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Published by Enhelion, 2019-11-30 01:19:29







C reativity may be different for different minds. For some it means being imaginative or
inventive, taking risks or challenging
convention. For others it is about original
thinking or producing something that nobody has Creativity can be defined as an art to create
come up with before. John Kao in 1997 defined something. The term generally refers to a
creativity as ‘I define creativity as the entire
process by which ideas are generated, developed richness of ideas and originality of
thinking.1 While creative thinking can be

and transformed into value. It comprises what understood as ‘Specific thought processes

people commonly mean by innovation and which improve the ability to be creative.
entrepreneurship’1. While Sir Ken Robinson in The ability to think of original, diverse and

2001 defined creativity as ‘Creativity is the process elaborate ideas.’1

of developing ideas that are original and of

value. Creative intelligence is dynamic, diverse

and distinct’.2

In the technological age of today, creativity is linked with the ideas of inventiveness and
imagination that can be used for commercial gain. Everything around us - our homes, cities,
medical services, transport and communication systems - are conceived and developed by
practical people who know how to implement creative ideas. Creativity now is all about
giving answers to everyday problems.

3Creativity can also be defined at many distinct levels -- cognitively, intellectually, socially,
economically, spiritually, and from the finite perspective of different disciplines -- business,



science, music, art, dance, theatre, etc. Partly because it is tied to business, a great deal of
effort has been put forth defining creative problem-solving. In this genre one of the more
common definitions of creativity has to do with dissecting creative thought into a process of
dual exchanges through the melding of two types of thinking -- convergence and
divergence. Definitions of divergent thinking usually include the ability to elaborate, and
think of diverse and original ideas with fluency and speed. Ideating and brainstorming are
premiere examples of this type of thinking. Convergent thinking is defined as the ability to
use logical and evaluative thinking to critique and narrow ideas to ones best suited for given
situations, or set criteria. We use this type of thinking when we make crucial and well-
formed decisions after appraising an array of ideas, information, or alternatives.

In creative production both thought processes are necessary as one first diverges ideas in
numerous quantity and then narrows and refines the array through convergence.
Specifically in creative problem solving, or in any complex problem solving activity for that
matter, one needs to be able to weave in and out of divergent and convergent thought
patterns in arriving at an appropriate conclusion specific for a given situation.


There are certain features of creativity acknowledged THERE ARE CERTAIN FEATURES OF
as ‘the four Ps’:
PROCESS: This refers to the operations and stages of
thought that go into a creative work. Surprisingly,
creative process skills can be learned, and practice PROCESS
can improve overall creative performance along with
a person’s ability to think more imaginatively and PRODUCT
solve problems uniquely. Creativity involves both
nature and nurture. You don’t have to be born with PERSON
this creative quality—you can practice it.4 It is the
intellectual approaches that try to describe thought PLACE
mechanisms and techniques for creative thinking.5

5 .( Gabora, Liane (1997). "The Origin and Evolution of Culture and Creativity". Journal of Memetics -
Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission


PRODUCT: As the name in itself suggests, the product aspect of creativity involves the

creation of original ideas that are novel and useful.6

PERSON: The creative individual is the most important facet because the product,

environment, and process do not exist without the person. The creative process at its
greatest form is built by a person’s knowledge, thinking skills, emotional intelligence, all of
which are dependent upon individual choice.7 These are general intellectual habits, such as
openness, levels of ideation, autonomy, expertise, exploratory behavior etc.

PLACE: Creative press refers to the environment where a person lives, creates, or

processes. This is potentially the broadest of the four P’s of creativity as it takes into account
internal, external, and interpersonal factors. That includes everything from your mood, to
the weather, to the conversations you have with a friend. Apparently, the one negative
factor to creative press is conflict.8 It is the circumstances in which creativity flourishes, such
as degrees of autonomy, access to resources and the nature of gatekeepers. Creative
lifestyles are characterized by nonconforming attitudes and behaviors as well as flexibility.9


M 1.3.1 Ancient views
ost ancient cultures, including thinkers of Ancient Greece10, lacked the concept
of creativity, seeing art as a form of discovery and not creation. The ancient
Greeks had no terms corresponding to "to create" or "creator" except for the
expression "poiein" ("to make"), which only applied to poiesis (poetry) and to
the poietes (poet, or "maker") who made it. Plato did not believe in art as a form of
creation. Asked in The Republic,11"Will we say, of a painter, that he makes something?” he
answers, "Certainly not, he merely imitates.12

9 Sternberg, Robert J. (2009). Jaime A. Perkins, Dan Moneypenny, Wilson Co, ed. Cognitive Psychology.
CENGAGE Learning. p. 468. ISBN 978-0-495-50629-4
10 Władysław Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas: an Essay in Aesthetics, p. 244.), Ancient China, and Ancient
India(Albert, R. S.; Runco, M. A. (1999). ":A History of Research on Creativity". In Sternberg, R. J.Handbook of
Creativity. Cambridge University Press.
11 Plato, The Republic, Book X - wikisource:The Republic/Book X
12 Władysław Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas: an Essay in Aesthetics, p. 244.


It is commonly argued that the notion of "creativity" originated in Western culture through
Christianity, as a matter of divine inspiration13. According to the historian Daniel J. Boorstin,
"the early Western conception of creativity was the Biblical story of creation given in
the Genesis."14 In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, creativity was the sole province of God;
humans were not considered to have the ability to create something new except as an
expression of God's work.15 A concept similar to that of Christianity existed in Greek culture,
for instance, Muses were seen as mediating inspiration from the Gods.16 Romans and Greeks
invoked the concept of an external creative "daemon" (Greek) or "genius" (Latin), linked to
the sacred or the divine. It was during the Renaissance that creativity was first seen, not as a
conduit for the divine, but from the abilities of "great men".17

T 1.3.2 The Enlightenment and after
he development of the modern concept of creativity begins in the Renaissance, when
creation began to be perceived as having originated from the abilities of the
individual, and not God. However, this shift was gradual and would not become
immediately apparent until the Enlightenment.18 By the 18th century and the Age of
Enlightenment, mention of creativity (notably in art theory), linked with the concept
of imagination, and became more frequent.19 In the writing of Thomas Hobbes, imagination
became a key element of human cognition.20 William Duff was one of the first to identify
imagination as a quality of genius, typifying the separation being made between talent
(productive, but breaking no new ground) and genius.21

As a direct and independent topic of study, creativity effectively received no attention until
the 19th century.22 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading mathematicians and

13 Runco, Mark A.; Albert, Robert S. (2010). "Creativity Research". In James C. Kaufmanand Robert J.
Sternberg. The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0-521-73025-9
14 Albert, R. S.; Runco, M. A. (1999). ":A History of Research on Creativity". In Sternberg, R. J.Handbook of
Creativity. Cambridge University Press. p. 5
15 Niu, Weihua; Sternberg, Robert J. (2006). "The Philosophical Roots of Western and Eastern Conceptions of
Creativity". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26: 18–38.doi:10.1037/h0091265. Retrieved 23
October 2010
16 Dacey, John (1999). "Concepts of Creativity: A history". In Mark A. Runco and Steven R. Pritzer. Encyclopedia
of Creativity, Vol. 1. Elsevier. ISBN 0-12-227076-2
17 Albert, R. S.; Runco, M. A. (1999). ":A History of Research on Creativity". In Sternberg, R. J.Handbook of
Creativity. Cambridge University Press. p. 6.
18 Albert, R. S.; Runco, M. A. (1999). ":A History of Research on Creativity". In Sternberg, R. J.Handbook of
Creativity. Cambridge University Press. p. 6
19 Tatarkiewicz, Władysław (1980). A History of Six Ideas: an Essay in Aesthetics. Translated from the Polish
by Christopher Kasparek, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
20 Runco, Mark A.; Albert, Robert S. (2010). "Creativity Research". In James C. Kaufmanand Robert J.
Sternberg. The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0-521-73025-9.
21 Dacey, John (1999). "Concepts of Creativity: A history". In Mark A. Runco and Steven R. Pritzer. Encyclopedia
of Creativity, Vol. 1. Elsevier. ISBN 0-12-227076-2
22 .( Dacey, John (1999). "Concepts of Creativity: A history". In Mark A. Runco and Steven R.
Pritzer. Encyclopedia of Creativity, Vol. 1. Elsevier. ISBN 0-12-227076-2


scientists such as Hermann von Helmholtz (1896) and Henri Poincaré (1908) began to reflect
on and publicly discuss their creative processes.




nitially it was believed that creativity was bestowed upon you from a higher, otherworldly
being. But in today’s world the thought is different. The creative process can be understood
as the process about goals and actions to achieve them. The creative process is about
thinking and doing in no prescribed order.24 In short any the process for creation of
something should consist of an intention to create something, then some information
should be gathered to fulfil the intention and finally an action should be done to complete
it. This can be achieved via six phases of creative process25:

INSPIRATION: In which you research and generate many ideas. Basically in the first phase

the human mind starts taking motivation from the environments and produces as many
thoughts as it can.



CLARIFICATION: In which you focus on your goals. The second phase specifies the goals

which are to be fulfilled.

EVALUATION: In which you review your work and learn from it. The third phase makes

the human mind rethink, assess and analyze all the thoughts that it has produces during

DISTILLATION: In which you decide which of your ideas to work on. The fourth phase

concentrates on selecting the important ideas from the thoughts which are necessary to
fulfil the goal specified in during the second phase.

INCUBATION: In which you leave the work alone.

PERSPIRATION: In which you work determinedly on your best ideas. In the final phase

everything is put into place and important and unimportant ideas are sorted. Now, the
human minds works only on important minds to create new ideas.


T he very first question that is needed to be answered is what is a copyright? As the
name in itself suggests it is a right to copy. The current copyright law of the United
Kingdom is to be found in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (the 1988 Act),
as amended. This came into force on 1 August 1989, for the most part, save for some minor
provisions that were brought into force in 1990 and 1991. The main thrust of the law of
copyright is that it grants the authors and other creators an incentive to create and to
promote their intellectual, moral and economic interests.26

The scholars of Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire were the first to be concerned about
being recognised as the authors of their works, but they did not have any economic rights27.
The history of modern copyright law dates back to 18th century with the enactment of
English Statute of Anne, which applied to England, Scotland, and Wales. It was “An Act for
the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or
purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned”. Initially copyright was
given to books only. With the development in human creativity, science and technology the
right was extended to a wide range of works like: maps,
performances, paintings, photographs, sound recordings, motion pictures, computer
programs etc. Internationally till 19th century the copyright laws varied according to
jurisdictions. To solve this problem in 1886 Berne Convention was adopted to provide



mutual recognition of copyright between nation states and to promote the development of
international standards for copyright protection.

In different countries copyright has developed differently - even in its fundamentals. Britain
(UK) developed copyright as a property concept through the 18th and 19th century and still
has 'the effort put into a work' as part of its copyright value as well as the original 'creative'
value. USA followed Britain with a 'copyright-as-property' model and developed it in within
their own entrepreneurial culture. In mainland Europe copyright developed along a different
path - copyright as author-centred - and it is from this concept that moral rights developed.
Moral rights have only been added into copyright legislation in the UK since 1989.28


I t is a principle of American law that an author of a work may reap the fruits of his or her
intellectual creativity for a limited period of time. Copyright is a form of protection
provided by the laws of the United States for original works of authorship, including
literary, dramatic, musical, architectural, cartographic, choreographic, pantomimic, pictorial,
graphic, sculptural, and audio visual creations29.

n 1518, the first copyright privilege was granted in England. It was issued to Richard
Pynson, King’s Printer, and the successor to William Caxton. The privilege gave a
monopoly for the term of two years. These copyright privileges were called as
monopolies. Later in 1701, the parliaments of England and Scotland were united as a result
of the Anglo-Scottish Union. The new parliament was able to change the laws in both
countries and an important early piece of legislation was the Copyright Act of 1709, also
known as the Statute of Anne, after Queen Anne. The act came into force in 1710 and was
the first copyright statute.30 The current copyright law of the United Kingdom is to be found
in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (the 1988 Act), as amended. This came into
force on 1 August 1989, for the most part, save for some minor provisions that were
brought into force in 1990 and 1991.

T 1.4.3 INDIA
he law of copyright was introduced in India only when the British East India Company
was established in 1847. The term of the Copyright was life time of the author plus
seven years after the death of the author. But in no case could the total term of
copyright exceed a period of forty-two years. The government could grant a compulsory
licence to publish a book if the owner of copyright, upon the death of the author, refused to



allow its publication. Registration of Copyright with the Home Office was mandatory for
enforcement of rights under the Act. In 1914 the Indian legislature under the British Raj
enacted the Copyright Act of 1914. It was almost similar to the United Kingdom Copyright
Act of 1911. But the major change that was brought in this Act was criminal sanction for
infringement. Number of times amendment were brought to this Act up till 1957.
Subsequently, The Copyright Act, 1957 was enacted in order to suit the provisions of the
Berne Convention. This Act was enacted by Independent India by which we are governed till


T here are few requirements that a work should have to get a copyright over it. These are:

ORIGINALITY: In University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd.32 it was held

that to be original, the work must originate from the author and not copied by him from
another work. The judge propounded a 'rough practical test', "what is worth copying is
prima facie worth protecting". This formulation was also approved in Ladbroke (Football)
Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. The Court in the said case observed, "The requirement of
originality means that it is the result of a substantial degree of skill, industry or experience
employed by him."

Practically, it is impossible for any work, especially the works that needs copyright
protection to be original in literal terms. Therefore, the meaning of originality cannot be
taken in strict sense, it has to be liberally interpreted. The work need not be original in the
sense that it must involve any original or inventive thought rather it should involve “at least
some minimal degree of creativity.” The idea need not be novel and completely new, what is
important is that the expression should be original. Same idea can be expressed in similar
manner. Those different modes of expression should be fresh. The work should be a result of
man’s own skill, labour and judgement. As In University of London Press Ltd. v. University
Tutorial Press Ltd.33 Peterson J. stated that: “The word ‘original’ does not in this connection
mean that the work must be the expression of original or inventive thought, and, in the case
of ‘literary work’, with the expression of thought in print or writing. The originality which is
required relates to the expression of thought.” It is clearly stated here that the originality

32 (1916)2 Ch 6 Oct 608.
33 [1916] 2 Ch 601


required by the law is not that of revolutionary new ideas but of the way that the thought is

EXPRESSION OF AN IDEA: Copyright is only given in expression of an idea and not in

ideas. In Donoughue v. Allied Newspaper Ltd.35, it was held by the court that “….if the idea,
however brilliant and however clear it may be, it is nothing more than an idea, and is not pit
in form of words, or any form of expression such as a picture or a play, then there is no such
thing as a copyright at all. It is not until it is reduced into writing or into some tangible form,
that you get to copyright at all, and the copyright exists in particular form of language in
which, or in case of pictured, in the particular form of picture by which, the information or
idea is conveyed to those who are intended
to read it or to look at it.”


C opyright ensures certain minimum ORIGINAL LITERARY, MUSICAL, DRAMATIC AND
safeguards of the rights of authors ARTISTIC WORKS
over their creations, thereby
protecting and rewarding creativity. CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS
Creativity being the keystone of progress, no

civilized society can afford to ignore the
basic requirement of encouraging the same.

Economic and social development of a [Cite your source here.]

society is dependent on creativity. The protection provided by copyright to the efforts of

writers, artists, designers, dramatists, musicians, architects and producers of sound

recordings, cinematography and computer software, creates an atmosphere conducive to

creativity, which induces them to create more and motivates others to create.36

The subject-matter of copyright protection includes every production in the literary,
scientific and artistic domain, whatever the mode or form of expression. The Copyright Act,
1957 protects:

Original literary, musical, dramatic and artistic works.
Cinematograph films.
Sound recordings.

34 “Originality” in Copyright Doctrine by Ian Hoare
35 (1937) 3 Ch D 503.

LITERARY WORK37: A literary Work is the outcome as a result of application of the mind

and substantial labour by the author and having it reduced it into a form of writing.

Example- A novel, a Book Review, a Survey report, Lecture, Speech etc.

Interestingly, a “computer programme” is also covered under the definition of literary work
and had been defined as a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any
other form, including a machine readable medium, capable of causing a computer to
perform a particular task or achieve a particular result.

DRAMATIC WORK38: Dramatic work includes any piece for recitation, choreographic

work or entertainment in dumbshow, the scenic arrangement or acting form of which is fixed
in writing or otherwise but does not include a cinematograph film.

ARTISTIC WORK39: Artistic work means:

(i) A painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an engraving
or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality.

It also includes, “work of sculpture” which can be casts and models.

Here, engravings- include etchings, lithographs, wood-cuts, prints and other similar works,
not being photographs.

(ii) Work of architecture which means any building or structure having an artistic character
or design, or any model for such building or structure;

(iii) Any other work of artistic craftsmanship;

MUSICAL WORK40: A Musical Work means any combination of melody and harmony or

either of them, printed, reduced to writing or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced.

Example- the hymns of Meera Bai and the symphonies of Beethoven are classic examples of
Musical Work.

CINEMATOGRAPHIC WORK41: Cinematography is an art form in the field of

filmmaking. According to the Indian Law, A Cinematographic Work includes the sound track,
if any, and “cinematograph” shall be construed as including any work produced by any
mechanical instrument or by radio-diffusion.



Example- The famous horror soundtrack of movie ‘Exorcist’ is protected under the copyright
Law under the cinematographic Work.

The logic behind such inclusion is the simplicity of protection laws which doesn’t require the
filmmakers to get their soundtracks registered individually for protection.

SOUND RECORDING42: Sound recording means a recording of sounds from which sounds

may be produced regardless of the medium on which such recording is made or the method
by which the sounds are produced. A phonogram and a CD-ROM are sound recordings.


C opyrights are all about profit sharing by the owner of the intellectual property. The
object of copyright law is to encourage authors, artists and composers to create
original works and rewarding them with exclusive right for a fixed period to
reproduce the works for commercial exploitation. It is a well settled under the copyright law
that the creator of the original expression in a work is its author. The author is also the
owner of copyright. The author in copyright history, especially before the Statute of Anne,
had been regarded as a separate entity from the printer or publisher of a work.43

Authorship is the organization of a meritorious production, embodying the author or
the thought of the author as well as the thought of the other, in an organized and
communicable form and bearing the impress of the
distinctive individuality of the mind which produced it. The Berne Convention,
establishing a union to protect literary and artistic works, recognizes by virtue of Article 1
that the rights being protected through copyright law are the rights of authors.44 Authors
are the first beneficiaries of rights under the law and provide a reference point as to how
long rights over the work should exist.45 Copyrightable works of authorship include a broad
array of subject matter, from poetry to computer programs, motion pictures to compilations
of data. In copyright parlance, the creator of a copyrightable work is its "author," whether
poet, computer programmer, film director or principal investigator.


43 Alina Ng, ‘Authors and Readers: Conceptualizing Authorship in Copyright Law’ at
44 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, Jul. 24 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 18338.
45 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Jul. 24 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 18338.


A uthor, under the U.S. Copyright Law, is either the person who actually creates a
copyrightable work or, if the copyrightable work is created within the scope of
employment, the employer of the person who actually creates the copyrightable
work. The author of a work is entitled to copyright in the work if the work is original and is
fixed. The work can even be a compilation of existing data, a derivative work. Under the
U.S. Copyright Law, exclusive rights are granted to an author or owner of a copyrightable
work falling under any of these categories. Typically, the author of a work owns the
copyright in the work. However, under the U.S. Copyright Law, for a work made for hire,
that is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment or a specially
ordered or commissioned work, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author.

‘Joint Authorship’ is something when two or more people work together to create a
copyrightable work and their contribution could be individually seen. For eg: a lyricist and
composer collaborate together to form a song. The U.S. Copyright Act provides that each co-
author owns an undivided interest in the entire work. For example, where lyrics and music
are intended to be joined at the time they are created, the lyricist and composer each have
an undivided interest in the entire work. When instrumental versions produce revenues
(e.g., elevator music), the lyricist is entitled to share in those revenues, just as the composer
is entitled to share in revenues derived from the lyrics alone (e.g., print posters).47 In the
recent decision Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.
2009), authorship credit was a key factor in establishing intent to create a joint work of
authorship. Janky was a songwriter who challenged a putative co-author's right to issue a
non-exclusive license to the defendant, Visitor's Bureau. Visitor's Bureau maintained that it
had properly used the song under a non-exclusive license issued by the song's co-author,
Henry Farag. Janky testified that Farag's contributions had accounted for only 10% of the
lyrical content of the song. Janky originally filed a copyright application naming Farag as co-
author, but later filed another copyright application "correcting" the earlier registration,
omitting Farag's name, and listing herself as the sole author. Janky testified that she placed
Farag on the original application "as an indication of [her] gratitude . . . and to demonstrate
that [she] appreciated every little bit of support." Farag testified that his lyrical changes were
significant and that he had also made revisions to the song's melody. The Court concluded
that Janky and Farag each intended to create a joint work and that each had contributed
independently copyrightable material, noting that "crediting another person as a co-author
is strong evidence of intent to create a joint work."48





C anadian copyright law sets out rules which determine who is to be the first owner of
the copyright for a new copyrightable work. The rules cover different groups of
people such as the authors of the work, employees who create works in the course
of their employment, independent contractors who create works under contracts for
services, and academics. It is helpful to think of the rules which set out in initial allocation of
copyright as 'default' rules because the whole or a portion of the 'ownership' of the
copyright may always be transferred to a different person in a contract of sale.

Section 13(1) of Canada's Copyright Act states that "subject to this Act, the author of a work
shall be the first owner of the copyright therein."50 This rule introduces two new questions.
First of all, what are the other elements of the Copyright Act to which s. 13(1) is subject?
Second, who is an author? In response to the first question, this article will address some of
the other elements of the Copyright Act to which s. 13(1) is subject shortly. For now, suffice
to say that there are nuances and exceptions to the rule in s. 13(1) for groups of people such
as employees. The second question is more complicated, but the courts have issued a
number of decision which provide some definition to the concept of who is an author
according to Canada's Copyright Act. Two helpful decisions regarding the matter of who is
an author are Glen Gould Estate v. Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd.,51 and Donoghue v. Allied
Newspapers Ltd.52

David Vaver states that joint authors will be the first co-owners of a copyright.53
Presumably, this rule flows from section 13(1) of the Copyright Act. Section 2 of the
Copyright Act provides a definition of a work of joint authorship as work in which "the
contribution of one author is not distinct from the contribution of the other author [...]"54
This definition distinguishes works of joint authorship from collective works such as
compilations, where it may be evident that the original contribution of the author of one of
the constituent works would be distinct from the original contribution of the compiler who
arranged and selected the constituent works into a compilation. However, if all of the
authors participated in an indistinguishable manner in creating the constituent works and in
selecting and arranging the various constituent works, than it would probably be more
appropriate to classify such a collaborative work as a work of joint authorship instead of as a


Section 2 (d) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 defines the meaning of the authors as the
person who causes the work to be created. As per Section 13 of Copyright Act, 1957 the

50Copyright Act, RS 1985, c C-42, s 13(1)
51 Glen Gould Estate v Stoddart Publishing Co Ltd [1998] O.J. No. 1894, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 321
52 Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 503
53 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright|Patents|Trade-marks, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc.,
2011) at 118
54 Copyright Act, RS 1985, c C-42, s 2


author is the first owner of copyright in a work, the authors in different copyrighted works

Ë In the case of a literary or dramatic work the author, i.e., the person who creates the

Ë In case of a musical work, the composer.
Ë In case of cinematograph film, the producer.
Ë In case of a sound recording, the producer.
Ë In case of a photograph, the photographer.
Ë In the case of a computer generated work, the person who causes the work to be


In Godrej Soaps (P) Ltd v Dora Cosmetics Co, the Delhi High Court held that where the
carton was designed for valuable consideration by a person in the course of his employment
for and on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant had led no evidence in his favour, the
plaintiff is the assignee and the legal owner of copyright in the carton including the logo.


˜ WORK DONE IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT: As per Section 17 of the copyright
act, 1957 the author of artistic is not the first owner, if the work made by the
author is in the course of his employment by an employer a contract of service or
apprenticeship. The rule in general says, copyright in a work made by an
employee in the course of their employment is owned by the employer, unless
there is an express or implied agreement that the employee will own the
copyright.55 The important fact to be kept in mind here is that the creative work
should be done in course of employment i.e. there should be a contract for
employment. In the case of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. v. Mr. Gajendra
Singh and Ors.56 The honourable court in para 39 laid down the factors
identifying a contract of employment. The court said ‘The factors to be
considered. Recent case law suggests that the factors relevant to the process of
identifying a contract of employment may usefully be listed as follows:
Ä the degree of control exercised by the employer;
Ä whether the worker's interest in the relationship involved any prospect of
profit or risk of loss;
Ä whether the worker was properly regarded as part of the employer's
Ä whether the worker was carrying on business on his own account or
carrying on the business of the employer;
Ä the provision of equipment;

56 2008 (36) PTC 53 (Bom)


Ä the incidence of tax and national insurance;
Ä the parties' own view of their relationship;
Ä the traditional structure of the trade or profession concerned and the

arrangement within it.’
˜ ASSIGNMENT: Copyright is assignable to any person who on the basis of

assignment can claim ownership. As per Section 18 of copyright act 1957 the
owner of the copyright in an existing creative work or the prospective owner of
the copyright in a future creative work may assign to any person the copyright
either wholly or partially and either generally or subject to limitations and either
for the whole term of the copyright or any part thereof. Assignment must be in
writing signed by the assignor or by his duly authorised agent. It shall identify the
specific creative works and specify the rights assigned and the duration and
territorial extent of such assignment. It shall also specify the amount of royalty
payable, if any, to the author or his legal heirs during the currency of the
assignment and the assignment shall be subject to revision, extension or
termination on terms mutually agreed upon by the parties.

In the case of Sree Gokulam Chit and Finance Company (P.) Ltd. v. Johny Sagariga
Cinema Square, Proprietary57 concern explaining the meaning and what
constitutes an assignment the court in para 19 said, ‘A careful reading of
Sections 18 and 19 would show that the purpose of assignment is actually to
enable the assignee to exploit the rights that the owner of the copyright has in (i)
the literary, dramatic or musical work (ii) the computer programme (iii) the
artistic work (iv) the cinematograph film or (v) the sound recording.
An assignment serves two purposes. For the assignee, it confers the right of
exploitation for a specified period in a specified territory. For the assignor, it
confers the right to receive royalty. An agreement, the sole purpose of which was
just to prevent others from exploiting the copyrights of the owner and to enable
the assignee to get back his loan, cannot be an agreement of assignment. In an
agreement of assignment, the only right that the assignee has is the right of
exploitation. The only right that the assignor has is to receive royalty. If the
assignor does not exploit his rights during the period of assignment, not only
would the assignment lapse on the expiry of the term, but also the money paid to
the assignor would never get repaid. In other words, the rights conferred by an
agreement of assignment on the assignee flow only one way. While after the
expiry of the period of assignment, the copyrights flow back to the assignor, the
royalty paid to the assignor never gets repaid to the assignee.’

˜ COMMISSIONED WORK: In the case of a 3D photograph taken, or a 3D painting
or portrait drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph film made, for valuable

57 2011 (3) CTC 747

consideration at the instance of any person, such person shall, in the absence of
any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein.58
Also, if the creator has sold the entire copyright, the purchasing business or
person becomes the copyright owner.59


T oday, owners of creative works have extensive legal rights to recover investments
made in the production and distribution of such works. Whenever a person becomes
copyright owner, he/she gets few sets of rights:

ECONOMIC RIGHT: these rights are of economic importance and profits can be gained out of

these. These include:

œ Right to Reproduce: The reproduction right is perhaps the most important right

granted by the Copyright Act. Under this right, no one other than the copyright
owner may make any reproductions or copies of the creative work.60

œ Right to Prepare Derivative Works like translations and adaptations: The

right to make a derivative creative work overlaps somewhat with the reproduction
right. According to the Copyright Act, a derivative work is a work based upon one or
more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A derivative work usually involves a type of
transformation, such as the transformation of a novel into a motion picture. In the
computer industry, a second version of a software program is generally considered a
derivative work based upon the earlier version.61

œ Right to Distribute: The distribution right grants to the copyright holder the

exclusive right to make a creative work available to the public by sale, rental, lease,
or lending. This right allows the copyright holder to prevent the distribution of
unauthorized copies of a work. In addition, the right allows the copyright holder to
control the first distribution of a particular authorized copy. However, the
distribution right is limited by the "first sale doctrine", which states that after the
first sale or distribution of a copy, the copyright holder can no longer control what
happens to that copy. Thus, after a book has been purchased at a book store (the
first sale of a copy), the copyright holder has no say over how that copy is further



distributed. Thus, the book could be rented or resold without the permission of the
copyright holder.62

œ Right to Display Publicly (related to artistic works): 63The public display right

is similar to the public performance right, except that this right controls the public
"display" of a work. This right is limited to the following types of works:

o literary works;
o musical works;
o dramatic works;
o choreographic works;
o pantomimes;
o pictorial works;
o graphical works;
o sculptural works; and
o stills (individual images) from motion pictures and other audio visual works.

œ Right to Perform Publicly (related to musical or dramatic works): 64The

public performance right allows the copyright holder to control the public
performance of certain copyrighted works. The scope of the performance right is
limited to the following types of works:

o literary works,
o musical works,
o dramatic works,
o choreographic works,
o pantomimes,
o motion pictures, and
o audio visual works.
Under the public performance right, a copyright holder is allowed to control when
the work is performed "publicly." A performance is considered "public" when the
work is performed in a "place open to the public or at a place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
are gathered." A performance is also considered to be public if it is transmitted to
multiple locations, such as through television and radio. Thus, it would be a violation
of the public performance right in a motion picture to rent a video and to show it in a
public park or theatre without obtaining a license from the copyright holder, keeping
in mind that some commercial benefits are gained from it and it is not used for
personal purpose. In contrast, the performance of the video on a home TV where
friends and family are gathered would not be considered a "public" performance and
would not be prohibited under the Copyright Act. The public performance right is
generally held to cover computer software, since software is considered a literary



work under the Copyright Act. In addition, many software programs fall under the
definition of an audio visual work. The application of the public performance right to
software has not be fully developed, except that it is clear that a publicly available
video game is controlled by this right.

MORAL RIGHT: these rights are given to the author irrespective of the economic importance

of the creation. These include:

Rights of Paternity: 65The author has a right to claim authorship of his work and

can prevent all the others from claiming authorship of his work. The author also had
a right to demand that his name should appear in all the copies of his work at
appropriate place. He can also prevent others from using his name in their work.

Rights of Integrity: 66an author has a right to prevent distortion, mutilation or

other alterations of his work, or any other action in relation to the said work which
would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.

Moral rights are personal rights that connect authors to their creative work. Though they
exist only in relation to copyright material, they are distinct from the economic rights
included in copyright. Moral rights arise automatically and have a legal meaning. The author
of a creative work has moral rights in relation to that work, even if the author is not the
owner of the copyright in the work.67

When a copyright owner transfers the ownership to person or entity that will be responsible
for getting the work to market, the owner typically transfers the rights attached to it. But
the most important point to note here is that the moral rights can never be transferred.
Moral rights will always stay with the original creator of the creative artwork.


E conomic approaches to creativity have focussed on three aspects - the impact of
creativity on economic growth, methods of modelling markets for creativity, and the
maximisation of economic creativity (innovation).

In the early 20th century, Joseph Schumpeter introduced the economic theory of creative
destruction, to describe the way in which old ways of doing things are endogenously
destroyed and replaced by the new. Some economists (such as Paul Romer) view creativity

65 Ahuja V.K., Law Relating To Intellectual Property Rights, LexisNexis, 1st edn 2007, reprint 2013 pg 40
66 Ahuja V.K., Law Relating To Intellectual Property Rights, LexisNexis, 1st edn 2007, reprint 2013 pg 40


as an important element in the recombination of elements to produce new technologies
and products and, consequently, economic growth. Creativity leads to capital, and creative
products are protected by intellectual property laws.

Mark A. Runco and Daniel Rubenson have tried to describe a "psychoeconomic" model of
creativity.69 In such a model, creativity is the product of endowments and active
investments in creativity; the costs and benefits of bringing creative activity to market
determine the supply of creativity. Such an approach has been criticised for its view of
creativity consumption as always having positive utility, and for the way it analyses the
value of future innovations.70

The creative class is seen by some to be an important driver of modern economies. In his
2002 book, The Rise of the Creative Class, economist Richard Florida popularized the notion
that regions with "3 T's of economic development: Technology, Talent and Tolerance" also
have high concentrations of creative professionals and tend to have a higher level of
economic development.

When a creativity is commercialized, there can are chances of misuse and also other aspects
are important like funds, profit sharing, balance of interest etc., needs to be protected. Here
comes the role of copyright.


A uthors are the persons who are the creator of the art form. Owners are the ones
who own the rights under the copyright law. A copyright is the legal right granted to
an artist or distributor for the production, sale, or distribution of an artistic work. In
effect, a copyright marks a level of a degree of ownership and, in its most basic form; a
copyright is secured for a work by its creator or the entity that has paid for its creation.71
Normally, authors are the first owners of the copyright. But in certain situations, author and
owner can be two different people.

COMMISSIONED WORK: In the case of a photograph taken, or a painting or portrait

drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph film made, for valuable consideration at the
instance of any person, such person shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary,

69 Rubenson, Daniel L.; Runco, Mark (1992). "The psychoeconomic approach to creativity". New Ideas in
Psychology 10 (2): 131–147. doi:10.1016/0732-118X(92)90021-Q
70 Diamond, Arthur M. (1992). "Creativity and Interdisciplinarity: A Response to Rubenson and Runco". New
Ideas in Psychology 10 (2): 157–160. doi:10.1016/0732-118X(92)90023-S


be the first owner of the copyright therein.72 Also, if the creator has sold the entire
copyright, the purchasing business or person becomes the copyright owner.73

The author is either the creator of the work or the person who employs someone to create
the work. Many authors do not retain their copyright ownership; they sell or transfer it to
someone else in return for a lump sum payment or periodic payment known as a royalty. In
this way, the author and copyright owner may be two different people.74 FOR EG: The
moment an image is created by an artist, the artist holds and owns the copyright. When a
work of art is sold whether an existing piece or commissioned work for a private collector,
the purchaser is the owner of the actual piece.

Author is only the maker of the artwork whereas owner is the right holder who is entitled to
exploit the work in order to gain economic revenue from it. Another difference between
both the concepts is of transferability. The ownership is transferrable whereas authorship is
not. This can be explained after understanding the rights that an author or owner has.


air use and fair dealing were not born by statute but established as judge-made law,
first by English and later by American judges, who mutually influenced and cross-
referenced each other.75 Fair use and fair dealing’s scope and shape developed
gradually, although the very foundation and rationale were established remarkably early.76
By 1841, when the doctrine made its full appearance in the United States in Folsom v
Marsh,77 American courts already had a bundle of precedents to decide the case. “During
the nineteenth century, fair use was a broad concept that encompassed several issues that
today would often be treated separately: for example, it would apply to the copying of non-
protectable facts and ideas as distinct from protectable expressions, to the copying of non-
substantial parts of protected expressions, as well as to permissible copying of substantial
parts of protected expressions.”78 While current doctrine tends to treat these issues as
conceptually distinct, and confine fair dealing to the third, the three are not entirely

75 Scott v Stanford (1867), LR 3 Eq 718 at 722 (quoting Story J’s famous formulation of fair use in American law
from Folsom v Marsh, 9 F Cas 342 (CCD Mass 1841), and noting that “[t]he general principles guiding the Court
in cases of this description could hardly be found better stated” than in that case).
76 Id.
77 Folsom v Marsh, 9 F Cas 342 (CCD Mass 1841)
78 Michael Geist, The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of
Canadian Copyright Law,ed., pp 93-156


separate. The tests used for determining “substantiality” involve similar questions to those
that are asked in determining “fairness”,79 and whether the work is mainly factual or
expressive may influence the outcome of the fairness analysis.


I ndia's effort to give protection to its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) holders through
the well-thought of legislation, requires a full revision of the Copyright Act, Fair Dealing
and their relationship to academy and research.

Though we continue to struggle with the copyright implications of new technologies related
to electronic storage and transmission of information, the basic issue of Doctrine of Fair Use
for teaching, research and development could never be clearer. Fresh understanding of the
Copyright Act of 1957 with all its amendments is a need of the day. The concept is better
understood if it can be shown as a well-established age-old view of copyright.

The relationship of copyright and fair dealing can be interpreted in various manners having
diverse interpretations of users' rights. These users may be teachers, reviewers, researchers,
critics, journalists or correspondents, academicians or any other information agents and
information service providers.

The interpretation, even if it is legitimate, may affect the so-called users' objective.
Differences of interpretation result from diverging perspectives on copyright's role to a
work. Legal liability of this interpretation is always weighted against the potential benefits
on the part of the society.

Copyright is a set of legal rights that belong to the copyright owner and are required to be
enforced. This valid opinion is somewhat against the public or social concern. “A
compromise is made for the necessity of limited user rights”.80 “Thus the works of an author
which are considered vital to advancing education and progress of society in terms of growth
of knowledge must be available to the users for the said purpose.”81

In India, the doctrine of fair dealing has been laid down under Section 52 of the Indian
Copyright Act, 1957. The English Copyright Act, 1842 was held to applicable in India by the
Bombay High Court in McMillan v Khan Bahadur Shamsul Ulama Zaka, even when the Act
was not made expressly applicable to India.82 In 1914, the Indian council passed the
Copyright Act, 1914 with the goal that thereupon the law of copyright was represented by
the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911 which was basically the amplification of the British

79 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks,2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at
80 Lape L G, Transforming fair use: The productive use factor in Fair Use Doctrine, Albany Law Review, 58
(1995) 677-724
81 Id.
82 McMillan v Khan Bahadur Shamsul Ulama Zaka, (1895) I.L.R. Bom. 557


Copyright Act, 1911. The Indian legislature; however had a very limited power of
modification and addition. Fair dealing was first statutorily introduced in 1914 as a mere
duplication of Section 2(1)(i) of the UK Copyright Act, 1911, providing that copyright would
not be infringed by ‘any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism, review or newspaper summary’.

The current Indian copyright statute i.e., the Indian Copyright Act was passed in 1957 as an
independent and a self-contained law. Even the new legislation had extensively copied, both
textually and in basic principles, from the new UK Copyright Act, 1956. However, the scope
of fair dealing was increased in the new Copyright’s Act, 1957. A fair dealing with any work
for the purposes of radio summary or judicial proceeding was hereafter proclaimed not to
constitute an infringement of copyright. From 1957 up till now, fair dealing has been
amended thrice. The first minor amendment brought to Section 52 was by the Copyright
Amendment Act 1983 (23 of 1983) whereby an explanation below sub clause (ii) of clause
(b) was inserted which was, however, carefully amended by the Copyright Amendment Act,
1994. Activities like private research and dealing with computer programmes and their
copying by a lawful possessor were incorporated into the provision and making sound
recordings of any literary, dramatic and musical works in certain circumstances were
declared to constitute fair dealing. The latest amendment brought to Section 52 was in the
year 1999, which again sought to address issues relating to computer programmes.


A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic musical or artistic work for the purpose of
research or private study or criticism or review, whether of that work or any other
work shall not constitute an infringement of copyright.83

The nature and source of the doctrine of fair use- there is no agreement in the nature of the
doctrine. Broadly speaking it can be viewed as a limitation on the right of the author granted
under the statute, or as a defence to infringement. Furthermore three distinct sources are:

One source is sought in the presumed intention of the author to allow certain use of hi
work. This presumed intent is obviously a fiction. Authors, being human, would prefer to
have absolute control over the use of their works. While the intent can be reasonably
inferred in many cases, the fiction becomes strained in others, and, if treated as the sole
source of the doctrine may lead to serious misunderstanding. A theory closer to reality
would be more desirable and other theories are available.

83 Roger Needham, Tape Recording Photocopy and for use, published in copyright Law symposium No. 10 at
pp. 77.


Another approach is to derive the doctrine of fair use from the doctrine of de minimis nin
curat lex. Again this theory has utility in some cases but it cannot explain those in which a
large amount of copyright is permitted.

The third approach is to derive the doctrine from the constitutional policy. This theory is
best expressed in the words of the Judge Levet:84

“since the copyright act is intended to afford encouragement to the production of literary
works reward to the owner in a secondary consideration…accordingly, subsequent authors,
publishers and the general public may use a copyrighted work in a reasonably manner
without the consent of the author on the theory that such use constitutes ‘fair use’ of the
copyrighted material”

According to the Judge Palmier:

“the general purpose of copyright protection are to afford authors the right to reap the
fruits of their expressions and to promote the store of information and objects of culture
available for public enjoyment and application. Usually these two purposes are not
inconsistent. When, however an author’s monopoly threatens to infringe unduly on public
use of the ideas or objects of that expressions, the Courts have demonstrated flexibility in
adjusting the conflicting theories. Thus copyright ability may all together be denied, or, if
copyright is upheld, restrictively protected by requiring almost verbatim copying to
constitute infringement. In other situation, the subject and purpose of copyright may be
explicitly defined so as not to authorize disclosed information or objects.”85

he right to quote directly from a copyrighted work is called the right of fair use, it is a

product of purely judicial process- processes which were designed to aid just such

persons as the scholar, lawyer, or physicians who rely on accumulated or knowledge
facts in their arts. The use of such material is considered as fair when it is reasonable.86

This word reasonable is very familiar to a lawyer, but it frightens the layman: it seems
indefinite, so changeable. But it is exactly this indefiniteness and adaptability that makes it
so useful. It catches the crook and protects the scholar. The courts have, however,
developed some criteria for determining what a reasonable use of copyrighted material is.

In Johnstone v Bernard Jones Publication ltd87 the plaintiff was the author of the two
original literary works, one of which was published in 1934 and it was called “A Summary of

84 Continental Casualty Co. v Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 31-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
85 Continental Casualty Co. v Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 31-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
86 Warren v White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co., 39 F 2d 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1930)
87 [1938] 2 All E.R. 37.


some systems and Tables in dealing with the Three Alternative Possibilities or Results applied
to Cross-words, Pictures and Pools”, the second of these works was called “the Systematic
Football Betting”. It was a booklet containing 128 pages, and it was published in 1935. It is
not now disputed that the plaintiff is, and has at all material times been, the owner of the
copyright in these two booklets. A material part of each booklet is certain mathematical
tables by the use of which an entrant for football pools is enabled to arrange his entries in
what is thought to be an advantageous manner. The two literary works in question have had
quite a wide circulation, and the plaintiff, in addition to having written those booklets, is a
regular contributor to a publication known as Racing and football outlook. He has published
many articles in that paper in regard to his system, and these articles. There is no doubt,
caused very general interest among persons who enter football pools. On page 24 of its
issue of the football forecast of 1st December, 1936, a letter was published headed those
penny pools. Tables again, and it purported to be signed by “R.I.H Birmingham”. It is the
publication and printing of that letter which is said to be an infringement of the plaintiff’s
copyright. It is said, and it is clearly established, that a table appearing in that letter and
headed Reduced Permutation Table is in substance a reproduction of Table which appeared
in each of the Plaintiff’s two booklets. If a work is taken and reproduced and criticisms are
offered upon that work, it is not necessary, in order to bring the case within the proviso that
the name of the author should be referred to in terms. If the work is set out and is criticised,
that is enough to bring the matter within the words of the section, so far as the purposes of
criticism are concerned. Then, of course, one has to consider the question of whether this is
a fair dealing for the purpose of criticism. The Table in question as being a reproduction of
the plaintiff’s work, that is by no means inconsistent with his taking the view that the letter,
as it stood, being in the form of criticism, was not an infringement of copyright.

Infringement of copyright has to be tested on visual appearance of the drawing and object
in question. The purpose, functional utility, efficacy of different parts and components of
the object of the material of which they may be made are irrelevant for the purpose of

Where the plaintiff was political and lobby correspondent of the Observer newspaper,
which is owned by the Observer Ltd., the first defendant, Pressdram LTd., is the publisher
and the second defendant, Leo Thorpe the is the publisher in an article in Private Eye of an
internal Observer Office memorandum written by the plaintiff. The alleged infringement is
in the case of the first defendant by publishing and in the case of the second defendant for
conversion in respect of copies of the article infringing the defendants, for an injunction
against future infringement and damages for the breach of copyright, together with in the
case of the first defendant only, statutory and aggravated and exemplary damages, for
conversion and delivering up of infringing material.

88 John Richard Brady v Chemical Process Ltd., AIR 1987 Delhi 372 at pp. 382


As to the plea of fair dealing the court observed the relevant fair dealing with the
memorandum for the record approved purposes. It is fair dealing directed to and
consequently limited to and to be judged in relation to the approved purposes. It is dealing

which is fair for the approved purposes and not dealing which might be fair for some other
purposes of fair in general. Mere dealing with the work for that purpose is not enough: it
must also be dealing which is fair for that purpose whose fairness must be judged in relation
to that purpose.89

he Indian Copyright Act under Section 52 carves out fair dealing from copyright
infringement as affirmative defences, and places the burden of proving the defences

onto the user once the copyright owner establishes prima facie infringement by
substantial copying of expression. However, the fair dealing cases in India do not always
establish prima facie infringement before considering the application of fair dealing.90 The
first issue in these cases, following the text of the Copyright Act, is the definition of fair
dealing. As the Act does not define fair dealing, the Indian courts have heavily referred to
the English authority of Hubbard v Vosper91 which contained the oft-quoted definition of
fair dealing by Lord Denning:

“It is impossible to define what is ‘fair dealing.’ It must be a question of degree. You must
consider first the number and extent of the quotations and extracts…..Then you must
consider the use made of them…….Next, you must consider the proportions…...Other
considerations may come to mind also. But, after all is said and done, it must be a matter of

Also, the enumerated purposes under Section 52 have been typically interpreted as
exhaustive, inflexible and certain, since any use not falling strictly within an enumerated
ground is considered an infringement.92 The courts have time and again restated that it is
impossible to develop a ‘rule of thumb’ for cases of fair dealing as each case depends upon

in its own facts and circumstances. As the courts in India have analysed the doctrine of fair
dealing, in which they drew primarily from UK and US approaches, they recognized certain
factors that may be more or less relevant in fair dealing cases and which are not provided by
the Indian copyright statute.

In RG Anand v Delux Films and Ors,93 the Indian Supreme Court while recognizing the idea-
expression contradiction held that in an idea there cannot be a copyright, subject-matter,

89 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd. (1973) 1 All ER 241 at pp. 245-246.
90 Civic Chandran v Ammini Amma, 1996 PTC 16 670.
91 Hubbard v Vosper, (1972) 1 All ER 1023 p. 1027
92 Blackwood and Sons Ltd and Others v AN Parasuraman and Ors, AIR 1959 Mad 410 Para 84 and Civic
Chandran ,1996 PTC 16 670.
93 RG Anand v Delux Films and Ors, [1979] 1 SCR 218


themes, plots or historical or legendary facts and violation of the copyright in such cases is
confined to the form, manner and arrangement and expression of the idea by the author of
the copyrighted work. The Court further held that where the same idea is being developed
in a different manner, it is apparent that the source being common, similarities are bound to
occur and therefore in such a case the courts should look whether or not the similarities are
on fundamental or substantial aspects of the mode of expression adopted in the
copyrighted work.94 In other words, in order to be illegal the copy must be a substantial and
material reproduction of expression and not merely of an idea. Therefore, the question of
fair dealing defence does not arise in case a copying is made of an idea as that would not, at
all, constitute a copyright infringement.

“However, the issue of substantiality is the subject of two different concerns. First, there is
no copyright infringement unless there is substantial taking. Second, once there is prima
facie copyright infringement, whether a use is fair is partly determined by the substantiality
of the taking as one of the factors.”95 Therefore, for fair dealing to apply, the use must be
substantial enough to render an infringement, and for the use to be fair, it must not be too
substantial. However, in Indian jurisprudence, the courts have been unable to separate the
two very different inquiries. In either case, however, generally, Indian courts have applied
both quantitative and qualitative test of substantiality and the literal number of words
copied has not been held to be a determinative factor.96 The courts have recognized that
the permissible quantum of extracts or quotations will depend upon the facts of each case.

In Blackwood case, which involved the reproduction of the work in the form of guides, the
court rightfully held that the alleged infringer’s intention is an important but not a decisive
factor in determining whether the work in question was copied so substantially that the
copying would amount to negative fairness.97

The Court took a peculiar stand in SK Dutt v Law Book Co and Ors, where the dispute was
based on the use of certain quotations from a work. The Court interpreted the fact of
acknowledgement by the authors of the plaintiff's material to mean that, had the authors
made any other use of the plaintiff's book in compiling their own book, they would have
acknowledged it; thus, the copying was held not to be a substantial taking.

According to the Indian courts, while a review may summarize the original work and present
it for scrutiny to a third person so that one can get an idea about the work; a criticism may
discuss the merits and demerits of the work and a guide may seek to enable students of the
original work to better understand it from the point of view of examinations but, on the

94 Id.
95 Lape L G, Transforming fair use: The productive use factorin Fair Use Doctrine, Albany Law Review, 58 (1995)
96 Blackwood Case, AIR 1959 Mad 410 Para 71
97 Id.


other hand verbatim copying cannot be provided any shield under the copyright regime.98 A
commentary has been held to be an expression of opinion or a set of explanatory notes on a
text. American courts have further developed the factor of purpose and character by adding
to the facet of ‘transformative character of the use’.99 This means that a mere reproduction
from the original in a mechanical manner lacks the necessary element of being
transformative.100 Remarkably, the Indian Supreme Court, presciently in its judgment in
Anand’s case pronounced a principle resembling the ‘transformative work’ doctrine which
was developed in the United States much later. It held that:

“Where the theme is the same but is presented and treated differently so that the
subsequent work becomes a completely new work, no question of violation of copyright

In V Ramaiah v K Lakshmaiah,101 where the question that whether the Act of the
respondent in writing the guide is an infringement of the copyright, the courts were
cautioned to keep in mind that defendants pleading fair dealing should not have used the
work without out making any independent contribution, in other words, the work must
have been transformative.

The Court in Chancellor masters102 case, which again concerned copying for the purpose of
guide books, had laid down that while dealing with the issue of fair dealing, a Court should
ask whether the purpose served by the subsequent (or infringing) work is substantially
different (or is the same) from the purpose served by the previous work. To be called
transformative, the subsequent work must be different in character; it must not be a mere
substitute, in that, it not necessary that only superficial changes are made, the basic
character remaining the same.103 “This determination, according to the Court, is closely knit
with the other three factors, and therefore, central to the determination of fair use, i.e., if
the work is transformative, then it might not matter that the copying is whole or substantial.
Again, if it is transformative, it may not act as a market substitute and consequently, will not
affect the market share of the prior work.”104

The courts have generally taken a mild stand on guides so far as the purpose of the guide is
only to help the students to understand the meaning, significance and answers that have to
be written for the questions therein. Thus, it falls four squarely under fair dealing with a
literary work for purpose of private study bona fide intended for the use of educational

98 Ramesh Chaudhary and Ors v Ali Mohd, AIR 1965 J&K101.
99 Campbell v Accuff- Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994)
100 Syndicate press of University of Cambridge v Kasturilal and Sons, 2006 (32) PTC 487 (Del) Para 7
101 V Ramaiah v K Lakshmaiah, 1989 (9) PTC 137
102 Chancellor Masters Case, 2008(38) PTC 385(Del) Para 28.
103 Id.
104 Id.


institutions.105 But the Court in Blackwood case declined to hold that guides constitute a
‘criticism’ of the copyright works.

in Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge and Anr v B D Bhandari106 and
Anr, the Court while holding the work of the defendants to be transformative and not
merely a substitute for the book of the plaintiff was reluctant to issue an injunction order
because of the large scale use of such guide books and dependence thereon by students.

On the other hand, in Syndicate press of University of Cambridge v Kasturilal and Sons,107
the Court went ahead to hold that even if it is assumed that the defendant's work could
have enabled students to give effective answers in examinations, such a situation cannot
permit copying verbatim texts of the original work.

In Rupendra Kashyap v Jiwan Publishing House,108 where the defendant was involved in
publishing question papers of the CBSE's examinations, to which, the plaintiff contended to
hold an exclusive license, the Court has very explicitly held that the law as to copyright in
India is governed by a statute which does not provide for defence in the name of public
interest. An infringement of copyright cannot be permitted merely because it is claimed to
be in public interest to infringe a copyright.

In Super cassette Industries v Nirulas Corner House (P) Ltd,109 where the plaintiff alleged
copyright infringement on the ground that few audio clippings of songs in which they owned
copyright were played on the television in an enclosed room of the defendant's hotel, the
Court, while rejecting the defence of fair dealing in terms of Section 52(1)(k) ) held “that the
two categories 'hotels' and 'similar commercial establishment' gives a clue to Parliamentary
intention to exclude the operation of such categories of establishments from the benefit of
what are obviously deemed not infringements and that such provisions should receive a
restricted interpretation, having regard to the nature of the expressions used.”110 These
provisions were held to be pointers to the legislative intent of treating use of televisions and
sound recordings, in hotels as communications to the public as opposed to a private
purpose, even if played in an enclosed hotel room. Therefore, the Court declined to extend
the law beyond its meaning to take care of any supposed broader legislative purpose.

It can be inferred from this that though the courts have utilized the American factor of
purpose and transformative character but in spite of that, the courts have also stuck to the
language used in the statute, by strictly adhering to purposes enumerated in the act and
interpreted the provisions in a restricted manner. Also, the Indian courts have not taken

105 V Ramaiah v K Lakshmaiah, 1989 PTC 137
106 University of Cambridge and Anr v B D Bhandari, MIPR 2009 (2) 60 Para 8
107 University of Cambridge v Kasturilal and Sons, 2006 (32) PTC 487 (Del) Para 7.
108 Rupendra Kashyap v Jiwan Publishing House, 1996 (38) DRJ 81 Para 24
109 Super cassette Industries v Nirulas Corner House (P) Ltd, 148 (2008) DLT 487 Para 20
110 Id.


consideration for other factors such as necessity. Thus, such a rigid approach by the courts
has failed to introduce the element of flexibility contemplated under the American fair use

The Indian courts have borrowed the US born, ‘factor analysis method’ in the assessment of
fair dealing, the Indian judiciary has only considered issues concerning fair dealing in each
case in a limited context. The courts have not been able to explore other factors, such as,
bad faith because they have not come at issue. Though such factors may not have been
expressly highlighted as a potential factor, this silence, however, does not mean that such
factors cannot feature in future cases.

Rather than incorporating fair use by the introduction of factor analysis method in the
Indian Copyright Act, Indian courts should rather seek to build on the distinctive features of
its fair dealing regime, such as its policy preoccupations and other factors (in addition to
those incorporated in the US code) for determining fair dealing that helps introduce the
element of flexibility.


I n its definition of copyright, the US Copyright Office states that "copyright ... has come to
mean that body of exclusive rights granted by law to copyright owners for protection of
their work." Indian law, on the other hand, supplies a statutory definition of copyright in
section 14 of the Copyright Act of 1957.

On a general level, copyright is a positive privilege that grants exclusive rights to the author
of a copyright or authorizes others to benefit from a copyrighted work. It is interesting that
the US, unlike any other nation, in its Constitution, under Article 1, § 8, Clause 8,
the Copyright Clause, refers to copyrights in the same breath as patents. Patents, unlike its
constitutional co-existent, are a negative right to prevent others from exploiting a patented

Copyright gives a heap of restrictive rights to the creator of a copyrighted work with respect
to the reproduction of the work, and other specified acts, to empower the creator to
appropriate money related profits by practicing such rights and accordingly encourage
innovation. Provided that an individual without due consent practices any of the rights
within the bundle of rights given by the Copyright Act, then such an enactment is an
encroachment upon the creator's copyright in the work. Copyright infringement is
statutorily defined in both India and the US. Like other legal rights, copyright too is not
absolute but is subject to limits and exceptions. The legal framework of copyright does not
absolutely prohibit the use of a copyrighted work, but, in fact, allows a person to use a
copyrighted work under certain exceptions. One such exception is "fair use." The term fair
use, although undefined under both US and Indian copyright law, has its spirit captured in


legislation, with the judicially derived factors being listed under 17 USC § 107, and § 52 of
the Copyright Act of 1957, rendering "certain acts not amounting to infringement."

Before we indulge deeper into the discussion of fair use and jurisdictional differences, it is
essential to understand the fundamentals of fair use. Fair use is an exception to the rights of
the author which allows limited use of copyrighted material without the author's
permission. For instance, fair use does not allow reproduction of a whole work or a
substantial part of such work, but, rather, extracts or quotations from the work are
permitted, such that they do not appear to snatch the first author's expression of his or her
idea. If, in a statutory construction, there is no notion of fair use then any use by an
unlicensed person, however tiny, is an infringement on the rights of the author. To be clear,
any unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is normally an infringement and fair use acts as
a defence thereof — the defence of fair use does not necessarily mandate a non-infringing
action. The unlicensed user admits that he has used the work, which would normally
constitute copyright infringement, but justifies his use as covered within the fair use

There is a minor difference in terminology with regard to the concept of fair use in the US
and India. US law uses the term "fair use," while British and Indian law uses the term "fair
dealing." The earliest discussion of fair dealing can be traced to Gyles v. Wilcox, a decision
from the Court of Chancery in England in which Lord Chancellor Hardwicke introduced the
notion of "fair abridgment." In the US, Justice Joseph Story laid the foundation for the
notion of fair use and abridgment in Folsom v. Marsh with a four-factor test. Today, it
stands as the basis for the fair use doctrine now codified under US law. However, from the
Folsom decision in 1841 until the enactment of the Copyright Statute, 17 USC § 107, in 1976
that incorporated the four-factor test, fair use in US law was only a common law doctrine.
One of the earliest Indian cases to discuss unfair use within the domain of copyright
was Macmillan and Company v. K. and J. Cooper, which was decided based on the India's
earlier Copyright Act of 1914.

The statutory framework for fair dealing in India follows the common law and, as noted
earlier, does not define fair dealing per se. The legal provision for fair dealing provides that:

The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:

(a) A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes of —

research or private study;
criticism or review, whether of that work or of any other work;

(b) A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purpose of
reporting current events —


in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical or
by broadcast or in a cinematograph film or by means of photographs.

The publication of a compilation of addresses or speeches delivered in public is not a fair
dealing of such work within the meaning of this clause. Thus, Indian law allows fair dealing
as a defence for specific acts that would not be deemed as infringement for the four
specified categories of copyrighted works (viz. literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works).

US law, in contrast to Indian law, does not specify acts which would be considered fair use;

rather it gives a four factor test that must be considered to assess whether an action of

exploitation by the person falls within the ambit of fair use. The statutory language provides

“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phone records or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include:

ý the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;

ý the nature of the copyrighted work;
ý the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted

work as a whole; and
ý the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted


The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.

The US statute provides a "test" for assessing whether a particular use lies in the ambit of
fair use, as against an exhaustive list of activities that constitute exceptions to copyright. The
test appears to be applicable across the board, irrespective of the nature of the work
protected by copyright.

In a quick comparison of the legislative structures and the interpretations thereof, one may
argue that the US route gives judges more freedom to assess "fair use" .On the other hand,
the Indian boundaries defined for "fair dealing" appear to be more common and friendly to
the common man. This being said, however, it appears that the US test may tend to ignore
the commercial implications that fair dealing might have upon such use of a work. The

111 §107 of the USCA

balancing act, at least for the Indian legislation, appears to have been found in the conjoint
application of the two. Indian courts have now, incorporated vide reference, the Folsom v.
Marsh112 test, while adjudging, if fair dealing was in fact "fair" to the real commercial
implications that the author suffers. “This is walking a fine line, whereby, the exception
enumerated in the legislation needs to be satisfied, before the quantitative estimations of
the impact of the fair dealing upon the qualitative exercise of the author's right can be
analysed.”113 “It appears that, just as the Berne Convention made copyright a sort of
universal right, the developing jurisprudence surrounding fair use and fair dealing is bringing
about parity in the stance that nations take towards protecting rights of intellectual
property owners — thus leading to possible uniformity in the manner courts across different
jurisdictions are likely to adjudicate disputes.”114


A mong the exceptions to copyright infringement are the fair dealing provisions that
are codified in section 29 and 30 Copyright Design and Patent Act, 1988. Pursuant to
these provisions, a person is not liable for copyright infringement, if his act amounts
to fair dealing for the purposes of non-commercial research or private study (s. 29(1),
29(1C)), for the purposes of criticism or review (s. 30(1)), or for the purpose of reporting
current events (s. 30(2)). “One characteristic of fair dealing is that it is only permitted for the
purposes listed in the CDPA which means that it is irrelevant whether the dealing is fair in
general or fair for a purpose not specified in the Act.”115 If a dealing falls within one of the
purposes specified in the CDPA, its fairness must then be shown. “What is fair is however
not defined in the Act. It is rather a question of degree and impression.”116 “Guidance can
nevertheless be drawn from case law which has developed factors that are considered
relevant to determine fairness. The importance given to each of these factors depends on
the circumstances surrounding the infringing act and therefore varies according to the case
in question.”117 Among the factors are the quantity and quality of what has been taken from
the copyrighted work,118 the use made of the work in question, particularly the question
whether the alleged fair dealing is commercially competing with the copyrighted work,119
and the motives of the alleged infringer.


112 Folsom v Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
113 Narayanan, P., Copyright and Industrial Designs (Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 2nd ed., 1995) § 15.37.
114 Id.
115 Beloff v Pressdram, (1973) 1 All ER 241 (262) (Ungoed-Thomas J)
116 BBC v BSB Ltd, (1992) Ch 141 (149) (Scott J)
117 Id.
118 Hubbard v Vosper, (1972) 2 QB 84 (94) (Lord Denning MR)
119 Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer, (2001) Ch 257 (280) (Chadwick LJ)


L imitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights granted to authors or owners are
regulated by a number of international treaties. These international treaties are the
indications of harmony in the global view of copyright world.

Art 9(2) of the Berne Convention authorizes the national legislation to allow the
reproduction of protected work 'in certain special cases' under the following two conditions:

Ë Reproduction does not conflict with normal exploitation of the work; and
Ë Reproduction does not unreasonably curb the legitimate interest of the author

(Berne Convention, 1983).

Art IV, Paragraph 2 of the UCC allows the Member States for exceptions to the rights of a
work under the conditions:

© They do not conflict with the spirit and provisions of the Convention;
© They accord a reasonable degree of effective protection to each of the rights -

namely reproduction right, the public performance right and the broadcasting right.

Both views support each other. Limitations and exceptions to copyright are named "Fair
Dealing" doctrine in many countries including India, and "Fair Use" doctrine in United States.
American concept of "fair use" is a bit more flexible compared to its sister "fair dealing"

The copyright as a legal concept was introduced in the United Kingdom's Statute of Anne in
1709. During the course of time, the Court created a doctrine of "fair abridgement" for
authorized reproduction, which later became known as "fair dealing". This law cannot be
applied to any act which does not fall within one of the permitted use categories.

Doctrine of Fair Use tries to achieve a socially optimal level of protection to provide the
rightful owner his due while leaving the public with sufficient information vital for the
progress of the society. Thus the right of the owner can be violated to facilitate education,
research and dissemination of knowledge for social, economic and cultural progress.

Under the United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (CDPA), "fair dealing"
is defined as "private study and criticism and review and news reporting" (S 29, 30). In case
of review and criticism, one precondition of fairness being that the source should be
sufficiently acknowledged. Again the 2003 amendment reduced the research fair dealing
exception to non-commercial research only.

Under Crown - the Australian Copyright Act, 1968, the grounds of fair dealing are as follows:

Research and study 33
Review and criticism
Reporting the news

Legal advice.

The rule of fair dealing in Canada is the same or similar to UK and Australia to some extent.

Under the provisions of fair dealing in the Copyright Act, Chapter 63 of Singapore Statutes, a
certain amount of copying for the purpose of research or education is permissible as long as
it is a "fair dealing". Again, a fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review, reporting of
news, judicial proceedings or professional advice would not constitute an infringement.

In the United States, the fair use doctrine is codified in Copyright Act, 1976 under Section
107. The Act also considers the factors to be considered in determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use or not.

Article 14 of Indonesian Copyright Act keeps special provision of using or copying an official
symbol of state and national anthem with the original character.

The global view of fair dealing is an enumerated set of possible defences against an action
for infringement of an exclusive right of copyright. Though United States and India have a bit
different concept of fair dealing, but most of the countries around the globe are in unison as
far as factors related to teaching and education is concerned.


he most complete judicial analysis of the fair use factors vis-à-vis parodies is found in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.120 (referred to as Campbell). The facts of the case
are as follows: In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote and recorded “Oh,
Pretty Woman”. The rights to the song were assigned to Acuff-Rose Music Inc., which
subsequently registered the song for copyright protection. In 1989, Luther Campbell, lead
vocalist and song writer for an obscure band called 2 Live Crew, wrote a version of the
famous song, substituting its lyrics with ones which were obscene. Subsequently, Campbell’s
music production company, Luke Records, released an album which included the parody.
The credits on the album recognized Orbison and Dees as the writers and Acuff-Rose as
publisher of the original song. The general manager of Campbell’s music production
company, Luke Records, had offered to give due credit for ownership and authorship of the
original song to Acuff-Rose Music Inc., and also to pay a fee for its use, but Acuff-Rose
declined to grant permission. Undeterred, 2 Live Crew continued to sell the album. Acuff-

120 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).

Rose contended that the lyrics were either inconsistent with good taste or would mock the
future value of its copyright.121

Before Campbell reached the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, relying on Sony Corporation
of America v. Universal Studios122, (referred to as Sony) and reversing the district Court’s
decision, held that the song was not a fair use and thus, constituted copyright infringement.
In Sony, the Court had commented that commercial use creates a presumption against fair
use.123 Relying on this, the Sixth Circuit emphatically concluded, “its blatantly commercial
purpose prevented the derivative work from qualifying as fair use.”

However, when the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Souter, the author of the
majority decision, rejected the Sixth Circuit’s decision that all commercial parodies are
presumptively unfair. The Supreme Court also rejected 2 Live Crew’s argument that all
parodies should be considered presumptively fair. The Court held that every parody must
pass the test of fair use, and applied the factors set out in Section 107 of the Copyright Act
to the parody in question.

Of the four fair use factors, it was the first one that the Campbell Court singled out for the
most comprehensive analysis. The Court defined parody as “the use of some elements of a
prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author’s work.”124

According to the Court, the relevant question is, to what extent the new work is
transformative, i.e., to what extent the new work alters the original with new expression,
meaning, or message. The more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Justice Souter
found that 2 Live Crew’s version rose to the level of parody by virtue of its comments on the
naïveté of the original; since it “juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man…with degrading
taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility.”125

Downplaying the importance of the commercial use factor which the Sixth Circuit’s decision
had stressed upon, Justice Souter disapproved of the Sixth Circuit’s “elevation of one
sentence from Sony to a per se rule”.126 The Court was of the opinion that the correct
interpretation of Sony is that a commercial use as opposed to a non-profit use is merely “a

121 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
122 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal Studios , 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
123 Id.
124 Narayanan, P., Copyright and Industrial Designs (Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 2nd
ed., 1995) §
125 Supra Note 14.
126 Supra Note 14.


separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use…[and] the force of that
tendency will vary with the context.”127

The Court did not devote much attention to the second fair use factor, which called for an

inquiry into the nature of the copyrighted work, and held that this factor in the parody

context was not much help “since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive

Regarding the third factor, which mandated an inquiry into the quantity of the work copied,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s holding that 2 Live Crew had taken the
heart of the original, but held that this was permissible, since “the heart is also what most
readily conjures up the song for parody.

As far as the market substitution test was concerned, the Court held that a parody, “like a
scathing theatre review”, does not fall foul of the fourth factor merely because it may have
a detrimental effect on the market of the original. Instead, the relevant enquiry is whether
the parody can act as a substitute for the original and therefore diminish demand for the

“The Court noted that such substitution was unlikely, since the original and the parody
usually serve different markets.”129 Analysing the facts of the case, the Court found that 2
Live Crew’s version did not harm the market for the original.130 The Supreme Court majority

thus found that the Sixth Circuit had erred on its analysis of three of the four factors, and

dismissed the other as being of little assistance to the fair use analysis of parody. Based on

this conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment

and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Supreme Court’s

unanimous opinion in Campbell has been hailed as a “significant victory for would-be
parodists”,131 having the potential to significantly advance freedom of expression within the

framework of constitutional and statutory copyright.

Out of the subsequent American cases on parody, the Court found in favour of the plaintiff
in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,132 and in favour of the defendant in
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (referred to as Leibovitz),133 and Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Company.134 It is important to note that all these cases arrived at their

127 Supra Note 14.
128 Supra Note 14.
129 Supra Note 14.
130 Supra Note 14.
131 Fox, J. M., “The Fair Use Commercial Parody Defense and How to Improve It”, (2006) 46 IDEA
619, 628
132 Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27
133 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998)
134 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d at 1257 (11th Cir. 2001)


respective conclusions by applying the test formulated in Campbell. The United States
judiciary has remained scrupulously faithful to the Campbell ratio.

he fair use defence in India is provided for in Section 52 of the Indian Copyright Act,
1957, which stipulates, inter alia, that a fair dealing with a literary work for the
purpose of criticism or review, whether of that work or of any other work shall not
constitute infringement of copyright.

It has been observed in M/s. Blackwood & Sons Ltd. v. A.N. Parasurama135 that “in order to
constitute a fair dealing there must be no intention on the part of the alleged infringer, to
compete with the copyright holder of the work and to derive profits from such competition
and also, the motive of the alleged infringer in dealing with the work must not be

Thus, to successfully avail of the fair use defence in India, a parodist has to satisfy two

º he must not intend to compete with the copyright holder and
º he must not make improper use of the original.

“The first condition, which is essentially the market substitution test, is easily proved, as
most parodies do not seek to compete with the original but merely to ridicule or criticize the
original in a manner that exposes its flaws.”137 As far as the second condition is concerned, it
is doubtful as to what is meant by improper use and whether a parody is an instance of such
use. In order to answer this question, reference may be made to the Kerala High Court
judgment in Civic Chandran v. Ammini Amma (referred to as Civic Chandran).138

“The artistic work challenged in Civic Chandran was not a parody as such, but a counter
drama, as expressively termed by the Court.”139 “The original work in question was Ningal
Enne Communistakki – a well-known drama written by Thoppil Bhasi, a famous Malayalam
playwright.”140 The play dealt with some of the burning social and political problems of
those days, specially espoused by the Communist Party of India before its split, and had
considerably aided the undivided Communist Party of India to come to power in Kerala in
the 1957 assembly elections. “On the other hand, the counter drama written by the
appellant, Civic Chandran, was intended to convey the message that though the party had

135 M/s. Blackwood & Sons Ltd. v. A.N. Parasurama, AIR 1959 Mad. 410.
136 Id.
137 Rahul Saha, Sryon Mukherjee, Not So Funny Now it is? The Serious Issue of Parody in Intellectual Property
138 Civic Chandran v. Ammini Amma, 1996 PTR 142
139 Id.
140 Id.


succeeded in coming to political power, it had forgotten the depressed classes who were
instrumental in its success, and who had made substantial sacrifices for the party.”141 The
counter drama used substantial portions of the original, with some alterations required for

its purpose. The characters and dialogues in the original were also reproduced in some

“The Court held that the reproduction was not a misappropriation for the purpose of

producing a play similar to the original. Rather, the purpose was to criticise the idea

propagated by the original drama, and to expose to the public that it had failed to achieve
its real object.”142 Furthermore, it was noted that there was no likelihood of competition
between the two works in question.143

It was held that since the copying was for the purpose of criticism, it amounted to fair
dealing and did not constitute infringement of the copyright.

It is important to note is that, in arriving at this holding, the factors considered by the Court

“the quantum and value of the matter taken in relation to the comments or criticism;
the purpose for which it is taken; and
the likelihood of competition between the two works.”

This three-fold test is markedly similar to the test used by American judiciary. The only
factor omitted is the nature of the copyrighted work – a factor that has been stated to be of
little importance as far as parodies are concerned.

“Therefore, as far as the Kerala High Court is concerned, a parody, so long as it copies from

the original in order to criticise it, does not constitute improper use of the original and thus
qualifies as fair dealing.” 145

The discussion carried on in this part has clearly shown that both in India and the United

States, parody has been given considerable protection, both by the legislature and the
judiciary, under the fair use defence. “Such broad protection for parody has been the subject
of considerable criticism. Lee argues that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the four
factors unduly favours the parodist, and concludes that after weighing the factors, the
majority of parodies will prevail under the fair use defence against actions by copyright
holders.”146 Thus, he argues that the U.S. Courts have by and large set too low a threshold

141 Id.
142 Id. At para 24.
143 Id.
144 Id at para 8.
145 Supra note 67.
146 Lee, J., “Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music: The Sword of the Parodist Is Mightier than the Shield of the
Copyright Holder”, (1994) 29 U.S.F. Law Rev. 279, 302.


for parodies to qualify for the fair use defence.147 The authors believe that although the
judicial analysis of the four factor test is unquestionably and markedly pro-parodist, this is
not without good reason; it is economically efficient, and in consonance with the principles
of copyright law, to afford parodies broad protection from infringement actions.


Amendments made in section 52 are:

“the reporting of current events and current affairs, including the reporting of a
lecture delivered in public”, has been added in sub-section (a).
Storing of any work in any electronic medium for the purpose mentioned in sub-
section (a) for a short period of time would not amount as infringement.
Storage of the work or any performance for a short duration of time purely in the
technical process of electronic communication or communication to the public
would not amount as infringement. But if the person responsible for the storage has
received a written complaint from the owner that such storage is infringement, then
person responsible for such storage shall refrain from facilitating such access.
Then clause (zb) has been added, where, the adaptation, reproduction, issue of
copies or communication to the public of any work in any accessible format by any
person to help persons with disability either for their personal use, educational
purpose or research, would not amount to infringement.
any organisation working for the benefit of the persons with disabilities in case the
normal format prevents the enjoyment of such works by such persons, then also it
would not amount as infringement.


The following must be always be taken into consideration

Ï In order to claim copyright protection the work must fall under any of these
ü Literary, dramatic or musical works;
ü Literary would mean a work which is in form of writing of printing like a
person has written a poem on the dawn of the morning, so in this poem the
author has expressed his thoughts and ideas, therefore, this work will be a
copyrightable subject matter.
ü Drama which is performed on a stage. Expressing your thoughts in form of act
like performing a play on certain theme on stage.
ü Musical Work means a work consisting of music and includes any graphical
notation of such work but does not include any words or action intended to be

147 Id.


sung, performed or spoken with the music. A musical work need not be
written to enjoy copyright protection but it should be on a tangible matter.
ü Artistic Work; means expressing your thoughts through the medium of art for
e.g., painting, portrait etc.
ü Cinematography film, means any work of visual recording or any medium
produced through a process from which a moving image may be produced by
any means like capturing the pictures.
ü Sound recording means a recording of sounds from which sounds may be
produced regardless of the medium on which such recording is mad like sound
recording on a phonogram or a CD-ROM
ü Sculpture
ü Architecture work

If the work is does come under any of these heading, the work will not be copyright

Ï The work must not be just an idea because the copyright act does not protect merely
an idea. The idea must be presented on a tangible form.

Ï Remedies available to the owner: Civil and Criminal
Civil Remedies: Damages is another remedy which depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. Injunction is issued by the court. initially court by
looking at the prima facie case of infringement grants, temporary injunctions and
after that permanent injunction
Criminal Remedies: The fine of 50,000 up to 2,00,000 Rs can be imposed. Police
has power to seize the infringed copies. An imprisonment of 6 months to 3 years
can be imposed

Ï Remedies available for the infringer:
Ø The common defence which can be taken by the opposite party is that the work
which is alleged to be infringed is itself unoriginal work.
Ø The various ground mention under section 52 can be taken, for eg.
Ø if the copying is done for private use including research work or for criticism or
Ø fair dealing in reporting current events in a newspaper, magazine or similar
means or by broadcasting
Ø if reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purpose of
making a report of a judicial proceeding or for judicial proceeding only.

The defence of fair use can be taken when it is used for commercial purpose. The grounds
that have been mentioned in section 52 none of them is for deriving profit, it was for the
either research, critique, newspaper etc.


Example 1: There is copyrighted presentation authored by Mr. Ashish. If these slides are
copied by a teacher in order to teach the students then here it is fair use or fair dealing but
if the same slide is copied by another person in order to train the employees then it would
not amount to fair use because here the presentation are being used for commercial
purpose. A paragraph copied from any book for the purpose of judiciary would also be
entitled for the defence of fair use.
Example 2: Any work copied for the purpose of criticism or for review would not amount as
Example 3: Any extract copied for the purpose of newspaper, magazines, or similar
periodicals would not amount as infringement.


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