The Royal Scots, Booklet

THE KOHIMA CAMPAIGN 1944

Apart from those in B Echelon, very few officers and men of the 1st Battalion who had taken part in
the heroic actions leading up to and at Le Paradis, defending the perimeter of Dunkirk, were taken
off the beaches in 1940 There were the wounded who had been evacuated earlier in the fighting and a
few who had got away partly by using their wits, partly by trusting to luck and going hell-for-leather
for the coast. Those who did make it, less than 50 in total, were very quickly formed into the basis of
a re-constituted 1st Battalion at Bradford, in Yorkshire, based on some 250 NCOs and men who were
already Royal Scots and six hundred raw recruits. The next two years were spent on coastal defence
and then training for the return to Europe. On 15 April 1942, however, the Battalion, again as part of
the 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, alongside our old friends 1st Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment,
who had also been re-constituted after Le Paradis, sailed from Glasgow en route to India to join the
defence of India against the Japanese who were by then advancing up through Burma.

In early March 1943, after considerable training, and a number of false starts, the Battalion was
committed to action in the Arakan. The action there was not successful and the British and Indian
force withdrew back to Chittagong in India.

During the last week of May 1943 the 1st Battalion moved from Chittagong by train to Ahemednagar,
east of Bombay, where it rejoined 2 Division. Thereafter, for a ten day period, the whole Battalion,
having taken 550 sick in the Arakan, mainly from malaria, was subjected to an intensive period of
anti-malarial medication during which no strenuous training, or exercise, was carried out. Shortly
afterwards it received reinforcements and undertook a comprehensive period of re-training. At the
end of January 1944 it moved to Belgaum in the central Ganges plain where it was possible to embark
upon intensive jungle training. The feature of jungle training loathed most by the Jocks was the
presence of leeches as Sergeant Easton recalled.

We had puttees instead of gaiters because the place was alive with leeches. You even had to put grease
on the eyeholes of your boots to save them going in, and even then they got in. You felt them getting
into your flesh and when you took your puttees off at night your trousers were filled with leeches that
had had their fill and were lying in the bottom of your trousers.

In early March 1944 the Japanese launched a major offensive westwards from the Chindwin towards
Kohima and Imphal. Their initial aim was to seize Imphal in order that it could be used as a supply
base for the invasion of India. The British and Indian troops operating to the west of the Chindwin
fell back on Imphal and the village of Kohima, which they were determined to hold as their strategic
importance was fully realised. The nature of the countryside on the Indo-Burmese border, an extreme
mix of almost trackless mountains and jungle, made the possession of motorable roads essential
for success. The British and Indian forces were supplied from the railhead at Dimapur via the road
through Kohima to Imphal. If that road was cut men and pack animals had to be re-supplied by air.

It was against that background that the 1st Battalion, along with the remainder of 2 Division, was
ordered to move to Calcutta by train and then to Dimapur by air. The Battalion moved at a strength of
forty officers and 830 soldiers. For many this was their first experience of flying. Kohima's garrison
consisted of just 1,000 troops and it was being threatened by a Japanese force of 12,000. The Japanese
closed the Dimapur-Kohima road, however, just a few miles to the north-west of Kohima on 7 April,
about a week before the Battalion was complete in Dimapur.

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5 Brigade was the first formation of 2 Division to be committed to the relief of Kohima. It seized the
Japanese positions blocking the road at Zubza and Jotsoma on 14 April and, by 18 April, with the
Garrison Commander estimating that he could hold our for no more than a further twelve hours,the
road into Kohima was again open and the garrison was reinforced by fresh troops. The relief of
Kohima was the turning point of the war in Burma but in mid-April 1944 the road through Kohima
to Imphal was still closed and Japanese troops still held many strong positions in the Kohima area.
The next phase of the battle was the destruction of these positions. During the third week in April
5 Brigade began a cross-country left hook which was designed to enable it to attack the Japanese
positions at Kohima from the north, while 4 Brigade mounted a cross-country right hook aimed at
seizing the Japanese positions on GPT Ridge, to the south of the village.

The 1st Battalion, however, was in action in the Kohima area before 4 Brigade launched its right
hook.

Our first task was to take over two hills, later extended to a third, on the north side of the road at
milestone 32 [three miles north-east of the village of Zubza]. We relieved the 1st Battalion The Royal
Berkshire Regiment and took over features known as Bolton and Reading. They were razor-backed,
precipitous spurs covered in thick jungle. A narrow track that kept to the highest ground wound along
the tops and ended in a close-built wooden village.

We occupied these features without any trouble and dug in. It was all very peaceful that afternoon.
One could see for miles across the valley and on to the outskirts of Kohima. There was some shelling
from one of our batteries away to the south-west, but nothing very serious, nothing more than peace-
time manoeuvres would put up. It reminded one of all the war books one had ever read - and warned
us. Then came the evening, and the jungle noises became more insistent. Previously they had hardly
broken through our own activities.

As we started to stand-to we heard them clearly. Something moved in the thick vegetation below
us. A twig broke and then another. Our nerves were taught and the simplest sounds appeared more
menacing than anything we had heard on our jungle training. But the night passed quietly. Once or
twice a sentry decided that a Japanese battalion was on top of him, but our training and discipline
came to our aid. There was no false alarm and morning found the Battalion with one more lesson
learnt: never fire at night. It was the golden rule of the Fourteenth Army.

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There were soon other, more important, lessons to be learnt.

A day or two after we had settled in came our first contact with the enemy. Major Russell, commanding
D Company, had sent a patrol along a track to the south-east. It bumped the enemy, had some casualties
and withdrew. The remainder of the platoon was pushed in and then the whole company. The Japs

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were well dug-in on a steep cliff. We could not see them, but they could see us. We probed all round
them, lost about a dozen men and then the company withdrew. Our losses had not been heavy, but we
had the unsatisfactory feeling that we had lost some very good men, and we could not swear to having
killed a single Jap. It was our first attempt to turn the little yellow rats out of their holes without
supporting fire, and our last. Just another jungle warfare lesson learnt.
The lesson was quickly learnt, however, and the Jap position was subjected to artillery, mortar and
machine-gun fire. Initially all that effort seemed to be of no avail as a second attack was again met
with determined resistance and had to be called off. The recipe was repeated and this time the results
were different.

On the road to kohima. Major hayward, second in command of the 1st battalion (centre) with captain currie, adjutant, on the right

Next morning Lieutenant Darling, patrolling down to the enemy position, reported it clear of Japs.
We went down and found it devoid of life, but by no means clear of Japs. There were considerably
more dead Japs than our total casualties, and that cheered us up enormously. We saw what a shambles
the place was. The reverse slope where our mortars had got busy seemed particularly damaged.
There must have been a company headquarters and a first aid post there and both had received direct
hits. Sergeant Smail dug up one grave with twenty dead Japs in it. All had been wounded and then
beheaded before their 'comrades' withdrew. This put a very different complexion on the battle. We
realised that though we may not appear to inflict casualties on the enemy we were doing so the whole
time. It was a good lesson and we remembered it throughout the campaign.
The Battalion's casualties for April 1944 were fifteen soldiers killed, two officers and thirty-five
soldiers wounded and one soldier missing.

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On 24 April the Battalion moved forward on the main road towards Kohima to a position north of
the village of Jotsoma. From there, on the following day, it moved by a mixture of vehicle and march
route up to the village of Khonoma from where it began its cross-country approach to Kohima on 27
April, but it did not arrive at GPT Ridge until 3 May. It was a hazardous journey.

The march was probably not more than thirty miles and it was expected to take about five or six
days. To those who do not know the country this sounds a fairly easy feat. But it was not. The track
had been made by the Special Service Company under Major MacGeorge, The Royal Scots. It was a
single-file march and in parts ropes had been put down to drag oneself up the sheer precipices. Naga
porters helped with some of the heavier equipment and with rations, but no air drop was attempted,
firstly because there was no possible dropping zone, and secondly, to maintain surprise. Mules, of
course, were out of the question. It was simply a matter of climbing to the top of a ridge and slithering
down the other side on one's haunches. The ridges varied in height from hundreds to thousands of
feet, and the temperature in the valleys and on the tops varied accordingly. It was not a march in
the accepted sense of the word. It was a climb, pure and simple, which was in direct contrast to our
language, which was neither.

During the flanking move there was some action on Pavilion Hill on 1 May. A group of unarmed Naga
porters was ambushed by the Japanese. Not surprisingly they dropped the rations they were carrying
and fled. A platoon of A Company,anticipating that the Japanese would return to retrieve the rations,
mounted its own ambush at the same spot. The Japanese duly returned and the ambush was sprung
leaving three dead. Later in the day the Japs mounted attacks on Pavilion Hill which initially was held
by just two platoons of A Company and the Manchester's Machine- Gun Platoon, but later reinforced
by the arrival of C Company.

Fortunately the Jap decided to attack from the south-east and walked, or rather climbed, straight
into A Company's LMGs. He withdrew after about twenty minutes and left us very much master of
ourselves and of the situation. Just then Major Menzies arrived with C Company and Somerville's
platoon rejoined after their successful ambush on the Japanese on 1 May. That put a very different
complexion on the affair and the next attack, which was launched just before dusk, was beaten off
with considerable slaughter. Fortunately for us, it seems it was a Jap habit to announce his intention
of attacking by screams of 'Banzai' and other encouraging noises, which always gave us ample time
to prepare for him. Another of his habits which militated against success was his invariable practice
of reinforcing failure. From dusk to 11 pm he put in an hourly attack at exacdy the same place, in
exactly the same way with exactly the same result. It is true that on one occasion he managed to get
two or three men inside our position, but they were immediately dealt with by Lieutenant Black and
Lance Corporal McKay. Our total casualties did not amount to half a dozen and we picked up and
buried seventeen of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of our posts. That there were many more
nearby was proved by the fact that a few days later another unit was unable to stay on Pavilion Hill
owing to the smell of carrion.

The attack on GPT Ridge was led by The Royal Norfolks with The Royal Scots in support. Surprisingly
the attack caught the Japanese unawares and the Norfolks drove forward to within 100 yards of the
end of the ridge with the 1st Battalion following them closely. The two battalions were surrounded by
Japanese, but in such thick country it was possible for patrols to get through to the rear without being
discovered. Both battalions quickly set about consolidating their positions with dogged determination.

We arrived on 3 May and I suppose we were there about a week. For the first day or two we were
continually sniped and harried by an active enemy who was fighting on his own ground and knew

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every track and game trail. But gradually we got the better of him. First we blitzed the area between
ourselves and the Norfolks and joined up the [battalion] boxes. Then we started counter-sniping,
at which we had considerable success. RSM Brunton was a particularly keen and efficient shikari
(Hindi word for hunter).

A patrol on the approaches to kohima

He discovered a Japanese water point and sat over it. I have forgotten what his exact bag came to, but
it was a welcome addition to the daily total. We also laid some very successful ambushes around our
position. The Pioneer Platoon was notably successful and one of their ambushes so annoyed the Japs
in the big bunker to our rear as to make an attack upon us. This was more noisy than effective and was
easily repulsed. An immediate counter-attack by the Carrier Platoon, in which Sergeant Dick greatly
distinguished himself, caught the enemy just as he was reforming. Our bag for that day, I remember,
was thirty-one counted Jap bodies.
Sergeant Syme, who was a Section Commander in the Carrier Platoon, having been forced to leave
their vehicles behind and now forming Patrol Platoon, recalled the part he played in the action around
Kohima on 5 May.
Once the Japs began taking pot shots at A Company, and some of A Company began to get a wee bit
shaky, so the Patrol Platoon was sent for and out we went - the whole Platoon. It just so happened
that I was the leading Section to go, so that the rest of the Platoon could stretch out behind me. I'll tell
you, I went along there and there was nothing that I didn't see. We stopped when we were in line and
we turned and we had a wee rise up to where they were [the Japanese] and we went up over the rise.
I had my Bren gunner killed, that was the first man I'd ever lost.
The Japanese, however, refused to be driven from their positions and there was heavy fighting

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involving the Norfolks and C Company of The Royal Scots to try to drive them from a major bunker
on a feature known as the Pimple. The enemy held out for nine days in that position which was
eventually cleared by B Company after it had been subjected to direct fire from tanks at a range of
thirty yards.

The next objective was to clear the Japanese from their positions on Aradura Spur which was attacked
on 28 May. Again the enemy's resistance was determined and casualties were so high that the attack
had to be called off. Once again Sergeant Syme was involved in the action.

The Japs were falling back from Kohima, and this next hill, [Aradura Spur] we patrolled it daily for
a week before putting in an attack. Although we had patrolled the area daily we lost sixty odd men
in the attack, killed (17), wounded or missing and Christ knows where they [the Japs] were because
we never saw them. We couldn't stay on top, we just had to come back off it. The next time we went
there was nobody there, they were away!

By then, however, the Japanese were feeling the pressure of the incessant attacks being mounted
throughout the whole of the Kohima area. Furthermore their morale was being undermined by the
failure of their supply system to provide them with food. On the last day of May 1944 the local
Japanese commander decided, against his orders, that he would have to withdraw. That movement
started in early June. The battle for Kohima was over; it had lasted for sixty-four days and witnessed
some of the fiercest fighting of the war. In May the Battalion had lost one officer and thirty-six
soldiers killed, seven officers and 115 soldiers wounded and nine soldiers missing. Imphal was still
cut off but, as the Japanese withdrew, the British and Indian troops were free to follow them south
down the road to Imphal.

The final major battle of the Kohima campaign for the 1st Battalion took place at the large village of
Viswema, twelve miles from Kohima and seventy-five miles from Imphal, on 6 June. The Lancashire
Fusiliers were the lead battalion of 2 Division with The Royal Scots immediately behind them. The
initial attack by the Fusiliers was repulsed and both battalions attacked in concert the following
morning. Again Japanese resistance was determined but the attackers managed to break into the
enemy's perimeter. The battle lasted three days and casualties were heavy.The position was eventually
cleared by a set piece attack by the 7th Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment. Once Viswema fell
the operation became an advance in contact and, although there were some stiff local actions, 2
Division was able to make steady progress towards Imphal. On 21 June the troops thrusting south
from Kohima met up with those pushing north from Imphal. The Japanese advance into India had
been defeated. The Battalion's losses during the Kohima campaign were two officers and seventy-six
soldiers killed, fifteen officers and 189 soldiers wounded and four soldiers missing. On 24 June, at the
end of the campaign, the Battalion's strength was twenty-six officers and 512 soldiers - the difference
of some seventy all ranks from the emplaning figure in early April being accounted for by sickness.

Postscript. While the 2nd Division set about erecting a Divisional Memorial to those who had fallen
in the epic struggle to relieve Kohima and open the road to Imphal, the 1st Battalion were equally
determined to additionally commemorate their own. This Memorial was designed and constructed by
The Royal Scots themselves under the supervision of a small committee. It was made of local stone
and wood and was erected by the Pioneer Platoon. The Monument is sited at Kennedy Hill, on the
Aradura Spur, and was unveiled by Lieutenant Colonel Masterton Smith, who had fought throughout
the Battle and was now the Commanding Officer, on 25 November 1944. The Monument, overseen
by The Commonwealth War Graves Commission, is now surrounded by local housing but (in 2017)
was reported as being in good order and carefully looked after by the family living around it.

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Dedication of 1st battalion memorial, aradura spur, imphal, 25 november 1944. The padre is the reverend crichton robertson

When you go home Tell
them of us and say

For your tomorrow We
gave our today

The Kohima Epitaph

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THE LISBON MARU
POSSIBLE DISTURBANCE OF THE WRECK OF THE LISBON MARU AND ANY HUMAN
(BRITISH POW) REMAINS THAT MAY STILL BE ON BOARD OR ON THE SURROUNDING

SEABED
Background
The Lisbon Maru sailed from Hong Kong on 27 September 1942 en route to Shanghai and Japan. She
was armed and carried, in addition to 1816 British POWs, 778 Japanese troops and a guard of 25 for
the POWs. There was nothing that identified her as carrying POWs.
The British POWs were mostly drawn from The Royal Navy (379) 'accommodated' in No 1 Hold
at the front of the ship, 2RS (373) and 1MX (366), with others from various cap badges to a total of
1077, 'accommodated' in No 2 Hold forward of the Bridge and the RA (380) 'accommodated' in No
3 Hold at the stern. The Senior British Officer on board was Lt Col HWM Stewart, CO 1MX, in No
2 hold. Conditions in all three holds were very crowded.

Just after 0700hrs on 1 October, in a position 6 miles off the Sing Pang Islands in the Chusan (now
Zhousan) Archipelago off the coast of Chekiang Province (south of Shanghai), the Lisbon Maru was
hit in the engine room, at the stern, by a torpedo fired from the US submarine USS Grouper. The
engines stopped, the lights went out and those few POWs who were on deck were pushed back into
the holds. The ship's gun began firing. The POWs were kept in the partially closed holds throughout
the day with no food, water or access to latrines. No blame has ever been, nor ever must be, attached
to the USS Grouper. There was nothing that identified her as carrying POWs; there were a large
number of Japanese troops on board; and she was armed. Everything that could be seen identified the
Lisbon Maru as a legitimate target.

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At 1700 hrs the 778 Japanese troops were taken off onto a Japanese destroyer and merchant ship
which had arrived, leaving the British POWs, their guard of 25 and the 77 crew on board. In doing
so they removed the ship's four lifeboats and most, if not all, of the six life rafts ensuring that none
would be available for any possible subsequent evacuation of the POWs. At about 2100 hrs, allegedly
fearing the POWs could break out and overpower the guard, the Guard Commander ordered the
ship's Captain to fully close the hatches and batten them down with canvas. Conditions in all three
holds deteriorated rapidly. In No 1 Hold two diphtheria patients died and in No 3 hold, nearest where
the torpedo had struck, water was rising rapidly. The POWs manned the pumps; but because of the
extreme heat and shortage of air some of them collapsed into the water and drowned.

By dawn on 2 October it was apparent that the ship was in imminent danger of sinking and soon
afterwards the crew and all but five of the guards were taken off. At about 0900 hrs the ship gave a
violent lurch and it was apparent that she could not last much longer. Lt Col Stewart ordered a Royal
Scots officer, Lt Howell, to attempt to break out through the battened hatches. He succeeded in doing
so and, after being shot at by the remaining Japanese guards, which led to two men being killed,
reported to Col Stewart that the situation was desperate and that the ship was in imminent danger
of sinking, but that he had seen an island some distance off. Col Stewart gave the order to leave the
holds and a number of the POWs rushed on deck, plunged overboard and began swimming towards
the island. The remaining guards began firing at them until the weight of numbers of POWs pouring
onto the deck overpowered them and, probably, threw them overboard.

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By good fortune the stern at this point became stuck on a sandbank leaving the forepart as far as the
bridge sticking out of the water for about a further hour which gave sufficient time for all live men
to climb or be assisted out of the holds. Many men did not have lifebelts and many could not swim.
Between the ship and the islands were a number of Japanese auxiliary vessels and tugs, some of them
surrounded by men in the water vainly asking to be picked up and, if they were, then pushed them
back into the water; and the firing of shots could be heard. The Lisbon Maru finally sank at about
1045. At some stage the Japanese boats started to pick up those prisoners still alive in the water and
who had not drifted past them towards the Islands.

Lt Howell, having been picked up by fishermen in a sampan, was among the first to reach the largest
of the Islands and was able to explain to the villagers there that the heads bobbing about in the water
were British prisoners and not Japanese. As a result the Chinese set off in junks and sampans to assist
the survivors. They picked up a considerable number of exhausted swimmers while other villagers
assisted those who had drifted or swum to the islands and helped them to land on the rocky shores.
Some 200 survivors were assembled on the islands, where the villagers fed and clothed them from
their own scanty supplies and treated them with great kindness until the Japanese landed in force on
the following days and rounded up all but three of the prisoners. These three, all civilians who had
been working in Hong Kong - two with the Royal Navy, were hidden by the village representative,
who later arranged for their escape to Chungking.

Those picked up by the Japanese ships were collected together on the deck of a large gun boat where,
exposed to the elements, some died of exposure and exhaustion before finally being landed south of
Shanghai on 5 October.

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Of the 1816 POWs who had left Hong Kong only 973 (including the three escapees) survived leaving
843 (46%) who were assumed to have been killed by the Japanese firing on them or drowned - many
of the latter being non-swimmers, without life-jackets or other means of support, and some, it was
reported, as the result of shark attack. Amongst The Royal Scots a total of 183 died, many more than
the 107 killed in the whole of the battle for Hong Kong. Relatively few of the POWs, only those who
had died on board before she sank, would have gone down within the ship. The remains of the others
will have been scattered in the surrounding seas.

Aftermath
Subsequently Lt Howell was awarded the MBE for his gallantry in breaking open the hold and Lt
Norman Brownlow the same award for organising the evacuation of the ship and then, having reached
the island himself, obtaining a small boat and rescuing men from the sea who were trying to reach and
clamber ashore on the islands.

After the war a fund was organised amongst survivors in order that the proceeds might be sent to
to the Sing Pang islanders as a token of gratitude. In February 1949 the Governor of Hong Kong
presented to Mr WooTung-ling, the village representative who had hidden the three escapees, and
other islanders a motor fishing launch and some monetary awards.

All thoses who died as a result of the sinking are commemorated on panels at the entrance to the Sai
Wan CWGC cemetery on Hong Kong island.

Possible Disturbance of the Wreck and its Surrounding Area
There have been recent suggestions that the wreck of the Lisbon Maru might be raised and any
remains found in or near it possibly repatriated to the UK..

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There are two aspects that arise from this:

1. The first is would the hull survive 'recovery'? I am certainly no expert but it was an old, lightly-
built merchant ship with large holds as opposed to a warship, possibly with an armoured hull and
many bulkheads to increase its survivability when sustaining damage in battle. After 75 years in salt
water it might just, quite literally, fall apart.
2. The definition of a "war grave" is a burial place for members of the Armed Forces or civilians
who died during military campaigns or operations. The term can be considered to apply to ships sunk
during war time. By any standards the Lisbon Maru meets this definition. The UK has clearly defined
its position on this within The Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, which, in simple terms, states
that such ships, and any remains on them, should be left undisturbed. While this Act can only apply
within British-controlled waters including, for example, those around the Falklands, it does express
the British Government's views on the treatment of such 'war graves' including those involving
foreign and merchant vessels. In British waters it has already been extended to include the wreck
of a German U-Boat and the Storaa Judgement of 2006 formally confirmed that it could extend to
merchant vessels. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect the British Government to oppose as strongly
as possible any planned or proposed disturbance of the Lisbon Maru or its immediate surrounds,
albeit concerning a Japanese ship in Chinese waters.

On the possible repatriation of any remains the practice only began for us, the British, when it was
offered to the Next-of-Kin (NOK) of those killed in the Falklands conflict in 1983. This was partly
because the numbers involved were relatively small (compared to the major conflicts of the 20th
Century) and partly because the difficulties NOK would encounter visiting the war graves at such a
distance and the fragile transport links. This policy has extended to all those who have been killed
or died on active service, including in Northern Ireland, since then. Remains of any British war dead
from World Wars 1 or 2 that appear today, whether identified or not, are not repatriated but are re-
buried in the nearest CWGC cemetery. In the case of any remains that might be recovered from on
or around the Lisbon Maru we believe, after 75 years, even with the huge advances in DNA testing,
identification would be impossible probably even the linking iof ndividual bones to each other.

The Trustees of The Royal Scots are firmly committed, and will take all measures possible, to
ensure that the Lisbon Maru and its surrounds remain undisturbed and respected within the British
Government's interpretation of a War Grave at Sea. Our view is fully endorsed by The Royal Naval
and The Royal Artillery Associations with who we have actively consulted on this subject.

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THE COLD WAR 1945 – 1990
Following the end of the Second World War there was to be no return to the traditional round of peace
time soldiering as occurred after 1918. The period is marked by the variety of roles required from and
commitments of the Army, in particular low-intensity operations from the infantry. Reductions in the
size of the Army led to amalgamations and disbandments of many famous Regiments while at the
same time unforeseen crises requiring military action created severe strain on the forces remaining.
'Overstretch' became a familiar theme. National Service, initially for eighteen months but, from
1949, for two years, was introduced to provide the manpower to meet this. It lasted until the final men
were called up in 1960 with the announcement of the introduction from 1962 of all-regular forces
(plus, for the Army, the TA).
In Europe the post-war occupation forces remained in Germany, Austria and other former Axis areas.
From 1949 these became part of The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a deterrent
against the Russian threat as wartime alliance changed to 'Cold War'. Outside Europe the Palestine
problem continued until the creation of the state of Israel in 1949. The transition of former Colonies
to independence was not always peaceable. The containment of Communist expansion in Malaya and
Korea demanded the deployment of large forces. In 1969, the Army had to be deployed to support
the Police in Northern Ireland and remained in that role, in often very considerable numbers, right
through to July 2007.
The intensity of activity over the period from 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 1990 is demonstrated
by the fact that the 1stBattalion changed station over 30 times in that time and covering from the
UK to Korea. Many of these moves required reorganisation, adopting a new role and familiarisation
with new equipment. In addition eleven 'emergency' tours were carried out requiring a move at short
notice to some critical situation – latterly normally to Northern Ireland.

Earl Mountbatten, last Viceroy of India, moves to inspect the 1st Battalion Guard of Honour at The
Pakistan Independence Parade

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Field Marshal Montgomery visiting the 2nd Battalion in Trieste, July 1948
In December 1945 the 1st Battalion was posted from India to Singapore and Malaya until January
1947 when it moved to Karachi where it remained until the partition and emergence of the separate
states of India and Pakistan, including providing the Guard of Honour for the Pakistan ceremony
of Independence. It sailed for home in December, one of the last British battalions to leave the
sub-continent, and nearly six years after they had left for Burma. On arrival it moved to Dreghorn
Barracks in Edinburgh to assume the role of Training Battalion for the then four Lowland infantry
regiments. Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion remained in Palestine maintaining order between Arabs and
Jews apart from a four month tour in the Canal Zone. Two members of the Battalion were killed
during these operations. In April 1946 it moved to Malta and then, in June 1947, to Trieste as part of
of the occupation force in an area disputed between Italy and Yugoslavia. At the end of 1948 they too
returned to Edinburgh where, on 9 February 1949, they amalgamated, on a very wet parade, with the
1st Battalion as part of the reduction in Army force levels after the independence of, and therefore no
longer need to garrison, India and Pakistan.

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The Amalgamation Parade of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, Dreghorn Barracks, Edinburgh, 9 Feb
1949

This was the first time the Regiment had been reduced to one regular battalion since 1686 (262 years),
a unique record for a Regiment of the Line. In the meantime both the 7th/9th and 8th Territorial
Battalions having initially been stationed, and employed, as part of the occupying force in Germany
had been disbanded respectively in June and February1946 only to be reconstituted as part of the re-
formed Territorial Army(TA) in the spring of 1947.
In February1951 the 1st Battalion moved to West Germany to join The British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) as part of Britain's contribution to NATO. Initially they were stationed in Munster but moved
to Wuppertal in December. In May 1952 they moved again, this time to Berlin which remained a city
occupied and governed by the wartime Allies, The United States, France, Russia and Great Britain.
They remained there until April 1953 when they returned briefly to transit through Top Camp, next to
Glencorse, before sailing for Korea. On 26 July1962 HRH The Princess Royal, the Colonel-in-Chief,
had opened the Regimental Monument just below The Mound in West Princes Street Gardens.

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HRH The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief, unveiling The Regimental Monument in West Princes
Street Gardens, Edinburgh, on 26 July 1952

In 1950 Communist North Korea, backed by Russia and, later, China, invaded South Korea. The
United Nations, under US leadership, immediately deployed considerable forces in support of South
Korea. The British contribution expanded from a single Brigade to the 1st Commonwealth Division
including troops from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India. In 1953 the 1st Battalion were posted
to relieve The Black Watch. They sailed from Southampton on the evening of 2 June, Coronation Day,
the Colour Party having taken part in the Coronation Parade in London that day and handing over
the very damp Colours to a Regimental party from the Depot as they went up the gangplank. The
Battalion landed at Pusan on 7 July and carried out intensive training until they were due into the line
on 29 July. On the evening of 26 July it was announced that a truce would be signed the following
morning and that a cease fire would be effective from 2200 hours that evening. At that time a Royal
Scots bugler sounded the 'Cease Fire' which echoed round the valleys. It was, however, only a truce
and the Battalion spent a busy year occupying and improving the front line while carrying out much
training. Sadly three members of the Battalion died in accidents during the tour, two in drownings
and one in a tent fire.

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A jeep trailer bath in Korea

In April 1954 the Regiment moved back into its Headquarters and Depot at Glencorse outside
Edinburgh. The Battalion remained in Korea until June 1954 when they moved to the Suez Canal
Zone in Egypt. Since the end of World War 2 the Egyptians had been trying to remove the British
presence by civil disorder, murder and hit and run shooting attacks. The Battalion therefore had to
adapt from the role of general war to one of internal security. Meantime another uprising against
British rule had broken out in Cyprus when the EOKA terrorists, seeking Enosis, or union with
Greece, began the now familiar pattern of riots, assassinations and sabotage followed by guerilla
attacks from their hides in the Troodos Mountains. In September 1955 the Battalion was moved at
short notice to the Paphos area of Cyprus where the Police had become virtually ineffective. Initially
the Battalion was deployed in small groups throughout the area to restore police confidence before
concentrating in company areas to mount anti-terrorists operations against EOKA. Two soldiers were
killed during these before the Battalion left the island in January 1956 to return to Elgin in Scotland
where they spent the summer on ceremonial duties.

Stability was short-lived, however, as in July President Nasser of Egypt nationalised the Suez
Canal and, in November, a joint British and French expeditionary force invaded to recover it. The
1st Battalion joined this operation which was surrounded by political indecision and prevarication.
Although it proved militarily possible to regain control of the Canal, world opinion, and, notably, US
opposition, made it politically impossible to do so and, in December, the allied forces handed over to
the United Nations and withdrew. The Battalion had one fatality when Major David Pinkerton was
shot and later died from his wounds. He had been a Company Commander with 2RS in Hong Kong,
winning the MC for his bravery and leadership in both the Mainland and Island battles, and survived
the Japanese POW Camps. He had served in Korea and, but for his death, would almost certainly have
commanded the 1st Battalion.

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Returning to Elgin in January 1957, the Battalion remained there until January 1958 when they again
moved to Berlin as part of the continuing Allied occupation force in that still divided city. Their
tour was remarkable for both military and sporting successes, winning the BAOR Machine Gun
Competition and the Football, Boxing and Rugby Cups. While there the four Lowland Regiments
replaced their individual cap badges with the unpopular Lowland Brigade shared one. After two years
the Battalion returned to Dundonald Camp near Ayr in Scotland. At the same time, the TA, no longer
having former National Servicemen to fill its ranks, was reduced in size with the 7th/9th and 8th
Battalions amalgamating to form the 8th/9th Battalion. Glencorse Barracks had also closed in 1960 to
be be rebuilt as The Lowland Brigade Depot and Regimental HQ moved into offices, and later added
a Museum, within Edinburgh Castle.
In October 1960 the Battalion moved on posting to Libya, British troops having remained there since
1945. Although much reduced, there were still garrisons in Tobruk, Benghazi, Tripoli and Homs at
the request of King Idris to provide stability and security to his Kingdom. Initially the Battalion was
based in Benghazi with a company detached in Tobruk to provide security for the large RAF staging
airfield at El Adem. After a year, the Battalion concentrated in Tripoli where it remained until April
1963.

Libya 1962. The Battalion had been issued with the Self Loading Rifte (SLR) and combat suits
It was during this period that National Service ceased and the Regular Army became an all volunteer
force for the first time since 1939. The Battalion was desperately understrength with only two rifle
companies, each of only two rifle platoons and a support platoon. Recruiting of sufficient regulars
proved a demanding and difficult task, especially when based in North Africa.
In April 1963 the Battalion returned to Britain to be stationed at Tidworth on Salisbury Plain as
part of the Strategic Reserve. They now had to be organised, equipped and trained for short notice
deployment by air to any crisis point requiring military action. In January 1964 a reinforced company
trained for two months in Arctic operations at Fort Churchill on the Hudson Bay. In mid-May, during a

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Battalion Exercise on the Plain, a message was received ordering the Battalion to move immediately,
by air, to Aden. Here tribal uprisings in the hinterland of the Aden Protectorate were threatening the
road running between Aden and the garrison at Dhala on the Yemen border. A six week operation had
secured the road but the dissidents remained a threat and the Radfan area of steep, high and rugged
peaks had to be occupied. At the same time two rival nationalist groups, encouraged by President
Nasser, began a campaign of murder and intimidation in Aden itself, and its surrounding area, despite
the British Government's undertaking to grant independence by 1968.

A Company patrol in the Wadi Taym, Radfan Foot patrol in Aden Town

The Battalion was complete in Aden by 24 May, less than 10 days from the first warning, with A
Company already deployed at Thumier providing defence for the Radfan base. The next nine months
found the Battalion carrying out four, one month long operational tours up country in the Radfan,
interspersed with 'rest' periods in Aden town which usually involved intensive internal security duties,
urban patrolling by foot and vehicle and little 'rest'! It was like a very hot (temperature) Belfast six
years early! Operations in the Radfan, with temperatures up around 100 degrees Fahrenheit, and
often higher, were 75% combatting administrative, climatic and terrain conditions and 25% active
patrolling and similar operations. While the Battalion was in Aden, The Pipes and Drums made two
tours to Australia and South America - both 'firsts' in the Regiment's history.

In February 1965 the Battalion returned to Tidworth and then, in August 1966, after work-up training
in Canada, moved to Osnabruck in Germany and converted to the mechanised battalion role in AFV
432 tracked Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). It was the first battalion to convert direct to the role
which brought the requirement for many new skills such as driving, maintenance and radio operating,
together with the need to react tactically much more quickly and at greater speed than before. The
success of our conversion was watched very closely but, by the end of the year, having completed a
Divisional Exercise across German countryside, a new experience rather than on a training area, we
were judged to have passed all tests, and received considerable praise.

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6 Platoon, B Company assaulting from FV 432s supported by pintle-mounted machine guns

In 1967 the Territorial Army was again reduced considerably in size and renamed The Territorial,
Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve (TA&VR). The Regiment's element was reduced to only one
company, A Company of The 52nd Lowland Volunteers. This was followed in early 1968 by the
merger of the Lowland and Highland Brigades to form The Scottish Division exercising administrative
command of all the Scottish Infantry Battalions and their two Training Depots. The following year
Regimental cap badges were reintroduced to the pleasure of all Royal Scots. On 1 July 1968 HM The
Queen, accompanied by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, had unveiled an extension to the Regimental
Monument commemorating the 47 years that HRH The Princess Royal had served as our Colonel in
Chief from 1918-1965.

In 1969 a new era and area of operations began for the British Army when, on 14 August, 1st Battalion
The Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire were deployed on the street of Londonderry,
in Northern Ireland, to assist the hard-pressed and exhausted Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in
combatting the severe rioting that was taking place. What started as inter-communal strife between
Catholic Republicans demanding civil rights against Protestant Loyalists, soon developed into an
anti-terrorist campaign, still in support of the RUC, aimed at containing the ambitions of the Irish
Republican Army and its allied organisations seeking a united Ireland. Within days of the first troops
deploying, reinforcements were sent to the Province and, by October, ten battalions were helping
to police Ulster. This task was to dominate British Army commitments for the next thirty-five years
including over the major campaigns of the Falklands, Gulf and Iraq. The 1st Battalion, stationed in
Osnabruck, were the first reinforcement battalion to deploy from BAOR arriving in Belfast on 2
March 1970. It was during this tour that the Provisional IRA emerged and commenced their campaign
of bombings and shootings.

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Major A R G Addison and B Company on The Falls Road, Belfast 1970

The Battalion suffered five operational and two non-operational deaths during the 13 tours and a
further 2 attached from other Corps were killed in accidents.

A Company on riot duties Belfast An observation post on the Fermanagh
Border

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The Army's task grew from riot control and 'Keeping the Peace' to quelling and defeating urban
and rural terrorism. Force levels in the Province varied during this time in response to the intensity
of terrorist activity, peaking at some 22,000, including 27 infantry battalions or infantry roled units,
over Operation Motorman in July/August 1972 when the Battalion was on a short-notice emergency
tour and deployed to the Creggan Estate of Londonderry for the Operation itself. It is interesting to
note that the size of this deployment with the Ulster Defence Regiment and RUC in support, was very
similar to the British Army element in The Gulf War in 1991-2. Overall between 1970 and 2002 the
Battalion carried out 13 operational tours in Northern Ireland, including two, two year resident tours,
totalling some 71/2 years in the Province.
The Battalion returned for a second tour to Tidworth in November 1970 to take on the role as the
British Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)) battalion. The AMF(L) was a multi-
National, Brigade-sized formation whose role was to deploy in a deterrent role to the flanks of the
Organisation at short-notice during an early stage of crisis to build confidence, display solidarity
and, if required, fight alongside the single National forces normally deployed in those areas. The
Battalion's priority was to learn to operate in the Arctic of North Norway, followed by rather more
conventional warfare in Denmark and, on the Southern Flank, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Much time
was spent on major exercises, study periods and winter training, including operating on skis, over the
next four years. Together with three short-notice (24 hours!) deployments to Northern Ireland, not
much time was spent in Tidworth.

Winter Training in Norway 1970-74
During 1971 a second TA Company was added back to the Regiment when the 52nd Lowland
Volunteers was enlarged to two Battalions. Both RS Companies were in the 2nd Battalion.
After four winters in the AMF(L) role the battalion was posted to Cyprus in May 1974. At that time
the Battalion had had more family separation in the previous four years than any other in the Army.

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All ranks and their families were therefore looking forward to two years stability in the sunshine
as they took over responsibility for security of the Akrotiri and Dhekalia Sovereign Base Areas.
This was not to be. On 15 July President Makarios was deposed by elements of the National Guard
who were still, as in 1955, seeking Enosis or Union with Greece despite Cyprus having become an
independent Republic in 1961. The situation deteriorated rapidly as the National Guard - manned
by Greek Cypriots, took control and forced the Turkish Cypriot minority into their enclaves. This
resulted in Turkey invading the island and the division of the Republic, which continues as of the time
of writing. The British Bases were not directly involved but the plight of the majority of the families,
living off base in the Republic, became critical and they, together with thousands of tourists, had to
be evacuated to the UK through the Bases. Throughout this period the Battalion was deployed on
internal security, both on the edge of and outside the Bases, and assisting with the evacuation. They
remained, mostly unaccompanied, on the island until January 1975 when they returned to Edinburgh.

Cyprus 1974-75

During the next year in Edinburgh the Battalion was involved in Ceremonial duties, assisting the
civil authorities during a strike of refuse workers in Glasgow and a fifth emergency tour in Northern
Ireland. This tour, our first in South Armagh, was one of the hardest ones we undertook. Sadly we
lost three soldiers when the vehicle in which they were travelling was blown up. In June 1976 the
Battalion returned to Munster in West Germany where they had been stationed briefly in 1951. They
formed the unique role of Nuclear Convoy Escort Battalion, mounted in Land Rovers, and working

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closely with 8 Regiment RCT and US troops, in providing security of resupply of warheads for
the nuclear artillery. These three years, when we were removed from the Northern Ireland roster,
provided a much needed respite from the intensive activity of the previous six.
The Battalion returned to Edinburgh from Munster in March 1979 to undertake more ceremonial
duties and a sixth, four month tour, in Belfast, before moving in February 1981 to Ballykinler in
Northern Ireland, this time as a resident battalion for two years where they formed part of the Province
Reserve. Not having their own area of responsibility companies were often deployed under command
of other units as reinforcements. We lost a soldier killed on one of these.
In 1983 the Battalion returned to Edinburgh to take part in the celebrations to mark the 350th anniversary
of the raising of the Regiment in 1633. The climax of these was a Review of the Regiment by HM The
Queen in Holyrood Park. It was at this parade that Her Majesty announced the appointment of Her
daughter, HRH The Princess Anne, to be our Colonel-in- Chief.

‘Royal Scots 350’ A composite painting of scenes during the 350th commemoration events
In March 1984 the Battalion deployed to the Falkland Islands and South Georgia for five months
where a garrison had been maintained since the defeat of the Argentinian invasion in 1982.
In April 1985 the Battalion returned to BAOR in the role of a mechanised battalion stationed at
Werl. A major armoured training exercise in Canada was followed by an eighth tour to Northern
Ireland, in West Belfast, from December 1987 to March 1988. 1989 saw the issue of a new Armoured
Infantry Fighting Vehicle - the Warrior - with a turret mounting a 30mm cannon which introduced a
completely new range of tactics and skills to the Battalion. This coincided with the end of the Cold

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War, after 40 years, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, followed by the tearing down of the Berlin
Wall, without a shot being fired.

POST COLD WAR 1990-2006
While the Battalion settled in enthusiastically to conversion training the debate began on the future
structure and organisation of the British Army. This was put on hold after Iraq invaded Kuwait and
a Coalition Force, including the 1st British Armoured Division, was assembled to eject and defeat
them. The 1st Battalion deployed to Saudi Arabia in December 1990 and played a major part in the
short but fierce ground war of 25-28 February, gaining more gallantry awards than any other unit in
the Division. Very sadly Private Tom Haggerty was killed in an ammunition accident just after the
actual fighting had finished. The full story of the Battalion's role in The Gulf War is given in the essay
'The Regiment's Last Battle Honour' in the History section of the Regimental web-site.

0peration Desert Storm. Royal Scots fighting onto an objective
On 27 June The Princess Royal reopened the totally refurbished Regimental Museum in Edinburgh
Castle. A month later, on 23 July, it was announced that the 1st Battalion was to amalgamate with
that of The King's Own Scottish Borderers. Immediately after this depressing news, and only six
months after they had fought on behalf of their country, the Battalion returned to Fort George, outside
Inverness, in Scotland. Then, in early 1992, the number of Royal Scots Territorials was reduced again
to only one company. From September 1992 to March 1993 the Battalion undertook its ninth Northern
Ireland tour in South Armagh. It was during this tour, on 3 February, and much to everyone's joy,
the planned amalgamation with the Borderers was cancelled. By early 1994, not surprisingly after
the turmoil over the previous eighteen months and the lack of a defined role in an isolated barracks,
poor recruiting and retention were seriously affecting manning levels in the Battalion. On 1 March
the Regimental Band, along with those of all the other Scottish Infantry Regiments disbanded and

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formed into the Lowland and Highland Scottish Division Bands. From November 1995 to April 1986
the Battalion returned to South Armagh for its tenth Northern Ireland tour. Sadly a Junior NCO was
shot and killed at the very end of the tour.

In July 1996 the Battalion at last left Fort George for Colchester where it assumed the really different
role of that of an airmobile battalion. Strong in Milan anti-tank missile capability and light cross-
country mobile vehicles, the Battalion was reinforced by a full company of Gurkhas who formed B
Company. During the next four years the Battalion trained as a Battalion in Kenya and the USA and
completed its eleventh and twelfth tours to Northern Ireland. B (Gurkha) Company were not allowed
to deploy to Northern Ireland so were replaced respectively by a company from The Worcestershire
and Sherwood Foresters Regiment and The Duke of Wellington's Regiment on these tours while B
Company deployed twice on operational tours to Bosnia. Separately, during their time in the airmobile
role, rifle companies trained in Cyprus, the USA and on winter warfare training in Canada.

A mortar platoon ‘All-terrain Weapons Winter warfare training, Canada, 2000
Platform’

It was with great sadness that we said goodbye to B (Gurkha) Company in March 2000. Our own
numbers during this period had, however, been boosted by the very welcome arrival of some fifty
Fijians from 1998 onwards - the first ones having joined from the Royal Fijian Military Forces Band
during their participation in the Edinburgh Military Tattoo that year. In later years they were joined by
a number of other recruits from the Commonwealth, notably Kenya and South Africa.

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The first Fijians arrive in 1999

The Battalion moved to Ballykelly, near Londonderry for its thirteenth (final) tour, and second
two-year residential one, in August 2000. By the time the Battalion arrived the IRA had ceased to
be tactically relevant but there was always the threat to the ongoing peace process from dissident
groups from both sides. While continuing to maintain a high operational level throughout the tour the
opportunity was taken to encourage sport. With the arrival of the Fijians the Battalion won both the
Army and, outstandingly, the Middlesex Rugby Sevens. Adventurous training was enthusiastically
undertaken, apart from much use of local facilities within the Province, activities included gliding
in Oxfordshire and bobsleighing at Lillehammer in Norway and expeditions as far afield as India,
Jordan, Egypt, Spain, Ascension Island, France and sea sailing off Scotland.

In April 2002 the Battalion returned to the excellent Dreghorn Barracks in Edinburgh. The priority,
in spite of excellent retention rates in Ballykelly and, at 140 in 1991, the best enlistment figures for
over a decade, was very much recruiting. Behind the logo 'The Boys are Back in Town' the Battalion
marched through Edinburgh in combat kit with Colours flying and bayonets fixed to remind the City
that we were home. Soon afterwards a composite Company trained in Belize before the Battalion
settled down to prepare for a six-month tour in Bosnia. They deployed in November and rapidly
established their strong presence in a delicate political arena with some determined searches and large
finds including within the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb) Houses of Parliament and their Ministry
of Defence.

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Displaying one of the weapons finds

They returned to Edinburgh in April 2003 and the delayed presentation of new, and what was, sadly,
to prove to be the Regiment's final Colours, took place in glorious sunshine within Dreghorn Barracks
on 4 July. Before the Presentation the Battalion had been warned for an emergency tour in Iraq from
November, not as a formed battalion but as three separate companies reinforcing other units. A very
small Battalion HQ deployed filling posts within the Divisional HQ from which they could oversee
Battalion administrative matters on the ground. Preparation and training were fitted around provision
of Her Majesty's Guard at Balmoral and support to The Edinburgh Military Tattoo. Deployment was
in November which meant that elements of the Battalion had operated in jungle, mountains and desert,
along with a substantial element of ceremonial, all within the space of eighteen months, and a major
change from the Northern Ireland treadmill of the previous ten years. The three companies all had
very different, successful but busy tours under command of various units, mostly Royal Artillery and
Royal Armoured Corps operating in the infantry role but also, in C Company's case, under command
of a Danish Battalion, probably a unique event in the Regiment's long history. The deployment did
not however help Battalion cohesiveness and the major task on the return of the three companies to
Dreghorn in April was to rebuild that.

That rebuilding came rapidly with a Battalion training exercise in Galloway followed by a major all-
arms test exercise on Salisbury Plain. On 21 July 2004, in a statement to the House of Commons,
the Secretary of State for Defence delivered a long awaited statement, Options for Change, on yet
another restructuring of the Army - in the infantry's case to lead to a reduction from 40 to 36 regular
battalions. While the detail was still supposedly to be decided it was clear that the Scottish Regiments
were under severe pressure and could lose two of their six regular battalions. Throughout the rest of
2004 the 1st Battalion concentrated on doing things that had not been possible for a bit. The sevens
team won the Army competition for the sixth time running, companies held training camps, adventure
training took place and, critically, individuals undertook career courses. Halfway through this period
the Battalion was warned as a standby reserve for Iraq from January to July 2005 and training swung

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into the, by now, well-established preparatory path leading to deployment on operations. This allowed
the serving members to concentrate on something positive for the future while the retired members of
the Regiment, meeting within the Regimental Council, coordinated the Campaign to save not just The
Royal Scots but all the existing 40 battalions which were already desperately over-stretched against
existing operational commitments. On 15 December, carefully timed just as the House departed on
its Christmas Break, the announcement came that The Scottish Division would lose one battalion and
merge into The Royal Regiment of Scotland of seven battalions, five regular and two reserve (formerly
territorial). The reduction to be achieved through the merger of the 1st Battalions of The Royal Scots
and The King's Own Scottish Borderers. Regimentally the decision was made that we would continue
to fight against any reduction in the infantry but do nothing that would damage the difficult job of
uniting the two Battalions harmoniously. On Saturday18 December the Regimental Association Pipe
Band led a march of 3,500 supporters of the 'Save the Scottish Regiments' campaign along Princes
Street for a rally in the Gardens. The Royal Scots contingent of 800, by far the largest, was at the front
and, being the last Saturday before Christmas, the Street was packed with shoppers who to a man (and
woman) applauded and supported us the whole way. For a complete record of the events leading up
to and following the announcement of Options for Change see part 2 of Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard
(PPB) Vol 3 - The Regimental Campaign.

In the event the 1st Battalion were not required in Iraq and reverted to a period of uncertainty and a
multitude of support and assistance tasks which sapped at the hard won battalion cohesion. It was then
warned for a Northern Ireland tour in South Armagh from January to July 2006 which at least allowed
focused training and protection from other commitments. Iraq and Afghanistan were now assuming
ever more importance as operational commitments and, in early December, Northern Ireland was
changed to Iraq with the Battalion, less one Company, to be based in a reserve role outside Basra
and one company in Baghdad. Deployment was in early January and was followed by a busy, varied
and operationally active tour. The rugby team was initially left with the rear party and won the Army
Rugby Cup for the first and only time in the Regiment's history - and the sevens for an unprecedented
seventh year in a row.

On the 28 March 2006, Regimental Day, while the 1st Battalion were deployed on operations in Iraq,
and after 373 years to the day of unbroken service to Sovereign and Country since King Charles
1 had signed his Warrant to raise Hepburn's Regiment, our direct forbears, the Regiment merged
with the five other surviving Regular and two Territorial Regiments of Scottish Infantry to form
The Royal Regiment of Scotland, abbreviated to SCOTS. As it would have been hugely difficult
to merge the Battalions while on operations, The 1st Battalion was temporarily re-titled The Royal
Scots Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland (and 1KOSB similarly temporarily renamed - see
Aftermath below). The 28th March is now celebrated as Formation Day by the new Regiment and
marks their inheritance from us of the position of the Senior Infantry Regiment in the British Army.

Lowering of the old and raising of the new Regimental Flags Shaibah Base, Basra, 28 March 2006

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AFTERMATH
The Battalion returned to Dreghorn in early May 2006. On 26 May, under its new name, it marked its
homecoming by parading down Princes Street, behind its old Colours and, for the first time, in front
of HRH The Princess Royal in her new appointment as Royal Colonel rather than Colonel-in-Chief.
They were followed by a huge contingent from The Regimental Association led by their Pipe Band,
representatives from our affiliated and allied units, HMS Edinburgh, The Royal Gurkha Rifles, The
Canadian Scottish and The Royal Newfoundland Regiments, our former TA Company (now part of 6
SCOTS), and members of our affiliated cadet forces.
On 1 August, Minden Day, celebrated by The King's Own Scottish Borderers as their Regimental
Day, the two battalions merged to form The Royal Scots Borderers, 1st Battalion the Royal Regiment
of Scotland (1 SCOTS).
On 9 May 2007 HRH The Princess Royal, now The Royal Patron of The Regimental Association,
unveiled two plaques on the Regimental Monument in West Princes Street Gardens The first, of carved
stone, marked the end of our 373 years of independent service and the merging of the Regiment into
The Royal Regiment of Scotland while the second, a bronze plaque, commemorated her 23 years
as Colonel-in-Chief. The opportunity was also taken to add the final Gulf Battle Honours and the
remaining places we had served to the Monument.
Part 3 - Epilogue - of PPB Vol 3, published in 2007, completed the story of the Regiment and explains
how elements of the Regiment, such as items of dress, have been incorporated into SCOTS and the
detail behind the actual formation of the new Battalion.

Further Reading: Greater detail on the whole of the period covered in this essay can be found in the
relevant copies of the Regimental Journal, The Thistle. Details can be found on the Regimental web
site at www.theroyalscots.co.uk
Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard (PPB).

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Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard, published, two volumes in 2001 and the third in 2007, is the definitive
History of The Royal Scots. Volume 1 covers the period from 1603 when the predecessors of the
Regiment fought for Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in the Thirty Years War to the end of World War
1 in 1919. Volume 2 covers 1918 to 2000 and Volume 3 takes our story from 2000 to the merger of the
Regiment into The Royal Regiment of Scotland in 2006 and the immediate aftermath of that merger.
All three are richly illustrated in both colour and black and white and enhanced with a total of 86
maps to assist the reader.
Copies of the Three Volumes are available from:
The Royal Scots Museum Office
The Old Provost Marshal's House,
The Castle,
EDINBURGH
EH1 2YT
at a cost of £25 for the three. P&P is additional and, due to their weight, can be expensive, especially
for overseas delivery. Those wishing copies are therefore advised to collect them from the Museum
Office, or have them collected for them. If advised in advance free access can be arranged into the
Castle but only to the Museum.

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THE REGIMENT’S LAST BATTLE HONOUR

This is the then Lieutenant Colonel Iain Johnstone OBE's personal report as Commanding Officer on
1 RS's participation in Operation Desert Storm- the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq in 1991 for which
it was awarded its 147th and 148th (final) Battle Honours over its 383 years of Service, Wadi El Batin
and GULF 1991, the latter carried on the Regimental Colour.

COMMANDING 1RS BG OP GRANBY/DESERT STORM 1990-91

This is based on something written not long after the event, and I think it is important that it is relayed
as it was, not as it now appears. This is an important point because, as General Rupert Smith once
said, "I am becoming less certain exactly when I began to know what I know now".

This is a personal account of commanding a Battalion during the Gulf campaign, with 4 Armoured
Brigade, as part of the 1st (UK) Division. I took over The First Battalion The Royal Scots in October
1989. It was an Armoured Infantry Battalion in 6 Armoured Brigade, consisting of 3 companies
each of 16 Warrior IFV, a platoon of 24 Milan ATGWs mounted on FV 432s as were a section of
eight 81mm mortars, my main headquarter vehicles as well as the ambulances. There were also a
Reconnaissance Platoon, a platoon of 90 electrical and mechanical engineers and a convoy of soft
skinned vehicles providing support and resupply. Its strength was about 800 men. Within a week I
was throwing it about as part of a battlegroup on Soltau training area. I was lucky because the next
year, in 1990, our division became the Support division for BAOR, which meant that not only did we
get more than our fair share of simple repetitive manual tasks, but we were also at the bottom priority
for training. This meant that Soltau that year was a low-key affair with no tanks, no gunner support
and an ever-increasing number of restrictions that had been placed on us to appease the civilian
population. We were not at our peak.

Perhaps sensing that and not long after our return to base, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. We
reported in at CEFT 1,1 (a combat readiness level) making us one of the few units with 95% of our
established manpower and equipment in place and ready to go. As a result we thought we would be
sent. We weren't. Instead we watched suspiciously as 7 Brigade were stood by and as units were
stripped to reinforce them. Eventually we were warned to be ready to chop to 4 Brigade in order to
replace 7 Brigade in March 1991 on rotation. To move up to our war establishment as well as taking
account of the postings that had already taken place for our imminent Arms Plot to UK we took a
formed company of 3 RRF under command and moved down to Hammelburg, the Geman Infantry
urban warfare training center, in our new ORBAT to shake ourselves out. We had plenty of time to
get to know our new brigade headquarters or so we thought.

Our real participation in GRANBY was announced to me at Hammelburg on the 15 November..we
were to load our vehicles and kit for the Gulf on 30 November.

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British Military vehicles at Bremerhaven awaiting shipment to the Gulf

GRANBY 1.5 had been born. For us it had 5 phases:

Phase 1, Rumour Control. Phase 1 had by this time taken place. There had been a bazaar of rumour
at all levels. The OPSEC was dreadful and speculation was fuelled by "experts", both green ones
and television ones. As the commander it was important to discover the truth and to stamp out
rumour. This was tricky as there was a whole range of information, most of which was as well
informed as mine and which certainly sounded more interesting. You see, there is a fine balance
between overbriefing, underinforming and speculation, and we found it once the operation had been
born by skipping the chain of command and I briefed all of the soldiers directly twice a day before
battalion fitness training. Briefing the soldiers did not necessarily mean that the information got to
the wives so the Families Office and the HIVE (families meeting center) had to become information
nodes. Nothing unsettles people more than uncertainty. This was a lesson that permeated the whole
campaign.

Phase 2 : The Preparation. At least by Phase 2 we had been told that we were actually going. The
problem was that we had to be ready to ship out in a fortnight. The schedule was tight and the help
that was imposed upon us gave us little freedom of action. We gave up the company of 3 RRF
because their unit was going too, and we took on board a company of Grenadier Guards instead. They
had been stripped out to reinforce 7 Brigade and were a reconstituted company who hadn't worked
together. All the commanders were sent north to fire the 30mm guns whilst the soldiers were sent
east to Sennelager to be processed through a well-intentioned sausage machine that was unfortunately
outwith my control.

In the meantime the Adjutant had to sort out bums to seats, a procedure which is not easy nowadays
because of the degree of specialisation in the modern Infantry: none of our soldiers come out of the

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backs of their vehicles without some specialist trade: there are no simple load carriers and shit-pit
diggers left. During this my headquarters was being engaged in a series of briefings and work up
exercises and it became difficult to predict who in the Headquarters was going to be where when.
A commander can't be everywhere at once and there were a myriad of decisions to be taken. I laid
down a series of principles: for instance: I want to be administered by the Advance Party not briefed
to death: and then left the implementation to everyone else. Mission Command has its place in the
office as well as on the battlefield.

As far as manning was concerned the mission was clear: we had to deploy to the Gulf with the
strongest team possible: that encompassed selection as well as training. If you weren't happy about
the crew you could either sack people or redeploy them. We did the latter. All Armoured Infanteers
have skills, but they were not necessarily doing the job at which they were strongest when the order
came. This is the problem with having to operate during peacetime with an organisation designed for
wartime: some people are just in the wrong place.

To prepare the Battalion for war we closed down the messes and put everyone on ration strength,
feeding the Battalion in the cookhouse. We held a Battalion muster parade before dawn every morning
where I briefed the men on what was going on before we all went for an hour's violent fitness training.
The same procedure was repeated before last light (about 1600): more fitness: and then we worked on
until we could do no more. Breaking the going-home-for-meals cycle early was important. Soldiers
clocked in at home only to sleep. This became a declaration of commitment by the soldiers and their
families alike. We made the deadline: just.

Phase 3 : The Deployment. We moved to theatre around Christmas, but this process covered some
weeks. During this time clarity of purpose was paramount. Our mission became to deploy to the
desert as soon as we could, in order to get on with theatre training. We soon found out though that
if you sat about and waited your turn, you would be by-passed. There seemed to be a need to fight
for everything. There was also a need to guard your kit jealously, because there were a lot of sticky
fingers about itching to relieve you of it. Trust only those you know and keep your beady eye on them.
Little worked as planned. What came off the ships bore scant resemblance to the manifest. Although
the DOAST (Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table) was meticulously planned, ships overtook each
other and some broke down. Planes arrived at strange times and low loaders didn't turn up. As a
result, every hour brought a change of plan, and so, to make the most of what we had got, we decided
to deploy piecemeal. Working on the basis that half a company in the desert is worth two in transit,
we deployed the vehicles with just the drivers and commanders and then bounced the Jocks into the
field to join them within 24 hours of touchdown.

This was now the time to take stock: we were about to go on the offensive in the open desert, not on
the defensive in woody old North West Europe, and not with the people we had been training with
either. We had also to maintain the aggressive spirit in the Jocks despite the fact that there were few
resources available.

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“A reputation of such strength….” Private Owens during the training phase. Private Owen is a
grandson of Cpl Elcock VC MM who won his medals with the 11th Battalion in France in the Great

War

182

We had no idea when or indeed if war would start, but we did know that there was no time to
waste. We imposed strict standards from the start. People carried all their operational kit all the time.
Stand-to was enforced at 0530 and 1800. Light discipline was harsh; Drivers and commanders were
forced to drive closed-down wherever they went. Vehicle batteries began to boil in the heat, filling
the turret with acid fumes, our remote chemical alarms gave off rogue warnings and we masked in
record-beating times while we experimented with numerous measures to reduce sand ingress into
the vehicle engines. We were lucky because we had learned much from the STAFFORDS who had
been in theatre with 7 Brigade a couple of months longer than we. Never be too proud to take advice.
Tempers were lost on an hourly basis in a clash of wills. Slowly but surely the hard posture became
second nature, but to maintain it required steadfastness of purpose.

Officers lived with their vehicle crews. There were no perks for them. Everyone was treated in the
same way. We backloaded everything that was not essential and then we threw out most of what was
left. Bergens (including mine) were shared, leaving a set of clean clothes, washing kit and a notebook
as the only personal items. Everything else was communal. The loneliness of command, a somewhat
naval concept, had no place in the desert. Personally, it was vital that the vehicle crew knew me,
knew when I was tired, knew when I was under stress. I lived with them as a member of the crew and
we shared everything. The buddy-buddy system applies as much to officers as to men.

We trained as hard as we could. We had to extract every last ounce of value from the limited resources
at our disposal. We set up our own illegal field firing ranges, we scrounged ammunition, we fired
day and night and conducted progressively more demanding practices. When one of our company
commanders was shot in the stomach during a complex live firing night trench-clearing practice, we
were firing again within five minutes of the CASEVAC helicopter taking off. We needed to show
everyone that we meant business, and the Jocks thrived on it. They took a pride in the tough image
that they were creating and, as the Press began to notice, the tougher they became. They positively
revelled in it.

Then at last we began to train with our armour. This was the first time that we had ever worked
together and we had a lot of ground to make up: but we were limited in what we could achieve
by a shortage of spares and real estate. Everything we used in training would not be available for
immediate action. This was a chronic juggling act that must have taxed Div HQ constantly. We had
to practise new procedures as well as old: anti missile drills, meeting engagements, counterstrokes
and, because we had never worked together before, we had to keep everything as simple as possible.
In fact we began to emulate the Soviets, not only in their tactical drills, but in their norms of support
as well. There were other problems to address too: the anonymity of the commander was one. It
seemed pretty pointless going forward to inspire the troops if they did not know you were there. So,
my vehicle flew the somewhat large commanding officer's Saint Andrew's flag on its turret (Note. the
flag was indentical to the Lieutenant Colonel's Colour first recorded in 1680!). In the end the whole
battlegroup configured on that as a matter of procedure.

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Commanding 0fficer's Warrior in action ftying his ftag

At formation level the Div Comander briefed us on the actual plan and then ran it through as a
command exercise. This allowed the battlegroup commanders an opportunity to discover potential
problem areas, and also gave them the chance to alter procedures.

We then ran through the breaching operation with the 1st US Div (the Big Red One) who were going
to make the hole in the Iraqi defences, and practised passage of lines. It was a shambles, but it did
allow us to make alterations so that, on the night, the whole thing went like clockwork. Never turn
down the opportunity to rehearse. We also used the time to iron out a few misunderstandings at
brigade level as well.

General Smith visited regularly and gave us great confidence. He used our operational deployment
to the west as a training exercise to practise the plan, so we were becoming pretty familiar with it.
This was most reassuring. Talking of reassurance, we had meanwhile been issued with satellite
navigation kits, and these proved to be truly wonderful pieces of equipment. Command was suddenly
made much easier and every procedure from reorganisation to CASEVAC was speeded up. We split
the limited issue of Satnav 50/50 between the teeth and tail. This was a war of logistics, and a REME
recovery vehicle with satnav could quickly bring forward a platoon's worth of refurbished firepower,
while spending twice as much time repairing kit, instead of charging around the desert looking for
it. There was a deluge of new equipment. We were being given the very best that money could buy
and I doubt if any British force has ever been so totally supported. We were given rifle grenades,
rocket propelled mine clearers, radar, night viewing aids. We had M548 tracked load carriers to assist
resupply, decoy tanks, chemical sheeting and a whole mass of other bits and pieces. Unfortunately,
we did not have much time to train on it.

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Phase 4, The War. We moved up into our forward assembly area. We had been injected against
Anthrax and plague (with a whooping cough floater) we had been taking Nerve Agent Protection pills
for months. We hadn't had a drink for ages and my liver thought that it had been transplanted. The
Jocks were fitter by not drinking and there had been no discipline cases.

The Brigade was to attack through the US bridgehead to destroy the enemy tactical reserves in order
to secure the right flank of the 7 ( US ) Corps. 1RS was to be in reserve initially, was then to destroy
the enemy Battalion(-) in the western half of BRASS and was finally to be ready for further moves
culminating in the destruction of the Republican Guard. The enemy Counter Attack capability was
the initial target. Anything that could move or shoot a long way was to be destroyed.
We were configured as a 1,2 Battlegroup with C Squadron The Life Guards with 15 Challenger tanks,
a troop of armoured engineers with CET (combat engineer tractor), bridge layers, mine ploughs and
fascines, an ambulance collecting section and a Forward Air Controller under command with up to
2 regiments of artillery in support. The Battlegroup was now over 1000 strong. We moved up to
the staging areas and, after it was decided to despatch 7 Brigade first, and after they had gone, we
transited the breach. En route to the forming up place the Brigade Commander changed the plan.
1RS were now to clear and destroy the enemy in BRONZE. This had not originally been our task
and, to be honest, I hadn't paid much attention to the detail. And that is another lesson! I tried
unsuccessfully to contact all the company commanders on our recently fitted secure radios but their
limited issue meant that we didn't have an all informed secure net and I had to use other means. I
held a quick set of orders at the back of my vehicle.

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Lieutenant Colonel Iain Johnstone giving his orders. Maj John Potter OC B Coy, kneeling with
a notebook, with Maj Norman Soutar OC A Coy to his left. Both were awarded the MC for their

leadership in action

Dusk fell. It was a dark, rainy night. Each vehicle showed a red light at the back as an identification
feature. That and the lack of ambient light effectively obscured the Warrior's Image Intensification
sights. The Thermal Imaging sights on Challenger, which identify heat sources, worked fine, but they
couldn't see the red lights. Despite the ability of Warrior to match Challenger's cross country speed,
the different sighting systems on that night reintroduced the old divide between armour and Infantry.
H hour arrived. We were expecting to be gassed. We had 3 doctors and 19 ambulances with us and
were expecting to take heavy casualties, particularly from artillery and chemicals. We should have
been frightened and perhaps we were. As we moved off, the MLRS rockets streaked above us and I
offered up a prayer, "Please God don't let my vehicle break down again", and we were off
.

186

Immediately we were cut in two by a gunner convoy of over 100 ammunition trucks. Our lead
vehicles went off a bit far north and got tangled up with the tail of another unit, the Recce Platoon had
a contact to the south and I was concerned that we would get sucked into the very defensive line we
were supposed to be bypassing. Sweat was pouring down our faces because we were closed-down
and in NBC suits with body armour on top. We moved off in our now so familiar formation and
reached Objective BRONZE at midnight.
BRONZE was quite slow. The "clear" mission that I had been given meant that we had to take out
every enemy position, and that took time. We destroyed a batch of M46 guns, cleared a string of
bunkers and captured about 100 PW.

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Iraqi prisoners being rounded up

Hot interrogation outlined the extent of minefields and located the next gun position for us. Leaving
B Company to finish clearing up, we moved on using the Lifeguards and A Company. We were
accustomed to each other by now and only the minimum of orders were needed.

As we cleared BRONZE we swung north and ran into what appeared to be an infantry position with
a large column of armoured vehicles some 2 kms behind it. We were unable to identify them. It was
confirmed that there were definitely no friendly vehicles at that grid: we used the gunners laser kit to
get a 100% read out but somehow it didn't have the right feel. We let the armour escape and took out
the Infantry position around dawn.

Sometime later we discovered that those unidentified vehicles had been a British dressing station with
30 odd geographically embarrassed armoured ambulances. AFV recognition at long range on TI is
difficult. We were now faced with a dilemma. Even though we were under pressure to move on there
were quite a few enemy dead and seriously injured soldiers to whom we had a responsibility under
the Geneva Convention. The Regimental Aid Post treated the enemy wounded and the padre quickly
buried the dead. We loaded the seriously wounded into our ambulances and we set off again. We
went due north and then swung down south to take the enemy from the rear on BRASS.

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Forming up place

(FU P)

Phase I Lifegutmls
attack armour on Fife
Phase 2 8 Company
sweeps through to
Strathc!yde

Phe se JA A Company
crosses Oile.d Road ro

attack rrrampian

PkrQse 3e 8 Company
sends +Platoon to
attach Castle

ApproxilrffAtt swle
o 1 Xdomerre
-t::::=:=====:l

We had actually planned this attack on BRASS. All of the soldiers had been briefed on it in detail.
Sitting in the back of a vehicle without any vision ports and without access to the net, with the prospect
of launching yourself from it into a well-fortified Iraqi position is not to be envied. The soldiers
therefore deserve the very best plan and briefing that time allows. Ours got it. This particular plan
had 3 phases: destruction of tanks first, the northern mechanised position next and the southern one
last. As we moved off, our heavy artillery fire coupled with strong winds whipped up a sand storm so
that visibility was severely reduced. The Lifeguards destroyed the first tanks. There were more than
we had expected.
Once the enemy tanks were burning I launched B Company to roll up the right flank. We really had
taken the enemy from the rear. Some of his vehicles were dug in so deep that we debussed soldiers
to destroy them from the ground. Once the north was secure I launched A Company, who had been
creeping down the left flank in anticipation, and they put in their own two-phase armoured infantry
assault driving through their own covering barrage so that as it lifted the enemy were at rifle point.
About 6 T55, 20 APC, 6 AA guns and miscellaneous trucks, bunkers, stores and ammunition were
destroyed. We took another 100 or so prisoners, quite a few of them wounded.

Private Gow of 5 platoon, B company during the assault on Brass. He was awarded the Military
Medal for his action

By this time it was becoming quite apparent that the fight had been knocked out of the Iraqis and that
many of them had fled. They seemed to be offering no coordinated resistance. I say seemed because
it was impossible to be certain. Unlike other operations this one was so quiet. The commander was
cocooned. There was no noise save that of the radios and the throb of the engine. Fighting at night in
particular and using the II sights was like playing a computer game on a green monitor with the sound

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turned down. It was easy to be calm because there was an unreality about it all. It was only when
the hatch was thrown back to debus that there was a shock-wave of sound with tracer bouncing off
everywhere. You felt safe: too safe: detached from reality. Not an Infantry feeling at all.

Whilst 14/20th and 3 RRF sorted out their objectives, we cleared through the rest of the position.
There were a lot of mines and bomblets about, and a number of vehicles had explosions under their
tracks. Further orders were called and we were told to take out Objective TUNGSTEN with 3 RRF
that night.

The bad news was that, in our northern half of TUNGSTEN, according to the not particularly detailed
brief, there were the remains of 2 artillery battalions, 2 mechanised infantry companies, 2 armoured
squadrons and an ordinary infantry company at the following seven grid references. Apparently the
promised detailed intelligence picture was still in the post. Never believe promises. However, the
good news was that the enemy were believed to be significantly reduced. We asked for, and received,
an additional tank squadron. It arrived late. Our Recce Platoon, which had been sent forward to
identify a crossing point over a pipeline, had become involved in a running contact, and our main
headquarters element, which included the mortars and RAP, had been separated from us by a rogue
convoy cutting across them. So we were pretty late.

Configuring the Battlegroup as 2 company/squadron groups we crashed over the pipeline from a
running start and assaulted one position after the other, rolling across the 17 km objective. It took us
until first light to finish and we then swung north into a blocking position. It was all getting a bit too
easy and it was tempting to take risks. But what for? We were already moving faster than the Corps
could accommodate, and there was the added risk of running into the Egyptians.

We were also terribly tired: a constantly moving operation like this allows no sleep for commanders,
and as deputy commanders have to command their vehicles too, they don't sleep either. The high-
tech 24-hour-a-day battle had arrived, and tired people were making small mistakes and took longer
to do things. Risk and gain: that is the fundamental equation for all commanders. If there is no gain
then take no risk.

We replenished. Our A1 echelon had been tucked up into main headquarters and we had dropped back
some MILAN for protection. It carried only ammunition and fuel, the rest was further back. This
meant that we were topped up again within an hour or so. In the interim, we had to take out another
position, which had been firing mortars. We were getting pretty slick by now, and B Company sorted
it out with a fire mission regiment and a platoon attack. We were on the move again that afternoon,
but shortly afterwards the tank regiment on our right had a blue-on-blue with the tail end of 7 Brigade
and so we were told to hold firm. Thereafter we received a series of orders that were intended to take
us north, south and east. Eventually we went east at dawn, in order to cut the road out of Kuwait City,
to destroy the remains of the encircled Iraqi army. We stopped some 30 kms short when offensive
operations were suspended. For us the short, violent and very successful war had really finished.

Phase 5 : The Debrief. The subsequent spell in the desert was tricky. The place was littered with the
debris of war; dangerous debris at that. We reconfigured in a semi non-tactical layout, and suddenly
our routine was shattered. The hard tactical posture that had become a way of life had gone and we
needed to do something. It seemed silly to train for what we had just done and so we ran a series
of cadres in preparation for our Arms Plot move back and during that time we assessed just what, if
anything, we had learned as commanders.

The overwhelming use of air power and the stunning logistic success have already been catalogued as

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operational lessons. From a lower level we learned that IFF needs to be addressed across the whole
spectrum, visible and non-visible. We found that PWs, particularly wounded ones, can slow you
down. We relearned that people make mistakes when they are tired and that commanders in a mobile
war are more likely to get tired than their men. We also discovered that the shift away from an all
informed net by using trunk communications or secure radio on limited issue degrades command and
inadvertently leaves some people out of chunks of the planning process. We reminded ourselves that
the tried tools of command still work: human contact, building trust, ensuring mail gets through, and
enforcing firm and fair discipline. Not surprisingly we showed that cutting out booze makes better
soldiers and that they didn't really mind too much provided that it is made very difficult to get hold of.

We also reinforced the point that TD (tactical doctrine) and terminology must be consistent, must be
learned and understood by everyone, especially if they're to be switched between formations. From
my command level GRANBY highlighted the need for combined arms training to be conducted on a
regular basis exercising with the same units with whom you intend to fight.

There's no substitute for this intensive field training: because that's where the sort of problems occur
that happen for real. The beauty of DESERT STORM was that it was so similar to our training. The
British Army should take comfort from that. However, the prospect of ever diminishing opportunities
to carry out such field training in the future is concerning. It will have repercussions for commanders
and subordinates alike. It might even encourage Lindt's "zero defect mentality" where commanding
officers, given only one chance at jumping through the hoop might become less prepared to allow
their subordinates any opportunity to make mistakes. That would lead us down the path towards rigid
centralised control: a dangerous path for all that. Things happen so fast in this high tech environment
that rigid centralised control can't keep up, as the Iraqis discovered.

I said at the very beginning that command in war was easy. This is perhaps not surprising as we
had been given time to conduct work up training before we launched and, once we did we had air
supremacy, significant reinforcement, the best equipment and the very best of soldiers. We also had
tremendous support from our Army and our Public. Despite the fact that we had transited minefields,
attacked an enemy who was reported to have 125 brigades of war hardened troops and one who would
not hesitate to use chemical weapons, we suffered virtually no casualties. We were outstandingly
lucky. We were luckier still to have been part of such an overwhelming success because nothing
makes command easier than success.

0il by David Rowlands painted in 1991 for the Warrant 0fficers and Sergeants Mess

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NIGHTS OUT OF BED (ON OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS AWAY FROM HOME
BARRACKS) POST - 1945

Although the British Army, in the post-1945 period, has been engaged, almost constantly, on many
operations, only three 'wars', Korea 1951-53, the Falklands Islands in 1982 and the Gulf War of 1991
have been recognised with the award of Battle Honours. While the 1st Battalion had arrived in Korea
before the ceasefire was declared, it was not deployed on full operations, and, as such, did not earn
the campaign or any individual Battle Honour. Those serving in the 1st Battalion at that time did,
however, receive both the British and UN Korean War medals. The only Honours therefore earned
since 1945 are from the Gulf War in 1991. These are Wadi El Batin and GULF 1991. The latter has
been added to the Regimental Colour.

Apart from those wars for which Battle Honours have been awarded, there have been many campaigns
or operational situations in which the Regiment has been involved since 1945 and for which, in
some cases, a General Service Medal with one or more bars has been awarded. These have included
Palestine (2RS 1945-46), the Canal Zone (1954-55), Cyprus (1955), Suez (1956), Radfan and South
Arabia (1964-65) and, of course, Northern Ireland.

The 1st Battalion served on thirteen operational tours in Northern Ireland of which two were resident.
These are listed below:

Belfast Mar - Jul 1970
Londonderry May-Jul 1971
Belfast Oct-Dec 1971
Belfast/Londonderry Jun-Aug 1972
South Armagh Dec 1975-Apr 1976
Belfast Feb-May 1980
Ballykinler (Resident) Mar 1981-Mar 1983
Belfast Dec 1987-Mar 1988
South Armagh Sep 1992-Mar 1993
South Armagh Nov 1995-Apr 1996
Fermanagh (part deployment) Jun-Dec 1997
South Armagh Mar-Aug 1999
Ballykelly (Resident) Aug 2000-Apr 2002

With the unaccompanied tours in Cyprus, after the Turkish invasion, from August 1974 - February
1975 and the Falkland Islands from March - July 1984, plus, of course the Gulf War from January -
April 1991, a total of well over eight years, or 25%, were spent on operational deployment in the thirty
- two years of 'peace' between 1970 and 2002. That figure does not include deployments away from
Barracks on major exercises. In the years 1971-74 when the 1st Battalion was the British battalion
in the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force(Land)(AMF(L)), the Battalion trained every winter
in Norway and took part in a major NATO Exercise in Greece, Denmark or Norway every autumn,
leading to a further 6-8 weeks away from barracks every year. In the years 1970-74 the Battalion had
the dubious distinction of having the most separation of any battalion in the British Army. (Known,
following studies into this and the resulting effect on enlistment, re-engagement and general morale,
as 'Nights out of Bed').

The pace continued after the 1st Battalion's return to Edinburgh in April 2002 with a deployment to

191

Bosnia from September 2002-April 2003. This was followed by Iraq from November 2003-April
2004 and again from January-May 2006 where they were serving at the time of the merger into The
Royal Regiment of Scotland on 28 March 2006.
In 1994 the Accumulated Service Medal was introduced to recognise the fact that many individuals
had served for many tours in Northern Ireland or other theatres for which the General Service Medal
1962 with a clasp had been awarded. The qualifying period is thirty-six months of such service since
14 August 1969 - the start date for the award of the clasp 'Northern Ireland'.

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PRE-1914 BATTLE HONOURS

The full list of the twenty-eight pre-1914 Battle Honours (excluding the Sphinx and "Egypt") carried
on the Regimental Colour is as follows. The Battalion or Battalions involved, the date of the action
and the date of the award is also shown.

Battle Honour Battalion(s) Date of Action Date of Award

Tangier 1680 Regiment 1680-1684 1910
Namur 1695 Regiment 1695 1910
Blenheim 1st & 2nd 1704 1882
Ramillies 1st & 2nd 1706 1882
Oudenarde 1st & 2nd 1708 1882
Malplaquet 1st & 2nd 1709 1882
Louisburg 1st 1758 1882
Havannah 2nd 1762 1909
Egmont-op-Zee 2nd 1799 1821
St Lucia 1803 1st 1803 1821,1910 1
Corunna 3rd 1809 1832
Busaco 3rd 1810 1817
Salamanca 3rd 1812 1817
Vittoria 3rd 1813 1817
St Sebastian 3rd 1813 1817
Nive 3rd 1813 1817
Peninsula 3rd 1810-1813 1815
Niagara 1st 1813-1814 1815
Waterloo 3rd 1815 1815
Nagpore 2nd 1817 1823
Maheidpore 2nd 1817 1823
Ava 2nd 1824-1826 1826
Alma 1st 1854 1855
Inkerman 1st 1854 1855
Sevastopol 1st & 2nd 1854-1855 1855
Taku Forts 2nd 1860 1861
Pekin 1860 2nd 1860 1861,1914 2
South Africa 1899-1902 1st & 3rd 1899-1902 1903

1, "St Lucia" was granted in 1821 and the date "1803" in1910 to differentiate between the various
other dates on which the island had been captured.

2. The date "1860" was added by Army Order of July 1914

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The Last Queen’s and Regimental Colours of the 1st Battalion

194