On the Turn - Japan, 1900 - mrbuddhistory.com

On the Turn - Japan, 1900

Part of the series Fin de Siècle: the 1890s
By Richard Perren | Published in History Today Volume: 42 Issue: 6 1992

Economic History Political Social Japan

From isolation to Great Power status - Richard Perren explains how a mania for
Westernisation primed the pump of Japan's transformation at the turn of the century.

Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when rule by the emperor replaced the government
of Japan by the Tokugawa shogun, the country embarked on a process of modernisation. In
the next thirty years Western experts were imported to train the Japanese at home, selected
Japanese were sent abroad to learn from the West, and Japan's new leaders embarked on a
programme of radical reform. By these means they aimed at trans- forming a country that was
weak and backward into a strong modern industrial nation. This new Japan would be capable
of dealing with Western powers on equal terms and of throwing off the humiliating 'unequal
treaties' they had imposed between 1858 and 1869.

When the Emperor Meiji died in 1912, control was concentrated in a highly centralised state
whose functions were carried out through Western-style political, administrative and judicial
institutions operating in the name of the emperor. Western-style armed forces upheld the
position of the Japanese state at home and abroad. A modern and efficient education system
served the aims of the state. Western-style economic and business institutions were in place,
and factory-based industry firmly established. Japan had already been victorious in two major
wars, against China in 1894-95 and Russia in 1904-5. She had not only achieved the much-
desired revision of the unequal treaties, but was a world power with an alliance with Britain,
and a possessor of colonies. Yet the country still retained many traditional features, and had
only adopted those characteristics of the West that were absolutely necessary to achieve its
desired aims.

How far had the transformation process gone by 1900, and can the decade of the 1890s be
described as a 'turning point'? To answer this we need to judge when Japan passed beyond
that point in time when her modernisation could not have been reversed. Because the whole
process of Japanese modernisation involved a complex interaction of social, economic, and
political change it is not possible to ascribe a precise date to its completion. Nevertheless,
there are a number of factors to suggest that by 1900 it had reached a stage where it was
unlikely to be reversed.

It was the authorities that had to provide the necessary pump-priming and make strategic
decisions about which areas of Japanese life needed to be transformed. It had become a
traditional habit of the Japanese to look to officialdom for example and direction in almost
everything, and this habit naturally asserted itself when it became necessary to assimilate a
foreign civilisation which for nearly three centuries had been an object of national
repugnance. This required the education of the nation as a whole and the task of instruction
was divided among foreigners of different nations. The Meiji government imported around
300 experts or yatoi – a Japanese term meaning 'live machines' – into the country to help
upgrade its industry, infrastructure and institutions. Before the Franco-Prussian War,
Frenchmen were employed in teaching strategy and tactics to the army and in revising the

criminal code. The building of railways, installing telegraphs and lighthouses, and training
the new navy was done by Englishmen. Americans were employed in forming a postal
service, agricultural development, and in planning colonisation and an educational system. In
an attempt to introduce Occidental ideas of art, Italian painters and sculptors were brought to
Japan. German experts were asked to develop a system of local government, train Japanese
doctors and, after the Franco-Prussian War, to educate army officers. A number of Western
observers believed that such wholesale adoption of an alien civilisation was impossible and
feared that it would produce a violent reaction.

Although this did not occur, many early innovations were not really necessary to
modernisation but merely imitations of Western customs. At that time the distinction between
the fundamental features of modern technology and mere Occidental peculiarities was by no
means clear. If it was necessary to use Western weapons there might also be a virtue in
wearing Western clothes or shaking hands in the Occidental manner. Moreover, Meiji Japan
had good reason to adopt even the more superficial aspects of Western culture. The
international world of the nineteenth century was completely dominated by the Occident, and
in view of the Western assumption of cultural superiority, the Japanese were probably correct
in judging that they could not be regarded as even quasi-equals until they possessed not only
modern technology but also many of the superficial aspects of Western culture. The resulting
attempts in the 1870s and 1880s to borrow almost anything and everything Western may now
seem to us to be amusingly indiscriminate, but it is perfectly understandable.

As the object of modernisation was to obtain equal treatment by the West many of the
cultural innovations, besides being more than outward for»s to the Japanese themselves, had
an important psychological influence on Western diplomats and politicians. Under the
shogun, members of the first Japanese delegation to the United States in 1860 wore
traditional samurai dress with shaved pate and long side hair tied in a bun and carried swords.
Under the emperor, Western-style haircuts were a major symbol of Westernisation. Soldiers
and civilian functionaries wore Western-style uniforms, and politicians often adopted
Western clothes and even full beards. In 1872 Western dress was prescribed for all court and
official ceremonies. Meat eating, previously frowned on because of Buddhist attitudes, was
encouraged, and the beef dish of sukiyaki was developed at this time. Western art and
architecture were adopted, producing an array of official portraits of leading statesmen as
well as an incongruous Victorian veneer in the commercial and government districts of the
cities and some rather depressing interiors in the mansions of the wealthy.

Though the pace of change was hectic at first, and the adoption of Western forms seemed
indiscriminate, it soon slowed as the Japanese became more selective about which aspects of
their society they wanted to transform. Their adaptability meant the contracts of most
Western experts and instructors only needed to be short-term, the average length of service
being five years, and yatoi were less in evidence by the 1890s. The craze for Westernisation
reached its height in the 1880s, but thereafter there was a reaction against unnecessary
imitations and many of its more superficial features, like ballroom dancing, were dropped.
Other social innovations subsequently abandoned were the prohibition of prostitution and
mixed bathing, both of which were initially enforced to placate the prejudice of Western
missionaries.

In reforming the legal system, Western concepts of individual rather than family ownership
of property were adopted. But for purposes of formal registration of the population the law
continued to recognise the old extended family or 'house', known in Japanese as the ie. This

consisted of a patriarch and those of his descendants and collateral relatives who had not yet
established a new ie. Within this structure the position of women was one of obedient
subservience. In the 1870s the theme of liberation of women from their traditional
Confucianist bondage was taken up by a number of Japanese intellectuals, influenced by
Western writers on the subject. At the same time a number of women activists publicly
engaged in politics. As both movements lacked public appeal they waned in the 1880s. In
1887 the Peace Preservation Ordinance, which remained in force to 1922, banned women
from political parties and meetings. Women under the Civil Code of 1898 had no
independent legal status and all legal agreements were concluded on a woman's behalf by the
male to whom she was subordinate – either father, husband, or son. Women had no free
choice of spouse or domicile and while they could in theory protest against this situation, they
could do so only in a non-political manner. Such action posed a challenge to the whole social
orthodoxy on which the Japanese state was founded, so in practice few women protested.

One Western institution whose adoption would have made a very favourable impression on
the West, but which made next to no headway in Japan, was Christianity. Like the women's
movement it had some impact among Japanese intellectuals, but prejudices against it ran too
deep. In 1889 less than a quarter of one per cent of Japanese were Christians. The only
religion that did flourish was Shinto which was one of the traditional faiths of Japan. Revived
interest in it had been a key element in the intellectual trends that led to the imperial
restoration. But there was little deep interest in religion among Japan's new leaders. Though
the government continued to control and support the main Shinto shrines, the many cults that
made up the faith lapsed into a traditional passive state forming no more than a ceremonial
background to the life of the Japanese people.

There was greater enthusiasm for Westernisation over the matter of constitutional reform, and
this dated back to the early 1870s when Meiji rulers realised change here was necessary to
gain international respect. In the next decade the major tasks for building a modern political
constitution were undertaken. In 1882 the statesman Ito Hirobumi led a study mission to
several European capitals to investigate the theories and practices he believed were most
appropriate for Japan. Before his departure he decided not to slavishly reproduce any Western
system but that whatever example was taken as a model would be adapted to Japan's special
needs. Most of his time was spent in Berlin and Vienna, and after his return to Japan work on
the new constitution began in the spring of 1884. A new peerage was created, in December
1885 a cabinet type government was introduced, and to support it, a modern civil service with
entry by examination was established. The Meiji constitution which took effect from
November 1890 was essentially a cautious, conservative document which served to reinforce
the influence of the more traditionally-minded elements in Japan's ruling class. While
distinctively Japanese, it compared most closely with the German model of the monarchy.

This constitution, though nominally democratic, retained power in the hands of a small ruling
elite with minimal interference from or responsibility to, the majority of the population.
There was to be a bicameral parliament, called, in English, the Diet. The House of Peers was
mostly made up from the ranks of the new nobility and the lower house chosen by an
electorate limited to adult males paying taxes of fifteen yen or more. In 1890 this was limited
to 450,000 persons or 5 per cent of adult males. Even when the taxation qualification was
reduced to ten yen in 1902 it only increased the electorate to 1,700,000 males. The
constitution's architects hoped that the provisions for democratic government it contained
would be counterbalanced by other safe-guarding provisions. Most important of these was the
position of the emperor, who was accorded a position of primacy in the state. The imperial

family were said to rule over Japan in perpetuity, and under the constitution the emperor was
the repository of absolute and inviolable sovereignty. This was underlined by making cabinet
and armed forces responsible not to politic- al pasty, nor to the Diet, or the Japanese people,
but to the emperor alone.

The emperor as an individual had little personal influence on events, and was not strong
enough to unify the various factions that vied for political power. This was only possible by
reference to pre-existing traditions of Japanese culture. These were invoked to stress the
duties of loyalty and obedience to the sovereign, and through him to the state. As early as
October 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education, often seen as the basic tool for inculcating
the orthodox philosophy of the state, showed the strong influence of the Confucian view that
the state was essentially a moral order. This edict made only passing reference to education
itself, but showed the revived influence of Confucian ideology in its stress on harmony and
loyalty to the throne. Its central concept of mass indoctrination through formal education was
an entirely modern emphasis. Intensive drilling of Japanese children with lessons in
patriotism became possible when funds were available for universal compulsory education. In
1885 only 46 per cent of children of statutory school age were in school, though by 1905 this
had risen to 95 per cent.

The purpose of educational reform, at its most basic level, was to turn out efficient recruits
for the army, factory, and farm. This was because political and military modernisation, as
well as industrialisation, depended on new skills, new attitudes and broader know- ledge.
Japan's leaders realised from the 1870s that social and intellectual modernisation was a
prerequisite to success in other fields. But in the social and intellectual areas, as in
economics, the responsiveness of thousands of individuals was more important than the
exhortations of authority.

While political and social reform and cultural change were limited in extent and selective in
their nature by the end of the 1890s, the same picture emerges in economic life. Industrial
modernisation took two forms – the reorganisation of traditional industries, and the
transplantation of new industries from the West. Some traditional industries, like cotton-
spinning, experienced radical change and the introduction of factory production, while others
made slower progress. Japan was an important exporter of raw silk hut that industry was not
dependent upon elaborate or expensive machinery. The production of cocoons was a labour-
intensive industry, already carried out as a by-employment in peasant households. Gradually
small factories equipped with improved but relatively simple and inexpensive power-driven
machines were introduced. The investment in this industry was thus spread thinly over a y eat
number of producers. Where large investments of capital were absolutely necessary, as with
Japan's strategic heavy industries like iron and steel, armaments, and ship- building, the
initial investment was made by the government. But even here success was not immediate
and these early concerns were sold off to Japanese businessmen at low prices in the 1880s. In
some of the new industries success came sooner than in others. In 1897-1906, 90 per cent of
railway rolling stock was built in Japan but 94 per cent of locomotives were still imported,
mainly from England and Germany. It was not until after 1900 that the basis of heavy
industry in Japan was firmly established.

Indeed, the whole of Japanese economic and social life in 1900 was still firmly rooted in
traditional forms with quite a small modern superstructure. But for Japan the term 'traditional'
needs qualification because it does not necessarily mean that pre-modern Japanese economy
and society was antagonistic to change. In spite of Japan's decision to isolate itself for almost

300 years, features evolved that could be built upon once the country was forced to accept
Western influence. The growing volume of research on the period before 1868, in the form of
local and regional studies, has reinforced the view that Japan was a relatively advanced pre-
industrial economy. For an underdeveloped country it was already well provided with a basic
infrastructure by the time the process of modernisation began in earnest. Agricultural output
per head of the population was quite high and pre-modern Japan possessed a substantial
degree of commerce. In the more backward northern regions, on the island of Hokkaido, and
also parts of the extreme southern island of Kyushu, medieval forms of social and economic
organisation persisted until quite late. But on the more advanced regions of the main island of
Honshu, especially the Kanto Plain around Edo – the old name for Tokyo – and Osaka, there
was a thriving urban-centred commercial economy. Merchants and traders supplied the wants
of the towns of the region and production for exchange, and not just subsistence, was carried
on in the countryside.

Much of Japan's growth after 1868 was built upon the foundations of its pre-modern
economy. Partly under the protection and encouragement of government most of the capital-
intensive investments went into railways, steam-ships, and mechanised heavy industrial
plants. But just as important in promoting development at that time were a vast number of
small improvements and minor capital undertakings. Before 1940 the majority of roads were
of unsurfaced dirt and bridges were simple wooden structures. Agricultural construction,
represented primarily by irrigation works, changed little from Tokugawa times. Only after the
turn of the century did most Japanese make Western products a part of their daily lives, and
they were adapted to a traditionally Japanese life-style. In Tokyo in 1910 most of the
dwellings were made of wood and only about an eighth used brick, stone, or plaster. Within
the houses most furniture was still the traditional kind and most of the food eaten was of a
traditional type. This meant that there was still an enormous market to be supplied by peasant
farmers, village entrepreneurs, small businesses and traditional craftsmen. In 1890 nearly 70
per cent of Japanese investment was in the traditional sector and it still accounted for 45 per
cent, fifteen years later.

But the success of Japan's modernisation efforts needs to be judged not only by what
happened within the economy itself, or by the changes within Japanese society. Reform was
undertaken as a means to an end and that end was recognition as an equal by the West. This
was necessary before there was any chance of removing the unequal treaties of the 1850s and
1860s and contained two major restrictions on Japanese sovereignty. Firstly, there was the
provision of 'extra-territorial jurisdiction'. Under this Westerners accused of crimes were not
tried by Japanese courts, but by consular courts within the foreign settlements of the seaports
of Japan set out in the treaties. The other restriction was the loss of tariff autonomy. Eager for
markets, the Western powers placed severe limits on Japanese import and export duties.
These measures were the usual way for nineteenth-century Western powers to regulate
diplomatic and commercial relations with Oriental countries, the model being the treaties
imposed on China after the Opium War of the 1840s. For Japan the actual consequences of
the treaties were not particularly damaging. No great market for opium was developed, and
the opening of Japanese industry to competition from the West forced the pace of economic
'change instead of allowing inefficient industries to shelter behind protective tariffs.
Foreigners resident in Japan were restricted to the treaty ports and needed official permits to
travel out- side so were never a great intrusion into Japanese life. And the justice dispensed in
the consular courts was generally fair to both Japanese and Westerners.

Nevertheless, the fact of these treaties' existence was rightly regarded as a great humiliation
as they usurped functions which are the proper preserve of a fully independent state, They
came up for renewal periodically and from 1871 onwards Japan asked for their revision. In
that year refusal was a foregone conclusion, as even the Japanese could see that the
conditions originally necessitating extra-territorial jurisdiction had not undergone any change
justifying its abolition. In later years Western nations were reluctant to allow their citizens to
come under the power of a legal system that was still not fully reformed, despite the abolition
of torture as an accepted legal practice in 1876 and the introduction of a Code of Criminal
Procedure, framed in accordance with Western ideas, in 1882. But this was the start of what
the West wanted and when negotiations were reopened in 1883, Japan included as
compensation for the abolition of consular jurisdiction a promise to remove all restrictions on
trade, travel, and residence for foreigners within the country. These and subsequent
discussions in the 1880s reached no definite conclusion, mainly because the Japanese refused
to grant foreigners living in the country the right to own freehold property. It was not until
1894 that a final settlement of the consular question became a real possibility when Britain
agreed to abolish consular jurisdiction by 1899.

The five year delay was for two reasons. Before the new treaty came into force Japan had to
fully implement a new legal code. The thorough recodification of the law this required was a
slow and difficult task as most legal reforms were introduced piecemeal. This area is
probably the strongest example of direct Western pressure being applied to change a
fundamental feature of Japanese life. Drafts drawn up, largely under French influence, were
submitted in 1881 and again in 1888, but a completely revised legal code only went into
effect in 1896, removing the final impediment to ending extra-territorial jurisdiction in 1899.
The other cause for delay was to allow Japan to renegotiate the rest of its treaties – of which
there were over fifteen – with other Western powers, so that all nations were on an equal
footing. This aspect was undoubtedly made possible by the successful outcome with Britain.
Tariff autonomy was not finally restored to Japan until twelve years after 1899, but up to
1911 she was allowed to increase import and export duties.

The successful negotiations in 1894 were important as a turning point for the Japanese and
for the West. The greatest opponents of the loss of extra- territorial jurisdiction were the few
hundred foreign merchants and businessmen who lived and worked in the treaty ports. But
for Japan this was a national political question that had provoked fierce debates in the Diet
and in the press. The first treaties between Japan and the West were signed when the nation
was still in a state of torpor from its long slumber of seclusion, and under circumstances of
duress. The redemption of her judicial and fiscal authority had been, for thirty years, the
dream of Japanese national aspiration, and both domestic and foreign policies had been
shaped with this one end in view. For Japan's rulers, innovation after innovation, often
involving sacrifices of traditional sentiments, were introduced for the purpose of assimilating
the country and its institutions to the standard of Western civilisation. By 1900 Japan was still
not regarded as a full equal by Western nations, but she was now accorded greater respect. In
the next decade this was built upon with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, the defeat of
Russia in 1905, and the annexation of Korea in 1910. By 1912 there was no doubt that Japan
had achieved 'Great Power' status.