Organization Theory and Design

430 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Key Concepts organization development
organizational change
ambidextrous approach organizational innovation
change process product and service changes
creative departments radical change
creativity skunkworks
culture changes strategy and structure changes
dual-core approach switching structures
horizontal coordination model team building
idea champion technical champion
idea incubator technology changes
incremental change time-based competition
large group intervention venture teams
management champion
new-venture fund

Discussion Questions

1. How is the management of radical change likely to differ from the management of in-
cremental change?

2. How are organic characteristics related to changes in technology? To administrative
changes?

3. Describe the dual-core approach. How does administrative change normally differ
from technology change? Discuss.

4. How might organizations manage the dilemma of needing both stability and change?
Discuss.

5. Why do organizations experience resistance to change? What steps can managers take
to overcome this resistance?

6. “Bureaucracies are not innovative.” Discuss.
7. A noted organization theorist said, “Pressure for change originates in the environment;

pressure for stability originates within the organization.” Do you agree? Discuss.
8. Of the five elements required for successful change, which element do you think man-

agers are most likely to overlook? Discuss.
9. How do the underlying values of organization development compare to the values un-

derlying other types of change? Why do the values underlying OD make it particularly
useful in shifting to a learning organization?
10. The manager of R&D for a drug company said that only 5 percent of the company’s
new products ever achieve market success. He also said the industry average is 10 per-
cent and wondered how his organization might increase its success rate. If you were act-
ing as a consultant, what advice would you give him concerning organization structure?
11. Review the stages of commitment to change illustrated in Exhibit 11.9 and the seven
techniques for implementing change discussed at the end of the chapter. At which
stage of change commitment would each of the seven techniques most likely be used?

Chapter 11 Workbook: Innovation Climate*

In order to examine differences in the level of innovation *Adapted by Dorothy Marcic from Susanne G. Scott and Reginald
encouragement in organizations, you will be asked to rate A. Bruce, “Determinants of Innovative Behavior: A Path Model of
two organizations. The first should be an organization in Individual Innovation in the Workplace,” Academy of Manage-
which you have worked, or the university. The second ment Journal 37, no. 3 (1994), 580–607.

Chapter 11: Innovation and Change 431

should be someone else’s workplace, that of a family mem- your own answers in column A, your interviewee’s answers
ber, a friend, or an acquaintance. You will have to interview in column B, and what you think would be the ideal in
that person to answer the questions below. You should put column C.

Innovation Measures A B C
Your Other Your Ideal
Item of Measure Organization Organization
Score items 1–5 on this scale:
1 ϭ don’t agree at all to 5 ϭ agree completely
1. Creativity is encouraged here.†

2. People are allowed to solve the same
problems in different ways.†

3. I get to pursue creative ideas.‡

4. The organization publicly recognizes and
also rewards those who are innovative.‡

5. Our organization is flexible and always
open to change.†

Score items 6–10 on the opposite scale:
1 ϭ agree completely to 5 ϭ don’t agree at all

6. The primary job of people here is to follow
orders that come from the top.†

7. The best way to get along here is to think
and act like the others.†

8. This place seems to be more concerned
with the status quo than with change.†

9. People are rewarded more if they don’t
rock the boat.‡

10. New ideas are great, but we don’t
have enough people or money to carry
them out.‡

†These items indicate the organization’s innovation climate.
‡These items show resource support.

Questions 2. How might productivity differ between a climate that
1. What comparisons in terms of innovation climates can supports innovation and a climate that does not?

you make between these two organizations? 3. Where would you rather work? Why?

432 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Case for Analysis: Shoe Corporation of Illinois*

Shoe Corporation of Illinois (SCI) produces a line of their line and send in orders. They do not have to change
women’s shoes that sell in the lower-price market for styles nearly as often as we do. Sometimes I wish we could
$27.99 to $29.99 per pair. Profits averaged 30 cents to 50 do that, too. It makes for a much more stable and orderly
cents per pair 10 years ago, but according to the president system. There is also less friction between people inside the
and the controller, labor and materials costs have risen so company. The salespeople always know what they’re sell-
much in the intervening period that profits today average ing; the production people know what is expected of them.
only 25 cents to 30 cents per pair. The plant personnel are not shook up so often by someone
coming in one morning and tampering with their machine
Production at both the company’s plants totals 12,500 lines or their schedules. The styling people are not shook
pairs per day. The two factories are located within a radius up so often by the plant saying, “We can’t do your new
of 60 miles of Chicago: one at Centerville, which produces style the way you want it.”
4,500 pairs per day, and the other at Meadowvale, which
produces 8,000 pairs per day. Company headquarters is lo- To help SCI be more competitive against larger firms, Alli-
cated in a building adjacent to the Centerville plant. son recently created an e-commerce department. Although
his main interest was in marketing over the Internet, he
It is difficult to give an accurate picture of the number also hoped new technology would help reduce some of the
of items in the company’s product line. Shoes change in internal friction by giving people an easier way to commu-
style perhaps more rapidly than any other style product, in- nicate. He invested in a sophisticated new computer system
cluding garments. This is chiefly because it is possible to and hired consultants to set up a company intranet and
change production processes quickly and because, histori- provide a few days’ training to upper and middle man-
cally, each company, in attempting to get ahead of com- agers. Katherine Olsen came on board as director of
petitors, gradually made style changes more frequently. At e-commerce, charged primarily with coordinating Internet
present, including both major and minor style changes, SCI marketing and sales. When she took the job, she had
offers 100 to 120 different products to customers each visions of one day offering consumers the option of
year. customized shoe designs. However, Olsen was somewhat
surprised to learn that most employees still refused to use
A partial organizational chart, showing the depart- the intranet even for internal communication and coordi-
ments involved in this case, appears in Exhibit 11.10. nation. The process for deciding on new styles, for exam-
ple, had not changed since the 1970s.
Competitive Structure of the Industry
Very large general shoe houses, such as International and Major Style Changes
Brown, carry a line of women’s shoes and are able to un- The decision about whether to put a certain style into pro-
dercut prices charged by SCI, principally because of the duction requires information from a number of different
policy in the big companies of producing large numbers of people. Here is what typically happens in the company. It
“stable” shoes, such as the plain pump and the loafer. They may be helpful to follow the organization chart (see Ex-
do not attempt to change styles as rapidly as their smaller hibit 11.10) tracing the procedure.
competitors. Thus, without constant changes in production
processes and sales presentations, they are able to keep M. T. Lawson, the styling manager, and his designer,
costs substantially lower. John Flynn, originate most of the ideas about shape, size of
heel, use of flat sole or heels, and findings (the term used
Charles F. Allison, the president of SCI, feels that the for ornaments attached to, but not part of, the shoes—
only way for a small independent company to be competi- bows, straps, and so forth). They get their ideas principally
tive is to change styles frequently, taking advantage of the from reading style and trade magazines or by copying top-
flexibility of a small organization to create designs that ap- flight designers. Lawson corresponds with publications and
peal to customers. Thus, demand can be created and a price friends in large stores in New York, Rome, and Paris to ob-
set high enough to make a profit. Allison, incidentally, ap- tain pictures and samples of up-to-the-minute style innova-
pears to have an artistic talent in styling and a record of tions. Although he uses e-mail occasionally, Lawson prefers
successful judgments in approving high-volume styles over telephone contact and receiving drawings or samples by
the years. overnight mail. Then, he and Flynn discuss various ideas
and come up with design options.
Regarding how SCI differs from its large competitors,
Allison has said: *Written by Charles E. Summer. Copyright 1978. Revised with
permission.
You see, Brown and International Shoe Company both
produce hundreds of thousands of the same pair of shoes.
They store them in inventory at their factories. Their cus-
tomers, the large wholesalers and retailers, simply know

Chapter 11: Innovation and Change 433
EXHIBIT 11.10
President Partial Organization Chart
C. F. Allison of Shoe Corporation of
Illinois
Styling Manager Controller Director of
M. T. Lawson M. M. Fraser E-commerce Sales Manager
K. T. Olsen L. K. Shipton
Designer Pattern Maker
John Flynn Richards Order Clerk Statistician
R. Ferguson M. Freeman

Plant Superintendent Plant Superintendent 22 Salespeople
Meadowvale Centerville

Assistant
Superintendent
Paul Robbins

Foreman, Foreman,
Cutting Bottoming

Foreman, Foreman,
Prefitting Finishing

Foreman, Foreman,
Fitting Packing and Shipping

434 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

When Lawson decides on a design, he takes a sketch to people, to Ferguson for entering in his statistical record of
Allison, who either approves or disapproves it. If Allison all orders received by the company.
approves, he (Allison) then passes the sketch on to L. K.
Shipton, the sales manager, to find out what lasts (widths) Three weeks after the salespeople receive samples,
should be chosen. Shipton, in turn, forwards the design to Allison requires Ralph Ferguson to give him a tabulation of
Martin Freeman, a statistician in the sales department, who orders. At that time, he decides whether the salespeople
maintains summary information on customer demand for and the Web page should push the item and the super-
colors and lasts. intendents should produce large quantities, or whether
he will tell them that although existing orders will be
To compile this information, Freeman visits salespeo- produced, the item will be discontinued in a short time.
ple twice a year to get their opinions on the colors and lasts
that are selling best, and he keeps records of shipments by The procedures outlined here have, according to
color and by last. For these needs, he simply totals data Allison,
that are sent to him by the shipping foreman in each of the
two plants. worked reasonably well. The average time from when Law-
son decides on a design until we notify the Centerville plant
When Freeman has decided on the lasts and colors, he to produce the pilot run is two weeks to a month. Of
sends Allison a form that lists the colors and lasts in which course, if we could speed that up, it would make the com-
the shoe should be produced. Allison, if he approves this pany just that much more secure in staying in the game
list, forwards the information to Lawson, who passes it on against the big companies, and in taking sales away from
to Jenna Richards, an expert pattern maker. Richards our competitors. There seems to be endless bickering
makes a paper pattern and then constructs a prototype in among people around here involved in the styling phase of
leather and paper. She sends this to Lawson, who in turn the business. That’s to be expected when you have to move
approves or disapproves it. He forwards any approved fast—there isn’t much time to stop and observe all of the so-
prototype to Allison. Allison, if he, too, approves, notifies cial amenities. I have never thought that a formal organiza-
Lawson, who takes the prototype to Paul Robbins, assis- tion chart would be good in this company—we’ve worked
tant to the superintendent of the Centerville plant. Only out a customary system here that functions well.
this plant produces small quantities of new or experimen-
tal shoe styles. This is referred to as a “pilot run” by exec- M. T. Lawson, manager of styling, said that within his
utives at the plant. department all work seems to get out in minimum time; he
also stated that both Flynn and Richards are good employ-
Robbins then literally carries the prototype through ees and skilled in their work. He mentioned that Flynn had
the six production departments of the plant—from cutting been in to see him twice in the last year
to finishing—discussing it with each foreman, who in turn
works with employees on the machines in having a sample to inquire about his [Flynn’s] future in the company. He is
lot of several thousand pairs made. When the finished lot 33 years old and has three children. I know that he is ea-
is delivered by the finishing foreman to the shipping fore- ger to make money, and I assured him that over the years
man (because of the importance of styling, Allison has di- we can raise him right along from the $60,000 we are now
rected that each foreman personally deliver styling goods paying. Actually, he has learned a lot about shoe styles
in process to the foreman of the next department), the lat- since we hired him from the design department of a fabric
ter holds the inventory in storage and sends one pair each company 6 years ago.
to Allison and Lawson. If they approve of the finished
product, Allison instructs the shipping foreman to mail John Flynn revealed:
samples to each of the company’s twenty-two salespeople
throughout the country. Olsen also receives samples, pho- I was actually becoming dissatisfied with this job. All shoe
tos, and drawings to post on the Web page and gauge cus- companies copy styles—it’s generally accepted practice
tomer interest. within the industry. But I’ve picked up a real feel for designs,
and several times I’ve suggested that the company make all
Salespeople have instructions to take the samples im- its own original styles. We could make SCI a style leader and
mediately (within 1 week) to at least ten customers. Orders also increase our volume. When I ask Lawson about this, he
for already-established shoes are normally sent to Ralph says it takes too much time for the designer to create origi-
Ferguson, a clerk in Shipton’s office, who records them and nals—that we have all we can handle to do research in trade
forwards them to the plant superintendents for production. magazines and maintain contracts feeding us the results of
However, salespeople have found by experience that experts. Beside, he says our styles are standing the test of the
Martin Freeman has a greater interest in the success of new marketplace.
“trials,” so they rush these orders to him by overnight
mail, and he in turn places the first orders for a new style Projects X and Y
in the interoffice mail to the plant superintendents. He then Flynn also said that he and Martin Freeman had frequently
sends off a duplicate of the order, mailed in by the sales- talked about the styling problem. They felt that

Chapter 11: Innovation and Change 435

Allison is really a great president, and the company surely rather than another, it may mean we have to keep people
would be lost without him. However, we’ve seen times idle on later machines while there is a pileup on the sewing
when he lost a lot of money on bad judgments in styles. machines on which this complicated little operation is per-
Not many times—perhaps six or seven times in the last 18 formed. This costs the plant money. Furthermore, there are
months. Also, he is, of course, extremely busy as president times when they get the prototype here late, and either the
of the corporation. He must look after everything from fi- foremen and I work overtime or the trial run won’t get
nancing from the banks to bargaining with the union. The through in time to have new production runs on new
result is that he is sometimes unavailable to do his styling styles, to take the plant capacity liberated by our stopping
approvals for several days, or even 2 weeks. In a business production on old styles. Lawson doesn’t know much
like this, that kind of delay can cost money. It also makes about production and sales and the whole company. I
him slightly edgy. It tends, at times when he has many think all he does is to bring shoes down here to the plant,
other things to do, to make him look quickly at the styles sort of like a messenger boy. Why should he be so hard to
we submit, or the prototypes Richards makes, or even the get along with? He isn’t getting paid any more than I am,
finished shoes that are sent for approval by the shipping and my position in the plant is just as important as his.
foreman. Sometimes I worry that he makes two kinds of
errors. He simply rubber-stamps what we’ve done, which Lawson, in turn, said that he has a difficult time getting
makes sending these things to him simply a waste of time. along with Robbins:
At other times he makes snap judgments of his own, over-
ruling those of us who have spent so much time and ex- There are many times when Robbins is just unreasonable.
pertise on the shoe. We do think he has good judgment, but I take prototypes to him five or six times a month, and
he himself has said at times that he wishes he had more other minor style changes to him six or eight times. I tell
time to concentrate on styling and approval of prototypes him every time that we have problems in getting these
and final products. ready, but he knows only about the plant, and telling him
doesn’t seem to do any good. When we first joined the
Flynn further explained (and this was corroborated by company, we got along all right, but he has gotten harder
Freeman) that the two had worked out two plans, which and harder to get along with.
they referred to as “project X” and “project Y.” In the first,
Flynn created an original design that was not copied from Other Problems
existing styles. Freeman then gave special attention to color Ralph Ferguson, the clerk in the sales department who re-
and last research for the shoe and recommended a ceives orders from salespeople and forwards totals for pro-
color line that didn’t exactly fit past records on consumer duction schedules to the two plant superintendents, has
purchases—but one he and Flynn thought would have complained that the salespeople and Freeman are bypass-
“great consumer appeal.” This design and color recom- ing him in their practice of sending experimental shoe or-
mendation were accepted by Lawson and Allison; the shoe ders to Freeman. He insisted that his job description (one
went into production and was one of the three top sellers of only two written descriptions in the company) gives him
during the calendar year. The latter two men did not know responsibility for receiving all orders throughout the com-
that the shoe was styled in a different way from the usual pany and for maintaining historical statistics on shipments.
procedure.
Both the salespeople and Freeman, on the other hand,
The result of a second, similar project (Y) was put into said that before they started the new practice (that is, when
production the next year, but this time sales were discon- Ferguson still received the experimental shoe orders), there
tinued after 3 weeks. were at least eight or ten instances a year when these were
delayed from 1 to 3 days on Ferguson’s desk. They re-
Problem between Lawson and Robbins ported that Ferguson just wasn’t interested in new styles, so
Frequently, perhaps ten to twelve times a year, disagree- the salespeople “just started sending them to Freeman.”
ment arises between Mel Lawson, manager of styling, and Ferguson acknowledged that there were times of short de-
Paul Robbins, assistant to the superintendent of the Cen- lay, but said that there were good reasons for them:
terville plant. Robbins said,
They [the salespeople and Freeman] are so interested in
The styling people don’t understand what it means to pro- new designs, colors, and lasts that they can’t understand
duce a shoe in the quantities that we do, and to make the the importance of a systematic handling of the whole order
changes in production that we have to. They dream up a procedure, including both old and new shoe styles. There
style quickly, out of thin air. They do not realize that we must be accuracy. Sure, I give some priority to experimen-
have a lot of machines that have to be adjusted and that tal orders, but sometimes when rush orders for existing
some things they dream up take much longer on certain company products are piling up, and when there’s a lot of
machines than others, thus creating a bottleneck in the pro- planning I have to do to allocate production between
duction line. If they put a bow or strap in one position Centerville and Meadowvale, I decide which comes first—

436 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

processing of these, or processing the experimental shoe order information, production schedules, and shipping
orders. Shipton is my boss, not the salespeople or Freeman. deadlines. If everyone—from Allison down to the people in
I’m going to insist that these orders come to me. the production plants—was kept up to date throughout the
entire process, we wouldn’t have all this confusion and
The Push for New Technology bickering. But no one around here wants to give up any
Katherine Olsen believes many of these problems could be control—they all have their own little operations and don’t
solved through better use of technology. She has ap- want to share information with anyone else. For example,
proached Charles Allison several times about the need to I sometimes don’t even know there’s a new style in the
make greater use of the expensive and sophisticated com- works until I get finished samples and photos. No one
puter information systems he had installed. Although Alli- seems to recognize that one of the biggest advantages of the
son always agrees with her, he has so far done nothing to Internet is to help stay ahead of changing styles. I know
help solve the problem. Olsen thinks the new technology that Flynn has a good feel for design, and we’re not taking
could dramatically improve coordination at SCI. advantage of his abilities. But I also have information and
ideas that could help this company keep pace with changes
Everyone needs to be working from the same data at the and really stand out from the crowd. I don’t know how
same time. As soon as Lawson and Flynn come up with a long we expect to remain competitive using this cumber-
new design, it should be posted on the intranet so all of us some, slow-moving process and putting out shoes that are
can be informed. And everyone needs access to sales and already behind the times.

Case for Analysis: Southern Discomfort*

Jim Malesckowski remembered the call of 2 weeks ago as The plant in Oconomo had been in operation since
if he had just put down the telephone receiver: “I just read 1921, making special apparel for people suffering from in-
your analysis and I want you to get down to Mexico right juries and other medical conditions. Jim had often talked
away,” Jack Ripon, his boss and chief executive officer, had with employees who would recount stories about their fa-
blurted in his ear. “You know we can’t make the plant in thers or grandfathers working in the same Lamprey com-
Oconomo work anymore—the costs are just too high. So pany plant—the last of the original manufacturing opera-
go down there, check out what our operational costs tions in town.
would be if we move, and report back to me in a week.”
But friendship aside, competitors had already edged
As president of the Wisconsin Specialty Products Divi- past Lamprey in terms of price and were dangerously close
sion of Lamprey, Inc., Jim knew quite well the challenge of to overtaking it in product quality. Although both Jim and
dealing with high-cost labor in a third-generation, union- the plant manager had tried to convince the union to ac-
ized, U.S. manufacturing plant. And although he had done cept lower wages, union leaders resisted. In fact, on one
the analysis that led to his boss’s knee-jerk response, the occasion when Jim and the plant manager tried to discuss
call still stunned him. There were 520 people who made a a cell manufacturing approach, which would cross-train
living at Lamprey’s Oconomo facility, and if it closed, most employees to perform up to three different jobs, local
of them wouldn’t have a chance of finding another job in union leaders could barely restrain their anger. Jim
the town of 9,900 people. thought he sensed an underlying fear, meaning the union
reps were aware of at least some of the problems, but he
Instead of the $16-per-hour average wage paid at the had been unable to get them to acknowledge this and
Oconomo plant, the wages paid to the Mexican workers— move on to open discussion.
who lived in a town without sanitation and with an unbe-
lievably toxic effluent from industrial pollution—would A week passed and Jim had just submitted his report to
amount to about $1.60 an hour on average. That would be his boss. Although he didn’t specifically bring up the point,
a savings of nearly $15 million a year for Lamprey, to be it was apparent that Lamprey could put its investment dol-
offset in part by increased costs for training, transporta- lars in a bank and receive a better return than what its
tion, and other matters. Oconomo operation was currently producing.

After 2 days of talking with Mexican government rep- The next day, he would discuss the report with the
resentatives and managers of other companies in the town, CEO. Jim didn’t want to be responsible for the plant’s dis-
Jim had enough information to develop a set of comparative
figures of production and shipping costs. On the way home, *Doug Wallace, “What Would You Do?” Business Ethics
he started to outline the report, knowing full well that un- (March/April 1996), 52–53. Reprinted with permission from
less some miracle occurred, he would be ushering in a bliz- Business Ethics, PO Box 8439, Minneapolis, MN 55408; phone:
zard of pink slips for people he had come to appreciate. 612-879-0695.

Chapter 11: Innovation and Change 437

mantling, an act he personally believed would be wrong as the union’s unwilling to cooperate, and the company needs
long as there was a chance its costs can be lowered. “But to make a better return on its investment if it’s to continue
Ripon’s right,” he said to himself. “The costs are too high, at all. It sounds right but feels wrong. What should I do?”

Notes

1. Robert D. Hof, “Building an Idea Factory,” BusinessWeek 14. Richard W. Woodman, John E. Sawyer, and Ricky W. Griffin,
(October 11, 2004), 194–200; Brian Bremner and Chester “Toward a Theory of Organizational Creativity,” Academy
Dawson, “Can Anything Stop Toyota?” BusinessWeek (No- of Management Review 18 (1993), 293–321; and Alan
vember 17, 2003), 114–122; and Norihiko Shirouzu and Farnham, “How to Nurture Creative Sparks,” Fortune
Jathon Sapsford, “Heavy Load; For Toyota, a New Small (January 10, 1994), 94–100.
Truck Carries Hopes for Topping GM,” The Wall Street
Journal (May 12, 2005), A1, A6. 15. J. Grossman, “Strategies: Thinking Small.”
16. Robert I. Sutton, “Weird Ideas That Spark Innovation,” MIT
2. Based on John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, Mass.:
Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 18–20. Sloan Management Review (Winter 2002), 83–87; Robert
Barker, “The Art of Brainstorming,” BusinessWeek (August
3. David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman, “Organizational 26, 2002), 168–169; Gary A. Steiner, ed., The Creative Or-
Frame Bending: Principles for Managing Reorientation,” ganization (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965),
Academy of Management Executive 3 (1989), 194–204; and 16–18; and James Brian Quinn, “Managing Innovation:
Michael L. Tushman and Charles A. O’Reilly III, “Ambidex- Controlled Chaos,” Harvard Business Review (May–June
trous Organizations: Managing Evolutionary and Revolu- 1985), 73–84.
tionary Change,” California Management Review 38, no. 4 17. Thomas M. Burton, “Flop Factor: By Learning from Fail-
(Summer 1996), 8–30. ures, Lilly Keeps Drug Pipeline Full,” The Wall Street Journal
(April 21, 2004), A1, A12.
4. Alan G. Robinson and Dean M. Schroeder, Ideas Are Free: 18. Kotter, Leading Change, 20–25; and John P. Kotter, “Lead-
How the Idea Revolution Is Liberating People and Trans- ing Change,” Harvard Business Review (March–April 1995),
forming Organizations (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 59–67.
2004), as reported in John Grossman, “Strategies: Thinking 19. G. Tomas M. Hult, Robert F. Hurley, and Gary A. Knight,
Small,” Inc. Magazine (August 2004), 34–35. “Innovativeness: Its Antecedents and Impact on Business Per-
formance,” Industrial Marketing Management 33 (2004),
5. William A. Davidow and Michael S. Malone, The Virtual 429–438.
Corporation (New York: HarperBusiness, 1992); and Gregory 20. Erick Schonfeld, “GE Sees the Light,” Business 2.0 (July
G. Dess, Abdul M. A. Rasheed, Kevin J. McLaughlin, and 2004), 80–86.
Richard L. Priem, “The New Corporate Architecture,” Acad- 21. L. D. DiSimone, comments about 3M in “How Can Big
emy of Management Executive 9, no. 3 (1995), 7–20. Companies Keep the Entrepreneurial Spirit Alive?” Harvard
Business Review (November– December 1995), 184–185;
6. Brent Schlender, “How Big Can Apple Get?” Fortune (Febru- and Thomas A. Stewart, “3M Fights Back,” Fortune (Febru-
ary 21, 2005), 66–76. ary 1996), 94–99.
22. T. M. Burton, “Flop Factor.”
7. Joseph E. McCann, “Design Principles for an Innovating 23. D. Bruce Merrifield, “Intrapreneurial Corporate Renewal,”
Company,” Academy of Management Executive 5 (May Journal of Business Venturing 8 (September 1993), 383–389;
1991), 76–93. Linsu Kim, “Organizational Innovation and Structure,” Jour-
nal of Business Research 8 (1980), 225–245; and Tom Burns
8. Kelly Barron, “Logistics in Brown,” Forbes (January 10, and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London:
2000), 78–83; and Scott Kirsner, “Venture Vérité: United Tavistock Publications, 1961).
Parcel Service,” Wired (September 1999), 83–96. 24. James Q. Wilson, “Innovation in Organization: Notes to-
ward a Theory,” in James D. Thompson, ed., Approaches to
9. Robert D. Hof, “Building an Idea Factory.” Organizational Design (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pitts-
10. Richard A. Wolfe, “Organizational Innovation: Review, Cri- burgh Press, 1966), 193–218.
25. Charles A. O’Reilly III and Michael L. Tushman, “The Am-
tique and Suggested Research Directions,” Journal of Man- bidextrous Organization,” Harvard Business Review (April
agement Studies 31, no. 3 (May 1994), 405–431. 2004), 74–81; M. L. Tushman and C. A. O’Reilly III, “Build-
11. John L. Pierce and Andre L. Delbecq, “Organization Struc- ing an Ambidextrous Organization: Forming Your Own
ture, Individual Attitudes and Innovation,” Academy of ‘Skunk Works,’” Health Forum Journal 42, no. 2 (March–
Management Review 2 (1977), 27–37; and Michael Aiken April 1999), 20–23; J. C. Spender and Eric H. Kessler, “Man-
and Jerald Hage, “The Organic Organization and Innova- aging the Uncertainties of Innovation: Extending Thompson
tion,” Sociology 5 (1971), 63–82. (1967),” Human Relations 48, no. 1 (1995), 35–56; and
12. Richard L. Daft, “Bureaucratic versus Non-bureaucratic Robert B. Duncan, “The Ambidextrous Organization:
Structure in the Process of Innovation and Change,” in
Samuel B. Bacharach, ed., Perspectives in Organizational So-
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438 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

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Chapter 11: Innovation and Change 439

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between Internal and External Cooperation in Product De- tion of Innovations,” American Sociological Review 42
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for Change.”

12 Decision-Making Processes

Definitions

Individual Decision Making
Rational Approach • Bounded Rationality Perspective

Organizational Decision Making
Management Science Approach • Carnegie Model • Incremental Decision Process Model

The Learning Organization
Combining the Incremental Process and Carnegie Models • Garbage Can Model

Contingency Decision-Making Framework
Problem Consensus • Technical Knowledge about Solutions • Contingency Framework

Special Decision Circumstances
High-Velocity Environments • Decision Mistakes and Learning • Escalating Commitment

Summary and Interpretation

A Look Inside

Maytag

The repairman isn’t the only one feeling lonely at Maytag these days.
Once an American icon of high-quality appliance manufacturing,
Maytag has fallen on some seriously hard times. By the late 1990s,
costs at the appliance maker had spiraled out of control, rivals such
as Whirlpool, General Electric (GE), and Electrolux were snatching
market share, and the stock was on a downhill slide. Even worse, Maytag’s
reputation for quality and dependability had taken a beating due to leaking
problems with the new Neptune washer. When Ralph Hake took over as CEO in
2001, he knew he had to do something drastic to return Maytag to its glory days.
Hake quickly took charge, diving headfirst into the mess at Maytag and making sev-
eral major decisions designed to boost sales and return the company to profitability. For
example, the acquisition of stove and refrigerator maker Amana helped push sales up. To cut
costs, he closed warehouses, centralized information technology (IT) operations, trimmed the
number of Maytag vendors, and slashed the research and development (R&D) budget. Unfor-
tunately, some of Hake’s decisions just exacerbated the deeper problems at Maytag. The se-
vere cost cutting jeopardized quality control efforts, leading to a continued decline in customer
satisfaction. Whereas Maytag used to be the leader in customer satisfaction, surveys show
it’s now near the bottom of the heap. Moreover, by cutting the R&D budget, Hake hamstrung
new product development. “Maytag realized it too late,” says one appliance industry veteran,
“but innovation is the name of the game today.” Maytag also lost touch with consumers, and
the few new products it has brought out haven’t caught on. The much-heralded Neptune
Drying Center, for example, is so large that few people can fit it in their existing laundry rooms.
On a positive note, Hake has begun investing more in new product initiatives, including a
laundry R&D center in Newton, Iowa. However, it could be too little too late. Unless Maytag
can fix its quality problems, repair its reputation, and regain market share, the turnaround
Hake envisioned will turn into a dead end.1

Every organization grows, prospers, or fails as a result of decisions by its man-
agers, and decisions can be risky and uncertain, without any guarantee of suc-
cess. Sometimes, decision making is a trial-and-error process, in which top
managers continue to search for appropriate ways to solve complex problems. At
Maytag, Ralph Hake and his top management team continue to evaluate the com-
pany’s troubles and search for the correct alternatives to mend them. Decision mak-
ing is done amid constantly changing factors, unclear information, and conflicting
points of view. The 2002 decision to merge Hewlett-Packard (H-P) and Compaq,
for example, was highly controversial. Former H-P CEO Carly Fiorina and her sup-
porters believed it was essential for H-P’s future success, but other managers and
board members argued that it was insane to risk H-P’s printer business and move
the company more deeply into the highly competitive computer world. Fiorina’s side
ultimately won out, but results of the merger have been disappointing. Hewlett-
Packard’s board ousted Fiorina in early 2005, partly due to issues related to the
Compaq merger. Now, new CEO Mark Hurd faces his own challenges, with man-
agers, consultants, and observers offering different, often conflicting views of what
is needed to get H-P back on track.2

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 443

Many organizational decisions are complete failures. A classic example is the
1985 introduction of New Coke, which Coca-Cola executives were sure was
the company’s answer to winning back market share from Pepsi. Within 3 months,
the company had gotten more than 400,000 angry letters and phone calls, and New
Coke quietly faded from store shelves.3 A similar example comes from Interstate
Bakeries, which makes Wonder Bread and Twinkies. When the company tinkered
with its recipe to give bread a longer shelf life, sales began falling. Consumers rejected
the stale, gummy new products, contributing to a net loss of $25.7 million in 2004.
Interstate is now in bankruptcy.4

Even the most successful companies sometimes make big blunders. Dream-
Works, the studio that made Shrek 2, the biggest box-office hit of 2004, poured tens
of millions into marketing for the DVD release of the monster hit. Sales during the
initial release period boomed, so DreamWorks flooded the market. But managers
got a shock when retailers began returning millions of unsold copies. Based on
patterns in the past, DreamWorks wrongly assumed the strong early sales would
continue and perhaps even grow.5

Yet managers also make many successful decisions every day. Meg Whitman
made eBay today’s model of what an Internet company should be by steering clear
of get-rich-quick schemes and keeping the company focused on nurturing its com-
munity of buyers and sellers. Cadillac managers’ decision to ditch stuffy golf and
yachting sponsorships in favor of tying in with popular Hollywood movies has
boosted sales and revived Cadillac’s image. And Carlos Ghosn implemented struc-
tural, management, and product changes that transformed Nissan from a direction-
less, debt-ridden company into one of the most dynamic and profitable automakers
in the world.6

Purpose of This Chapter

At any time, an organization may be identifying problems and implementing alter-
natives for hundreds of decisions. Managers and organizations somehow muddle
through these processes.7 The purpose here is to analyze these processes to learn
what decision making is actually like in organizational settings. Decision-making
processes can be thought of as the brain and nervous system of an organization. De-
cision making is the end use of the information and control systems described in
Chapter 8. Decisions are made about organization strategy, structure, innovation,
and acquisitions. This chapter explores how organizations can and should make de-
cisions about these issues.

The first section defines decision making. The next section examines how indi-
vidual managers make decisions. Then several models of organizational decision
making are explored. Each model is used in a different organizational situation. The
final section in this chapter combines the models into a single framework that de-
scribes when and how they should be used and discusses special issues, such as
decision mistakes.

Definitions

Organizational decision making is formally defined as the process of identifying and
solving problems. The process has two major stages. In the problem identification
stage, information about environmental and organizational conditions is monitored

444 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Briefcase to determine if performance is satisfactory and to diagnose the cause of shortcom-
ings. The problem solution stage is when alternative courses of action are consid-
As an organization ered and one alternative is selected and implemented.
manager, keep these
guidelines in mind: Organizational decisions vary in complexity and can be categorized as pro-
grammed or nonprogrammed.8 Programmed decisions are repetitive and well de-
Adapt decision processes fined, and procedures exist for resolving the problem. They are well structured be-
to fit the organizational cause criteria of performance are normally clear, good information is available
situation. Understand how about current performance, alternatives are easily specified, and there is relative cer-
processes differ for pro- tainty that the chosen alternative will be successful. Examples of programmed deci-
grammed and nonpro- sions include decision rules, such as when to replace an office copy machine, when
grammed decisions. to reimburse managers for travel expenses, or whether an applicant has sufficient
qualifications for an assembly-line job. Many companies adopt rules based on ex-
perience with programmed decisions. For example, a rule for large hotels staffing
banquets is to allow one server per thirty guests for a sit-down function and one
server per forty guests for a buffet.9

Nonprogrammed decisions are novel and poorly defined, and no procedure ex-
ists for solving the problem. They are used when an organization has not seen a
problem before and may not know how to respond. Clear-cut decision criteria do
not exist. Alternatives are fuzzy. There is uncertainty about whether a proposed so-
lution will solve the problem. Typically, few alternatives can be developed for a non-
programmed decision, so a single solution is custom-tailored to the problem.

Many nonprogrammed decisions involve strategic planning, because uncertainty
is great and decisions are complex. One recent example of a nonprogrammed deci-
sion comes from Tupperware, the maker of unique food storage products and
kitchen gadgets traditionally sold at home Tupperware parties. Managers hit a
home run with the decision to set up booths in shopping malls and push sales over
the Internet. Thus, a further push into retail sales by placing Tupperware in Target
stores, with volunteer salespeople to demonstrate the products, seemed destined for
success. But moving into Target turned out to be one of the biggest disasters in Tup-
perware’s history. Some Target stores and shoppers didn’t know how to deal with
the influx of Tupperware salespeople, who ended up feeling slighted and stopped
volunteering for store duty. Sales were slow. At the same time, the availability of
Tupperware in Target stores decreased the interest in home parties, further hurting
sales and alienating independent sales reps. Although overseas sales remained
strong, sales of Tupperware in North America fell to a 3-year low and profits plum-
meted nearly 50 percent. Managers are currently considering new decisions about
how to turn things around.10

Particularly complex nonprogrammed decisions have been referred to as
“wicked” decisions, because simply defining the problem can turn into a major task.
Wicked problems are associated with manager conflicts over objectives and alterna-
tives, rapidly changing circumstances, and unclear linkages among decision ele-
ments. Managers dealing with a wicked decision may hit on a solution that merely
proves they failed to correctly define the problem to begin with.11

Today’s managers and organizations are dealing with a higher percentage of
nonprogrammed decisions because of the rapidly changing business environment.
As outlined in Exhibit 12.1, today’s environment has increased both the number and
complexity of decisions that have to be made and has created a need for new
decision-making processes. Managers in rapidly changing e-business departments,
for example, often have to make quick decisions based on very limited information.
Another example is globalization. The trend toward moving production to low-

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 445

Today’s Business Environment EXHIBIT 12.1
• Demands more large-scale change via new strategies, reengineering, restructuring, mergers, Decision Making in
Today’s Environment
acquisitions, downsizing, new product or market development, and so on Source: Reprinted by
permission of Harvard Business
Decisions Made Inside the Organization School Press. From Leading
• Are based on bigger, more complex, more emotionally charged issues Change by John P. Kotter.
• Are made more quickly Boston, MA, 1996, p. 56.
• Are made in a less certain environment, with less clarity about means and outcomes Copyright © 1996 by the
• Require more cooperation from more people involved in making and implementing decisions Harvard Business School
Publishing Corporation, all
rights reserved.

A New Decision-Making Process

• Is required because no one individual has the information needed to make all major decisions
• Is required because no one individual has the time and credibility needed to convince lots of

people to implement the decision
• Relies less on hard data as a basis for good decisions
• Is guided by a powerful coalition that can act as a team
• Permits decisions to evolve through trial and error and incremental steps as needed

wage countries has managers all over corporate America struggling with ethical de-
cisions concerning working conditions in the Third World and the loss of manufac-
turing jobs in small American communities. In one Tennessee community where the
unemployment rate is 18 percent, 600 workers lost their jobs because the company
decided to send garment manufacturing overseas.12

Individual Decision Making

Individual decision making by managers can be described in two ways. First is the
rational approach, which suggests how managers should try to make decisions. Sec-
ond is the bounded rationality perspective, which describes how decisions actually
have to be made under severe time and resource constraints. The rational approach
is an ideal managers may work toward but never reach.

Rational Approach

The rational approach to individual decision making stresses the need for system-
atic analysis of a problem followed by choice and implementation in a logical, step-
by-step sequence. The rational approach was developed to guide individual decision
making because many managers were observed to be unsystematic and arbitrary in
their approach to organizational decisions.

446 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

EXHIBIT 12.2
Steps in the Rational
Approach to Decision
Making

P

PROBLEM SOLUTION Implement Monitor ROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
the Chosen the Decision
Alternative Environment

Choose 81 Define the
the Best 72 Decision
Alternative Problem
63
Evaluate 54 Specify
Alternatives Decision
Objectives

Develop Diagnose
Alternative the Problem
Solutions

Although the rational model is an ideal not fully achievable in the real world of
uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change highlighted in Exhibit 12.1, the model
does help managers think about decisions more clearly and rationally. Managers
should use systematic procedures to make decisions whenever possible. When man-
agers have a deep understanding of the rational decision-making process, it can help
them make better decisions even when there is a lack of clear information. The au-
thors of a recent book on decision making use the example of the U.S. Marines, who
have a reputation for handling complex problems quickly and decisively. The
Marines are trained to quickly go through a series of mental routines that help them
analyze the situation and take action.13

According to the rational approach, decision making can be broken down into
eight steps, as illustrated in Exhibit 12.2 and demonstrated by the department store
Marshall Field’s.14

1. Monitor the decision environment. In the first step, a manager monitors internal
and external information that will indicate deviations from planned or accept-
able behavior. He or she talks to colleagues and reviews financial statements,

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 447

performance evaluations, industry indices, competitors’ activities, and so forth.
For example, during the pressure-packed 5-week Christmas season, Linda
Koslow, general manager of Marshall Field’s Oakbrook, Illinois, store, checks
out competitors around the mall, eyeing whether they are marking down mer-
chandise. She also scans printouts of her store’s previous day’s sales to learn
what is or is not moving.15
2. Define the decision problem. The manager responds to deviations by identifying
essential details of the problem: where, when, who was involved, who was af-
fected, and how current activities are influenced. For Koslow, this means defin-
ing whether store profits are low because overall sales are less than expected or
because certain lines of merchandise are not moving as expected.
3. Specify decision objectives. The manager determines what performance out-
comes should be achieved by a decision.
4. Diagnose the problem. In this step, the manager digs below the surface to ana-
lyze the cause of the problem. Additional data might be gathered to facilitate this
diagnosis. Understanding the cause enables appropriate treatment. For Koslow
at Marshall Field’s, the cause of slow sales might be competitors’ marking down
of merchandise or Marshall Field’s failure to display hot-selling items in a visi-
ble location.
5. Develop alternative solutions. Before a manager can move ahead with a decisive
action plan, he or she must have a clear understanding of the various options
available to achieve desired objectives. The manager may seek ideas and sug-
gestions from other people. Koslow’s alternatives for increasing profits could in-
clude buying fresh merchandise, running a sale, or reducing the number of em-
ployees.
6. Evaluate alternatives. This step may involve the use of statistical techniques or
personal experience to gauge the probability of success. The merits of each al-
ternative are assessed, as well as the probability that it will reach the desired ob-
jectives.
7. Choose the best alternative. This step is the core of the decision process. The
manager uses his or her analysis of the problem, objectives, and alternatives to
select a single alternative that has the best chance for success. At Marshall
Field’s, Koslow may choose to reduce the number of staff as a way to meet the
profit goals rather than increase advertising or markdowns.
8. Implement the chosen alternative. Finally, the manager uses managerial, admin-
istrative, and persuasive abilities and gives directions to ensure that the decision
is carried out. The monitoring activity (step 1) begins again as soon as the solu-
tion is implemented. For Linda Koslow, the decision cycle is a continuous
process, with new decisions made daily based on monitoring her environment
for problems and opportunities.

The first four steps in this sequence are the problem identification stage, and the
next four steps are the problem solution stage of decision making, as indicated in
Exhibit 12.2. A manager normally goes through all eight steps in making a decision,
although each step may not be a distinct element. Managers may know from expe-
rience exactly what to do in a situation, so one or more steps will be minimized. The
following In Practice illustrates how the rational approach is used to make a deci-
sion about a personnel problem.

448 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

In Practice 1. Monitor the decision environment. It is Monday morning, and Joe DeFoe, Al-
berta’s accounts receivable supervisor, is absent again.
Alberta
Consulting 2. Define the decision problem. This is the fourth consecutive Monday DeFoe has
been absent. Company policy forbids unexcused absenteeism, and DeFoe has
been warned about his excessive absenteeism on the last two occasions. A final
warning is in order but can be delayed, if warranted.

3. Specify decision objectives. DeFoe should attend work regularly and establish the in-
voice collection levels of which he is capable. The time period for solving the prob-
lem is 2 weeks.

4. Diagnose the problem. Discreet discussions with DeFoe’s co-workers and information gleaned
from DeFoe indicate that DeFoe has a drinking problem. He apparently uses Mondays to dry out
from weekend benders. Discussion with other company sources confirms that DeFoe is a prob-
lem drinker.

5. Develop alternative solutions. (1) Fire DeFoe. (2) Issue a final warning without comment. (3) Is-
sue a warning and accuse DeFoe of being an alcoholic to let him know you are aware of his
problem. (4) Talk with DeFoe to see if he will discuss his drinking. If he admits he has a drinking
problem, delay the final warning and suggest that he enroll in Alberta’s new employee assis-
tance program for help with personal problems, including alcoholism. (5) Talk with DeFoe to see
if he will discuss his drinking. If he does not admit he has a drinking problem, let him know that
the next absence will cost him his job.

6. Evaluate alternatives. The cost of training a replacement is the same for each alternative. Alter-
native 1 ignores cost and other criteria. Alternatives 2 and 3 do not adhere to company policy,
which advocates counseling where appropriate. Alternative 4 is designed for the benefit of both
DeFoe and the company. It might save a good employee if DeFoe is willing to seek assistance.
Alternative 5 is primarily for the benefit of the company. A final warning might provide some in-
centive for DeFoe to admit he has a drinking problem. If so, dismissal might be avoided, but fur-
ther absences will no longer be tolerated.

7. Choose the best alternative. DeFoe does not admit that he has a drinking problem. Choose al-
ternative 5.

8. Implement the chosen alternative. Write up the case and issue the final warning.16

In the preceding example, issuing the final warning to Joe DeFoe was a pro-
grammed decision. The standard of expected behavior was clearly defined, infor-
mation on the frequency and cause of DeFoe’s absence was readily available, and
acceptable alternatives and procedures were described. The rational procedure
works best in such cases, when the decision maker has sufficient time for an orderly,
thoughtful process. Moreover, Alberta Consulting had mechanisms in place to im-
plement the decision, once made.

When decisions are nonprogrammed, ill-defined, and piling on top of one an-
other, the individual manager should still try to use the steps in the rational ap-
proach, but he or she often will have to take shortcuts by relying on intuition and
experience. Deviations from the rational approach are explained by the bounded ra-
tionality perspective.

Bounded Rationality Perspective

The point of the rational approach is that managers should try to use systematic
procedures to arrive at good decisions. When organizations are facing little compe-
tition and are dealing with well-understood issues, managers generally use rational

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 449

Bounded Rationality: Trade-off

Limited time, information,
resources to deal
with complex,

multidimensional issues

Trade-off Personal Constraints: Trade-off Decision/
Trade-off Choice:
Personal desire for prestige,
Search for a
success; personal decision style; high-quality
and the desire to
satisfy emotional decision
alternative
needs, cope with pressure,
maintain self-concept

Organizational Constraints: Trade-off

Level of: agreement, EXHIBIT 12.3
shared perspective, Constraints and Tradeoffs
cooperation, or support; during Nonprogrammed
corporate culture and Decision Making
structure, ethical values Source: Adapted from Irving L.
Janis, Crucial Decisions (New
procedures to make decisions.17 Yet research into managerial decision making shows York: Free Press, 1989); and A.
that managers often are unable to follow an ideal procedure. Many decisions must L. George, Presidential Decision
be made very quickly. Time pressure, a large number of internal and external fac- Making in Foreign Policy: The
tors affecting a decision, and the ill-defined nature of many problems make system- Effective Use of Information
atic analysis virtually impossible. Managers have only so much time and mental ca- and Advice (Boulder, Colo.:
pacity and, hence, cannot evaluate every goal, problem, and alternative. The Westview Press, 1980).
attempt to be rational is bounded (limited) by the enormous complexity of many
problems. There is a limit to how rational managers can be. For example, an exec- Briefcase
utive in a hurry may have a choice of fifty ties on a rack but will take the first or
second one that matches his suit. The executive doesn’t carefully weigh all fifty al- As an organization
ternatives because the short amount of time and the large number of plausible al- manager, keep these
ternatives would be overwhelming. The manager simply selects the first tie that guidelines in mind:
solves the problem and moves on to the next task.
Use rational decision
Constraints and Tradeoffs. Not only are large organizational decisions too com- processes when possible,
plex to fully comprehend, but several other constraints impinge on the decision but recognize that many
maker, as illustrated in Exhibit 12.3. For many decisions, the circumstances are constraints may impinge
ambiguous, requiring social support, a shared perspective on what happens, and on decision makers and
acceptance and agreement. For example, consider the early U.S. decision to dis- prevent a perfectly ratio-
band the Iraqi army and disagreements over which of three new security forces to nal decision. Apply the
build up. These events left the United States without any sizeable Iraqi force bounded rationality per-
to subdue the growing violence, compelling American troops to be more visible spective and use intuition
and active and making them targets of attack and criticism. In addition, U.S. lead- when confronting ill-
ers’ lack of agreement to use military force to stop the looting that occurred when defined, nonprogrammed
troops first entrered Iraq alienated many Iraqi citizens, allowed insurgents to decisions.
gain strength, and made it more difficult to implement later police and military
decisions.18

Corporate culture and ethical values also influence decision making, as discussed
in Chapter 10. This chapter’s Leading by Design box describes how the founder of

450 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Leading by Design

Motek

At Motek, which makes software tasks can’t be completed by Friday, he or she is expected to
that tracks the movement of give a Thursday-afternoon alert, which gives others time to
goods in warehouses, no one is pitch in and help or move the job to the following week and
permitted to work past 5:00 P.M. or inform the customer. Customers rarely complain because
on weekends. Everyone gets 5 weeks Motek has developed such strong bonds of loyalty that they
of vacation, plus ten paid holidays, know the job will be done right and within an acceptable
and people get to choose their own as- time frame.
signments and vote on the size of their pay raises and
bonuses. Motek’s democratic decision making also applies to pay
When Ann Price founded Motek, she wanted to create a rates and bonuses. Everyone except the CIO and sales man-
company whose primary mission was to improve the lives of ager makes one of three salaries at Motek, and the highest is
its employees and customers rather than to reward share- only $30,000 more than the lowest. Employees recently had
holders or investors. She decided early on to take a long-term an opportunity to vote on increasing their compensation by
approach to business. “We know we’re revolutionizing the distributing profits, but they decided instead to look to the
warehouse automation industry,” Price says. “We know we’ll long run and pay down company debt. Each founding em-
get there. But instead of doing it in five years, we’ll do it in ployee has been promised 1 percent of Motek’s value when it
ten and have a life along the way.” Her emphasis on treating is sold to a large company, which Price believes could happen
people well has guided every major company decision as within the next few years.
Motek grows and changes.
Decision making at Motek is a democratic process. Every Price has emphasized hiring the right people, socializing
Monday morning, the company’s technical staff gathers to them into the corporate culture, providing them with
discuss what needs to be done that week, poring over a to- complete information, and then trusting them to make their
do list of hundreds of tasks. Rather than having a manager own decisions. It’s a decision formula that seems to be work-
determine which people should perform which jobs, individ- ing. As Motek continues to grow, Price’s challenge will be
uals volunteer for various chores and decide among them- maintaining an environment that encourages the kind of
selves the best way to accomplish all the work. “We decide decisions that create both happy employees and a successful
what happens,” explains employee Ran Ever-Hadani. “Things organization.
are rarely decreed from above.” If someone sees that all the
Source: Ellyn Spragins, “Is This the Best Company to Work for Anywhere?”
FSB (November 2002), 66–70.

software company Motek created a culture where decisions are made based on a
primary goal of improving the lives of employees and customers. Managers also of-
ten make decisions within a context of trying to please upper managers, people who
are perceived to have power within the organization, or others they respect and
want to emulate.19 Personal constraints—such as decision style, work pressure, de-
sire for prestige, or simple feelings of insecurity—may constrain either the search for
alternatives or the acceptability of an alternative. All of these factors constrain a
perfectly rational approach that should lead to an obviously ideal choice.20 Even
seemingly simple decisions, such as selecting a job on graduation from college, can
quickly become so complex that a bounded rationality approach is used. Graduat-
ing students have been known to search for a job until they have two or three ac-
ceptable job offers, at which point their search activity rapidly diminishes. Hun-
dreds of firms may be available for interviews, and two or three job offers are far

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 451

short of the maximum number that would be possible if students made the decision
based on perfect rationality.

The Role of Intuition. The bounded rationality perspective is often associated
with intuitive decision processes. In intuitive decision making, experience and judg-
ment rather than sequential logic or explicit reasoning are used to make decisions.21
Intuition is not arbitrary or irrational because it is based on years of practice and
hands-on experience, often stored in the subconscious. When managers use their
intuition based on long experience with organizational issues, they more rapidly
perceive and understand problems, and they develop a gut feeling or hunch about
which alternative will solve a problem, speeding the decision-making process.22 The
value of intuition for effective decision making is supported by a growing body of
research from psychology, organizational science, and other disciplines.23 Indeed,
many universities are offering courses in creativity and intuition so business stu-
dents can learn to understand and use these processes.

In a situation of great complexity or ambiguity, previous experience and judg-
ment are needed to incorporate intangible elements at both the problem identifica-
tion and problem solution stages.24 A study of manager problem finding showed
that thirty of thirty-three problems were ambiguous and ill-defined.25 Bits and scraps
of unrelated information from informal sources resulted in a pattern in the man-
ager’s mind. The manager could not prove a problem existed but knew intuitively
that a certain area needed attention. A too-simple view of a complex problem is of-
ten associated with decision failure.26 Intuition plays an increasingly important role
in problem identification in today’s fast-paced and uncertain business environment.

Intuitive processes are also used in the problem solution stage. Executives fre-
quently make decisions without explicit reference to the impact on profits or to
other measurable outcomes.27 As we saw in Exhibit 12.3, many intangible factors—
such as a person’s concern about the support of other executives, fear of failure, and
social attitudes—influence selection of the best alternative. These factors cannot be
quantified in a systematic way, so intuition guides the choice of a solution. Man-
agers may make a decision based on what they sense to be right rather than on what
they can document with hard data. A survey of managers conducted in May 2002
by executive search firm Christian & Timbers found that 45 percent of corporate
executives say they rely more on instinct than on facts and figures to make business
decisions.28

Howard Schultz turned Starbucks into a household name by pursuing his intu-
ition that the leisurely caffeine-and-conversation caffe model he observed in Italy
would work in the United States, despite market research that indicated Americans
would never pay $3 for a cup of coffee. Jerry Jones based his decision to buy the los-
ing Dallas Cowboys on intuition, then made a series of further intuitive decisions that
turned the team back into a winner. Similarly, the vice president for talent develop-
ment and casting at MTV relied on intuition to create the show The Osbournes. “We
never tested the show,” he says. “We just knew it would make great TV.”29

However, there are also many examples of intuitive decisions that turned out to
be complete failures.30 This chapter’s Book Mark discusses how managers can give
their intuition a better chance of leading to successful decisions.

Managers may walk a fine line between two extremes: on the one hand, making
arbitrary decisions without careful study, and on the other, relying obsessively on
numbers and rational analysis.31 Remember that the bounded rationality perspective
and the use of intuition apply mostly to nonprogrammed decisions. The novel,

452 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

unclear, complex aspects of nonprogrammed decisions mean hard data and logical
procedures are not available. One study of executive decision making found that
managers simply could not use the rational approach for nonprogrammed decisions,
such as when to buy a computed tomography (CT) scanner for an osteopathic hos-
pital or whether a city had a need for and could reasonably adopt an enterprise re-
source planning system.32 In those cases, managers had limited time and resources,
and some factors simply couldn’t be measured and analyzed. Trying to quantify
such information could cause mistakes because it may oversimplify decision criteria.
Intuition can also balance and supplement rational analysis to help organization
leaders make better decisions. At Paramount Pictures, a top management team com-
bined intuition and analysis to keep the studio consistently profitable.

Book Mark 12.0 (HAVE YOU READ THIS BOOK?)

Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking
By Malcolm Gladwell

Snap decisions can be just as good as— cites the example of a Pentagon war game, in which an
and sometimes better than—decisions that enemy team of commodities traders defeated a U.S. Army
are made cautiously and deliberately. Yet they can also be se- that had “an unpredented amount of information and in-
riously flawed or even dangerously wrong. That’s the premise telligence” and “did a thoroughly rational and rigorous
of Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink: The Power of Thinking without analysis that covered every conceivable contingency.” The
Thinking. Gladwell explores how our “adaptive unconscious” commodities traders were used to making thousands of
arrives at complex, important decisions in an instant—and instant decisions an hour based on limited information.
how we can train it to make those decisions good ones. Managers can practice spontaneous decision making un-
til it becomes second nature.
SHARPENING YOUR INTUITION • Know Your Limits. Not every decision should be based on
Even when we think our decision making is the result of care- intuition. When you have a depth of knowledge and ex-
ful analysis and rational consideration, Gladwell says, most of perience in an area, you can put more trust in your gut
it actually happens subconsciously in a split second. This feelings. Gladwell also cautions to beware of biases that
process, which he refers to as “rapid cognition,” provides interfere with good decision making. Blink suggests that
room for both amazing insight and grave error. Here are some we can teach ourselves to sort through first impressions
tips for improving rapid cognition: and figure out which are important and which are based
• Remember that more is not better. Gladwell argues that on subconscious biases such as stereotypes or emotional
baggage.
giving people too much data and information hampers
their ability to make good decisions. He cites a study CONCLUSION
showing that emergency room doctors who are best at Blink is filled with lively and interesting anecdotes, such as
diagnosing heart attacks gather less information from how firefighters can “slow down a moment” and create an
their patients than other doctors do. Rather than over- environment where spontaneous decision making can take
loading on information, search out the most meaningful place. Gladwell asserts that a better understanding of the
parts. process of split-second decision making can help people
• Practice thin-slicing. The process Gladwell refers to as make better decisions in all areas of their lives, as well as help
thin-slicing is what harnesses the power of the adaptive them anticipate and avoid miscalculations.
unconscious and enables us to make smart decisions with
minimal time and information. Thin-slicing means focus- Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking, by Malcolm Gladwell, is
ing on a thin slice of pertinent data or information and al- published by Little, Brown.
lowing your intuition to do the work for you. Gladwell

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 453

When she was head of Paramount Pictures, Shery Lansing and her boss, Jonathan In Practice
Dolgen, head of Viacom Entertainment Group, made a powerful team. Unlike many
studios, which lose money despite successful box-office films, Paramount has consis- Paramount
tently turned a profit every year since Lansing and Dolgen were put in charge. Pictures

As a former independent producer, Lansing relied on her experience and intuition
to pick good scripts and the right actors to make them work. Consider 1994’s Forrest
Gump. “It was a film about a guy on a bench,” said Lansing. “It was one of the riskiest
films ever made.” But Lansing’s intuition told her that Tom Hanks sitting on a bench talking
about life being “like a box of chocolates” would work, and the film reaped $329 million at the box
office. More recent successes under the leadership of Lansing and Dolgen include Along Came a Spi-
der, Vanilla Sky, and Lara Croft: Tomb Raider. Dolgen, a former lawyer, provided the analytical side
of the partnership. Dolgen’s intelligence and careful attention to detail helped Paramount generate
consistently good returns. Sometimes, his analysis would suggest that a risk was just not worth tak-
ing, even though it meant the studio turned down a potential blockbuster.

Lansing and Dolgen were considered one of the most effective management teams in Holly-
wood. They combined their natural strengths—one intuitive, the other analytical—to make good
decisions that kept Paramount consistently profitable in a difficult, high-risk, unpredictable business.
However, although Paramount has turned out a string of well-planned, reliable movies, top execu-
tives at Viacom are pushing the studio to take bigger risks and come up with some box office block-
busters. Lansing recently left Paramount and a new leader will try his hand at the business of pick-
ing successful movies. Like Lansing, though, he will likely rely largely on intution. There’s no formula
for accurately predicting which stories will resonate with today’s fickle movie-going audience.33

Organizational Decision Making Briefcase

Organizations are composed of managers who make decisions using both rational As an organization
and intuitive processes; but organization-level decisions are not usually made by a manager, keep this
single manager. Many organizational decisions involve several managers. Problem guideline in mind:
identification and problem solution involve many departments, multiple viewpoints,
and even other organizations, which are beyond the scope of an individual manager. Use a rational decision
approach—computation,
The processes by which decisions are made in organizations are influenced by management science—
a number of factors, particularly the organization’s own internal structures and when a problem situation
the degree of stability or instability of the external environment.34 Research into is well understood.
organization-level decision making has identified four primary types of organiza-
tional decision-making processes: the management science approach, the Carnegie
model, the incremental decision process model, and the garbage can model.

Management Science Approach

The management science approach to organizational decision making is the analog
to the rational approach by individual managers. Management science came into be-
ing during World War II.35 At that time, mathematical and statistical techniques
were applied to urgent, large-scale military problems that were beyond the ability of
individual decision makers.

Mathematicians, physicists, and operations researchers used systems analysis to
develop artillery trajectories, antisubmarine strategies, and bombing strategies such
as salvoing (discharging multiple shells simultaneously). Consider the problem of a

454 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

battleship trying to sink an enemy ship several miles away. The calculation for aim-
ing the battleship’s guns should consider distance, wind speed, shell size, speed and
direction of both ships, pitch and roll of the firing ship, and curvature of the earth.
Methods for performing such calculations using trial and error and intuition are not
accurate, take far too long, and may never achieve success.

This is where management science came in. Analysts were able to identify the
relevant variables involved in aiming a ship’s guns and could model them with the
use of mathematical equations. Distance, speed, pitch, roll, shell size, and so on
could be calculated and entered into the equations. The answer was immediate, and
the guns could begin firing. Factors such as pitch and roll were soon measured me-
chanically and fed directly into the targeting mechanism. Today, the human element
is completely removed from the targeting process. Radar picks up the target, and the
entire sequence is computed automatically.

Management science yielded astonishing success for many military problems.
This approach to decision making diffused into corporations and business schools,
where techniques were studied and elaborated. Today, many corporations have as-
signed departments to use these techniques. The computer department develops
quantitative data for analysis. Operations research departments use mathematical
models to quantify relevant variables and develop a quantitative representation of
alternative solutions and the probability of each one solving the problem. These de-
partments also use such devices as linear programming, Bayesian statistics, PERT
charts, and computer simulations.

Management science is an excellent device for organizational decision making
when problems are analyzable and when the variables can be identified and mea-
sured. Mathematical models can contain a thousand or more variables, each one rel-
evant in some way to the ultimate outcome. Management science techniques have
been used to correctly solve problems as diverse as finding the right spot for a
church camp, test-marketing the first of a new family of products, drilling for oil,
and radically altering the distribution of telecommunications services.36 Other prob-
lems amenable to management science techniques are the scheduling of ambulance
technicians, telephone operators, and turnpike toll collectors.37 The following ex-
ample describes how Continental Airlines uses management science techniques to
optimize crew recovery solutions.

In Practice Airlines spend a tremendous amount of time and energy planning and scheduling
their operations, yet schedule disruptions due to bad weather, unexpected events,
Continental mechanical problems, or ill crew members are unavoidable. That means flight delays
Airlines and cancellations, and lost revenue for the airline. Continental Airlines wanted a way
to deal with crew disruptions in real time, so that pilots and flight attendants could
be reassigned quickly and cost-effectively. By reassigning crews quickly, airlines can
avoid additional delays and cancellations, improve on-time performance, preserve pas-
senger goodwill, and save money.
Crew assignments and reassignments are limited by several employee qualification factors, in-
cluding the type of aircraft a pilot is qualified to fly, qualifications for landing at specific airports, for-
eign language ability for flight attendants on international flights, employees’ quality-of-life prefer-
ences, and so forth. In addition, numerous governmental regulations and contractual labor laws and
rules, such as the number of hours or days in a row an employee can work, must be taken into
account. Without a computerized decision support system, Continental had to produce recovery

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 455

solutions manually, which could take days even for a moderate disruption because of the number
and complexity of factors that have to be considered.

Continental managers and crew coordinators worked closely with CALEB Technologies to de-
velop CrewSolver, a computerized system that takes all the legal and governmental requirements,
crew qualifications, and quality-of-life issues into account. Mathematical formulations generate up
to three possible solutions. Continental estimates that it saved approximately $40 million in 2001 as
a direct result of using CrewSolver to recover from four major disruptions, including the terrorist at-
tacks in September. After the attacks, the problem of recovery involved more cancellations and a
larger time window than Continental or CALEB had ever imagined. Yet the system returned optimal
solutions in less than 17 minutes. This gave Continental an advantage over other major airlines.
When airspace was reopened, Continental offered passengers more consistent and reliable service
because it suffered fewer delays caused by crew unavailability. Continental executives believe that
without CrewSolver, the airline could not have recovered from the disruptions and schedule changes
caused by the September 11 attacks.38

Since then, Continental has continued to use management science to improve oper-
ations efficiency, reliability, and service. Other airlines, including Southwest Airlines
and Northwest Airlines, have since implemented their own customized versions of
CrewSolver to quickly and effectively solve scheduling problems that affect millions
of people every day.

Management science can accurately and quickly solve problems that have too
many explicit variables for human processing. This system is at its best when ap-
plied to problems that are analyzable, are measurable, and can be structured in a
logical way. Increasingly sophisticated computer technology and software programs
are allowing the expansion of management science to cover a broader range of
problems than ever before. For example, some retailers, including Home Depot,
Bloomingdale’s, and Gap, now use software to analyze current and historical sales
data and determine when, where, and how much to mark down prices. Managers
at Harrah’s Entertainment Inc. have turned the company into one of the hottest op-
erators of casinos by amassing tons of data about customers and using sophisticated
computer systems to make decisions about everything from casino layout to hotel
room pricing. Prices quoted for rooms, for instance, are based on a complex math-
ematical formula that takes into account how long the customers typically stay,
what games they play and how often, and other details.39

Management science has also produced many failures.40 In recent years, many
banks have begun using computerized scoring systems to rate those applying for
credit, but some argue that human judgment is needed to account for extenuating
circumstances. In one case, a member of the Federal Reserve Board, the agency that
sets interest rates and regulates banks, was denied a Toys “R” Us credit card based
on his computerized score.41

One problem with the management science approach is that quantitative data
are not rich and do not convey tacit knowledge, as described in Chapter 8. Informal
cues that indicate the existence of problems have to be sensed on a more personal
basis by managers.42 The most sophisticated mathematical analyses are of no value
if the important factors cannot be quantified and included in the model. Such things
as competitor reactions, consumer tastes, and product warmth are qualitative di-
mensions. In these situations, the role of management science is to supplement man-
ager decision making. Quantitative results can be given to managers for discussion
and interpretation along with their informal opinions, judgment, and intuition. The
final decision can include both qualitative factors and quantitative calculations.

456 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Briefcase Carnegie Model

As an organization The Carnegie model of organizational decision making is based on the work of
manager, keep these Richard Cyert, James March, and Herbert Simon, who were all associated with
guidelines in mind: Carnegie-Mellon University.43 Their research helped formulate the bounded ratio-
nality approach to individual decision making, as well as provide new insights about
Use a coalition-building organizational decisions.
approach when organiza-
tional goals and problem Until their work, research in economics assumed that business firms made deci-
priorities are in conflict. sions as a single entity, as if all relevant information were funneled to the top deci-
When managers disagree sion maker for a choice. Research by the Carnegie group indicated that organization-
about priorities or the true level decisions involved many managers and that a final choice was based on a
nature of the problem, coalition among those managers. A coalition is an alliance among several managers
they should discuss and who agree about organizational goals and problem priorities.44 It could include man-
seek agreement about agers from line departments, staff specialists, and even external groups, such as pow-
priorities. erful customers, bankers, or union representatives.

Management coalitions are needed during decision making for two reasons.
First, organizational goals are often ambiguous, and operative goals of departments
are often inconsistent. When goals are ambiguous and inconsistent, managers dis-
agree about problem priorities. They must bargain about problems and build a
coalition around the question of which problems to solve.

The second reason for coalitions is that individual managers intend to be ratio-
nal but function with human cognitive limitations and other constraints, as de-
scribed earlier. Managers do not have the time, resources, or mental capacity to
identify all dimensions and to process all information relevant to a decision. These
limitations lead to coalition-building behavior. Managers talk to each other and ex-
change points of view to gather information and reduce ambiguity. People who have
relevant information or a stake in a decision outcome are consulted. Building a
coalition will lead to a decision that is supported by interested parties.

The process of coalition formation has several implications for organizational
decision behavior. First, decisions are made to satisfice rather than to optimize prob-
lem solutions. Satisficing means organizations accept a satisfactory rather than a
maximum level of performance, enabling them to achieve several goals simultane-
ously. In decision making, the coalition will accept a solution that is perceived as sat-
isfactory to all coalition members. Second, managers are concerned with immediate
problems and short-run solutions. They engage in what Cyert and March called
problemistic search.45

Problemistic search means managers look around in the immediate environment
for a solution to quickly resolve a problem. Managers don’t expect a perfect solu-
tion when the situation is ill-defined and conflict-laden. This contrasts with the
management science approach, which assumes that analysis can uncover every rea-
sonable alternative. The Carnegie model says that search behavior is just sufficient
to produce a satisfactory solution and that managers typically adopt the first satis-
factory solution that emerges. Third, discussion and bargaining are especially im-
portant in the problem identification stage of decision making. Unless coalition
members perceive a problem, action will not be taken.

The decision process described in the Carnegie model is summarized in Exhibit
12.4. The Carnegie model points out that building agreement through a managerial
coalition is a major part of organizational decision making. This is especially true at
upper management levels. Discussion and bargaining are time consuming, so search
procedures are usually simple and the selected alternative satisfices rather than
optimizes problem solution. When problems are programmed—are clear and have

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 457

Uncertainty Coalition Formation Search
Information is limited Conduct a simple, local search
Managers have many Hold joint discussion and Use established procedures if
constraints interpret goals and appropriate
problems Create a solution if needed
Conflict
Managers have Share opinions Satisficing Decision Behavior
diverse goals, opinions, Adopt the first alternative that is
values, experience Establish problem priorities acceptable to the coalition

EXHIBIT 12.4 Obtain social support for
Choice Processes in the Carnegie Model problem, solution

been seen before—the organization will rely on previous procedures and routines.
Rules and procedures prevent the need for renewed coalition formation and politi-
cal bargaining. Nonprogrammed decisions, however, require bargaining and conflict
resolution.

Organizations suffer when managers are unable to build a coalition around
goals and problem priorities, as illustrated by the case of Encyclopaedia Britannica.

For most of its 231-year history, the Encyclopaedia Britannica had been viewed as an In Practice
illustrious repository of cultural and historical knowledge—almost a national treasure.
Generations of students and librarians relied on the Britannica—but that was before Encyclopaedia
CD-ROMs and the Internet became the study tools of choice. Suddenly, the thirty-two- Britannica
volume collection of encyclopedias, stretching 4 feet on a bookshelf and costing as
much as a personal computer (PC), seemed destined to fade into history.

When Swiss-based financier Joseph Safra bought Britannica, he discovered one of
the reasons. For nearly a decade, managers had bickered over goals and priorities. Some top
executives believed the company needed to invest more in electronic media, but others supported
Britannica’s traditional direct-to-home sales force. Eventually, the company’s Compton unit, a CD-
ROM pioneer now being used by millions of consumers, was sold, leaving Britannica without any
presence in the new market. In the 1980s, Microsoft had approached Britannica to develop a CD-
ROM encyclopedia; when it didn’t work out, Microsoft went with Funk & Wagnalls and developed
Encarta. Microsoft arranged to have Encarta preinstalled on PCs, so the CD-ROM was essentially
free to new PC buyers. When Britannica finally came out with its CD-ROM version, however, it was
priced at a staggering $1,200. The squabbling among managers, owners, and editors about prod-
uct development, pricing, distribution, and other important decisions contributed to the com-
pany’s decline.

The first step in Safra’s turnaround strategy was to install a new top management team, led by
one of his longtime advisors. The team immediately coalesced around the important problem of
establishing a presence in the world of electronic media. With this goal, the company rushed out a
revamped, lower-cost CD-ROM package and launched the Britannica.com Web site, which allows
users to call up encyclopedia entries online as well as get a list of links to related Web sites. The team
also created a separate digital media division to focus on new product development, such as for

458 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

wireless Web technology. Managers are looking toward the wireless Web as the best route to a suc-
cessful future and have teamed up with numerous wireless carriers and licensed Britannica’s content
to other Web sites.

Building a coalition focused on common goals rather than having managers pushing and pulling
in different directions got Britannica off the critical list by helping it cross the bridge to the digital
era. Now, managers are in the process of evaluation to see what new decisions need to be made to
help the company thrive in the digital world.46

Briefcase The Carnegie model is particularly useful at the problem identification stage. How-
ever, a coalition of key department managers is also important for smooth imple-
As an organization mentation of a decision, particularly a major reorganization. Top executives at Bri-
manager, keep these tannica realize the importance of building coalitions for decision making to keep
guidelines in mind: the company moving forward. When top managers perceive a problem or want to
make a major decision, they need to reach agreement with other managers to
Take risks and move the support the decision.47
company ahead by incre-
ments when a problem is Incremental Decision Process Model
defined but solutions are
uncertain. Try solutions Henry Mintzberg and his associates at McGill University in Montreal approached
step by step to learn organizational decision making from a different perspective. They identified twenty-
whether they work. five decisions made in organizations and traced the events associated with these de-
cisions from beginning to end.48 Their research identified each step in the decision
sequence. This approach to decision making, called the incremental decision process
model, places less emphasis on the political and social factors described in the
Carnegie model, but tells more about the structured sequence of activities under-
taken from the discovery of a problem to its solution.49

Sample decisions in Mintzberg’s research included choosing which jet aircraft
to acquire for a regional airline, developing a new supper club, developing a new
container terminal in a harbor, identifying a new market for a deodorant, installing
a controversial new medical treatment in a hospital, and firing a star radio an-
nouncer.50 The scope and importance of these decisions are revealed in the length
of time taken to complete them. Most of these decisions took more than a year, and
one third of them took more than 2 years. Most of these decisions were nonpro-
grammed and required custom-designed solutions.

One discovery from this research is that major organization choices are usually
a series of small choices that combine to produce the major decision. Thus, many
organizational decisions are a series of nibbles rather than a big bite. Organizations
move through several decision points and may hit barriers along the way. Mintzberg
called these barriers decision interrupts. An interrupt may mean an organization has
to cycle back through a previous decision and try something new. Decision loops or
cycles are one way the organization learns which alternatives will work. The ulti-
mate solution may be very different from what was initially anticipated.

The pattern of decision stages discovered by Mintzberg and his associates is
shown in Exhibit 12.5. Each box indicates a possible step in the decision sequence.
The steps take place in three major decision phases: identification, development,
and selection.

Identification Phase. The identification phase begins with recognition. Recogni-
tion means one or more managers become aware of a problem and the need to
make a decision. Recognition is usually stimulated by a problem or an opportunity.

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 459

A problem exists when elements in the external environment change or when in-
ternal performance is perceived to be below standard. In the case of firing a radio
announcer, comments about the announcer came from listeners, other announcers,
and advertisers. Managers interpreted these cues until a pattern emerged that indi-
cated a problem had to be dealt with.

The second step is diagnosis, in which more information is gathered if needed to
define the problem situation. Diagnosis may be systematic or informal, depending
upon the severity of the problem. Severe problems do not allow time for extensive
diagnosis; the response must be immediate. Mild problems are usually diagnosed in
a more systematic manner.

Development Phase. In the development phase, a solution is shaped to solve the
problem defined in the identification phase. The development of a solution takes one
of two directions. First, search procedures may be used to seek out alternatives
within the organization’s repertoire of solutions. For example, in the case of firing a
star announcer, managers asked what the radio station had done the last time an an-
nouncer had to be let go. To conduct the search, organization participants may look
into their own memories, talk to other managers, or examine the formal procedures
of the organization.

The second direction of development is to design a custom solution. This hap-
pens when the problem is novel so that previous experience has no value. Mintzberg
found that in these cases, key decision makers have only a vague idea of the ideal
solution. Gradually, through a trial-and-error process, a custom-designed alterna-
tive will emerge. Development of the solution is a groping, incremental procedure,
building a solution brick by brick.

Selection Phase. The selection phase is when the solution is chosen. This phase is
not always a matter of making a clear choice among alternatives. In the case of
custom-made solutions, selection is more an evaluation of the single alternative that
seems feasible.

Evaluation and choice may be accomplished in three ways. The judgment form
of selection is used when a final choice falls upon a single decision maker, and the
choice involves judgment based upon experience. In analysis, alternatives are evalu-
ated on a more systematic basis, such as with management science techniques.
Mintzberg found that most decisions did not involve systematic analysis and evalu-
ation of alternatives. Bargaining occurs when selection involves a group of decision
makers. Each decision maker may have a different stake in the outcome, so conflict
emerges. Discussion and bargaining occur until a coalition is formed, as in the
Carnegie model described earlier.

When a decision is formally accepted by the organization, authorization takes
place. The decision may be passed up the hierarchy to the responsible hierarchical
level. Authorization is often routine because the expertise and knowledge rest with
the lower-level decision makers who identified the problem and developed the solu-
tion. A few decisions are rejected because of implications not anticipated by lower-
level managers.

Dynamic Factors. The lower part of the chart in Exhibit 12.5 shows lines running
back toward the beginning of the decision process. These lines represent loops or cy-
cles that take place in the decision process. Organizational decisions do not follow
an orderly progression from recognition through authorization. Minor problems
arise that force a loop back to an earlier stage. These are decision interrupts. If a

EXHIBIT 12.5 460 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes
The Incremental Decision Process Model
Source: Adapted and reprinted from “The Structure of Unstructured Decision Processes” by Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and André Théorêt, published in Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no.
2 (1976), 266, by permission of The Administrative Science Quarterly. Copyright © 1976 Cornell University.

Identification Development Selection
Phase Phase Phase

Search Screen

Diagnosis Design Judgment Authorization
Recognition Evaluation—Choice

Analysis
Evaluation

Bargaining
Evaluation—Choice

Internal Interrupt New Option Interrupt

External Interrupt

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 461

custom-designed solution is perceived as unsatisfactory, the organization may have
to go back to the very beginning and reconsider whether the problem is truly worth
solving. Feedback loops can be caused by problems of timing, politics, disagreement
among managers, inability to identify a feasible solution, turnover of managers, or
the sudden appearance of a new alternative. For example, when a small Canadian
airline made the decision to acquire jet aircraft, the board authorized the decision,
but shortly after, a new chief executive was brought in who canceled the contract,
recycling the decision back to the identification phase. He accepted the diagnosis of
the problem but insisted upon a new search for alternatives. Then a foreign airline
went out of business and two used aircraft became available at a bargain price. This
presented an unexpected option, and the chief executive used his own judgment to
authorize the purchase of the aircraft.51

Because most decisions take place over an extended period of time, circum-
stances change. Decision making is a dynamic process that may require a number of
cycles before a problem is solved. An example of the incremental process and
cycling that can take place is illustrated in Gillette’s decision to create a new razor.

The Gillette Company uses incremental decision making to perfect the design of ra- In Practice
zors such as the Sensor, the Mach3, or the vibrating M3Power. Consider the develop-
ment of the Mach3. While searching for a new idea to increase sales in Gillette’s ma- Gillette
ture shaving market, researchers at the company’s British research lab came up with a Company
bright idea to create a razor with three blades to produce a closer, smoother, more
comfortable shave (recognition and diagnosis). Ten years later, the Mach3 reached the
market, after thousands of shaving tests, numerous design modifications, and a develop-
ment and tooling cost of $750 million, roughly the amount a pharmaceutical firm invests in
developing a blockbuster drug.

The technical demands of building a razor with three blades that would follow a man’s face
and also be easy to clean had several blind alleys. Engineers first tried to find established techniques
(search, screen), but none fit the bill. Eventually a prototype called Manx was built (design), and in
shaving tests it “beat the pants off” Gillette’s Sensor Excel, the company’s best-selling razor at the
time. However, Gillette’s CEO insisted that the razor had to have a radically new blade edge so the
razor could use thinner blades (internal interrupt), so engineers began looking for new technology
that could produce a stronger blade (search, screen). Eventually, the new edge, known as DLC for
diamond-like carbon coating, would be applied atom by atom with chip-making technology
(design).

The next problem was manufacturing (diagnosis), which required an entirely new process to
handle the complexity of the triple-bladed razor (design). Although the board gave the go-ahead to
develop manufacturing equipment (judgment, authorization), some members became concerned
because the new blades, which are three times stronger than stainless steel, would last longer and
cause Gillette to sell fewer cartridges (internal interrupt). The board eventually made the decision to
continue with the new blades, which have a blue indicator strip that fades to white and signals
when it’s time for a new cartridge.

The board gave final approval for production of the Mach3 to begin in the fall of 1997. The new
razor was introduced in the summer of 1998 and began smoothly sliding off shelves. Gillette re-
covered its huge investment in record time. Gillette then started the process of searching for the next
shaving breakthrough all over again, using new technology that can examine a razor blade at the
atomic level and high-speed video that can capture the act of cutting a single whisker. The company
has moved ahead in increments and is expected to roll out its next major shaving product sometime
before the end of 2006.52

462 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

At Gillette, the identification phase occurred because executives were aware of the
need for a new razor and became alert to the idea of using three blades to produce
a closer shave. The development phase was characterized by the trial-and-error cus-
tom design leading to the Mach3. During the selection phase, certain approaches
were found to be unacceptable, causing Gillette to cycle back and redesign the ra-
zor, including using thinner, stronger blades. Advancing once again to the selection
phase, the Mach3 passed the judgment of top executives and board members, and
manufacturing and marketing budgets were quickly authorized. This decision took
more than a decade, finally reaching completion in the summer of 1998.

Briefcase The Learning Organization

As an organization At the beginning of this chapter, we discussed how the rapidly changing business en-
manager, keep these vironment is creating greater uncertainty for decision makers. Some organizations
guidelines in mind: that are particularly affected by this trend are shifting to the learning organization
concept. These organizations are marked by a tremendous amount of uncertainty at
Apply both the Carnegie both the problem identification and problem solution stages. Two approaches to de-
model and the incremen- cision making have evolved to help managers cope with this uncertainty and com-
tal process model in a plexity. One approach is to combine the Carnegie and incremental process models
situation with high uncer- just described. The second is a unique approach called the garbage can model.
tainty about both prob-
lems and solutions. Deci- Combining the Incremental Process
sion making may also and Carnegie Models
employ garbage can pro-
cedures. Move the organi- The Carnegie description of coalition building is especially relevant for the problem
zation toward better per- identification stage. When issues are ambiguous, or if managers disagree about
formance by proposing problem severity, discussion, negotiation, and coalition building are needed. Once
new ideas, spending time agreement is reached about the problem to be tackled, the organization can move
working in important toward a solution.
areas, and persisting with
potential solutions. The incremental process model tends to emphasize the steps used to reach a so-
lution. After managers agree on a problem, the step-by-step process is a way of try-
ing various solutions to see what will work. When problem solution is unclear, a
trial-and-error solution may be designed. For example, in 1999, executives from
three of the world’s largest music companies formed a coalition to provide online
consumers with a legal alternative to the digital piracy of Internet song-swapping
services. However, making the joint venture MusicNet an appealing choice was a
challenge. As originally conceived, the service didn’t provide music lovers with the
features they wanted, so managers took an incremental approach to try to make
MusicNet more user-friendly. Today, as the leading online music service provider,
MusicNet creates customized downloads and subscription services distributed
through providers such as Yahoo!, AOL, and Virgin Digital. Managers have con-
tinued to use an incremental approach as the industry evolves with the introduction
of Apple’s iTunes and other new distribution channels. As one executive put it,
“This is a business of trial and error.”53

The two models do not disagree with one another. They describe how organiza-
tions make decisions when either problem identification or solution is uncertain.
The application of these two models to the stages in the decision process is illus-
trated in Exhibit 12.6. When both parts of the decision process are simultaneously

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 463

Problem Identification Problem Solution

When problem identification is When problem solution is uncertain,
uncertain, Carnegie model applies incremental process model applies
Incremental, trial-and-error process
Political and social process is needed is needed
Solve big problems in little steps
Build coalition, seek agreement, Recycle and try again when blocked
and resolve conflict about goals and
problem priorities

EXHIBIT 12.6
Decision Process When
Problem Identification and
Problem Solution Are
Uncertain

highly uncertain, which is often the case in learning organizations, the organization
is in an extremely difficult position. Decision processes in that situation may be a
combination of Carnegie and incremental process models, and this combination
may evolve into a situation described in the garbage can model.

Garbage Can Model

The garbage can model is one of the most recent and interesting descriptions of or-
ganizational decision processes. It is not directly comparable to the earlier models,
because the garbage can model deals with the pattern or flow of multiple decisions
within organizations, whereas the incremental and Carnegie models focus on how a
single decision is made. The garbage can model helps you think of the whole orga-
nization and the frequent decisions being made by managers throughout.

Organized Anarchy. The garbage can model was developed to explain the pattern
of decision making in organizations that experience extremely high uncertainty,
such as the growth and change required in a learning organization. Michael Cohen,
James March, and Johan Olsen, the originators of the model, called the highly un-
certain conditions an organized anarchy, which is an extremely organic organiza-
tion.54 Organized anarchies do not rely on the normal vertical hierarchy of author-
ity and bureaucratic decision rules. They result from three characteristics:

1. Problematic preferences. Goals, problems, alternatives, and solutions are ill-
defined. Ambiguity characterizes each step of a decision process.

2. Unclear, poorly understood technology. Cause-and-effect relationships within
the organization are difficult to identify. An explicit database that applies to de-
cisions is not available.

3. Turnover. Organizational positions experience turnover of participants. In ad-
dition, employees are busy and have only limited time to allocate to any one
problem or decision. Participation in any given decision will be fluid and limited.

An organized anarchy is characterized by rapid change and a collegial, nonbu-
reaucratic environment. No organization fits this extremely organic circumstance all
the time, although learning organizations and today’s Internet-based companies may
experience it much of the time. Many organizations will occasionally find them-
selves in positions of making decisions under unclear, problematic circumstances.
The garbage can model is useful for understanding the pattern of these decisions.

464 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Streams of Events. The unique characteristic of the garbage can model is that the
decision process is not seen as a sequence of steps that begins with a problem and
ends with a solution. Indeed, problem identification and problem solution may
not be connected to each other. An idea may be proposed as a solution when no
problem is specified. A problem may exist and never generate a solution. Deci-
sions are the outcome of independent streams of events within the organization.
The four streams relevant to organizational decision making are as follows:

1. Problems. Problems are points of dissatisfaction with current activities and
performance. They represent a gap between desired performance and current
activities. Problems are perceived to require attention. However, they are dis-
tinct from solutions and choices. A problem may lead to a proposed solution
or it may not. Problems may not be solved when solutions are adopted.

2. Potential solutions. A solution is an idea somebody proposes for adoption.
Such ideas form a flow of alternative solutions through the organization.
Ideas may be brought into the organization by new personnel or may be in-
vented by existing personnel. Participants may simply be attracted to certain
ideas and push them as logical choices regardless of problems. Attraction to
an idea may cause an employee to look for a problem to which the idea can
be attached and, hence, justified. The point is that solutions exist independent
of problems.

3. Participants. Organization participants are employees who come and go
throughout the organization. People are hired, reassigned, and fired. Partici-
pants vary widely in their ideas, perception of problems, experience, values,
and training. The problems and solutions recognized by one manager will dif-
fer from those recognized by another manager.

4. Choice opportunities. Choice opportunities are occasions when an organiza-
tion usually makes a decision. They occur when contracts are signed, people
are hired, or a new product is authorized. They also occur when the right mix
of participants, solutions, and problems exists. Thus, a manager who hap-
pened to learn of a good idea may suddenly become aware of a problem to
which it applies and, hence, can provide the organization with a choice op-
portunity. Match-ups of problems and solutions often result in decisions.

With the concept of four streams, the overall pattern of organizational deci-
sion making takes on a random quality. Problems, solutions, participants, and
choices all flow through the organization. In one sense, the organization is a large
garbage can in which these streams are being stirred, as illustrated in Exhibit 12.7.
When a problem, solution, and participant happen to connect at one point, a de-
cision may be made and the problem may be solved; but if the solution does not
fit the problem, the problem may not be solved.

Thus, when viewing the organization as a whole and considering its high level
of uncertainty, one sees problems arise that are not solved and solutions tried that
do not work. Organization decisions are disorderly and not the result of a logical,
step-by-step sequence. Events may be so ill-defined and complex that decisions,
problems, and solutions act as independent events. When they connect, some
problems are solved, but many are not.55

Consequences. There are four specific consequences of the garbage can decision
process for organizational decision making:

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 465

Problems Solutions EXHIBIT 12.7
Illustration of
Ps = Problems Independent Streams
Ss = Solutions of Events in the Garbage
COs = Choice Can Model of Decision
Making
Opportunities
PARs = Participants Middle Management Participants

Participants Ps
Ss
COs
PARs

Solutions COs Ss COs Solutions
COs
Department A Ps Department B
Ps PARs Ps
Ss Ss
COs COs

PARs PARs

Participants Participants
Problems Problems

1. Solutions may be proposed even when problems do not exist. An employee
might be sold on an idea and might try to sell it to the rest of the organization.
An example was the adoption of computers by many organizations during the
1970s. The computer was an exciting solution and was pushed by both com-
puter manufacturers and systems analysts within organizations. The computer
did not solve any problems in those initial applications. Indeed, some comput-
ers caused more problems than they solved.

2. Choices are made without solving problems. A choice such as creating a new de-
partment may be made with the intention of solving a problem; but, under con-
ditions of high uncertainty, the choice may be incorrect. Moreover, many choices
just seem to happen. People decide to quit, the organization’s budget is cut, or a
new policy bulletin is issued. These choices may be oriented toward problems
but do not necessarily solve them.

3. Problems may persist without being solved. Organization participants get used
to certain problems and give up trying to solve them; or participants may not
know how to solve certain problems because the technology is unclear. A uni-
versity in Canada was placed on probation by the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors because a professor had been denied tenure without due
process. The probation was a nagging annoyance that the administrators
wanted to remove. Fifteen years later, the nontenured professor died. The pro-
bation continues because the university did not acquiesce to the demands of the

466 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

heirs of the association to reevaluate the case. The university would like to solve
the problem, but administrators are not sure how, and they do not have the re-
sources to allocate to it. The probation problem persists without a solution.
4. A few problems are solved. The decision process does work in the aggregate. In
computer simulation models of the garbage can model, important problems
were often resolved. Solutions do connect with appropriate problems and par-
ticipants so that a good choice is made. Of course, not all problems are resolved
when choices are made, but the organization does move in the direction of prob-
lem reduction.

The effects of independent streams and the rather chaotic decision processes of
the garbage can model can be seen in the production of David O. Russell’s movie
I ࡖ Huckabees, which has been called an “existential comedy.”

In Practice Screenwriter and director David O. Russell has become known for creating intelligent,
original movies such as Flirting with Disaster and Three Kings. His 2004 film I ࡖ
I ࡖ Huckabees Huckabees might be the most original—or some would say just plain weird—so far.
The New York Times referred to the movie as “a jumbled, antic exploration of exis-
tential and Buddhist philosophy that also involves tree-hugging, African immigrants,
and Shania Twain.” Yet the movie got decent critical reviews and was picked by the
Village Voice as one of the best films of 2004.
Russell had a vision of what he wanted the movie to be from the beginning, but few
others could grasp what that was. Most of the actors who signed on to star in I ࡖ Huckabees ad-
mit that they didn’t really understand the script, but trusted Russell’s vision and imagination. Two of
the biggest actors in Hollywood, Jude Law and Gwyneth Paltrow, signed on to play employees at a
department store chain called Huckabees. But Paltrow backed out before filming ever started. Nicole
Kidman was interested but had a conflict. Jennifer Aniston became—and as quickly unbecame—
a possibility. Finally, Naomi Watts, who had been Russell’s original choice for the role, was able to
free herself from scheduling conflicts to take the part. The casting wasn’t quite set though. Jude Law
dropped out for unknown reasons—but just as quickly dropped back in.
Filming was chaotic. As the actors were on camera saying the lines they’d memorized, Russell
was a few feet away continually calling out new lines to them. In one scene, Law became so ex-
hausted and frustrated that he started pounding his fists in the grass and shouting expletives. Rus-
sell loved the improvisation and kept the cameras rolling. Actors were unsure of how to develop
their characterizations, so they just did whatever seemed right at the time, often based on Russell’s
efforts to keep them off balance. Scenes were often filmed blindly with no idea of how they were
supposed to fit in the overall story.
After Russell’s hours in the editing room, the final film turned out to be quite different from what
the actors thought they’d shot. Some major scenes, including one that was supposed to articulate
the film’s theme that everything is connected, were cut entirely.
Amazingly, considering the chaos on the set, the film was completed on schedule and on bud-
get. Although I ࡖ Huckabees is emotionally and intellectually dense, and not the kind of movie
that reaps big bucks, the haphazard process worked to create the movie David O. Russell wanted
to make.56

The production of I ࡖ Huckabees was not a rational process that started with a
clear problem and ended with a logical solution. Many events occurred by chance
and were intertwined, which characterizes the garbage can model. Everyone from
the director to the actors continuously added to the stream of new ideas for the

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 467

story. Some solutions were connected to emerging problems: Naomi Watts cleared
her schedule just in time to take the role after Gwyneth Paltrow dropped out, for
example. The actors (participants) daily made personal choices regarding charac-
terization that proved to be right for the story line. The garbage can model, how-
ever, doesn’t always work—in the movies or in organizations. A similar haphazard
process during the filming of Waterworld led to the most expensive film in Holly-
wood history and a decided box-office flop for Universal Pictures.57

Contingency Decision-Making Framework

This chapter has covered several approaches to organizational decision making, in-
cluding management science, the Carnegie model, the incremental decision process
model, and the garbage can model. It has also discussed rational and intuitive deci-
sion processes used by individual managers. Each decision approach is a relatively
accurate description of the actual decision process, yet all differ from each other.
Management science, for example, reflects a different set of decision assumptions
and procedures than does the garbage can model.

One reason for having different approaches is that they appear in different or-
ganizational situations. The use of an approach is contingent on the organization
setting. Two characteristics of organizations that determine the use of decision ap-
proaches are (1) problem consensus and (2) technical knowledge about the means
to solve those problems.58 Analyzing organizations along these two dimensions sug-
gests which approach will be used to make decisions.

Problem Consensus

Problem consensus refers to the agreement among managers about the nature of a
problem or opportunity and about which goals and outcomes to pursue. This vari-
able ranges from complete agreement to complete disagreement. When managers
agree, there is little uncertainty—the problems and goals of the organization are
clear, and so are standards of performance. When managers disagree, organization
direction and performance expectations are in dispute, creating a situation of high
uncertainty. One example of problem uncertainty occurred at Wal-Mart stores re-
garding the use of parking lot patrols. Some managers presented evidence that golf-
cart patrols significantly reduced auto theft, assault, and other crimes in the stores’
lots and increased business because they encouraged more nighttime shopping.
These managers argued that the patrols should be used, but others believed the pa-
trols were not needed and were too expensive, emphasizing that parking lot crime
was a society problem rather than a store problem.59

Problem consensus tends to be low when organizations are differentiated, as de-
scribed in Chapter 4. Recall that uncertain environments cause organizational de-
partments to differentiate from one another in goals and attitudes to specialize in
specific environmental sectors. This differentiation leads to disagreement and con-
flict, so managers must make a special effort to build coalitions during decision
making. For example, NASA has been criticized for failing to identify problems with
the Columbia space shuttle that might have prevented the February 2003 disaster.
Part of the reason was high differentiation and conflicting opinions between safety
managers and scheduling managers, in which pressure to launch on time overrode
safety concerns. In addition, after the launch, engineers three times requested—and
were denied—better photos to assess the damage from a piece of foam debris that

468 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

struck the shuttle’s left wing just seconds after launch. Investigations now indicate
that the damage caused by the debris may have been the primary physical cause of
the explosion. Mechanisms for hearing dissenting opinions and building coalitions
can improve decision making at NASA and other organizations dealing with com-
plex problems.60

Problem consensus is especially important for the problem identification stage of
decision making. When problems are clear and agreed on, they provide clear stan-
dards and expectations for performance. When problems are not agreed on, prob-
lem identification is uncertain and management attention must be focused on gain-
ing agreement about goals and priorities.

Technical Knowledge about Solutions

Technical knowledge refers to understanding and agreement about how to solve
problems and reach organizational goals. This variable can range from complete
agreement and certainty to complete disagreement and uncertainty about cause–
effect relationships leading to problem solution. One example of low technical
knowledge occurred at PepsiCo’s 7-Up division. Managers agreed on the problem
to be solved—they wanted to increase market share from 6 percent to 7 percent.
However, the means for achieving this increase in market share were not known
or agreed on. A few managers wanted to use discount pricing in supermarkets.
Other managers believed they should increase the number of soda fountain out-
lets in restaurants and fast-food chains. A few other managers insisted that the
best approach was to increase advertising through radio and television. Managers
did not know what would cause an increase in market share. Eventually, the
advertising judgment prevailed at 7-Up, but it did not work very well. The failure
of its decision reflected 7-Up’s low technical knowledge about how to solve the
problem.

When means are well understood, the appropriate alternatives can be identified
and calculated with some degree of certainty. When means are poorly understood,
potential solutions are ill-defined and uncertain. Intuition, judgment, and trial and
error become the basis for decisions.

Contingency Framework

Exhibit 12.8 describes the contingency decision-making framework, which brings
together the two dimensions of problem consensus and technical knowledge about
solutions. Each cell represents an organizational situation that is appropriate for the
decision-making approaches described in this chapter.

Cell 1. In cell 1 of Exhibit 12.8, rational decision procedures are used because prob-
lems are agreed on and cause–effect relationships are well understood, so there is lit-
tle uncertainty. Decisions can be made in a computational manner. Alternatives can
be identified and the best solution adopted through analysis and calculations. The
rational models described earlier in this chapter, both for individuals and for the or-
ganization, are appropriate when problems and the means for solving them are well
defined.

Cell 2. In cell 2, there is high uncertainty about problems and priorities, so bar-
gaining and compromise are used to reach consensus. Tackling one problem might
mean the organization must postpone action on other issues. The priorities given

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 469

Certain PROBLEM Uncertain EXHIBIT 12.8
CONSENSUS Contingency Framework
for Using Decision Models

Certain 1 2

SOLUTION KNOWLEDGE Individual: Individual:
Rational Approach, Bargaining,
Computation Coalition
Formation
Organization:
Management Organization:
Science Carnegie Model

Uncertain 3 4 Individual:

Individual: Bargaining and
Judgment, Trial Judgment,
and Error Inspiration and
Imitation
Organization:
Incremental Learning Organization:
Decision Process Carnegie and Incremental
Model Decision Process Models,
Evolving to Garbage
Can Model

to respective problems are decided through discussion, debate, and coalition
building.

Managers in this situation should use broad participation to achieve consensus
in the decision process. Opinions should be surfaced and discussed until compro-
mise is reached. The organization will not otherwise move forward as an integrated
unit. In the case of Wal-Mart, managers will discuss conflicting opinions about the
benefits and costs of parking lot patrols.

The Carnegie model applies when there is dissension about organizational prob-
lems. When groups within the organization disagree, or when the organization is in
conflict with constituencies (government regulators, suppliers, unions), bargaining
and negotiation are required. The bargaining strategy is especially relevant to the
problem identification stage of the decision process. Once bargaining and negotia-
tion are completed, the organization will have support for one direction.

Cell 3. In a cell 3 situation, problems and standards of performance are certain, but
alternative technical solutions are vague and uncertain. Techniques to solve a prob-
lem are ill defined and poorly understood. When an individual manager faces this
situation, intuition will be the decision guideline. The manager will rely on past ex-
perience and judgment to make a decision. Rational, analytical approaches are not
effective because the alternatives cannot be identified and calculated. Hard facts and
accurate information are not available.

The incremental decision process model reflects trial and error on the part of the
organization. Once a problem is identified, a sequence of small steps enables the or-
ganization to learn a solution. As new problems arise, the organization may recycle

470 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

back to an earlier point and start over. Eventually, over a period of months or years,
the organization will acquire sufficient experience to solve the problem in a satis-
factory way.

McDonald’s provides an example of a cell 3 situation. Managers are searching
for ways to revive flagging sales at the fast-food chain’s U.S. restaurants. They are
using trial and error to come up with the right combination of management
changes, new menu items such as the Fruit and Walnut Salad, and fresh advertising
approaches that will rekindle sales and recharge McDonald’s image.

The situation in cell 3, of senior managers agreeing about problems but not
knowing how to solve them, occurs frequently in business organizations. If man-
agers use incremental decisions in such situations, they will eventually acquire the
technical knowledge to accomplish goals and solve problems.

Cell 4. The situation in cell 4, characterized by high uncertainty about both prob-
lems and solutions, is difficult for decision making. An individual manager making
a decision under this high level of uncertainty can employ techniques from both cell
2 and cell 3. The manager can attempt to build a coalition to establish goals and
priorities and use judgment, intuition, or trial and error to solve problems. Addi-
tional techniques, such as inspiration and imitation, also may be required. Inspira-
tion refers to an innovative, creative solution that is not reached by logical means.
Inspiration sometimes comes like a flash of insight, but—similar to intuition—it is
often based on deep knowledge and understanding of a problem that the uncon-
scious mind has had time to mull over.61 Imitation means adopting a decision tried
elsewhere in the hope that it will work in this situation.

For example, in one university, accounting department faculty were unhappy
with their current circumstances but could not decide on the direction the depart-
ment should take. Some faculty members wanted a greater research orientation,
whereas others wanted greater orientation toward business firms and accounting
applications. The disagreement about goals was compounded because neither group
was sure about the best technique for achieving its goals. The ultimate solution was
inspirational on the part of the dean. An accounting research center was established
with funding from major accounting firms. The funding was used to finance re-
search activities for faculty interested in basic research and to provide contact with
business firms for other faculty. The solution provided a common goal and unified
people within the department to work toward that goal.

When an entire organization is characterized by high uncertainty regarding both
problems and solutions, as in learning organizations, elements of the garbage can
model will appear. Managers may first try techniques from both cells 2 and 3, but
logical decision sequences starting with problem identification and ending with
problem solution will not occur. Potential solutions will precede problems as often
as problems precede solutions. In this situation, managers should encourage wide-
spread discussion of problems and idea proposals to facilitate the opportunity to
make choices. Eventually, through trial and error, the organization will solve some
problems.

Research has found that decisions made following the prescriptions of the con-
tingency decision-making framework tend to be more successful. However, the
study noted that nearly six of ten strategic management decisions failed to follow
the framework, leading to a situation in which misleading or missing information
decreased the chance of an effective decision choice.62 Managers can use the contin-
gency framework in Exhibit 12.8 to improve the likelihood of successful organiza-
tional decisions.

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 471

Special Decision Circumstances Briefcase

In a highly competitive world beset by global competition and rapid change, deci- As an organization
sion making seldom fits the traditional rational, analytical model. Today’s managers manager, keep this
have to make high-stakes decisions more often and more quickly than ever before guideline in mind:
in an environment that is increasingly less predictable. For example, interviews with
CEOs in high-tech industries found that they strive to use some type of rational Track real-time informa-
process, but the uncertainty and change in the industry often make that approach tion, build multiple
unsuccessful. The way these managers actually reach decisions is through a complex alternatives simultane-
interaction with other managers, subordinates, environmental factors, and organi- ously, and try to involve
zational events.63 everyone—but move
ahead anyway when mak-
Three issues of particular concern for today’s decision makers are coping with ing decisions in a high-
high-velocity environments, learning from decision mistakes, and avoiding escalat- velocity environment.
ing commitment.

High-Velocity Environments

In some industries today, the rate of competitive and technological change is so ex-
treme that market data are either unavailable or obsolete, strategic windows open
and shut quickly, perhaps within a few months, and the cost of poor decisions is
company failure. Research has examined how successful companies make decisions
in these high-velocity environments, especially to understand whether organizations
abandon rational approaches or have time for incremental implementation.64

A comparison of successful with unsuccessful decisions in high-velocity envi-
ronments found the following patterns:

• Successful decision makers tracked information in real time to develop a deep
and intuitive grasp of the business. Two to three intense meetings per week with
all key players were usual. Decision makers tracked operating statistics about
cash, scrap, backlog, work in process, and shipments to constantly feel the pulse
of what was happening. Unsuccessful firms were more concerned with future
planning and forward-looking information, with only a loose grip on immedi-
ate happenings.

• During a major decision, successful companies began immediately to build mul-
tiple alternatives. Implementation of alternatives sometimes ran in parallel be-
fore they finally settled on a final choice. Companies that made decisions slowly
developed just one alternative, moving to another only after the first one failed.

• Fast, successful decision makers sought advice from everyone and depended
heavily on one or two savvy, trusted colleagues as counselors. Slow companies
were unable to build trust and agreement among the best people.

• Fast companies involved everyone in the decision and tried for consensus; but if
consensus did not emerge, the top manager made the choice and moved ahead.
Waiting for everyone to be on board created more delays than was warranted.
Slow companies delayed decisions to achieve a uniform consensus.

• Fast, successful choices were well integrated with other decisions and the over-
all strategic direction of the company. Less successful choices considered the
decision in isolation from other decisions; the decision was made in the ab-
stract.65

When speed matters, a slow decision is as ineffective as the wrong decision. As
we discussed in Chapter 11, speed is a crucial competitive weapon in a growing

472 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

number of industries, and companies can learn to make decisions quickly. To im-
prove the chances of a good decision under high-velocity conditions, some organi-
zations stimulate constructive conflict through a technique called point–counter-
point, which divides decision makers into two groups and assigns them different,
often competing responsibilities.66 The groups develop and exchange proposals and
debate options until they arrive at a common set of understandings and recommen-
dations. Groups can often make better decisions because multiple and diverse opin-
ions are considered. In the face of complexity and uncertainty, the more people who
have a say in the decision making, the better. At Intel Corp., the decision-making
process typically involves people from several different areas and levels of hierarchy,
“jousting with one another about the pros and cons of this or that,” says CEO Craig
Barrett.67

In group decision making, a consensus may not always be reached, but the ex-
ercise gives everyone a chance to consider options and state their opinions, and it
gives top managers a broader understanding. Typically, those involved support the
final choice. However, if a very speedy decision is required, top managers are will-
ing to make the decision and move forward. Once a decision has been made at In-
tel, for example, it is everyone’s responsibility to be involved and commit, even if
they disagree. As Barrett says, “No backbiting, no second-guessing. We make a de-
cision, we charge ahead.”68

Decision Mistakes and Learning

Organizational decisions result in many errors, especially when made in conditions
of great uncertainty. Managers simply cannot determine or predict which alterna-
tive will solve a problem. In these cases, the organization must make the decision—
and take the risk—often in the spirit of trial and error. If an alternative fails, the or-
ganization can learn from it and try another alternative that better fits the situation.
Each failure provides new information and insight. The point for managers is to
move ahead with the decision process despite the potential for mistakes. “Chaotic
action is preferable to orderly inaction.”69

In some organizations, managers are encouraged to instill a climate of experi-
mentation to facilitate creative decision making. If one idea fails, another idea
should be tried. Failure often lays the groundwork for success, such as when tech-
nicians at 3M developed Post-it Notes based on a failed product—a not-very-
sticky glue. Companies such as PepsiCo believe that if all their new products suc-
ceed, they’re doing something wrong, not taking the necessary risks to develop
new markets.70

Only by making mistakes can managers and organizations go through the
process of decision learning and acquire sufficient experience and knowledge to
perform more effectively in the future. Robert Townsend, who was president at Avis
Corporation, gives the following advice:

Admit your mistakes openly, maybe even joyfully. Encourage your associates to do
likewise by commiserating with them. Never castigate. Babies learn to walk by
falling down. If you beat a baby every time he falls down, he’ll never care much
for walking.

My batting average on decisions at Avis was no better than a .333. Two out of
every three decisions I made were wrong. But my mistakes were discussed openly
and most of them corrected with a little help from my friends.71

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 473

Escalating Commitment Briefcase

A much more dangerous mistake is to persist in a course of action when it is failing, As an organization
a tendency referred to as escalating commitment. Research suggests that organiza- manager, keep these
tions often continue to invest time and money in a solution despite strong evidence guidelines in mind:
that it is not working. Two explanations are given for why managers escalate com-
mitment to a failing decision. The first is that managers block or distort negative in- Do not persist in a course
formation when they are personally responsible for a negative decision. They sim- of action that is failing.
ply don’t know when to pull the plug. In some cases, they continue to throw good Some actions will not
money after bad even when a strategy seems incorrect and goals are not being met.72 work if uncertainty is
high, so encourage orga-
A second explanation for escalating commitment to a failing decision is that nizational learning by
consistency and persistence are valued in contemporary society. Consistent man- readily trying new alterna-
agers are considered better leaders than those who switch around from one course tives. Seek information
of action to another. Even though organizations learn through trial and error, orga- and evidence that indi-
nizational norms value consistency. These norms may result in a course of action be- cates when a course of
ing maintained, resources being squandered, and learning being inhibited. Empha- action is failing, and allo-
sis on consistent leadership was partly responsible for the Long Island Lighting cate resources to new
Company’s (LILCO’s) refusal to change course in the construction of the Shoreham choices rather than to un-
Nuclear Power Plant, which was eventually abandoned—after an investment of successful ventures.
more than $5 billion—without ever having begun operation. Shoreham’s cost was
estimated at $75 million when the project was announced in 1966, but by the time
a construction permit was granted, LILCO had already spent $77 million. Opposi-
tion to nuclear power was growing. Critics continued to decry the huge sums of
money being pumped into Shoreham. Customers complained that LILCO was cut-
ting back on customer service and maintenance of current operations. Shoreham of-
ficials, however, seemed convinced that they would triumph in the end; their re-
sponse to criticism was, “If people will just wait until the end, they are going to
realize that this is a hell of an investment.”

The end came in 1989, when a negotiated agreement with the state of New York
led LILCO to abandon the $5.5 billion plant in return for rate increases and a $2.5
billion tax write-off. By the time Governor Mario Cuomo signed an agreement with
the company, LILCO had remained firmly committed to a losing course of action
for more than 23 years.73

Failure to admit a mistake and adopt a new course of action is far worse than
an attitude that tolerates mistakes to encourage learning. Based on what has been
said about decision making in this chapter, one can expect companies to be ulti-
mately successful in their decision making by adopting a learning approach toward
solutions. They will make mistakes along the way, but they will resolve uncertainty
through the trial-and-error process.

Summary and Interpretation

The most important idea in this chapter is that most organizational decisions are not
made in a logical, rational manner. Most decisions do not begin with the careful
analysis of a problem, followed by systematic analysis of alternatives, and finally im-
plementation of a solution. On the contrary, decision processes are characterized by
conflict, coalition building, trial and error, speed, and mistakes. Managers operate
under many constraints that limit rationality; hence, intuition and hunch often are
the criteria for choice.

474 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Another important idea is that individuals make decisions, but organizational
decisions are not made by a single individual. Organizational decision making is a
social process. Only in rare circumstances do managers analyze problems and find
solutions by themselves. Many problems are not clear, so widespread discussion and
coalition building take place. Once goals and priorities are set, alternatives to
achieve those goals can be tried. When a manager does make an individual decision,
it is often a small part of a larger decision process. Organizations solve big problems
through a series of small steps. A single manager may initiate one step but should
be aware of the larger decision process to which it belongs.

The greatest amount of conflict and coalition building occurs when problems are
not agreed on. Priorities must be established to indicate which goals are important
and what problems should be solved first. If a manager attacks a problem other peo-
ple do not agree with, the manager will lose support for the solution to be imple-
mented. Thus, time and activity should be spent building a coalition in the problem
identification stage of decision making. Then the organization can move toward so-
lutions. Under conditions of low technical knowledge, the solution unfolds as a se-
ries of incremental trials that will gradually lead to an overall solution.

The most novel description of decision making is the garbage can model. This
model describes how decision processes can seem almost random in highly organic
organizations such as learning organizations. Decisions, problems, ideas, and peo-
ple flow through organizations and mix together in various combinations. Through
this process, the organization gradually learns. Some problems may never be solved,
but many are, and the organization will move toward maintaining and improving
its level of performance.

Finally, many organizations must make decisions with speed, which means stay-
ing in immediate touch with operations and the environment. Moreover, in an un-
certain world, organizations will make mistakes, and mistakes made through trial
and error should be encouraged. Encouraging trial-and-error increments facilitates
organizational learning. On the other hand, an unwillingness to change from a fail-
ing course of action can have serious negative consequences for an organization.
Norms for consistency and the desire to prove one’s decision correct can lead to con-
tinued investment in a useless course of action.

Key Concepts

bounded rationality perspective nonprogrammed decisions
Carnegie model organizational decision making
coalition organized anarchy
contingency decision-making framework point–counterpoint
decision learning problem consensus
escalating commitment problem identification
garbage can model problem solution
high-velocity environments problemistic search
imitation programmed decisions
incremental decision process model rational approach
inspiration satisficing
intuitive decision making technical knowledge
management science approach

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 475

Discussion Questions

1. When you are faced with choosing between several valid options, how do you typi-
cally make your decision? How do you think managers typically choose between sev-
eral options? What are the similarities between your decision process and what you
think managers do?

2. A professional economist once told his class, “An individual decision maker should
process all relevant information and select the economically rational alternative.” Do
you agree? Why or why not?

3. Do you think intuition is a valid way to make important business decisions? Why or
why not? Can you think of a time when you used intuition to make a decision?

4. The Carnegie model emphasizes the need for a political coalition in the decision-
making process. When and why are coalitions necessary?

5. What are the three major phases in Mintzberg’s incremental decision process model?
Why might an organization recycle through one or more phases of the model?

6. An organization theorist once told her class, “Organizations never make big decisions.
They make small decisions that eventually add up to a big decision.” Explain the logic
behind this statement.

7. How would you make a decision to select a building site for a new waste-treatment
plant in the Philippines? Where would you start with this complex decision, and what
steps would you take? Explain which decision model in the chapter best describes
your approach.

8. Why would managers in high-velocity environments worry more about the present
than the future? Discuss.

9. Describe the four streams of events in the garbage can model of decision making. Do
you think those streams are independent of each other? Why?

10. Why are decision mistakes usually accepted in organizations but penalized in college
courses and exams that are designed to train managers?

Chapter 12 Workbook: Decision Styles*

Think of some recent decisions that have influenced your *Adapted by Dorothy Marcic from “Action Assignment” in
life. Choose two significant decisions that you made and Jennifer M. Howard and Lawrence M. Miller, Team Management
two decisions that other people made. Fill out the follow- (Miller Consulting Group, 1994), 205.
ing table, using Exhibit 12.8 to determine decision styles.

Your decisions Approach used Advantages and Your recommended
1. disadvantages decision style
2.
Decisions by others
1.
2.

Questions 2. How can you know which approach is best?
1. How can a decision approach influence the outcome

of the decision? What happens when the approach fits
the decision? When it doesn’t fit?

476 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Case for Analysis: Cracking the Whip*

Harmon Davidson stared dejectedly at the departing figure note, saying, “If we do find opportunities for improvement,
of his management survey team leader. Their meeting had we’ll try to have recommendations for you.”
not gone well. Davidson had relayed to Al Pitcher com-
plaints about his handling of the survey. Pitcher had re- But the survey was barely a week old when the direc-
sponded with adamant denial and unveiled scorn. tor of management received his first call from an outraged
customer. It was the assistant secretary for public affairs,
Davidson, director of headquarters management, was Erin Dove, and she was not speaking in her usual upbeat
prepared to discount some of the criticism as resentment of tones. “Your folks have managed to upset my whole su-
outsiders meddling with “the way we’ve always done busi- pervisory staff with their comments about how we’ll have
ness,” exacerbated by the turbulence of continual reorga- to change our organization and methods,” she said. “I
nization. But Davidson could hardly ignore the sheer vol- thought you were going through a fact-finding study. This
ume of complaints or his high regard for some of their guy Pitcher sounds like he wants to remake DTS head-
sources. “Was I missing danger signals about Pitcher from quarters overnight. Who does he think he is?”
the start?” Davidson asked himself. “Or was I just giving a
guy I didn’t know a fair chance with an inherently contro- When Davidson asked him about the encounter with
versial assignment?” public affairs, Pitcher expressed puzzlement that a few
summary observations shared with supervisors in the inter-
With his division decimated in the latest round of est of “prompt informal feedback” had been interpreted as
downsizing at the Department of Technical Services (DTS) such disturbing conclusions. “I told them we’ll tell them
earlier that year, Davidson had been asked to return to the how to fix it,” he reassured his supervisor.
headquarters management office after a 5-year hiatus. The
director, Walton Drummond, had abruptly taken early re- “Listen, Al,” Davidson remonstrated gently. “These
tirement. are very accomplished managers who aren’t used to being
told they have to fix anything. This agency’s been on a roll
One of the first things Davidson had learned about his for years, and the need for reinvention isn’t resonating all
new job was that he would be responsible for a compre- that well yet. We’ve got to collect and analyze the infor-
hensive 6-month survey of the headquarters management mation and assemble a convincing case for change, or we’ll
structure and processes. The DTS secretary had promised be spinning our wheels. Let’s hold off on the feedback un-
the survey to the White House as a prelude to the agency’s til you and I have reviewed it together.”
next phase of management reform. Drummond had al-
ready picked the five-person survey team consisting of two But 2 weeks later, Technology Development Director
experienced management analysts, a promising younger Phil Canseco, an old and treasured colleague, was on
staff member, an intern, and Pitcher, the team leader. Davidson’s doorstep looking as unhappy as Erin Dove had
Pitcher was fresh from the Treasury Department, where he sounded on the phone. “Harmon, buddy, I think you have
had participated in a similar survey. But having gone off af- to rein in this survey team a bit,” he said. “Several man-
ter retirement for an extended mountain-climbing expedi- agers who were scheduled for survey interviews were
tion in Asia, Drummond was unavailable to explain his working on a 24-hour turnaround to give a revised project
survey plans or any understandings he had reached with budget to the Appropriations subcommittee that day. My
Pitcher. deputy says Pitcher was put out about postponing inter-
views and grumbled about whether we understood the new
Davidson had been impressed with Pitcher’s energy priorities. Is he living in the real world?”
and motivation. He worked long hours, wrote volumi-
nously if awkwardly, and was brimming with the latest or- Canseco’s comments prompted Davidson to call a few
ganizational theory. Pitcher had other characteristics, how- of his respected peers who had dealt with the survey team.
ever, that were disquieting. He seemed uninterested in With varying degrees of reluctance, they all criticized the
DTS’s history and culture and was paternalistic toward top team leader and, in some cases, team members, as abrasive
managers, assuming they were unsophisticated and uncon- and uninterested in the rationales offered for existing struc-
cerned about modern management. ture and processes.

A series of presurvey informational briefings for head- *This case was prepared by David Hornestay and appeared in
quarters office heads conducted by Davidson and Pitcher Government Executive, August 1998, 45–46, as part of a series of
seemed to go swimmingly. Pitcher deferred to his chief on case studies examining workplace dilemmas confronting federal
matters of philosophy and confined his remarks to sched- managers. Reprinted by permission of Government Executive.
ule and procedures. He closed his segment on a friendly

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 477

And so Davidson marshaled all of his tact for a re- He felt Davidson’s role was to hold the line against un-
view with the survey team leader. But Pitcher was in no warranted criticisms from prima donnas trying to dis-
mood for either introspection or reconsideration. He credit the survey.
took the view that he had been brought in to spearhead
a White House–inspired management improvement ini- Many questions arose in Davidson’s mind about the
tiative in a glamour agency that had never had to think survey plan and his division’s capacity to carry it out. Had
much about efficiency. He reminded Davidson that even they taken on too much with too little? Had the right peo-
he had conceded that managers were due some hard ple been picked for the survey team? Had managers and
lessons on this score. Pitcher didn’t see any way to meet executives, and even the team, been properly prepared for
his deadline except by adhering to a rigorous schedule, the survey?
since he was working with managers disinclined to co-
operate with an outsider pushing an unpopular exercise. But the most immediate question was whether Al
Pitcher could help him with these problems.

Case for Analysis: The Dilemma of Aliesha State College:
Competence versus Need*

Until the 1980s, Aliesha was a well-reputed, somewhat cost about the same—and both were extremely expensive.
sleepy state teachers college located on the outer fringes of The speech-therapy clinic, everyone agreed, addressed itself
a major metropolitan area. Then with the rapid expansion to a real need and one of high priority. But—and everyone
of college enrollments, the state converted Aliesha to a 4- had to agree because the evidence was overwhelming—it
year state college (and the plans called for it to become a did not do the job. Indeed, it did such a poor, sloppy, dis-
state university with graduate work and perhaps even with organized job that pediatricians, psychiatrists, and psy-
a medical school in the late 1990s). Within 10 years, chologists hesitated to refer their patients to the clinic. The
Aliesha grew from 1,500 to 9,000 students. Its budget ex- reason was that the clinic was a college program run to
panded even faster than the enrollment, increasing twenty- teach psychology students rather than to help children with
fold during that period. serious speech impediments.

The only part of Aliesha that did not grow was the The opposite criticism applied to the high school. No
original part, the teachers’ college; there enrollment actu- one questioned its excellence and the impact it made on the
ally went down. Everything else seemed to flourish. In ad- education students who listened in on its classes and on
dition to building new 4-year schools of liberal arts, busi- many young teachers in the area who came in as auditors.
ness, veterinary medicine, and dentistry, Aliesha developed But what need did it fill? There were plenty of perfectly ad-
many community service programs. Among them were a equate high schools in the area.
rapidly growing evening program, a mental health clinic,
and a speech-therapy center for children with speech “How can we justify,” asked one of the psychologists
defects—the only one in the area. Even within education connected with the speech clinic, “running an unnecessary
one area grew—the demonstration high school attached to high school in which each child costs as much as a gradu-
the old teachers’ college. Even though the high school en- ate student at Harvard?”
rolled only 300 students, its teachers were the leading
experts in teacher education, and it was considered the best “But how can we justify,” asked the dean of the school
high school in the area. of education, himself one of the outstanding teachers in the
demonstration high school, “a speech clinic that has no re-
Then, in 1992, the budget was suddenly cut quite sults even though each of its patients costs the state as
sharply by the state legislature. At the same time the faculty much as one of our demonstration high school students, or
demanded and got a fairly hefty raise in salary. It was clear more?”
that something had to give—the budget deficit was much
too great to be covered by ordinary cost reductions. When *“The Dilemma of Aliesha State College: Competence versus
the faculty committee sat down with the president and the Need” (pp. 23–24), from Management Cases by Peter F. Drucker.
board of trustees, two candidates for abandonment Copyright © 1977 by Peter F. Drucker. Reprinted by permission of
emerged after long and heated wrangling: the speech- the author.
therapy program and the demonstration high school. Both

478 Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Notes

1. Michael V. Copeland, “Stuck in the Spin Cycle,” Business 17. James W. Dean, Jr., and Mark P. Sharfman, “Procedural Ra-
2.0 (May 2005), 74–75. tionality in the Strategic Decision-Making Process,” Journal
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(February 7, 2005), 50–64; David Bank and Joann S. Lublin, 18. Farnaz Fassihi, Greg Jaffe, Yaroslav Trofimov, Carla Anne
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H-P Finds New Products,” The Wall Street Journal (February 19. Art Kleiner, “Core Group Therapy,” Strategy & Business, is-
23, 2005), D3. sue 27 (Second Quarter, 2002), 26–31.

3. Alex Markels, “10 Biggest Business Blunders,” U.S. News & 20. Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymak-
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and Owen Thomas, “Hits (& Misses),” Business 2.0 Determinants of the Pace of Strategic Decision Making,”
(January–February 2004), 126; Carlos Ghosn, “Saving the Academy of Management Journal 37, no. 4 (1994),
Business without Losing the Company,” Harvard Business 932–956; and Orlando Behling and Norman L. Eckel,
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16. Adapted from Archer, “How to Make a Business Decision,”
59–61.

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes 479

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