The CoESPU Magazine - Quarterly no. 3-4/2023

The CoESPU

THE COESPU COMPOUND MEMORIAL

Dear Readers, By way of introduction, I am Brigadier General Giuseppe De Magistris, as of June 29, 2023 the new Director of the CoESPU and of this almost 10-year-old magazine. I am taking on this role at a time when the international situation is more challenging than ever before. We have been recently witnessing a rise in conflicts and instability around the world. Never has the need for effective Stability Policing capabilities been greater. In this vein, the CoESPU Magazine plays a crucial role in promoting awareness and understanding on Stability Policing, providing a unique forum for subject matter experts from around the world to share their knowledge and insights on this complex and critical topic. In this issue, we feature several thought-provoking articles revolving around Stability Policing. Emanuele Poli, Navy Geographer Officer, Professor of Economic-Political Geography at the Italian Army Military Academy of Modena, and Anna Rosa Candura, from the University of Pavia – Faculty of Human Studies, analyze the long-standing issue of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Captain Marco Codispoti, Lessons Learned Analysis/Evaluation and Experimentation Staff Officer at the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence, deeps dive in the conflict between radicalisms in the city of Hebron. LTC Donatello Cirillo, Commander of the Carabinieri Forestry Group of Catanzaro, argues that in UN peace operations environmental protection should be given the same importance as human rights protection. Driscole Nenenga, a legal consultant and trainer specialized in international peace, security, and preventive diplomacy, and CoESPU’s alumnus, examines the sensitive topic of military interventions and the use of force within a national security context. LTC Paolo Cambieri, Legal Advisor at the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence, presents Artificial Intelligence from a new fascinating perspective. Moreover, in the past six months, we delivered several courses funded by the US Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), including the 11th, the 12th and the 13th United Nations Core Pre-Deployment Training Material courses. Then, other followed, such as the 2nd, the 3rd and the 4th Specialized Training Materials for UN Police courses, the 3rd UN Staff Officer course, a Train of Trainers (ToT) Child Protection course (in collaboration with the German Federal Foreign Office), the 1st Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising course, the 1st Community-oriented Police course and the 1st Capacity Building course. In the same framework, we also conducted two Formed Police Unit (FPU) Pre-Deployment Training courses dedicated to personnel coming from the Moldovan Trupele de Carabinieri, and the second edition of the Army Monuments Officer Training (AMOT) course in cooperation with the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and the Smithsonian Institution. The AMOT course, funded with both Italian and the US Department of State GPOI’s funds, was a 10-day activity that provided military and police officers with the knowledge and skills necessary to protect cultural property in times of armed conflict. This course highlighted once again the crucial role the Carabinieri and the CoESPU alike play worldwide in the fight to counter cultural heritage exploitation. By the same token, our 2023 flagship event, i.e., the International Conference on Cultural Heritage Protection in Crisis Areas held from 28 to 29 September 2023 in Vicenza, epitomizes our steadfast commitment in this endeavor and showcases our formidable partnership with the most prominent players worldwide. Impressive the lineup: in fact, inter alia, UNESCO, OSCE, the United Nations Police Division – Standing Police Capacity, European Union, NATO, African Union, the Carabinieri Command for the Cultural Heritage Protection, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Multinational CIMIC Group, and many prestigious international Universities and Organizations were in attendance. Moreover, last December, as a traditional event, we hosted the 10th UN FPU Coordinators Workshop, with the presence of the UN Police Adviser, Police Commissioner Faisal Shahkar, who had already visited the CoESPU on 6 October 2023. Among the projects carried out upon request of the Italian Defense Staff, it is worth mentioning a training activity in the field of Human Trafficking for Libyan Border Guard Officers, the 17th Asymmetric Threat Course and the 17th International MP course. Stability Policing is a complex and challenging topic, but it is critical to building and maintaining long-term peace as well as to ensuring development in this troubled world. Enjoy the reading. BG Giuseppe DE MAGISTRIS CoESPU Director FOREWORD

The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically inflected and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practises. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions. DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this journal belong to single authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the CoESPU, the UN, The Italian Government, the Carabinieri or other nominated Institutions. Content is copyrighted where expressly indicated, but Material belongs to authors themselves. The Center of Excellence for Stabilities Police Units retains full and exclusive ownership over other magazine contents and original images. Reproduction of any part of this magazine without express written permission is strictly prohibited. Dr. Maureen BROWN BG (ret.) Giorgio CUZZELLI Prof. Andrea DE GUTTRY Dr. Michael DZIEDZIC (Col. ret) Dr. Karen J. FINKEBINDER Prof. Oreste FOPPIANI Dr. Nadia GERSPACHER Prof. Edoardo GREPPI Dr. David LIGHTBURN Col. Michele LIPPIELLO Prof. Paolo MAGRI Prof. Andrea MARGELLETTI Prof. Emanuele Vittorio PARSI Prof. Karla PINHEL RIBEIRO Prof. Bernardo SALA Amb. Dmitry TITOV Prof. Gabriella VENTURINI Prof. Salvatore CIMINI Prof. Paolo FORADORI Prof. Gian Luca FORESTI Prof. Laris GAISER Col. Arrigo Paolo Andrea GAREFFI Prof. Marco LOMBARDI Col. Maurizio MELE Lt. Col. Filippo MILANI Prof. Sara PENNICINO United Nations, CoESPU Magazine Team Cover picture by playground.com - prompt by The CoESPU Magazine Team Other authors are indicated in single captions COESPU, VIA MEDICI, 87 ZIP: 36100, VICENZA (ITALY) Telephone +39 0444 932190 IMAGES AND ARTWORK SOURCES: PUBLISHER: EDITORIAL TEAM MAGAZINE EDITOR IN CHIEF: BG Giuseppe De Magistris MANAGING EDITOR: Maj. Lucio De Angelis DRAFTING, COMPOSITION, GRAPHICS AND EDITING: Maj. Lucio De Angelis CWO Massimiliano Dimichele Mr. Denis Rizzotti SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE EDITORIAL BOARD

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION IN CRISIS AREAS............... DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S CORNER......................................................................................................... THE QUESTION IS: DO WE REALLY WANT TO WIN?......................................................................... THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RADICALISMS IN THE CITY OF HEBRON...................................................... ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO RUSSIA: AN ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS FOR DIDACTIC USE..... THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL UN PEACE OPERATIONS.. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND USE OF FORCE WITHIN A NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT...................... “The CoESPU Magazine – the on line Quarterly of Stability Policing” is a stand-alone on line publication. Printed copies are intended for internal use and shall not be distributed. Published on www.coespu.org THE COESPU MAGAZINE REGISTRY COURT NUMBER: VICENZA N.3367/2018 U.G. R.S. 8/2018. ISSN: 2611-9005 COESPU MAGAZINE [ONLINE] PUBLISHED ONLINE ON THE COESPU WEBSITE WWW.COESPU.ORG - INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER: AXERA SPA, VIA MADONNETTA N. 215 INT. 4 - 36075 MONTECCHIO MAGGIORE (VI) ITALY coespu.org facebook.com/coespu twitter.com/_CoESPU_ linkedin.com/school/coespu [email protected] TABLE OF CONTENTS 24 42 18 8 70 52 82 98 62 59 RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER PEACEKEEPING COESPU TRAINING COESPU ONSITE VISITS AROUND THE WORLD ALUMNI EVENTS

“RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” “INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER PEACEKEEPING” - -

8 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” “Arafat or Hamas, there is no third party”. Yitzhak Rabin 1993 - Oslo Agreement1 Abstract The aim of this article is to examine the historical and cultural features that influenced the emergence of radical movements in the city of Hebron , in a comprehensive understanding. It furthermore aims at comprehending how they influenced the peace process between 1994 and 1999, by tracing a cross-section of the religious and political conflict between radicalism. This is undertaken examining one of the holy places contested by Islam and Judaism: the city of Hebron, where the Tomb of Abraham and the Patriarchs is located. In the last century, strong fundamentalist minorities have inflamed the monotheistic religions in the Middle East. This issue requires a careful study starting from the root of the problem and traces the most meaningful historical stages of its development; from the biblical testimonies of the founder of the three religions, Abraham, to the four Israeli-Arab wars2 and the peace negotiations - Oslo Agreements - between Israel and the representatives of the Palestinians, in 1993. Likewise, it is worthwhile to carefully analyse the extremely active presence of the two religious’ radicalisms, centred on the same territorial rivalry: the issue of land is strongly emphasised by the wave of migration in Palestine, in the early ‘900. On the one hand, the emphasis on the full possession of the land of Israel is still the majority guiding principle of national religious Judaism, reinforced by the establishment of Jewish settlements in the predominantly Arab and Muslim city of Hebron. On the other hand, radical movements, first the Islaby Marco Codispoti THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RADICALISMS IN THE CITY OF HEBRON The conflict between radicalisms in the city of Hebron. The Temporary International Presence in Hebron-TIPH mission THE MISSION’S MANDATE STATES THAT TIPH “ASSISTS IN MONITORING AND REPORTING ON EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NORMAL LIFE IN THE CITY OF HEBRON, CREATING A SENSE OF SECURITY AMONG PALESTINIANS IN HEBRON”.

9 mic Resistance Movement – Hamas3, waged the struggle against Zionism and Israel, for the liberation of “the greater Palestine”, understood as the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, which in 1998 consisted of the occupied territories of Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel, without any room for compromise. Indeed, the historical, political, and religious circumstances that shaped the city of Hebron have paved the way for the stable settlement of radical religious communities. With the eyes of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron’s (TIPH) observer deployed from 1998 to 1999, I will try to summarize few insights about the difficult coexistence between Muslims and Jews gained through the mission’s experience and efforts to provide Palestinians that sense of security that constitutes a prerequisite for stabilisation. In this endeavour I have been supported by historical and geopolitical texts to better interpret the intensity of the religious conflict and the root causes of its appearance. The idea and draft of this paper started some four months ago, but subsequently to the devastating attack4 carried out on October 7th, 2023, during the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah5, by Hamas and other Palestinian armed militias6, it became even more evident that an historical analysis of the events that led to the current dramatic conflict is not only advisable but also necessary, to better understand the possible future consequences and repercussions in Israel and the whole Middle East. The efforts to understand the reasons why the conflict between representatives of different religions, has reached such a climax and dominated the international political scene, leaving little hope for a peaceful solution to coexistence, reminded several times of the urgent need for international mediation between the conflicting parties in the land where the great monotheistic religions were born thousands of years ago. Executive summary Introduction The city of Hebron, Al Khalil (the Friend) in Arabic, Khevron in Hebrew, is located about 20 miles south of present-day Jerusalem and it is a UNESCO world heritage site since 20177. It is the place where David was proclaimed King of Judea, but most importantly it is the place where the Tomb of Abraham and his wife Sarah, Isaac and his wife Rebekah, Jacob and Leah stands. It is also the place where the Lord first showed Abraham the land that would belong to him and his descendants8. The holy site is also known as Ibrahim Mosque or Cave of Machpelah, being a place contended both by Muslims and Hebrews devoted to Abraham, the forefather of the three monotheistic religions. Over the years, the value that religious traditions placed on Abraham’s tomb was such that Hebron became closely and intimately interwoven with the religions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. With the Arab conquest in the 7th century, the tomb was converted into a mosque and later into a church in the 11th century during the Crusader period, only to become a mosque again in the 12th century under the rule of Salah-al-Din. One of the key steps to better understand the importance of Hebron for the Muslims is to acknowledge the fact that Ibrahimi Mosque or Cave of Machpelah is an Islamic Waqf, a religious fund in Islamic law, which provides a network of welfare and charitable services for the Muslim population and been an income for the maintenance of mosques, holy sites, water supplies and more. Historically and institutionally the most significant Awqaf (plural of Waqf) were those linked to the holy places of Islam that are intended for the preservation of the four ha-

10 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” rams (Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, and Hebron) and related services. In fact, they allow us to understand in a clear way the goal of this institution: to perpetuate the Umma, the community, in time and space. While Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem are relatively well-known to Western culture, less known is the role of Hebron for Islam, where Muslims believe there is the tomb of Ibrahim. The whole of the territories of Hebron constituted the oldest waqf of Islam, called Tamimi because the Prophet himself would have granted it to a certain Tamim al Dari even before Palestine was conquered, and an essential part was the mosque. These elements are sufficient to grasp the traumatic gravity of the massacre carried out inside the Ibrahim Mosque by an Israeli settler during the salat (prayer) of 25 February 19949. Palestine. Historical scenario from World War I to the Nakba10 (1948) After the partition of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the city of Hebron became part of the British Mandate of Palestine from 1922 to 1948, while the emigration of settlers from all over the world after the “Balfour” Declaration11 gradually changed the relations of coexistence between the Jewish community and the Arabs, until riots broke out in 1920-1921, 1929 and 1936-1939. During these years the historical scenario of Palestine was characterized by a long list of killings and massacres perpetrated both by Arabs and Hebrews in Mandatory Palestine12. Consequently, the events in the city of Hebron deal with the events that have shaped the Israeli-Arab conflict throughout the same period, in which the conflict has evolved from a mere dispute over territory and a dispute over borders to a collision of rights and memory. The city of Hebron remained Muslim throughout modern history, although there continued to be a small Jewish presence. After the partition of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the city became part of the British Mandate of Palestine from 1922 to 1948, while the emigration of settlers from all over the world after the “Balfour” declaration gradually changed the relations of coexistence between the Jewish community and the Arabs, until riots broke out in 1920-1921. In 1929, during the anti-British and anti-Zionist riots, the Arab pogrom forced the Jews to leave the city and gradually reappeared in the following years. During the Great Arab Revolt of 1936, the Jews were forced to leave the area permanently. In 1948, Hebron fell

11 under the control of Transjordan, now Jordan, and its notables voted to become part of that kingdom in 1950, until the end of the Six-Day War in 1967, when the city was occupied by Israel and became part of the West Bank under Israeli military administration13. The events in the city deal with the events that have shaped the Israeli-Arab conflict throughout the twentieth century, in which the conflict has evolved from a mere dispute over territory and a dispute over borders to a collision of rights and memory. Jewish settlements in Hebron A few weeks before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, on the nineteenth Independence Day of Israel, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, the spiritual leader of religious Zionism, delivered a sermon in which he recalled that the integrity of the Land of Israel had been undermined by the 1948 plan for the partition of Palestine, which removed the holy cities of Hebron, Nablus and Jericho in Judea and Samaria from Israel’s control. “Where is our Hebron, Shechem, Jericho and Anathoth, torn from the state in 1948 as we lay maimed and bleeding?”. The words reinforced the belief of the land’s inherent sacredness besides the settlement of the land to fulfil the commandment in the Torah. Three weeks after the sermon the Six-Day War broke out. The land was conquered and the ancient cities whose name the rabbi had cried out were transformed from a dream to an immediate reality14. After the Six-Day War of 1967, thanks also to a tacit political consensus, Jewish settlers in Hebron were gradually allowed to pray in the synagogue established in the Tomb of the Patriarchs, the Ibrahim Mosque, or the Abraham Mosque. Rabbi Moshe Levinger built a synagogue in Hebron in 1968 during the holy festival of Passover, supported by the Hatenua Leman Eretz Israel Haslema, the movement of the Land of Israel. His action constituted the first episode of religious colonisation, establishing the policy of the “fait accompli”. In 1974, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook (the son) together a group of rabbis from the settlement of Kiryat Arba near Hebron founded the Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faith) thus representing the radical wing of the national religious movement. Thanks to Gush pressure, Jews could pray on Saturday mornings in the Hall of Isaac, in the Tomb of the Patriarchs, where a Torah scroll was introduced, and later Moshe Levinger’s wife Miriam, one of the leaders of ‘the non-governmental organization Harchivi Mekom Aholech15, an organization that redeems houses in Hebron, occupied the Beit Hadassah in Hebron and founded a yeshiva (which still functions). “In the beginning we rented a hotel. Moshe Dayan, who was the defence minister then, came and took us to the military compound. Dayan then built for us Kiryat Arba”. After encountering resistance from local Arabs to the expansion of Kiryat Arba, Levinger said some of Kiryat Arba’s resident decided they needed to reestablish a Jewish presence inside of Hevron proper. Because we agreed to move away from Hevron, soon we won’t have Kiryat Arba and soon we won’t have Hevron. In the beginning it was very difficult, but it started expanding and

12 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” now we have a few neighbourhoods. To me it was always very clear, the ways of the father dictate to the children. Abraham started here, King David ruled at the beginning from here, now our stage of history will start from here”16. Following his example, numerous settler families began to settle in Hebron, making any conceivable plan of coexistence in the occupied territories ever more complicated. The growing number of Jewish settlers in the Old City was perceived by the Palestinians as an extreme attempt to reclaim the land in the wake of the Zionist doctrine, leading to intense mobilisation and strong opposition to any attempt at dialogue. The first four Israeli settlements in Hebron were all established on ground that the settlers related to as “Jewish ownership” before the 1929 massacre. Hay alYahud/Avraham Avinu was established roughly on the area of the pre-1929 Jewish Quarter, Al-Dabbuya/Beit Hadassah at the previous location of a Jewish hospital, Madrasat Osama/Beit Romano on the previous site of a Jewish religious school. And in the case of Tel Rumeida statements on a Jewish usage of the parcels are available17. Following his example, numerous settler families began to settle in Hebron, making any conceivable plan of coexistence in the occupied territories ever more complicated. The growing number of Jewish settlers in the Old City was perceived by the Palestinians as an extreme attempt to reclaim the land in the wake of the Zionist doctrine, leading to intense mobilisation and strong opposition to any attempt at dialogue. The OSLO I agreements However, the policy of expansion came to a sudden halt with the general election of 23 June 1992, which was won by the Labour Party. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s political activity gave new impetus to the stalled peace process after the Madrid Conference. After ten months of secret negotiations in Norway, Israel, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)18 announced an agreement in principle. The agreement was signed in Washington in September 1993. Prior to the formal signing of Oslo I, both sides signed a “Letter of Mutual Recognition” in which the PLO agreed to recognise the state of Israel and the Israelis recognised the PLO’s role as the “representative of the Palestinian people”. In addition to the “Letter of Mutual Recognition”,” Oslo I produced the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”, which established the Palestinian Legislative Council,

13 essentially a freely elected parliament, and set the parameters for the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza over a five-year period. The announcement of the Oslo I Accord triggered a hysterical reaction in the national-religious world. The handshake between Rabin and Arafat, according to the Jewish Gush Emunim, the bloc of the faith, violated the religious commandment that compels Jews to fight those who oppose it. The reading of the Oslo I Agreement, which sanctioned the autonomy of Gaza and the city of Jericho, was another shock to the religious settlers, according to whom any territorial cession of Eretz Israel delays the arrival of redemption, but this time, even more than the evacuation from Sinai or the withdrawal from Lebanon, much of what had been acquired with the June 1967 war was threatened. Moreover, the opposition to the Oslo Accords triggered an intense mobilisation also among the radical Islamic groups, which intensified the protest. The most powerful of them, Hamas, carried out an attack in Hebron in which it tried to kill a prominent representative of the Jewish settlers, Rabbi Haim Druckman, who miraculously survived. More attacks on settlers in the Hebron area followed. The attack showed, in the eyes of Mafdal, the National Religious Party, as well as Likud, that the Oslo Accords had not brought peace, but only the loss of land. Among proponents of the ongoing Oslo peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, the prevailing idea was that the return of some territories conquered in 1967 would bring peace. In practise, the signing of the agreements meant that the process of colonisation, and particularly the future of the settlement of over a hundred thousand colonists in the territories, suddenly became uncertain. Religious national leaders, who until then had supported the Likud governments and who did not hold Rabin in high esteem, rejected the government’s position. At the same time, heavy attacks on settlers were carried out by the armed wing of Hamas to further deteriorate the position of the head of government. The religious settlers of Kiryat Arba accused the government of not protecting them. For the settlers, the Oslo Accords did not bring peace but, on the contrary, strengthened Palestinian hopes for full autonomy in the territories. Immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords19, some two hundred of the country’s most important rabbis issued a proclamation declaring that the policies of the Rabin government offered the Land of Israel to the goyim, a term for non-Jews, the Gentiles, thereby endangering even the lives of the Jews of Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel. Rabin, who led the peace process, was accused of being a “Mosser”, a term for a Jew who betrays another Jew to his oppressor.20 Religious law provides for the death penalty in extreme cases for those guilty of such accusations, in recognition of the principle of Pikuakh nefesh21 , the

14 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” obligation to save Jewish lives. The Tomb of Patriarchs’ massacre. In March 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 904 condemned the horrific massacre perpetrated by the settler Baruch Goldstein on twenty-nine Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron during the holy month of Ramadan. The murderous rage of the perpetrator threatened to destroy and cut off hopes for a peace process at the very tomb of Abraham. The resolution called for measures to ensure the security and protection of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories, including a temporary international presence. One of the first and most important consequences of the Goldstein’s action was the acceptance of the Shamgar Commission’s22 recommendation to divide the Ibrahim Mosque into two areas, one for the Jews and one for the Muslims. Another measure taken throughout Hebron to ensure the complete separation of the two communities was the closure of the city’s commercial centre to Palestinians, forcing Palestinian vendors to close their shops. At the same time, the international community witnessed the enormous impact of the Israeli occupation in defence of the Jewish settlers on the one hand, and the frustrating inability of the Arabs to bring about the withdrawal of the invader, either through popular mobilisation and rebellion or international pressure. After the massacre at the Tomb of the Patriarchs, PLO President Yasser Arafat announced his withdrawal from negotiations with Israel until Israel agreed to the presence of international observers in the city of Hebron. On 31 March 1994, representatives of the PLO and Israel signed an agreement asking Italy, Denmark, and Norway to send an international observer force to form a “temporary international presence in the city of Hebron” with the main task of supporting, encouraging, and assisting the stability and return to normal life in the city of Hebron. The three countries responded positively to the request and a first group of observers settled in Hebron in April 1994 to activate the logistics system for the mission. On 8 May 1994, the mission, TIPH I, officially began, but on 8 August 1994, the Israelis and the Palestinians failed to reach an agreement on extending the mandate of the international mission, resulting in the withdrawal of the observers. The OSLO II Accords Nevertheless, on 28 September 1995, the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as Oslo II, which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank by 1997, was signed in Taba, Egypt by Y. Rabin and Y. Arafat. “Arafat or Hamas, there is no third party23. On 4 November 1995, Rabin, a signatory to the agreement, was assassinated by a Jewish extremist. In November 1996, Peres, the late Rabin’s successor, was able to proceed with the first phase of his withdrawal. This led to the situation that lasted until August 1998. President Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 1995, two months later the signing of the Oslo Accords II. For the impact that the assassination had, and for the historical and symbolic context in which it took place, it is one of many examples of staunch opposition to any form of dialogue between the two parties. The just arrested murderer, Yigar Amir, a Kach activist, told the magistrates that he was driven by the Halakha, which is the Jewish legal code24. The dialogue between the judge and the murderer during the trial sheds light on the ideological distortions that Jewish extremism, like any other fundamentalism, makes of religious tradition. Paradoxically, after Rabin’s death, the

15 right wing gained support and the National Religious Party, known in Israel by its Hebrew acronym Mafdal, focused more on defending Jewish identity values, conquering the land and became increasingly associated with. in 1996, elections won by Netanyahu’s Likud brought the Mafdal back to power in the right-wing coalition. The relationship between Mafdal and Likud was marked by strong tensions over the Hebron issue and the Prime Minister’s agreement with Arafat, as a result of which the city was returned to the Palestinian Authority, pending an Israeli withdrawal by 1998. Once again, religious national pride had to contend with the international agreements imposed on the State of Israel. More than ever before, the task of the Mafdal was fundamental: to secure the front of the colonists from government positions. The continuation of colonisation and the maintenance of the settlements depended on the government keeping its alliance with the Likud. Mafdal votes were crucial at this stage in maintaining a right-wing majority that warded off the threat of dismantling the settlements in Judea. However, the emphasis on full possession of the land remained the majority guiding principle of both national-religious Judaism and the Islamic movements. In fact, the idea of compromise on the question of the land, which divided religious Jews, met with fierce resistance from the Islamic movements. Although most Israelis were rather hostile or indifferent to the impulse of the messianic rabbis’ message, it nevertheless led to the demonisation of Rabin and a progressive acceptance of the Pikuakh nefesh principle of Halakha, the obligation to save Jewish lives, especially among the activists of the Kach movement. On the other hand, after the first Intifada, several attacks were carried out on settlers in Hebron, mostly by the Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas, which had become an important political force in Palestinian society, committed to struggle against the negotiating partners in the peace process, Israel, and the PLO. In fact, Hamas success was based both on the proposal of Islam as an alternative to the PLO and on its presence as a possible frame of reference for Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Hebron Agreement (Protocol) During the Oslo Accords, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), represented by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, signed the Hebron Protocol on 17 January 1997. January 1997, the Hebron Protocol, also known as the Hebron Agreement, which provided for the partial withdrawal of the IDF from Hebron and divided the city into two spheres of influence: an estimated 20% of the area was placed under Israeli control, usually referred to as H2, and the remaining 80% under the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), called H1. The first stretched across the historic centre and included Al Shuhada, Old Al Shalallah and New Shalallah Streets, the Tomb of the Patriarchs, also known as the Cave of Machpelah (Abraham’s

16 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” Mosque), the Iron Gate, the centres of Bet Hadassah, Bet Romano, along Al Shuhada, renamed King David Street by the settlers, the centre of Avraham Avinu, adjacent to the Arab Souk, the centre of Tel Rumeida or the hill overlooking the city. The division between the H1 and H2 control zones was clearly visible, as it consisted of numerous checkpoints established at neuralgic points in the city centre (known as checkpoints), manned by various Israel Defence Forces (IDF) detachments composed of personnel from the Paratroopers, the Givati, the Golani and the Nahal Brigades, as well as personnel from the Israel Border Police. The border between the control zones ran through the city at various points and was usually recognisable by the conspicuous yellow and brown concrete blocks that marked the end of one zone and the beginning of the other. Zone H1 was under the control of the new PNA, which administrative and police apparatus had to ensure public order and security for an Arab population estimated at about one hundred and twenty thousand Muslim residents. At that time (1998) the Jewish presence in Hebron consisted of five thousand residents in Kiryat Arba settlement and four hundred settled in the heart of the Old City. The TIPH 2 The mission’s mandate25 states that TIPH “assists in monitoring and reporting on efforts to maintain normal life in the city of Hebron, creating a sense of security among Palestinians in Hebron”. The TIPH, which had no military or police functions, only civil ones, operated within a structural asymmetry embedded in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Its main task was to report on violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as well as Hebron-related agreements. The reports were forwarded to the Palestinian and Israeli authorities, as well as to the five contributing countries. TIPH seeks to be visible throughout the city and especially in known hotspots such as the Old City, Tel Rumeida, Tariq Bin Ziad and Jabal Jawhar. The TIPH agreement identified the following seven tasks: To promote a sense of security for Palestinians in Hebron through the presence of the TIPH; to contribute to the promotion of stability and an appropriate environment conducive to the welfare of Palestinians in Hebron and their economic development; to monitor the promotion of peace and prosperity among Palestinians; to assist in the promotion and implementation of projects initiated by donor countries; to promote economic development and growth in Hebron; and to report and coordinate activities with the Israeli and Palestinian authorities. In August 1998, five years after the Oslo Accords, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu resumed dialogue with Arafat and proposed giving the Palestinians control of additional 13.1% of the West Bank according to the following scheme: 1) 9% of Israeli-controlled Area C would be transferred to jointly-controlled Area B; 2) 1% of Area C would be transferred to exclusively Palestinian-controlled Area A; 3) the remaining 3% of Area C would become a “nature reserve” where all Palestinian building activity would be prohibited. Netanyahu set one condition: Yasser Arafat’s determination to fight the fundamentalist groups of Hamas and Jihad armed militias which threated the security of hundreds of settlers living in the old town, although protected by more than one thousand IDF troops. Moreover, the settlers living entrenched in the Jewish Quarter of the city, zone H-2, were armed to the teeth for security reasons related to the unique and explosive situation of Hebron where two observers of the TIPH2 were killed by a Palestinian gunman in police uniform in 200226. This situation of constant violence results for the Palestinians of the city, in the closure of the University of Hebron27, considered a cove of Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists, closure of the main connecting roads, illegal occupation28 or/and destruction of homes and property, loss of jobs and commercial activities due to the frequent curfew imposed exclusively on the Palestinian population of both areas, arrests, physical and verbal abuse by settlers or soldiers, searches at checkpoints and murders. In the same way, this conflicting situation also imposes severe consequences on the Jewish population living in poor conditions, subject to daily stoning, attacks, ambushes, and that leads its existence as in a trench and under the constant protection of the Israeli army. A leaked TIPH report covering 20 years of information and based on over 40,000 recorded incidents, found that “the city is more divided than ever, due to the actions of the Israeli government and Israeli settlers.” It also found that Israel is in “severe and regular breach” of the right to non-discrimination and of the obligation to protect the population living under occupation from deportation, while “radical Israeli settlers” make life in the Israeli-controlled area difficult for its Palestinian re-

17 Marco Codispoti Capt. - Italian Carabinieri NATO SP CoE Lessons Learned Analysis, Evaluation & Experimentation Section Staff Officer NOTE 1 quotation by Y. Rabin according to an interview released to Thomas Friedman in “Palestina la storia incompiuta”. Slomo Ben Ami. Edizioni Corbaccio pag.287,299 2 1948 Arab Israeli War, 1956 Crisis of Suez, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur 3 acronym of “Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia” 4 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’, exactly 50 years later the beginning of 6 October 1973 Yom Kippur war 5 “Rejoicing of the Torah”, Jewish religious observance held on the last day of Sukkot (“Festival of Booths”), when the yearly cycle of Torah reading is completed and the next cycle is begun Simchat Torah | Meaning, Traditions, Symbols, & Facts | Britannica 6 Including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 7 Hebron/Al-Khalil Old Town - Documents - UNESCO World Heritage Centre 8 Holy Bible, Genesis 13:14–18 “So Abraham went to live near the great trees of Mamre at Hebron, where he pitched his tents. There he built an altar to the Lord.” 9 Istituzioni del mondo musulmano. G. Vercellin pag.323,324- Einaudi 1996-2002 10 The Nakba, which means “catastrophe” in Arabic, refers to the mass displacement and dispossession of Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In 2022, the UN General Assembly requested that this anniversary be commemorated on 15 May 2023, for the first time in the history of the UN. About the Nakba - Question of Palestine (un.org) 11 The Balfour declaration, signed by the British Foreign Minister Balfour to the leader of the British Jewish community Lord Rothschild in 1917, represented a watershed in the history of that area. 12 Cfr. Gilbert, Martin (2005). Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Routledge. 13 Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopaedia- M.R.T. Dumper and Bruce E. Stanley Editors ABC-CLIO 2007 pages164-167 14Gideon Aran, The father, the son, and the holy land, in Spokesmen for the Despises, Ed. by Appleby Sott R., University Chicago Press pag.313 15 Literally “Expand the size of your tent” The name of the organization is the Hebrew words from the verse in Isaiah chapter 54: “ Enlarge the place of thy tent, and let them stretch forth the curtains of thine habitations: spare not, lengthen thy cords, and strengthen thy stakes”. Israeli Army Turns Blind Eye as Settlers Take Over Hebron Home in Closed Military Zone - Israel News - Haaretz.com 16 ‘In the beginning we had to live in the army compound’ (israelnationalnews.com) Nov 22, 2019 17Yaakov Katz and Tovah Lazaroff (April 14, 2007). “Hebron settlers try to buy more homes”. The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on January 11, 2012. 18 born in 1964, on the initiative of the Arab League, as a political-military expression of the Palestinian resistance it assumed international significance after the 1967 conflict. Under the leadership of al-Fatah, whose leader Y. Arafāt the PLO acquired, in the 1970s, the role of political representative of the Palestinian nation also in the international arena, the role which has been enhanced since the proclamation of the State of Palestine in 1988 19 The Oslo Accords, 1993 (state.gov) 20 Cfr. R. Guolo, op. cit., p. 157 21 George Robinson Essential Judaism: a complete guide to beliefs, customs, and rituals 2001, p. 100 “the principle of pikuakh nefesh, of saving a life, takes precedence over virtually all other mitzvot (613 commandments in the Torah)” 22 Commission of Inquiry Into the Massacre at the Tomb of the patriarchs in Hebron web. archive.org/web/20130112230634/http:// www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/ Legal Issues and Rulings/COMMISSION OF INQUIRY- MASSACRE AT THE TOMB OF THE 23 quotation by Y. Rabin according to an interview released to Thomas Friedman in “Palestina la storia incompiuta”. Slomo Ben Ami Former israeli Foreign Minister. Edizioni Corbaccio pag.287 24 Rabin’s alleged killer appears in court CNN - Rabin’s killer appears in court - Nov. 7, 1995 25 http://www.tiph.org/mandate-and-agreements/ 26 On 26 March 2002 Catherine Berruex from Switzerland and Turgut Cengiz Toytunç from Turkey were shot and killed on Bypass Road 35 just outside Hebron. Hüseyin Ozarslan from Turkey was injured but survived the attack. TIPH commemorates the killing of two Observers in 2002 - TIPH press release/NonUN document - Question of Palestine 27 Israel Closes Two Universities in Hebron as Terrorist Havens - The New York Times (nytimes.com) 28 Settlers families illegally occupied empty Al Rajabi house renaming it Beit HaShalom Hebron: Israeli settlers must be stopped from taking over Al-Rajabi House – UN Special Rapporteur | OHCHR 29 Israel terminates TIPH operations in H2: Further shrinking of humanitarian space leaves residents facing increased protection risks | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory (ochaopt.org) 30 Palestina la storia incompiuta la tragedia arabo-israeliana pag. 287- Ed.Corbaccio 2007 sidents29. The TIPH, the sole international mission deployed inside the occupied Palestinians territories with Israel’s consent, left the H2 area of Hebron city Following the Israeli government’s decision not to renew its mandate beyond 31 January 2019. Conclusions At its core, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a dispute over land. Religion, as we have seen, becomes the battleground for these disputes and the site of confrontation between two different ethnicities and nationalisms. Still, the idea of compromise on the question of the land, which divided religious Jews, met with fierce resistance from the Islamic movements. No wonder these tensions flare up on religious holidays, for both Jews and Muslims. Shlomo Ben Ami30 recalls that “the longing for the same landscape, the mutually exclusive claims to ownership of lands, places and religious symbols, the ethics of dispossession and refugees, on which both sides claim a monopoly, all this makes their national histories virtually incompatible”. Dignity denied: Life in the settlement area of Hebron city | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory (ochaopt.org) PICTURES Marco Codispoti

18 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” Abstract: Over the years, States have developed the tendency of resorting to military interventions to curb high risk and emerging threats and challenges to national security, which is actually contrary to normal practice whereby security forces or forces of law and order, mainly the police and gendarmerie type forces, have the primary responsibility of ensuring safety and security within the national territory, and the military only intervenes as a last resort. Hence, the militarisation of the security sector has had some visible consequences such as the exertion of too much force, the deployment of forces in missions for which they are not trained as well as the difficult cohabitation between some State defence and security forces in combatting high risk security threats. Cognisant of the lack of proportionality, adequacy and cooperation in deploying forces to face heightened and evolving security threats within a national territory, this article aims at examining the impact of the latter at the strategic, operation and tactical levels, as well as its impact on peacebuilding and nation building. Key words: national security, proportionality, adequacy and cooperation. Introduction The thirty-year war from 1618- 1648 was marked by the signing of the Westphalia Peace Treaties, landmark treaties in international relations which created States, main actors of international relations and the international community. By virtue of these treaties, States are all equal before one another. A State is a political entity made of a precise geographical territory, a population and a central government. When all these constitutive elements are duly gathered, then the fourth comes in; sovereignty. Sovereignty is the liberty of a State to dispose of or manage its natural resources, national territory, air space, maritime space and population as it pleases (internal sovereignty), as well as its freedom of choice with respect to the bilateral and multilateral relations it deems necessary to establish with other actors of international relations (external sovereignty). Hence, it could therefore be understood that sovereignty is what enables a State to take action both at the national and international by Driscole Nenenga A. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND USE OF FORCE WITHIN A NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT Proportionality, adequacy and cooperation in military interventions and the use of force within a national security context UN Photo/Christopher Herwig

19 levels. It gives States authority and influence in the deliberation of pressing issues in international relations. To ease its understanding, sovereignty can be seen as legal personality which offers rights and imposes obligations on its subjects. By virtue of the strategic role that sovereignty together with all the other constitutive elements of a State play in the existence and recognition of a State, as well as its influence in international affairs, the preservation of the latter shall always be the top priority on the agenda of States. This explains why States are always ready to go the extra mile to protect and preserve their sovereignty whenever the latter is threatened. A case in point is the twenty-year war launched by the USA together with other European powers against the Taliban just after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In this light, taking into account their internal and external sovereignty, States have defined a security apparatus which covers all the constitutive elements on which the stakes, existence and survival of a State lies; the national territory (both aerial, maritime and terrestrial), natural resources and population, just to name a few. Due to the growing dynamics and changes on the international community, foreign interest could be added to the afore mentioned constitutive elements. The security fabric within States is composed of defence or armed forces on one hand, in charge of the preservation of the territorial integrity of the State, its protection against aliens, foreign attacks as well as the protection of the foreign interests of the State. On the other hand, there are security forces or forces of law and order who are in charge of the protection of goods and persons, the fight against threats to human integrity and national security just to name a few. In the deployment of troops for security or defence purposes, it is essential for policy makers to be cognisant of proportionality, adequacy and cooperation for the proper management of situations on the ground. Evolving security threats and challenges such as terrorism, trafficking, financial and cross-border crimes, coupled with the socio-political and socio-economic contexts within States have proven to be very complex overtime and the intervention of armed forces or the use of force by forces of law and order could either bring lasting solutions or worsen the situation on ground. In a bid to completely eradicate global security threats, States, who have the monopoly of violence tend to exert excessive force to deal with these threats, which is contrary to the principle of proportionality prescribed by international law as well as constitutions and domestic laws of liberal democracies1. By so doing, States tend to militarise their security approach, policies and strategies in the face of security threats and challenges. Moreover, in certain situations, inadequate force is being deployed to deal with security threats and challenges way beyond the competence of the forces deployed. In addition, certain operational circumstances require that forces work together in order to effectively and efficiently accomplish their missions, which is not always the case. These circumstances as well as their consequences will be examined in the following paragraphs with respect to their operational impacts (I) and their impacts on peace building and nation building (II). I. Operational, tactical and strategic impact: The definition of the roles and competences of armed forces and forces of law and order is a guideline for political leaders to know what type specific unit or contingent should be deployed in the face of certain security issues. This could be likened to the unwritten rule or principle whereby the combat and daily uniforms of defence and security forces are determined with respect to the typology of their missions and the specificities of their operational environments. As already elaborated above, national security is the primary responsibility of security forces or forces of law and order in some contexts. These include mainly the police and gendarmerie type forces, which are IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR SECURITY OR DEFENCE PURPOSES, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR POLICY MAKERS TO BE COGNISANT OF PROPORTIONALITY, ADEQUACY AND COOPERATION FOR THE PROPER MANAGEMENT OF SITUATIONS ON THE GROUND

20 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” the equivalent of the Carabinieri in Italy, the Guardia Civil in Spain or the FBI in the USA. While the police forces carryout routine security and safety tasks such as traffic control, urban patrol and criminality. The gendarmerie type forces on the other hand are police forces with a military status, which gives them a dual security and defence function, hence, in some countries they form part of the armed forces and are placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defence such as the case of Cameroon, where the National Gendarmerie is under the authority of the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence in charge of the National Gendarmerie. Gendarmerie forces have a general judicial police mission for preventive motives and an administrative judicial police mission for repressive purposes, as well as reinforced law and order. They are equally specifically trained for high risk police and military operations, which explains the existence of specialised units and SWAT teams within Gendarmerie forces tasked and trained to face specific security threats. Rather than militarising internal or national security, under the pretext of a heightened security threat, it would be judicious for States to reinforce the tactical, strategic and operational capacities of forces of law and order to face these challenges and the military or armed forces could be a last resort. This has been greatly addressed by the Italian Carabinieri, which has amongst others, the Mobile Units Division, placed under the authority of the Mobile and Specialised Units Command whose headquarters is in Rome2. This Division is composed of two brigades; the 1st Mobile Brigade, made of 12 Regiments and Battalions, dedicated to Image 1: Cameroonian police and gendarmerie personnel conducting a highway patrol. Source: https://www.cameroun24.net/blog/?pg=actu&ppg=&pp=&id=25491 GENDARMERIE FORCES HAVE A GENERAL JUDICIAL POLICE MISSION FOR PREVENTIVE MOTIVES AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL POLICE MISSION FOR REPRESSIVE PURPOSES, AS WELL AS REINFORCED LAW AND ORDER

21 public order services, civil protection and support to the Territorial Arms in territorial control, in addition to the 4th Carabinieri Regiment on Horseback.3 We equally have the 2nd Mobile Brigade composed of the 1st Carabinieri Paratroopers Regiment “Tuscania”, the 7th Carabinieri Regiment “Trentino Alto Adige” and the 13th Carabinieri Regiment “Friuli Venezia Giulia”, destined for military operations abroad and for the Integrated Defence of the national territory and in public order services, as well as the Special Intervention Group (G.I.S.), for decisive actions in high-risk situations and placed under the operational command of the General Headquarters. It could undoubtedly be agreed that the Italian Carabinieri is well organised and equipped to fully handle multivariate human and national security issues. The direct merit of proportionality and adequacy in the use of force in the deployment of defence and security forces is the assurance of mission accomplishment and moreover, it enables them gain experience and further perfect their skills, thereby ensuring their specialisation and professionalisation in handle complex and high risk security issues. Constant dependence on the military to handle internal security issues largely exposes a States weakness and incompetence in the face of threats and challenges to national security. However, in the theatre of operations, despite the necessity of adequacy and proportionality in the use of force to handle security issues, unforeseen circumstances on the field and complex security contexts such as terrorist or rebel incursions could sprout the need for the mutualisation of efforts of the police and gendarmerie forces to accomplish a mission. Moreover, due to the tactical, strategic and operational circumstances of a particular military or police intervention, decision makers could decide to deploy two or three contingents from different police or military corps. This strategy is regularly implemented by the Cameroonian defence and security forces, whereby the police, gendarmerie and customs jointly carryout patrol and surveillance on national highways to fight against clandestine activities, the transportation of contraband goods and to ensure the compliance and conformity to national legislation. This should rather be seen as a calculated and comprehensive approach to effectively and efficiently apprehend a particular security situation within a combined military and or police organisation and UN Photo/Marco Dormino

22 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” promote harmonious cohabitation between defence and security forces who are usually in competition. Within the framework of peace operations, military interventions and the use of force are all guided by the legal foundations of the said peace operation, ranging from the UNSC resolution which authorises the peace operation, the Directive on the Use of Force, the Rules of Engagement and the Protection of Civilians mandate. II. Impacts on peacebuilding and nation building: Armed forces and forces of law and order have a crucial role to play in the promotion of national unity and the elevation of a nations image and prowess by virtue of the typology of their missions. Hence, every military intervention and use of force could either consolidate national unity or destabilise it. The deployment of forces in the face of security threats and challenges is done in the interests of the State but must equally take into account the rights and integrity of the civilImage 2: a unit of the Central Command of the Mobile Interventions Group (CCGMI), one of the elite units of the Cameroonian police getting ready for an operation Source: https://www.journalducameroun.com/tag/police/ ian population who are an integral part of peacebuilding and nation building processes, which always intervene at the end of a prolonged or protracted internal security crisis. Moreover, owing to the fact that amongst many others, the protection of territorial integrity, goods and persons are always the objectives of military interventions and the use of force to curb security challenges, these missions cannot be said to be successful when the security threat is eradicated, but rather when upon the eradication of the threat civilian and material casualties are virtually inexistent. Defence and security issues are

23 Driscole Nenenga A Legal consultant specialised in international peace, security and preventive diplomacy. Bibliography A. Books: - Pol L, et al, “The Internal War: how the fight against drugs is militarising Latin America”, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales – CELS, ISBN 978-987-4195-04-3, 2018. B. Articles: - Friesendorf C, “International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police Roles”, SSR Paper 4, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), ISBN 978‐92‐9222‐202‐4, 2012; - Kaldor, M and Selchow, S 2015 From Military to ‘Security Interventions’: An Alternative Approach to Contemporary Interventions. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 32, pp.1–12, DOI: http:// dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.fu - Major Simmons C, “The Power is Yours: The Justification for Military Intervention to Respond to an Environmental Threat”, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Volume 229, Issue 4; - National Institute of Justice, “Overview of Police Use of Force,” March 5, 2020, nij.ojp. gov: https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/overview-police-use-force ; - Sutto M. et al, “The Role and the Values of Gendarmerie-Type Police Forces in Stabilisation Processes”, the CoESPU MAGAZINE – Quaterly no.2-2023, ISSN 2611-9005, pages 36-43. C. Websites: - https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/security/ ; - https://rm.coe.int/168067d214 ; - https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/intelligence-security-and-the-law ; - https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-2/Prism_101-114_Smith-Shrimpton.pdf ; - https://www.carabinieri.it/chi-siamo/oggi/ organizzazione/mobile-e-speciale ; - https://www.cameroun24.net/blog/?pg=actu&ppg=&pp=&id=25491 ; - https://www.journalducameroun.com/tag/ police/ . already substantial threats to national unity and peacebuilding, to which other constraining circumstances such as disgruntled civilians should not be added. Military interventions and the use of force are therefore response strategies and policies to threats to the territorial integrity of the State as well as the safety and security of goods and persons, which should be carried out within the perspective of the preservation of national unity by winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population, thereby paving the way for a smooth peacebuilding and or nation building process afterwards. Crisis and conflicts destabilise and deconstruct the normal flow of events within a country which create the need for post conflict reconstruction, within a civil-military framework, as both civilians on one hand and defence and security forces on the other hand, are all integral part of the inclusive and comprehensive process of peace building and nation building. Hence, the conduct of hostilities by military and police forces in handling threats to national security is actually determinant to the success of post conflict reconstruction and nation building, whose success or failure is greatly linked to the extent of civil-military cooperation during the preceding conflict or crisis. The existence of gendarmerie type forces within a State’s security apparatus is indeed an operational imperative by virtue of the high risk security threats which exist within a State. However, owing to the robust and impulsive nature of the interventions of their elite and specialised units, their deployment ought to be very meticulous to directly handle the targeted security issue at hand to avoid any civilian casualties as much as possible in order not to provoke a situation of social unrest and a national crisis or conflict afterwards. Conclusion: In fine, military interventions and the use of force in dealing with security issues are undesirable occasions during which States ought to reaffirm and strengthen the patriotic bond between State institutions and the civilian population, by considering proportionality, adequacy and cooperation in military deployments and the use of force in handling security issues to ensure peace, unity and stability on the national territory. In a contemporary global context characterised by evolving and complex security threats and challenges, which have proven to be very nebulous and transversal, an effective and efficient management of these issues at a national level by State authorities with regards to military interventions and the use of force will be instrumental in attenuating conflict and crisis tendencies around the world, thereby ventilating a global sensation of the triple S which are; safety, security and stability; primordial for the attainment of SDGs and many others for human kind. Moreover, State responsibilities and obligations regarding territorial integrity and the safety and security of goods and persons determine the fate of the nation’s peace, unity and stability, which are the very essence of national defence and security forces.

24 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” Abstract: With the referendum held on March 16, 2014, Crimea decided to separate from Ukraine and to join the Russian Federation; the RF, after a few days, formally accepted the request by annexing the Crimea. This event, which gave rise to divergent positions among the governments, generated a serious international crisis, the effects of which are still in full manifestation. This contribution intends to highlight the facts that led to this crisis, examining the different points of view: the one against the Russian annexation (Ukraine, European Union, USA and its allies) and the one in favor of the annexation (Russian speakers of Crimea and obviously Russian Federation). The intent is to dwell on the comparison between the case of Crimea and that of Kosovo, to underline how international law is interpreted and used differently, depending on the circumstances, to support what is most convenient. This exploitation disqualifies the entire supranational juridical complex and the positions based on it. In the end, what really counts in the interpretation of geopolitical events is the analysis of political, economic and military interests. The Russian Federation, after the Ukrainian government’s rapprochement with NATO (which emerged from the Euromaidan demonstrations) cannot afford to lose a territory that plays a strategic role of fundamental importance and which has belonged to its sphere of influence for hundreds of years. Added to these reasons is the desire of Russian-speaking Crimeans to have guarantees about their future, threatened by the anti-Russian policy of the new government in Kiev. The analysis of current geopolitical events plays a decidedly educational role, fundamental for developing, in learners, the critical capacity, now atrophied by the continuous media bombardment and by information that tends to a single point of view. 1. The events between 2013 and 2014: background of the crisis. The events that started the secessionist movement in Crimea are to be found in the crisis affecting the whole of Ukraine at the end of 2013. On November 21, 2013, in Kiev (capital of Ukraine - 50° 27′ N; 30° 31′ 25″ E) a series of demonstrations began, which by Emanuele Poli Anna Rosa Candura ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO RUSSIA: AN ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS FOR DIDACTIC USE Annexation of crimea to the russian federation: an analysis of geopolitical events for didactic use1 Di Battaglia_di_San_Martino_Affresco_004.JPG: Frizzoni (?), Bergamoderivative work: Ligabo (talk) - Battaglia_di_San_Martino_Affresco_004.JPG, Pubblico dominio, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=10869488

25 took the name of Euromaidan2. The name consists of two parts: “Euro” (short for Europa) and “Maidan” (from Majdan Nezaleznosti, майдан незалежності, Independence Square, the main square of Kiev). The demonstrations take place after the suspension, by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, of an association and free trade agreement with the European Union, in order to resume closer economic relations with Russia. The protests last about 3 months, despite the presence of the police, freezing temperatures and snow. Since January 2014, the protests have changed in nature; from an initial pro-European demonstration, we moved on to the request for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych and his government, accused of corruption, abuse of power and violation of human rights. Violent clashes took place from 19 to 25 January 2014, in response to police repression attempts and the approval (on 16 January) of laws against freedom of demonstration. Since January 23, in various western provinces of Ukraine, government and regional council buildings have been occupied by protesters. The European Union and the United States begin to threaten harsh sanctions against the Ukrainian President, held responsible for street violence and fierce repression. Only Russia backs the government in Ukraine and speaks of undue foreign pressure and coup attempts. On 18 February the violence caused 28 deaths (including 7 policemen) and 335 injured. On February 20, demonstrators try to storm the government and parliament building and the police fire on the crowd causing over 100 deaths and 700 injured. Following these terrible violence, Yanukovych and the leaders of the opposition agree to call early elections and a government of national unity, returning to the 2004 constitution, with a significant limitation on presidential power, On February 22, 2014, Yanukovych (now surrounded) fled the capital, FIG. 1 Territory of Ukraine, in a cartogram from the World Factbook (Source: cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/map Public Domain 2023

26 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” losing track of himself. Meanwhile, parliament votes on the impeachment request presented by the opposition (approved with 328 votes in favor out of 340) and determines the immediate forfeiture of Yanukovych from the office of President of the Republic (st.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2014-02-22/). Oleksandr Turcinov was appointed in his place, with a new Prime Minister, Arsenij Yatsenyuk, both men of the more nationalist wing of the Pan-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” party. On 24 February 2014, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov announced that Yanukovych was wanted (along with others) on charges of massacre. On February 25, the new government repeals the law (of July 3, 2012) concerning language policy; this law, which provided for official bilingualism in areas where the entity of linguistic minorities exceeds 10% of the population, is repealed with the vote of 232 deputies, liminating Russian as an official language.3 At the same time, various government officials declare that they intend to review the administrative status of Ukraine, to reduce the autonomy of some regions, including Crimea. 2. In medias res: the highlights of 2014 The local authorities of Crimea do not accept the new Ukrainian government (following the Euromaidan demonstrations) because they claim it was generated by a coup d’état, as the procedures followed to oust and replace the President did not follow the rules of the Constitution; for this reason, the local government declares its willingness to separate from Ukraine. On 27 February 2014, some armed men (dressed in camouflage overalls and without belonging badges) began to guard the local administration offices in Simferòpoli (Simferòpoli – Simferòpol; 44° 57′ N; 34° 06′) and hoisted the Russian flag, on the roof of buildings. These men possess Russian vehicles (and rifles), but the Kremlin claims they are “local self-defense militias”. The following day, more armed and unmarked men occupy Crimean airports; also on February 28, the former president Yanukovych spoke from his refuge in Rostovon-Don (Russia), accusing the Kiev government of a “coup d’état”. On March 1, the Russian parliament approves President Vladimir Putin’s request for the use of military force in Ukraine, with the aim of protecting the population of Russian nationality. Russian troops were already on the Ukrainian border, officially carrying out a military exercise, interpreted by many as an attempt to intimidate the new power in Kiev. By deploying its warships, the Russian navy blocks the port of Sevastopol (Sevastopol’- Sevastopil’ - 44° 36′ N; 33° 31′ E) and prevents the movements of Ukrainian ships. The government in Kiev accuses the military occupation of the peninsula by the Russian army and is mobilizing its armed forces. The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and the European Union accuse Russia of violating international law and destabilizing Ukrainian sovereignty. Pro-Russian demonstrations take place on March 2 in many Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv (Kharkiv, 49° 59′ 33′′ N; 36° 13′ 52′′ E; second largest city in Ukraine, by population, after Kiev)4.New paramilitary troops occupy the coast guard command in Balaklava and surround the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne (44° 50′ 34″ N; 34° 19′ 21″ E), which is located about 23 kilometers from Simferopol. The Ukrainian soldiers refuse to surrender their weapons and for days the two sides face each other, without shooting. Ukrainian soldiers are being held captive inside their base and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk claims it is a declaration of war by Russia. On March 3 and 4, more and more paramilitary troops take control of the border points between Crimea and Ukraine. On March 6, the Russians sink a disarmed Ukrainian anti-submarine cruiser, the Ochakov, at the entrance to the port of Donuzlav (naval base and headquarters of the Ukrainian navy for the southern area; 45° 20′ 2′′ N; 33° 00 ′ 3′′ E), pinning down, five Ukrainian war units. Il 6 marzo, i Russi affondano un incrociatore antisommergibili ucraino in disarmo, lo Ochakov, all’imbocco del porto di Donuzlav (base navale e quartier generale della marina ucraina per la zona sud; 45° 20′ 2′′ N; 33° 00′ 3′′ E), bloccandovi cinque unità da guerra ucraine. Belbek military airfield (village near Sevastopol - 44°41′ N; 33°35′ E) is occupied by Russian military who oust Ukrainian soldiers. The Ukrainian interior minister, Arsen Avakov, declares (through his Facebook page) that he considers this action as an armed invasion and occupation. Also on 6 March, the Supreme Council of Crimea, sent the request for annexation to Russia to Russian President Vladimir Putin and set a

27 referendum for 16 March to confirm this decision (Kobzev, 2014). Deputy Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Rustam Temirgaliev says that the Ukrainian forces still present on the territory must surrender or leave and that the only legal armed forces on the territory of Crimea are the Russian armed f On March 11, the Crimean Parliament votes for the exit of Crimea from Ukraine, with 78 votes in favor out of 81 voters (Chamber of Deputies, 2014, p.1). On March 15, a resolution of the United Nations Security Council (which aims to stop the referendum on the self-determination of Crimea), requested by the United States, gets 13 votes (out of 15) in favor and China abstain, but is blocked by Russia’s veto right, which, of course, it votes against. On 16 March 2014, the referendum was held, proposing two questions (written in the three co-official languages of Crimea: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar in the Cyrillic alphabet). The first question asks: “Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, as a federal subject of the Russian Federation?”. The second: “You are in favor of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?” (Kobzev, 2014). 1,274,096 people participate in the referendum, equal to 83.1% of those entitled to vote; of these, 97.47% are in favor of reunification with Russia (Chamber of Deputies, 2014, p. 3). On 17 March, the Crimean Parliament approved, in an extraordinary session, the results of the consultation, proclaiming the Republic of Crimea as an independent sovereign state. Still in the same session, Parliament asked the Kremlin to accept, in the Russian Federation, the Republic which had become independent from Ukraine. On March 18, a treaty was signed in Moscow between representatives of Crimea and Russian President Vladimir Putin, to establish the rules regarding the annexation of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation. FIG. 2 The Crimean peninsula (Source: Maximilian Dörrbecker, or “Chumwa” – usingOpenStreetMap Open Database License - 2023)

28 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” The document establishes, among other points: that Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar are the official languages of Crimea; Russian citizens will do military service until 2016; elections in the Republic of Crimea and in the Autonomous City of Sevastopol will be held on the second Sunday of September 2015, until then, the current government authorities will perform administrative functions; the border between the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine will be an international border between Russia and Ukraine; maritime borders in the Black and Azov seas, are based on international treaties concluded by the Russian Federation. The annexation takes place very quickly: the treaty, presented by Putin to the State Duma of Russia, is ratified on March 20, with the only vote against the deputy Il’ya Vladimirovich Ponomarëv, of the Just Russia party. On the same day, the Duma approves the federal constitutional law on the acceptance, in the Russian Federation, of the Republic of Crimea and on the formation, within the Federation, of new political subjects: the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. The Russian conquest of the Ukrainian bases in the Black Sea peninsula continues. Many soldiers enter the Russian army, encouraged by the maintenance of their rank and by a considerably higher economic treatment. On 24 March, Ukraine takes note of the military situation in Crimea: the National Security Council, in agreement with the defense ministry of Kiev, announced the withdrawal of its remaining troops stationed on the peninsula. A few hours earlier, about two hundred Russian soldiers, attacked and conquered the naval base of Feodosia (Caffa - 45° 02′ 56′′ N; 35° 22′ 45′′ E), it and causing the wounding of some soldiers from Kiev. On the same day, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu, the first government official to travel to Crimea after the annexation, appointed Denis Valentinovič Berezovsky (former Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Navy, one of the first to swear allegiance to the new authorities of the pro-Russian Crimea), Deputy Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 3. International reactions During and after the events in Crimea, the United States, many states of the European Union and many states of the Atlantic Pact declared themselves strongly against Russian annexation. On March 27, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly approved a declaration establishing the invalidity of the Russian annexation of Crimea: : «The General Assembly today affirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, underscoring the invalidity of the 16 March referendum held in autonomous Crimea. By a recorded vote of 100 in favour to 11 against, with 58 abstentions, the Assembly adopted a resolution titled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, calling on States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any change in the status of Crimea or the Black Sea port city of Sevastopol, and to refrain from actions or dealings that might be interpreted as such. Also by the text, the Assembly called on States to “desist and refrain” from actions aimed at disrupting Ukraine’s national unity and territorial integrity, including by modifying its borders through the threat or use of force. It urged all parties immediately to pursue a peaceful resolution of the situation through direct political dialogue, to exercise restraint, and to refrain from unilateral actions and inflammatory rhetoric that could raise tensions […]» (General Assembly, 27 March 2014). The involvement of the United Nations General Assembly, was necessary after the failure of attempts to get the United Nations Security Council to express itself on the Ukraine crisis; the Security Council convened seven sessions (on the situation in Ukraine) and, at the eighth session, Russia, one of the permanent members, vetoed, blocking a draft resolution that would have urged countries THE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS PLAYS A DECIDEDLY EDUCATIONAL ROLE, FUNDAMENTAL FOR DEVELOPING, IN LEARNERS, THE CRITICAL CAPACITY, NOW ATROPHIED BY THE CONTINUOUS MEDIA BOMBARDMENT AND BY INFORMATION THAT TENDS TO A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW

29 not to recognize the results of the Crimean referendum. Vitaly Churkin, (Russian representative to the UN) underlines how the outcome of the vote demonstrates that Russia is not alone on the international scene. The states that, together with Russia, reject the text approved by the General Assembly are: Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The reactions to the annexation are not limited to protest: the USA, the European Union, Japan and Canada are applying a first tranche of sanctions against Moscow. Washington imposes visa freezes and asset freezes on seven Russian officials and four Ukrainian separatist leaders. Brussels announces the same sanctions against 21 officials, including 13 Russians and 8 Ukrainians from Crimea. The United States applies a second measure of measures against 20 Russian officials and the Russian banking institution Bank Rossija. Moscow responds by banning nine US officials from entering Russia; among these are former Republican presidential candidate John McCain and House Speaker John Boehner. On March 21, the European Union also imposed more sanctions against 12 high-level Russian and Ukrainian officials. The list includes names already included in the US ones, such as Vladislav Surkov, adviser to President Putin. Despite the forecasts and the sanctions, there seems to be a strengthening of consensus in Russia towards Putin, whose popularity, according to some polls, is growing rapidly. 4. The different points of view The referendum in Crimea and the subsequent annexation to the Russian Federation have raised a strong debate in the international community, with differing positions. Voices against Russia’s annexation of Crimea appeal to international law, deeming this act illegitimate because it is based on a military occupation. They are based on the principle of territorial integrity, established by the United Nations: : «All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.» (United Nations Charter, 24 October 1945, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2, paragraph 4). Various international agreements, signed first by the Soviet Union and then by Russia, corroborate the arguments of those opposed to annexation. In 1975, the Soviet Union signs the Helsinki agreements, which include various principles for the recognition of the inviolability of national borders and respect for territorial integrity; the Helsinki Accords are required by the Soviet state, eager to assert its territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe, after the end of the Second World War. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states is also included, but, according to many opinions, Russia did not respect this principle during the Crimea crisis (CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, 1975). In 1991, with the Alma-Ata Protocols, Russia accepted the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as the possession of Crimea (International Observatory, 2009). On December 5, 1994, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum, together with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Ukraine; the Memorandum, which provided for the Ukrainian commitment to dismantle nuclear weapons, sanctions the inviolability of Ukrainian sovereignty and prohibits any action of economic and military influence by the signatories (treaties. un.org/doc/ December 5, 1994). In the agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the concession of the Sevastopol base of 1997, extended in 2010, the Russian Federation recognizes full Ukrainian sovereignty of Crimea. Always from the point of view of international law, to counter these positions, Moscow maintains that its military intervention, made official on March 1 by the Duma, took place only to protect the Russians of Crimea and to allow the regularity of the referendum self-determination. Those who support the Russian position on the legitimacy of the annexation cite the principle. Also in the agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the concession of the Sevastopol base of 1997, extended in 2010, the Russian Federation recognizes the full Ukrainian sovereignty of Crimea. Again from the point of view of international law, to counter these positions, Moscow maintains that its military intervention, made official on March 1 by the Duma, took place only to protect the Russians of Crimea and to allow the regularity of the referendum self-determination. Those who support the Russian position on the legitimacy of the annexation, mentions the principle of self-determination of peoples: : «To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of

30 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace» (United Nations Charter, 24 October 1945, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 1, paragraph 2). This principle is reaffirmed and defined in the Helsinki Accords of 1975: By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.» (CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. FINAL ACT, Helsinki 1975, Chapter I Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, paragraph VIII Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, p. 7). It is clear that if a community belonging to a State unilaterally declares its secession (that is, the separation of its territory from the State), this involves a modification of the borders of the State concerned, without the consent of the State itself; this would be contrary to the principle of territorial integrity. It should also be specified that, in article 73, the Ukrainian Constitution reads: «Issues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum» (rada.gov.ua/en).5 It is therefore not possible that the decision to detach a part of the territory takes place through a local referendum. 5. The principle of self-determination of peoples and its relationship with territorial integrity. There are only three cases6 in which the self-determination of a people can give rise to a secession, without the consent of the central state: if that people is subjected to military occupation, to a colonial regime or to serious discrimination for political or racial reasons. In the latter case The right to self-determination can be recognized only in the presence of serious human rights violations which also involve exclusion from the economic, political and social life of the country of origin.The question to ask is whether or not discriminatory acts against Russian speakers7 have taken place in Crimea. The supporters of the legitimacy of Crimea’s secession respond positively and believe that the referendum (and the transfer of sovereignty of this Black Sea peninsula) served to prevent the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence (stimulated by the first moves of the new illegitimate government of Ukraine ) such as the elimination of Russian as a co-official language. In the days of the crisis, the Ukrainian transitional government revoked this repeal law, which gave Russians an argument to assert discrimination in Crimea. It is equally true that, in Ukraine, nationalist movements are growing which intend to restrict the rights of the Russian-speaking population. In the light of the concrete situation, it therefore becomes very difficult to affirm or exclude that there are or will be conditions of oppression or discrimination in Crimea. Vladimir Putin, the Russian Presidente, in a conference of March 18, 2014,8 underlined the sacredness of Crimea for Russians. Putin argued that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was the result of gross violations and was decided behind the scenes in a totalitarian state, presenting the people with a fait accompli, and there is no longer a legitimate power and the Russians do not know who to talk to. Therefore, not helping the Russians in Crimea would have been a betrayal. Also according to Putin, a coup d’état by extremist, ultranationalist and anti-Semitic forces took place in Kiev and the current authorities are not legitimate. Russian President Putin criticizes the behavior of the West, which, in his opinion, behaved irresponsibly in Ukraine, knowing that there were millions of Russians. The population of Crimea behaved according to the rule of self-determination of peoples, using the same rule used by Ukraine when it left the USSR. The other previous fact, mentioned by Putin, is the recognition by the West of the legitimacy of the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia; on that occasion, no permission THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION CAN BE RECOGNIZED ONLY IN THE PRESENCE OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WHICH ALSO INVOLVE EXCLUSION FROM THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

31 from the central power was requested (from the West). Putin and many supporters of the Russian position often refer to Kosovo to corroborate their point of view. In that circumstance, in fact, the International Court of Justice, the highest judicial organ of the United Nations, in an opinion issued on 22 July 2010, established the conformity with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia, dated 17 February 2008. The International Court of Justice considered that there were many precedents in this sense and argued that the author of the declaration of independence was the Kosovar people and not the interim administration, which governed the region at that time on the basis to Security Council Resolution 1244.9 Another voice, which underlined the comparison with Kosovo, comes from the President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Milorad Dodik10 , who, in 2014, argued that the holding of the referendum in Crimea confirmed the principle of self-determination, established in the basic documents of the UN (and, often, violated). According to Dodik, the international community, if territorial integrity is useful, asks for the observance of this principle, but, when the principle of self-determination is needed, it says that the independence of Kosovo is a normal fact; the President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that, in the case of Crimea, the international community insists on respect for the principle of territorial integrity, but everything depends on the geostrategic interests of Europe and the USA. In international politics, it has long been known that Crimea is a sore point but everything depends on the geostrategic interests of Europe and the USA. In international politics, it has long been known that Crimea is a sore point. Everyone knew that Crimea aspired to more integration with Russia, or even wanted to be a part of it. When riots started in Ukraine, this problem came to light. The case of Crimea creates a new, increasingly legitimate practice. Dodik thinks that the events in Crimea are being taken into consideration by the Serbian Republic, for a long-term strategy to obtain independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.11 This example shows how easily the principles of international law can be exploited: they are interpreted differently according to the circumstances, to support what is more convenient. 6. The justifications for the Russian annexation of Crimea In his March 18, 2014 speech, Putin argued that the Crimean peninsula is considered a territory belonging to Russia for historical and cultural reasons. Another justification for annexation is the responsibility to protect Russians living across national borders. In reality, the essential strategic role that Crimea plays for the Russian Federation must be considered. Crimea has been a peninsula linked to Russia for hundreds of years (see, in this regard, the paragraph 9). In 1783, the Crimean Khanate, controlled by the Ottoman Empire, was occupied by the Russian Empire. In the 19th century, following confiscations and persecutions, the Crimean Tatars began to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, many Russian colonists arrived, who became the majority of the region. There was with the deportation of the Tatars by Stalin, in 1944. After 1917, the Crimea followed the events of the Soviet Union: in 1921, the Republic was established Autonomous Soviet Socialist Crimea; in 1945 it was transformed into a province (Riasanovsky, 1989, pp. 268-270; p. 532, passim). In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, of Ukrainian origin, transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.12 The act, officially, was done in recognition to commemorate the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (between the Ukrainian Cossacks and Russia). In reality, the gift (Stalin used, in 1944, ruthless methods to punish the Ukrainians who had welcomed the German occupation) was a gesture of conciliation, to demonstrate the importance that Russia attributed to Ukraine, for its own security and integrity. The cession of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 took place in a very different context from today’s one, since Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet Union.It was an internal administrative change, without repercussions on the population of the Crimea, because within the USSR, linguistic uniformity was guaranteed by the obligatory nature of the Russian language; the ruble was the common currency and the economic system was integrated. That act went almost unnoticed, but is now seen as a serious “historical error”; the Nobel Prize winner (last president of the Soviet Union) Gorbachev, has made this relevant statement, to the Interfax agency : «Crimea had become part of Ukraine on the ba-

32 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” sis of Soviet laws, i.e. the laws of the communist party, without ask the people. Now the people have decided on their own to correct that mistake. This decision should be celebrated, not sanctioned [...]» (tempi.it/ March 18, 2014). F the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments, ratified a new agreement in Kharkiv which extended the permanence of the fleet for another 25 years, until 2042. of a 30% discount on Russian gas supplies, for a total value of 40 billion dollars. Ukraine’s rapprochement with NATO would have led to a certain loss of Russian military bases on the peninsula. There would have been a consequent downsizing of Russia’s geopolitical weight; for this reason, the important questions of international law (on the legitimacy or otherwise of the annexation of Crimea) probably have a marginal role in the affair. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, the reference they make to international law is almost always instrumental and subjective; what matters most are political, military and economic interests. There are two opposing blocs, eager to expand or maintain their zone of influence. It seems that the US and the European Union are not particularly interested in respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine; rather, it is a matter of military and economic alliances On the other hand, the Russian Federation has exploited the requests for help from Russian-speaking Crimeans, intervening immediately, not so much to safeguard their security or to guarantee their self-determination, but rather to preserve at least part of its strategic position. One of the main problems that arise is, of course, understanding the possible ulterior motives in the presentation of data and opinions13. 7. Reflections (and materials) for the planning of a Didactic Learning Unit In the Italian didactic literature, coexist reflections and protocols on “Didactic Units”, “Learning Units” and “Didactic Learning Units”, accompanied by regulations and laws that do not make the teacher’s job easy. In presenting the folFIG. 3 The expansion of the Republic of Genoa in the Mediterranean Sea (Source: reddit.com Public Domain 2023)

33 lowing considerations, this specific topic will not be dealt with14, but we will try to suggest some stages for the construction of interdisciplinary activities, compatible with the three different models. First of all, it is necessary to frame the connection between History, Geography and Cartography, obviously using the case study of Crimea15; to do this, it will be useful to start from the “LOCATION” theme, distinguishing the two concepts of “absolute location” and “relative location”. It is therefore necessary to recall the FIVE THEMES of Geography: LOCATION, HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION, REGIONS, PLACE, MOVEMENT16. Furthermore, given the difficulty of finding detailed and complete cartographic materials (to illustrate the Crimean dispute), in the descriptions, latitude and longitude of some places will be added, in order to allow the answer to the question: “where is this place?” (absolute location); thus, it is highlighted the importance of the continuous reference to geographical coordinates, therefore, precisely, to the theme “LOCATION”. Within this theme, obviously, a reflection on the geopolitical meaning of time zones should be inserted, not only citing the fundamental and unknown contribution of Quirico Filopanti (1860), but also showing the concrete change brought about by the modification of the time zones to life of people17. Moreover, a reflection on the relationship between the availability of cartographic materials and the desire to illustrate, with intellectual honesty, a thorny geopolitical issue (which has become a humanitarian tragedy, one of too many in the history of humanity) would be needed. This specific reflection would require too much space and will not be analysed, but we could not fail to mention it. 8. Outline of four introductory lessons The events concerning the Crimean crisis lend themselves to a didactic application: the contents related to current events should always be present in the academic and school programs, to arouse the students’ FIG. 4 The Crimean peninsula, in a satellite image (Source: Google Earth; image capture date: December 14, 2015 - Public Domain)

34 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” curiosity, and to achieve the fundamental educational objectives. In planning a “debate space”, a container is built for the transmission of knowledge, above all, for the analysis of facts through comparison with the ideas of others. The training objectives are: to interpret, memorize and re-process information from different media; develop one’s own critical capacity, which avoids being subjected to the instrumental interpretation of the various events; respect ideas different from your own. The objectives related to knowledge, which represent fundamental prerequisites for a careful analysis of geopolitical facts, are not secondary: knowing how to compare various territories from a socio-cultural and political point of view; understand the processes and dynamics that regulate historical and geographical facts, grasping the relationships of cause and effect, establishing comparisons and making comparisons between the present and the past; know the main geopolitical changes after World War II. The analysis of multiple sources is essential for the achievement of the educational objective concerning the development of critical capacity in students. This competence is fundamental, even if information today tends to a single point of view. An emblematic example are precisely the events in Ukraine, from the Euromaidan demonstrations to the crisis in Crimea, analyzed by the media, without taking into account the Russian point of view. Learners are not familiar with some basic historical and geographical information, which can be transmitted effectively, through the use of geographical maps and some historical maps. The first lesson will therefore be a geographical, historical FIG. 5 Marine chart, from Andrea Bianco’s Atlas of 1436 (Marciana, ms 4783). (Source: wikimedia.org/ Public Domain 2023)

35 and cartographic orientation. The second lesson will concern the actual debate, resulting from the different positions of the major world leaders. The teacher will read the statements of the American President, who supports the illegitimacy of the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s failure to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine Subsequently, the teacher will read Putin’s statements, which justifies the annexation of Crimea to Russia, in respect of the self-determination of peoples (citing the precedent of Kosovo). At this point, the teacher will open the debate aimed at the students, inviting them to express their opinions, always being careful to pursue one of the pre-established educational objectives: respect for different ideas. The third lesson is aimed at group work of students, with training and evaluation purposes. The teacher will divide the class into groups of three or four students, then he will assign each group the task of relating, in written form, a specific fact about the Crimean crisis. This lesson uses Internet research, and each group will use a computer aid with Internet connection. Cooperative learning in small groups, in which pupils are encouraged to help each other and to feel co-responsible; it is a very effective teaching method, through which students learn important social skills and competences. The fourth and last lesson includes the final evaluation: each group is asked to read their report in front of the class and to express their point of view. The teacher will evaluate each student on the basis of both group work and an individual question, which will verify the acquisition of the contents proposed during the lessons. 9. “Affective Geo-history” of the territory: the Italian presence in Crimea (an in-depth lesson) «Cartographic representation seems to be the only instrument able to revive the moribund Italian geography. Like a poor and pretty girl, geography needs to marry with other disciplines in order to gain adequate social position. Here, then, medical geography, urban geography, social geography, political geography and the like, all famous names acquired. From the beginning, cartography plays the role of matchmaker.» (Candura, 2010, p. 215). Starting from these considerations, dated but not aged (so to speak), a reflection was articulated to suggest a sort of rebirth of Italian Geography, through the aid of Cartography. Again with regard to the role of nuptial mediator, played by the cartographic tool, the case study of the Crimea can be posed, as a geohistorical exercise that answers the question: “where does History end and where does Geography begin?”. A cartographic illustration describing the expansion of the Republic of Genoa is brought to the attention of the students. The cartogram at FIG. 3 can be found in many versions, variously modified, where, moreover, the same italian translation error is almost always reproduced: “banking penetration” translated into Italian with “penetrazione bancaria”18(which means “penetration of banks”, in the sense of “penetration of credit institutions”), while, obviously, it is “penetration of the coasts” (it would have been, perhaps, better, in the original, to write “shore penetration”19). We should always linger over the attention to be paid to translations, in any teaching, but particularly in History, Geography and Cartography20, since, when speaking of the relationship between Man and Planet, the precision of the concepts is fundamental, particularly for the purposes of a correct understanding of the tragedy currently unfolding. Regardless of errors and inaccuracies, the cartogram referred to in the FIG. 3 offers three preliminary suggestions for reflection. First of all, there is an opportunity to reflect on the Italian phrase “perdere la Trebisonda” (“losing the Trebizond”, used to mean “losing one’s bearings”) as a significant example of the presence of terminology of historical-cartographic derivation in common parlance21. Secondly, it is possible to recall the meaning of the naval flag of the Italian Navy, as described by the official source of knowledge of the regulations in force in Italy: «It is established, for the Navy and the Merchant Navy, a naval flag conforming to the models resulting from the table annexed to this decree, signed by the Ministers of Defense and the Merchant Navy. For the Navy, the naval flag consists of the Italian tricolor, loaded, in the center of the white band, by the heraldic emblem of the Navy, representing in four parts the coats of arms of the Maritime Republics (Venice-Pisa-Genoa-Amalfi), and surmounted by a turreted and rostral crown. [...]» (freely translated, from the official text, from: Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1947, art. 1, p. 3520)22. The importance of the Republic of Genoa is thus highlighted (as is the sense of using the cartogram referred to in the FIG. 3). So, what is the cartographic drawing that describes the expansion of the Republic of Genoa (FIG. 3) In order not to commit inaccuracies, it must be included in the geo-

36 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” graphical theme “MOVEMENT”, since it narrates the Geo-History of the Genoese movement, told through Cartography23. Finally, we note how the age-old and close relationship between Cartography and Technology is well symbolized and summarized by satellite images (which, moreover, always exert an undisputed fascination on learners). In order to relate the history of the unification and geopolitical dismemberment of the Crimea with the Italian presence in the territory, it is advisable to use sources of different nature and origin24. A synthesis is offered by Amico (2023), who excellently condenses the narrative, starting from the XIII century. The Italian presence in Crimea has been attested since 1204, when Venice took advantage of the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders to occupy the ports in the southern part of the peninsula. In 1261 the Venetians were replaced by the Genoese thanks to an agreement with the Byzantine Emperor who granted them the exclusive right to trade in the Black Sea. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, these colonies became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1475. But the Genoese presence did not disappear. A part of the population found refuge with the Tartars of the hinterland. A century later, in 1574, Martin Broniewski, Polish ambassador in Crimea, reported the existence of descendants of the Genoese (Kizilov, 2015) who had maintained the use of the language and their own religious traditions. Presence confirmed again in a book, published in 1834, which documented how in the language of the Tartars, along the entire coastal strip, a large number of Genoese words were found. The reflections can be accompanied by the observation of a nautical chart, taken from Andrea Bianco’s Atlas of 1436, where Ligurian allocations are recognizable, indicated by Genoese flags. In the eighteenth century, especially during the reign of Catherine II, the Russian authorities developed campaigns to populate the areas of the Volga, the Black Sea and the Crimea. This led to a wave of migration from Western Europe and also from Italy. Between 1782 and 1783, a thousand colonists arrived from Livorno (Ligurian, Corsican, Sardinian and Tuscan); they settled in the region of Cherson (46° 38′ N; 32° 35′ E). A second, much more numerous, wave of Italian migration followed at the beginning of the 19th century. In fact, between 1820 and 1870, emigrants arrived in the area of Kerč’ (45° 20′ 19′′ N; 36° 28′ 05′′ E), mainly from the Apulian towns of Trani (41° 16′ N; 16° 25′ E), Bisceglie (41° 14′ 27′′ N; 16° 30′ 07′′ E) and Molfetta (41° 12′ N; 16° 36′ E). To these was added, again from Puglia, a more restricted but more qualified migration, made up of architects, notaries, doctors, engineers and artists, but also of anti-Bourbon activists, who concentrated in the city of Odessa (46° 29′ N; 30° 44′ E) 25. This new migratory wave had been encouraged by the tsarist authorities to develop various agricultural activities (especially the cultivation of vines and the production of wine) and regulated by diplomatic agreements with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. According to official data, in 1897 Italians accounted for 1.8% of the population of the province of Kerč’, a percentage which rose to 2% in 1921; some sources speak specifically of a minority ranging from three thousand to five thousand people. The October revolution, the civil war and the construction of socialism also involved the Italian minority. As part of the forced collectivization of the countryside, the Italians, mostly very small landowners, were forced to create the “Sacco and Vanzetti” kolkhoz. At the same time, a “socialist re-education” campaign began, using communist militants who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union and IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, ESPECIALLY DURING THE REIGN OF CATHERINE II, THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES DEVELOPED CAMPAIGNS TO POPULATE THE AREAS OF THE VOLGA, THE BLACK SEA AND THE CRIMEA. THIS LED TO A WAVE OF MIGRATION FROM WESTERN EUROPE AND ALSO FROM ITALY. BETWEEN 1782 AND 1783, A THOUSAND COLONISTS ARRIVED FROM LIVORNO (LIGURIAN, CORSICAN, SARDINIAN AND TUSCAN)

37 of sure Stalinist faith. Among these Paolo Robotti, who talks about it in the book La prova (Robotti, 1965) and Giuliano Pajetta who briefly talks about his stay in Kerč’ in the book Russia 1932-34. (Pajetta, 1985) Tragic years: during the “purges” of 1933-37 many Italians, accused of being fascist spies, were arrested and disappeared into the hell of the gulag. But it will be the war that irreversibly seals the fate of the Italians of Crimea. In 1942, after the reconquest of the peninsula by the Red Army, various national minorities present in the area were deported on charges of having collaborated with the Nazi occupiers. The deportation of the Italian minority began on 29 January 1942: the entire community, including the anti-fascist refugees who had settled in Kerč’, was rounded up and sent in cattle cars to the Siberian gulag. Each person was allowed to take no more than 8 kilograms of baggage with them. The journey lasted almost two months (from 29 January to the last days of March). An 8.000 km odyssey in terrible conditions, with temperatures of over 30 degrees below zero, during which the majority of children and the elderly died of disease, hunger and cold. Chruščëv, in his report to the XX Congress of the P.C.U.S., called this deportation a brutal, monstrous genocide of peoples and added that the Ukrainians had escaped this fate only because they were too many (about 40 million) and there was no place to deport them. Nevertheless, only on November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet will declare the deportation illegal. Dante Corneli, who spent many years in Siberia and, returning to Italy, denounced in his books26 the crimes of Stalin and the Italian communist leadership who were accomplices (Massari, Nobile, 2023), talks about the drama of over two thousand Italians of the Agricultural Colony of Kerč’. A testimony confirmed by the Soviet authorities themselves according to which, during the journey and the first year of deportation, one in five deportees died. In the deportation camps, the Italian community was almost annihilated from hunger, cold, disease and the harshness of forced labour. Overall, it is estimated that the total survivors were no more than 10 percent of the deportees. After 1956 (with the beginning of the “thaw” and the closure of most of the deportation camps) the Italian survivors of Crimea returned home. In 1957, it appeared that 460 exiles had returned; reduced, in 1989, to 316, mostly residing in a Kerč’. Here, in 2008, was formed the association “C.E.R.K.I.O.” (Comunità degli Emigrati in Regione di Crimea – Italiani di Origine; Community of Emigrants in the Crimean Region – Italians of Origin) which hands down the use of the Italian language. (Amico, 2023; freely translated). For further study, it is appropriate to cite the volume by Rojas Gomez (2021). The Author narrates that, having arrived on the shores of the Black Sea in the 19th century to colonize extremely fertile lands, to exploit the abundance of fish from the seas and to join the commercial routes already traced four centuries earlier by the maritime republics of Genoa and Venice, the Italians of Crimea became soon the symbol of a successful emigration. In a few decades they freed themselves from the poverty that had driven them to leave Puglia, finding their new homeland in the city of Kerch, but without ever forgetting their Italian origins, preserving the language, religious and even culinary traditions. A dream shattered by the advent of communism: first the collectivization of goods, then the Stalinist purges and finally the tragic epilogue of January 29, 1942, with the house-by-house roundup and Di Yvon Adolphe - Collections du château de Versailles, Pubblico dominio, https://commons. wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15577670

38 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” time showing how Ukrainians have supported recent changes in LP and language legislation» (Carpinelli, 2019, p. 61; see, also, pp. 88-89, passim). 4 1.433.886 inhabitants for Kharkiv and 2.950.702 for Kiev (est. 2021; source: Calendario Atlante de Agostini 2023, p. 1107). For educational purposes (see paragraphs 8 and 9), this aspect will be very important for an in-depth analysis of the use of sources; in particular, to distinguish censuses and estimates 5 See also D’Angelo (2015), pp. 1151-1552, passim. 6 See the exceptions to the principle of territorial integrity: «[...] in conclusion there are three types of “people”, with respect to which the principle of self-determination generates a legitimate claim to secession (external self-determination): the (former) colonies, the peoples oppressed by foreign occupation and infra-state groups, clearly identifiable with respect to the rest of the population of the State, which are precluded from any form of participation in government in order to pursue their political, economic and social development”. (Lanciatti, Tanzi, 2012, p. 261) 7 See Carpinelli (2019): pp. 63, 68, 83 and 87, passim. 8.tempi.it/putin-firma-l-accordo-per-l-annessione-della-crimea-gorbaciov-corretto-un-errore-storico-del-partito-comunista/ March 18, 2014 8 tempi.it/putin-firma-l-accordo-per-l-annessione-della-crimea-gorbaciov-corretto-un-errore-storico-del-partito-comunista/ March 18, 2014 9 peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker. un.org/files/990610_SCR1244%281999%29. pdf June 10, 1999. 10 adnkronos.com/Archivio/AdnAgenzia/2014/03/18/Esteri/Ucraina-Milorad-Dodik-appoggia-integrazione-Crimea-in-Russia_173339.php March 18, 2014. 11 The President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has a great interest in exalting the principle of self-determination, to validate his point of view; so did the countries of the Atlantic Pact, at the time of Kosovo. On a proposal from Serbia, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, on 8 October 2008, a resolution asking for an opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legitimacy, according to international law, of the Kosovar proclamation of independence.The opinion of 22 July 2010 is not an example of legal clarity. The Court affirmed that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law since the practice of states, even apart from decolonization, is full of precedents in this regard. He answered the question formally; he asked if the proclamation of independence was confor over three months and concentrated in the Maidan square in Kiev (hence the hashtag used on the net that gave the movement its name) led to the deposition in February 2014 of President Yanukovych, replaced ad interim by a pro-Western provisional government, until the election in May 2014 of P. Porošenko. The formation of a government linked to the United States and Europe has provoked a harsh reaction from Moscow, which has accepted the request for annexation of Crimea, The formation of a government linked to the United States and Europe has provoked a harsh reaction from Moscow, which has accepted the request for the annexation of Crimea and supported the pro-Russian groups present in the eastern regions of Ukraine, especially in the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Donetsk and of Lugansk in the Donbass, inducing the European Union and the USA to adopt economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and exacerbating the country’s internal contradictions, not sedated despite the signing of the agreements known as the Minsk Protocol (September 2014) and Minsk II Protocol (February 2015).’ (treccani.it/enciclopedia/euromaidan/ 2023). Note, however, how, in the explanation, the etymology is not reported. The real problem, on the other hand, is that, in the case of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the very will to be (or try to be) impartial is considered a partisan attitude 3 «Language policy (LP) in Ukraine has a political and historical context of unique complexity. […] Within the past 30 years we can identify different directions in state LP reflecting the complex linguistic situation and its fragile balance in the country. Such a complex linguistic situation served as a starting point of any LP activities maintained by the two great - almost equally supported - Ukrainophile and Russophile political camps. But during the nation state building process (after Ukraine gained independence in 1991), the LP and legislation aimed to regulate language use became more and more a target associated with the Russophile political regime, and consequently their da ys were numbered. After the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine adopted several policies and laws in support of the Ukrainian language. The most important of them is the recent law “On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language”, which greatly expands protection for Ukrainian throughout the territory. This law has been defined by its detractors as a “draconian law” which introduces the “total forced ukrainization”. But beyond legal disputes, the purpose of the law, even if not the only one, is to reverse centuries of Russification, which led to what some term the “linguicide” of the Ukrainian language. In addition to this, in the circumstances of conflict still ongoing between Russia and Ukraine, the support for the Ukrainian language is viewed by many as a national security issue. The article is enriched by sociological surveys conducted in the country over note 1 The work is the result of close collaboration between the authors; however: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 can be attributed to Emanuele Poli; paragraphs 7 and 9 can be attributed to Anna Rosa Candura. The problem of maintaining neutrality, even in the definition of a word, perfectly introduces the difficult articulation of this geopolitical theme; consulting, for example, a classic source to which one turns in search of impartiality (the Treccani Encyclopedia) one notices that, in this case, it struggles to remain impartial: 2 “Euromaidan - Term used to indicate the vast protest movement that developed in Ukraine in November 2013 following the decision of the incumbent president V. Yanukovych not to sign the treaty of political and economic association with the European Union, orienting the country in a distinctly pro-Russian sense. Despite the harsh crackdown by Kremlin-backed government forces, the protests, which lasted mass deportation of the entire Italian community to the Kazakhstan (Kazakistan) Gulag, in retaliation against the Italian invasion of the USSR. Decimated by cold, hunger, disease and forced works, the Italians of Crimea are almost extinct and the few who remain are fighting today against oblivion and to keep the flame of “Italianness” alive. The Author narrates this obscure and little-known part of contemporary history, combining the rigor of archival research with the testimonies of the last survivors; through the synthesis of this volume (Rojas Gomez, 2021); the emotional involvement of the learners lays an important ethical basis for the study of the territory. Also on the basis of this last analysis, it can be seen that dispute over the Crimean peninsula is, ultimately, a dilated example of how, in the theme “HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION”, take place most of the connections between History, Geography and Cartography; thus, a true applied Geo-History can be constructed, made up of concrete (and dramatically visible) realities, instead of theories.

39 2022 unilaterally declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia - even though none was fully under Russian control. The annexations remain unrecognized by the international community. The invasion has also created Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 26 June 2023, there were 6.3 million Ukrainian refugees recorded globally, and 5.09 million people were internally displaced as of May 2023. Almost 24.900 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 18 June 2023. The invasion of Ukraine remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the conflict in Syria).» (cia.gov/ the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/ 2023) 14 For further information, see: icscroci.edu. it/materiali-uda-unita-didattica-di-apprendimento/ 2020; wauniversity.it/differenza-tra-unita-didattica-e-unita-apprendimento/ 2021; unidprofessional.com/unita-didattica-unita-di-apprendimento/ 2022. 15 The importance of this link can obviously be found in many historical, geographical and cartographic studies; to give just one example, think of the analysis of “marginalia”: «The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment brought a strong scientific component into maps, […]. The ideal of spreading information to large numbers of people led to the expansion of printed material - including maps - that incorporated the latest scientific information. The demand for cartographic material increased, and mapmakers emphasized scientific (or pseudo-scientific) information, particularly in the borders, as a marketing tool to attract customers interested in wall maps for display as well as functional items. Moreover, the important role cartography had in the formation of modern States, as a way of controlling the territory, as a strategic tool for war, and as a symbolic element to boast the power of a nation, is reflected in the titles, which many times announce that the map is the “newest and most accurate.” Not only were the erudite and political interests of cartography compatible with the artistic beauty of illustrations, they also had a strong influence on the subjects chosen for marginalia […]» (Sáenz, Perez, 2014, p. 22). 16 See thoughtco.com/five-themes-of-geography-1435624 (July 13, 2019) and genip.us/about-genip; for further reflections, see also: Candura (2018); Candura (2022); Fouberg, Murphy (2020); Fouberg, Murphy (2022). 17 liberoquotidiano.it/news/esteri/ March 30, 2014 18 See: odysseytraveller.com/articles/history-of-genoa-rival-to-venice/; it.wikipedia. org/wiki/Colonie_genovesi#; memorients. com/articles/genoa-in-the-mediterraneanand-the-black-sea-sakrān-a-genoese-at-themamluk-court; sakeritalia.it/europa/italia/ tracce-genovesi-nella-storia-della-crima/; limesonline.com/lespansione-di-genova-nel-mediterraneo/111529; archeome. it/ucraina-quando-la-crimea-era-una-colonia-della-repubblica-di-genova/ 19 Probably, the Anglo-Saxon use “bank penetration” derives from “West Bank Wall”, now synonymous with “the Israeli Wall in the West Bank (Cisgiordania)”; for this reason, it is also advisable to reflect on the correctness of the translations (see, for example, the suggestions on the website: linguee.it/ west bank wall; linguee.it/ cisgiordania). 20 In this regard, see the paragraph “Indossi le scarpe invece di calzarle? Sei stato tradotto” (Candura, 2018, pp. 100-102). The sentence cannot be translated from Italian to English (“Do you wear shoes instead of wearing them? You have been translated”), since the Italian verb “calzare” (which means “to put on the shoe”) has no equivalent in English, so it is translated with the verb “to wear”, which, however, when it is re-translated into Italian, it is almost always rendered with “indossare” (which, however, precisely means “putting on the dress” not “putting on the shoe”); translators often tend to simplify, but sometimes simplifying becomes impoverishing thereby subtracting many important nuances. 21 Trebizond is a city (of today’s Turkey), overlooking the Black Sea, of great importance as a safe point of reference for all the boats that crossed the waters of the sea in front. In ancient times it was extremely important to have not only cartographic, but also visual references, since the risk of being shipwrecked or colliding with other ships was very high and the city of Trebizond was located in a visible and easily recognizable point (see FIG. 3). 22 The Italian text is: «È istituita per la Marina militare e per la Marina mercantile una bandiera navale conforme ai modelli risultanti dalla tavola annessa al presente decreto, firmata dai Ministri per la difesa e per la marina mercantile. Per la Marina militare, la bandiera navale è costituita dal tricolore italiano, caricato, al centro della banda bianca, dall’emblema araldico della Marina militare, rappresentante in quattro parti gli stemmi delle Repubbliche marinare (Venezia-Pisa-Genova-Amalfi), e sormontata da una corona turrita e rostrata. [...]» (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1947, articolo 1, p. 3520). 23 See, again, thoughtco.com (July 13, 2019, cit.). 24 See, for example: Ferrari, Pupulin (2017); Fisher (1970 and 1978); Magocsi (2010 and 2014). 25 Among the events of the nineteenth century, one cannot fail to mention the “Crimean War” (“Guerra di Crimea” 1854-1856) - in which the Carabinieri’s “Sardinian Expeditionary Corps in the East” (“Corpo di Spedizione Sardo in Oriente”) took part in 1855. This war had as its main cause the so-called “Eastern question”, determined by Russia’s age-old aspiration to have an outlet in the Mediterranean. See the detailed history in: carabinieri. it/arma/curiosita/non-tutti-sanno-che/c/crimea 26 …of which an edition, edited with scientific criteria, exists today, thanks to Massari Editore (see Massari, Nobile, 2023). trary to the resolution 1244 of the security council; Kosovo was placed under provisional administration by the United Nations, and a constitutional path was outlined which gave autonomy to the region, but not independence. The Constitutional Court, to avoid the obstacle, affirmed that the author of the declaration of independence was the Kosovar people and not the provisional administration, which governed the region at that time [...]” (Ronzitti, 2013, pp. 48-49, passim) 12 .For further information, see: Magocsi (2010). 13 . See, for example, a classic source for didactic use, which, however, tries not to take sides: «Shortly after YANUKOVYCH’s departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a “referendum” was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The “referendum” was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the “referendum” as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine’s eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel beginning an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 with the aim of ending the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements, but this effort failed as well. By early 2022, more than 14.000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by launching a full-scale invasion of the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia made substantial gains in the early weeks of the invasion but underestimated Ukrainian resolve and combat capabilities. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had regained all territories in the north and northeast and made some advances in the east and south. Nonetheless, Russia in late September

40 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” temporaneo, Jovene Editore, Napoli 2012. Magocsi P.R., A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2010. Magocsi P.R., This Blessed land. Crimea and the Crimean Tatars, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2014. Massari R., Nobile M. (ed.by), Ucraina dalla A alla Z, Massari Editore, Bolsena (VT) 2023. Osservatorio internazionale. Le Repubbliche ex sovietiche: 4) la Comunità degli Stati Indipendenti, “senato.it”, Bimestrale della Biblioteca ‘Giovanni Spadolini’, Senato della Repubblica, August 24, 2009. Pajetta G., Russia 1932-1934, Editori riuniti, Roma 1985. Pecoraro M. L., La protezione internazionale delle minoranze, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli 2003. Pioletti A.M., Di Tommaso D., Meynet E. (ed. by), L’insegnamento attuale della geografia. 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Shevchenko N., L’histoire du bilinguisme en Ukraine et son role dans la crise politique d’aujourd’hui, in: “Cahiers Sens Public”, vol. 17-18, n. 1-2, 2014, pp. 203-225. Tatsyi V. I., Butler W.E. (ed. by), THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF UKRAINE. Past, Present, and Future, Five Volumes, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF Ca’Foscari, Venezia, 2017. Filopanti Q. (Giuseppe Barilli), Miranda. A book divided into three parts entitled Souls, Numbers, Stars, on the neo-Christian religion: with confirmations of the old and new doctrines of Christ: from wonders hitherto unheeded in the words and divisions of the Bible: in the facts and dates of history and in the position and motions of the celestial bodies, James Morgan, London 1860. Fisher A. W., The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970. Fisher A. W., The Crimean Tatars, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1978. 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41 linguee.it/italiano-inglese/search?source=auto&query=cisgiordania 2023 marina.difesa.it/noi-siamo-la-marina/storia/ la-nostra-storia/tradizioni/Pagine/LaBandiera.aspx s.d. memorients.com/articles/genoa-in-the-mediterranean-and-the-black-sea-sakrān-a-genoese-at-the-mamluk-court nuoviprofessionalicommerciali.it/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/Modello-UDA-MIUR.pdf odysseytraveller.com/articles/history-of-genoa-rival-to-venice/ peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/ files/990610_SCR1244%281999%29.pdf June 10, 1999 rada.gov.ua/en 2023 sakeritalia.it/europa/italia/tracce-genovesi-nella-storia-della-crima/ secoloditalia.it/2014/03/il-vero-interesse-dimosca-e-per-il-porto-di-sebastopoli-oggi-come-due-secoli-fa/ March 1, 2014 st.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2014-02-22/ ucraina-presidente-yanukovich-lascia-kiev-e-fuga-094917.shtml February 22, 2014 storiain.net/storia/crimea-una-penisola-concupita/ September 1, 2014 tempi.it/putin-firma-l-accordo-per-l-annessione-della-crimea-gorbaciov-corretto-un-errore-storico-del-partito-comunista/ March 18, 2014 t houghtco.com/five-themes-of-geo - graphy-1435624 July 13, 2019 transparency.org, « Corruption perceptions index 2015» treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf December 5, 1994 treccani.it/enciclopedia/crimea 2023 ukrcensus.gov.ua 2023 unidprofessional.com/unita-didattica-unita-di-apprendimento/ 2022 wauniversity.it/differenza-tra-unita-didattica-e-unita-apprendimento/ 2021 Anna Rosa Candura The University of Pavia Humanities studies Department Emanuele Poli Official geographer of the Italian Navy, professor of economic-political geography at the Military Academy of Modena LEGAL SCIENCES OF UKRAINE, Editorial office of the journal «Law of Ukraine», Kyiv; «Pravo», Kharkiv 2013. United Nations Charter, October 24, 1945 (un. org/en/about-us/un-charter). Yemelianova A., A diagnosis of corruption in Ukraine, ERCAS (European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building) Working Paper n. 14, 2010. Sitography a dnkronos.com/Archivio/AdnAgen - zia/2014/03/18/Esteri/Ucraina-Milorad-Dodik-appoggia-integrazione-Crimea-in-Russia_173339.php March 18, 2014 archeome.it/ucraina-quando-la-crimea-era-una-colonia-della-repubblica-di-genova/ archivio.giornalettismo.com/crimea-che-cose-la-penisola-della-guerra-tra-russia-e-ucraina/ March 2, 2014 balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Ucraina/Un-paese-diviso-Lingua-e-identita-etnica-in-Ucraina-218472 May 31, 2022 carabinieri.it/arma/curiosita/non-tutti-sannoche/c/crimea cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/ 2023 genip.us/about-genip 2023 icscroci.edu.it/materiali-uda-unita-didattica-di-apprendimento/ 2020 i struzioneer.gov.it/wp-content/uplo - ads/2019/12/Metodi-e-modelli-per-progettare-e-valutare-UdA.pdf it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonie_genovesi# 2023 italian.ruvr.ru/2014_03_15/La-Crimea-si-prepara-per-il-referendum-2882/ March 18, 2014 italian.ruvr.ru/by_author/87437118/ March 16, 2014 liberoquotidiano.it/news/esteri/11582722/ ucraina-crimea-si-allinea-a-fuso-orario-di-mosca.html March 30, 2014 liberoquotidiano.it/news/esteri/11582722/ ucraina-crimea-si-allinea-a-fuso-orario-di-mosca.html March 30, 2014 limesonline.com/lespansione-di-genova-nel-mediterraneo/111529 2023 linguee.it/inglese-italiano/traduzione/west+bank+wall.html 2023

42 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” Introduction In its broadest form, security is the essential prerequisite for the stability of a country and of any geographical area. The term is defined in the UN Charter as Human Security. According to this definition, an anthropocentric and multidimensional approach to it is necessary. In particular, the concept of national and global security must be extended to such fields as economic, environmental, and personal security, social stability, political stability, food security and health assurance. The first conceptualization of post-conflict reconstruction was conceived following World War II by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall; he proposed a large-scale European economic reconstruction program under which more than 12 billion in economic aid to European countries was financed (the so-called “Marshall Plan”). This rebuilding plan constitutes the modus operandi that will dominate contemporary postwar management. Planning of this kind, which tends to emphasize the economic aspect of rebuilding above all, was useful in the past millennium but it is now found to be poorly compatible with the multidimensional needs created in the aftermath of a conflict. It was not until the 1970s that the concept of post-conflict environmental management at the international level evolved, and special attention began to be paid to environmental damage caused by conflict, although the relationship between the environment and legislation in a post-conflict context remained sharp for many years. Environmental security will remain a niche issue within reconstruction programs for a few more decades. Disaster and resilience studies are now beginning to be considered seby Donatello Cirillo THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL UN PEACE OPERATIONS The evolution of environmental protection in the multidimensional Peace Operations of the United Nations ACCORDING TO THE UNITED NATION ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM (UNEP), AT LEAST 40 PERCENT OF ALL INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS IN THE PAST SIXTY YEARS HAVE A LINK TO NATURAL RESOURCES, WHICH DOUBLES THE RISK OF CONFLICT SPILLOVER IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

43 riously especially in the UN context with the concept of peacebuilding. The United Nations has placed respect for the environment at the center of its human development model since the 1970s, with the creation of United Nation Environment Program (UNEP) following the Stockholm Conference. Through this organism, composed of expert staff located in different parts of the world, the United Nations laid a cornerstone in the history of environmental law, with the set goal of combating climate change through the promotion of more sustainable use of natural resources. This approach has since evolved over time on several occasions, moving from “Principle 25” of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (according to which “Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.”), to culminating in resolution 48/13 of Oct. 8, 2021, by which the UN Human Rights Council expressly recognized the “human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment,” a text taken up and laid at the foundation of the aforementioned historic General Assembly resolution 76/300 of July 28, 2022. According to the UNEP, at least 40 percent of all intra-state conflicts in the past sixty years have a link to natural resources, which doubles the risk of conflict spillover in the first five years. Since 1990, at least 18 violent conflicts have been fueled by the exploitation of natural resources, whether they are of significant economic value, such as timber, diamonds, gold, minerals, and oil, or seemingly meager, such as fertile land and water. Conflicts between farmers and shepherds are examples of competition for natural resources. Historically, the livelihoods of farmers and herders complemented each other as they had long-standing agreements that allowed peaceful dynamics between the two groups during the transhumance season. However, in recent decades, these arrangements have come under increasing pressure due to a multitude of factors, such as competition for access to scarce resources over time, the negative effects of climate change, and changing socioeconomic patterns. This complex picture has led to a rapid escalation of tensions and conflicts with thousands of casualties among shepherd and farming communities. Just to take one example, think of the situation in Darfur, which assumed dramatic proportions since February 2003. UNPOL

44 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” This conflict can be traced mainly to ethnic rivalries pitting Arabs, traditionally nomadic shepherds, against tribes of black Africans, stationary, farmers or ranchers. If, on the one hand, the environment and natural ecosystems are an indirect cause of conflict and an aggravating factor of existing vulnerabilities (think of the effect of climate change on migration flows, the violence perpetrated for the hoarding of scarce resources due to drought and desertification), on the other, their integrity is directly threatened or violated in the very phase of conflict (depletion, destruction of ecosystems, soil and groundwater pollution). Critical issues almost always linger even after the cessation of hostilities, a phase in which the assisted or failed State is still unable to maintain or reestablish the “rule of law,” with the consequence that the fragile balance achieved could be destabilized again and lead to an escalation of conflict. UNEP Executive Director, Inger Andersen, pointed out that “the exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of the conflict cycle, from contributing to the outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace” further noting that “access and flow of water, land degradation, floods and pollution, in addition to competition over extractive resources, can directly exacerbate tensions and lead to eruption of conflicts, as is the case for resource depletion issues such as deforestation, soil erosion and desertification”. In 2001, the United Nations General Assembly (Res. A/RES/56/4, Nov. 13, 2001) declared November 6 as the “International Day for the Prevention of the Exploitation of the Environment in Wars and Armed Conflict.” The message behind the celebration of this day is to ensure that environmental protection is included in the broader strategies for conflict prevention and peacekeeping: there can be no lasting peace if the natural resources and ecosystems on which people’s livelihoods rely are destroyed. In creating a system suitable for its consolidation, the United Nations peacekeeping missions will necessarily have to be marked by the environmental theme, which emerges at every stage of development of collective security action. In this framework, the Mandate for the Protection of Civilians includes all actions that are indispensable (all necessary means) for the achievement of lasting peace in the short, medium and long term, hence safeguarding human rights, whose threat or violation is also dictated by the potential or actual impairment of the environment, to be considered as a direct projection of the former. The human right to a healthy environment has indeed been identified as a “third generation” right by the United Nations Human Right Council (UNHRC, Res. A/HRC/ RES/48/13, Oct. 8, 2021), which included it among the so-called rights of solidarity, “of which self-determination of peoples, peace, development, environmental protection and quality of life are part.” In this direction, the United Nations General Assembly (Res. 76/300, July 28, 2022) for the first time universally enshrined the human right to a “clean, healthy and sustainable” environment. The present study aims to trace an evolutionary line of environmental issues in the context of UN missions and dwells, in particular, on the post-conflict phase, in a perspective of potential expansion of the institution building in multifunctional operations.[…] A model of intervention in multidimensional operations will be described, through the use “on field” of a highly specialized civilian-military and police component on environmental issues, in order to carry out the tasks of “capacity building” and, in particular, “institutional building” in environmental matters.[…] The environmental factor as an element of stability in the post-conflict phase. In the present work, UN policy on the environment has been briefly described, from the perspective of general accountability and responsibility, in order to direct the internal organization of the mission to the preservation of the natural resources of the host State, and to avoid further negative effects on these produced by the same personnel taking part in the operaIN CREATING A SYSTEM SUITABLE FOR ITS CONSOLIDATION, THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS WILL NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE MARKED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL THEME, WHICH EMERGES AT EVERY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ACTION

45 tion, as well as by the conflict itself. Can “rebuilding” actions in the environmental field with external projection be implemented as a concrete element for the reconstruction of the host country’s stability and its sustainability in the medium and long term? The UN policy on the protection of civilians1 at Level III (after addressing the previous levels with measures to “protect through dialogue and engagement” and “provide physical protection”) pointed to the “creation of a protective environment for civilians” as a necessary measure to prevent the recollapse of threats of physical violence, to support the legitimacy of the Host State and its capacity to protect civilians, and to support the (re) establishment of the rule of law and the criminal justice chain. Such actions, according to the UN document, should be prioritized as soon as the conflict has subsided in a given area and conditions are favorable. In designing and implementing these joint activities, mission components should examine the extent to which they contribute to the protection of civilians in the short, medium, and long term, design them to maximize their protective impact, and identify and mitigate any risks to civilians associated with the activity. These may include, to name a few: • security sector reform (SSR) and capacity building in areas such as professionalism and integrity; • administrative systems to support the delivery of government services; • legal and policy frameworks; • human rights; • democratic governance. Creating a protective environment also involves supporting political processes, including the meaningful participation of women, and ensuring that they are implemented in a way that promotes the long-term protection of civilians. It includes disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Picture: Conceptualization of risks and opportunities from natural resources and the environment along the peace and security continuum (from: A Summary of Progress from UNEP’s Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Programme – Progress Report 2008-2015, p.9).

46 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” of ex-combatants; promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; detection and clearance of explosive devices; cessation of the illicit exploitation of natural resources; prevention of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons; and combating serious and transnational organized crime. It thus clearly emerges that among the objectives of “capacity building” in multidimensional operations, there is mainly that of creating sustainable peace. The described “self-sustainability” has as a key step the creation of a virtuous system also in the management of natural resources. The mandate for the protection of civilians given by the Security Council provides for all necessary actions (“all necessary means”) that can prevent threats to peace; consequently, the protection of ecosystems is also fully covered by the Security Council and is twofold (excluding, here, the examination of aspects concerning the use of resources as the very instrument of conflict, governed by the Ius in bello, as well as their exploitation to finance the belligerent forces). Firstly, it is precisely the scarcity, overexploitation, mismanagement of natural resources and inequitable redistribution of their proceeds that is often the very cause of tensions and conflicts.2 Indeed, desertification, famine, and depletion of oil resources have forced thousands of people to leave their native lands and migrate, exacerbating situations of creeping conflict between communities. Not only would the conflicts be numerically greater but, also, qualitatively more complex and thus more resistant to attempts at peace. Indeed, it has been noted that environmental conflicts precipitated into violence tend to resurface more easily and exacerbate more than others. In fact, if the environment is at stake, the cycle of conflict is accelerated, the root causes of dispute exacerbated, and the possibility of swift and nonviolent peacemaking drastically reduced.3 Another key finding is the following: the highest number of disputes surveyed are found in countries of the Global South, because this is where natural resources are most concentrated.4 In addition, many of these countries have experienced and/or are experiencing a period of strong economic growth, the realization of which has also been possible by initiating massive exploitation of the natural resources available to them, given that institutions are often still weak and corrupt, and it is the poorest and most vulnerable local populations that suffer the consequences. Specifically, those who live in territories where other environmental risk factors also persist and/or in land that is difficult to access and in unique and unspoiled natural ecosystems rich in raw materials.5 Secondly, there is a close connection between the enjoyment of human rights and the purposes of peacebuilding: climate change is a threat multiplier, directly and indirectly impacting a range of rights, including water, food, health, and people’s very lives, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable, i.e., the poorest and most exposed, who possess scarce resources to withstand shocks and stresses. Through its impacts, climate change can foster inequality,

47 conflict, and humanitarian crises.6 Within this framework, the intervention to be implemented is typical of peace-building, i.e., long-term actions that are taken to consolidate peace and to prevent a new situation of tension or conflict from being generated after an agreement to end or suspend hostilities has been reached (both objectives, achieving peace and reconstruction are now part of a comprehensive strategy and stipulate that they should be pursued concurrently, regardless of the stage the conflict is at). The Se- cretary General has in the past stated that “sustainable and transparent natural resource management is critical for post-conflict planning, as it is both a critical source of government revenue and a major driver of violent conflict where natural resources are not properly managed. The challenge is to create institutions that support sustainable transformation of natural resources into state revenues, livelihoods and infrastructure, without creating new sources of friction or contributing to longterm environmental degradation.”7 Multidimensional operations should have the promotion of the rule of law as their mandate, with the inclusion of environmental protection as a third-generation fundamental right. In particular, based on the analysis on the origin of tensions or conflict, new law enforcement measures could be proposed in transition and reconstruction of local institutions, as related to: • sustainable forest management and access to water resources; • protection of specially protected nature sites; • agrarian reforms and forestry-pastoral measures for equitable land regulation; • regulatory facilities on waste, discharge and wastewater regulation. Training and specialization of contingents. Environmental capacity building activities, often carried out in difficult theaters, require highly specialized personnel.8 The skills needed to perform these tasks require a high degree of professionalization, accompanied by the ability to act in multicultural and often insecure contexts. High quality standards of personnel are accompanied by an increasing demand for intervention in diverse and distant areas from various international and regional organizations active in the field of peace and security. The quality of deployed personnel is a crucial element in ensuring the proper execution of the mandate and the successful outcome of missions on the ground.[…] The current climate emergencies affecting every ecosystem impose the systemic analysis and assessment of human activities according to criteria of economic, ecological and social sustainability. Such awareness requires, among other things, a review of the parameters for the design, organization and conduct of Peace Operations for military, civilian and police components. In this perspective, a possible model for the expansion of the environmental component in multidimentional operations is provided by Decree Law No. 111 of 20199 (the so-called “Climate Decree”) by which a specific program was launched that provided for the establishment of a task force, the “Green Helmets for the Environment” (initially experimental for a three-year period, the program was made permanent from 2023), placed under the aegis of the “Environmental expert UNESCO” program, which already coordinates the so-called “Blue Helmets for Culture.”10 The action team of “green helmets”, which consists of a group of 22 experts from ISPRA (Higher Institute for Environmental Protection) with diverse and interdisciplinary skills (engineers, biologists, physicists, landscape architects are, for example, just some of the specializations), may be activated to intervene in national and international scenarios in order to implement interventions for the protection of biodiversity and environmental and forest resources within protected and UNESCO-recognized sites such as MaB (Man and Biosphere) sites and Biosphere Reserves, encompassing terrestrial, marine and coastal ecosystems. In relation to the described program, the Carabinieri Corps11, which, through their EnvironmenTHE CURRENT CLIMATE EMERGENCIES AFFECTING EVERY ECOSYSTEM IMPOSE THE SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO CRITERIA OF ECONOMIC, ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

48 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” tal, Agri-food and Forestry component (strengthened following the unification of the State Forestry Corps), represents the largest Environmental Police Force in Europe, has further expanded its international projection, launching a specific training for the military of the sector (Environmental Expert Network - UNESCO), in order to equip itself with a task force of military experts to be employed in the field of international police cooperation for environmental and forestry matters.[…] Conclusion. The complex realities of contemporary conflicts require not only economic aid but also careful analysis of context and damage so that a reconstruction program can be managed more coherently. […] In this paper, it has been emphasized that while the goals of “capacity building” in multidimensional operations include primarily that of creating sustainable peace, this goal necessarily passes through the mission’s commitment to creating the basis for sustainable protection of the natural environment. Only by ensuring a healthy environment can one contribute to the full realization of collective security through the protection of civilians and the preservation of basic human rights. Peacebuilding operations in the environmental field, in addition to being technically complex (such as to require, as illustrated, highly specialized military, civilian and police contingents) and not easy to coordinate logistically, present critical issues, particularly from a financial perspective. In fact, interventions in that area presuppose medium- to long-term planning: sustainable forest and natural resource management, effective protection of ecosystems, proper waste management – just to give a few examples – all require the “case-by-case” preparation of an impressive legal-regulatory framework in order to make the joint effort worthwhile. Transition and consolidation, moreover, must be the result of a process guided by the principles of national ownership and inclusivity. That is, it must be an evolutionary path developed endogenously and including all parties, regardless of their side during the conflict, including through the reconversion of pre-existing economic activities that were often at the source of the tensions. In addition, it is necessary to intervene in the educational system of the new generations, imprinting it with ecological responsibility and such as to develop an awareness in this direction. The importance and scope of interventions would require programs with very long developments and with positive effects that are actually visible only after

49 a few decades – elements that do not fit the time horizon of missions. In this regard, one more figure should give pause for thought. In 2021, the UN, regional organizations and alliances, and coalitions of States, conducted 63 multilateral peace operations in 38 countries or territories around the world. The United Nations continued to be the leading organization deploying multilateral peace operations, with 20 operations in 2021, but there is a general downward trend in personnel deployed globally. The main contribution in terms of personnel to UN missions (aggregating the numbers of Experts on Mission, Formed Police Units, Individual Police Officers, Staff Officers, and Troops – updated to Feb. 28, 2023) is provided by developing States such as Bangladesh (7,269 units), Nepal (6,264 units), India (6,090 units), and Rwanda (5,931). As these are nations with low budgets and almost a complete absence of specialized personnel in the examined sector, questions arise about the real effectiveness of capacity building and developing the missions themselves. Certainly, there is still a long way to go. The UN Peacebuilding Fund, for example, has dedicated at least $60 million to Environmental Cooperation in recent years, and other UN agencies have begun sending climate security experts to environmentally vulnerable conflict zones such as Somalia. Italy’s aforementioned “Green Helmets for the Environment” program, a highly specialized contingent for “on field” deployment in the network of protected areas of international significance, which is part of the broader UNESCO Environmental expert program, also goes in this direction. Over the past few decades – taking the words of UNEP’s Executive Director – the way the international community looks at challenges to peace and security has fundamentally changed. The increase in the number of non-State actors means that security is no longer viewed only in terms of conventional military threats. This evolution of the security scenario demands a change in the way the international community engages in conflict management. The potential role of natural resources and the environment needs to be taken

50 “RULE OF LAW (ROL) IN PEACE OPERATIONS: COORDINATION AMONG JUDICIARY, CORRECTIONAL AND POLICE COMPONENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES” note 1 The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations Department of Peace Operations (Ref. 2019.17) november 1th , 2019 (review 2022) - The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook, United Nations Department of Peace Operations, 2020. 2 E.BOMPAN, M.IANNELLI Water Grabbing , Le guerre nascoste per l’acqua, Ed. Emi, 2018, indicate that from 1948 to 2017, political incidents related to the control of water resources precipitated into hot conflicts were as many as 37. The Syrian war, with its numerous blackouts and damage to critical infrastructure has led to a situation where to date, more than 50 percent of the population has no access to safe water, with dramatic food and sanitation consequences. 3 From conflict to peacebuilding – The role of natural resources and the environment, United Nations Environment Program ‐ UNEP, Report of February 20, 2009. That of environmental protection, as argued by Unep, must consequently be an essential feature of contempointo account from the outset: from conflict prevention and early warning, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. “If we are to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, we must act with greater urgency and consistency to reduce the threats that armed conflict poses to our environment and, ultimately, to our health and livelihoods. We have only one way forward: to strengthen our ambition to protect our planet, even in the most complex and challenging scenarios.” We wish, as a closing remark, to quote the significant words recently uttered by David Jensen, UNEP focal point for the Coalition for Digital Environmental Sustainability: “Environmental protection before, during and after armed conflicts must achieve the same level of political importance as the protection of human rights. A healthy environment is the foundation on which peace and many human rights are realized.”