Philosophy

Philosophy
The Richmond Journal of Philosophy
Volume One Issue One Summer 2002
isIn sthisue...

David Pugmire
on irrationality

Roger Crisp
on Aristotle

Brad Hooker
on Kant

Alan Thomas
on the mind/body problem

Peter Goldie
on the emotions

Aaron Ridley
on music and song

Richmond upon Thames College

The Richmond Journal of
Philosophy

Issue one
Summer 2002

Editorial Board

Stephen Grant
Paul Sheehy
Paul Sperring

Philosophy Department
Richmond upon Thames College

Egerton Road
Twickenham
Middlesex

TW2 7SJ
United Kingdom

[email protected]

2

Contents

Contents

Editorial p4
p5
About the Editorial Board p6

Are You Ever Irrational? p11
David Pugmire
p17
Aristotle’s Ethics: How Being Good Can Make You Happy
Roger Crisp p23

Kant’s Normative Ethics p27
Brad Hooker
p37
Is Your Mind Your Brain?
Alan Thomas p42
p43
Can We Trust Our Emotions? p45
Peter Goldie
3
Song Got Wrong
Aaron Ridley

Notes on Contributors

Notes for Contributors

How to Subscribe

Editorial

[Editorial]

Welcome to the first edition of the The big or traditional questions of Our aims thus stated we are now
Richmond Journal of Philosophy or metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics pleased to turn to the papers
RJP. The motivation for and ambition will provide the journal’s centre of themselves. David Pugmire invites us
of the journal is to provide serious gravity. The third way in which the into the heart of an epistemological
philosophy for students who are at an philosophy is serious is through the concern by asking whether one can
early stage in their philosophical scope, variety and depth of analysis ever be irrational. Next Roger Crisp and
studies. The style and content of the that can be achieved by the Brad Hooker consider respectively the
papers will be accessible to students accumulation of papers over time. ethical theories of Aristotle and Kant.
who have yet to become hardened to Moreover, each paper is not simply an An enduring source of philosophical
the more technical and specialised introduction to one of the main topics debate is introduced and some possible
journals of professional philosophy. on A-level, IB or degree courses. Such answers considered when Alan Thomas
papers will indeed have a role in the poses the question of whether your
What do we mean by ‘serious’ journal, but they will not be the only mind is your brain. Philosophy not only
philosophy? First, the content of the kind. Our contributors will be offering occasionally stirs the emotions, but is
journal is not constrained by a remit to original papers based on their own also deeply interested in their nature
appeal to or reach the interested research. The journal will be a forum and role. Peter Goldie’s paper tackles
general public. Whilst the papers for the kind of critical engagement the issue of whether we can trust our
must speak to the needs of students and debate that characterise the emotions. Finally Aaron Ridley
who are relatively inexperienced in practice of philosophy. The fourth way investigates the source of a song’s
philosophy, they presuppose that their in which the philosophy is serious is in value by looking at the relationship
audience is actively engaged in the contributors themselves. The vast between music and words.
philosophy. Second, the content is bulk of the papers will be written by
serious in its focus on the central professional philosophers engaged in We would like to acknowledge those
areas of philosophy. both research and teaching. who have made it possible to bring the
journal to this stage. We are delighted
to be able to thank the contributors to
this edition and the many other
philosophers who have offered
encouragement and support.
Particular thanks are due to Richmond
upon Thames College for its
commitment to the journal from the
very beginning.

4

About the Editorial Board

[ ]About the

Editorial

Board

Stephen Grant originally studied Dr Paul Sheehy teaches philosophy at Paul Sperring is head of the philosophy
French and Politics, before moving into Richmond upon Thames College and department at Richmond upon Thames
philosophy. He taught philosophy at a King’s College London. His main areas College and an A-level examiner in
private university in the Czech of interest are in political and moral philosophy. He completed his
Republic, before returning to England philosophy, metaphysics, and the undergraduate and masters studies at
to pursue a doctorate at King’s College philosophy of the social sciences. His Warwick University, studying both
London. He teaches at both Richmond doctoral thesis was on the ontological analytic and continental philosophy.
upon Thames College and King’s, and moral status of social groups and His current research interests are in
specialising in ethics, political he has published on social groups and the philosophy of mind.
philosophy and the emotions. His voting.
doctorate focuses on the relationship
between moral concepts and the
emotions.

[Editorial]

5

Are You Ever Irrational? David Pugmire

David Pugmire
Are You Ever

[ ]Irrational?

O Lord, make me chaste, but not yet. – young children, for example, applies Arguably, one can’t actually believe
St Augustine primarily to thinking and acting; and what does not at least appear true; and
accordingly, it is in these two areas one cannot but believe what does
At bottom I am afraid, but I haven’t that irrationality would be found. appear true. (‘That’s right, but I doubt it’
admitted it to myself. – Wittgenstein hardly makes sense, except to the
As Descartes’ thinking things, our American President.) Compelling
I hold many firm beliefs, with some of beliefs are no longer directly and reasons for something compel belief. (In
which I disagree. – George W. Bush automatically triggered by our Orwell’s 1984, Winston Smith maintains
perceptions, as they may once have that no kind of suffering can make him
Aristotle famously defined human been in our prehuman ancestors. Our think as opposed to say that 2+2=5,
beings as ‘rational animals’, the minds are not in the thrall of brute that belief, at least, can’t be politicised.)
emphasis being on the first of these perceptual fact. We form our beliefs;
two words. Later, Shakespeare has and we do that by deliberating and Similarly, as practical beings we are
Hamlet characterise human beings as reaching judgements, however carefully unlike phototropic insects that have to
‘in conception how like a god’; and or carelessly. Now, belief aims at truth. seek light where they find it, even in a
later still Kant made reason the basis candle flame. We don’t just react to
of our freedom, our power to use our stimuli but can consider and choose
minds for the best, to preside over our how to react. When we reason about
responses to what the world throws at what to do we are seeking to
us. But for most of us there come determine what, under the
moments when this all seems like circumstances, would be for the best.
whistling in the dark: often we seem (Whether this means for the best
to let ourselves down. Some of our morally or not is part of what has to
attitudes and choices seem surprising be decided here.) If beliefs aim at the
and perplexing, even to us, let alone to true, actions aim at the good. The
others. And there are cynics who grounds for a choice lie in some worth
would never have rated us highly: ‘the that one finds in it. Thus, where there
flesh is weak!’ In Eden, tempted where is no ‘desirability characterisation’ of
we knew better, we threw away an option, it is hard to see how there
paradise. Very often the phrase, could be any motive for it, how it
‘human nature’ is used to connote could be explained and therefore how
fecklessness and incorrigibility. it could happen. It is questionable, for
instance – as Elizabeth Anscombe
What exactly lies behind all these observed – whether anyone could be
potent but confusing assertions? Are deemed to just want a saucer of mud.
we vulnerable to true irrationality? If so, it would seem to follow that
And what would that be? Rationality,
so charmingly and vexingly absent in

6

Are You Ever Irrational? David Pugmire

where a given choice is clearly seen as Again, despite best efforts people may (At this point try for yourself to comb
better than the alternatives there be confused or unaware of important personal experience, literature, and
could be no adequate motivation for factors. Evidence can be vague and history for examples and then to sift
any other choice. Of course, I can susceptible of interpretation, and one these for the principles they involve,
choose something that you think the cannot prevaricate forever. always asking the question: Has
worst of, but how could I choose Weaknesses and difficulties of such reason lost its grip here, or has it just
something that I myself really did, at kinds might absorb all the cases we not laid hold?)
bottom, view as the worst course? are tempted to regard as irrational.
In self deception I seem to believe
Perhaps, then, irrationality is Do they? What would downright something in the teeth of what I
impossible. It is hard to understand irrationality be? It would surely know; I contrive to believe what I
how I could believe where I see that involve, in the case of action, going know better than to believe.
matters remain inconclusive or how I ahead with something in the
could take the plunge where that realisation that I am thereby letting
strikes me as a mistake. Perhaps our myself down (rather than realizing
perversities of thought and action – only in retrospect that it wasn’t for the
our blatant delusions and self- best); and in the case of belief,
destructiveness – are not strictly clinging to or insisting on something
irrational but more nonrational. The but unsettled at the thinness of the
two are not to be confused. Thus, the case for it. My position would need to
failure properly to use our powers to strike me as forlorn or desperate,
deliberate and understand what really unless I am just oblivious (and then I
confronts us, before forming beliefs or am just not rational). Are there any
taking action is very common. Indeed, structures of thought and action that
care with these things does not come could manifest themselves in this
easily, and we are not always way?
adequately educated and habituated
to it. Also, mere omissions to make use
of our rational faculties abound.
People are often impulsive and just
don’t bother to think at all (‘Oh, what
the hell!’ ‘I just felt like it’) or don’t
reflect with sufficient patience (‘I
guess I rushed the gun’).

[Irrationality]

7

Are You Ever Irrational? David Pugmire

Here are two candidates in rather hidden faults in the evidence. In a what one regards as the worst

abstract form: more creative version of this, which alternative at the time. This sort of

(1) Belief in the innocence of someone could be termed faith, the ‘evidence’ thing is both very common and very
whose guilt is obvious or proven. could be reconstrued in light of one’s puzzling. There seems just no room
unshakeable belief, so that, for here for adequate motivation. Are

(2) Belief that a hopeless war is instance, damning behaviour tending these perverse lapses in self-discipline

winnable. to confirm the worst is represented really what they seem?

The status of these cannot be decided sympathetically as the defensive Notice that weakness of will may not
without detailed examination of flailings of a victim. This could be done
specific cases. Such examination out of a genuine, not to say ingenuous,
could reveal some interesting faith in the person (‘It just can’t be as
possibilities in the shape of stratagems it looks!’), but then we have a case of
for sustaining belief or action against naivete and so of mere nonrationality.
better judgement. Thus, a person But if this insistence on putting the
might ignore adverse evidence in the best face on things is peremptory and
belief that it might be overwhelming dogmatic and recognised as such by

(note: he hasn’t examined the the person inventing the excuses, then be fully analogous to self deception. It
evidence, so his belief isn’t that it is we come closer to genuine is arguable that for me to realise that

overwhelming but that it might be, or irrationality. We still haven’t arrived at something must be (or cannot be)

probably is, and that is why he averts that point, however, until this person true, is for my belief to change
his eye from it). In the last days of actually has the thought that these accordingly. Between how I think the
World War II, the German armaments excuses are mistaken. Yet that seems reasons stand and what I then believe
minister, Albrecht Speer, who was the to remove the belief that made him there is no wiggle room. By contrast,
only person Hitler would listen to, was self-deceived. there may be a narrow but fateful gap
deputised to get the fact of the between appreciating where the
German collapse through to Hitler. He Two general candidates for practical reasons point and acting
prepared a document carefully setting irrationality of practice, or weakness accordingly. The idea is that what I
out the realities and was careful to of will, would be: judge to be all in all the best may not
preface it with the conclusion: ‘The be what I desire most strongly. The
war is irretrievably lost.’ Hitler’s (1) Smoking or eating unhealthy food, force of renegade desire may be
reaction was to read this opening whilst believing that the risk from enough to loosen the grip of better
sentence, shut the report and lock it this is unacceptable. judgement without altering that
away in a safe, exclaiming, ‘Don’t judgement. In Homer’s Odyssey, even
depress me today!’ Again, one might (2) Letting oneself watch television great Ulysses knows that the prospect
actually look the evidence in the face instead of preparing for a crucial of certain death on the Sirens’ rocks
but bit by bit, without seeing, or exam the next day, which one cannot be trusted to protect him from
thinking about what it adds up to; recognises to be foolish. the beguilement of Sirens’ songs and
one sees the trees but not the forest. so as their deadly sweet island comes
Finally, one might confront the In such cases of feckless letting go one within earshot he has himself bound
evidence, and realise full well where it seems knowingly and freely to choose to the mast and orders his sailors to
points and yet still hold out on the disregard any of his subsequent orders.

grounds that what looks decisive may This allows two ways of understanding

not be, that evidence is seldom apparent lapses of choice. Sometimes

conclusive and there may be a saving one’s judgment itself is swayed (and

explanation somewhere that has yet perhaps sometimes rightly swayed) by

to emerge. Or, more stubbornly, that the proximity of temptation: ‘My

the conclusion just can’t be true, goodness! This is lovely!’ One has just

therefore it isn’t and so there must be changed one’s mind—a mistake maybe,

8

Are You Ever Irrational? David Pugmire

as one realises later, but not irrational. Suppose there are really hard cases of Maybe in the end we are never truly
One forgets, temporarily, how self deceit and weakness of will that irrational, but at the very least we are
important the interview is. Or one is resist all attempts to make sense of a great deal more complicated than
under no illusion that, say, the risks them. Some philosophers claim that we imagine.
from smoking are definitely not worth this would oblige us to postulate a
taking, but they are not incurred by split in the mind in which the David Pugmire
this particular cigarette, nor by any reasoning that warns us against the Department of Philosophy
other one cigarette, and each cigarette inferior choice occurs and its University of Southampton
is, of course, just one. So, enjoy! In conclusion grasped but is partitioned
what look like harder cases (‘What’s off from the rest of the mind in which
wrong with me? How can I do this?’), the reasons favouring this choice are
the independence of desire from able to decide the day. Then all our
deliberated judgement can be invoked. reasonings are rational and our choice
This way out of irrationality would, is also rational in light of the reasons
however, be blocked if the source and that produced it, although it remains
force of desires has to be explained by the worst choice, as we impotently
the worth we see in the things we and forlornly recognise.
desire—judgements again.

[Irrationality]

9

Are You Ever Irrational? David Pugmire

Addendum Changes in Belief

The following chart suggests the
power of believing as we fancy despite
knowing better. It does not encourage
optimism about education! - note that
what is at issue here is not the truth of
the beliefs but the sway over us of
insight into the evidence for them:
despite the patchiness of the evidence
all the beliefs could be true, and for
many this logical possibility is a
welcome bolthole. (What is your
favourite conspiracy theory?)

100
80
60
40
20
0
Percentage saying 'YES'
ESP
UFO
Astrology
Reincarnation
Von Daniken

Phenomenon
Before After Follow up

Changes in the percentage of students expressing belief as a result of university course specifically addressing the issue of
belief in paranormal phenomena. The follow-up was conducted one year after the end of the course. 'Educational
Experience and Belief in Paranormal Phenomena', Thomas Gray, p31, Cult Archaeology and Creationism, edited by Francis
Harold and Raymond Eve (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1995).

10

Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp

Roger Crisp
Ethics

[ ]Aristotle's

How Being Good Can Make You Happy

Aristotle was among the very greatest The range of Aristotle’s thought is When people talk of ‘Aristotle’s Ethics’,

thinkers ever, some would say the phenomenal. He could plausibly be they usually have in mind the work

greatest. He was born in Stagira, in said to be the founder of many known as the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ (or

Macedonia (now in northern Greece) disciplines, making advances in our ‘NE’). This consists in ten ‘books’, with

in 384 BCE. His father was a doctor, understanding of logic, mathematics, several chapters in each. Each book

and he always had an interest in biology, physiology, astronomy, time, tends to concentrate on a particular

medical matters. In 367 Aristotle theology, literature, rhetoric, the theme, or small number of themes.

travelled to Athens, where he spent nature of happiness, and much else. Exactly when Aristotle composed the

the next twenty years as a member of Dante called him ‘the master of those work is not certain, but there is a

Plato’s Academy. Plato died in 347, who know’, and when Aristotle’s works tradition that he was revising it

and Aristotle left Athens for thirteen were rediscovered in the west early in shortly before he died. Aristotle did

years, during some of which he the second millennium it was not write books ‘for publication’.

tutored (not particularly successfully, absolutely standard, when one was Rather, he gave lectures to students in

by all accounts) Alexander the Great. puzzled about almost anything, just to the Lyceum, his notes for which were

In 334, he founded his own take the relevant Aristotelian volume then deposited in the library for

philosophical school, the Lyceum, off the shelf and find the answer. If we consultation. As the years went by he

where he remained until just before had all of his works, an English would return to these notes and revise

his death in 322. translation of them would run to them, which explains how certain

something like 7 or 8 million words. In anomalies have entered the text we

fact, only one fifth remains, but we do now have (the two separate, and

have the most significant. potentially conflicting, accounts of

pleasure, for example, in books 7 and

10). Its influence on humanity has

been immense, both within and

outside the Christian tradition, and it

[Aristotle]continues to play an important part in
contemporary thinking about ethics.

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Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp

It is important to remember that Happiness conceptions, that is, views about what
Aristotle was not an isolated thinker. happiness actually consists in. In his

Socrates had died in Athens in 399, The starting point for Greek account, Aristotle moves between
only twenty-two years before Aristotle philosophical ethics was the question, spelling out the implications of the
himself arrived there. A central ‘What is the good life?’. That question concept, which he believes put
Socratic tenet was that moral virtue was seen as close to, or even identical constraints on any plausible
consists in knowledge, so that one with, the question, ‘What is the happy conception, and offering arguments
who acts wrongly acts from ignorance. life?’, and not so much, ‘What is the for his own conception of happiness
The Socratic conception of happiness right way to act?’. Though the Greek itself. In an important chapter, I.7,
linked it closely with virtue and philosophers do have much to say Aristotle tells us that happiness is
knowledge. Plato continued this about right action, their primary focus ‘complete’. Since the beginning of the
tradition, identifying moral virtue with is neither on rightness nor on action. book, he has been constructing
an ordering of the soul in which Rather, it is on happiness, and the hierarchies of activities and
reason governs the emotions and happiness of a whole life. specialisms. Bridle-making, because it
appetites to the advantage of the is merely instrumental to

virtuous person. Aristotle can be seen Does that mean that, since he focuses horsemanship, is less complete than

as following the same agenda, asking on the happiness of the individual, horsemanship. But horsemanship is

the same sorts of ethical questions, Aristotle’s ethics is egoistic? Not in the instrumental to the end of military

and using the same concepts. sense that he is advocating any kind of science, and so subordinate in turn to

In this brief essay, I shall be able to do self-conscious, deliberate, self-seeking it. In general, Aristotle says,
little more than touch upon a couple behaviour – looking out for number instrumental goods are inferior to
of the main topics of discussion in one. According to Aristotle, you should goods which are both good in
Aristotle’s Ethics: happiness and be concerned about particular other themselves and instrumental to some
virtue. I shall have to pass over much people for their sake, not for yours. But other good. The most complete (or
of interest in Aristotle’s accounts of there is nothing in Aristotelian ethics most final, or most perfect) good is
responsibility, justice, practical inconsistent with the idea that, when that which is not instrumental to any
wisdom, moral weakness, friendship, the chips are down, your reasons for other good, and is good in itself. Such
and pleasure. But if I can persuade you being concerned, for being a certain is happiness.
to read and think about this wonderful kind of person, for living a certain kind
book for yourselves, I shall consider my of life, or performing certain kinds of The same follows from the notion of
task to have been more than action, in the end rest only on the ‘self-sufficiency’. This notion was
worthwhile. advancement of your own good. popular in philosophical discussions of
Strikingly, there is nowhere in Aristotle Aristotle’s time. According to
any recommendation of genuine self- Aristotle’s use of it here, something is
sacrifice. Even the person who dies self-sufficient ‘which on its own
bravely on the battlefield ‘assigns makes life worthy of choice and
himself the greater good’ – the good in lacking in nothing’. Happiness does
question being ‘nobility’ (see book IX, this. It is also unimprovable: it cannot
chapter 8 (IX.8)). be made more ‘worthy of choice’. It is
important to recognise here that

There is a difference between the Aristotle is not suggesting that a life

concept of happiness, and various can be happy only if it is itself

conceptions of it. If you and I are unimprovable. That would be absurd,

talking about what human happiness since any human life is always lacking

consists in, we use the same concept. something the addition of which

We attach the same sort of sense to would improve it. Rather, Aristotle’s

the word ‘happiness’, and it is this that point is a conceptual constraint on

enables us to engage in discussion. any conception of happiness, that it

But we may well have different not be improvable by the addition of

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Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp

some good which it has omitted. At this point, we may wish to ask The good – the ‘acting well’ – of a
Compare here the argument of Plato’s Aristotle which life one should go for, flautist is, of course, to perform that
mentioned approvingly by Aristotle in and whether it might be acceptable to characteristic activity well. Now
X.2: if you claim that happiness commit vicious acts so as to further consider a human being. Its
consists in pleasure, but accept that a one’s contemplation (to kill a rich characteristic activity is the exercise
life containing pleasure and wisdom is aunt, for example, so as to spend one’s of reason: that is what, Aristotle
better than a life containing just the inheritance on studying philosophy at thinks, makes human beings what they
pleasure, your conception has been Cambridge). Here we should remember are. The good of a human being, then,
shown to be insufficient. Aristotle’s frequent recommendation will be exercising that capacity well.
that we not seek greater precision in But what is it to do that? The good is
This interpretation of Aristotle on ethics than the subject-matter permits acting well, and acting well is acting
happiness has come to be known as (see e.g. I.3), and his reminding us in in accordance with the virtues. So
‘inclusivist’, for the obvious reason X.8 that happiness can be found in exercising rationality well will consist
that it understands Aristotle to be exercising the moral virtues. There is in exercising rationality in acting
claiming that any conception of nothing in Aristotle’s text to suggest virtuously.
happiness must include all goods. that he would advocate immorality in
Against this, the ‘dominant’ the pursuit of philosophy. This famous argument of Aristotle’s –
interpretation has been offered, usually called the ‘function argument’
according to which Aristotle sees Having outlined this conceptual – has been subjected to much
happiness as the primary or dominant constraint, Aristotle then moves to criticism. Do human beings have a
good among several others. The force consider the ergon – the characteristic single characteristic activity? Is
behind the dominant view lies mainly activity – of human beings, in the rationality not anyway characteristic
in the fact that in X.7, Aristotle hope that some light may be shed on of other beings – the gods? Why
appears to claim that happiness is to the nature of human happiness. What assume that the good for a human
be identified with just one good, that makes a flautist a flautist? His being is the same as performing well
of philosophical contemplation. Here, characteristic activity – playing the the characteristic activity of human
an inclusivist may suggest that flute. beings? (In other words, perhaps the
Aristotle, having argued in I.7, that (morally) good human life is not the
happiness consists in the exercise of life that is in fact best for me, in terms
the virtues, moves on in book X to of my own well-being.) Why should
consider which of these virtues is the exercising rationality well not be to
most important. use reason to seek my own pleasure, or
honour, or power: is Aristotle not just
smuggling his own conception of
happiness into the argument?

[Aristotle]

13

Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp

Some of these objections probably rest intellectual virtues, the most their own sake. Elsewhere, he says that

on uncharitable interpretations of the important of which in connection with he will choose them for the sake of

argument. And at least some of them ethics is practical wisdom. Intellectual ‘the noble’, and we can plausibly see

can be avoided if we see Aristotle’s virtue is acquired primarily through choosing an action for its own sake as

conception of happiness as resting not teaching, while the virtues of equivalent to choosing it for the sake

only on the function argument itself, character arise through habit. of the noble. Again, as with Kant, there

but on his accounts of the individual Someone might possess outstanding is no reference to love of others. But

virtues in books II-V. Of course, it is mathematical ability from a very we should not forget Aristotle’s

too swift of him to expect us just to young age, but developing virtue of account of friendship, which does

accept that exercising rationality well character is more like learning a skill, allow for the concern one person may

is exercising it in accordance with the such as carpentry – hence it is related have for another.

virtues. But the detailed portrait to the non-rational part of the soul. Virtues, then, are dispositions
Aristotle paints of the virtuous life – Performing just actions, generous engendered in us through practice or
and vicious lives – in the later books actions, and so on, will lead one to habituation. The notions of excess and
can be seen as providing the main develop the corresponding character. deficiency, which play such an
support for his account of happiness. And this character will lead to one’s important part in Aristotle’s account
choosing virtuous actions for their of the virtues, are first introduced in
Virtue and the Mean own sake (II.4). connection with the notion of

It is important not to forget the habituation (II.2). In the case of
conclusion of the ergon argument: healthy eating, for example, getting
human happiness consists in the into the habit of eating too much or of
exercise of the virtues. This has the eating too little will ruin one’s health.
radical implication that a vicious or Aristotle compares someone who is
immoral person literally has nothing to afraid of everything to someone who
live for, and indeed might be best to is afraid of nothing, and this kind of
commit suicide (since viciousness comparison has led some
constitutes unhappiness). What, then, commentators to think he is offering
did Aristotle mean by ‘virtue’? us a quantitative account, according
to which virtue is to be captured in, for

Greek culture was one of excellence, in example, being afraid of a middling

the sense that young men were number of things. But Aristotle’s

encouraged to compete with one thinking is clearly prescriptive or

another in many spheres of life, This provides a link between Aristotle’s normative: the brave person is the one
including athletic, intellectual, and view and that of the German who stands firm against terrifying
aesthetic activity. It is worth philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724- situations, when he should, for the
remembering that in Greek a horse 1804). According to Kant, in his right reasons, and so on.
that ran fast could be said to have a Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
‘virtue’ or excellence, in so far as it Morals, moral worth attaches to an What, then, is Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of
performed well its characteristic action only to the extent that it is the mean’? In II.6, Aristotle says that
activity. Aristotle, however, is speaking motivated by respect for the moral we can feel fear, for example, either
not so much of physical excellences as law. Some have taken objection to this too much or too little, but that having
virtues of character and of thought. claim, suggesting not only that moral fear at the right time, of the right
Here, it is important that we have worth can lie in other motivations, things, and so on is ‘the mean and
some understanding of the soul (I.13). such as love, but that pure respect for best’. But how are we to understand
feeling fear at the right time as in a

The soul can be seen as bipartite, with duty is itself sometimes out of place. mean? Again we have to remember

a rational and a non-rational part. The Aristotle here tells us that a virtuous the normative nature of the doctrine.

rational part is the source of the person will choose virtuous actions for No one should be fearless, since there

14

Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp

are some things one should fear. The doctrine of the mean works when There are differences between
Likewise, there are things one should we have a single morally neutral Aristotle and modern writers on the
not fear. There are, then, two action or feeling that it is possible to
directions in which we may go wrong: do or feel at the right time, fail to do virtues. The virtue of kindness or
feeling fear at the right time is in or feel at the right time, and do or feel beneficence, for example, is almost
between not feeling fear at the right at the wrong time. And it rests on an entirely absent from Aristotle’s
time, and feeling fear at the wrong important insight: there are spheres of account, though he does allow that
time. human action and feeling, and virtue human beings do feel some common
consists in success within these bonds with one another on the basis of
This analysis helps us to see how the spheres. their shared humanity (VIII.1). And the
doctrine of the mean works with crown of the virtues for Aristotle is a
actions. Generosity, for example, In recent years, there has been a distinctly unmodern and pre-Christian
involves giving away money at the revival of interest in the virtues, and in disposition, greatness of soul (IV.3),
right time, and to the right people, and the ethics of virtue. The two main which consists in thinking oneself
one may fail to live up to its modern competitors to virtue ethics worthy of great things and being
requirements both by failing to give are utilitarianism and Kantianism. It is concerned almost entirely with
away money when one should (which important to recognise that these honour. The great-souled person is
is stinginess) and giving away money three theories may largely converge in unlikely to stir himself to help the
when one should not (which is their practical conclusions. They may vulnerable.
wastefulness). We can also see how all, for instance, recommend that one
one’s character may consist partly in be generous, or just. But the reasons
two ‘opposite’ vices, and Aristotle that the theories offer differ greatly.
explicitly says (IV.1) that some of the According to utilitarianism, what
characteristics of wastefulness (such makes actions right is their producing
as spending money when one should the largest amount of well-being
not) are commonly found with certain overall. According to Kantianism, what
characteristics of stinginess (such as makes actions right is their being in
taking money from the wrong accordance with the law of reason. We
sources). Aristotle’s doctrine is might understand Aristotle, and a pure
therefore not one of moderation. virtue ethics, as claiming that what
Sometimes, for example, one will be makes actions right is their being
required to be very angry, and virtuous.
sometimes to give away only a tiny
amount of money. It depends on the
circumstances, and moderation has
nothing in itself to be said for it.

[Aristotle]

15

Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp

Aristotle’s discussions may be tabulated as follows:

Virtue Sphere Discussion in NE
Courage Fear and confidence III.6-9
Temperance Bodily pleasure and pain III.10-12
Generosity Giving and retaining money IV.1
Magnificence Giving and retaining money
on a large scale IV.2
Magnanimity Honour on a large scale IV.3
[Nameless] Honour on a small scale IV.4
Even temper Anger IV.5
Friendliness Social relations IV.6
Truthfulness Honesty about oneself IV.7
Wit Conversation IV.8
Justice Distribution V
Friendship Personal relations VIII-IX

Aristotle also briefly discusses shame, attempt carrying across his Further Reading
which he says is not really a virtue, conclusions about happiness in such a
and appropriate indignation. polity to what he would have seen as Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
highly degenerate nation-states. It is (trans. R. Crisp, Cambridge:
Another difference between Aristotle not, in other words, a good idea to Cambridge University Press, 2000).
and modern theorists of the virtues is claim Aristotle as an ally in a modern
his objective notion of happiness. The debate the very assumptions of which Crisp, R. and Slote, M. (ed.),
idea that there is some universal he might have questioned. Rather, he Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
account of well-being, especially one should be read, carefully and University Press, 1997).
grounded in human nature, is denied sensitively, with an understanding of
by most important modern writers historical, social, and political context, Urmson, J., Aristotle’s Ethics
who otherwise see themselves as as one of the best sources of insight (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
returning to Aristotle. Likewise, none into the human ethical condition
of them goes as far as to identify available to us.
happiness with the exercise of the
virtues. Roger Crisp
Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy
It is also important to remember the St Anne’s College, Oxford
context in which Aristotle composed
his lectures. He was writing two and a
half millennia ago, for noblemen in a
city-state of tens of thousands. He
believed such a city to be the best
form of human society, and might well
have thought it absurd even to

16

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker

Brad Hooker
Kant's

[ ]Normative
Ethics

One central moral idea is that your Kant’s ethics is grounded in the ‘Categorical imperatives’, on the other
doing some act is morally permissible distinction between hypothetical hand, tell us what to do regardless of
only if others’ doing that act would imperatives and categorical ones.1 By our desires. I’m required to tell the
also be morally permissible. There are ‘hypothetical imperatives’, he means truth even if I don’t happen to want to.
a number of different ways of imperatives that tell you what you The same is true of my other moral
developing this idea. One is the must do in order to get or do duties.
suggestion that, before deciding to do something you happen to desire: for
some act, you should ask yourself example, ‘if you want a good sleep, But what could bring about
‘What if everyone did that?’ Another don’t drink a gallon of caffeine at intentional human action except
central moral idea is that it is immoral bedtime’, or ‘if you want to be trusted, desires, preferences, inclinations, and
to ‘use’ people. always keep your word and tell the the like? Kant thought that unless
truth’. there is something that can supply an
Kant took himself to have identified a answer, morality is a sham. He thought
‘Categorical Imperative’ that operates we aren’t responsible for our desires
as the foundational principle of and preferences. (We couldn’t help the
morality. He formulated his dispositions we were born with, nor
Categorical Imperative in different the training we received in our
ways. One of his two main formative years.) And if these desires,
formulations of the Categorical preferences, etc., completely
Imperative develops the ‘What if determine our behaviour, then we
everyone did that?’ question. The other can’t really be held responsible for
main formulation of his Categorical that behaviour either.
Imperative develops the idea that
morality does not permit you to use
people.

[Kant]

17

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker

Kant thought that our desires and our Let us say that Kant’s theory requires a year. This is an impossible state of

beliefs about how to satisfy them are three-step process. First, I formulate affairs. So, according to Kant’s

not the only things that could guide the maxim of my action. Second, I contradiction in conception test, the

our intentional behaviour. We could ‘universalise’ this maxim—that is, maxim I will give more to charity this

act from duty. And what determines formulate the universal law of nature year than is the average given in this

what duty requires? Kant’s answer is: corresponding to the maxim of my year is morally impermissible. But,

‘Since I have robbed the will of every action. Third, I consider whether I intuitively, this maxim seems

inducement that might arise for it as a could will that the universal law of admirable rather than impermissible.

consequence of obeying any particular nature hold. Let us move on to one of Kant’s own
law, nothing is left but the conformity examples. Kant thinks that the
of actions to universal law as such, To see how this theory works, consider universal law of nature corresponding
that this alone must serve the will as Kant’s example of the lying promise.4 to the maxim of the lying promise is
its principle.’2 The maxim of the agent’s action is: logically impossible. He writes,
whenever I need money, I will get it by

making a false promise to repay it. As I then become aware at once that I
you can see, maxims state the agent’s can indeed will to lie, but I can by no
means and end—i.e., the means means will a universal law of lying;
employed in the act and the purpose for by such a law there could
the act is supposed to achieve. The properly be no promises at all, since
means here is making a false promise it would be futile to profess a will
to repay money; the end is getting for future action to others who
money. The universal law of nature would not believe my profession. .. .7
corresponding to this maxim is, to
paraphrase Kant: Whenever anyone Kant must be assuming that if
needs money, he or she will get it by everyone followed the principle of
making a false promise to repay it.5 making false promises in order to get
money, then everyone would know

The Contradiction in that everyone was doing this. Well, we
Conception test can reasonably assume that, at least in
most cases, if everyone is behaving in

Kant thinks this brings us to the first Kant distinguishes between two a certain way, then awareness that
of his main two formulations of the questions.6 The first is: Can I even this behaviour is widespread will
Categorical Imperative: ‘Act as if the conceive of my maxim becoming a become widespread.
maxim of your action were to become universal law of nature? The second is:
through your will a universal law of Assuming I could conceive of its But it is possible that everyone could
nature’.3 A law of nature specifies an becoming a universal law of nature, be acting in a certain way without
absolute regularity. For example, the can I will that it become a universal everyone’s being aware that everyone
law that pure water boils under law of nature? was acting in this way. Here are some
normal atmospheric conditions at 100 examples. When I started as an
undergraduate at an American

degrees centigrade is a law of nature: There are some maxims that it is university, all the students I met told

pure water always boils under these logically impossible should ever me that they were studying virtually

conditions. So laws of nature would be become universal laws of nature. A every minute of sixteen hours a day. I

laws (a) applying to everyone and (b) good example, which I learned from was overwhelmed until, about six

which everyone always follows. To Derek Parfit, is the maxim: I will give months later, I realised everyone was

imagine the maxim of my proposed more to charity this year than is the hugely exaggerating. Another example

action as a universal law of nature, I average given in this year. The is that when I came to the UK to do a

imagine that everyone always does the corresponding universal law would be: further degree, I attended a university

kind of act I propose doing when they Everyone will give more to charity this where the fashion was exactly the

18 are in the circumstances I am in. year than is the average given in this opposite: all students hugely

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker

understated how hard they were The Contradiction in the Then, Kant’s question ‘Can I will that
working. By this point, I was not quite Will test my maxim be a universal law of
so stupid. So this time it took me only nature?’ would seem to amount to ‘All
about three months to figure out that In the question ‘Can I will that my things considered, do I really desire my
everyone was misrepresenting the maxim be a universal law of nature?’ maxim to become a universal law of
truth. One more example: I grew up in what does Kant mean by ‘will’? Our nature?’ But when Kant tries to
a culture in which pretty much every first guess might be ‘choose’ or illustrate how his question works,
male overstated certain things, but I ‘endorse’. But what determines what I what he gives us is the question ‘Could
didn’t realise that at the time. choose? The answer that first springs I, in every situation, accept this maxim
to mind is: my all-things-considered as law?’
So we do need to distinguish between wants or desires. Yet we should be far
everyone’s acting in a certain way and from confident that this answer is Kant asks us to think about the case of
everyone’s knowing everyone acts in correct—for this answer creates severe a well-off person considering not
that way. It is possible for these to part problems in interpreting other claims coming to the aid of others in
company. And this distinction is of Kant’s, such as the claim that moral distress.10 Kant asks whether this well-
important in our discussion of Kant duty in no way depends on contingent off person could will it to be the case
because what would make it impossible human desires. On the other hand, that everyone ignores the cries of
to get money through false promises of what besides ‘all-things-considered others in need. Kant says the answer is
repayment would not (necessarily) be desire’ could ‘will’ really be? So let us No, and the reason he gives is that on
everyone’s making these false promises. suppose ‘will’ means ‘all-things- other occasions the previously well-off
What would make it impossible to get considered desire’. person may herself be in dire need of
money through false promises of help from others. In giving this reason
repayment would instead be everyone’s Kant suggests that one cannot will
knowing that everyone makes these that some way of acting (such as
false promises. denying aid to those in need) becomes
universal practice if one might under
Many modern philosophers have said certain conditions will that someone
explicitly that there are two distinct not act in this way. His remark
requirements which principles must suggests that I cannot now will that
pass if they are to qualify as moral people universally refuse to aid those
principles. The first is that moral in need if it is the case that, were I
principles must be capable of being (now or later) in need, I would then
universally followed.8 The second is will that others help me.
that they must be such that they can
be universally known to be universally
followed.9 This second requirement is
often called the publicity principle.

[Kant]

19

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker

But that suggestion seems inadequate, an assumption must be false. And the wishes, with its being categorical in

because it rules out too much. Just as false assumption appears to be (1). the sense that it neither makes

I would if I were stuck in a ditch want By rejecting (1), we are rejecting the exceptions nor gets outweighed by
others to come to my aid, I would if I idea that it is a necessary condition of other moral considerations. The rule
were convicted want the judge not to a principle’s being morally sound that requiring me to tell the truth does not
punish me. If the former desire’s there be no circumstances in which make an exception for cases in which
existence in the hypothetical case agents might find themselves where I don’t feel like telling the truth. But it
rules out the maxim allowing everyone they would not want that principle might make exceptions for cases in
to ignore cries for help, the latter followed. Now let us turn to the idea which my telling the truth would
desire’s existence in the hypothetical that it is a sufficient condition of a endanger the lives of innocent people.
case rules out the maxim enjoining principle’s being morally sound that
judges to punish convicts. How can there be no circumstances in which Turn now to the other of Kant’s two
Kant claim that it matters what I agents might find themselves where main formulations of the categorical
would will when I need help but it they would not want that principle imperative—the injunction never to
doesn’t matter what I would will when followed. treat rational agents merely as means
I am facing the judge? but rather always to treat them as
This idea is often attacked with the ends in themselves.
Let me put this argument against Kant following counter-example. Die-hard
in a slightly different way. Kant is Nazis propose to kill Jews in order to
advancing the following principle: ‘purify the human species’. Critics of

(1) If I would, were I in another Kant’s first formulation of the

person’s predicament, not want a Categorical Imperative say the

certain maxim followed, that Categorical Imperative on this

maxim is not morally sound. formulation will not be able to show

But just as it is an empirical fact that (at least some kinds of) Nazis that
if I were stuck in the ditch I would not killing the Jews in order to ‘purify the
want others to act on the maxim species’ is wrong, since die-hard Nazis
allowing everyone to ignore cries for would will it to be a universal law that
help, it is an empirical fact that the Jews be killed. That is, there is no
occasion on which die-hard Nazis

(2) If I were in the convict’s would not will that the Jews be killed.

predicament, I would not want to Were these Nazis to find out they The most inviting way of interpreting
be followed the maxim enjoining themselves were Jewish, even then this injunction is that it requires us to
judges to sentence convicts to would they will that the Jews treat people in a way they can consent
punishment. (themselves included) be killed. Such to. We might think that the focus on
killing is nevertheless clearly morally consent rules out deception. The
So, on Kant’s principle, wrong. Therefore, the case of the die- thought is that, on careful reflection,
hard Nazis seems to constitute a you can’t actually consent to my
(3) The maxim enjoining judges to powerful counter-example to the idea deceiving you. For if you’re agreeing to
sentence convicts to punishment is that the first formulation of the let me lie to you, then I’m not really
not morally sound. Categorical Imperative gives us a deceiving you, since you know not to
sufficient criterion of right and wrong. trust what I say. Likewise, you can’t
But surely the maxim enjoining judges
to sentence convicts to punishment is

morally sound. Indeed, Kant himself I should mention one other standard really consent to my coercing you. For

would say that judges should punish criticism of Kant. He insisted on if you consent to what I do to you, I’m

convicts even though this conflicts considering only very general maxims not really coercing you. We might

with the desires of the convicts.11 The (rules), and confused a rule’s being even make this claim about assault. To

reasoning leading to (3) is logically categorical in the sense of not making do so, we’d have to define ‘assault’ as

valid. So, since (3) is clearly mistaken, exceptions to satisfy the agent’s intentionally physically harming

20

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker

someone without that person’s Robert Audi, however, attempts a So Audi’s suggestion is that treating
rational consent. If you rationally different interpretation of Kant’s someone as a means consists in
consent to my physically harming you, principle about treating others as treating that person as if his or her
what I do isn’t assault. ends.13 Audi takes the idea of treating well-being doesn’t in itself matter at
someone as a means as pointing to all. There is nothing in this suggestion
There is a question about whether the ‘the idea of using something merely as about lack of consent. Audi’s
focus here should be on what you an instrument: it matters only in interpretation thus contrasts sharply
really do consent to, or merely on what getting the job done; it may be with the usual interpretation of Kant’s
you could consent to. Suppose you damaged in the process and trashed prohibition on treating rational agents
want me to repay the loan I borrowed thereafter.’14 And Audi writes, ‘from our as means.
from you. You could rationally consent understanding of instrumental
to my not repaying the loan to you. If relations, we have a sense of what it is The suggestion that morality requires
the focus is on what you could to treat someone merely as a means. us to treat people as if their well-
consent to (whether or not you We regularly use tools and far too being matters in itself is fairly empty
actually do), then is my not paying the often similarly use other people. Here, until some indication is given of how
loan permitted? If so, then the what happens to the tool is of no much weight we must attach to a
categorical imperative seems to be concern - unless we may need it for person’s well-being. After all, I might
going wrong. another job or happen to like it for its treat you appallingly though I attach
own sake.’15 some minimal weight to your well-
A far more natural reading of ‘treat being. Suppose that, though I treat
people always as ends in themselves you as if your well-being matters in
and never merely as means’ is as itself, the minimal weight I attach to
requiring us to treat people in ways your well-being is .000001 of the
that they actually do consent to, or weight I attach to anyone else’s well-
would consent to under appropriate being. Clearly, if I treated you that
conditions. This idea is developed way, I wouldn’t be treating you rightly.
within what has become known as What is needed is not just that I treat
contractarian, or contractualist, you as if your well-being matters in
ethics.12 Contractualism is in many itself to some degree, but that I treat
ways the successor theory to Kant’s. you as if your well-being matters in
itself a lot. Now the question is, how
much is enough to count in this
context as a lot? The idea of treating
others as ends rather than means
seems not to tell us how much more
than minimal importance we must
attach to the well-being of others.

[Kant]

21

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker

Whatever the implications of Kant’s nature is to substitute indefinite
moral theory, what is the right answer pronouns (‘everyone’, ‘anyone’) for
to the question of how much weight the first of the first person
to attach to the well-being of others? pronouns in the maxim and then to
Intuitively, some degree of partiality is substitute ‘he or she’, or ‘him or
morally required. In your day-to-day her’, for the later first person
decision making, you to be somewhat pronouns, and then alter the verbs
more concerned about the well-being so that they agree with the new
of your family and friends than you are subjects. For example, in the text
about the well-being of others. above I substituted ‘anyone’ for the
first ‘I’ and ‘he or she’ for the
But the requirement to be partial second ‘I’.
might itself be impartially justifiable.
Indeed, we might expect that every 6 Kant, pp. 86–7.
defensible moral requirement is
impartially justifiable. What is this 7 Kant, p. 68.
impartial justification? The most
natural answer is that, when we 8 This first requirement would rule
impartially assess any possible set of out the principle that one ought to
moral requirements, we should accord give more to charity than is the
the same importance to benefits or average this year.
harms to any one person as we do to
the same size benefits or harms to 9 This second requirement would
anyone else. This line of thought, rule out the principle that one
however, is not Kantian; it is rule- ought to get money by making
utilitarian. false promises to repay it.

10 Kant, p. 86.

Brad Hooker 11 Kant, p. 92 fn.
Professor of Philosophy
University of Reading 12 For an overview, see Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord’s ‘Contractarianism’,
Notes in H. LaFollette (ed.) Blackwell's
Guide to Ethical Theory (Cambridge,
1 Kant’s Groundwork of the Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000)
Metaphysics of Morals was pp. 247–67. A contractualist theory
translated by H. J. Paton and can be found in T. M. Scanlon’s
published as The Moral Law What We Owe Each Other
(London: Hutchinson, 1948). My (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
references to Kant will be to the University Press, 1998). I briefly
1969 reprint of Paton’s translation. discuss contractualism in my Ideal
For the distinction between Code, Real World: A Rule-
categorical and hypothetical consequentialist Theory of Morality
imperatives, see pp. 78–80. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 6–8, 66–70.
2 Kant, p. 67.

3 Kant, p. 84. 13 Audi, ‘A Kantian Intuitionism’, Mind

4 Kant, pp. 67–8. 110, pp. 601–35.

5 The easy way to get from the 14 Audi, p. 612, italics added.

maxim of the action to the 15 Audi, p. 623, italics added.

corresponding universal law of

22

Is Your Mind Your Brain? Alan Thomas

Alan Thomas
Is Your Mind

[ ]Your Brain?

When you arrived at the location You do not predict everything that So in our dealings with the world we
where you are now perusing this happens in the world in such a way.
paper, your action was preceded by a When you are calculating which way treat some parts of it differently from
prior decision to make the journey: a the avalanche will fall, or the boulder
mental event. Perhaps you did not roll, during a hazardous mountain other parts, and the grounds we give
make the trip alone; you arranged to hike, you do rely on the slide rule and
come with a friend, to meet them the laws of physics, at least in their for this difference is that parts of the
beforehand, and to travel with them to everyday 'folk' variant. If you say that
where you currently are. That involved the avalanche has a mind of its own, world have minds and other parts
prediction on your part of how your and that is why it blocked the path,
friend would behave. That prediction you are speaking metaphorically. don’t. Philosophers have always been
was not a matter of physical comings
and goings involving slide rules, the puzzled as to what this difference
laws of physics and your friend’s mass
and velocity. It involved your appeal to amounts to and this puzzlement has
their mental events and states. You
believed that they would meet you survived scientific progress in the
because they believed that it was what
they ought to do, in the light of what understanding of the physical basis of
they wanted, given that they are
rational human beings. behaviour. This progress is made up

not only of the emergence of an

autonomous science of psychology,

originally a discipline that was part of

philosophy, but also the emergence

and spectacular development of the

brain sciences, centrally

neurophysiology. How can this be?

Haven’t we understood all that there is

to understand about the mind when

we know that the mind is the brain?

[Mind]

23

Is Your Mind Your Brain? Alan Thomas

Philosophy being philosophy, is not a flesh-eating instance of the of complex representation but merely

philosophers are worried about the undead, but an imagined human of signs, such as the rings of a tree

word ‘is’ in the sentence, ‘the mind is subject that is physiologically a replica that indicate its age. The kind of

the brain’. It has to be understood in of you but has no mental life. You, by representing that minds do is more

the sense of strict and literal identity contrast, do have a conscious mental complex because, paradoxically, there

at a time. In that sense, when we say life. As you sit reading this, you have a is a richer sense in which it can go

that the table is the table, we do not distinctive range of experiences, unlike wrong. The tree’s rings signal states of

mean that it is very similar to some the zombie or the cyborg that has affairs without the same capacity for

other table, that in another sense of none. This seems to suggest that your error, but your thoughts can be wrong

the word ‘identity’ means, ‘is very mental life has features that a brain in a thousand ways (alas).

similar to’. Identical twins are identical does not have. Suppose that I rigged Second, and related to your capacity
in that sense of ‘very similar to’, but up a means for you to view your brain to represent, you are a thinker. Your
philosophers are interested (typically) processes as you were reading this thoughts can be tied together by
in identity strictly conceived. One paper. Suppose in a mirror you saw the relations that are rational. If you are
thing that has seemed, to many output from this device, a thirsty, and you believe that your thirst
philosophers, to follow from the claim cerebroscope. How would you will be relieved by putting 50p in the
that one thing is identical to another reconcile the pale grey mushy stuff Coke machine, and you have 50p, then
is that they would have to share all you see in the mirror with the you ought (other things being equal)
their properties or features. (It does complexity of your mental experience? to put the money in the machine for
not follow that if two things share all Doesn’t your mental life have features the drink to slake your thirst. These
their features or properties that they that are just missing from the life of a mental states of yours did not just
are the same.) So if we really believe cyborg or a zombie, even if they have happen in sequence. They were a
that the mind is the brain, then the functioning brains? What is missing? sequence, a rational chain of
mind and the brain should share all argument. This sequence depended on
their features. But many philosophers other mental states of yours. I said you
have believed that the mind and the should put the money in the machine
brain do not share all of their features if all other things were equal. But
and therein lies the problem. suppose that they were not. Suppose
that 50p was your only coin for your
This claim needs to be unpacked call home for your parents to come
and pick you up and if you drank the
considerably. What is it about the Coke you would be stuck overnight at
a deserted railway station with a
mind that we do not believe that a collection of mass murderers. You
ought not to buy the Coke but you
brain can also possess? Candidates for ought to make the call. So it seems
these rational sequences call on a
such features are: representation range of mental states that you have
and they are all implicated in some
(directedness), rationality,

consciousness and, generally, the

belief that there is a ‘what it is like’ to

be a mental subject. The philosophers’

worry is that we do not find these

features in a brain.

Each of you is, I take it, neither a Expanding on this line of thought, kind of network of states. What, in the

cyborg nor a zombie. If I knock off your philosophers have argued that minds brain, corresponds to that? What is

head I won’t find the white oozing goo can represent, whereas brains cannot. that at the level of neurons? We know

that emerges from the heads of the You can think of things, whereas brain that, in fact, the brain does operate in

automata in the Aliens series of states simply are. You can think of the a network like way. But where is the

movies. Nor are you a zombie in the non-existent, such as an imagined sensitivity to rationality in such

sense that you are a physical replica of mountain made entirely of gold. Your networks? Your thoughts must make

a human being that does not have mind represents the world as so and sense, whereas your brain events

experiences. The philosophical zombie so, whereas nature gives evidence not merely are.

24

Is Your Mind Your Brain? Alan Thomas

Third, you are a conscious subject. (and a metaphorical pointing at that; It does not do so in terms that are
There is a difference between being philosophers who believe in such a always useful or helpful. If you want
conscious and being non-conscious. thing spend a lot of time hitting to know the causes of an economic
For a whole person, that is the themselves on the head). It is a bit like recession, you need an explanation in
difference between being awake and Dizzy Gillespie’s response to the economic terms using the typical
responsive, and being unconscious or woman who asked him to explain concepts and procedures of
asleep. But we also think that this rhythm in jazz: his answer, economics. Nevertheless, there is a
distinction applies to individual states paraphrased, was that if he needed to sense in which those very same
you can be in. You can be conscious of tell her she was not ever going to features of the world that the
a thought, or a sensation like a pain, or know. economist describes in her successful
you can be not conscious of those explanation of a recession are those
things. The difference seems to be a At this point, a certain amount of features that a physicist could
matter of awareness. How, looking at a exasperation may set in. How can it be describe if she chose to do so. It would
brain and its states and events, could denied that the mind is the brain? We be a long, boring, and shapeless list in
we explain the difference between have the spectacular successes of lieu of a 'description', but it would be
those of its own states of which it is psychology and neurophysiology as true. True statements can have many
aware and those of which it is not proof that it is. Science, by this stage other defects, but remain true. So
aware? Is it a matter of having an in our collective history, stands on its physics gives a true and complete
internal scanner? If so, then brains own two feet and it does not postulate description of everything that there is,
could be conscious, but so will the operations of mind to explain even if not always a helpful or salient
handheld and laptop computers and anything. In particular, the most description. Less abstractly, we know
many other devices of comparable fundamental science, physics, that behaviour has a physical basis.
(and higher) complexity. Are they describes everything that happens. Drugs affect our brains and our
conscious too? behaviour, brain damage impairs
mental function, mental illness can be
One way to sum up these worries is cured by anti-depressants. How can
that there is a 'what it is like' to be a these facts be denied? These facts
mental subject. There is a 'what it is show that the mind is the brain.
like' to be you. I don’t mean by this
that you are alienated, or hopeful
about the future and such like. I mean
simply that at the level of being a
conscious mental subject, there is
what it is like to be such a thing. This
is a very difficult thing to describe or
to do anything other than point to

[Mind]

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Is Your Mind Your Brain? Alan Thomas

These facts are undeniable, and if they do not cause. This seems a very heavy events, or of substances instantiating
are undeniable we had better find a price to pay. The second option is to properties. Our initial problems were
way, if we want to sustain our deny our principle. The world is not, as about the distinctive features of the
conclusion of claiming that the mind it seems to be, physically closed and mental; those aspects of our mental
is not identical to the brain, of dealing complete. That seems desperate. life that suggest that the events of our
with them. An initial response is to say mental life cannot be identical, as a
that of course the brain is very The third option says: let’s make a new type, with the type of events in our
important for the functioning of the distinction. That is the distinction brains. But further examination of that
mind, but then a steering wheel is very between two particular things being view has taken us a long way from the
important for the functioning of a car. identical at a time, and types or initial starting point to consideration
But steering wheels do not drive cars, classes of things being identical. In the of issues about descriptions and
drivers do. Similarly, the brain is a very former sense, perhaps we have been properties. But then this reflects the
important conduit for mental shown that mental events are brain holistic character of philosophy, where
functioning, but it is not a mind. events. But describing them in that nearly all problems overlap. Perhaps
Damage to the conduit damages the way makes a difference. There are this was only to be expected in the
operations of mind the way that many sciences, if we look beyond mind’s investigation of itself and its
damaging the steering damages the physics, where mental sayings and place in the natural world.
functioning of a car. But mind and doings make a difference to what we
brain are not identical. can and cannot explain. Mental talk Alan Thomas
makes a difference, but not the kind of University of Kent at Canterbury
The serious challenge comes from the difference we accommodate by [email protected]
argument that says that everything in making it a magical exception to the http://www.logical-operator.com
the world has a true physical claims of physics or a special unusual
description. So if the mind is distinct part of physics. On this relaxed view,
from the physical brain, we seem to be mind talk and brain talk are two ways
suggesting that its doings and of talking. They do not introduce new
happenings are not physical doings classes of thing into the world. They
and happenings which is ruled out by are different vocabularies with
this argument. What can we say here? different commitments but none the
worse for that.
There are three routes. One is to say
that we just need to build in to This view may have problems of its
physics, at a fundamental level, laws own. It looks, for example, as though
that correlate physical events with one and the same event in the world
mental properties. This expands the can have both a true physical
repertory of what we count as physics. description and a true mental
The problem here is that everything description. But how could that be if
that happens, we believe, happens that event does not have different
because it has physical causes. So now properties? And if it does have
we have two competing causes for different properties, don’t we re-state
events, a brain event cause and a our initial worry? It is the event
mental event cause. We know that the described as a brain event that
first of those, being physical, completely explains what happens,
completely explains what it causes. So not the fact that this event is also your
we have accepted that there are parts decision to read a philosophy paper.
of the world that are mental, mental
events that are not brain events, at the The answers to these concerns go
cost of making them idle spectators of deeply into central questions about
the passing show. They are caused, but how language relates to the world and
whether it is basically made up of

26

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

Peter Goldie

[Emotions?]Can We Trust Our

I think that our commonsense A cheap resolution of these competing I see as two quite deep
intuitions tend to draw us in two intuitions would be to say that there epistemological worries about the
apparently opposing directions about are cases and cases: sometimes our emotions as a source of empirical
this question. On the one hand, we are emotions help us to gain knowledge of knowledge—that is to say, they are
inclined to say that we can certainly the world around us, and sometimes worries about whether the emotions
trust our emotions. Indeed, our they hinder us. No doubt this is true so can help us to know certain things—
emotions can sometimes tell us things far as it goes, but I think there is more empirical facts—about the world
about the world that reason alone will to be said than just that. So what I around us. I think that there is
miss, as all the recent books about want to do here is to say what lies something especially troubling about
‘emotional intelligence’ attest. In this behind these competing intuitions, the emotions here.
respect, our emotions serve us very and the sense in which both are right
well; that, one might think, is why we (without simply appealing to the idea
evolved as creatures with emotions. that there are cases and cases). But in
Yet, on the other hand, we are inclined doing this I want to raise what
to say that our emotions can and do
profoundly distort our view of things:
in anger or jealousy, for example,
when the red mist comes down over
the eyes, and we can feel the blood
pulsing in the temples, things look
other than the way they are, and,
accordingly, our emotions can mislead
us profoundly; literature is replete
with examples.

[Emotions]

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Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

The value of emotions: the South African writer, J. M. Coetzee. were to have no other consequences
instrumental and The central character, David Lurie, is a elsewhere (even for him), it still
university lecturer who is forced to matters that he was able to give love

non-instrumental resign in disgrace from his post for to the dying animals.
having an affair with a student, which
To the extent that the emotions do involves him treating her very badly. But now I must get down to the task
serve the purpose of being a source of He tries to make a life of sorts with his at hand: Can we trust our emotions to
knowledge about the world, then they daughter, who has a hopeless give us knowledge of the empirical
are of instrumental value. (A knife, for smallholding deep in the country. He world?
example, is of instrumental value in so starts, as part of his new life, to help a
far as it is useful for cutting things, friend of his daughter, Bev Shaw, at Having an emotion
and if it ceases to be able to do that, the animal welfare clinic that she
then it is no longer of instrumental runs. Many sorry animals come in, and I will first consider what it is to have
value in that respect.) Although my many have to be put down, either an emotion, and then go on to
focus here will be only on the because they are sick, or because no consider what it is to have an emotion
potential instrumental value of one wants them. David asks Bev, when that reveals things as they really are—
emotions—on their value in enabling he first visits the clinic, whether she that is, as I will put it, to have the right
us to see things as they really are—I minds putting down the animals. She emotion. Let me begin with an
also think that they can be valuable replies ‘I do mind. I mind deeply. I example. You are trying to cross a field
non-instrumentally; that is to say, wouldn’t want someone doing it for during your afternoon walk, and you
they can be valuable even if they serve me who didn’t mind.’ Much later, right see a bull in the field. You feel afraid
no further purpose or create no other at the end of the novel (after some of it. Your fear, being an emotion, is
sort of valuable thing. awful things have happened to David what is called intentional, in the sense
and his daughter), there is a wonderful that it is directed in thought and
This is in contrast to a popular view in redemptive moment, almost feelings towards an object, in this case
ethics, which I think should be unbearably poignant. One by one dogs the bull.1 You think that your fear is
resisted, which goes only part of the and cats are brought in to be put justified (although in your fear you
way in accepting the value of down, now by David as well as Bev. might hardly dwell on the point): you
emotions. This is done by, first, Coetzee writes: ‘One by one Bev think it is justified not only because
accepting that emotions matter, and touches them, speaks to them, the bull seems to you to be dangerous,
then, secondly, going on to insist that comforts them, and puts them away, but also because you think it really is
they only matter because of the way then stands back and watches while dangerous (because it might harm you,
that they can affect other things— he seals up the remains in a black with its long horns and menacing look
their effect on how you act, for plastic shroud. He and Bev do not in your direction). In your fear you are
example. In other words, emotions are speak. He has learned by now, from frozen to the spot, and feel adrenaline
only valuable instrumentally. her, to concentrate all his attention on coursing through your veins. Then
the animal they are killing, giving it suddenly you run! Only when you get
I will not argue the point here, partly what he no longer has difficulty in over the stile into the next field do you
because it is not the central topic of calling by its proper name: love.’ At feel safe; your heart is still racing, but
the paper, and partly because I find it last, in this final scene of the novel, the fear is now nearly over.
very difficult to think of an argument
that can persuade someone who

disagrees. So, rather than putting up David has the right emotion; and, I As this example brings out, an emotion

an unpersuasive argument (one that want to add, it matters non- (in this case your fear) is complex,

will only persuade the already- instrumentally that he should have the episodic, dynamic, and structured. It is

converted, and what is the use of right emotion (and that he should be complex in that it involves many

that?), I will give an example; able to name it). Even if his treatment different elements: thoughts and

examples can sometimes persuade of the soon-to-be-dead animals were feelings directed towards the object of

where arguments cannot. It comes no different because of his emotion, the emotion (the bull), bodily changes

from a wonderful novel, Disgrace, by and even if David’s feelings of love (increased adrenaline), and so forth. It

28

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

is episodic and dynamic in that, over Having the right (all it wants to do is follow you out of
time, these elements wax and wane emotion curiosity and it would only be
(your fear ceases after you have got dangerous if you made it panic); or
into the next field). And it is structured Now, what is it to have the right perhaps being afraid for too long (even
in that the emotion constitutes part of emotion? Well, staying with this after you are safely in the next field).
a larger unfolding sequence of actions example, it would not be the right
and events (you still feel nervous many emotion if it were not really a bull, but The idea, then, is that the right
hours later).2 one of those Milton Keynes stone cows emotion is the one that is not only
that we see through the window of appropriate to its object, but is also
the train, and you had mistaken this proportionate and of the right
for a real live bull. Also, it would not duration. In short, the right emotion is
be the right emotion if it was really a the emotion that is reasonable or
bull, but the bull was not really justified.
dangerous because it was very firmly
tethered. In both these cases, it would In the bull example, and the example
not be right to feel fear because the is typical of emotional experience in
object of your emotion is not really a this respect (there are other non-
source of danger; and thus the fear typical cases that I will turn to next),
would not be justified. But even if it the emotional response involves the
was really a bull and it really was experience of the emotion as being
dangerous, so it is right to feel fear, reasonable or justified. In other words
you could still feel fear in the wrong you fear the bull, and at the same time
way: perhaps being too afraid think that the bull that seems to you
to be dangerous really is dangerous,
and that it really is dangerous because
of its having other features (long
horns that might harm you, a
menacing look etc.), and that its
having these other features justifies
your fear.

[Emotions]

29

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

In the non-typical case, one does not the right emotion and you are not. In to feel any particular sort of emotion;

see one’s emotion as reasonable or the mouse example, you think the rather, it involves being disposed to

justified in this way. For example, you mouse is not really dangerous (even have just thoughts, to decide on what

are afraid of the mouse in the corner though it seems to be), and it is not, is truly just, and to act justly.)

of the room, and yet at the same time and so you are right that your fear is Sometimes Aristotle is read as if he is
you know that the mouse is not really not reasonable or justified. You think saying (and there are things that he
dangerous. So, in these circumstances, you are not having the right emotion says that encourage this reading) that
you would not try to justify your fear and you are not. (To fill in the rest of to be virtuous in some respect,
by appealing to the mouse’s features the picture, try to think of an example courageous for example, is to be
which you think make it dangerous; where you think that you are not somewhere in between two extremes:
rather, you might give an explanation having the right emotion but you are.) moderation in one’s fear at all times,
of your fear which does not seek at the so to speak. But this is not what I think
same time to justify it: you might, for It seems true to say that we want to he is really getting at; it would be an
example, say ‘I have always been have the right emotions: this would absurd view if it were. So when I call it
afraid of mice ever since I woke up and mean, so far as fear is concerned, an emotional mean-disposition, I do
found one in my bed when I was six; being the sort of person who is afraid not intend to suggest that I endorse
but I know they are perfectly harmless.’ when and only when fear is reasonable the so-called doctrine of the mean; for
Nevertheless, even in these non- or justified. This sort of person, I reject it.4 Rather, as I think Aristotle
typical cases, the experience is still of Aristotle would say, has the virtue of makes clear, the virtuous person will
the mouse as seeming to be courage, as to have this virtue just is feel (that is, have emotions) and act
dangerous. There is, thus, the to be disposed to be afraid when and ‘at the right times, about the right
possibility of acknowledging, in one’s only when it is reasonable or justified. things, towards the right people, and
own case, and at the same time as the We want our emotional dispositions, in the right way; … this is the
emotional experience takes place, that so to speak, to attune us to the world intermediate and best condition, and
things are not really as they seem: the around us, enabling us to see things as this is proper to virtue’ (Nicomachean
mouse seems to you to be dangerous; they really are and to respond as we Ethics 1106b20). And, with courage
but you know that it is not. And this is should—in short, enabling us to get it specifically in mind, he says, ‘Hence
why you give an explaining reason right. whoever stands firm against the right
why you are afraid (your childhood things, and fears the right things, for
experience), without holding that this Emotion and virtue the right end, in the right way, at the

explaining reason for your fear also In Book II of his Nicomachean Ethics, right time … is the brave person; for
justifies it.3 Aristotle discusses the virtues, of the brave person’s actions and feelings
which courage is, of course, an reflect what something is worth and
So far, then, we have the following example. Courage is also (and not all what reason prescribes’ (1115b17).5
picture. Having the right emotion is the virtues are like this; justice is not) Not moderation in all things, then, but
having the emotion that can be an example of an emotional mean- just getting it right. In each case, on
justified by features of the object of disposition: to be courageous is to each occasion, there will be one way
the emotion. In the bull example, you have the virtue of courage, and to of getting it right, and many ways of
are right that your fear is reasonable have this virtue just is to be disposed getting it wrong; it is, as Aristotle says,
or justified, and that things really are to feel fear when and only when fear like hitting a target (1106b16).
as they seem: the bull seems to be

dangerous and it really is. You think is justified—that is, disposed to get it Having the emotional mean-

you are having the right emotion and right (in thought, feeling and action) disposition, the deployment of which

you are. Where the bull is firmly so far as fear is concerned. (Thus, to be will enable one to get things right, is a

tethered but you have not seen the a just person is to have a virtue that is profoundly normative notion,

tether, you think the bull really is not also an emotional mean- governed by the norms of reason, and

dangerous, but it is not, and so you are disposition (although it is a mean- not by what is merely typical or

wrong that your fear is justified or disposition), because being a just normal. It would be absurd to suggest

reasonable. You think you are having person does not involve being disposed that one can check to see whether or

30

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

not one is getting it right by And it was certainly ‘normal’ to Getting it right and
comparing one’s emotional responses experience what was called an getting it wrong
with those of other humans or with ‘outpouring of grief’ at the death of
those of others within one’s Princess Diana, but this too has been If we are not properly attuned to the
community, and concluding that if argued to be wrong;6 and here again world around us, then we will be
they match up with what is typical or the contrary view is not wrong simply disposed to get it wrong. If, for
normal, then they are fine, and if not, in virtue of not being normal. And, so example, you are, by disposition, a
then they are ‘wrong’. For example, it is far as fear is concerned, it might be timorous person, then you will not
in an important sense normal for normal not to fear the microwaves have the emotional mean-disposition
humans to feel envy and sexual from mobile ‘phones, and those who for fear, and accordingly you will
jealousy, but in both cases it is at least feel no fear may think that fear is not respond with fear to all sorts of things
questionable whether envy and sexual justified, for they think that there are (such as mice) that are not really
jealousy are ever justified. no good reasons to consider them dangerous—or at least to things that
dangerous. are not as dangerous as you take them
Moreover, in respect of an emotion to be. And if you are disposed to be
towards a particular object or type of But perhaps we will find out at some unduly indifferent to fear, then again
object, an entire community (or near future date that most of us are wrong
enough entire) can be wrong, as for about this: we should be afraid of
example, were English people at the mobile ‘phones. In this respect, our
beginning of the First World War, who emotional dispositions are different
almost universally felt profound anger from our perceptual mechanisms. We
and disgust at all things German: need only check that our perceptual
Dachshunds, Wagner, and so on. We mechanisms (sight, hearing, smell etc.)
now see that as silly (or worse), and are normal, and the idea of ‘normal’
surely it is we who are right. here is not a normative idea.

[Emotions]

31

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

you will not have the emotional mean- emotional disposition gets temporarily of your emotion does not have the

disposition for fear, and here you will put ‘out of tune’. features that it seems to have?

fail to fear things when you ought to. So let us see where we have got to so (Perhaps you think you have the
It is, of course, an over-simplification far. If one is of the right disposition, emotional mean-disposition but you
(one to which Aristotle was perhaps that is, if one has the emotional mean- do not; or perhaps there are other
prone) to think in terms of us having disposition, and if there are no other temporary undue influences on your
(or lacking) a single emotional mean- undue influences on one’s thinking, thinking that you are not aware of.) In
disposition for fear of all sorts of thing. then one will see things as they really such cases (and here is the worry),
Matters are less simple than that: are, and one will respond emotionally in one’s emotional responses tend to
some people are brave about one sort the right way, in thought feeling and skew one’s reasons to make them
of thing and timid or overly fearful action. But if one is not properly cohere with the emotional experience.
about others. A particular person disposed, or if there is some temporary To be clear, I am not here concerned
could, for example, be both unduly undue interference on one’s emotional with those non-typical occasions, like
indifferent in respect of the risk of response, then there is a significant risk the mouse example, when one knows
being attacked by bulls in fields, and of getting things wrong; one’s emotions at the time that one’s emotional
unduly timorous in respect of the risk can distort how things are, and one will response is not justified, but the
of being attacked by muggers in dark fail to respond emotionally in the right emotion remains, for on those
alleyways. There may be explanations way, or as one ought. occasions one’s reasons stand opposed
of these dispositions that will appeal to one’s emotional response, and one

to his past experiences: perhaps he recognizes that it is one’s emotional

was brought up in the company of an response that is in error. I am, rather,

unusually friendly bull, and was also concerned with those more typical

brought up by parents who were cases where, in the here and now of

terrified of street crime, so that their emotional experience, one does not

timorousness in this respect rubbed know that one has reason to doubt

off on him. one’s own emotional response, so one

To have the emotional mean- The first epistemological sees no reason to question one’s
disposition is not, however, sufficient worry: Reason-skewing experience of the object of the
for getting it right. Other temporary emotion as having the features that it
factors can also unduly interfere with This is just where my epistemological seems to have. In such cases, I think
one’s emotional response on an we tend to look for and find ‘reasons’
occasion, leading one to fail to get where there are none—‘reasons’ which
things right. I will mention two are supposed to justify what is really
notable ones. First, one’s mood can an unjustified emotional response. The
affect one’s emotional response: for emotion becomes a sort of idée fixe to
example, if one is in a jittery mood which other thoughts have to
(perhaps through drinking too much conform. This is the first
coffee), then one is more likely to be epistemological worry; let us call it the
frightened by a strange noise as you worry about reason-skewing.

walk through an alleyway. Secondly, a worries being to arise. As I have This skewing process can be

recent emotional experience in already said, it is typical of emotional continuous whilst the emotional

relation to one thing can resonate experience to consider one’s emotion response is in place, operating on new

across to some other, unrelated thing: to be justified—that is, to see the information as it comes in. One’s

for example, if one has just had the object of one’s emotion as having the emotions and emotionally-held

terrifying experience of being mugged features that justify your feeling. So judgements ought to be open to be

in the alleyway, then one may be far so good. But what if, without one’s shown to be wrong by new evidence,

especially likely to be jumpy every knowing it, one’s emotional response but when new evidence does emerge,

time the doorbell rings; your is wrong or unjustified, and the object one tends not only to be insensitive to

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Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

that evidence, but also, for the sake of One response to this objection, which I Now, it is surely a reasonable
internal coherence, to doubt the find independently attractive but will epistemic requirement that one be
reliability of the source of that new not pursue here (although it is not willing and able to ‘stand back’ to
evidence. An extreme case is Leontes unrelated to the second worry), is that reflect on, criticize, and if necessary
in Shakespeare’s A Winter’s Tale. Once perhaps more of these cognitive change our way of thinking of things.
he becomes convinced that he has deficiencies can be traced back to the And this requirement surely rightly
been cuckolded by his boyhood friend emotions than might at first be extends to critical reflection on the
Polixenes, he refuses to listen to what thought. The other response, which I way that one’s emotions can have this
previously trustworthy Camillo tells will put forward here, is that there is skewing effect. This is obviously the
him to the contrary; he even refuses to something special about the case when one knows that one’s
accept the words of the oracle of emotional case: emotionally-held emotional dispositions are not as they
Apollo. Anyone with a contrary view to judgements, about things as having should be (as in the mouse example).
his own must be either mistaken or an emotion-proper properties, are more But it is also the case when one has no
enemy, acting on ulterior motives. intransigent than are their non- particular reason to doubt one’s
Only when Leontes’ child and wife die emotional counterparts, and thus the emotional dispositions: even then one
at the hand of Apollo does he skewing (for the sake of internal should try to be especially watchful
recognize that he has ‘too much coherence) tends to be towards the and reflect dispassionately on the
believ’d his own suspicion’. preservation of the emotionally-held evidential support for one’s
idée fixe at the cost of the emotionally-held judgements. The
So what’s special about unemotional beliefs. contrast is stark here between the
the emotions here? epistemic requirement to check up on
our perceptual mechanisms and the
A possible objection to my position is epistemic requirement to check up on
that there is nothing special about the our emotional dispositions. The
emotional case: people are generally contrast lies not only in the fact,
subject to all sorts of well- which I have already discussed, that
documented cognitive deficiencies,7 we need only be sure that our
and the emotional case is just an perceptual mechanisms are normal
instance of this. (within a certain tolerance), whereas
we need to be sure that our emotional
dispositions enable us to get it right,
which is a normative notion. This
alone makes the epistemic
requirement harder to satisfy in the

[Emotions]

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Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

emotional case (comparing one’s in common; you do not seem to be knowing that special watchfulness is

emotional reaction with that of others able to get the work done properly; the required. On such an occasion, then,

may not be the right check). But it is journey to and from home is a one might ask oneself ‘Am I

more problematic than that. The nightmare; and so on. Your friends, not emotionally involved here? Because if

contrast with ordinary perception lies in the here and now of this emotional I am, I should be especially watchful.’

also in the fact that we can readily experience, assure you that things Yet the answer comes back ‘No, I am

observe that our perceptual only seem this black because you are not emotionally involved here’;

mechanisms have fallen away from feeling so despairing (you used not to moreover, one might sense a certain
what they should be: car number- be like this; perhaps some Prozac puzzlement as to what sort of emotion
plates become illegible; you now might help?). You try to stand back might be relevant here.
cannot hear a noise which others can and see things as others do (maybe
hear; and so on. Whereas we typically things will look a bit brighter in the I call this the water lilies worry after
cannot observe that our emotional morning). And you might succeed in this marvellous passage from Robert
dispositions have fallen away from the doing this to some extent. But you Musil’s The Man Without Qualities:
norm: as Simon Blackburn puts it, could still think that it is your friends ‘We ... imagine that the world is
there is no ‘loss of immediately felt who are wrong: they believe these unambiguous, whatever the
phenomenal quality … when we things because they do not see that relationship between the things out
become, say, corrupt’.8 things really are hopeless and how there and the inner processes may be;
right you are to be in despair (Prozac and what we call an emotion is a

might lift the despair, but the job will personal matter that is added to our

still be hopeless). own pleasure or uneasiness but does

The second not otherwise change anything in the
world. Not just the way we see red

epistemological worry: when we get angry – that too,
water lilies moreover; it is only erroneously that
one considers it something that is an

occasional exception, without

This leads me directly to the second, suspecting what deep and general law

deeper epistemological worry. one has touched upon! - but rather

Emotions continue to resonate in one’s like this: things swim in emotions the

The problem is a very familiar one to mind long after they are, as it seems, way water lilies consist not only of
everyday experience: how one is to ‘over’. It is a fundamental error to think leaves and flowers and white and
satisfy this epistemic requirement of emotions as being just about green but also of “gently lying there”’.9
when one is in the swim of emotional mental turbulence,of the sort that one
experience. Consider this example. You can immediately recognize from If Musil is right, then, that we are
introspection, so that one cannot be in always in the swim of emotion (‘no
error as to whether or not one is being emotion … ever comes to an entirely
emotional at any given time. Rather, specifiable end’10), and that we will
we can be emotional without knowing often not know what emotions are at
it: for example, one may think that work in our minds at any given time,
one has ‘got over’ some emotional then we could be in this worrying
experience or other, and that its position. Our reasons continue to be

are in despair about your job. The job potentially distorting effects are no skewed as they are in emotional

seems hopeless, and it seems to be longer at work, whilst the emotion experience (the reason-skewing

hopeless for all sorts of reasons which still, at a deeper level, continues to worry), and yet we have no way of

seem to justify your despair: there are resonate in the psyche. One can knowing in what way they are being

no decent prospects for promotion; therefore be inclined to think that one skewed, because we do not know what

most of your colleagues are people is being ‘dispassionate’ when one is emotion is at work (the water lilies

with whom you really have very little not, and thus one has no way of worry).

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Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

Let me give an example. A long time Without your realising it, what you say The second water lilies worry is that
ago you were very angry with a is influenced by your emotional one can be emotionally engaged
colleague at work because he failed to experience, which still has its residue without knowing it, so one has no way
turn up to a meeting that you were deep in the recesses of your mind: you of knowing which of one’s reasons are
chairing where his presence was do not say that he is unreliable (for the being skewed, and in what ways. Even
essential. And he promised to be there. long-past incident is no longer in the if one were to embrace Musil’s
You thought your anger to be forefront of your mind), but your thought (or my interpretation of it)
thoroughly justified—how could he not reference is not as favourable as it that we are always in the swim of
have told you in advance! The would have been if the incident had emotion, and thus to accept that a
following day, though, he gave you a never taken place. You are, in a subtle special watchfulness is always
full explanation, and was extremely way, and without knowing that you required, one will still be no wiser as to
apologetic. You put your anger behind are doing it, getting your revenge.11 how to apply this epistemic
you, as you should do, realising that he requirement at any particular moment.
really had a good reason not to be So where does this This seems to me to be especially
there, and a good reason why he could leave us? troubling. But then perhaps I am just
not give you advance warning. Later being unduly emotional.
still—much later—you are asked to The two epistemological worries, then,
give your colleague a reference. are as follows. First, whilst one is in Peter Goldie
the swim of life, emotionally engaged King’s College London
with what is going on, one’s reasons
are liable to be skewed by one’s
emotions, which become sort of idées
fixes. This is the reason-skewing worry.
To avoid this as much as possible, one
should see oneself as subject to the
epistemic requirement to reflect on
one’s reasons, and to correct them
where necessary, and to be aware that
one should be especially watchful
when one is emotionally engaged.

[Emotions]

35

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie

Notes 5 See also, with courage in mind,
1115b35 and 1116a4.
1 Intentionality is a notion that I
cannot hope adequately to explain 6 See Anthony O’Hear’s ‘Diana,
here. It is sometimes explained as queen of hearts: sentimentality
the property of aboutness that is personified and canonised’ in D.
one aspect of the mental; for Anderson and P. Mullen (eds.),
example, if you think about your Faking It: The Sentimentalisation of
kitchen at home, it is your kitchen at Modern Society (Social Affairs
home that your thought is about. Unit, 1998), pp181–190.
There is a very good, but not easy,
paper by Tim Crane, ‘Intentionality 7 For a fascinating survey of these
as the mark of the mental’, in A. deficiencies, see R. E. Nisbett and L.
O’Hear ed., Current Issues in the Ross, Human Inference: Strategies
Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford and Shortcomings of Social
University Press, 1998), pp229–51, Judgement (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
where Crane argues that Prentice-Hall, 1980).
intentionality is better understood
as directedness towards an object. 8 See his ‘Errors and the
This is the view I adopt here. Phenomenology of Value’, in his
Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York:
2 I argue for this in The Emotions: A Oxford University Press, 1993),
Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: pp149–65, at page 160.
Clarendon Press, 2000).
9 The Man Without Qualities, tr. S.
3 Jonathan Dancy discusses the Wilkins and B. Pike (New York:
distinction between explaining and Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), page 1561.
justifying reasons in his Practical
Reality (Oxford: Oxford University 10 Ibid. page 1307.
Press, 2002).
11 This example is very loosely based
4 Aristotle discusses these ideas in on some empirical research, which
Chapters 6 and 7 of Book II of his seems to lend some support to my
Nicomachean Ethics. There is an case here. See Dolf Zillman and
excellent discussion of the doctrine Joanne Cantor, ‘Effect of timing of
of the mean (and a rejection of it information about mitigating
as false), in a recent and very circumstances on emotional
readable book by Rosalind responses to provocation and
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, retaliatory behaviour’, Journal of
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Experimental Social Psychology 12,
1999; I strongly recommend this 1976, pp38–55.
book to anyone beginning to find
his or her way into Aristotle’s
ethics. Also, for anyone thinking of
buying a copy of the Nicomachean
Ethics, the edition that I
recommend is translated by
Terence Irwin, Indianapolis:
Hackett. It has especially useful
notes and a glossary.

36

Song Got Wrong Aaron Ridley

Aaron Ridley

[ ]Song Got

Wrong

One of the commonest ways of going But again, and however obvious-
wrong in philosophy is to assume that looking it may seem, the inference is
the consequences of a statement that bad and the conclusion is false. These
is obviously true must themselves be two mistakes – known respectively, of
obvious. So, for instance, from the course, as dualism and utilitarianism –
obviously true statement that the show how powerful the seductions of
mind is not the same as the body, it expecting obvious consequences from
can seem to follow directly that the obviously true statements can be. The
mind and the body must be distinct examples I have given are well known
kinds of thing. But that conclusion, ones from the philosophy of mind and
although it may look like an obvious ethics. But the same sort of error
consequence of the obvious truth that crops up throughout philosophy, not
minds and bodies are different, is least, as I hope to show, in aesthetics.
almost certainly false. Or, to take
another example, from the obviously
true statement that human beings
tend to prefer pleasurable experiences
to painful ones, it can seem to follow
directly that all issues of value must be
reducible to questions about the
pleasurableness or painfulness of
experiences.

[Song]

37

Song Got Wrong Aaron Ridley

I II have one set of qualities, the text of

the song another. The text of a song is

Here’s an obviously true statement: To see what’s wrong with the first of therefore the words of the poem it sets

songs are a combination of music and these seemingly obvious inferences, as sung in that song; and, as such, the

words. Franz Schubert’s song Erlkönig, we need to think for a moment about text of a song cannot be fully specified

for instance, is clearly a combination poems. Consider rhyme, alliteration, without reference to the song itself,

of Schubert’s music and the words of intonation and metre. All of these are which is to say, without reference to
the poem by Goethe that Schubert sound-effects, factors which make a the music of the song. The first
sets. So far, so obvious. But it can poem sound one way rather than apparently obvious consequence of
seem to follow from this, and to follow another. They are, in an altogether the obvious truth that songs are a
obviously, that the text of Schubert’s unmetaphorical sense, musical combination of music and words is
song must be Goethe’s poem. And it qualities. They are also, of course, part therefore false. It is not the case that
can seem to follow obviously from of what makes a poem mean what it the text of, say, Schubert’s Erlkönig is
that that an appreciation of Schubert’s does, or have the expressive effect Goethe’s poem of the same name,
song must, at the very least, involve an that it does. The difference in which Schubert has set. Rather, the
appreciation of Schubert’s music, an meaning between Coleridge’s line ‘In song’s text consists of the same words
appreciation of Goethe’s poem, and an Xanadu did Kubla Khan a stately in the same order as Goethe’s poem,
appreciation of the relation between pleasure-dome decree’ and a perfectly but of those words as sung to
the two. Certainly these are the good paraphrase of it – for example, Schubert’s music.
conclusions that contemporary ‘Kubla Khan ordered that a pleasure-
philosophers of music have drawn, and dome of elegant but substantial I III
have thought to follow obviously from proportions be erected or built in
the obvious truth that songs are a Xanadu’ – is due, at least in part, to What of the second apparently
combination of words and music.1 But the fact that the paraphrase entirely obvious consequence – that an
both conclusions are false, however lacks the musical qualities of the appreciation of Schubert’s song must
intuitively compelling they might original. A poem is to be appreciated involve an appreciation of Schubert’s
appear. And both have seriously as the poem it is, in other words, at music, of Goethe’s poem and of the
impeded the attempt to say anything least partly in virtue of its musical relation between them? Well, we can
philosophically sensible about song – qualities. I don’t think that this is already see that this can’t quite be
one of the most important kinds of controversial. But as soon as a poem right. Goethe’s poem is not, after all,
music there is. is set to music, it is precisely its the text of Schubert’s song, so there is
musical qualities that change, and no longer any reason to think that an
more or less inevitably so. The metre independent appreciation of that
of the resultant song is likely to be poem must be part of what an

altogether different from that of the appreciation of Schubert’s song

original poem; rhyme and alliteration involves. One must appreciate the

may be softened, highlighted, text, to be sure: but the text and the

eliminated or even created in the poem are not, as we have seen, the

setting; and the music may impart to same thing. Nor, for reasons that

the words an entirely new style of shadow the ones given above, are

intonation. The musical qualities of there any grounds to think that an

the words of the song, that is, may be appreciation of Schubert’s song must

completely different from the musical involve an independent appreciation

qualities of the words of that song of its ‘music’ – that is, of its music

when read as a poem. And since its considered in isolation from its words.

musical qualities are part of what For the music of Schubert’s song is no

makes a poem the poem that it is, this more to be divorced from its words

means that the text of a song is not than those words are to be divorced

the poem that it sets. The poem may from its music. The sound of a voice is

38

Song Got Wrong Aaron Ridley

shaped by the words that it sings: the IV
timbre of a high note sung to the word
‘chalk’, for instance, is entirely Once one sees that the obvious truth
different to that of one sung to the that songs are a combination of music
word ‘cheese’, as a moment’s and words doesn’t entail that any
experimentation (at home) will given song is to be regarded as a
confirm. And since the sound or hybrid of a piece of music and a poem,
timbre of a piece of music is a both specifiable independently of the
musically important quality of it, and song itself, some other things become
since the timbre of a song’s leading clearer, or at least acquire a clearer
instrument, the voice, is decisively context.2 Here I have space to
affected by the words that it sings, the highlight just one of these.
music of a song cannot, in the end, be
specified independently of its text. There is a near-ubiquitous thought
The appreciation of Schubert’s that the quality of a song is a function,
Erlkönig, that is, cannot involve an primarily, of the quality of its ‘music’ –
appreciation of its ‘music’ in isolation that is, of its music considered
from its text, since its text is partly independently of its words, as a piece
what makes its music the music that it of purely instrumental music (that just
is. Songs may indeed be a so happens, as it were, to be sung).
combination of music and words. But
that doesn’t mean that the music and Partly, I suspect, the motivation for
the text that it sets can be got at this thought lies in the fact that most
separately; and it therefore certainly of the people writing about musical
doesn’t mean that an appreciation of a aesthetics are native English-speakers,
song must involve appreciating its while most of the songs that they
‘components’ in isolation from one admire are in German, French or
another, and then appreciating the Italian. One can see why, from this
‘relation’ between them. The second perspective, it would be nice if the
obvious-seeming consequence is words didn’t matter too much. But
therefore also false. there is another, more principled-
seeming, reason to think that the
music must be in the driving seat; and
this lies in the observation, often

[Song]

39

Song Got Wrong Aaron Ridley

made, that great songs sometimes that philosophers of music never point songs in virtue of that, we should want
have rotten words, an observation out the equally true and equally to say, Dylan transforms and
customarily rounded out or off with a misleading fact that great songs often galvanises his music through the
reference to Schubert (who frequently have lousy music. Here Schubert words that he sets – points that the
set poets of infinitely lesser stature makes way for, e.g., Bob Dylan: lousy hybrid model not only fails to capture,
than Goethe). Now this point is made music, badly sung, but great songs. but is bound to misrepresent.
often enough to be worth pausing What do ‘lousy music’ and ‘badly sung’
over. What – exactly – is it meant to mean in this case? They mean ‘would V
show? One can see how it fits with be lousy and bad if the music were to
the hybrid picture of song. Spelled be judged by the standards Much more needs to be said, of
out, the fit comes to this: viewed appropriate to a piece of purely course.3 But it should be clear that the
purely as a poem – i.e. as a poem in its instrumental music.’ The conclusion? error that I have been trying to expose
own right – the words to such and By parity of reasoning, that the quality – the error of thinking that the
such a song are no good. The song of a Dylan song must derive solely consequences of the obvious truth
itself, however, is felt to be first rate. from its words (as specified that songs are a combination of music
Therefore the quality of the song must independently of its music), that is, and words must themselves be obvious
derive solely from its music (specified from its words conceived as purely – is a serious one. It pushes those who
independently of its words), that is, poetic, so that we now have an perpetrate it into an entirely false
from its music conceived as purely observation that both exploits the dichotomy – here, Schubert or Dylan:
instrumental. Thus the observation strictly bipartite character of the Schubert if you think that the
both exploits the strictly bipartite hybrid model and offers a reason to greatness of his songs, in light of the
picture encouraged by the hybrid suppose that the real point and value weakness of the poems that he sets,
model and offers a reason to suppose of a song – any song – must reside in must be due to the fact that the
that the real point and value of a song its qualities as an autonomous piece (allegedly independently specifiable)
– any song – must reside in its of poetry. And this, in effect, is ‘music’ of a song is the chief source of
qualities as an autonomous musical simultaneously to presuppose and to its value; Dylan if you think that the
artefact. To point out that Schubert’s reinforce the idea that what is greatness of his songs, in light of their
songs sometimes have rotten words, properly to be thought of as essential weakness when construed as pieces of
then, is, in this context, to song is the words without the purely instrumental music, must derive
simultaneously to presuppose and to music. from their (allegedly independently
reinforce the idea that what is specifiable) ‘texts’. Neither alternative,
properly to be thought of as essential Silly. But the Dylan and Schubert for the reasons that I have given, is
to song is the music without the cases are mirror-images of one correct, and neither captures the value
words. It is no surprise, in light of this, another, and both flow directly from of the kind of song that it sets out to
the (mis)understanding of song as a champion. That is already a major
hybrid art form, and of songs as a failing. But there are knock-on
more or less unequal combination of effects, too, at least one of which is
independently specifiable pieces of actively pernicious. This is that, with
poetry and independently specifiable song got wrong in the way that I have
pieces of music. So the greatness of described, the appearance can be
Schubert and Dylan songs needs to be generated of a theoretically
understood in a different way. respectable reason for dismissing so-
Specifically, the greatness of those called popular music out of hand. For
songs needs to be understood in a way if, as most philosophers of music have
that recognises the transformative rightly thought, Schubert’s songs are
effect that words and music can have indeed and undeniably great; and if, in
on one another. Thus, while Schubert the grip of the hybrid model, it is
transforms and galvanises his words in concluded that their greatness must
setting them, and produces great derive from their purely ‘musical’

40

Song Got Wrong Aaron Ridley

qualities, since the poems they set are Notes 3 I try to say some of it in my
often so bad; and if, as a result of that, forthcoming book, The Philosophy
it is concluded that the value of any 1 Examples of distinguished of Music: Theme and Variations
song must be a function of its ‘music’ contemporary philosophers of (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
construed as purely instrumental; music drawing precisely these Press), chapter 3.
then, since more or less no popular conclusions are to be found in, e.g.,
music can survive being so construed, Peter Kivy, The Corded Shell 4 For a particularly uncompromising
it follows, to this way of thinking, that (Princeton: Princeton University example, see Roger Scruton, The
popular songs are simply, and pretty Press, 1980), chapter 10, and Aesthetics of Music (Oxford:
well by definition, worse than classical Jerrold Levinson, ‘Song and Music Oxford University Press, 1997),
ones. If one takes a composer such as Drama’, in his The Pleasures of chapter 15.
Schubert as one’s paradigm, that is, Aesthetics (Ithaca: Cornell
and as most philosophers of music University Press, 1996), pp.42-59.
have, and if one mistakenly endorses
the hybrid model of song, then what is, 2 I take the term ‘hybrid’ from
essentially, a piece of silly snobbery Jerrold Levinson’s essay, ‘Hybrid Art
can find itself elevated to the status of Forms’, in his Music, Art, and
a philosophical finding.4 And this, Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell
while not perhaps as calamitous as the University Press, 1990), pp.26-36.
misunderstandings engendered by Levinson regards song as a ‘hybrid’
either dualism or utilitarianism, is art form in precisely the sense that
nevertheless regrettable, and certainly I have rejected.
constitutes something of a black mark
against recent musical aesthetics.
Song has deserved better from its
attendant philosophers than this.

Aaron Ridley
Department of Philosophy
University of Southampton

[Song]

41

Notes On Contributors

Notes On

[ ]Contributors

Roger Crisp Brad Hooker Aaron Ridley

is a fellow and tutor in philosophy at is a professor of philosophy at the teaches at the University of
St Anne’s College, Oxford. His main University of Reading. His main area Southampton, where he specialises in
interests lie in ancient philosophy, of interest is ethics. Recent aesthetics, philosophy of music, and
ethics, and political philosophy. He publications include Ideal Code, Real Nietzsche. His books include Music,
has published widely including How World: a Rule Consequentialist Theory Value and the Passions (Ithaca: Cornell
Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000) University Press 1995) and R G
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) and he and Truth in Ethics and Moral Collingwood: a Philosophy of Art
has recently completed a new Particularism, ed. with Margaret Olivia (London: Orion 1998) and he has
translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Little (Oxford: Clarendon 2000) published many articles in leading
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge journals.
University Press, 2000). David Pugmire
Alan Thomas
Peter Goldie is a philosopher from the University of
Southampton where his main interests is a lecturer at the University of Kent
is a lecturer in philosophy at King’s are philosophical psychology, ethics, at Canterbury, where he focuses on
College London. His main areas of philosophical anthropology, and Kant. moral, political and social philosophy,
interest are ethics, philosophy of mind, His book, Rediscovering Emotion Wittgenstein, and Kant’s philosophy of
the emotions, and aesthetics. He (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University mind. He is the author of Value and
recently published The Emotions: A Press) came out in 1998, and he is the Context: the Nature of Moral and
Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: author of numerous articles. Political Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford
Oxford University Press, 2000), and he University Press, 2002) and Thomas
has edited a collection of essays on Nagel: a Study of his Philosophy
the emotions entitled Understanding (London/Princeton: Acumen/Princeton
Emotion: Mind and Morals (London: University Press, 2002). He is also the
Ashgate, 2001). editor of the Cambridge Companion to
Bernard Williams (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).

42

Notes For Contributors

Notes For

[ ]Contributors

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discussion of the mind/body problem, arguments. Where technical terms are Britain, Australia and the United
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causation in the Enquiry). We would and examples offered. journal’s editorial board. We invite
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[Contributors]

43

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[Philosophy]

47

The Richmond Journal of Philosophy

Are You Ever Irrational? David Pugmire 6

Aristotle's Ethics Roger Crisp 11

Kant's Normative Ethics Brad Hooker 17

Is Your Mind Your Brain? Alan Thomas 23 Design & Production Marketing for Education 01282 612222 [ref 21966 - 06/02]

Can We Trust Our Emotions? Peter Goldie 27

Song Got Wrong Aaron Ridley 37

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