodes, humanitarian escorts, decongestingcritical road arteries, and mitigating looting. TheFormed Police Units ensured convoy security, thesecuring of collection and distribution centers, andsupport for joint patrols with the Haitian NationalPolice and humanitarian agencies. In parallel,“INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION MOBILIZEDHUNDREDS OFORGANIZATIONS, ESSENTIALIN THE HUMANITARIANRESPONSE AFTER THE 12JANUARY 2010 EARTHQUAKE,IN WASH, HEALTH, SHELTER,AND ECONOMIC RECOVERYACTIVITIES““INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION MOBILIZEDHUNDREDS OFORGANIZATIONS, ESSENTIALIN THE HUMANITARIANRESPONSE AFTER THE 12JANUARY 2010 EARTHQUAKE,IN WASH, HEALTH, SHELTER,AND ECONOMIC RECOVERYACTIVITIES“non‑governmental organizations, coordinated byemergency response platforms, deployed medicaland logistical capabilities, with the central role ofrapid response teams and the rapid activation ofclinics and water points in the areas of Saint‑Marc,Mirebalais,andArtibonite.In October 2010, only a few months after theearthquake,acholeraoutbreakwasrecordedintheSaint‑Marc region. In a short time, infectionsreached hundreds of thousands of cases; in 2017,the World Health Organization and the UnitedNations estimated over 800,000 infections andmore than 10,000 cumulative deaths.Epidemiological and genetic investigationsconductedby scientificandhealthentities, includingthe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,traced the strain to a South Asian origin , whileacademic and civil society reports documentedserious shortcomings in the management of wastefrom a United Nations base near the ArtiboniteRiver. For months, the official narrative wasdefensive; only in 2016 did the UNSecretary‑General acknowledge the Organization’sresponsibility for having contributed to the spreadof cholera, announcing a renewed commitment tothe victims and to water infrastructure . Thatsequence: initial denial, converging evidence,belatedadmission,profoundlyaffectedperceptionsof the mission’s legitimacy: in working‑classneighborhoods, the image of the “peacekeepers”dimmed, reactivating latent resentments andshrinkingtheoperatingspaceforstability policing10118
for proximity dialogue with communities. Thedoctrinal lesson is clear: in high‑vulnerabilitytheaters, environmental management of bases(wastewater, latrines, and sludge disposal) is anintrinsic component of the protection of civiliansand must be treated as a critical operationalrequirement on par with ROE and forceprotection . At the same time, independentinquiries documented cases of sexual exploitationand abuse against minors and women byinternational personnel , with the birth ofnumerous unrecognized children and situations ofextreme vulnerability. These behaviors, in additionto flagrantly violating peacekeeping principles,producedlong‑termside effects: growingdistrustininstitutions, social stigmatization of mothers andchildren, and pressure on family and communitynetworks. Overlaid on this were dynamics ofhuman trafficking and sexual exploitationconducted by local and transnational criminalnetworks that took advantage of post‑earthquakechaos and weak controls, with routes extendingfromHaitianterritorytotheneighboringDominicanRepublicand,alonglongerchains, totheCaribbean1213and the American continent. Although neitheroverlapping with nor wholly attributable to themission, this set of phenomena weighed on publicperception and posed additional challenges tostabilitypolicing intheprotectionof civiliansandtheprevention of abuse. The Haitian story cannot beunderstood without considering the interplay ofpolitical interference, economic interests, and theconsolidation of organized crime. The arc from theousterofPresidentJean‑BertrandAristidein2004tothe political‑institutional crisis that erupted after theassassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021shows governance constantly pressured byexternal actors and divergent agendas. Theeconomic fabric, already precarious, was furtherexposed to pressure from international firms andconsortia in construction, logistics, and services,especially during the post‑earthquakereconstruction period: accusations and disputesover concessions, procurement, and the use offunds fueled the perception that the priority wasthe contracts pipeline rather than strengtheninglocal capacities. Meanwhile, entrenched criminalnetworks (around two hundred armed groups9Ph: Lt. Col Stefano Bortone
according to inter‑American system estimates)consolidated control over Port‑au‑Princeneighborhoods, port nodes, fuel supply chains,kidnap‑for‑ransom, and the trafficking of arms andpeople . In this environment, international securityaction often found itself operating “against thewind,” with tools and timelines misaligned with thespeed at which illicit actors adapted. Doctrinally,theHaitian case confirms that the organized crime–urban insurgency nexus requires SPU with stronginvestigative capabilities, chain‑of‑evidence,operational mentoring of the local police, andinter‑agency task forces able to target the financialassetsandlogisticalflowsofthesegroups .1415The Haitian arena saw external public and privateactors intersect: regional powers, multilateraldonors, contractors, and companies involved inreconstruction and export manufacturing chains.These interests, not always aligned, generateddistorted incentives and a “political economy” thatat times favored short‑term objectives (containinginsecurity, symbolic projects) over structuralreforms of policing, justice, and local governance.Journalisticandacademicanalyseshavehighlightedhow foreign interventions failed to sustainablystrengthen Haitian institutions, leaving a system onthe ground vulnerable to capture by elites andcriminalnetworks.Withoutaninclusivepoliticalpactand an architecture of shared accountability,international engagement risks crystallizing into aprolongedpresencewithoutanexittrajectory.The multinational composition of the contingentswas both an asset and a factor of complexity.Nationalities, organizational cultures, languages,sensitivities, and differing operational practices metdaily in operations rooms and across thedisposition. Within the FPUs, differing approachescoexisted regarding graduated use of force, crowdmanagement, mediation with community leaders,and engagement with humanitarian actors.Diversityifnotadequatelypreparedandtrainedfor,generated asymmetries in applying rules ofengagement, misunderstandings with thepopulation, and misaligned operational messaging.The lesson learned, of immediate doctrinal value,concernstheneedfor tightercommonstandardsin three areas: pre‑deployment intercultural andlanguage training; command ‑ and ‑ control10Ph: Lt. Col Stefano Bortone
procedures that are truly integrated and“nationality‑agnostic”; and transparent chains ofresponsibility for incidents affecting civilians . Therelationship with non‑governmental organizations—an indispensable asset in complex urbancontexts—likewise required a shared lexicon,mutual respect for humanitarian principles, andsystematicdeconflictionmechanisms .1617The assessment of overall effectiveness cannotignore certain empirical data. Despite periodswhen, especially after 2007, urban securityindicators showed a decline in kidnappings andviolence in Port‑au‑Prince ,the long‑termtrajectoryregistered a severe relapse: between 2018 and2021, homicides and kidnappings grew by 113%and1,236%respectively, reachinglevelsofterritorialcontrol by gangs never before so extensive . Thisdynamic highlights three design defects. First, adiscrepancy between maximal political objectives(stabilization, institutional reforms, development)and predominantly security‑oriented, andmoreover temporary, instruments: security createdwindows of opportunity that were not filled bylegitimate,functioninggovernance.1819Second, the erosion of legitimacy resulting fromcholera and abuses undermined the social capitalindispensable to the success of stability policingoperations; the “social license” to operate thinned,reducingtheeffectivenessevenoftechnicallysoundinterventions. Third, the resilience and adaptivecapacityofcriminalnetworkswereunderestimated:the absence of a joint strategy against organizedcrimeintertwiningpolicing, controloffinancialflows,port security, and community intelligence leftspacesthatgangsswiftlyoccupied.Themissionoscillatedbetweenpeace‑enforcementtasks in dense urban environments andstate‑building programs that require very differenttime horizons and resources. A deficit ofaccountability, internal and external, was endemic:from environmental management to disciplinaryactiononabuses,mechanismsappearedtardyandopaque, fueling distrust . The approach to securitywas clearly disconnected from justice: withoutfunctioning prosecutorial services, chains ofevidence, and penitentiary institutions, arrestinggang leaders merely produces turnover, while thepopulationdoesnotperceiveafairerState.20Within the MINUSTAH framework, FPUs providedan essential contribution in terms of crowd control,protection of critical sites, and support for theoperations of civilian and humanitariancomponents . The Italian FPU, embedded in themission’s policing architecture, operated accordingto the tenets of Stability Policing, integratingde‑escalation techniques, threat‑orientedinformation collection, and communityengagement to mitigate tensions, especially inhigh‑vulnerability urban areas. During the 2010healthemergencies, it contributedtotheprotectionof medical convoys and health facilities, incoordination with Haitian authorities and the mainNGOs engaged in the response. Thistechnical‑professional framework remains one ofthemost solidlegaciesonwhichtograftthelessonslearned.Withinthis framework,theItalianpresencewas characterized by the quality of its FormedPolice Units, integration with humanitarian actors,and a proximity‑based approach. Mixed patrolswith the Haitian National Police, the protection ofhumanitarian corridors, support to distributioncenters,accompanimentofItalianandinternationalNGOs, and theuseofcommunity‑oriented2111Ph: Lt. Col Stefano Bortone
policing techniques contributed, in specific areas,toreducing criminal pressure and enabling the healthandsocial response.Theseexperiences,embeddedin the lessons‑learned cycle, have nourished theItalian doctrine of stability policing in theinternational arena, with specific advances inpre‑deploymenttraining, standardsof conduct,andenvironmentalmanagementofbases .22Haiti’s trajectory suggests a precise agenda fordoctrine,training,andplanning:- the protection of civilians requires a dynamicbalance between visible security postures andcultural mediation. This demands language skills,mapping of community actors, andcommunity‑oriented policing as a permanent, notancillary,lineofoperation ;23- the prevention of abuse and exploitation mustbe treated as an operational function: selection,training, everyday leadership, safe reportingchannels, rapid investigations, and clearconsequences. Transparency is part of theprotectionofcivilians ;24-environmentalhealthisnotasupportfunction;itissecurity:pre‑embarkationhealthscreening,certified12wastewater treatmentsystems,frequentandpublicenvironmental audits, and biological emergencyplans developed jointly with authorities and healthpartners;- organized crime must be addressed with aninter‑agency approach: financial investigations, portand fuel security, disruption of arsenals, data‑ andcommunity‑driven intelligence, and regional judicialcooperation ;25- relations with non‑governmental organizationsmust be institutionalized in stable coordinationstructures at the tactical level: interconnectedoperations rooms, information‑sharingprocedures,and joint planning of movements anddistributions ;26- managing the contingents’“melting pot” requirestruly enforceable common standards: certifiedintercultural training, interoperable command andcontrol, harmonized rules of engagementsupervised in the field, and independentassessmentsofcivilianimpact ;27Haiti remainsoneofthemost complex crises intheinternational system. MINUSTAH represented amajorpolitical,military,andpolicingeffort,butitsPh: Lt. Col Stefano Bortone
outcomesconfirmthatstabilizationisnotattainablewithout coherent alignment among mandate,instruments, and accountability—and without anintegrated vision of security, justice, and service tocitizens. The lesson is twofold: on the one hand,strengthen SPU training on PoC (Protection ofCivilians), WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene),and SEA (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse) asinseparable elements of operations in fragile urbanareas; on the other, invest in capabilities to counterthe criminal networks that fuel violence andtrafficking, integrating advising and mentoring in asustainablekey.Onlyinthiswaywillitbepossibletoavoid future international efforts, in Haiti andelsewhere,turningintoanother foretoldfailure.homicides and kidnappings in Haiti (2019–2021)[15] United Nations Police,“UNPOL Handbook”(2017) [16] United Nations Police Division,“Policy onFormed Police Units in United NationsPeacekeeping Operations and Special PoliticalMissions” (2016) [17] OCHA, Haiti EarthquakeResponse 2010: cluster coordination and lessonslearned; humanitarian coordination documents[18] Haiti: missione o occupazione Onu?”, ilmanifesto, 3 January 2008 (security trends andperceptions in the capital) (see attachment:MINUSTAH_fallimento_lezioni_dottrinali_Stability_Policing_Haiti.txt) [19] IACHR/OAS, communications ongang proliferation [20] DPKO/DFS,“EnvironmentalPolicy for UN Field Missions” (2017) [21] UnitedNations Police Division,“Policy on Formed PoliceUnits in United Nations Peacekeeping Operationsand Special Political Missions” (2016) [22]DPKO/DFS,“Environmental Policy for UN FieldMissions” (2017) [23] DPKO/DFS,“Policy on theProtection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping” (2015)[24] UN Secretary‑General,“Special measures forprotection from sexual exploitation and abuse: Anew approach”, A/71/818 (2017) [25] UnitedNations Police,“UNPOL Handbook” (2017) [26]OCHA, Haiti Earthquake Response 2010: clustercoordination and lessons learned; humanitariancoordination documents [27] United NationsPolice Division,“Policy on Formed Police Units inUnited Nations Peacekeeping Operations andSpecialPoliticalMissions”(2016).Note: (1) UN Security Council, Resolution 1542 (2004) –S/RES/1542 (2004), establishing MINUSTAH; missionend setfor15 October 2017 (2) USGS; UNOCHA, HaitiEarthquake 12 January 2010, M7.0 – seismic data andhumanitarian impact (3) WHO/PAHO and UnitedNations, epidemiological updates on cholera in Haiti(2010–2017): cumulative estimate >800,000 cases and>10,000 deaths (4) UN Secretary‑General,“Specialmeasures for protection from sexual exploitation andabuse: A new approach”, A/71/818 (2017) [5] UnitedNations Police Division,“Policy on Formed Police Unitsin United Nations Peacekeeping Operations andSpecial Political Missions” (2016) [6] UN SecurityCouncil, Res. 2350 (2017) (transition to MINUJUSTH)andRes.2476(2019)(establishmentofBINUH).[7] Rassegna Arma Carabinieri, Quaderno no. 7/2017,“LaPoliziadi Stabilitàneimoderni scenarioperativi (seeattachment:MINUSTAH_fallimento_lezioni_dottrinali_Stability_Policing_Haiti.txt) [8] BINUH/OHCHR, reports on homicidesand kidnappings in Haiti (2019–2021); IACHR/OAS,communications on gang proliferation [9] OCHA, HaitiEarthquake Response 2010: cluster coordination andlessons learned; humanitarian coordinationdocuments [10] CDC and peer‑reviewed studies (e.g.,NEJM 2011/2012) [11]United Nations,“ANewApproachto Cholera in Haiti” (2016) [12] S. Gradilone,“Responsabilità degli Stati e delle organizzazioniinternazionaliperidanni nellemissionidipace”(2013)–framework on attribution and responsibility [13] UNSecretary‑General,“Special measures for protectionfrom sexual exploitation and abuse:Anewapproach”,A / 71 /818(2017) [14] BINUH / OHCHR, reportson13Lt. Col. Stefano BORTONECoESPU’s Press & PublicInformation Officer
14Ph: Lt. Col. Stefano Bortone14
Stability Policing as a Toolfor Crisis Management andPeacekeepingStability Policing as a Toolfor Crisis Management andPeacekeepingby Marco Bandioli and Francesco CaldariModern armed conflicts have long manifestedthemselves without formal initial acts ordeclarations of war. These steps are difficult toimplement in practice, given that conflicts oftenarisewithinnational sovereignty,withinlimitedlocalcontexts, or following offensive actions by terroristorganizations. Furthermore, an armed conflict canalso erupt (theoretically) suddenly, confronting theinternational community with the event, requiringcommunication via a concise text message onsome popular social network! Currently, it isunthinkable for an armed conflict to materializesuddenly and unexpectedly, at least theoretically,without any warning, both theoretically (geopoliticalassessments, intelligence analysis, etc.) andpractically (massment of troops, movement ofresources, increased communication, deploymentofmilitaryassets,etc.).Before a full-blown conflict erupts, many pastexperienceshavetaughtus thatpoliticallyuncertainand diplomatically ambiguous circumstances havefavored the establishment of states of tension,crisis, or undefined situations of \"non-peace\" and\"non-war.\" In essence, a progressive situation ofinstability can transform an initial \"situation oftension,\" which, as it deteriorates, can thentransform into a \"crisis situation,\" evolving into a\"pre-conflict situation,\" and ultimately leading to afull-blown\"openconflict.\"Naturally, even post-conflict situations where peacehas not been achieved and consolidated maypresentthesamechallengesofcrisismanagement.Situationsofpotentialinstability,withtheattendantproblemofinsecurity, andtheneedtoaddress andmanage a crisis were already clearly evident in the1990s, when \"Security and Defense Policy\" wasdiscussedbothattheNATOlevel andatthe levelofthe then-current WEU (Western European Union).However, to provide international legitimacy to apotential intervention force, whether military orconstabulary, and to ensure political coresponsibility, approval from the United NationsSecurity Council, via a specific \"UN Resolution,\" wasalready considered necessary for intervention in acrisis area. Specifically, since the UN does not haveits own armed forces, contingents made availableto the UN by various nations can operate at threedifferent functional levels, which consequentlydefinethreetypesofoperations:OperationsunderUNAUSPICIONS:theUnited15Ph: Ministero della Difesa
Nationsmerely endorses theoperation'sobjectives(e.g.,DesertStorm/UNITAF-Somalia1);Operations under a UN MANDATE: the UnitedNations appoints a nation or organization toplan and conduct the mission (operations with\"delegated management\"). In this case,the UNdefinestheobjectivestobepursuedbut retainsonly thepoliticaldirectionofthe operation(e.g.,Operation\"Alba\" /IFOR/SFOR/KFOR);Operations under UN COMMAND: The UnitedNations assumes direct command of theoperation, establishing the necessarycommand structures on a multinational basis(e.g., UNIFIL-Lebanon / UNOSOM-Somalia 2 /UNOMOZ-Mozambique).More specifically, in the military context, operationsaimed at managing a crisis are called \"CrisisResponse Operations\" (CROs) or \"Crisis ResponseOperations\" (in NATO, called \"Non-Article FiveCROs\").These Operations are further subdivided intosubtypes, the most important of which are \"PeaceSupport Operations\" (PSOs), also known as\"Petersberg Missions\" (as defined during the WEUCouncilof Ministersmeeting inPetersberg in1992).These, in turn, depending on their function asdefinedbytheUNCharter,aresubdividedinto:Operations with a Conciliatory Function (fromChapterVIoftheUNCharter);Operations with a Coercive Function (fromChapterVIIoftheUNCharter).The following types of missions are associated withtheConciliatoryfunction:HumanitarianAid;ConflictPrevention;PeaceMaking.The following types of missions are associated withtheCoercivefunction:Peacekeeping;PeaceEnforcement;PeaceBuilding.In fact, the concept of \"Peacekeeping”, has sincetaken on both a much more \"conciliatory\" aspect(leaving the coercive role primarily to \"Peace“THE CONCEPT OF\"PEACEKEEPING”, HAS SINCETAKEN ON BOTH A MUCHMORE \"CONCILIATORY\"ASPECT AND A MORE\"MULTI-ROLE\" ASPECT WHERETHE ASSIGNED MISSION CANALSO SPAN OTHER MISSIONS,VARYING ACCORDING TO THEONGOING SITUATION.““THE CONCEPT OF\"PEACEKEEPING”, HAS SINCETAKEN ON BOTH A MUCHMORE \"CONCILIATORY\"ASPECT AND A MORE\"MULTI-ROLE\" ASPECT WHERETHE ASSIGNED MISSION CANALSO SPAN OTHER MISSIONS,VARYING ACCORDING TO THEONGOING SITUATION.“Enforcement\") and a more \"multi-role\" aspect,where the assigned mission can also span othermissions, varying according to the ongoingsituation. The definition of \"PeacekeepingOperations,\" even in various UN manuals, is notalways uniform; however, the following appears tobe among the best: \"Multinational operationsconductedwithmilitaryorpoliceforcesprovidedbycontributing countries which, through a joint effort(also to share political responsibilities and resultingcosts! Editor's note), aim to maintain a situation ofinternational peace and security or, in any case, tocreate the specific conditions for maintaining asituationofpeace.\"In the late 1990s, following various UN missions, itbecame clear that certain contexts of instabilitywerebeingdeliberatelycreatedbyhostilegroups toundermine the efforts made during PeacekeepingOperations.Professor Stephen Stedman, based on hisnumerous experiences (Cambodia, Angola,Mozambique, and Rwanda) as a senior UNresearcher, defined such hostile groups as\"spoilers\" (atermthatinthis contextmeans \"toruinsomething\"), which has also been translated as\"peace saboteurs.\" He defined them as \"leadersand groups of individuals who believe that thepeace that emerges from negotiations threatenstheir power, their worldview, and their interests,and who resort to violence to prevent this bysabotaging the processes that seek to achievepeace.\" Furthermore, it waspreciselythecomplex16
crises of the 1990s, characterized by civil wars,ethno-sectarian tensions, and state collapse, thatexposed some of the limitations of traditionalmilitary forces, designed primarily for conventionalconflictsbetweenstates.In particular, the tragic experiences in the theatersof operation in Somalia in 1993 (failure to restorepolitical stability – UN Operation \"Restore Hope\")and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 (Srebrenicamassacre – failure of the UNPROFOR / UnitedNations Protection Force) demonstrated theinadequacy of military contingents in managinginternal threats, civil unrest, and protecting thepopulation. It was demonstrated that this inabilityhad created a dangerous \"policing gap\" (defined asa \"security vacuum\") that resulted in a security gapbetween the end of large-scale hostilities and thecreation of a stable and safe environment for thecivilianpopulation.These experiences in Somalia and Bosnia tragicallyhighlighted the inadequacy of conventional militaryforces: in Somalia, the humanitarian operationdevolved into an urban conflict in which US SpecialForces,despitetheirhighlytrainedcombatskills,found themselves crippled by irregular militias. InBosnia,however,UNpeacekeepersfailedtoprotectthe civilian population in Srebrenica, helplesslywitnessing one of the worst acts of genocide inEurope sinceWorldWar II. Inbothcases,traditionalmilitary forces, geared toward countering externalthreats, proved unprepared to manage internalsecurity,civilunrest,andcivilianprotection.The difficulties that arose during thesecircumstances therefore required a radicalrethinking of the approach to crisis management,highlighting the need for police forces that,however, had some form of \"military status,\"essentially a \"hybrid\" force capable of supporting(andevenreplacing)localpoliceforces.In light of the above, NATO theorized anddeveloped the doctrinal concept of \"StabilityPolicing\" (SP) to establish and train specialized unitsspecifically designed to bridge the gap betweenpurely military operations and civilian policeactivities, providing a flexible and effective tool formanaging the most delicate phases ofpeacekeepingoperations.This doctrine, formalizedin Allied Joint Publication17Ph: EULEX/Press office
AJP-3.22 (applied in complex scenarios, such aspeacekeepingmissions,post-conflictstabilization,orsupporting the reconstruction of \"fragile states\"),provides the following official definition: \"policeactivities aimed at temporarily strengthening orreplacing indigenous police forces in order tocontribute to the restoration and/or maintenanceofpublicorder andsecurity,the ruleoflaw, andtheprotectionofhumanrights.\"Moreover, Italy already possessed military forcesinstitutionallydedicatedandtrainedtoalsoperformpolice tasks and missions: the Carabinieri. Indeed,the concrete contribution that Italy, through itsCarabinieri, could make in creating a force withmilitary-level public security status, as it alreadyprovided on home soil, with a view to operationaldeployment in various crisis theaters, wasparticularlyevident.The innovative response to that “security vacuum”that had been felt and which had been addressedbyNATOthroughStabilityPolicing,took the formofthe creation of the first “Multinational SpecializedUnit”,betterknownasthe“MultinationalSpecializedUnit” (MSU), deployed in Bosnia in August 1998 aspart of the NATO SFOR (“Stabilization Force”)mission.This regimental-sized unit was composed ofGendarmerie-Type Forces (GTF), specifically ItalianCarabinieri and Argentine gendarmes, supportedby a Romanian military police component, underItalian leadership. Essentially, these were \"hybrid\"forces, i.e., police forces with military status thatcombined the discipline, organization, androbustness typical of the armed forces with theskills, mentality, and functions of civilian police. Thishybrid nature later proved to be the uniquesolution to the policing gap, as it allowed for acalibrated response in environments too hostile forcivilian police, but where the use of lethal militaryforce would be inappropriate andcounterproductive.The positive experience ofthe MSUs in the Balkanslaid the operational foundation for the subsequentformalizationofashareddoctrinewithinNATO,transforming a tactical solution into a recognizedstrategic-levelcapability.The effectiveness demonstrated in the field byMSUs has led to the need to codify operationalexperience into a formal, shared doctrinalframework. This process materialized in 2016 withthe publication of the Allied Joint Publication AJP3.22(AlliedJointDoctrineforStabilityPolicing),whichtoday represents the Atlantic Alliance's referencedocument on this matter. The doctrine not onlystandardizes the approach but also expands theconcept's scope, making it a flexible tool applicableacrossthefullspectrumofconflicts.AJP-3.22 defines two primary missions for StabilityPolicing, which adaptto varying levels of collapse orinefficiencyoflocalsecurityinstitutions:Replacement, requiredinsituationswherelocalpoliceforces (IPF – IndigenousPoliceForce)orarecognized government are nonexistent orcompletely collapsed. This is the mostdemanding case and can characterize a socalled \"Failed State.\" Replacement can becomplete (covering territorial control, generalpolicing, and specialized functions) or partial(limited to specific capacity gaps that existingIPFscannotfill);Reinforcement, requiredwhenlocalpoliceexistand are considered reliable, but theireffectiveness is limited or weakened. Thissituation is often characteristic of a \"recoveringstate.\" Reinforcement activities can includeseveral functions: monitoring: observing,evaluating, and reporting on IPF performanceto ensure compliance with human rights andinternational best practices; mentoring:providing ongoing guidance and advice toindividuals, teams, or specific units until theyare able to function independently, oftenfocused on developing personnel intoleadership and command positions; advising:providing specialized expertise and advice tolocal forces, applicable from the tactical to thestrategic level; reforming: a strategictransformationprocessaimedatimproving18
capabilitiesandintegrity,whichmayincludeinternalrestructuring, reconstruction, and inspection;Training: initiatives that contribute to the educationand training ofthe local force, both individually andcollectively; Partnering: involvement in jointactivities. Reinforcement can evolve from thereplacement function (initial phase) and requires aprogressive transfer of responsibility to the localpolice.To fulfill these missions, Stability Policing forcesmust possess a wide range of specializedcapabilities, distinct from those of a conventionalmilitaryunit,andinparticular:Crowd control and disorder management –essential capabilities formanaging civiltensionswith the proportionate use offorce, preventingtheescalationofviolence;Criminal investigations andforensics –essentialskills for gathering evidence, managing crimescenes, and supporting the justice system inprosecutingthoseresponsibleforcrimes;Border control and security of critical sites – toreestablish state sovereignty and protectinfrastructurevitaltothefunctioningofsociety;Counter-terrorism and organized crime –specialized capabilities to counter threats thatundermine stability and finance destabilizinggroups;Protection of civilians and vulnerable groups –to ensure human security and create aprotected environment, particularly forminorities,women,andchildren.The deployment of MSU units proved from theoutset fully capable of both bridging the\"deployment gap\" (defined as the inability, orunwillingness, of local police to carry out theirassigned mission) and providing a concretecontributiontoendinglarge-scaleviolence.Examples of deployment include the deploymentsin Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the fight againstISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). In Bosnia, thedeployment of NATO's SFOR encountered thethreatoforchestratedcivilunrest,knownas \"rent-amobs\" (aderogatorytermforagroupofpeople,often hired, who participate in protests or events tocreate an artificial or inauthentic demonstration ofsupportoropposition).SFOR, lacking crowd control capabilities, wasparalyzed. The deployment of the MSU in 1998decisively filled this deployment gap. In its first yearof operation, the MSU resolved 261 of 263\"interventions\"without resortingtotheuseofforce,relyingondeterrence,dissuasion,andnegotiation.InKosovo,therapiddeploymentoftheMSUwithinKFOR (Kosovo Force) in 1999 prevented adeployment gap. This readiness allowed them toeffectively manage the unrest in the divided city ofMitrovica, neutralizing the tactics of the so-called\"Bridge Watchers,\" a paramilitary group composedmainly of Serbs from northern Kosovo, activeespecially between the late 1990s and early 2000s.Incidentally, their name derives from the bridgeover the Ibar River, which divides the city ofMitrovica into two parts: the northern part, with aSerb majority, and the southern part, with aAlbanian majority, which has become a symbol ofthe ethnic and political division between the twocommunities;In the fight against ISIS, Stability Policing'scontribution, following the serious attack on theItalian Maestrale base in An Nasiriyah, home to theMSU,onNovember12,2003,whichresultedinthe19Ph: EUAM/EUROGENDFOR
deaths of 19 Italians (12 Carabinieri, 5 Armypersonnel, and 2 civilians) and 9 Iraqis, took theform of the Carabinieri-led Police Task Force – Iraq(PTF-I), an evolution of previous training missionslaunched by the force in Iraq. A contingent of 90Carabinieri was deployed in March 2015 to formthe PTF-I, which subsequently grew to includeapproximately170personnel,includingtheSpanishGuardia Civil and military and civilian policepersonnel from other countries. The coalition'sstrategy was based on the concept of \"clear andhold\": military forces \"cleared\" areas of ISIS, whilelocal police forces (\"Hold Forces\") were tasked with\"keeping\" them safe. The PTF-I was created to trainthese forces, a successful model of \"train, advise,andassist.\"In any case, the commitment and results achievedby the Carabinieri MSUs have highlighted Italy'spioneering role in developing, codifying, anddisseminating the concept of Stability Policingglobally, enabling the operational experiencegained to be transformed into a recognizedstrategic capability and a model of excellence.Recognition of this pioneering role wassubsequently realizedwiththeestablishmentoftheCenter of Excellence for Stability Police Units(CoESPU),inauguratedinVicenzaonMarch1,2005.The institution arose from an Italian proposalaccepted by the G8 during the 2004 Sea IslandSummit (photo) and supported from the outset bycrucial funding from the United States DepartmentofState.TheCoESPU'smissionistwofold,makingitauniquepointof referencewith:The\"advancedtrainingcenter\":theCoESPUisaworld-classtrainingcenter;the \"doctrinal hub\": in addition to training, theCoESPU functions as a strategic think tank,collaborating with international organizationstodevelopandstandardize commondoctrinesand procedures and promotinginteroperability.For completeness,the same facility that houses theCoESPU now also housesthe \"NATO Stabilityy Policing – Center of Excellence\" (NATO SP-CoE) aswell as the permanent Headquarters of the\"European Gendarmerie Force,\" better known asEUROGENDFOR (EUROPEAN GENDARMERIEFORCE–EGF).Ultimately,itisclear thatStabilityPolicing,conductedby specialized gendarmerie-type forces, is not anafterthought, but a crisis management tool. Itrepresents the link between military intervention,necessary to end the conflict, and the constructionofasustainablepeacebasedontheruleoflaw.For the sake of completeness, EUROGENDFOR'scurrent commitment is at the Rafah crossing(between Gaza and Egypt) as part of the EuropeanUnion mission \"EUBAM Rafah\" (European UnionBorder Assistance Mission – Rafah), a missionreactivated in early 2025 after a suspension since2007. This force includes a core of Carabinieri,demonstrating that these Stability Policing forcescan play a key role in ensuring the security andorderly post-conflict management of theseprecarious territories, thus contributing tointernational efforts for peace and stability in theregion.20Rear Admiral Lwr Hlf (Ret.) Marco BANDIOLIItalian NavyBG (Ret.) Francesco CALDARIItalian Carabinieri
Mankind was just so impossibly heavy. There were somany ofthemand they showed no sign of halting theirendless reproduction. Stop, she wanted to cry out,please stop. Youcannotallfitonthe spacebetweentheoceans, you cannot grow enough food on the landbeneath the mountains. You cannot graze enoughlivestock on the grasses around your cities, you cannotbuild enough homes on the peaks of your hills. Youmust stop, so that I can rest beneath youreverincreasing weight. […] Why could men not just beless greedy, shewondered.[…]Whydidtheynotlookatthe wars which had ravaged Thebes, and understandthatthese were necessary because they would not stopconsuming everything? That if they carried on as theywere, the seas would be empty of fish and the landwouldbeemptyofgrain? -Gaia,MotherEarth.1IntroductionandhistoricalbackgroundIfwe goback to the Trojanwar,wewouldprobablyidentify the conflict as a nature’s revenge and theroot causes would rely on mythical beliefs: it wasMother Earth Gaia, who could no longer supportthe weight of humanity, that asked Zeus to takeaction in order to correct the mortal problem andrestorethe“divineorderofthings\" (Haynes,2020,p.251). In the contemporary era, however, it is nolonger possible to rely on mythology to explainviolence and conflicts; on the contrary, we shouldinvestigate the root causes based on historical,sociocultural,politicalandeconomicdynamics,as inthecaseof1994Rwandangenocide.BeingoneofthemostdevastatinginhistorytheWas the Rwandan genocidea Malthusian catastrophe?Was the Rwandan genocidea Malthusian catastrophe?by Carlotta Nara GalloRwandan genocide is considered by many authorsas the largest example of one-sided violence in thepost- Cold War era (Eck, Hultman, 2007). TheextraordinarynatureofthemassacresagainstTutsiandsomemoderateHutubyextremistHutumadethe genocide obtain a particular place in thecollective memory of humanity (Touré, 2013). Since1916 this country has been under the Belgiancolonial rule, which transformed socioeconomicgroups inethnicitiesonthebasisofdifferentoriginsand psychological characteristics. The colonialpower reinforced the privileges of the minorityTutsis over the subordinated majority Hutus. Withthe independence of the country in 1962 and thecoup d’état in 1973, this domination has beenreversed with Hutus taking power and limiting21Ph: REUTERS/Corinne Dufka
Tutsis’ opportunities. The rapid population growth,the increasing population/resources ratio in aprimarily agricultural economy, and the largemigration flow of Tutsi in Uganda and Burundicontributed to the buildup oftensions in the 1990s.TheRwandangenocide tookplace inthe contextofcivil war started in 1990 between the RwandanGovernment Forces (RGF), composed by Hutu, andthe rebels Tutsi,whocreatedtheRwandanPatrioticFront (RPF) while being exiled in Uganda. TheArusha Accords of 1993 were never implementedand in 1994 the attack to the Rwanda’s HutuPresident’s airplane caused a conflict relapse,leading to the mass assassination of around800.000amongTutsiandmoderateHutu.The persecution lasted over 100 days and only aTutsi military victory stopped the genocide and thecountry-wide chaos and destruction (Richter et al.,2007). Different opinions aboutthe root causes hasbeen formulated: some authors see the Rwandangenocide as a modern-day Malthusian crisisresulting from climate change issues, others focuson combatants’ economic motivations, oninterethnic inequalities reinforcedby colonizationorstate organization facilitating a deadly efficiency(Friedman, 2016). Despite the different theories, aconsensus has emerged around the idea thatseveral structural andhistoricalfactorspredisposedRwanda to ethnic violence and multiple shorterterm factors precipitated it, but in the end therationale for the genocide was the strategy of asmall élitewhose political survival depended on theextermination of the Tutsi minority (McDoom,2012). The aim of this paper is first to analyze andcritically discuss the neo-malthusian narrative of aconflict caused by the scarcity of resources leadingto a zero-sum confrontation; secondly, to provehow the socio-cultural, economic, and politicalinterests contributed to the outbreak of violence inRwanda.The Neo-malthusian perspective: resourcescarcityandconflictIn1994Rwandawasoneofthemostdensely“THE RWANDAN GENOCIDETOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXTOF CIVIL WAR STARTED IN1990 BETWEEN THE RWANDANGOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF),COMPOSED BY HUTU, AND THEREBELS TUTSI, WHO CREATEDTHE RWANDAN PATRIOTICFRONT (RPF) WHILE BEINGEXILED IN UGANDA.”“THE RWANDAN GENOCIDETOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXTOF CIVIL WAR STARTED IN1990 BETWEEN THE RWANDANGOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF),COMPOSED BY HUTU, AND THEREBELS TUTSI, WHO CREATEDTHE RWANDAN PATRIOTICFRONT (RPF) WHILE BEINGEXILED IN UGANDA.”populated African countries, with high fertility ratesand a young population, exerting considerableecologicalpressureonland.This has inspired neo-Malthusian explanations ofits violence (Andre & Platteau, 1998; Verpoorten,2012): the effects of land scarcity can particularlyemerge in an agriculturedependent society, as inthe case of Rwanda, where more than 90% of theeconomically active population engaged inagriculture (Friedman, 2016). The relationshipbetweenresource scarcity andconflictinRwanda islinked to the Malthusian argument that whenpopulation growth overcomes the subsistencelevel, itwillbe curtailedby forces suchas epidemics,infanticide, famine and war (Homer-Dixon, 1999).We can however distinguish between hard- andsoft-Malthusian schools of thought: according tothe former it exists a causal relationship betweenoverpopulation and resource scarcity. The softMalthusians argue instead that resource scarcitydoes not directly induce violent conflict, rather wehave also to consider the socio-political andeconomic context. From this perspective, in thecase of Rwanda overpopulation may havecontributed to the conduct of the genocide byincreasingthecompetitionfor scarceresources,butit was not the rationale for the genocide. The rootcauses should be found in political domination anda desire for an aggressive redistribution ofeconomicassets(McNab,Mohamed,2006).According to authors like Diamond (2005), Andréand Platteau (1998), Rwanda’s conditions fit wellwithMalthus’shypothesisofviolenceinducedbya22
a rising population under a stagnant agriculturalsector and intensifying land pressure and changingsocial relationships can, in time, lead to insecurityand to an outbreak of extraordinarily brutalviolence. In her meso-analysis, Verpoorten (2012)finds much higher death rates in areas with higherpopulation density and lower access to new landfor young men. Moreover, as pointed out byZimmerer (2014), the environmental violence isamongst the main driving forces of collectiveviolence and climate change will dramaticallyincrease the likelihood of genocide occurring inareas at risk. On this basis, he criticizes genocideprevention model for its focus on humanitarianmilitary intervention, asking for a new concept ofsustainable prevention on the basis of global socialjustice.Criticisms and limits of the Neo-malthusianapproachDespite being shared by many,the neo-Malthusianexplanation comes with significant problems andlimits. First of all the little empirical evidence showsthe inability of such studies to fully explain the localnatureandconditionalityofthetensionbetweenresourcesupplyanddemand(Verpoorten,2012).The major counterpoint is that, for most cases,areas of high population density and populationpressure did not see greater levels of violence(Verwimp, 2005). Examples are Tanzania andBangladesh, which show higher populationsdensities and poverty, yet have not experiencedgenocidalviolence(Uvin,1998).The anti-Malthusian school of thought argues thatthere is not causal relationship between conflictsand resource scarcity, instead population growthcan be an innovative factor for society, stimulatinginventions, economic growth and productivity.However, this optimistic perspective cannot beapplied to the case of Rwanda, where increases inpopulationdidnotleadtoanincreasedproductivity(McNab, 2006). This is not to deny that limited landavailability in a subsistence agricultural society witha growing population played a significant factor infueling frustration that may have contributed tocollective violence, but it is not the primary cause(Friedman, 2016). Malthusian pressures may haveexacerbated prior patterns of socioeconomictensionandviolence(Richteretal.,2007).The lackofdata sourcesonthe causal linkbetweenwar, resource scarcity and population pressure,alongwiththepoorconsiderationoftherole ofthe23Ph: REUTERS/Corinne Dufka
national and international environment inexacerbating the conflict, are the biggestshortcomings of the neomalthusian narrative onRwandan genocide. In order to better understandwhy such a violent war occurred, it is thereforenecessary to analyze the socio-economic andpolitical reasonsandtheroleofinternationalactors.Sociocultural, political and economic context inRwandaHistorical models postulate that genocide cannotoccur without the ideology and decisions of itsauthoritarian perpetrators and the indifference ofbystanders (Richter et al., 331). From thisperspective,the genocide ofthe Tutsi is seen as theresult of extremist Hutu ethnicism, based ondivisions and forged stereotypes, reinforced bycolonization. It is above all the result of a historicaland sociocultural construction: colonizationtransformed socio-economic and socio-politicalgroups into dichotomous ethnic categories; in asecond moment, colonial identity discourses wereideologized and internalized by the Rwandansthemselvesoncetheybecameindependent(Touré,2013).In Rwanda, an anti-Tutsi narrative pervaded thesociety, relying on a specific Hutu interpretation ofRwanda’s history (McDoom, 2012). Straus (2006)describes this mechanism as “collective ethniccategorization” when Rwandans switched from“seeing people of another ethnicity or racialcategory as neighbors to seeing then as “enemies”whomustbekilled”(Straus,2006:225).Whenrulingélites perceive a threat to their power, they tend toengage in ethnic violence to preserve their position(McDoom, 2012). In this sense, McDoom’s (2014)model suggests that cohesive communities aremore resistant to élite attempts to divide themthanks to interethnic trust and cooperation.Evidence shows that in areas with greater ethnicintegration,the outbreak of violence is delayed as ittakes time to erode existing interethnic bonds andbridging social capital. International actors alsoplayedaninterestingroleinRwandancontext,as24shown by Uvin (1998), who analyzed the role ofdevelopment aid in the process of inequality,exclusion, and humiliation that characterized socialand economic life in Rwanda in the period leadingup to the genocide. He argues that developmentaid ignored and reinforced these characteristics ofsocial violence. Uvin (1998) also challenges the nowstandard explanations for the genocide in Rwanda,such as the effects of prevailing economic andpolitical crisis, the invasion by the RPF, theinternational pressure for a democratization, thehate propaganda, and the role of the militia.According to him, all these fail to investigate thedeeper social basis of the processes ofmanipulation and radicalization. An otherimportant factor not to forget, as McNab (2006)underlines, is the creation of a set of economicincentives to motivate participation in the genocideand to collect and redistribute resources (McNab,2006).ConclusionsThe Rwandan genocide cannot be reduced to asingular explanatory model. While neoMalthusianperspectives have offered important insights intohow environmental and demographic pressuresmay exacerbate pre-existing tensions, they fail tocapture the complex interplay of historical,sociopolitical, and economic factors that made the1994 genocide possible. The structural violenceembeddedincolonial legacies,thedeliberateethnicmanipulationbypoliticalelites,andthestrategicuseofpropaganda andeconomic incentives revealthatthe genocidewasnot aninevitable consequence ofscarcity, but rather the result of calculated choicesmade within a deeply unequal and fragmentedsociety.Moreover, the failure of international actors anddevelopment institutions to acknowledge andaddress the growing social exclusion, humiliation,and political repression in Rwanda prior to 1994further contributed to the permissive environmentin which mass violence could unfold. As such,preventing future genocides requires moving
Note: (1) Haynes Natalie, A Thousand Ships (PanMacmillan,2020),pp.250-251Sources:https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/25-years-sincethe-rwandan-genocide-idUSRTS2GFUK/Ms. Carlotta Nara GALLOUniversity of TurinFormer CoESPU’s Intern25beyond simplistic, monocausal narratives.Preventing such atrocities in the future requiresmore than reactive measures; what is required is asustainable approach grounded in global socialjustice: this means addressing the deep structuralinequalities that foster environments conducive tomassviolence (Zimmerer,2014).Ph: REUTERS/Corinne Dufka
26 26Ph: CoESPU (Rwanda, 2019)
27Introduction:Terrorism intheHornofAfricaTerrorism remains one ofthe most pressing globalsecurity challenges, generating instability andmenacing international peace and security. Overtime, governments and IOs opted for amultifaceted approach; however, the impact ofcounterterrorism (CT) measures is questionablebothdue to:the limitedunderstanding of criteria todefine “terrorism” (de Graaf, 2011), and thedebatableresultsofCTmeasures,whichhaveoftengiven rise to even more – or at least different –violence (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley, 2006). TheHornofAfricaisoneoftheregionsmostaffectedbyterrorism, with al-Shabaab, a notorious terroristorganization, operating primarily in Somalia. AlShabaab,\"the youth\" in Arabic, emerged in the2000s as the armed wing of the Islamic CourtsUnion (Dauda and Opeyeoluwa, 2023), with itsideological roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), a radicalIslamist organization dismantled by the Ethiopiansin the 1990s. After nationalist anger erupted, in2006 al-Shabaabrose as a separate force and, afterthe 2009 Ethiopian withdrawal, the group tookcontroloflargeareasofSomalia.In2010,thegroupconducted its first foreign attack, in Uganda, and in2012,itofficiallyalignedwithal-Qaeda.Executing activities almost uniquely in a local form,al-Shabaab’s deadliest attacks have been: the 2015Garissa University massacre, with 148 victims inKenya, and the 2017 Mogadishu truck bombing,which caused the death of over 500 people,representingoneoftheworstterroristattacksinthehistory of Africa (IEP, 2025). As data shows (chartsbelow), the attacks from this grouphaveSecurity in Somalia: UN, EU, andAfrican Union’s counterterrorismapproaches & the Italiancontribution in the Horn of AfricaSecurity in Somalia: UN, EU, andAfrican Union’s counterterrorismapproaches & the Italiancontribution in the Horn of Africaby Alessandro Tamburrinidecreasedover time,ashas their impact(IEP,2025).This is largely due to the offensives conducted bytheAfrican Union’s (AU) soldiers and the support ofother key organizations, particularly the UnitedNations(UN)andtheEuropeanUnion(EU).For this reason, this article aims to analyze thedifferent CT approaches of the UN, EU, and AU inSomalia, as well as evaluate the contribution of theItalian armed forces in the stabilization and securityofthe region.As itwillbe laterdiscussed,the roleofthe Carabinieri – and to an extent that of theCoESPU – has been instrumental in supporting thelocal militaries and police and indirectly in the fightagainst alShabaab, through the training of Somalipolice forces, both under a bilateral andinternationalframework.Global terrorism Index (Credit: IEP)TheRoleof theUN intheHornof AfricaThe UN has, since the 1990s, intervened in thisregion, imposing an embargo after the fall ofBarre's government and launching UNOSOM I andII (1992-1995). Moving to the 2000s, the SecurityCouncil (UNSC) issued, in 2008, Resolution 1844,
28a imposing sanctions on all those individuals orentities threatening regional peace and securitythrough acts against the transitional government,or AMISOM forces. However, at that stage, alShabaab had never been mentioned in any UNdocument. The first time the group was addressedby the UN was in Resolution 1907 (2009), aimed atextending the 1844 sanctions regime to Eritrea,precisely due to alleged support for al-Shabaab.Ultimately, in 2010, the terrorist organization wasincluded in the 2231 Consolidated list, whereindividuals and entities subject to sanctions arelisted. Notwithstanding the acknowledgment ofthe2012 al-Shabaab’s affiliation to al-Qaeda, the UNneverclearlyrecognizedtheSomaliextremistgroupas “terrorist”, but simply referred to it as a“destabilizing actor” or “opposition group” (UNSCRes.2036 & 2093). The ambiguous labelling did notchange even in 2013, when the UNSC decided tolaunch the United NationsAssistance MissioninSomalia (UNSOM), in order to support the peaceand state-building processes. In fact, in UNSOM’smandate,al-Shabaabisnotevenmentioned.A shift can be observed in 2023, when the UNSCestablishedadedicatedsanctions regimeagainstalShabaab (UNSCRes.2713), and in 2024, whenPh: Ministero della DifesaResolution 2753 terminated UNSOM and launchedthe Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia(UNTMIS). Here, al-Shabaab is indicated as \"aserious threat to the peace, security and stability ofSomalia and the region”. Both missions have beensupported by the UN Office in Somalia and theCounter-Terrorism Committee ExecutiveDirectorate (CTED), which has been central ininitiativesas“TechagainstTerrorism”(relevantgiventhe prominent role online of al-Shabaab) and inbacking the IGAD.Apartfromthese instruments, asper Kofi Annan’s auspices, the UN has beeninvolved in Somalia with its deradicalization (or PVE)plan.TheUNhas,indeed,launchedin2023inAfricatheYEEPProgramme,whichenabledayouthpolicydialogueonpreventingextremism.While assessing the success of the UN'sinstruments is difficult, it may be argued that theresults of the UN's terrorism-related actions in theHorn of Africa are mixed. The UN surely improvedthe Somali state and peace-building processes,always committed to the fullest respect of humanrights. Yet it had a limited impact on reducing alShabaab's capabilities due to its more political roleandtheframinginconsistencies.
29TheEU’spositionintheHornofAfricaAlthough the EU-CT and security approach is veryinternally-oriented and despite its geographicaldistance from the Horn of Africa, the reasonsbehind the EU’s foreign engagement are multiple:first, as Art.43 TEU posits, through its CommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,theEU“maycontributeto the fight against terrorism, including bysupporting third countries in combating terrorismin their territories” (TEU). The EU also does sothrough the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum,where it is one of the key players. Secondly, asconfirmed by EU officials, by supporting the Somaliforces in ensuring general national security, the EUprevents a possible spillover of violence outsideAfrica (through migration too), with al-Shabaabseenasavectorofinstability.Lastly,thecommercialroutespassing throughthe StraitofBab-el-Mandebare crucialfor Europeanmarkets,whichiswhy theyhavetobeprotectedandsecuredfromanythreat.To transform those motivations into action, the EUhas transposed the UN’s sanctions on alShabaaband its individuals, and it has put into place keymissions: in 2010, the Union launched EUTMSomalia (EUTM-S),to provide tactical and specialisttraining and strategic advisory roles to the SomaliNational Armed Forces (European Union, 2016).Despite the absence of any direct reference to“terrorism” or al-Shabaab, it is indisputable thatempowering the Somali forces through bettertraining and equipment surely contributes tofightingterrorism.In this regard, EUTM-S cooperates with EUCAPSomalia, the latter aiming at: supporting thedevelopment ofthe Somali Police Forces (especiallythe Darwish units), boosting maritime policecapacities, and fostering the rule of law. Then,completingtheEUintegratedapproach,thereis thefirst naval operation launched by the EU andoperating in the region: EUNAVFOR Atalanta.Unlike EUTM or EUCAP, Atalanta has an executivemandate thatis very relevant, since with time it hasevolvedtoalsotackle activities linkedtoal-Shabaab,whichisalsoexplicitlymentionedinitsmandate.“THE EU PREVENTS A POSSIBLESPILLOVER OF VIOLENCEOUTSIDE AFRICA (THROUGHMIGRATION TOO), WITH ALSHABAAB SEEN AS A VECTOROF INSTABILITY.”“THE EU PREVENTS A POSSIBLESPILLOVER OF VIOLENCEOUTSIDE AFRICA (THROUGHMIGRATION TOO), WITH ALSHABAAB SEEN AS A VECTOROF INSTABILITY.”Interacting with EUNAVFOR Aspides, OperationAtalanta is crucial as al-Shabaab is strengtheningtieswiththeHouthis,whichcould, inturn,maketheSomali terrorist organization more dangerous forthe overall regional security. To conclude with anassessment,the EU can certainly be understood asa key driver of the improvements in the capacityand state-building processes in Somalia. Thepositive impact of its CSDP missions has beenconfirmed by SIPRI, which, in a 2020 study,highlighted the impact of EUTM-S on groundmissions conducted by African soldiers (Williamsand Ali, 2020). Nonetheless, al-Shabaab is not aprimary target of the EU and, therefore, theeffectiveness of the Union’s missions is limited (yettangible).TheAfricanUnion’skineticapproachNotwithstanding the delayed prioritization ofterrorism (due to focus on decolonization), the CTapproach of the African Union is definitely morekineticandwithclearernarratives comparedtothatof the UN or the EU. This is, of course, the result ofthe proximity to the “existential” threat, al-Shabaab,which necessitated a more direct and tougherresponse. To pursue this offensive posture, alreadyin 2007, the African Union received the UN’sapproval to launch AMISOM, the African UnionMissioninSomalia(UNSCResolution1744).Unlikethe more careful and political approach of the UNand the EU, AMISOM was authorized to “take allnecessarymeasuresasappropriatetocarryoutthe[…] mandate” (Res.1744, para. 6), and in its 2017mandate renewal, it was also made clear that alShabaab was a central target of the mission.AMISOM was built around three components:Civilian (focused on humanitarian aspects andstate/capacity-building),Police (aimed at training,
30mentoring, and advising the Somali Police Forcesand at contributing to public order tasks), andMilitary. The latter envisaged on-the-groundoperations with troops and has been instrumentalin supporting the Somali National Security Forces(SNAF)to push al-Shabaab out of most of southernSomalia.Inthisregard,somebattlesandoperationsneed to be recalled: first, the 2010-2011 Battle ofMogadishu, which pushed the extremist militantsout of the Capital. Then, the 2014/2015 OperationEagle was the largest offensive since 2011, carriedout by AMISOM and the SNAF, and together withOperation Indian Ocean, it contributed to liberating10 key Somali towns. Lastly, the 2021 Basraoffensive,whichledtothedismantlingofakeybasefor al-Shabaab, from which the group launchedattacksagainstAMISOMbasesandcivilians.AMISOMcametoanendin2022andwas replacedby the African Union Transition Mission inSomalia (ATMIS). Maintaining the same threecomponents, the scope of ATMIS remained verymilitary-oriented. Its innovation was the strongemphasis on transitioning to general and globalcontroloftheSomaliauthorities.A transition, which is also at the core of AUSSOM(the African Union Support and StabilisationMissioninSomalia),thatis thelatest versionoftheAfrican Union’smission,whichsubstitutedATMIS in2024, adopting a more humanitarian stance, withthe military component reduced. Assessing theimpactoftheAU’s roleinSomalia,itis reasonabletounderline that there have been allegations ofviolations of human rights by the AU’s soldiers andthat there is also a lack of attention to the rootcauses of terrorism; as a matter of fact, only a fewand scarce deradicalization programs are in action.However, as the data and maps online showcase,thegreat reconqueringofterritoryandcontributionin the fight against al-Shabaab by African-ledmissions is undeniable, thus showing the potentialofAfricansolutionstoAfricanthreats.Italy’sengagement: theroleof theCarabinieriIn line with the goals of the missions of the threeorganizations discussed so far, the Italian armedforces’ contribution to the security of the Horn ofAfrica is significant. The primary instrument ofengagement is the MIADITSomalia. EstablishedPh: African Union
31by the agreement between Italy, Somalia, andDjibouti, this mission consists of training activitiesbothfor the Somalipolice andthe Djiboutianpoliceand gendarmerie-type forces. Partly conducted inthe Italian Military Support Base in Djibouti\"Amedeo Guillet\" by officials of the Arma deiCarabinieri, the mission provides support to theSomaligovernment,mainly intermsof securityandterritory control, thus entering the broaderframework of capacity building and stabilization(Ministero della Difesa); an aspect, which is also atthe core of the UN, EU, and AU’s commitment.Having reached its 23rd edition, MIADIT Somalia ispivotal in the development of security mechanismsto enforce in a region under constant turmoil, andthevarietyofactivitiesinvolvedallowsafully-fledgeddevelopment of the local (national) police forces.The mission is also very relevant for two reasons: itis strictly relatedto the goals oftheCoESPU, which,for instance,in2019,providedatraineraspartofanMIADT training to the US “Apache Company”soldiers in the Horn of Africa (The CoESPUMagazine, 2019). Secondly, MIADIT strictlycooperates with EUCAP Somalia, where theEUROGENDFOR (the EU’s multinational policeforce) operates. Part ofthe European Gendarmerieare once more the Italian Carabinieri. Moreover, aspreviously discussed, EUCAP Somalia is part of theEUCSDPintegratedapproach,togetherwithEUTMS.Precisely,thelatter isofpivotalimportancefor theItalian armed forces, given that since 2014, themission has been led by Italian military Generals.With a contingent of 148 Italian servicepersons,throughEUTM-SItalyalsostronglycollaborateswithAUSSOM soldiers in their Peace SupportOperations (at the core of CoESPU’s mission). Acollaboration that traces its roots to 2013, whenthere still was AMISOM, and when the ItalianCarabinieri sent officers to train Somali PoliceForces. To wrap up, the engagement of the Italianarmed forces in the Horn of Africa is of primaryimportance for multiple reasons: first of all, asDefence Minister Crosetto recalled,supportingthesecurity of the regions creates the conditions tohave fewer migration concerns coming from theHorn of Africa, and thus notto have an overload ofnew individuals to manage in Italy (AfricaRivista.it).Secondly, as also recalled by Lt. Gen. Iannucci(CommanderofItaly'sJointOperationsCommand–COVI), Somalia, as well as the Horn of Africa ingeneral, are areas of strategic depth for the MatteiPlan (Nova.news). Lastly, once more,the role oftheItalian military in the regions serves to guaranteethe securityofmaritime commercial routespassingthroughtheStraitofBab-el-Mandeb.ConclusionThe analysisofthe counterterrorismapproachesofthe United Nations, European Union, and AfricanUnion showcases that the major divergencesamong the three organizations are the result ofdistinct institutional framings, priorities, andoperational capabilities, as well as of securityrealities and perspectives. Each organization, in itsway, either more conservative or kinetic,contributes to the development of the Somalidefence framework, with the commitment to freeSomalia and the Horn of Africa from any form ofviolence or extremism. Within this multilevelarchitecture, Italy’s armed forces (especiallyCarabinieri) stand as a strategic bridge betweenmilitary actionandstabilization,providing top-notchquality training. Overall, Somalia proves that tocreate the conditions for durable security, forcealone is not sufficient, but rather a wide array ofmeans–andpossiblyactors–arenecessary.Ph: African Union
32Sources :AfricaRivista.it,‘Crosetto annuncia più missioni in Africa.Quali sono quelle attuali?’, http://bit.ly/4iXmIGf. De GraafB, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: AComparative Study (Routledge 2011). European Union,FightAgainst Terrorism (EUR-Lex) [2016]. European Union,Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union[2012] OJ C 326/13. Dauda M and Opeyeoluwa RO,‘Non-State Actors and Violations of Human Rights inAfrica: A Study ofAlShabab’ (2023) 7(2) VUNAJournal ofHistory and International Relations 1. Institute forEconomics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2025:Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Lum C, Kennedy LWandSherleyA,‘AreCounter-TerrorismStrategies Effective?The Ministero della Difesa,‘Somalia - MIADIT (MissioneBilaterale diAddestramento delle Forze di Polizia somalee gibutiane)’, https://www.difesa.it/operazionimilitari/opintern-corso/somalia-miadit/. Nova.news,‘GeneralIannucci (Covi) concludes visit to Djibouti and Somalia’,http://bit.ly/4aP7p00. Lum C, Kennedy LW and SherleyA,‘Are Counter-Terrorism Strategies Effective? The Results ofthe Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-TerrorismEvaluation Research’ (2006) 2 Journal of ExperimentalCriminology. The CoESPU Magazine,‘CoESPU Magazine2-2019,‘Around the World – Somalia’. United NationsSecurity Council, Resolution 1744 (20 February 2007) UNDoc S/RES/1744. United Nations Security Council,Resolution1844(20November2008)UNDoc S/RES/1844.United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1907 (23December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1907. United NationsSecurity Council, Resolution 2036 (22 January 2012) UNDoc S/RES/2036. United Nations Security Council,Resolution 2093 (6 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2093.United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2713 (1December 2023) UN Doc S/RES/2713. United NationsSecurityCouncil, Resolution 2753 (21 December 2024) UNDoc S/RES/2753. Williams PD and Ali HY, The EuropeanUnion Training Mission in Somalia: An Assessment (SIPRIBackgroundPaper,December2020).Alessandro TAMBURRINI“Project Advisor – External Contributor”at NATO Stability Policing CoE
33 33Ph: U.S. Air Force / Sgt. Zoe Russell (Somalia, 2021)
DDEPUTY COMMANDANT’S CORNER EPUTY COMMANDANT’S CORNER34
better than those who seek to use them for harm.Rarely has there been a time of more rapid and profound change for those invested inStability Policing — making CoESPU’s leadership as a globally recognized think-tank andtraining center more important than ever. Good leaders pay careful attention in times oftransition — redoubling their efforts to be present, communicate their vision, encourageand inspire, and garner feedback from those most effected by the change. That is exactlywhat CoESPU is committed to doing.CoESPU will continue to lead alongside the 19 international organizations with whom wepartner and look forward to expanding that number. We will drive innovation in StabilityPolicing, adapting our training offer to meet the realities of the 21 century and hostingworkshops to explore how AI and robotics impact our mission. Through it all, our visionremains unchanged: to build global capacity of professional, capable, and ethical StabilityPolice.stBut we can’t do this alone! CoESPU needs your feedback to help us navigate this period ofchange. So, if you are a CoESPU Alumni, sign up for our Alumni Database atwww.coespu.org/user/register and stay connected. If you are a practitioner, follow us onsocial media and keep track of the latest news and events. And if you have creative ideasfor how to meet the challenges ahead, write in the pages of this journal, and share themwith thousands of like-minded professionals around the world.With your support, CoESPU can lead through change, empowering the global StabilityPolicing community of interest to emerge from this period of transition stronger andmore vibrant than ever.Relentless Pursuit of ExcellenceThe Greek philosopher Heraclitus once said,\"Change is the only constant in life.”2,500 years later, Heraclitus’ adage remainsespecially true for CoESPU and our globalcommunity of interest. At the end of this FiscalYear, after 20 years of partnership through theGlobal Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), CoESPUwill embark on a new model of cooperation withthe United States. At the United Nations, shiftinggeopolitical realities and new models of thinkinghave diminished the number of large-scale PeaceOperations and reduced global demand forStability Police. In conflicts across Europe, theMiddle East, and Africa, protagonists embracehybrid warfare, blurring the line between militaryand civilian targets and placing vulnerablecommunities at even greater risk. And, across theglobe, leaders race to leverage ArtificialIntelligence (AI) and advanced robotics faster andCol. Joe BruhlUS ArmyCoESPU Deputy Commandant35
TTRAINING & COURSES RAINING & COURSES36
CPTM 27, FPU CS (PDT25) AND TOT (PDT25)January 14 – February 10 , 2026th th27th UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Material course, FPU Command Staff (PDT25) course andTrain-of-Trainers (PDT25) course, funded by the US Department of State, for trainees from Nepal.SP MODULEFebruary 10 – February 12 , 2026th thModule on Stability Policing, delivered by CoESPU, within the International Master on Security,Intelligence and Strategic Studies (IMSISS) by Trento University, in cooperation with Glasgow,Dublin and Prague Charles Universities.37
CB - SAFebruary 11 – February 24 , 2026th thA course on Capacity Building and Strategic Advising for Carabinieri Officers.SP10March 18 – March 31 , 2026th stCourse on Stability Policing in International Crisis Management Operations for Carabinieripersonnel.38
FPU - PCCs WorkshopMarch 23 – March 27 , 2026rd thAnnual United Nations FPU - Police Contributing Countries’ Workshop.39
OONSITE VISITS NSITE VISITS40
BG (US Army) Daniel Cederman, SETAF-AF Deputy CommanderMarch 6 , 2026thMr. François Bonet, Consul General of France in MilanJanuary 27 , 2026th41
BG Armelle Valentin, Commander of the French Gendarmerie for External MissionsMarch 12 , 2026th42
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AAROUND THE WORLD ROUND THE WORLD44
Mexico City, MexicoMarch 2026Human Rights & Gender Perspective in Policing course, delivered by CoESPU instructorsfor Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana officials.45Brindisi, ItalyMarch 2026Meeting between the CoESPU and the United Nations Standing Police Capacity.
46Chişinău, Republic of MoldovaMarch 2026Seminar \"Human Rights, Gender Aspects and Capacity Building\" at the Center forTraining and Improvement of the General Inspectorate of the Moldovan Carabinieri.
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