The Recognition-Primed Decision Model

The Recognition-Primed

Decision Model

An Alternative to the MDMP for GWOT

T he 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat By Lieutenant Colonel ning methodology for standard orders
Team (3rd IBCT), 10th Mountain David A. Bushey and Major development that is gaining a foothold
Division, was activated on 16 Sep- in the Army. This model allows units
tember 2004 at Fort Drum, New York. Michael J. Forsyth to develop feasible plans and orders
The brigade’s 4th Battalion, 25th Field in time-constrained environments and
Artillery Regiment (4-25 FAR), orga- very successfully to prepare for a future enables friendly forces to act faster than
nized along modular lines, is its organic deployment to Afghanistan—including the enemy.
fires battalion. during a rotation to the Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, As described in FM 5-0 Army Planning
Soon after activating with the brigade, Louisiana. We recommend the model as and Orders Production, the MDMP has
the fires battalion leaders realized they an alternative to the traditional military been theArmy’s decision-making model
needed a planning process that could decision-making process (MDMP) for for more than two decades. With seven
leverage the battalion’s modular ca- GWOT. steps and 117 sub-steps, it is an analytical
pabilities and enable them to develop process designed to generate the best so-
plans and orders rapidly in the current The Army’s needs in GWOT require lution from a series of options. Theoreti-
operating environment: the Global War rapid planning to produce agility and cally, the MDMP enables a commander
On Terrorism (GWOT). The battalion flexibility. The MDMP does not produce to employ tactically sound plans that
commander agreed to an experiment with plans and orders quickly enough for the result in success on the battlefield.1
a new planning model, the recognition- GWOT environment.
primed decision model, to determine if it However, recent research reveals that
could provide the fires battalion enough This article describes the recognition- the MDMP actually has the opposite
agility to be effective in GWOT. primed decision model and how other outcome in many cases. The MDMP is
battalions can use this model. a staff-driven regimen that inadvertently
Since 4-25 FAR stood up more than isolates the commander from develop-
a year ago, we have used this model Recognition-Primed Model and ing the plan.
MDMP Research. The recognition-
primed decision model is a new plan-

US Air Force Photo
by SrA Ave Pele

10 January-February 2006 Field Artillery

A group of research scientists from enable them to assess situations rapidly able with making decisions because its
KleinAssociates in Fairborn, Ohio, con- through pattern recognition, mentally formalization tends to shield the leader
ducted studies of military organizations wargame courses of action (COAs) and from the process.3
and planning. It made some startling make timely decisions.
discoveries. In light of these findings, Dr. Klein
Dr. Gary Klein and Klein Associates sought to develop a method of military
First, the group found that, with its have conducted research for military decision making that leveraged natural
focus on the staff process, the MDMP organizations for more than two de- human tendencies. The result was the
separated the commander from planning cades, focusing on how individuals and recognition-primed decision model
in most of the reviewed cases. Thus, ju- organizations make decisions. To begin outlined in Figure 1.
nior staff officers, the least experienced his research, Dr. Klein’s premise was
individuals, had to conceive a workable that organizational decision making The recognition-primed decision
plan. works best when systematically staffed model is a four-step process driven by
and developed within a group. But his the commander. The staff helps ensure
Second, contrary to conventional research led to a different conclusion, the plan is feasible, acceptable and suit-
thought, the MDMP produced cautious shattering preconceived views. Here is able to the situation. Steps 1, 3 and 4 are
plans that were poorly suited to the what Klein Associates found. similar to the respective steps of mission
demands of the situation. Researchers analysis, wargaming and orders produc-
attributed this to slavish compliance with First, intuitive decision making uses tion in the MDMP. The difference is in
the doctrinal planning template. experience to recognize the patterns in Step 2. As a tactical planning model,
a given situation, such as for example, the recognition-primed decision model
Lastly, the MDMP slowed an organi- terrain and an enemy defensive posi- depends on the commander’s input to
zation’s operational tempo (OPTEMPO) tion. Based on pattern recognition push the process and save time.
and stifled its ability to react to rapidly gained through training, education and
changing situations.2 experience, the leader quickly develops Step 1. Identify the Mission and
a COA in his head to reduce the enemy Conceptualize the COA. In this step,
By contrast, the Klein researchers position. the traditional MDMP mission analysis
observed that the recognition-primed remains critical to the planning process
decision model is a dynamic alternative Through mental wargaming, decision because it provides the organization and
that can produce solutions adapted to makers usually search for the first COA commander an understanding of the situ-
the situation. that will work in a given situation. It is ation and the ability to visualize how to
experience—intuition—that enables win. Based on this analysis and then his
Model Overview. This planning model the leader to imagine how solutions visualization of the end-of-mission, the
is based on a theory known as “recogni- will work. commander can provide a single, directed
tion-primed decision making,” which COA to solve the problem at hand and
is an intuitive process through which The Klein researchers found that this press planning forward.
leaders naturally make decisions. The is a natural mode of decision making
recognition-primed decision model le- for most individuals. In contrast, the At the conclusion of mission analysis,
verages the experience of seasoned com- MDMP makes many leaders uncomfort- the commander must provide guidance
manders whose education and training

Input 1Identify the mission & 2 Test & operation- 3 Wargame the 4Develop the Output
• Situational conceptualize COA.* alize the COA. COA.* orders.* • Rehearsals
• Execution of
Awareness Bn Cdr and Staff Process: Staff Process: Planners and All Cdrs Staff Process:
• Brigade • Staff sends alert WARNO #1 • Refine the details of the Process: • Write the OPORD. the COA
COA. • Determine if the COA • Backbrief the Cdr. • Assess-
Cdr’s Guid- to the batteries. • Identify the flaws and cor-
ance • Cdr & Staff conduct full blown rect them through analysis. satisfies the Cdr’s Products: ment of the
• Mission from MA.** • Test the COA using vision. • Five-Paragraph Effects
Higher HQ • Cdr guides the entire process. • Analyze whether or not OPORD
“feasible, acceptable and the plan will hold up to • Execution Matrix
Staff Tools: suitable” criteria.*** enemy action. • Verbal Notification of
• Facts & Assumptions • Brief the commander on
• Limitations & Constraints the refined COA. Products: Battery Cdrs via Radio
• IPB • Synchronization
• MCOO Products: Matrices *Steps 1, 3 and 4 are similar to the respective steps of Mission
• Etc. • Graphics • Execution Checklists Analysis, Wargaming and Orders Production in the MDMP.
• Support Matrices • WARNO #4 with the
Products: • Task Organization Refined COA **This is critical; the commander and staff must understand the
• Restated Mission • Sub-Unit Tasks problem to develop an effective solution.
• Directed Friendly COA • Skeleton OPORD
• WARNO #2 with MA Slides & • WARNO #3 with the COA ***If the COA fails the “feasible, acceptable and suitable” test,
Sketch then the process loops back to Step 1 to determine an
Cdr’s Guidance alternative COA.
• Enemy COA
Legend: MA = Mission Analysis
Cdr = Commander MCOO =M odified Combined
COA = Course of Action
HQ = Headquarters Obstacle Overlay
IPB = Intelligence Prepara- OPORD = Operations Order
WARNO = Warning Order
tion of the Battlefield

Figure 1: Recognition-Primed Decision Model. This model is an alternative to the more complex and time-consuming military decision-
making process (MDMP) in the Global War on Terrorism.

sill-www.army.mil/famag January-February 2006 11

to the staff as to his vision of the If at this time the staff cannot recon-
battlefield. The commander’s mis- cile the plan, it develops a workable
sion analysis worksheet (visualize, Visualize alternative to satisfy the commander’s

describe and direct) shown in Figure 1. Enemy COA and Current Friendly Disposition intent. If the plan is satisfactory, the
2 is a tool to help him do that. (Sketch of Situation) staff presents it to the commander in a
COA briefing with an updated enemy
This worksheet provides the frame- 2. Requirements (What We Must Do) situation, to include most likely and
work to help guide the commander’s 3. Limitations/Constraints (What We Cannot Do or dangerous COAs; a COA sketch; a
thoughts so he can present them in a written concept statement and concept
coherent manner that makes it easy Restraints on Our Freedom of Action)
4. Capabilities (What We Can Do)

for his staff to understand. Armed DDesecrsibceribe of support; a command and control

with a clear statement of intent and 5. Commander’s Battlespace—Description ofWhat is architecture; and task and purpose

proposed action, the staff then can Envisioned (Endstate Graphic with Decisive, Shap- for each subordinate unit.
move forward to Step 2. ing and Sustaining Operations Descriptions) Step 3. Wargame the COAs. The
6. Commander’s Intent: Purpose, Key Tasks (3-5
Step 2.Test and Operationalize the Max) and Endstate (Enemy, Friendly, Terrain) recognition-primed decision model
COA. This step is a major departure progresses to wargaming in Step 3 to
from MDMP. Rather than the staff DDireicrtect test the validity of the detailed COA

developing and comparing COAs, 7. Mission (Directed COA Sketch with Deployments, against a thinking enemy. This step is

which is the major time-consumer of Dispositions, T&P) virtually no different than wargaming

the MDMP, the staff adds details to 8. Task in the MDMP. The key is to conduct a

the directed COA to make execution 9. Purpose thorough evaluation of the COA with
possible and then tests its validity. 10. CCIR: Info the Cdr Must Have to Make Decisions an unbiased enemy.

Also, instead of the least-experi- (PIRs and FFIRs) Wargaming identifies the DPs,

enced leaders in the unit struggling branches and sequels to the plan.
to develop COAs, they work to Using one of the standard methods
operationalize the plan.4 The staff Legend: in doctrine—box, belt or avenue-in-
members gain experience vicariously CCIR = Commander’s Critical Information depth—the staff ensures the COA
through observation and analysis, thus Requirements stands up against enemy actions.

FFIR = Friendly Force Information Require-
ments
PIR = Priority Intelligence Requirements
building their abilities to recognize T&P = Task and Purpose The current environment sometimes
patterns and devise solutions to com- makes it difficult to wargame because
plex problems. of the varied nonlinear nature of the
The initial COA presented by the Figure 2: Commander’s Mission Analysis Worksheet enemy and the slow, unpredictable
commander necessarily will be a environment. To deal with these
skeleton and lack details. Therefore, in the plan and refines it to ensure it challenges, our experience in GWOT
the staff fleshes out the skeleton with works. and planning operations has led us to
details, such as timing, logistical support, At the conclusion of Step 2, the staff recommend the DP method of wargam-
decision points (DPs) and troop-to-task tests the COA against the “feasible, ing, as shown in Figure 3.
analysis. acceptable and suitable” criteria. This In this construct, the staff uses the DPs
It is during the development of the is the same test used in the MDMP to identified in Step 2 to refine the COA.The
intricacies that the staff identifies flaws determine the validity of a COA. facilitator, together with the S2, uses the
If-And-Then methodology to detail the
potential situations in the execution of
the COA and determine the information
required for the commander’s decisions
in each of those situations.
As the staff conducts this drill, all
members synchronize and integrate their
operating systems and begin building the
products that will be incorporated into
the operations order (OPORD), such as
the synchronization matrix.
Step 4. Develop the Orders. This is
the final step. The staff has steadily de-
veloped its products during the process,
so by Step 4, the final order is easily
collated and formulated. The assistant
S3 assembles the parts into a coherent,
doctrinal five-paragraph order with ap-
plicable annexes for issue at the orders
briefing
The studies KleinAssociates conducted
have demonstrated that the recognition-
Leaders of the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment (4-25 FAR), work through an urban primed decision model increases the
operations exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. tempo of developing plans and orders by

12 January-February 2006 Field Artillery

about 20 percent over the MDMP.5 The Lieutenant Colonel David A. Bushey com- A 4-25 FAR Soldier works through the
four-step recognition-primed decision mands 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery “shoothouse” during training at Avon Park,
model should take about six to eight Regiment (4-25 FAR), 3rd Infantry Brigade Florida.
hours and, under constrained conditions, Combat Team (3rd IBCT), 10th Mountain
four hours. Division, at Fort Drum, New York. Among
other assignments with the 10th Division,
GWOT is forcing the Army to become he was the Chief of Fires for the Com-
more agile and flexible as a force. The bined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) in
force requires a planning process that Bagram, Afghanistan; the Division Artillery
meets those needs and enables rapid de- S3; Battalion S3 for 3-6 FA; Brigade Fire
velopment of feasible plans and orders. Support Officer (FSO); and Assistant Fire
Support Coordinator. He also was a Fire
We believe that the recognition-primed Support and Battery Observer/Control-
decision model is a practical solution that ler (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Training
can be implemented immediately by any Center, (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Ad-
unit. This model compresses planning ditional deployments include Operations
timelines, gets the commander involved Hurricane Andrew Relief at Homestead,
and better facilitates the natural human Florida; Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Joint
approach to decision making. Therefore, Forge in Bosnia; and Joint Guardian in
we offer the recognition-primed decision Kosovo.
model as an alternative to the MDMP that
can help units become more agile and Major (Promotable) Michael J. Forsyth is
flexible in prosecuting GWOT. the Effects Coordinator for the 3rd IBCT
in the 10th Division. Until recently, he had
Endnotes: been serving as the Executive Officer and,
before that, S3 for 4-25 FAR. Among other
1. Department of the Army, FM 5-0 Army Planning and assignments, he was a Plans Officer for
Orders Production (Washington, DC: US Government CJTF-180 during Operation Enduring Free-
Printing Office, 2003), 3-1–3-4. dom IV; Small Group Instructor at the Field
2. Karol G. Ross, Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fire
F. Schmitt and Holly C. Baxter, “The Recognition-Primed Support and Battery O/C at the JRTC; and
Decision Model,” Military Review (July-August 2004), 6. Battalion FSO and Battery Commander in
3. Ibid. and Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Camp-
Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), bell, Kentucky.
30.
4. Ross, 7.
5. Ibid., 6.

Decision Point Event/Conditions If And Then

Commit SSE Event: PIR 1. The HVT se- FFIR 1. Friendly force Decision:
force to HVT. ID HVT in accessible location. curity is less than 20 is postured for the op- Commit SSE force
fighters. eration. to target.
DP Conditions: PIR 2. There is no FFIR 2. ISR elements/ Effects:
Intel SAM threat at the HVT platforms are available • Captureordestroy
1.Established special SIGINT pattern was executed on location. or easily re-tasked to HVT.
signature less than 24 hours ago with 8-digit grid. support. • Exploit for intel val-
or FFIR 3. CAS/EA-6B/ ue.
2. HUMINT information from source assessed with AH-64s are available or
moderate reliability is less than 48 hours old. easily repositioned.
FFIR 4. Weather mini-
Lift Avn—QRF is available. mums/illumination is
Man—QRF is available. acceptable below 30%.
Fires—Assets are readily available or easily shifted to FFIR 5. Target is within
cover the mission; tanker support is available. 150 NM of BAF, KAF or
Assumable Risk— FOB Salerno.
• Illum window is below 30%.
• Shift air QRF pilots to day/night.
• Reconstitution of QRF is not required.
• Weather is marginal.

Legend: HUMINT = Human Intelligence NM = Nautical Miles
Avn = Aviation HVT = High-Value Target QRF = Quick-Reaction Force
BAF = Bagram Airfield ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon- SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile
CAS = Close Air Support SIGINT = Signals Intelligence
DP = Decision Point naissance SSE = Sensitive-Site Exploitation
FOB = Forward Operating Base KAF = Kandahar Airfield
Man = Maneuver

Figure 3: Decision Support Matrix

sill-www.army.mil/famag January-February 2006 13