m.v. Meteora- Damage Report - No. 3 Crane - Saldanha Bay - South Africa

REPORT OF SURVEY

M.V. METEORA

NO. 3 CRANE HOIST WIRE FAILURE &
DAMAGE TO BPO TRAILER REG NO. CFG 26087

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE UNDERSIGNED, Marine Surveyor did, at the request of, Messrs. Bidvest Port
Operations (Pty) Ltd., Saldanha Bay, South Africa, with permission of the Master, Captain Antonios Kokaris, attend
onboard the Caymanian flag vessel, the m.v. Meteora of 32348 GRT on the 06 December 2018, and subsequently,
as then afloat and berthed alongside, Berth MPT 204, Saldanha Bay Harbour, South Africa, for the purpose of
conducting a damage survey relating to an incident involving the vessel’s no. 3 deck crane resulting in damage to
trailer registration number CFG 26087.

We now report as follows:
(I) Introduction

Our inspection was carried out just subsequent to the incident occurring at about 21:30 on 06 December 2018. At
this time of our inspection, the hoist wire on no. 3 crane had not yet been replaced, and the crane was not yet
operational. Our findings are based on an inspection of the crane, the parted wire, as well as a verbal statement
obtained from the vessel’s Chief Officer, Mr Roman Zorin.

This survey was not carried out in conjunction with other parties, however, Mr Peter Kirkman acting on behalf of the
Owners P & I Club, Messrs. The United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association and Mr Anthony Rousseau
acting on behalf of the stevedores, South Africa Cargo Services (Pty) Ltd., Saldanha Bay attended the vessel during
the course of 07 December 2018.

(II) The incident

At the time of the incident, which occurred at approximately 2130 LMT (UTC+2) on the 06 December 2018, the vessel
was berthed alongside MPT 204, Saldanha Bay Harbour, South Africa, and engaged in the loading of a cargo of
approximately 57000 metric tons of Iron Ore (Kumba Standard Lump) in bulk. At this time, the stevedores, Messrs.
South Africa Cargo Services (Pty) Ltd., Saldanha Bay, employed by Messrs. Kumba Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd., Saldanha Bay,
South Africa, were engaged in the loading of no. 4 cargo hold, via open skips, utilising the vessel’s no. 3 crane (30.0
mt SWL).

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(II) The incident (cont.)

At the time of the incident, Messrs. Bidvest Port Operations (Pty) Ltd., Saldanha Bay, were contracted by Messrs.
Transnet in the carriage of the cargo, from the stockpile area located within the harbour, to alongside the vessel. As
such, their responsibility was limited to the supply of the open top skips used for the loading, as well as the transport
of the cargo i.e. it did not include any onboard operations.

The vessel’s Chief Officer, Mr Roman Zorin, stated that No. 3 crane hoist wire parted whilst the crane was swung out
over the quayside and in the process of hoisting a full skip of cargo into the vessel’s no. 4 cargo compartment. At the
time of the wire parting, the full skip had been lifted just clear of the trailer by approximately 0.5-1.0 metres. The wire
parting resulted in the skip falling and coming to rest back onto the bed of the trailer with cargo block and spreader
arrangement falling and coming to rest within the still full open cargo skip. The resultant damage to trailer registration
number CFG 26087 was thus as a direct result of the wire parting.

(III) FINDINGS
(i) Certification and Documentation

The vessel’s no. 3 crane, was located between cargo holds 3 and 4, and the electro-hydraulic type and of of 30.0
metric ton SWL (Safe Work Load). An inspection of the Cargo Gear Register and cargo gear certificates revealed the
following:

1. Last Quinquennial Inspection: According to the certificate no. GGZZ0/WZH/20161207223356, issued by Messrs.
Bureau Veritas Classification Society, the last quinquennial (5 yearly) inspection, at which time No. 3 Deck Crane
was last subjected to a proof load test was performed on 12 December 2016 at Guangzhou, China . (Annexure B)

2. Last Annual Inspection: An examination of the Register of Lifting Appliances indicates the last annual inspection
was conducted on 20 October 2018 at Ko Sichang, Thailand. (Annexure C).

3. Wire Test Certificate: A Certificate of Test and Examination of Wire Rope for the hoist wire fitted to no. 3 crane
was not sighted.

4. The Onboard Record of Cargo Gear Inspection: The most recent copy was as of December 2018. It showed that
the wires had been recently lubricated. (Annexure D)

5. The hoist wire was last replaced 27 October 2014.

All certificates were found in date, and despite the wire test certificate not being produced, the vessels general record
keeping was of a high standard.

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(ii) Physical inspection of the crane & wires

A thorough inspection of the vessel’s no. 3 crane was carried out subsequent to the incident and the following noted:

1. The hoist wire was found to have parted one location along its length. This between the jib head and the hoist
winch;

2. An inspection of the wire in way of the break revealed the individual wires within the strands to be to be well
lubricated and free of oxidation and/or corrosion;

3. The remainder of the hoist wire appeared outwardly well lubricated over its length;
4. No further damage was noted either to the jib, hoist drum, sheaves or crane structure.

(III) CAUSATION

In the absence of any obvious defect found with the vessels crane, it was suspected that the crane may have been
overloaded at the time of the incident. This suspicion was subsequently proved correct when the lift was weigh-
bridged utilising the Transnet certified/assized weighbridge adjacent to berth MPT 204, Saldanha Bay Harbour.

As can be seen from the results as tabulated below, the mass of the lift (31.080 metric tons) at the time of the wire
parting was indeed in excess of the vessels no. 3 crane Safe Work Load of 30.000 metric tons.

Total Mass of Hauler 19/Trailer HT 13/Skip 69/Cargo + Spreader Beam 50540 kgs + 440 kgs 50980 kgs Photo no. 19
Total Mass of Hauler 19/Trailer HT 13 only 19900 kgs Photo no. 20
Total Mass of Skip 69/Cargo + Spreader Beam 31080 kgs

Given the above, and in the absence of any other defects found to exist with the crane, the overloading of no. 3 crane
was certainly the primary contributory factor resulting in the failure of the crane. This said, however, the age of the
hoist wire should also be considered. The hoist wire had last been replaced over four years ago, and although in
outward apparent good condition, was by no means new. Had the lifts been restricted to below 25.0 metric tons as
was planned and intended, it is wholly possible that the incident may not have occurred.

In addition, it would also be extremely naïve to assume that this overloading was a singular event. It is not
inconceivable, given the method of filling the bins, where the quantities are based on estimation only, that the crane
had been overloaded prior to the failure and that this was simply a case of the last straw that broke the camel’s back.
In our opinion, it is a combination of factors that lead to the failure, primarily, however, the overloading of the cargo
gear.

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(IV) OTHER

(i) Injury to personnel

Fortunately, no injuries were reported to have been sustained to any of the parties involved in the loading operation
as a result of the incident.

(ii) Other damage to vessel
The damage to the vessel was limited to the parted hoist wire. No other damage was noted, or reported by the
vessel’s personnel as being sustained to the vessel as a result of this incident.

(iii) Damage to cargo
The vessel was in engaged in loading Iron Ore in bulk and as such no damage was sustained to the cargo.

(iv) Damage to stevedoring equipment
Our inspection of the stevedore equipment utilised at the time of the incident revealed the following damage:

1) No damage was found to have been sustained to the stevedore spreader beam as a result of the incident.
2) Open topped steel skip No. 69 was found to be free of damage despite the incident.

(v) Damage to horse and trailer
1. No obvious damage was found to have been sustained to horse registration no. CFG 14131 utilised to transport

the cargo to alongside the vessel as a result of the incident;
2. A cursory visual inspection of trailer registration no. CFG 26087 was conducted under artificial light just

subsequent to the incident. The following damage was noted to have been sustained as a direct result of the
incident:
(a) The rear wheels were found to be heavily inclined inwards. This would indicate damage to the axel assembly;
(b) Both set of leaf springs were found to have sheared at a least one (1) location;

A full inspection of the trailer will need to be conducted by a qualified person to ascertain the full extent of the
damage.

A quotation for the scope of possible repairs to the trailer forms Annexure E to this report. The exact components
that are required to return the trailer to service are still to be determined.

(vi) Damage to Transnet property
No damage was sustained to Transnet property as a result of the incident.
(vii) Delay due to damage

All loading operations (3 gangs) were halted between 21:30 on 06 December 2018 and 00:55 on 07 December 2018
whilst Transnet established the condition and safety of the remainder of the vessels cranes.
(viii) Remedial Action Taken

The fitting of the new hoist wire was to be undertaken by the vessel’s personnel. The replacement wire was drawn
from inventory onboard.

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(V) Conclusion

In the opinion of the undersigned, the primary cause of the vessel’s no. 3 crane hoist wire parting was as a result of
the crane being overloaded due to the intended method of loading not being followed by Messrs. Transnet.

ISSUED UNDER MY HAND AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE THIS 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2018

TONY PRINSLOO - MARINE SURVEYOR

List of Annexures

Annexure A – A number of photographs
Annexure B – Copy of Certificate of Proof Load Test
Annexure C – Copy of Last Annual Inspection
Annexure D – Copy of record of wire inspection and gear maintenance
Annexure E – Repair quotation

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M.V. METEORA – ANNEXURE A – PHOTOGRAPHIC REPORT

1. TRUCK/HORSE REGISTRATION NO. CFG 14131/BPO M010 UTILISED TO HAUL THE CARGO
AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT.

2. TRUCK REGISTRATION NO. CFG 14131/CO. NO. BPO M010 UTILISED TO HAUL THE CARGO
AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT.
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M.V. METEORA

3. TRAILER REGISTRATION NO. CFG 26087 UTILISED TO HAUL THE CARGO AT THE TIME OF
INCIDENT.

4. TRAILER REGISTRATION NO. CFG 26087 – LEFT REAR SIDE WHEELS COLLAPSED/INCLINED
INWARDS.
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M.V. METEORA

5. TRAILER REGISTRATION NO. CFG 26087 – REAR RIGHT SIDE WHEELS INCLINED/COLLAPSED
INWARDS.

6. TRAILER REGISTRATION NO. CFG 26087 – RIGHT REAR LEAF SPRING ASSEMBLY FOUND TO
HAVE SHEARED AT LEAST ONE LOCATION.
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M.V. METEORA

7. TRAILER REGISTRATION NO. CFG 26087 – LEFT REAR LEAF SPRING ASSEMBLY FOUND TO
HAVE SHEARED AT LEAST ONE LOCATION.

8. A GENERAL OVERVIEW SHOWING BIN JUST SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.
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M.V. METEORA

9. A GENERAL OVERVIEW SHOWING BIN JUST SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.

10. A GENERAL OVERVIEW SHOWING BIN JUST SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.
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11. A GENERAL OVERVIEW SHOWING BIN JUST SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.

12. A GENERAL OVERVIEW SHOWING BIN JUST SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.
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13. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE PARTED HOIST WIRE.

14. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE PARTED HOIST WIRE.

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15. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE PARTED HOIST WIRE.

16. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE PARTED HOIST WIRE.

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17. A CLOSE-UP VIEW OF THE SPREADER BEAM UTILISED IN THE LOADING OPERATION.

18. SPREADER BEAM MASS 440 KGS.

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19. TRANSNET ASSIZED WEIGH BRIDGE DIGITAL READOUT SHOWING MASS OF HAULER NO.
19 / TRAILER NO. HT 13 AND LOADED BPO CARGO BIN NO. 69.

20. TRANSNET ASSIZED WEIGH BRIDGE DIGITAL READOUT SHOWING MASS OF HAULER NO.
19 AND TRAILER NO. HT 13 ONLY.
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M.V. METEORA – ANNEXURE B
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M.V. METEORA – ANNEXURE C
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M.V. METEORA – ANNEXURE D
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M.V. METEORA – ANNEXURE E
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