Turkey and the EU: Looking Beyond the Pessimism

COMMENTARY TURKEY AND THE EU: LOOKING BEYOND THE PESSIMISM

Turkey and the EU:
Looking Beyond the Pessimism

ERHAN İÇENER* and DAVID PHINNEMORE**

ABSTRACT This paper analyses the reasons for frustration and pes-

simism about Turkey-EU relations. It focuses on the impact of

the crisis in Europe, the 2014 EP elections and selection of Jean-

Claude Juncker for the Commission President post on Turkey’s EU

accession process. Finally, the paper tries to answer how the cur-

rent pessimism over Turkey-EU relations can be overcome.
Frustration and pessimism dom-
inate the mood in Turkey about cerned. Lingering hopes of progress
the current status of relations have been further undermined by
the ongoing economic crisis. Further
with the European Union (EU) and negativity has gained ground owing
the future of accession negotiations. to the increased support that anti-EU
The negotiations, which started in and Eurosceptic parties received in
October 2005, continue at a snail’s the 2014 European Parliament (EP) * Department
pace due to political blockages and elections, combined with the decreas- of Political
the Cyprus issue. So far, 14 (out of 35) ing levels of popular support gen- Science and
chapters have been opened and only erally for European integration and International
one chapter provisionally closed. As further enlargement. Most recently, Relations, Bursa
a result not least of the lessons learnt eyebrows have been raised by the call Orhangazi
from the 2004 and 2007 enlarge- from Jean-Claude Juncker, the in- University
ments, conditionality continues to coming Commission President, for a ** Queen’s
evolve and accession becomes more five-year break from enlargement. University
difficult. Moreover, the EU remains Belfast, Visiting
consumed by debates about enlarge- Many informed observers of Euro- Professor at
ment fatigue and integration capaci- pean integration and enlargement the College of
ty, particularly where Turkey is con- understand the reasons for frustra- Europe

Insight Turkey
Vol. 16 / No. 3 /
2014, pp. 37-46

2014 Summer 37

COMMENTARY ERHAN İÇENER and DAVID PHINNEMORE

tion but rarely share the feelings of European People’s Party (EPP) and
outright pessimism for the future of the center-left Progressive Alliance
Europe. The history of European in- of Socialists and Democrats are still
tegration is a messy history of ups the dominant groupings in the EP.
and downs but with the EU mud- Between them, they secured 54.86
dling through crises and integrating percent of the seats. When the seats
further as a result. Despite the talk of the Greens/European Free Alli-
of – and in some instances wishful ance and the Alliance of Liberals and
thinking about – disintegration, the Democrats for Europe are added, the
EU has responded to the Eurozone percentage of seats for pro-EU par-
crisis with further integration and ties in the EP rises to 70.44 percent.
moves towards substantive banking, Moreover, the remaining Eurosceptic
fiscal, and economic union. And and anti-EU parties do not form a co-
Croatia’s accession to the EU, in July herent bloc in the EP. They cannot be
2013, proved that debates on the ignored, but their potential to impact
death of enlargement are misplaced. significantly on the future of Europe
So too does the progress towards the debate can be – and has been – ex-
normalization of relations between aggerated, not least by those fearful
Kosovo and Serbia, which became of – and in some cases hoping for
possible thanks to the lure of EU – disintegration.
membership. Moreover, Montenegro The EP elections results tell us little
and Serbia have started accession ne- that we do not already know: turnout
gotiations, in June 2012 and January remains low (42.54 percent); popular
2014 respectively; Albania has re- support for the EU and mainstream
cently been granted candidate status; parties has declined; the EU suffers
and Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine from a democratic deficit; and it has
have signed association agreements a persistent legitimacy problem. Fol-
with the EU, an important step to- lowing changes introduced by the
wards the possibility of membership. Treaty of Lisbon and with the aim of
improving the democratic legitima-
The 2014 EP Election: cy of the European Commission, EU
No Good News for Turkey? leaders nominated the EPP’s Spitzen-
kandidat, Juncker, as the next Com-
One should not be overly pessimistic mission President, a nomination sub-
about the results of the EP elections. sequently confirmed by the EP. What
The vote for the mainstream parties have made the headlines for Juncker
in the EP did decline and Eurosceptic in Turkey are his views on enlarge-
parties, especially the Front National ment. While pledging to continue
in France and the United Kingdom accession negotiations with Turkey
Independence Party, scored remark- and others, Juncker has closed the
ably well. However, despite the rel- door on further enlargement for the
ative successes of Eurosceptic and duration of the 2014-2019 Commis-
far-right parties, the center-right sion.1 Concerning Turkey, and refer-

38 Insight Turkey

TURKEY AND THE EU: LOOKING BEYOND THE PESSIMISM

ring specifically to the Turkish gov- Luxembourg, Greece, and Cyprus.
ernment’s recent Twitter ban, Juncker Moreover, popular support in the EU
stated, “the country is clearly far away for further enlargement is very low.
from EU membership.” Pointedly, he In 2013, only 37 percent of respon-
did not mention Turkey in his agenda dents across the EU expressed sup-
for the next Commission, but did re-
fer to the Western Balkans and coun- Frustration and pessimism
tries of the eastern neighborhood, dominate the mood in Turkey
such as Moldova and Ukraine, in his about the current status of
comments on enlargement. relations with the European
Many scenarios for the future of Eu- Union and the future of
rope are too pessimistic. The same accession negotiations
cannot be said, however, for progno-
ses about Turkey – EU relations. Giv- port for more states being admitted.4
en the state of European integration, Only a few member states publically
the future remains far from bright. express support for Turkish acces-
Moreover, irrespective of the crises sion. Considering the potential for
the EU has been experiencing, Tur- enlargement referendums in Austria
key has its own particular problems and France and the possibility of
that need to be addressed if it is to non-ratification of Turkish accession
progress further towards EU mem- by a national parliament or the EP,
bership. Indeed, the Eurozone crisis, the future for Turkey’s membership
the outcome of the EP elections, and ambitions is far from promising.
Juncker’s appointment have not actu-
ally changed much in Turkey’s slow- To Admit or Not to Admit?
paced negotiations. The EPP’s domi- To Join or Not to Join?
nance in the EP is not new. And its
reserved position on further enlarge- Unlike with eastern enlargement
ment, especially to include Turkey, is countries, Turkey’s supporters lack
well known. Dominated by Christian a strong narrative that can support
Democratic parties, the EPP has been their case for its accession. The nar-
leading debates on offering Turkey a rative that accompanied the opening
“privileged partnership.” However, of accession negotiations – one pre-
the EPP recently – and to the surprise senting the EU as a norm-based com-
of few – stepped up its opposition to munity open to all European states,
Turkish accession and stated, “full as long as the candidates align them-
membership is no longer our goal.”2 selves with European norms and
Turkey has supporters in the EU,3 but values – no longer enjoys the same
for many in the EPP, it has long been prominence. On the contrary, many
considered as a permanent guest sit-
ting in the waiting room. Opposition
to Turkish accession is particularly
high in Austria, France, Germany,

2014 Summer 39

COMMENTARY ERHAN İÇENER and DAVID PHINNEMORE

Newly elected
President of
the European

Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker (L)

is congratulated
by the European

Parliament
President Martin
Schulz during a
press conference
on July 15, 2014,
in the European

Parliament in
Strasbourg,

eastern France.

AFP / Frederick Florin

of those opposing Turkish accession negotiations in the EU’s negotiating
are strong promoters of an “existen- framework. In fact, all negotiations
tial” narrative that presents the EU as are open-ended and so the reference
an essentially Christianity-based en- to the “open-ended” nature of the ac-
tity. And the accession of a formally cession negotiations was very much a
secular but overwhelmingly Muslim statement of fact. And it has been in-
Turkey is considered a threat to Eu- cluded in all negotiating frameworks
rope in their imagination. For them, since 2005. Yet, the fact that the inser-
Christianity is an essential condition tion of the reference to “open-ended”
for being a member of the EU. negotiations was specifically included
Before opening accession negotia- with Turkey in mind is an open secret
tions in 2005, the debates on Turkey in EU circles.
were focused on “whether Turkey Amid the EU and wider criticism of
should join the EU,” “why Turkey the way in which Recep Tayyip Er-
should join” and “when to begin ac- doğan and his government handled
cession negotiations.” A less promi- the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and
nent then, but ever-present question the corruption allegations of 2013-14,
is “should Turkey be admitted to the given also the slowdown in – or, for
EU?” Those opposing Turkey’s acces- some, a retreat from – Europeaniza-
sion have kept this more fundamental tion, especially regarding democrat-
question alive. It was these opponents ic norms, and problems regarding
who insisted on the inclusion of a ref- media freedom in Turkey, proposals
erence to the “open-ended” nature of for a relationship short of member-

40 Insight Turkey

TURKEY AND THE EU: LOOKING BEYOND THE PESSIMISM

ship and the “whether” question have membership in Turkey had dropped
re-gained prominence. In proposals to 38 percent in 2013.6
relating to the future of the EU that
foresee more differentiated and dif- Maintaining Some Momentum
ferent forms and patterns of integra-
tion based around a Eurozone core, The single biggest opportunity to
Turkey is counted at best among the overcome the mood of pessimism in
potential members of the outer rings Turkey – EU relations is resolution of
and tiers. the Cyprus problem. Such a develop-
Turkey has also been adding fuel to ment would be a game changer for
the “whether” debate. Against a back- Turkey’s accession negotiations. In-
drop of the Eurozone crisis in the EU, curable pessimists may beg to differ,
the notable success of the Turkish but if the Republic of Cyprus were to
economy, and Turkish foreign policy lift its vetoes on key negotiating chap-
achievements (especially in the Mid- ters, Turkey’s accession prospects
dle East up until the current crisis in would be considerably improved not
Syria) triggered debates in Turkey on least because the accession negotia-
whether it could in fact dispense with tions would gain momentum. The use
the goal of EU membership. Turkish of the conditional is intentional; the
policy makers have engaged in what prospects of Nicosia lifting its vetoes
can be called a “who needs whom are not encouraging. Cooperation
more” debate with some advocating
joining the Shanghai Cooperation The history of European
Organization and opting for a rela- integration is a messy history
tionship with the EU akin to Norway’s of ups and downs but with the
at the end of accession negotiations. EU muddling through crises
Even among some strong supporters and integrating further as a
of EU membership and opinion-mak- result
ers, serious consideration has been
given to how Turkey might fare on the between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece
periphery of an EU characterized by is likely to bring increased dynamism
greater flexibility and more differenti- to economic and political integration
ated integration.5 Such developments in southeastern Europe and the east-
can be seen as signals of a decreas- ern Mediterranean. Here, one of the
ing commitment to “full” member- strong motivations to resolve the Cy-
ship and of frustration in the face of prus issue for all parties, including the
the ongoing difficulties in furthering EU and the international community,
Turkey’s accession process. When is offshore gas and the discoveries in
combined with the effective stale- the eastern Mediterranean.7 Turkey’s
mate in the accession negotiations
and the prevailing pessimism over the
prospects for accession, all this helps
explain why popular support for EU

2014 Summer 41

COMMENTARY ERHAN İÇENER and DAVID PHINNEMORE

Many of those opposing Turkish mental rights) and Chapter 24 (jus-
accession are strong promoters tice, freedom, and security) of the
of an “existential” narrative that accession negotiations. As evident
presents the EU as an essentially from the frameworks for negotiations
Christianity-based entity with Montenegro and Serbia, the
cross-cutting issues of judicial and
potential role as an energy hub in the administrative capacity and in par-
region keeps hopes alive for Turkey – ticular anti-corruption initiatives and
EU relations. However, optimism for the maintenance of the rule of law
progress in the Cyprus negotiations covered by these chapters have as-
remains in short supply.8 sumed a pre-eminent status in acces-
Under the shadow of the grey clouds sion negotiations. While the EU aims
hovering over Turkey – EU relations to address these issues from the start
and in the absence of a clear perspec- of negotiations with Montenegro and
tive of accession, and as observed Serbia so as to observe a track re-
by the former Turkish ambassador cord of implementation as well as the
to the EU, Selim Kuneralp, the EU alignment of legislation before the
has “lost its leverage” on Turkey.9 To negotiations are closed, both chapters
keep the EU relevant for Turkey and are blocked in Turkey’s case. Turkey
to resuscitate the accession negotia- and the Commission would prefer
tions while 16 out of 35 chapters are to begin “real” negotiations in these
blocked, the EU’s member states in chapters. For the moment, therefore,
2012 endorsed a Commission pro- the “Positive Agenda” allows dialogue
posal for a new “Positive Agenda” for channels to be opened with Turkey,
Turkey. This involves eight working even if the opening benchmarks for
groups assisting Turkey in aligning Chapter 23 and Chapter 24 cannot –
its domestic policies and legislation frustratingly for Turkish officials – be
with key areas of the acquis commu- formally communicated to Turkey.
nautaire. The areas covered include: Regarding the “Positive Agenda,” one
visas, mobility and migration, energy, should not underestimate the efforts
trade and the customs union, politi- that the Commissioner for Enlarge-
cal reforms, fight against terrorism, ment, Štefan Füle, has made to keep
foreign policy dialogue and partici- the EU’s enlargement process alive
pation in EU programs. during the recent crises. Coming
A key dimension of the “Positive from a “new” EU member state, Füle
Agenda” is a focus on issues sched- has been fully aware of the transfor-
uled to be covered in the unopened mative role that enlargement can have
Chapters 23 (judiciary and funda- on would-be members. He might not
be as enthusiastic for enlargement
as his predecessor-but-one, Günter
Verheugen, who oversaw much of
the eastern enlargement process, but
despite all the feelings of negativi-

42 Insight Turkey

TURKEY AND THE EU: LOOKING BEYOND THE PESSIMISM

ty towards Turkey – EU relations in is not Turkey specific. Moreover, his
recent years, he has repeatedly stated criticism of the Twitter ban is widely
that the Commission has “no inten- shared among EU institutions and in
tion to ‘give up on Turkey’s EU acces- the member states. Treating Junck-
sion’” and that Turkey and the EU are er as if he were a new Sarkozy is to
“bound to succeed together.”10 As for exaggerate what he has said and mis-
the future of Turkey – EU relations, understand the dynamics of enlarge-
the Commission’s agenda-setting role ment. What is important for Turkey
on enlargement policy should not be is who will emerge as Juncker’s Com-
ignored. Its regular reports and strat- missioner for Enlargement.
egy documents have become a firm
part of the annual cycle of its activi- Overcoming Pessimism
ties. Moreover, it oversees an increas-
ingly detailed accession process. Also important, not least from a
However, enlargement is far from Turkish perspective, is how to over-
being high on the agenda of the in- come the pessimism that pervades
coming Commission. Its priorities of discussions about Turkey’s accession
the economy, trade, and energy are process and prospects. First, there
nevertheless understandable given is the issue of communication. Tur-
challenges the EU is currently facing. key, with the support of EU member
During the next five years, enlarge- states and the Commission, needs
ment will not, however, be complete- to increase its efforts to inform pub-
ly off the agenda. Indeed, the pause lic opinion in the EU about Turkey
in enlargement that Juncker has and the potential contribution of its
called for was likely anyway. With membership to the EU. However, de-
Iceland having effectively suspended creasing public support for EU mem-
its membership bid, no candidate is bership in Turkey and ill-informed
going to be in a position to accede to assertions about the disintegration of
the EU in the next five years: all are the EU show that communication is
at best in the early stages of substan- not only about Turkey promoting it-
tive negotiations, negotiations which, self within the EU. The EU has an im-
following the Croatian example, are age problem in candidate countries.
likely to take at least five or six years, Turkey’s Ministry of European Inte-
and after that two years are likely to gration has been informing Turkish
be required to secure ratification of public about the current and antici-
the accession treaty. pated benefits of EU integration and
Such a scenario is clearly relevant in membership. But this is not enough.
Turkey’s case. The pause relates to the The EU Delegation in Turkey and EU
admission of states not the progress member state embassies also have to
towards enlargement. So, contrary increase their efforts to inform Turk-
to the media coverage in Turkey, ish public opinion about the dynam-
Juncker’s opposition to enlargement ics of European integration and the
procedural and technical realities of

2014 Summer 43

COMMENTARY ERHAN İÇENER and DAVID PHINNEMORE

enlargement. Special efforts are need- Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
ed to deal with criticisms over the al- Turkish Grand National Assembly Volkan Bozkir, appointed
leged unfairness of the accession pro- as the EU Minister, speaks during a press conference on
cess and the perceived lack of equal December 20, 2011 at the Turkish embassy in Paris.
treatment of Turkey. On the EU side, AFP / Bertrand Guay
however, Turkey should be included
in debates and discussions over the Turkey want to be a member of the
future shape and design of European EU?” And “What does Europe mean
integration, just as it was during the to Turkish citizens?”
European Convention in 2002-2003
that inspired many of the reforms Identity issues have traditionally
ultimately contained in the Treaty dominated debates, but for many
of Lisbon. Assuming the commit- Turks and Europeans, Turkey’s EU
ment to EU norms and values can be membership needs to be presented
demonstrated, the President and the as a high politics issue as well. Geo-
Prime Minister of Turkey alongside politics and security considerations
the leaders of other candidates and do matter. Equally, when it comes to
potential candidate countries should accession negotiations, commitment
be invited to at least gatherings in the and the adoption and implementa-
margins of key EU meetings and in- tion of reforms in all the acquis chap-
cluded in EU family photos, as was ters is of paramount importance. Just
generally the case with candidates in focusing on the security dimension
the lead-up to eastern enlargement. of the relationship is likely to end in
A second issue is commitment: Tur- something short of membership.
key should renew its commitment
to EU membership. In the 1980s One important way to show Turkey’s
and 1990s, Turkey was criticized renewed commitment for EU mem-
for human rights issues. Consider-
ing the current issues in Turkey and
evolving demands and priorities of
EU conditionality, it is for sure that
promotion of the rule of law and the
implementation of anti-corruption
initiatives and judicial reform will
become prominent themes in the
accession negotiations. Therefore,
greater impetus should be given to
the adoption and implementation
of reforms in these areas. This could
also trigger a “grand débat” about the
EU in Turkey. Among the key ques-
tions for a renewed commitment that
need to be answered are: “Why does

44 Insight Turkey

TURKEY AND THE EU: LOOKING BEYOND THE PESSIMISM

bership is shifting ownership of the cession date to make accession a re-
discourse; meaning away from a “state alizable goal. The 100th anniversary
policy” to “the people’s choice.” Ro- of the foundation of the Republic of
mania’s Snagov Declaration in 1995 Turkey – 2023 – is rich in symbolic
importance and arguably a realis-
The single biggest tic target.12 Indeed, Erdoğan, when
opportunity to Prime Minister, proposed 2023 as a
overcome the mood date by which Turkey should become
of pessimism in a member of the EU. Setting the year
Turkey – EU relations 2023 as a target to transform Turkey
is resolution of the to an EU-ready country could act as a
Cyprus problem catalyst for reform. However, against
a backdrop of “enlargement fatigue”
could be an inspiration here. It pro- and an agreement to avoid any early
claimed a domestic consensus on the commitments on dates, EU member
goal of EU accession and was signed states, aware of Turkey’s protract-
by the President, the Prime Minister, ed accession negotiations and the
the Presidents of the Parliament’s two thorny political problems that ac-
chambers and the leaders of 13 politi- company them, are highly unlikely
cal parties, and supported by civil so- to offer Turkey a date for accession
ciety in Romania.11 To revive Turkey in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the
– EU relations, a similar document European Council in 2006 in its “re-
committing Turkish political parties newed consensus” on enlargement
and civil society to work for a civilian stated quite emphatically that the EU
constitution and to continue the re- “will refrain from setting any target
form process in Turkey with the aim dates for accession until the negotia-
of securing EU membership could be tions are close to completion.”13
drawn up and signed following the The calls for setting a date for acces-
parliamentary elections in 2015. If sion create unrealistic expectations in
such a commitment were followed by Turkish public opinion, which tends
focused reforms and their implemen- to forget that the EU has never men-
tation, the arguments of domestic tioned the possibility of declaring
and international supporters of Tur- such a date. And the EU’s potential
key’s EU membership would be sig- inability to meet these expectations
nificantly strengthened when making is likely to contribute to pessimism
their case. and frustration in Turkey. Here quick
Thirdly, it is often suggested that the comparisons can be made with east-
EU should offer Turkey a clear ac- ern enlargement, especially with Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. At the Göteborg
European Council in June 2001, the
EU announced the objective of ad-
mitting new member states in time
for them to participate in the 2004 EP

2014 Summer 45

COMMENTARY ERHAN İÇENER and DAVID PHINNEMORE

elections. This commitment was con- 2. See the European People’s Party Group
ditional on the candidate countries’ Priorities 2014-2019, retrieved July 20, 2014,
progress with a road map of reforms from http://www.eppgroup.eu/news/A-reform-
and concluding accession negotia- agenda-for-Europe%27s-future
tions by the end of 2002. Only when
negotiations had been concluded in 3. Eleven EU Foreign Ministers, “The EU and Tur-
December 2002 did the EU declare 1 key: steering a safer path through the storms,”
May 2004 as the accession date for its EUobserver, (December 1, 2011), retrieved July
first eastern enlargement. At the same 20, 2014, from http://euobserver.com/opinion/
time, the European Council declared 114473
its objective to welcome Romania
and Bulgaria in 2007. Again the date 4. Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 2013), QA.17.3.
was conditional on the accession cri-
teria being met. Subsequent referenc- 5. See Kemal Derviş, “Turkey and Europe, a New
es to January 2007 entry remained Perspective,”Global Turkey in Europe Policy Brief, 03,
conditional, and it was only in De- (November 2012); Bahadır Kaleağası, “Avoiding a
cember 2004, once negotiations had Shrinking EU in an Expanding Planet: A Turkish
been closed, that the date was fixed. Contribution to the Debate on Europe’s Future,”
Evidently, if and when the EU signals The German Marshall Fund of the United States For-
a date, it remains conditional. It is not eign Policy Program Policy Brief, (February, 2013);
a promise and dates are only set once Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The Future of Europe, Dif-
accession negotiations are conclud- ferentiated Integration and Turkey’s Role,” Global
ed. It is possible for the EU to note Turkey in Europe Commentary, 09 (October 2013).
and welcome a 2023 target for Tur-
key’s accession, but it would be naïve 6. Eurobarometer 80, op.cit. QA7a
to expect the EU to share the same
commitment. Precedent dictates this. 7. See Ayla Gürel and Fiona Mullen, “Can Eastern
It should also be noted that its his- Mediterranean Gas Discoveries Have a Positive
torical importance for the post-Cold Impact on Turkey-EU Relations,” Global Turkey in
War unification of Europe meant that Europe Policy Brief, 12 (March, 2014).
eastern enlargement was essentially
an irreversible process. This is far less 8. For a call for a new platform to negotiate an
the case for Turkey and the others in alternative model for resolution of the Cyprus
the queue for membership. problem, see Kudret Özersay, “Exhaustion and
Time for Change,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social
Endnotes Justice, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2012), pp. 406–413.

1. See Juncker’s EU Commission Presidency pri- 9. Andrew Rettman, “ ‘EU has lost its leverage
orities in his campaign website, retrieved July 20, on Turkey’, ambassador says,” EUobserver, (June
2014, from http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities; 20, 2011), retrieved June 20, 2014, from http://
Jean-Claude Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: euobserver.com/enlargement/32510
My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Dem-
ocratic Change: Political Guidelines for the next 10. Štefan Füle, “EU-Turkey bound together,”
European Commission”(July 15, 2014), retrieved Speech given at the Conference of Ministry of EU
July 20, 2014, from http://ec.europa.eu/news/ Affairs “Rethinking Global Challenges: Constructing
eu_explained/140715_en.htm a Common Future for Turkey and the EU,” Istanbul,
(June 7, 2013); Štefan Füle, “Crucial moment in
EU-Turkey relations,” Speech given during the De-
bate on Turkey at the Plenary Session of the Europe-
an Parliament, Strasbourg, (June 12, 2013).

11. Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinne-
more, Romania and the European Union: From
marginalisation to membership,” (Oxon: Rout-
ledge, 2008), pp.73-75.

12. See Cengiz Aktar, “The Positive Agenda and
Beyond: A New Beginning for the EU-Turkey Re-
lations?” Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2012), p.42

13. Council of the European Union, Presidency
Conclusions – Brussels European Council, 16879/1/
06 REV1, December 14-15, 2006, point 7.

46 Insight Turkey