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Democratization

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Competitive authoritarianism:
hybrid regimes after the Cold
War

Michael Seeberg a
a Aarhus University, Denmark

Version of record first published: 28 Feb 2012

To cite this article: Michael Seeberg (2012): Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid
regimes after the Cold War, Democratization, 19:1, 141-143

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.650064

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Downloaded by [Stanford University] at 11:46 11 July 2012 Democratization
Vol. 19, No. 1, February 2012, 141– 155

BOOK REVIEWS

Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the Cold War, by Steven
Levitsky and Lucan Way, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 536 pp.,
£60 (hardback), ISBN 0521882524 and £21.99 (paperback), ISBN 0521709156

Levitsky and Way’s new book has been long awaited. It has been forthcoming for
almost 10 years and it is magisterial in size and content. The book’s contribution to
the literature is hard to exaggerate. It writes directly into a gap in the literature and
does a great job of closing it. Many scholars are interested in the ‘grey zones’ of
democratization and they broadly seem to agree that democracy can be ‘partial’.
Nonetheless, empirical analyses often end up assuming that countries are either
‘democratic’ or ‘nondemocratic’, and consequently overlook important aspects
of regime change. Levitsky and Way instead give full attention to the grey zone
countries in between. However, as will be argued, their conceptualization and
explanatory account still suffer from important shortcomings.

Even though Levitsky and Way are mostly preoccupied with questions about
stability in what has often been termed hybrid regimes, they also delve into the
dynamics of democratization and pose a fundamental question that has occupied
many scholars throughout times (for example, Huntington, 1968; Moore, 1991
[1966]), namely what are the determinants of political development and stability?
Most recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have offered a compelling account
that focuses solely on domestic factors. Levitsky and Way offer a contrasting, but
novel answer stressing international and domestic factors.

Their central concept is competitive authoritarianism. Such regimes uphold
free and fair elections (the opposition at times wins elections) and other formal
democratic institutions are in place. However, informal institutions work to the
detriment of the formal democratic institutions. The conceptualization of democ-
racy is maximalist as these regimes uphold free and fair elections as well as civil
liberties and the rule of law. However, this understanding leaves no room for
interim democratic regime types, meaning that we might overlook important
dynamics in these.

Levitsky and Way seek to explain regime outcomes since the end of the Cold
War, in cases that begin as hybrid regimes. Three factors arguably explain the
majority of regime outcomes: linkage to the West, that is, density of ties and
cross-border flows between a particular country and the US/EU; incumbents’
organizational power, that is, the scope or cohesion of state and governing party

ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online
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Downloaded by [Stanford University] at 11:46 11 July 2012 142 Book reviews

structures; and Western leverage, that is, states’ vulnerability to Western democra-
tization pressure. The emphasis on linkage is a refinement of previous accounts that
mostly focus on leverage.

The relationship between these attributes follows a hierarchical pattern, which can
be illustrated as a decision tree. Linkage is the most important factor. If linkage is high,
we most likely see a successful democratization, regardless of the other two factors; if
linkage is low, regime outcome is driven primarily by domestic factors, particularly
the organizational power of the incumbents. When organizational power is high, com-
petitive authoritarian regimes are stable and can survive even serious challenges from
the opposition and external pressure. When organizational power is low, countries
become more vulnerable to Western democratizing pressure. If Western leverage is
high, governments are more likely to fall and also to democratize; otherwise stable
competitive authoritarianism will be the default outcome.

The analysis includes no less than 35 case studies, which give a solid basis for
inference. Levitsky and Way offer robust conclusions as their theory seemingly
predicts regime outcomes in 28 cases. Moreover, they seem to have high confi-
dence in their analytical framework as they swiftly dismiss other predominant
explanatory factors of democracy, such as the modernization thesis, geographic
diffusion, and historical legacy.

Levitsky and Way’s theory is particularly good at explaining cases with inten-
sive influence from either the EU or US or what they term ‘black knights’, such as
China, France, Japan, or Russia. On the one hand, strong EU/US influence explains
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and parts of Latin America. In fact
the effect has been so strong that it trumps other obstacles to democracy created by
weak civil societies, ethnic tension, and/or legacies of ‘sultanistic rule’. On the
other hand, ‘black knights’ have played a decisive role in stabilizing competitive
authoritarian regimes, such as Belarus, Cameroon, and North Korea.

Overall, the theory works well in cases that we already understand well, but it
has some important shortcomings when it comes to regions beyond the sphere of
influence or strategic interest of particularly the EU or US. Here, the authors
emphasize other domestic factors beyond incumbents’ organizational power
when trying to account for these otherwise unexplained cases. In the face of inaus-
picious structures, democracy may simply emerge where successors underutilized
their power. This factor was apparently critical to the democratization of Benin,
Ghana, Mali, Ukraine, and to some degree also Taiwan and Mexico.

However, this part of the theoretical framework is less successful than the rig-
orous decision tree described above. We still need to disentangle why successors
underutilize their position and instead allow civic and oppositional forces to
emerge, installing basic democratic institutions, for example, a credible electoral
commission. Bringing matters to a head, even if their theoretical framework
accounts for all but seven cases, those remaining cases challenge the value of
the theory beyond those cases we already understand well. Thus, we might gain
much analytical leverage if we are able to disentangle the drivers of these
successful democratizations.

Democratization 143

Downloaded by [Stanford University] at 11:46 11 July 2012 Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect a theory that can account for externally as
well as internally driven political development, but as political scientists we must
seek answers to these questions – answers which probably require even more inte-
gration of international and domestic theories. While acknowledging the strengths
of Levitsky and Way’s contribution, this review has identified some of the chal-
lenges that must be faced to provide such an integrated explanation that can also
account for cases of successful democratization with inauspicious structures.

Despite these objections, the overall impression of the book is very positive.
Levitsky and Way contribute significantly to an underexposed, yet highly impor-
tant area of research. The book fascinates and provokes and we will have to take
it into consideration for years to come in any attempt at explaining regime
change. It is tempting to declare that a new classic has been introduced into the
democratization literature.

Michael Seeberg
Aarhus University, Denmark

Email: [email protected]
# 2012, Michael Seeberg
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.650064

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. Fredericksburg: Bookcrafters,
1968.

Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modern World. London: Penguin, 1991[1966].