Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide - Stanley Foundation

Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide

Should Democracy Be The
Promoted or Demoted? Stanley
Foundation
By Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul
June 2007

Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University and director of SAIS’ International Development program.
Dr. Fukuyama received degrees from Cornell and Harvard. He was a member of the Political Science Department of
the RAND Corporation and a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996 to 2000
he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.

Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he codirects the Iran
Democracy Project. He is also the director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at the Freeman
Spogli Institute and professor of political science at Stanford University. He is also a nonresident senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In his second inaugural address on January 20, did the toppling of these dictatorships send liberty
2005, President George W. Bush used the rippling through the greater Middle East as some
word freedom 25 times, liberty 12 times, and Bush officials and supporters had hoped. Instead,
democracy or democratic 3 times. Bush did not autocratic regimes in the region have used the
enter the White House with a mission to promote excuse of terrorism (Egypt, Pakistan) or the
freedom around the world. Rather, as a presiden- alleged threat of US invasion (Iran) to tighten
tial candidate, he put forward a modest foreign autocracy. Outside this region, some countries
policy agenda that eschewed nation-building. The have made some progress toward developing
events of September 11, 2001, however, radically democracy (Georgia, Ukraine) but just as many
jarred his thinking on the nature of international have moved toward greater autocracy. Freedom
threats and triggered a fundamental reevaluation House concluded, “The year 2006 saw the emer-
of his administration’s national security policy gence of a series of worrisome trends that togeth-
that elevated democracy promotion as a central er present a potentially serious threat to the
objective of his foreign policy agenda. stability of new democracies as well as obstacles
to political reform in societies under authoritari-
In the years since September 11, though, the an rule…the percentage of countries designated
rhetorical attention devoted to the advance of free- Free has failed to increase for nearly a
dom, liberty, and democracy has greatly outpaced decade….”1 In sum, then, Bush’s new attention to
any actual progress in expanding democracy. To democracy promotion has not resulted in more
date, democracy has failed to take hold in the two people living in freedom.
countries where Bush ordered the forcible ouster of
autocratic regimes: Afghanistan and Iraq. In its Not surprisingly, many in Washington on both
2006 survey of freedom around the world, the left and right are pressing for a change in US
Freedom House labeled Iraq as “not free” with a 6 foreign policy objectives. Only those at the
rating on a 1-7 scale (with 1 being most free and 7 extremes on both ends of the political spectrum
being least free). Afghanistan barely earned the advocate the complete abandonment of democra-
designation “partially free” with a 5 ranking. Nor cy promotion as a US foreign policy objective.

2 Instead, skepticism is largely couched as “real- Part Three outlines some new modalities for
ism,” and a “return” to a greater focus on “tra- promoting democracy—including a return to
ditional” US national security objectives. From several established practices—that can make
this perspective, democracy promotion should US and international efforts to promote
take a back seat to strategic aims such as secur- democracy more effective.
ing US access to energy resources, building mil-
itary alliances to fight terrorist organizations, The Case for Democracy Promotion
and fostering “stability” within states. A parti-
san gap has also emerged on this issue. In a American Interests
German Marshall Fund survey released in June
2006, 64 percent of Republicans agreed that the No country in the world has benefited more
United States should “help establish democracy from the worldwide advance of democracy
in other countries,” but only 35 percent of than the United States. Not all autocracies are
Democrats concurred. or have been enemies of the United States, but
every American enemy has been an autocracy.
We do not reject the importance of focusing on Because of geography and US military power,
the more traditional goals of national security. most autocracies over the last 200 years have
However, we do reject the simple assumption lacked the capacity to attack US territory. But
that there is a zero-sum trade-off between the exceptional autocracies that became suffi-
these traditional security objectives and ciently powerful either did attack the United
democracy promotion. We also share the neg- States (Japan, Al Qaeda) or threatened to
ative assessments of the Bush administration’s attack (Germany under Hitler, the Soviet
efforts to promote democracy in the past few Union, North Korea). Conversely, Great
years. However, our response to this mixed, if Britain and France do have, at least theoreti-
not disappointing, record of achievement is cally, the military capacities to threaten the
not to downgrade or remove democracy pro- United States, but the thought of French or
motion from US foreign policy priorities. British attack is inconceivable simply because
Rather, after presenting the case for why the both are democracies.
United States should promote democracy, we
suggest new strategies and better modalities The transformation of powerful autocracies
for pursuing this objective. into democracies has likewise served US
national security interests. Most obviously,
Our paper proceeds in three parts. Part One the end of dictatorship and the consolidation
outlines the positive case for including democ- of democracy in Germany, Italy, and Japan
racy promotion as an important component of after World War II made the United States
US foreign policy. Part Two then presents the safer. Beyond keeping imperial and autocrat-
counterarguments, followed by our reasons ic leaders out of power, democratic consoli-
for viewing them as ultimately unpersuasive. dation in these countries served as the basis
of US military alliances in Europe and Asia.
The Stanley Foundation’s Bridging the Foreign At the end of the 20th century, regime change
Policy Divide project brings together pairs of in the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and
foreign policy and national security specialists greatly reduced this once-menacing threat to
from across the political spectrum to find com- the United States and its allies. Russia today
mon ground on ten key, controversial areas of lacks the military strength of the Soviet Red
policy. The views expressed in this paper are Army from 20 years ago. Yet Russia today
not necessarily those of their organizations or remains the only country in the world capa-
the Stanley Foundation. The series is coedited ble of launching a massive military attack
by Derek Chollet, senior fellow at the Center against American people on American soil.
for a New American Security; Tod Lindberg, The threat of such an attack has significantly
editor of the Hoover Institution’s journal diminished because of regime change in the
Policy Review; and Stanley Foundation pro- Soviet Union. And it is not a coincidence that
gram officer David Shorr. Russia has become more antagonistic toward
the United States and the West at the same

time that the current regime there has become But this is a hypothesis about the future based 3
increasingly authoritarian.2 on analogy, and not a certainty. In the long run,
we expect consolidation of democratic regimes
During the Cold War, some viewed the Soviet in the greater Middle East would increase the
threat as so paramount that all enemies of legitimacy of the governments and thereby
communism, including dictators, had to be reduce the appeal of anti-systemic movements
embraced. They predicted that any political like Al Qaeda. In the shorter term, democratic
change to the status quo in autocratic societies government throughout the region would
would not produce democratic regimes and US increase internal stability within states since
allies, but communist regimes and American democracies have longer life spans than autoc-
enemies. There were enough examples of this racies. If democratic regimes ruled all countries
trajectory—Cuba, Angola, and Nicaragua—to in the region, conflicts between states would be
warrant worry. But these are the failed cases of less likely, and consequently demand for
democratic transition, and US involvement in weapons, including weapons of mass destruc-
the internal changes of these countries can tion, would decrease. Finally, a more secure
hardly be called democracy promotion. In con- and stable region would reduce the need for a
trast, successful democratic transitions did not US military presence, just as a Europe whole
undermine US security interests. Transitions in and free dramatically reduced the need for
Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, the Philippines, South American deployments in that region. And for
Korea, Chile, and South Africa helped deepen major powers such as Russia and China, dem-
American ties with these countries.3 ocratic development also should reduce the
possibility that they would pursue balancing
The parallels to today are obvious. Once again policies against the United States.
facing a new worldwide ideological threat in
the form of radical Islamism, American strate- In the short run, however, there are potential
gic thinkers both in and outside of government risks for US security associated with demo-
worry that political change in autocratic US cratic development in the greater Middle
allies will produce theocratic regimes hostile to East. Without question, the toppling of the
American interests. The concern is valid, but is Taliban regime in Afghanistan deprived Al
often overplayed by the very same autocrats as Qaeda of a base of operations that had more
they seek to retain to power. So far, successful assets than its current base in Pakistan. Yet
democratization has never brought to power a this advantage for US strategic interests is not
government that then directly threatened the a result of democratization. In fact, the diffi-
national security interests of the United States cult process of developing democratic institu-
or its allies. In the Palestinian Authority tions in Afghanistan has failed to produce
(which is not a country), we are witnessing the stable government or a growing economy to
first case of such a potential outcome. Hamas date—a situation that has created an opening
seems to be capitalizing on its new status and for the Taliban’s resurgence. In Iraq, neither
resources to threaten America and its allies. In democratic government nor an effective state
the long run, however, participation in demo- has taken root. To date, the American people
cratic institutions and the assumption of are not safer as a result of regime change in
responsibility for governance might moderate Iraq. In both countries, US-led invasions
Hamas or undermine its popularity. It is still brought about regime change. But because
too early to assess the results of this transition these operations were neither launched to
(see the discussion of Hamas below). bring democracy nor followed through
toward that end, the resulting new or resur-
The advance of democracy in Europe and Asia gent threats to US national security emanat-
over the last century has made the United ing from Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be
States safer—giving reason to hope that blamed on democratization in general or US
democracy’s advance in other regions of the democracy promotion in particular.
world will also strengthen US national security.

4 Elsewhere in the region, the limited progress suade other countries to support our foreign
toward democratization in recent years is also policies. Apart from serving US strategic inter-
tenuously tied to US security. The Cedar ests, democracy promotion is also the right
Revolution and subsequent 2005 pullout of thing to do.
Syrian troops from Lebanon raised hopes for
stability there. Yet the Hezbollah-Israeli war in First and foremost, democracy is the best sys-
the summer of 2006 underscored how prema- tem of government. Winston Churchill was
ture these hopes were. Soon after President’s right: democracy is a terrible system of govern-
Bush second inaugural speech, Egypt’s ment, but still better than all of the others that
President Mubarak seemed to react by imple- have been tried. Democracy provides the best
menting incremental political reforms. A year institutional form for holding rulers account-
later, he rolled them back almost entirely, a able to their people. If leaders must compete
development that has heightened tensions for popular support to obtain and retain
within Egypt and strained US-Egyptian rela- power, then they will be more responsive to the
tions. We have yet to see whether partial preferences of the people, in contrast to rulers
reforms in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and who do not govern on the basis of popular sup-
Morocco will lead to further incremental port. The institutions of democracy also pre-
political liberalization or serve instead as cam- vent abusive rule, constrain bad rule, and
ouflage for continued autocratic rule. The net provide a mechanism for removing corrupt or
effect of these reforms on US security is still ineffective rule. Furthermore, democracy pro-
entirely unclear. vides the setting for political competition,
which in turn is a driver for better governance.
We admit that we do not know whether the Like markets, political competition between
analogy between democratization in the wider contending leaders, ideas, and organizations
Middle East and democratization in other produces better leaders, ideas, and organiza-
regions will hold and yield the same benefits. tions (which is the premise of the Bridging the
The destruction of fascist and communist Foreign Policy Divide project). At a minimum,
regimes and the emergence of more democrat- democracy provides a mechanism for removing
ic regimes, first in Europe and Asia after bad rulers in a way that autocracy does not.
World War II and more recently in Eastern The absence of political competition in autoc-
Europe and the former Soviet Union, signifi- racies produces complacency, corruption, and
cantly enhanced US national security. It is rea- has no mechanism for producing new leaders.
sonable to expect a similar outcome in the
wider Middle East; that is, the emergence of Second, democracies provide more, and more
more democratic regimes in the most autocrat- stable, welfare for their people than do autocra-
ic region of the world should also make the cies. Democracies avoid the worst threats to
United States more secure. As we say, it is still personal well-being, such as genocide and
an untested hypothesis. famine. Over the last several decades, democra-
cies around the world have not produced high-
American Values er economic growth rates than autocracies: “the
net effect of more political freedom on growth
Debates about democracy promotion cannot is theoretically ambiguous.”4 Instead, compared
be couched solely as a balance sheet of materi- to democracies, autocracies produce both much
al benefits and liabilities for the United States. higher and much lower rates of growth. For
American values must also enter the discus- every China there is an Angola. Democracies
sion. Since the beginning of the American tend to produce slower rates of growth than the
republic, US presidents have to varying best autocratic performers, but also steadier
degrees invoked America’s unique, moral role rates of economic development. The old con-
in international affairs. The loss of this identi- ventional wisdom that dictators are better at
ty, both at home and abroad, would weaken economic modernization than the democratic
domestic support for US involvement in world counterparts is not supported by data.
affairs and undermine American ability to per-

Third, the demand for and appeal of democra- in Western Christianity, which proclaimed the 5
cy as a system of government are widespread, universal dignity of man made in God’s image;
if not universal. Public opinion surveys of peo- thinkers from Tocqueville to Nietzsche have
ple throughout the world, including the wider argued that modern democracy is simply a sec-
Middle East, show that majorities in most ularization of Western values. There is no par-
countries support democracy.5 Ideological chal- ticular reason why other civilizations based on
lengers remain, such as the modernizing auto- other cultural premises should prefer demo-
crat or Osama bin Ladenism. But compared to cratic government. Lee Kwan Yew and other
earlier historical periods, these opponents of proponents of “Asian values” have argued
democracy have never been weaker. that, given the poor performance of many dem-
ocratic regimes in non-Western settings, this
The United States, therefore, has a moral inter- form of government is distinctly less desirable
est in promoting democracy. If democracy is than a growth-oriented authoritarian regime.
the best system of government, demanded by
the majority of people around the world, then Full consideration of this argument is beyond
the United States should help promote its the scope of this paper. There are certainly seri-
advance. Conversely, any US involvement in ous philosophical and political cases to be made
sustaining autocracy is immoral. Obviously, against the universality of liberal democratic
American leaders constantly face situations in values on a number of grounds. While accept-
which immediate security interests require ance of democratic norms and basic human
cooperation with autocratic regimes. But such rights has spread far and wide since the onset of
policies should not be defended on moral or the Third Wave of democratization, there are
ethical grounds. still parts of the world where they are openly
rejected on cultural grounds. The Chinese gov-
Engaging the Case Against ernment, various East Asian leaders and
thinkers, Islamists of assorted stripes, and many
Democracy Promotion Russian nationalists are among those arguing
that their cultures are inherently inimical to one
Three broad categories of reasons are offered or another aspect of liberal democracy.
for why the United States should not pursue
democracy promotion. The first is normative, We offer the following observations in con-
based on the view that democracy is culturally tention. In the first place, democracy promotion
rooted and not a universal good; the second never implied the “imposition” of either liberal-
prudential, concerning the principle of respect ism or democracy on a society that did not want
for sovereignty as the basis for international it. By definition this is impossible: democracy
order; and the third also prudential, concern- requires popular consensus, and works only if
ing the need for sequencing in the introduction the vast majority of a society’s citizens believe
of democratic reforms. that it is legitimate. Democracy promotion is
intended only to help reveal public preferences
The first argument—that democracy is not a in the society itself. Dictatorships often resort to
universally valid or desirable goal—has a violence, coercion, or fraud to prevent those
number of proponents. Postmodernism and preferences from carrying political weight;
other relativist philosophies argue that there democracy promoters simply try to level the
are no universally valid political or institution- playing field by eliminating the authoritarians’
al orders because it is impossible to arrive at unfair advantages.
philosophical certainty per se. A more com-
mon assertion is that democracy is culturally A second counterargument that is somewhat
rooted, and that societies with other cultural more difficult to make is that human rights
backgrounds may choose other forms of gov- and the democratic institutions that spring
ernment as they wish. Samuel Huntington, from them are immanently universal. In keep-
while preferring liberal democracy for the ing with the case made by Tocqueville in
United States, makes this kind of case.6
According to him, liberal democracy is rooted

6 Democracy in America, the historical arc There are countless variants of realist theory
toward universal human equality has been today, united primarily in their opposition to
spreading providentially for the past 800 democracy promotion as a component of for-
years. It has now encompassed not just the eign policy. Some argue not from a world-
Western, culturally Christian world, but has order point of view, but from the perspective
spread and taken root in many other parts of of narrower American interests: the United
the world as well—India, Japan, Korea, and States needs oil, security, trade, and other
South Africa. This suggests that democracy goods that are compromised by an emphasis
has spread not as a manifestation of a particu- on human rights or democracy. These views
lar civilization’s cultural preferences, but have acquired particular resonance since the
because it serves universal needs or performs Iraq war, which was seen as being driven by a
functions that are universally necessary, partic- neoconservative agenda of democracy promo-
ularly at higher levels of economic develop- tion and political transformation in the
ment. One can argue, for example, that the Middle East. These critics would argue that
procedural rules of liberal democracy guaran- US pressure for liberalization of political
tee that governments behave in a transparent, space and calls for elections have brought to
law-governed way and remain accountable to power groups like Hamas in Palestine,
the people they serve. Even if a culture does Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Muslim
not put a value on individual rights per se, lib- Brotherhood in Egypt, all of which are illiber-
eral democracy is ultimately required for good al and hostile to US interests. There has been
governance and economic growth. criticism especially of the Bush administra-
tion’s use of coercive regime change as a
The second argument against democracy pro- means to spur the political transformation of
motion is made by international relations the Middle East.
“realists,” namely, that world order depends
on states accepting the Westphalian consensus We make several arguments in response to the
to respect each other’s sovereignty and mutual realists. The first has to do with prudence in
agreement not to meddle in the internal char- means. To say that the United States should
acter of each other’s regimes. The Westphalian promote democracy in its foreign policy does
consensus arose out of Europe’s wars of reli- not mean that it should put idealistic goals
gion following the Reformation, when ahead of other types of national interests at all
European princes fought over the confessional times and places—or that it should use mili-
allegiances of their neighbors. Peace was tary force in pursuit of these goals. Indeed, the
obtained only when all agreed to a principle of United States has never made democracy pro-
cuius regio, cuius religio, and noninterference motion the overriding goal of its foreign poli-
in each other’s internal politics. cy. The Bush administration invaded Iraq
primarily out of concern over weapons of
Among contemporary writers, Henry Kissinger mass destruction and terrorism; democracy
has been one of the most articulate and consis- promotion was a tertiary goal that received
tent proponents of this view. Since his earliest heavier emphasis only ex post, when the other
writings,7 he has argued that idealistic concern justifications for the war proved hollow. The
with the internal character of other regimes United States has promoted democracy in
leads to messianic crusades that in the long run places like Germany and Japan after World
provoke resistance and undermine world War II, but only when in concert with its secu-
order. The idealistic Tsar Alexander I pro- rity goals. In these cases, transformation of
longed the destabilization of Europe begun by two former enemies into democratic countries
the French Revolution. International peace did indeed align with US strategic interests,
and stability reigned from 1815 to 1848 only and few realists would argue that the United
due to the efforts of the arch-conservative States would have been better served by an
Metternich to forge a balance of power in alternative policy.
Europe, heedless of ideological concerns.

The real trade-offs come in regions like the US security interests and its idealistic goals 7
Middle East, where the United States’ closest would thus seem to be false.
strategic allies are autocracies like Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, or Egypt. The Bush In our view, the appropriate policy in response
administration has made the general argument to this political landscape needs to be a calibrat-
that the deep root cause of terrorism and ed one that takes account of particular circum-
Islamist radicalism is the region’s lack of stances. There are some countries like Saudi
democracy, and that promoting democracy is Arabia where there is no realistic democratic
therefore one route to eradicating the terrorist alternative to the current authoritarian leader-
threat. Natan Sharansky has argued that the ship, or where likely alternatives would clearly
Oslo peace process was fatally flawed because be worse from a strategic perspective. In these
the United States and Israel relied on Yasser cases, authoritarian allies indeed represent the
Arafat’s authoritarian Fatah as an interlocutor, lesser of two evils. While quiet pressure on
instead of pressing for democracy in Palestine Egypt to liberalize might be appropriate, pro-
prior to peace negotiations.8 Prior to the inva- voking a major showdown to strong-arm Cairo
sion of Iraq, some observers similarly hoped into permitting free and fair elections is not like-
that a democratic Iraq would be a strategic ly to work. On the other hand, there is a dem-
partner of the United States and recognize ocratic alternative to General Pervez Musharraf
Israel. By this view, democracy, security, and in Pakistan—in the form of the newly created
peace with Israel all went hand in hand. alliance between the Pakistan People’s Party’s
Benazir Bhutto and former Prime Minister
It is quite clear in retrospect that this reading Nawaz Sharif. While this group had an uneven
of the sources of Arab radicalism was too record when they were in power, they have
simplistic. The deep sources of terrorism are pledged to crack down on the Taliban in the
much more complex than just the Middle Northwest Frontier Province and may indeed
East’s democratic deficit. One can argue in prove to be more reliable allies than
fact that it is precisely the modernization Musharraf. An open election in Pakistan
process that produces terrorism and that would risk further gains by Islamist parties,
more democracy is likely to exacerbate the but the country has a sizable middle-class elec-
terrorism problem, at least in the short run.9 torate and significant public sentiment that is
Many of the Iraqis who went to the polls in wary of an anti-Western course.
the various elections of 2005 were Shiites
who wanted not liberal democracy but Shiite Hamas in Gaza represents a more difficult
power, and who have subsequently worked case, since it is not only illiberal but also com-
to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic mitted to the destruction of America’s ally
in areas under their control. The winners of Israel. The strategic problem here is whether it
democratic elections elsewhere in the region is better to have this group on the inside of a
tend to be profoundly illiberal Islamist long-term peace and Palestinian state-building
groups, who are also more hostile to process or outside as obstructionists. Hamas
America’s ally Israel than to the authoritari- represents a significant part of the Palestinian
an governments they would like to displace. electorate, and the party will continue to play
The political tide in the Middle East is not an influential role in Palestinian politics
running in favor of pro-Western liberal regardless of whether the United States and
opposition groups. In addition, the United Israel accept it. A strong argument can be
States’ authoritarian allies like Hosni made that it is better to relent to Hamas’ par-
Mubarak of Egypt and Pervez Musharraf of ticipation in a government in hopes that their
Pakistan have been quite clever at sidelining goals will moderate over time. It is, in any
liberal opponents to accentuate the threat event, difficult to see how reliance on a cor-
from the Islamist opposition. The assertion rupt Fatah government as in the past will help
of President Bush’s second inaugural address bring peace or even a legitimate interlocutor in
that there is no necessary trade-off between the Palestinian Authority.

8 The final argument against the current agenda incompetent, or self-serving. The vast majori-
of democracy promotion concerns the ty of liberal or developmentally minded
sequencing of democratic reforms, especially authoritarian regimes or leaders are clustered
elections. State-building, creation of a liberal in East Asia, for reasons that probably have
rule of law, and democracy are conceptually roots in the region’s Confucian culture. This
different phases of political development, means, in practice, that in most of the world,
which in most European countries occurred in exactly the same groups want both liberal rule
a sequence that was separated by decades if of law and democracy; it is simply not an
not centuries. State-building and creation of a option for the United States to promote the
rule of law are more critical for economic former and delay the latter.
development than democracy is. Jack Snyder
and Edward Mansfield have argued that A further problem with the sequencing strate-
democratization’s early phases pose special dan- gy is that it presumes that the United States
gers of promoting nationalism and illiberal pol- and other foreign powers can somehow con-
itics.10 Authors from Samuel Huntington11 to trol democratic transitions, holding back pres-
Fareed Zakaria12 have consequently argued that sure for democratic elections while pushing for
US policy ought to focus on a broad governance rule of law and good governance. This vastly
agenda and delay pushing for democracy until overestimates the degree of control outsiders
a higher level of economic development has have over democratic transitions. The toolbox
been achieved. This so-called “authoritarian for democracy promotion is more modest, a
transition” has been followed by a number of subject that we will consider next.
countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile,
and is often recommended as a model for US Modalities of Democracy Promotion
policy in regions like the Middle East.
To argue that the United States has strategic
There is no question that such liberal authori- and moral interests in the spread of democracy
tarianism has worked quite successfully in does not mean that the United States can
places like Singapore, and even less liberal vari- spread democracy. Domestic factors, not exter-
ants, as in China, can boast impressive econom- nal forces, have driven the process of democra-
ic growth rates. If these countries eventually tization in most countries. Consequently, and
follow the Korean and Taiwanese paths toward especially in light of the tragedy in Iraq, some
a broadening of political participation, it is not have argued that Americans can best promote
obvious that an accelerated democratic transi- democracy abroad by simply watching it devel-
tion would bring about a better long-term op “naturally.”
result. In addition, there are specific instances
(primarily in post-conflict/failed state settings) We disagree. While we recognize the limits of
where outside pressure for early elections America’s ability to promote democracy
arguably resulted not in the emergence of dem- abroad—limits that have become more severe
ocratic political parties, but rather the locking in the past few years—we also know that US
in place of the same groups responsible for the policies can be very important in helping nur-
original conflict. ture democratic development. The war in Iraq
has fostered the false impression that military
As Tom Carothers has recently pointed out, force is the only instrument of regime change
however, there are a number of problems with in the US arsenal, when in fact it is the rarest
the sequencing strategy.13 First, in most parts used and least effective way to promote dem-
of the world it is very difficult to find liberal, ocratic change abroad. A wiser, more effective
developmentally minded authoritarians on and more sustainable strategy must emphasize
whom such a strategy can be built. The more nonmilitary tools aimed at changing the bal-
typical cases in Africa, the Middle East, and ance of power between democratic forces and
Latin America have been characterized by autocratic rulers and, only after there has
authoritarian governments that are corrupt, been progress toward democracy, building
liberal institutions.

Restoring the American Example centrally in its decision to invade Iraq, coupled 9
with its general suspicion of international law
Inspiration for Democrats struggling against and international institutions, has encouraged
autocracy and a model for leaders in new the perception that Americans do not believe
democracies are two US exports now in short in the rule of law. Again, the merits of these
supply. Since the beginning of the republic, the claims about American behavior are debat-
American experiment with democracy provided able. But it is indisputable that America’s
hope, ideas, and technologies for others work- image abroad as a model for democracy has
ing to build democratic institutions. Foreign vis- been tarnished.
itors to the United States have been impressed
by what they’ve seen, and American diplomats, Therefore, the first step toward becoming a
religious missionaries, and business people who more effective promoter of democracy abroad
traveled abroad inspired others by telling the is to get our own house in order. To begin
story of America’s democracy. In the second with, the political costs to America’s credibil-
half of the 20th century, when the United States ity as a champion of democratic values and
developed more intentional means for promot- human rights outweigh the value of holding
ing democracy abroad, the preservation and prisoners at Guantanamo indefinitely. The
advertisement of the American democratic facility should be closed, and the law passed
model remained a core instrument. last year on enemy combatant detentions
should be repealed or amended. In place of
Today this instrument needs repair. The legalistic attempts to pretend that the United
American model has been severely under- States does not engage in torture, a broader
mined by the methods that the Bush adminis- range of prohibited techniques should be
tration has used to fight the so-called global explicitly defined and ruled out. More gener-
war on terrorism. Irrespective of the legal par- ally, the next president of the United States
ticulars that may or may not justify the indef- must demonstrate a clear commitment to
inite detention of combatants/terrorists at restoring and perfecting the US democratic
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, opinion polls system of government.
demonstrate overwhelmingly that most of the
world views US detention policies as illegiti- In parallel, our efforts at public diplomacy
mate and undemocratic. Thankfully, senior have to improve.
American officials did not try to defend the
inhumane treatment of prisoners at Abu The United States cannot hope to recruit people
Ghraib in 2004. The news media’s exposure of to its side, or to the side of democratic values, if
the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib and it does not pay attention to what non-Americans
adherence to the rule of law through the pros- say they want, rather than what we think they
ecution of guilty soldiers was a first step in should want. In the Middle East, many Arabs
correcting the problem. But the failure to hold have argued that America is disliked not for its
higher-level officials accountable for the basic values, but for its one-sidedness in the
breakdown in authority raised questions Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its lack of sym-
about how seriously the United States took the pathy for Palestinian aspirations. In Latin
issue, and the images of torture greatly dam- America, populist leaders like Hugo Chavez
aged America’s international reputation. and Evo Morales have gained enormous sup-
Furthermore, the debate surrounding the port by promoting social policies aimed at the
unauthorized wiretappings of American citi- poor, an issue that America’s democratic friends
zens helped create an impression (false) in the region have largely ignored. The starting
abroad that the US government will sacrifice point for a better public diplomacy therefore is
the civil liberties of individuals in the name of to stop talking so much about ourselves and to
fighting terrorism—the very argument that start listening to other people, to compare the
autocrats across the world use to justify their product we’re offering to the actual aspirations
repressive policies. Finally, the Bush adminis- of democratic publics around the world.
tration’s propensity for unilateralism, most

10 Indeed, in light of the Bush administration’s policy officials must reject the false linkage
widespread unpopularity, it may be better for between cooperation and silence on human
the United States to dramatically tone down its rights abuses whenever autocrats make it a
public rhetoric about democracy promotion. precondition of engagement. Few friendly
The loudly proclaimed instrumentalization of autocratic regimes have ever stopped working
democracy promotion in pursuit of US nation- with the United States on a strategic issue of
al interests (like the war on terrorism) taints mutual benefit because an American official
democracy promotion and makes the United criticized their antidemocratic practices.
States seem hypocritical when security, eco-
nomic, or other concerns trump our interests in When it comes to autocratic regimes with
democracy (as they inevitably will). Acting in which the United States is friendly, American
concrete ways to support human rights and leaders have real leverage to press for evolu-
democratic groups around the world, while tionary change, especially over countries
speaking more modestly about American goals, dependent on US military protection or eco-
might serve both our interests and ideals better. nomic assistance. Rather than coercing them,
US officials must first try persuading our auto-
The idealistic component of US foreign policy cratic friends that they can ultimately best pro-
has always been critical to maintaining a tect their material and security interests by
domestic American consensus in favor of a proactively leading a process of evolutionary
strongly internationalist stance, so we do not change rather than by reactively resisting an
recommend permanently abandoning this eventual process of revolutionary change.
rhetorical stance. We have to recognize, how- American officials did exactly this, when they
ever, that the Iraq war and other events relat- helped coax allies in South Korea, Chile, and
ed to the war on terrorism have for the South Africa into embracing democratic
moment tainted valid and important concepts change. Careful diplomacy in the Philippines
like democracy promotion and democratic also helped keep the end of the Marcos dicta-
regime change. This is the case not only for torship peaceful.
foreign audiences but for many Americans as
well. Until this perception changes, adminis- Paradoxically, the same logic of engagement
trations will have to “sell” foreign policy to applies when considering the promotion of
domestic audiences on different grounds. democracy in dictatorships hostile to the
United States. Attempts to isolate or sanction
Revitalizing Dual Track Diplomacy these regimes have rarely worked. Sanctions
against the apartheid regime in South Africa
It is naive to believe that the United States only succeeded because the United States,
should only deal with other democracies. After Great Britain, and other European countries
all, in our own history, the creation of the had developed deep economic ties beforehand.
United States as an independent country South African democrats, unlike the leaders of
required military assistance from France’s the democratic movement in Iran today, also
absolute monarchy. The alliance with Stalin’s wanted these sanctions. Because the United
Soviet Union—perhaps the most diabolical States does not have significant trade with or
regime in human history—was necessary for investments in Iran, Cuba, or Burma, sanc-
victory in World War II. Today the wide range tions against these autocracies do little to help
of US security, economic, and environmental the prodemocracy forces inside these coun-
interests around the world necessitates diplo- tries. However, diplomatic relations with these
matic engagement with autocracies. regimes creates a more hospitable environ-
ment for internal democratic development.14 In
Nonetheless, American policymakers can con- the USSR, for instance, democratic forces
duct relations with their counterparts in auto- gained strength in the late 1980s when US-
cratic regimes, while simultaneously pursuing Soviet relations were improving, not earlier in
policies that might facilitate democratic devel- the decade when tensions were high. With rare
opment in these same countries. US foreign

exception, polices that open societies and in the democracy promotion business, including 11
economies up to international influence have NDI and IRI. As USAID funds for democracy
helped spur democratic change while policies assistance increased in the 1990s primarily in
that isolate societies impede such progress. response to new opportunities in the former
communist world, several for-profit contractors
Reorganizing Democracy Assistance joined the democracy promotion business as
well. Eventually, tension developed between
For most of American history, US foreign assis- USAID’s leadership and USAID’s nongovern-
tance did not explicitly aim to promote democ- ment grantees. Over the 1990s, USAID employ-
racy. President Kennedy created the United ees—that is, government officials—gradually
States Agency of International Development in assumed greater responsibility for crafting
1961 to counter communism and Soviet foreign democracy promotion strategies and treated the
assistance, but the focus was economic develop- NGOs as merely “implementers” of their ideas.
ment. Twenty years later, Ronald Reagan made The recipients, and especially the NGOs, resis-
democracy promotion a central objective when ted the label of implementer and instead tried to
he worked with Democrats in Congress to cre- preserve their identities as independent actors.
ate the National Endowment for Democracy The lines between government and nongovern-
(NED) in 1983. At the time, however, NED’s mental actors, already blurred, became even
budget was a fraction of total foreign assis- more ambiguous.
tance. Importantly, NED also was not constitut-
ed as an organ of the US government. While After September 11, President Bush to his credit
receiving its budget directly from Congress (and increased general foreign assistance funding,
not through the State Department or USAID), including support for democracy promotion.
NED established its own board, its own proce- Within the State Department, the Bush adminis-
dures for disseminating money, and made its tration established the Middle East Partnership
own decisions about whom it would and would Initiative, which became a new funding source
not support. for democracy assistance programs, among oth-
ers. At State, the Bureau for Democracy, Human
With the creation of NED came four affiliated Rights, and Labor Affairs received major increas-
organizations: the National Democratic Institute es in its democracy assistance budget. The
for International Affairs (NDI), the International Department of Defense also has become increas-
Republican Institute (IRI), the American Center ingly involved in democracy-related activities in
for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS, for- Afghanistan and Iraq. To coordinate civilian,
merly the Free Trade Union Institute [FTUI]), military, and intelligence operations in post-con-
and the Center for International Private flict settings better, the Bush administration
Enterprise (CIPE). These organizations all established the Coordinator for Reconstruction
had ties to US nongovernment institutions: and Stabilization, a new office within the State
NDI to the Democratic Party, IRI to the Department but staffed with personnel on loan
Republican Party, ACILS to the AFL-CIO, and from DoD, USAID, and other parts of the exec-
CIPE to the US Chamber of Congress. The idea utive branch. Most dramatically, under Secretary
behind these affiliations was that organizations of State Condoleezza Rice’s new transformation-
with democracy as a longstanding element of al diplomacy initiative, the department is trying
their missions could set their own agendas. to reform the way in which foreign assistance is
funded and delivered. The reform aims to consol-
Over time, however, the US government has idate the funding accounts and to make strategic
increasingly become a direct provider of democ- planning about assistance the purview of the
racy assistance. With the announcement of its State Department. As a first step, Rice created a
“Democracy Initiative” in December 1990, the new position within the State Department: the
Agency for International Development (AID) director of Foreign Assistance, who also serves as
made democracy promotion a core focus and administrator of AID.
soon became the main source of funding for
many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

12 This focus on how the government is organ- al security interest in providing an autocratic
ized to provide democracy assistance is badly regime with military aid or antiterrorist assis-
needed. The reform ideas to date, however, tance, but this aid must not be called democ-
have not been ambitious enough. Any strate- racy assistance or development aid.
gy for more effective democracy promotion
must include significantly greater resources At the same time, no democracy assistance to
as well as a reorganization of all US govern- nongovernmental organizations should come
ment bureaus and agencies that are tasked from this new department—or from any other
with providing democracy assistance. A new branch of the US government. Even if a new
Department of International Development Department of International Development is not
must be created, and its head must be a mem- established, this firewall between state-to-state
ber of the Cabinet. All foreign assistance assistance and the aid given to nongovernmental
resources currently funneled through other actors should become a guiding principle for
agencies and departments—with the excep- democracy assistance reform. For instance, it is
tion of military training and assistance— appropriate for the USAID or some other part of
must be transferred to this new department. the US executive branch to fund a technical
This new department would largely absorb assistance program for a justice ministry in a
AID, as well as DoD post-war reconstruction foreign country under the rubric of a bilateral
operations, rule of law training programs cur- government-to-government agreement.
rently housed in the Department of Justice,
agricultural aid now located in the Department Inevitably, conflicts of interest and misinter-
of Agriculture, and the Millennium Challenge pretations of motives arise when the State
Corporation. It is absolutely crucial that this Department provides direct financial support
department be, and be perceived as, autonomous to an NGO in another country. Is this money
from both the Department of State and the provided to aid democracy? Or is it given to
Department of Defense. The mandate of this new advance a concrete US economic or strategic
department would be very different from the tra- interest? Non-American NGOs, especially
ditional missions of the military and diplomacy: those working in autocratic societies, are
not regime destruction, but regime construction, increasingly reluctant to accept American
including nurturing improved governance, eco- assistance for fear of being labeled a lackey of
nomic development, and democratic consolida- the Bush administration or a spy for the
tion. This separation of departments to fulfill United States.15 Such questions come up
different missions will help each to deepen regardless of the exact origin of US funding.
expertise in its respective field, and also clarify to Increased separation between the US govern-
the outside world which arms of the US govern- ment and American funders of nongovern-
ment are doing what. Soldiers should not kill ter- mental actors thus can only be for the better.
rorists one day and teach Thomas Jefferson the This money for direct assistance to NGOs also
next. Diplomats should not negotiate a basing must be protected from any punishments or
agreement with a government one day and then conditionalities directed at the government of
turn around and fund an opposition leader to that country. When the White House decides
that same government. to cut foreign assistance to a country in order
to change its behavior at home or abroad, US
Once constituted, the new Department of funds earmarked to promote democracy
International Development should direct and through nongovernmental actors must not be
administer all assistance that is delivered part of the conditionality.
directly to foreign governments. When the US
government does provide direct assistance to a A vastly expanded NED would be one model.
foreign government through this new depart- To assume this role, NED would have to pro-
ment, it must be firmly conditioned on pursuit vide direct grants to all American providers of
of development objectives. There will be situa- technical and financial assistance for the non-
tions in which the United States has a nation- governmental sector, which will loosen its con-

nection with its four main grantees and require Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as a strat- 13
more involvement with for-profit contractors. egy for maintaining an open, liberal capitalist
NED would also need to open offices around order and avoiding a repeat of the protection-
the world. Because both of these changes might ist-driven meltdown of the 1930s. Democracy
dilute NED’s current mission, an alternative promotion was not an explicit objective of
model would be the creation of a new founda- either NATO or the International Monetary
tion, modeled after NED, but with a wider Fund. Member states in these institutions did
mandate and a different mechanism for provid- not even have to be democracies. Nonetheless
ing grants to both American organizations in NATO’s security umbrella, combined with
the democracy promotion business as well as American assistance through the Marshall Plan
direct grants to local NGOs around the world. and other subsequent programs, did help pre-
vent communist coups in Western Europe; keep
Democracy promotion should be placed in a the peace between formerly hostile countries
broader context of promoting economic devel- within the alliance; and contain Soviet military
opment, reducing poverty, and furthering expansion in Europe, which surely would have
good governance. The four objectives are undermined democratic institutions.
interlinked in multiple ways: good governance
is widely accepted as a requisite for economic The stable security environment was con-
growth, widespread poverty undermines dem- ducive to the deepening of democracy within
ocratic legitimacy, growth reduces poverty, member states and for increasing economic
democratic accountability is often required to and political cooperation among those states,
combat corruption and poor governance, and later culminating in the creation of the
growth creates a favorable climate for demo- European Union. This regional community in
cratic consolidation. Good governance in turn helped inspire Eastern European dissi-
recipient countries is also critical to maintain- dents to demand recognition of their human
ing congressional and popular support for rights as outlined in Basket Three of the
assistance programs. Nothing undermines Helsinki Final Act. NATO expansion after the
support as much as the perception that US tax- collapse of the Warsaw Pact offered Western
payer dollars are going into a proverbial Swiss multilateral connectivity to the new democra-
bank account. The United States cannot limit cies in East Central Europe and served as a
itself to the promotion of democracy; it must bridge as they prepared bids to join the
also use its leverage to promote development European Union. The gravitational pull of the
and good governance. These connections need European Union may be the most powerful
to be reflected in how policy is articulated as tool of democratic consolidation in the world
well. Senior foreign policy officials in the Bush today. The US security umbrella in Asia pro-
administration rarely invoke values such as vided a similar facilitating condition for dem-
equality and justice; yet historically, American ocratic development first in Japan, then South
leaders have considered these ideas fundamen- Korea, and eventually Taiwan. More intermit-
tal to shaping our own government. tently, the United States has also used its lead-
ership within the Organization of American
Enhancing and Creating International States to encourage democratic development
in Latin America.
Institutions for Democracy Promotion
Given the success of these multilateral institu-
After World War II, the visionary American tions in promoting democracy, it is striking
internationalists spearheaded the creation of a how little effort President Bush has devoted to
military alliance—the North Atlantic Treaty creating new multilateral institutions or
Organization (NATO)—to contain the Soviet reforming existing ones to advance freedom.
threat in Europe, and crafted bilateral security Since September 11, 2001, not one new major
pacts with Japan and South Korea to thwart international organization has been formed to
the communist menace in Asia. American lead- promote democratic reform. Nor has the Bush
ers also launched the Bretton Woods agree-
ments and its institutions, the International

14 administration devoted serious effort toward modalities of strengthening ties within the com-
boosting existing international organizations’ munity of democratic states, be it through a new
focus on democracy promotion. This neglect treaty or a new alliance.17
of multilateral institutions must end.
Even the World Trade Organization (WTO)
More than any other region in the world, the and other trade agreements must be viewed as
greater Middle East is devoid of multilateral levers that help open up economies, which in
security institutions. The United States, Canada, turn fosters democratic development. Excluding
the European Union, and other consolidated countries such as Iran from the WTO only
democracies should partner with their Middle hurts the democratic forces inside Iran who
Eastern counterparts to establish regional favor more, not less, integration of their coun-
norms, confidence-building measures, and other try into the world system. In some rare circum-
forms of dialogue and political reassurance. The stances such as South Africa under apartheid,
goal should be to establish a regional architec- economic sanctions have effectively pressured
ture that will affirm human rights and promote autocratic regimes to liberalize. The list of fail-
regional security based on the model of the ures—including decades-long sanctions against
Helsinki process in Eastern Europe, which Cuba and Iran—is equally striking. As a rule of
gave rise to the Organization of Security and thumb, the world democratic community
Cooperation in Europe and extensive human should take its cues about sanctions from the
rights monitoring within and across borders. democratic opposition in the target country.

The impetus for creating regional structures Strengthening International Norms
must come from within the region, but the ini-
tiative should also be supported from the out- The collapse of communism ushered in a giddy
side. Such efforts can draw inspiration and era for democracy promotion. Because so many
lessons from past experiences in Europe and autocratic regimes disappeared at the same
elsewhere. At the heart of the Helsinki process time, new post-Communist regimes welcomed
was the recognition that true security depend- Western democracy promoters into their coun-
ed not only on relations between states but tries with few restrictions. Today the atmos-
also on the relationship between rulers and the phere for democracy promotion is markedly
ruled. Many Middle Eastern governments different. The allegedly easy cases of democrat-
have signed statements committing themselves ic transition in East Central Europe have con-
to democratic reform, yet the Middle East solidated and require no further assistance from
lacks a regime that can help empower citizens democracy promoters. Autocratic regimes, at
to hold their rulers accountable to such first weak after communism’s collapse, have
pledges at home and in their relations with themselves consolidated and now have the
their neighbors. means to push back. Finally, the war in Iraq has
greatly tainted the idea of external regime
Beyond the Middle East, an expanded NATO change and put under suspicion all foreigners
could be an important, stabilizing force in unit- working to promote democratic change.
ing democracies around the globe. ASEAN is a
regional organization that seems ready to adopt This new context requires a new strategy for
more rigorous norms about democratic govern- bolstering the legitimacy of democracy pro-
ment and human rights. The recently created motion and the defense of human rights.
Community of Democracies got off to a bad start Governments must come together and draft
by extending membership to nondemocracies. a code of conduct for democratic interven-
But the idea of a new multilateral organization tions in the same way that governments and
committed to advancing democratic practices, be the international human rights community
it a revamped Community of Democracies or a have specified conditions in which external
new “League of Democracies,” is needed.16 More actors have the “responsibility to protect”
boldly, American leaders must embrace new threatened populations. A “right to help”
doctrine is needed. A starting point for this

new normative regime would be the “right” to Endnotes 15
free and fair elections, which in turn would
legitimize international election monitors and 1 Freedom in the World 2007: Selected Data
international assistance targeted at electoral from Freedom House’s Annual Global
transparency. At the other extreme, a new Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties
international code of conduct could include (Washington: Freedom House, 2007) p. 1.
strict prohibitions on direct financial assistance
to political parties, yet affirm the legality of 2 For elaboration of this logic, see James
foreign assistance to nonpartisan NGOs. Once Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “What To
these rules of the road are codified, signatories Do about Russia,” Policy Review, No. 133
to such a covenant would be obligated to (October-November 2005), pp. 45-62.
respect them. And if they did not, then the vio-
lation would serve as a license for further intru- 3 David Adesnik and Michael McFaul,
sive behavior from external actors. “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote
Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly,
An internationally agreed-upon code of con- Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 7-26.
duct for democracy assistance will constrain
the activities of some US actors. But it will also 4 Robert Barro, Determinants of Economics
enable other kinds of activities and interven- Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Study
tions. But in the long run, the United States (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997) p. 58.
and other democracies will only be effective in
promoting freedom abroad if we develop 5 Ronald Inglehart, “The Worldviews of Islamic
international institutions that enhance mutual- Publics in Global Perspective,” in Mansour
ly beneficial cooperation, and then abide by Moaddel, ed., Worldviews of Islamic Publics
the rules of these institutions in the conduct of (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 16; James
our foreign policy. Zogby, What Arabs Think: Values Beliefs and
Concerns (Washington DC: Zogby
In highlighting the moral and strategic impera- International, 2002); Mark Tessler, “Do Islamic
tives for promoting democracy abroad, Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward
President Bush has continued a longstanding Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from
tradition in US foreign policy that has deep Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria,”
roots in both the Democratic and Republican International Journal of Comparative
parties. Declaration of any important objec- Sociology, Vol. 43, Nos. 3–5, June 2002, pp.
tive, however, must be accompanied by a real- 229-249; and the cluster of articles under the
istic and comprehensive strategy for achieving rubric “How People View Democracy” in
it. Simply trumpeting the importance of the Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 1, January
objective over and over again is not a substitute 2001, pp. 93-145.
for a strategy. The tragic result of the gap
between objectives and strategies is that many 6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of
Americans are starting to view this goal as no Civilizations and the Remaking of World
longer desirable or attainable. The next Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
American president must do better. A more
effective strategy for promoting democracy and 7 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored:
human rights is both needed and available. Europe after Napoleon (Gloucester, MA:
Peter Smith, 1973).

8 Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy:
The Power of Freedom to Overcome
Tyranny and Terror (Balfour Books: 2006).

16 9 Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, The Stanley Foundation
and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2006, The Stanley Foundation is a nonpartisan, pri-
pp. 5-20. vate operating foundation that seeks a secure
peace with freedom and justice, built on world
10 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: citizenship and effective global governance. It
Democratization and Nationalist Conflict brings fresh voices and original ideas to
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); and Jack debates on global and regional problems. The
Snyder and Edward D. Mansfield, Electing foundation advocates principled multilateral-
to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to ism—an approach that emphasizes working
War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). respectfully across differences to create fair,
just, and lasting solutions.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale The Stanley Foundation’s work recognizes the
University Press, 1968). essential roles of the policy community, media
professionals, and the involved public in build-
12 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: ing sustainable peace. Its work aims to con-
Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad nect people from different backgrounds, often
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2003). producing clarifying insights and innovative
solutions.
13 Thomas Carothers, “The “Sequencing”
Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, The foundation frequently collaborates with
No.1, 2007, pp. 12-27. other organizations. It does not make grants.

14 McFaul, Milani, and Diamond, “A Win- Stanley Foundation reports, publications, pro-
Win Strategy for Dealing with Iran,” The grams, and a wealth of other information are
Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07. available on the Web at www.stanleyfounda
tion.org.
15 Akbar Ganji, “Money Can’t Buy Us
Democracy,” The New York Times, The Stanley Foundation encourages use of this
August 2, 2006. report for educational purposes. Any part of
the material may be duplicated with proper
16 Senator John McCain proposed the idea of acknowledgment. View this report online at
a new league of democracies in a speech at reports.stanleyfoundation.org.
the Hoover Institution on May 2, 2007.
Production: Amy Bakke and Margo Schneider
17 On these other modalities, see Tod Lindberg,
“The Treaty of the Democratic Peace,” The The Stanley Foundation
Weekly Standard, February 12, 2007, pp. 209 Iowa Avenue
19-24; and Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey, Muscatine, IA 52761 USA
“Democracies of the World, Unite,” The 563-264-1500
American Interest, Vol. 2, No. 3, 563-264-0864 fax
January/February 2007, pp. 5-19. [email protected]

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