Abu-Rabi 2006 The Blackwell Companion to Islamic Thought

636 NAYEREH TOHIDI

evident when compared with the experience of women in the Christian context, as elab-
orated in Bayes and Tohidi (2001).23 The struggle to adjust or reconstruct religion to
the new realities of the modern, egalitarian, and democratic gender regime has taken
place both from within and from without the religious institutions, and it has been an
ongoing process in the Christian (Protestant and Catholic) contexts (Schuster-Fiorenza
1992; and Radford Ruther, 1993).24 Thanks to the emergence of a stronger middle
class, the advent of modernity, and the vigorous bourgeois liberal fight for individual
rights and humanism, the reformation of religion, secularization, and the democrati-
zation of society have been achieved much more successfully in the more advanced and
industrialized Christian West. In the Muslim context, however, the interplay of geo-
graphic and geopolitical disadvantages, colonialism and underdevelopment has hin-
dered the progress of similar processes, thus further complicating the attainment of
civil rights, especially women’s rights.

As noted in previous pages, modernist rational and liberal attempts to reinterpret or
reform Islam were initiated almost a century ago by theologians and jurists such as the
Egyptian Muh.ammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905). By the turn of the twentieth century, some
Muslim women thinkers and writers as well had gradually begun framing their gender
conscious and women-friendly writings within the Islamic ethics (for example, Tahira
Qurratulein; Bibi Khanum Astarabadi; Zeinab Fawwaz; and Ayesha Taymuriya). Yet, it
is only in retrospect that one may or may not consider them to be Muslim feminists
because such categorization has been formulated very recently and – for the most part
– by Western or Western-based feminists rather than by Muslim feminists themselves.
For instance, when Elizabeth Cady Stanton and her female friends wrote The Woman’s
Bible in 1895, nobody called her a Christian feminist, but today because of the cur-
rency of feminist discourse, Amina Wadud’s work in the United States25 is naturally
seen as an example of Islamic/Muslim feminism. Such a naming in the present context
can be harmless if it does not imply a deliberate or unwitting “otherizing” or essential-
izing of Muslim women. It can be harmless if it does not limit the diverse spectrum of
the women’s movement in Muslim societies to the Muslim women only and to a pri-
marily religious feminism at the expense of ignoring, excluding, or silencing women of
non-Muslim religious minorities or women of secular, laic, or atheist orientation.

Like other components of the modern (and arguably post-modern) reform move-
ments within Islam, Muslim feminism is a Qur’an-centered discourse. The Qur’an, seen
as the “eternal and inimitable” text, provides for Muslims both the foundational basis
and the point of convergence of many different human interpretations in the light of
specific socio-economic and political situations (Stowasser 1998).26 Feminist Muslims
like Azizah al-Hibri see flexibility and evolution as “an essential part of Qur’anic phi-
losophy, because Islam was revealed for all people and for all times. Consequently, its
jurisprudence must be capable of responding to widely diverse needs and problems”(al-
Hibri 1997, 2).27 Muslims rely on ijtiha¯d, which is the ability to analyze a Qur’anic text
or a problematic situation within the relevant cultural and historic context and then
devise an appropriate interpretation or solution based on a thorough understanding of
Qur’anic principles and the Sunnah.28

However, an important challenge for Muslim feminists, some writers such as Anne
Sofie Roald argue, is that the Qur’an is seen as the “word of God” and consequently

NEGOTIATING PATRIARCHY AND MODERNITY IN IRAN 637

immutable.29 In response, Muslim modernists (such as Mohammad Mojtahed
Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush) and feminists have pointed out that the symbolic
wording of the Qur’an is not critical (Mir-Hosseini, 1999). Indeed the interpretation of
the Qur’an by men currently forms the basis of Islamic law, application, and practice.
This male (ulama) monopoly of authority to interpret the Qur’an or engage in ijtiha¯d is
what Muslim feminists are challenging now. Friedl (1997) explains this quite clearly in
the context of Iran:

Theoretically these texts are beyond negotiation because they are claimed to emanate from
divine or divinely inspired authority. Practically, however, the Holy Writ has to be trans-
lated, taught, and made understandable to the faithful, especially to illiterate and semilit-
erate people who cannot read original Arabic texts. . . . This means it has to be interpreted.
Interpretation is a political process: the selection of texts from among a great many that
potentially give widely divergent messages, and their exegesis are unavoidably influenced,
if not outrightly motivated, by the political programs and interests of those who control
the formulation and dissemination of ideologies (p. 146).30

The text is read and understood based on our presuppositions, and these presuppo-
sitions vary across time and across cultures, the new Islamic reformers argue. It is with
such an approach to religion that the women’s press in Iran has embarked on both polit-
ical and theological debates on gender issues taking on the Islamic reformers (cleric as
well as lay) in face-to-face encounters, interviews, and panel discussions.

For example, after numerous books and contributions to the journal Zanan (Women)
of radical and feminist writings based on ijtiha¯d in Islamic foundations, Hojat ol-Islam
Seyyed Mohsen Saeedzadeh (a young cleric) was imprisoned and after release was
defrocked and banned from publishing.31 Hojat ol-Islam Yusef Eshkevari is another
reformist liberal cleric who is still in jail, in part due to his declaration that h.ija¯b is not
an Islamic mandate. In line with them, Alireza Alavi-tabar, although a lay scholar, has
openly defended feminism, including Islamic feminism, on the basis of clear sociologi-
cal as well as theological definitions. His progressive ideas and bold and non-sectarian
advocacy of women’s rights have made him one of the popular Muslim reformers
among Iranian women and men.

Alavi-tabar identifies three mechanisms that have been used for reform and reinter-
pretation of Islamic conjunctions: suspending the primary conjunctions and legislat-
ing instead on the basis of the secondary conjunctions and governmental rules;
dynamic jurisprudence (fiqh-e pouya) of the secondary conjunctions; and ijtiha¯d in the
Islamic foundations. He argues that although the first two mechanisms are necessary
for the articulation of equal rights for women and men, they are not sufficient. As a
real solution for the present problem of the incompatibility of Islamic fiqh with women’s
equal rights and human rights, and in order to reach truly new and modern perspec-
tives, “advocates of the new religious thinking (nov andishan-e dini) have to eventually
seek ijtiha¯d in the Islamic foundations only.”32 Based on such a radical ijtiha¯d, the
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is seen, in its entirety, as a secondary (not essential or
primary) component of Islam; a human (rather than divine) revelation and a history-
and time-bound construct, and thus subject to change, revision, and reconstruction.

638 NAYEREH TOHIDI

When asked what he thinks about the existence or viability of Islamic feminism,
Alavi-tabar says:

It depends on what we mean and how we use this concept. If it means that one can advo-
cate equal social and legal rights for women and men while remaining loyal to religious
ethics and values, it is certainly present here and viable too. Islamic feminism is a call for
re-reading of our interpretations of the Islamic texts and history of religious life. By putting
aside the patriarchally-inspired values and tendencies, and upholding a new perspective,
many of what have been taken for granted as “obvious” ought to be questioned and proved
that they are not obvious elements of Shar¯ı’ah, but products of our worldly way of livings
and traditions . . . Islamic feminism, in this sense, is very close to the project of modern
religious intellectualism (p. 41).33

Like other modernist reform movements within religion, Muslim feminism empha-
sizes individual agency and insists upon women’s right to a direct relationship with God
with no human (clerical) mediators. Based on the idea of “intersubjectivity,” this places
the woman/man and God as the subjects of interaction rather than seeing the inter-
action as being between the male clerics and the woman/man believer. This was a basic
principle of reformation within Christianity raised in 1551 by Martin Luther, leading
to the Protestant Reformation. This principle, if applied seriously among Muslims, can
challenge the (male) clerical monopoly over religion, transforming women’s under-
standing of religion from a male cleric-centered authoritarian institution to a non-
hierarchical spiritual one that involves both individual and group-based processes
in women’s daily lives.

Policy Implications: Perils and Promises

Feminist believers from the three Abrahamic religions have much to learn from one
another’s experience in “reclaiming” their faith and spirituality from the clergy-
centered patriarchal monopoly of religious authorities. Achievement of women’s rights
in Iran or any other Muslim society cannot depend solely or even primarily on women’s
reinterpretation of Islamic texts. Because a literal reading of the Qur’an, like other
ancient scriptures, is male supremacist, and because most Muslims and non-Muslims
are still more inclined to accept the male authority, more should be done about the need
to have men re-educated at home and in school.

But spiritual feminism and faith-based feminists, including Islamic feminists, will not
be much different from religious fundamentalists if they do not respect freedom of
choice and diversity but instead try to impose their version of feminism on secular, laic,
and atheist feminists. What can be troubling in regard to religious feminism, be it
Islamic or Christian, is the tendency toward sectarianism or totalitarianism. The real
danger is when a single brand of ideological feminism, be it secular Marxist or religious
Islamic (in this case it becomes Islamist) presents itself as the only legitimate or authen-
tic voice for all women or the “true path for liberation,” negating, excluding, and silenc-
ing other voices and ideas among women in any given society. Appreciation for

NEGOTIATING PATRIARCHY AND MODERNITY IN IRAN 639

ideological, cultural, racial, sexual, and class diversity is critical for local and global fem-
inist movements.

For effective feminist strategizing, the importance of dialogue, conversation, and
coalition building among women activists of various ideological inclinations cannot be
overemphasized. The feminist movement is not one movement but many. What unites
feminists is a belief in human dignity, human rights, freedom of choice, and the further
empowerment of women rather than any ideological, spiritual, or religious stance. Sec-
ularity works better for all when secularism means impartiality toward religion, not
anti-religionism.

Some secularist and Marxist feminists have treated Muslim or Christian feminists as
rivals or foes of secular feminism and have been preoccupied with academic concerns
over their philosophical and ideological inconsistencies and post-modern limits (as if
the various brands of secular feminism are free from such limits). We may see religious
and spiritual feminism, including Muslim feminism, as a welcome addition to the wide
spectrum of feminist discourse, as long as these religious feminists contribute to the
empowerment of women, tolerance, and cultural pluralism. However, when their dis-
course and actions impose their religious strictures on all, when they co-opt the
meaning of feminism to fight against equal rights for women or women’s empower-
ment, or when they cooperate with and serve as arms of repressive and anti-democra-
tic Islamist states, Muslim feminists are not helpful. Muslim feminism has served the
women’s cause when it complements, diversifies, and strengthens both the material and
spiritual force of the women’s movements in any given Muslim society.

Observations on the recent Islamist and other religious fundamentalist movements
indicate that theocratic states are not able to empower women nor are they able to
provide an inclusive democracy for their citizens. Religion is important but should be
separated from state power. Muslim feminists seem to be an inevitable and positive com-
ponent of the ongoing change, reform, and development of Muslim societies as they
face modernity. In the short term, Muslim feminists may serve as a sort of Islamization
of feminism for some. In the long term, in a society that allows for and protects open
debate and discussion, Muslim feminism (as did Christian feminism) can facilitate the
modernization and secularization of Islamic societies and states. Negotiating moder-
nity takes many forms. Although feminism and the women’s movement have become
more global than ever before, as a Jewish feminist colleague (Simona Sharoni) once
noted, sisterhood is not global nor is it local; women’s solidarity has to be negotiated
within each specific context.

Women’s experiences in many Muslim and non-Muslim societies show that women’s
rights and empowerment, and democratization in general, cannot be left wholly in the
hands of the elites (female or male) and their theological and intellectual debates,
but rather have to be pushed and supervised by elements from broader civil society,
including women’s grassroots movements and organizations. Though important,
Muslim/Islamic reformism and feminism are only one necessary component of social
transformation toward women’s equal human rights. Economic changes that provide
equal opportunities for women to achieve gainful employment, changes in the gender-
based division of labor, integration of women into political processes and decision
making, and an egalitarian shift in cultural stereotypes about gender roles and rela-

640 NAYEREH TOHIDI

tions and double standards in sexual mores are all necessary processes for improvement
in women’s status in Iran and other parts of the Muslim world.

Conclusion

Historically speaking, sexism has not been peculiar to the Islamic world nor to the
Islamic religion. What is peculiar is that a visible gap has emerged in modern times
between the Islamic world and the Christian West with regard to the degree of egali-
tarian improvement in women’s rights. This gap has been due to the legacy of colo-
nialism, underdevelopment, defective modernization, the weakness of a modern middle
class, democratic deficit, the persistence of cultural and religious patriarchal constructs
such as shar¯ı’ah stemming from the failure of reform and secularization within Islam,
and the weakness of civil society organizations – especially women’s organizations – in
the Muslim world.

The recent surge in identity politics, Islamism, and religio-nationalist movements is
in part due to socio-economic and cultural dislocation, polarization, and alienation
caused by modernization, Westernization, and globalization, and in part it is a “patri-
archal protest movement” in reaction to the challenges that the emergence of modern
middle-class women poses to traditional patriarchal gender relations. The main premise
of this chapter is that processes of democratization, civil society building, and the con-
solidation of civil rights and universal human/women’s rights are intertwined with
reformation in Islam, feminist discourse, and women’s movements.

Gender has become the blind spot of democratization in the Islamic world. In terms
of national and international policy implications, it should be recognized that women
and youth have become the main forces of modernization and democratization in the
Islamic world, especially in Iran. Democracy cannot be established without a new gen-
eration of Muslim leaders and state elite who are more aware of the new realities of a
globalized world and more committed to universal women’s/human rights.

To win the war against terrorism and patriarchal Islamism, we need more than mil-
itary might. In the short and medium term, a just resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict can alter the present socio-psychological milieu that has allowed the growth of
extremism and male-biased identity politics; in the long term, democratization and
comprehensive gender-sensitive development seems to be the only effective strategy. A
significant component of this strategy has to be Islamic reformation, which requires
international dialogue with and support for secular as well as religious egalitarian and
democratic voices in the Muslim world.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge Jennifer Olmsted, Nikki Keddie, and Mahmood
Monshipouri for their helpful comments on an earlier and shorter version of this
article.

NEGOTIATING PATRIARCHY AND MODERNITY IN IRAN 641

Notes

1. For studies on the interplay between Islam and other social institutions, see, for example,
Yvonne Yazbcek Haddad and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender, and Social Change (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998); Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the State (Temple
University Press, 1991).

2. See Mervat Hatem, “Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evo-
lution of the Post-Colonial Nation-State” and also Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Feminism in an
Islamic Republic: Years of Hardship, Years of Growth” both articles in Y.Y. Haddad and J.L.
Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender and Social Change (1998).

3. For such similarities and differences between Islamists of Iran and Afghanistan (Taliban),
see MehrangizKar, “Women’s Strategies in Iran from the 1979 Revolution to 1999” in Jane
Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Globalization, Gender and Religion (2001).

4. For a fascinating narration of such debates, see Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The
Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (Princeton University Press, 1999).

5. Belinda Clark, “The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women,” American Journal of International Law, 85, 1991, 317.

6. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Rhetorical Strategies and Official Policies on Women’s Rights” in
Mahnaz Afkhami, ed., Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World (New
York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 104.

7. See Jane Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Gender, Globalization, and Religion: The Politics of
Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 2–6. Also see
Colum Lynch “Islamic Bloc, Christian Right Team Up to Lobby UN,” in Washington Post,
June 17, 2002, A01.

8. See, Rouydad, 19 Urdibehesht, 1382 or Iran-Emrooz, May 7, 2003 (www.iran-emrooz.de).
9. See www.zananiniran.com, Urdibehest 14, 1382/May 4, 2003.
10. See Mir-Hosseini, 1999.
11. See “Mas‘ale-ye zanan: Nov-andishi-ye dini ve feminism” (The Women Question: New Reli-

gious Thinking and Feminism), interview with Alireza Alavi-tabar, in the monthly Aftab,
No. 24, Farvardin 1382/March 2003, 38–41.
12. Rough estimates based on three regions in Asia as reported in The World’s Women 2000:
Trends and Statistics (New York: United Nations Publications, 2000), 89, chart 4.5.
13. In the government offices, this rate is higher – 31 percent – and in the informal sector, much
higher than the formal, see Poya Maryam, Women, Work and Islamism: Ideology and Resis-
tance in Iran (London: Zed Books, 1999), 77–87.
14. Elsewhere, several scholars, including myself, have explained the reasons for the surge of
Islamism and the significance of its gender dimension and the historical, geographic, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural reasons for the extra strength and resistant nature of patri-
archy in Iran and several other Muslim societies. See, for instance, Keddie 2002; Kandiyoti
1988; Moghadam 1993; Tohidi and Bayes 2001.
15. For information on this active Muslim feminist group, see www.muslimtents.com/
sistersinislam/.
16. Lila Abu-Lughod, ed., Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Haleh Afshar, Islam and Feminisms: An Iranian
Case Study (London: Macmillan, 1998); Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Aziza Al-Hibri, “Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining
Muslim Women’s Rights,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 12,
1997, 1–44; Margot Badran, “Toward Islamic Feminisms: A Look at the Middle East,” in

642 NAYEREH TOHIDI

Asma Afsaruddin, ed., Hermeneutics and Honor: Negotiating Female Public Space in Islamicate
Societies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 159–88; Asma Barlas, “Believ-
ing Women” in Islam: Understanding Patriarchal Interpretations of the Quran (Austin: Texas Uni-
versity Press, 2002); Miriam Cooke, Women Claiming Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism
Through Literature (London: Routledge, 2000); Elizabeth W. Fernea, In Search of Islamic Fem-
inism (New York: Doubleday, 1998); Erika Friedl, “Ideal Womanhood in Postrevolutionary
Iran,” in Judy Brink and Joan Mencher, eds., Mixed Blessings: Gender and Religious Funda-
mentalism Cross-Culturally (New York: Routledge, 1997); Riffat Hassan, “Women’s Rights
and Islam: From the I.C.P.D. to Beijing,” papers written for a Ford Foundation project in
Cairo in 1994, for an International Planned Parenthood Federation Conference held in
Tunis in July 1995, and for the Family Planning Association of Pakistan in April, 1995;
Mervat Hatem, “Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evolu-
tion of the Postcolonial Nation-State,” in Y.Y. Haddad and J.L. Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender
and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Zahra Kamalkhani, Women’s
Islam: Religious Practice among Women in Today’s Iran (London: Kegan Paul, 1998); Mehran-
giz Kar, “Women’ Strategies in Iran from the 1979 Revolution to 1999,” in Jane Bayes and
Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Globalization, Religion and Gender: The Politics of Women’s Rights in
Catholic and Muslim Contexts (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 177–203; Azza Karam, Women,
Islamism, and State: Contemporary Feminism in Egypt (London: Macmillan, 1998); Nikki
Keddie, “Women in Iran since 1979,” Social Research, 67, 2000, 407–38; Azadeh Kian-
Thiebaut, “Women and Politics in Post-Islamist Iran,” British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, 24, 1997, 75–96; Fatema Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpre-
tation of Women’s Rights in Islam (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1991); Ziba Mir-Hosseini,
“Stretching the Limits: A Feminist Reading of Shari’a in Iran Today,” in M. Yamani, ed.,
Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives (London: Ithaca Press, 1996) and Islam
and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1999); Valentine Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Notes on a
Debate,” Iran Bulletin (www.iran-bulletin.org/islamic_feminism.htm), 2000; Afsaneh
Najmabadi, “Feminism in an Islamic Republic: Years of Hardship, Years of Growth,” in Y.Y.
Haddad and J.L. Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender, and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998); Hisae Nakanishi, “Power, Ideology, and Women’s Consciousness in Postrev-
olutionary Iran,” in H. Bodman and N. Tohidi, eds., Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity
within Unity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Parvin Paidar (Nahid Yeganeh), “Women’s
Struggles in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh, eds., In the
Shadow of Islam (London: Zed Books, 1982), 26–74; Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political
Process in Twentieth-Century Iran. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and
“Gender of Democracy: The Encounter between Feminism and Reformism in Contempo-
rary Iran,” Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Program, Paper Number 6, United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, October 2001; Anne Sofie Roald, “Fem-
inist Reinterpretation of Islamic Sources: Muslim Feminist Theology in the Light of the
Christian Tradition of Feminist Thought,” in Karin Ask and Marit Tjomsland, eds., Women
and Islamization: Contemporary Dimensions of Discourse on Gender Relations (Oxford: Berg,
1998); Jane Smith, “Women, Religion and Social Change in Early Islam,” in Y.Y. Haddad
and Elison Banks Findly, eds., Women, Religion and Social Change (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1985); Barbara F. Stowasser, Women in The Quran, Traditions and Inter-
pretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Nayereh Tohidi, Feminizm, Demokrasi
ve Eslam-geraì (Feminism, Democracy, and Islamism in Iran) (Los Angeles: Ketabsara,
1996); Nayereh Tohidi, “Conclusion: The Issues At Hand,” in Herbert Bodman, and
Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity within Unity (Boulder: Lynne

NEGOTIATING PATRIARCHY AND MODERNITY IN IRAN 643

Rienner, 1998); Nayereh Tohidi and Jane Bayes, “Women Redefining Modernity and Reli-
gion in the Globalized Context,” in Jane Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Globalization,
Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts (New York:
Palgrave, 2001); Azam Torab, “The Politicization of Women’s Religious Circles in Post-
Revolutionary Iran,” in Sarah Ansari and Vanessa Martin, eds., Women, Religion, and Culture
in Iran (London: Curzon, 2002); Amina Wadud, Quran and Woman: Rereading Sacred Text
from a Woman’s Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
17. See www.bbc.co.uk/persian/news/011006_vleader.shtml, October 6, 2001.
18. Ibid.
19. Quoted from Hoda El-Sadda by Abou-Bakr in her article in Middle East Women’s Studies
Review, Winter/Spring 2001.
20. Author’s interview with Shirin Ebadi, December 1999.
21. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 168.
22. See www.bbc.co.uk/persian/news/011006_vleader.shtml, October 6, 2001.
23. Jane Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of
Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
24. See, for instance, Elizabeth Schuster-Fiorenza, But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical
Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992) and Rosemary Radford Ruther, “Christianity
and Women in the Modern World,” in Arvind Sharma, ed., Today’s Woman in World
Religions (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
25. Amina Wadud, Quran and Women: Rereading Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
26. See Barbara F. Stowasser, “Gender Issues and Contemporary Quran Interpretation” in Y.Y.
Haddad and J. Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998).
27. Azizah Al-Hibri, “Islam, Law, and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights,” American
University Journal of International Law and Policy, 12, 1997, 1–44.
28. Ibid.
29. Anne SofieRoald, “Feminist Reinterpretation of Islamic Sources: Muslim Feminist Theol-
ogy in the Light of the Christian Tradition of Feminist Thought” in Karin Ask and Marit
Tjomsland, eds., Women and Islamization: Contemporary Dimensions on Gender Relations
(Oxford: Berg, 1998), 41.
30. Erika Friedl, “Ideal Womanhood in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” in Judy Brink and Joan
Mencher, eds., Mixed Blessings: Gender and Religious Fundamentalism Cross-Culturally (New
York: Routledge, 1997), 146.
31. For the significant contributions of Saeedzadeh (some of which appeared under female
pseudonyms), see Mir-Hosseini 1999 and Kar 2001.
32. See “Mas‘ale-ye zanan: Nov andishi-ye dini ve feminism” (The Women Question: New
Religious Thinking and Feminism), interview with Alireza Alavi-tabar, in the monthly
Aftab, No. 24, Farvardin 1382/March 2003, 39.
33. Ibid., 41.

CHAPTER 36

An Islamic Critique of
Patriarchy: Mawlana Sayyed
Kalbe Sadiq’s Approach to
Gender Relations

Yoginder Sikand

Perhaps because they form only a small minority, relatively little has been written about
India’s Ithna Ashari or “Twelver” Shi‘ite community. While some works on the history
of the Indian Shi‘ites are available, Shi‘ite voices are almost completely absent in writ-
ings on Muslims in present-day India. This is particularly unfortunate, given the rich
scholarly tradition of the Indian Shi‘ites.1 Being a minority within a larger minority,
Indian Shi‘ite voices often reflect concerns and articulate perspectives that are missing
or else marginal in dominant Sunni discourses. The Lucknow-based Mawlana Sayyed
Kalbe Sadiq is one of the leading and best-known present-day Indian Shi‘ite scholars.
This chapter looks at his approach to the issue of gender in Islam, examining how he
interprets the Islamic tradition in order to promote gender justice. It is based on an
analysis of some of his maja¯lis (sing. majlis) or sermons that are hosted on various sites
on the Internet.2

Kalbe Sadiq: A Mawlana With a Difference

Kalbe Sadiq is regarded as one of the most prominent “liberal” and “progressive”
Islamic scholars in India today. Although he is commonly referred to as a Mawlana, the
honorific title generally used in South Asia for a learned Muslim scholar, he challenges
the stereotypical image of a Mawlana as a diehard conservative. He hails from a
Lucknow-based family that claims descent from the Prophet and which has produced
numerous illustrious Shi‘ite scholars over several generations. Born in 1939, he
received a traditional Islamic education from the Sultan ul-Madaris, at that time a
leading center of Shi‘ite learning in Lucknow, alongside a modern education. He went

AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY 645

on to do a doctoral thesis, based on an early medieval Arabic poet, at the Aligarh Muslim
University. Thereafter, he immersed himself in a range of social activities, first in
Lucknow and then elsewhere in India. Over the years he has set up a number of major
institutions, including the Unity College, the Era Medical College, the Hazrat Imam
Zainul Abideen Hospital, and the Tauhid ul-Muslimin Welfare Trust in Lucknow, and
the Madinat ul-‘Ulum College in Aligarh. In recognition of his stature as the leading
Indian Shi‘ite scholar, he was appointed as the vice-president of the Sunni-dominated
All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, a position that he still holds.3

Despite his various preoccupations, Sadiq continues in his family’s tradition of
addressing maja¯lis in gatherings in India and abroad. The majlis is a major institution
of Shi‘ite mass education. Maja¯lis are generally delivered in ima¯mbaras, mosques, and
people’s homes, and are open to the general public. No special occasion is needed for a
majlis. Pious or rich Shi‘ites invite ulama to organize maja¯lis on a range of occasions,
such as a birth, marriage, or death in the family, or to commemorate one of the 12
Ithna Ashari imams. Numerous maja¯lis are held in the month of Muharram, when the
story of the martyrdom of Imam Husain is recounted over a period of several days,
accompanied by public expressions of grief. The ulama who deliver the maja¯lis are nor-
mally paid by the organizers, who consider the holding of a majlis as a meritorious act.

Sadiq’s maja¯lis are extremely popular among many Shi‘ites as well as some Sunnis,
and he is regularly invited by Shi‘ite groups in India, Pakistan, Europe, and North
America to speak. Like traditional maja¯lis, Sadiq’s maja¯lis begin with an invocation to
God and praises of the Prophet and the imams. This is followed by quotations from the
Qur’an, carefully selected according to the topic that the particular majlis is devoted to,
which is normally decided beforehand by Sadiq in consultation with the organizers.
Unlike traditional maja¯lis, however, Sadiq’s maja¯lis are not simply about recounting the
deeds of the Prophet and the imams. Rather, they are a class apart, and explicitly seek
to relate religious injunctions and beliefs to issues of contemporary social concern.
Among the favorite issues that Sadiq deals with in his maja¯lis are the need for modern
education, inter-community dialogue and understanding, better relations between
Shi‘ites and Sunnis, and the promotion of women’s rights.4 In this way, Sadiq’s maja¯lis
serve an important pedagogical purpose and provide innovative and creative
approaches from within a broadly defined Islamic tradition to engage with questions
that are crucial for Muslims today.

Sadiq on the “Women’s Question”

Some of Sadiq’s maja¯lis hosted on various sites on the Internet deal exclusively with
women, focussing particularly on the question of women’s rights. Several others of his
maja¯lis deal with women only in passing, being centered on other related issues. Sadiq’s
basic purpose in addressing the question of gender in Islam is twofold: to counter the
claim that Islam is inherently misogynist, and, at the same time, to critique misogynist
interpretations of Islam. This is not a simple apologetic defense of Islam as might be
imagined, for Sadiq forcefully critiques widely held patriarchal assumptions and beliefs
among many of his fellow ulama. Further, since his primary audience in the maja¯lis are

646 YOGINDER SIKAND

Muslims, particularly Shi‘ites, and not non-Muslim critics, his main concern in his
maja¯lis is not so much to defend Islam from its detractors as to provide a reformist, and
what he sees as the “correct,” understanding of Islam, including on the “women’s
question.”

Sadiq’s innovative approach to women’s rights must be seen in the broader context
of his understanding of justice as a central pillar of Islam. He argues that God’s purpose
in sending a succession of prophets, heavenly books, and laws was simply one: to elim-
inate injustice and ensure the rights of all creatures of God. The purpose of religion is
not simply to instruct people to worship God, he says, but, equally importantly, to
inspire them to promote love and justice in society. Islam, he says, teaches that the
“rights of God’s creatures” (h.uqu¯q ul-‘iba¯d) are as important as the “rights of God”
(h.uqu¯q allah). He goes so far as to say that if one is confronted with the choice between
the two, one should choose the former, for “creatures of God need to have their rights
respected,” while God is in need of nothing. God will not forgive one’s sins, he says, if
one violates the h.uqu¯q ul-‘iba¯d, and these include the rights of women as well. On the
Day of Judgment, one’s prayers and ritual worship will not be of any help to a person
who tramples on the rights of others, he warns.

The concept of h.uqu¯q ul-‘iba¯d, Sadiq explains, is a comprehensive one that includes
the rights of all of God’s creatures, animate and well as inanimate. Even the earth has
its rights that need to be respected. Misuse of the earth’s resources is also a sin. Like-
wise, animals, too, have their rights, and so do trees and plants. All human beings, irre-
spective of religion and gender, also have their basic human rights to dignity, equality,
and freedom, and one cannot be a Muslim in God’s eyes unless one respects these rights
as well. Respecting the h.uqu¯q ul-‘iba¯d, as Sadiq sees it, is not a passive acceptance of the
rights of others, and nor is it an individualistic affair. Rather, it is a task incumbent on
all Muslims to actively struggle against injustice and to work for a socially just world
where there shall be no poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and want, and where all people, irre-
spective of sect, religion, ethnicity, and gender, will live in prosperity and harmony. A
true Muslim must dedicate his or her life to working toward the establishment of such
a society. The ideal society that the “Imam of the Age,” the twelfth imam whom most
Shi‘ites believe is presently in occultation, will usher in, would, Sadiq claims, be one
where everyone is contented, and where peace and justice prevail. But, in the mean-
while, every Muslim must struggle for social justice for all. God, Sadiq says, has taken
an “oath” (ahad) from the true ulama (sahih ‘ulama) that “they shall not rest for even a
moment till they eliminate every injustice from the world.”5 This includes injustices
meted out to women as well.

Sadiq’s Qur’anic Hermeneutics

Sadiq’s basic starting point in dealing with the issue of women and women’s rights is
that Islam is God’s chosen religion for all humankind and is valid for all times, and that
no other way to salvation is possible. Hence, he believes, Islam provides women with a
position far superior to that in other religions. This claim he asserts both by discussing
Islam’s teachings on gender relations and by comparing these with the teachings of

AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY 647

other religions. Sadiq’s understanding of gender equality and gender relations in Islam
follows from what he sees as the basic underlying message of the Qur’an, and, indeed,
of the mission of all the prophets that God has sent to humankind. He repeatedly quotes
the Qur’an to suggest that God’s purpose in sending a long chain of messengers, with
scriptures and revealed laws, was to establish a just social order and to eliminate injus-
tice and tyranny. Hence, he argues, any interpretation of Islam that goes against justice
is itself un-Islamic. From this it follows that understandings of Islam that promote
injustice toward women cannot be said to faithfully represent God’s intentions, and
hence must be revised or else rejected.

Following from this, Sadiq makes a critical distinction between God’s word, in the
form of the Qur’an, on the one hand, and our diverse human understandings of it, on
the other. He argues that human efforts to understand the true import of God’s reve-
lation are always limited by the fact of us being human. God, the “Limitless” (la¯-
mah.du¯d), he says, can hardly be fully understood by “limited” (mah.du¯d) beings. The fact
that humans (other than the prophets and the “innocent” imams) are limited beings
forms an insurmountable barrier to our gaining a complete understanding of God’s will
as contained in the Qur’an. This does not mean, however, that we cannot move in that
direction, although Sadiq is quite clear that a perfect and total comprehension of God’s
will is impossible for ordinary humans. This is said to be clear proof that the Qur’an is
God’s word, for, Sadiq says, while books written by ordinary mortals can be properly
translated into other languages, the Qur’an cannot be faithfully represented in any
other language because it is of divine origin. There can be, he says, no final translation
of the Qur’an, because translators, being humans after all, are limited by their human-
ness and their limited knowledge of the world through which they interpret the Qur’an.
As he puts it, translation is static (ja¯mid) while the Qur’an “moves along with time.”
Hence, new meanings of the Qur’an can be uncovered over time as the stock of human
knowledge expands. This, of course, has vital implications for how Sadiq looks at the
centuries-old Islamic traditions as developed by the ulama. Sadiq seems to suggest that
although Muslims must respect the scholars of the past and learn or be inspired by
them, they need not be bound by their opinions, including those on notions of the nor-
mative Muslim woman and on relations between the sexes, which were influenced by
their own historical location.

Sadiq’s case for a dynamic interpretation of the Qur’an, from which his own for-
mulations on the gender question derive, rests on his willing acknowledgment that
human knowledge is always in a state of development and progress. This, in turn,
reflects on how we read and understand the Qur’an and the conclusions that we draw
from it. The interpretation of the text is heavily influenced by the location and personal
biography of the interpreter, Sadiq stresses. Although one must respect the “elders” for
their knowledge and their dedication to Islamic scholarship, he says, one must also rec-
ognize that their understanding of the Qur’an was indelibly influenced by the available
human knowledge of their own times. None of the classical Qur’anic commentators
(mufassiru¯n), other than the 12 imams, claimed infallibility (‘isma), he says, and this
explains why and how the Qur’an has been understood and interpreted in diverse ways
by different scholars at different times. As time progresses and the corpus of human
knowledge, both of the natural and the human sciences, expands, our understanding

648 YOGINDER SIKAND

and interpretation of the holy text must also correspondingly widen, uncovering
new meanings that were not accessible to past interpreters. Far from suggesting any
inadequacy in the Qur’an, Sadiq argues that this itself provides conclusive proof of the
Qur’an being God’s word, for in this way it proves its continuing relevance in every age.
As regards the question of gender, therefore, this dynamic reading of the Qur’an allows
for the possibility of new meanings to be read into the text with the passage of time,
which, in turn, makes for new gender-just understandings of the divine mandate.

Sadiq’s advocacy of a dynamic hermeneutics of the Qur’an naturally brings to the
fore the twin questions of taql¯ıd, blind following of past jurisprudential precedent, and
ijtiha¯d, creative exercise of reason in understanding the sources of Islamic jurispru-
dence. This has a vital bearing on issues of jurisprudence involving women. Ithna
Ashari Shii’tism has kept open the “doors of ijtiha¯d” (ba¯b ul-ijtiha¯d), but insists on the
need for taql¯ıd on the part of “ordinary” believers of a living mujtahid. Sadiq confesses
that he is himself a muqallid, of Ayatollah Sayyed ‘Ali Sistani of Iraq, but argues that
being a muqallid is far from being the same as a “blind follower.” He refuses, he says, to
surrender his right to think for himself, and while he acknowledges that he would act,
in any particular matter, in accordance with the ijtiha¯d of Ayatollah Sistani, he argues
that he has the right to put into practice the ijtiha¯d of his mujtahid in the manner that
he himself deems most appropriate, in accordance with the exigencies of particular
social contexts.

Critique of Misogynist so-called Ahadith

Sadiq’s gender-just understanding of Islam is based on an approach to the Qur’an and
the hadith (pl. ahadith) that differs significantly from that generally associated with
traditional ulama. Of particular concern here is the way in which Sadiq deals with the
corpus of hadith that is regularly invoked to justify the marginalization and oppression
of women. Sadiq suggests that while the Qur’an advocates gender justice, the corpus
of hadith contains many statements that are clearly misogynist. In part because of this,
he repeatedly stresses that he rests his arguments only on the Qur’an, and that it is the
Qur’an alone from which he seeks to develop his understanding of women’s rights. God,
he says, has Himself announced in the Qur’an that He has taken on Himself the respon-
sibility of preserving the book free from any error or change (tah.r¯ıf ). On the other hand,
he says, God has made no such undertaking in the case of the hadith. Sadiq recognizes
that it is largely from selective quotations from the corpus of hadith that upholders of
patriarchy have sought to develop “Islamic” arguments to oppress and subordinate
women. Hence, he devotes considerable attention to critically interrogating several
misogynist so-called ahadith. This he does by pointing out that many so-called ahadith
are pure fabrications, concocted well after the death of the Prophet and then wrongly
attributed to him. This was done for a variety of reasons, such as to promote certain
political factions or to bolster patriarchy. A major source of misogyny in the corpus of
hadith is what is commonly known as isra‘iliyat or isra‘ili rivayat. These are stories that
trace their origins to early Jewish converts to Islam, who brought with them their own
inherited misogynist attitudes, which some of them either attributed to the Prophet as

AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY 649

so-called ahadith, or else disseminated as tales that later became an integral part of
popular lore among many Muslim communities. Given this, Sadiq says, extreme
caution is necessary when using the hadith for advancing certain positions, and here
he refers to both the Sunni and the Shi‘ite hadith collections. Only those ahadith must
be accepted that are in accordance with the Qur’an, he says. If they contradict the
Qur’an they are to be discarded, and Sadiq argues that this is precisely what the Prophet
and the imams had themselves insisted on.

In his critique of patriarchal ahadith, Sadiq focuses particularly on the Sunni col-
lection of hadith, which differs in many respects from its Shi‘ite counterpart, although
this does not mean that he uncritically accepts the corpus of Shi‘ite hadith as fully
authentic. In this way he appears to fulfill two purposes: firstly, to critique patriarchal
interpretations of Islam by showing them to be based on concocted ahadith wrongly
attributed to the Prophet; and secondly, to implicitly critique the Sunni tradition and
offer the Shi‘ite understanding of Islam as both more “authentic” and somehow more
gender friendly. The latter he does in a subtle way while insisting that he has “full
respect” for Sunni scholars and the companions of the Prophet, stressing that he con-
siders Sunnis to be his “brothers” in their capacity of being fellow Muslims.

In his treatment of what he regards as concocted ahadith, Sadiq is at pains to point
out that such traditions are in conflict with Qur’anic ethical commandments and so
cannot be said to have any authoritative value and nor can they be considered as
genuine sayings of the Prophet. One widely-known so-called hadith often quoted by
Sunni ulama which Sadiq critically examines has it that the Prophet declared that a
husband must seek the advice of his wife in any matter in which he has a doubt, but
must do precisely the opposite of what his wife suggests. This so-called hadith has been
widely used to denigrate women as intellectually deficient to men, and as unable to
make sensible decisions. Sadiq insists that this story is fabricated and has no merit at
all. To back his claim he refers to another hadith, according to which, during the battle
of Hudaibiyyah, when some of his companions differed with him on his peace proposal,
the Prophet sought his wife Umm Salama and did precisely what she advised him to do.
The Prophet is shown here as doing precisely the reverse of what he is alleged to have
advised his companions in the first so-called hadith. Because the Prophet could not pos-
sibly have acted against his own advice, Sadiq stresses, the first statement attributed is
clearly concocted.

Sadiq employs the same method of hadith criticism in dealing with another so-called
hadith regarded as authoritative by many Sunnis, according to which, while on his
nightly heavenly ascension (mi‘ra¯j), the Prophet passed by hell and saw that it was full
of women. This story has been taken by many Muslim scholars to suggest that women
are somehow more prone to evil than men. Sadiq argues that it was impossible for the
Prophet ever to make such a claim. As evidence, he cites a hadith according to which
the Prophet said that if a man gives his daughter a good education and if she is virtu-
ous and pious, she can stop the angels from dragging him to hell, with God’s leave. In
other words, instead of being congenitally disposed to evil or evil in themselves, women,
if pious, can actually save men from hell-fire. A second hadith that Sadiq uses to counter
the above misogynist one has it that the Prophet declared that heaven lies at the feet of
mothers. Sadiq further critiques the first so-called hadith by reminding his listeners that

650 YOGINDER SIKAND

in their supplications (duru¯‘) they beseech God for welfare (hasana) in this world and in
the next, adding that a great source of hasana in this world is a pious wife (nek bivi).
Hence, he says, the story of hell being full of women, which has been routinely used to
subordinate women, cannot be said to be authentic.

Sadiq is particularly critical of certain grossly misogynist so-called ahadith that are
found in the S. ah.¯ıh. of al-Bukhari, which many Sunnis consider to be the most reliable
and authentic collection of Prophetic traditions. While questioning these so-called
ahadith he is careful not to appear to hurt Sunni sentiments, adding that although the
narrators of these traditions, like other companions of the Prophet, were not infallible,
they ought to be respected. Sadiq critically interrogates some so-called ahadith narrated
by Abu Hurayrah, and contained in al-Bukhari’s S. ah.¯ıh., to illustrate his argument that
many false stories have been wrongly attributed to the Prophet in order to bolster patri-
archy and subordinate women. Sadiq’s critique of Abu Hurayrah rests on the argument
that although Abu Hurayrah had spent relatively very little time with the Prophet, he
later narrated an enormous number of traditions that he attributed to the Prophet.
Many of these so-called ahadith were definitely fabricated. These include certain plainly
misogynist traditions, which Sadiq explains as a result of Abu Hurayrah’s alleged
“psychological allergy” to women. Thus, he cites a story narrated by Abu Hurayrah
claiming that the Prophet once said that if a dog, a donkey, or a woman crosses in front
of a man while he is praying, his prayer gets nullified. This is taken to suggest that a
woman’s worth was the same as a donkey’s or a dog’s. Sadiq counters Abu Hurayrah’s
story by arguing that when some Muslims complained to ‘A’ishah, youngest wife of the
Prophet, about Abu Hurayrah’s statement, she said that the Prophet could never have
uttered these words since she herself sometimes lay down in front of the Prophet while
he prayed and she would not move from that position for fear of disturbing him.

Sadiq critiques another so-called hadith narrated by Abu Hurayrah, according to
which the Prophet told his followers that three things were bad omens: a house, a horse,
and women. When ‘A’ishah heard that Abu Hurayrah had circulated this story she
remarked that he was not a good listener. She said that she was present when the
Prophet was giving the discourse when he mentioned this, but added that the Prophet
had actually said that the Jews, who think that the home, the horse, and women are
accursed, are wrong. However, she said, Abu Hurayrah entered the room when the
Prophet was midway in this sentence, and so misunderstood what he had meant.

A third so-called hadith found in al-Bukhari’s collection which Sadiq critically inter-
rogates and then dismisses as false relates to the story of the creation of Adam and Eve.
According to this story, God created Adam from mud, and then fashioned Eve from out
of Adam’s rib. This is why, this so-called hadith alleges the Prophet said, women will
always remain “bent.” Hence, it is claimed, the Prophet declared that one should never
try to “straighten” a woman, for, being like a bent rib, she would inevitably “break.”
This so-called hadith is widely used to justify the argument that women are derived
from, and hence biologically inferior to, men, and that they are also inherently
“crooked.” Sadiq dismisses this story as a pure fabrication, asking how, if women are
the “molds” (sancha) of their children, and if they are congenitally “bent” or “crooked,”
they can produce “proper” male offspring. That this story has no Qur’anic sanction,
Sadiq argues, is clearly evident from the fact that the word “rib” is not used even once

AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY 651

in the Qur’an. In this regard Sadiq refers to another popular story, according to which
God first created Adam, and when Adam felt lonely He created Eve to keep him
company. Sadiq says that this story, too, completely contradicts the Qur’anic account
of creation, where Adam and Eve are described as being produced simultaneously, and
that too from the same substance and hence sharing the same essence. Similarly, Sadiq
dismisses the theory, held by many Muslims, that Eve succumbed to Satan’s temptation
and so was the cause of Adam’s expulsion from heaven. He says that this story is not
found in the Qur’an, and is probably the result of a later influence of Christians with
whom Muslims came into contact as Islam spread outside the Arabian Peninsula
following the death of the Prophet.

By subjecting these and other so-called ahadith to a critical examination, Sadiq
concludes that such misogynist stories and statements must not be accepted blindly,
and nor should they be used to justify women’s subjugation in the name of Islam.
Indeed, he seems to suggest, since they directly violate the Qur’an’s clear dictum of the
fundamental equality of men and women, they must be treated as fabrications, and,
therefore, should be firmly rejected.

A Gender-Just Qur’anic Exegesis

Sadiq’s critique of misogyny in an “Islamic” garb goes along with an advocacy of an
Islamic theology of gender equality. Islam, or, more properly, the Ithna Ashari Shi‘ite
interpretation of Islam, offers ideal models of womanhood, Sadiq claims. The ideal
Muslim woman, as expressed through these models, is far from being a passive crea-
ture confined to her home. Sadiq cites the instance of many women of the ahl ul-ba‘it,
the family of the Prophet whom the Shi‘ites hold in great reverence, who were great
scholars themselves and also actively struggled against oppression and worked for the
cause of Islam. Such, for instance, was Sayyeda Zainab, daughter of Imam ‘Ali, who
participated in the battle of Karbala against the army of the tyrant Yazid, son of
Mu‘awiyah. Another ideal woman was Hazrat Fatima, daughter of the Prophet, wife
of Imam ‘Ali and mother of Sayyeda Zainab and the Imams Hasan and Husain. Hazrat
Fatima, Sadiq remarks, was so honorable in the eyes of the Prophet that he would stand
up whenever she entered his presence; this being a privilege that she alone enjoyed.
Sadiq also cites the examples of Mary, mother of Jesus, and Asiya, wife of the Pharaoh,
whom the Qur’an upholds for all Muslims, not just Muslim women alone, to emulate.
Another sign of the great respect in which pious women are held in Islam, Sadiq says,
is the annual Hajj pilgrimage, when the pilgrims run between the hills of Safa and
Marwah to relive the plight of Hagar (Hajra) searching for water for her thirsty son
Isma‘il.

Citing these examples, Sadiq sees the Qur’an as clearly and unambiguously man-
dating gender justice. The project that Sadiq seeks to promote involves both highlight-
ing the positive Qur’anic teachings in this regard as well as critically examining and
dealing with those verses of the Qur’an that some commentators have used to uphold
and bolster patriarchy. In developing a gender-just Qur’anic perspective, Sadiq points
out that the Qur’an constantly refers to men and women as equal partners (zauj) of

652 YOGINDER SIKAND

each other. It speaks of men and women being born of the same substance, and as
fellow creatures of the one God, hence suggesting that, ontologically, they are not just
equal but, in a very fundamental sense, identical, despite their physical differences.
Sadiq argues that what most distinguishes humans from animals is the soul or spirit
(ruh). The soul is the “basic reality” of human beings, while the body is simply a
“garment” for it. The soul, he says, is neither male nor female. Hence, he argues, despite
their biological differences, men and women have the same status (martaba). The
Qur’an points to this, in, for instance, its story of the creation of humankind and its
separate references to believing men and women where it relates the similar spiritual
rewards they would receive in the afterlife. From this it follows, Sadiq asserts, that it is
not one’s biology, but, rather, one’s character, piety, knowledge, and deeds, that deter-
mine one’s status ( fazilat) and make one inferior or superior to others. Neither of the
genders can claim to be superior to the other as a whole. A man may be considered
superior to a particular woman, not because of his gender, but, instead, because of his
piety or knowledge. On the other hand, if a certain woman is more pious and knowl-
edgable than a particular man, she is clearly superior to him. In fact, Sadiq says,
arguing against those who believe women to be intellectually inferior than men, God
has given the capacity to reason (‘aql) equally to men and women. If girls are provided
equal opportunities to study, he says with approval, they could even excel boys.

Sadiq’s advocacy of gender equality is not a call for gender identity in terms of roles,
for he argues that although men and women are equal, and in an ontological sense,
the same, they are biologically prepared to engage in different tasks for the sake of a
more harmonious family and society. There is nothing in the Qur’an, Sadiq says, that
prohibits women from going out of the house or even working outside, under certain
conditions. Yet, their most essential task, he says, is to maintain the home and look after
the children. On them rests the onerous responsibility of rearing the new generation,
for a mother is the “first school” of her children. It is a mark of the great respect that
Islam accords women, he says, that it has given her this responsibility on which depends
the future of the entire community. A woman who is herself well educated, both in
Islamic as well as modern disciplines, can perform this task in the most effective way.
Hence the need for women’s religious and secular education that Sadiq repeatedly
stresses.

In his discussion of the Qur’an, Sadiq directly addresses certain issues of jurispru-
dential import mentioned in the text that relate to women and that have often been
used either to deny Muslim women their Islamic rights or else to argue that Islam is
itself a misogynist religion. His discussion of these issues is geared both to critiquing
misogynist interpretations of the Qur’an as well as to rebutting the claims of the critics
of Islam. One such issue is that of inheritance rights. Sadiq takes on critics of Islam
who claim that the Qur’an legally sanctions women’s subordination by giving them
inheritance rights half that of men. This claim, Sadiq says, is not true at all. For one
thing, the Qur’an nowhere makes such a specification, and does not deal with men and
women as two monolithic categories for matters of inheritance. While daughters do get
half the share of their brothers in their deceased father’s property, this rule does not
apply for other categories of heirs in all cases. Thus a deceased son’s parents inherit
equally, a deceased man’s daughter’s son gets half the share of his son’s daughter, and

AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY 653

his mother’s brother and sister get the same share. Arguing for the inherent justness
of the Qur’anic rules of inheritance, Sadiq points out that while a woman would inherit
half the share of her brother in the event of the death of their father, she would also
receive a sum of money as mehr on marriage from her husband, the amount of which
she can specify in the marriage contract. All gifts, other than articles meant solely for
men’s use, given to the couple at the time of marriage also belong legally to the wife.
The wife is not obliged to spend anything on running the household, even if she has
an independent source of income. All that she earns is hers, and the husband may not
demand that she contribute to meeting the family’s expenses. The reason why a daugh-
ter inherits less than a son has nothing to do with any presumed inferiority of woman.
Rather, Sadiq says, it is entirely just, given the fact that a woman’s financial needs must
be provided for by males – by her father, or, in his absence, her elder brother, until her
marriage, and, after that, by her husband. “A woman’s income is a hundred per cent
saving, while a husband’s income is a hundred per cent expense,” Sadiq says,
rounding off a discussion of what he regards as the Quran’s women-friendly rules of
inheritance.

Another contentious issue relates to women’s testimony (shahadat). Some Islamic
scholars consider a woman’s testimony as half that of a man, based on a selective
reading of a certain Qur’anic verse. Sadiq offers an alternative reading, suggesting that
this verse must be seen in the particular historical context in which it was revealed, and
stressing that it must not be arbitrarily transposed onto a different context to argue the
case that women are somehow congenitally less intelligent than men, as some Muslim
scholars indeed insist. That this provision was intended for only a particular context,
and was not to be generalized for all women and for all times, is evident, Sadiq says,
from the fact that any true Muslim would readily accept the evidence of a single
woman, Hazrat Fatima, daughter of the Prophet, even if the entire population of the
world were arraigned against her. With the help of this argument of contextuality,
Sadiq is able to willingly approve of the current practice in Iran, for instance, where,
he says, a third of the members of the country’s parliament are women, whose vote
has the same value as that of male members.

A third vexed issue is that of divorce (t.ala¯q). Sadiq’s discussion of divorce is geared
to several purposes: to contrast the Shi‘ite position on the matter with the general Sunni
position and thereby implicitly assert the superiority of the former over the latter; to
critique and condemn widespread misuse of Sunni fiqh provisions related to t.ala¯q; and
to counter the argument that draws on t.ala¯q-related provisions in Sunni fiqh to claim
that Islam is inherently misogynist. He points out that the practice of “triple t.ala¯q,”
according to which if a man pronounces the word “t.ala¯q” three times in one sitting,
even if in jest, anger, or in a state of inebriety, his marriage is nullified, has led to wide-
spread abuse and oppression of women. It has resulted in numerous hapless women
being arbitrarily divorced by their husbands. In case the husband repents and wishes
to regain his wife, his wife would have to marry someone else, consummate the mar-
riage, obtain a divorce and then remarry her first husband. This practice is known as
halala. This form of t.ala¯q is widely accepted by most Sunni ulama in India. Sadiq argues
that “triple t.ala¯q” actually has no Qur’anic basis. He also declares that it is forbidden in
the Ja‘fari mazhab, the school of law that the Ithna Ashari Shi‘ites follow, where even if

654 YOGINDER SIKAND

the word t.ala¯q is uttered thrice in one sitting it is considered as constituting a single
t.ala¯q, not three. Sadiq offers to allow divorced Sunni couples who wish to save them-
selves the embarrassment of halala and desire to be reunited to resort to the Ja‘fari
school while still remaining Sunnis. In this way, he holds out the prospect of a more
gender-just law on divorce, works out a practical means for Sunni–Shi‘ite dialogue and,
at the same time, presents an argument to indirectly put forward the claim of the Shi‘ite
fiqh being more gender-just than the Sunni.

Another question that Sadiq addresses is the Qur’anic verse, in Su¯rah al-Baqarah,
which refers to God having given men an “edge” over women. This verse has been used
by many commentators to claim unrestricted male superiority over women in every
matter or sphere. Sadiq vehemently disagrees with this claim, pointing out that this
Qur’anic reference is clearly made in the context of divorce, and is not meant to apply
in general terms. The “edge” here is said to refer to the fact that a man can divorce his
wife whenever he wants to, but in the absence of any conditions written into the
marriage contract, a woman can have the marriage dissolved only by approaching the
qazi, who, after being convinced that the husband has failed in his marital duties, can
announce the marriage to be dissolved.

Yet another vexed issue that Sadiq deals with in the course of his elaboration of the
Qur’anic vision of gender relations is a verse in Su¯rah al-Nisa that suggests that if a wife
is disobedient, her husband can admonish her. If that does not work he can send her
to her bed, and, finally, if this does not change her attitude, he can beat her. This does
not mean, Sadiq says, that Islam gives husbands the unrestricted right to beat their
wives, as some scholars claim. A husband cannot beat his wife if she refuses to cook
for him or clean the house, for instance, for she is not duty bound to do so. Sadiq says
that the actual import of the word “beating” (d.arb) in this Qur’anic verse has been
greatly debated and fiercely contested by various Islamic scholars. He relates that Imam
Tabari, in his commentary on the Qur’an, devotes 27 pages to discussing the word, and
says that over 200 meanings have been offered to explain it. Sadiq opines that it is
wrong to equate d.arb with beating, and adds that several ulama who have done so have
also laid down that a husband can beat a wife only with a toothbrush. This implies, he
says, that there must be no seriousness in this sort of “beating.” Rather, it suggests a
form of “love” and “joking,” further stressing the fact that one is forbidden to actually
beat one’s wife in a harmful way. In this regard, he reminds his listeners that the
Prophet is the model for all Muslims to follow. The Prophet is not known to have ever
beaten his wives, even if he was sometimes troubled by some of them. Likewise, none
of the imams of the Shi‘ites are said to have beaten their wives, although some of their
wives even plotted against them. Hence, Sadiq says, Muslim men must follow their
example, refrain from beating their wives, and, instead, treat them with love and
compassion.

The Ideal Islamic Family

An interesting feature of Sadiq’s gender discourse is its framing in terms of the rights
of women, particularly in their capacity as wives. Sadiq remarks that while it is true

AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY 655

that women, like men, have their duties as well, unfortunately traditionalist scholars
generally ignore women’s Islamic rights and focus, instead, on their responsibilities
alone. This must, however, change, Sadiq stresses. In order to help people to take their
commitment to Islam seriously, he says, focus must first be given to their rights, after
which one must stress their duties. To violate the natural rights that God has granted
every human being, he argues, is a grave sin, an act of oppression that God will not
forgive unless the person whose rights have been trampled upon forgives the culprit.
Women, like other creatures of God, have their own rights, and Sadiq insists that men
must respect and uphold these if their commitment to Islam is to be acceptable to God.

Bitterly critiquing patriarchal custom, Sadiq says that treating women as virtual ser-
vants of their husbands has no sanction whatsoever in Islam. This constitutes a fun-
damental violation of their God-given rights. A man cannot force a woman to meet his
personal needs. He cannot insist that she wash his clothes or cook food for him. She is
not legally obliged to do so, and can refuse if she wants to. On the other hand, Sadiq
says, a man, through his sincere love and respect for and loyalty to his wife, can cement
such a close spiritual bond with her that they both willingly look after the personal
needs of each other. However, this is not the fundamental objective of marriage in
Islam, which, instead is, Sadiq says, to produce a future generation that would be, in
spiritual, moral, and intellectual terms, superior to the preceding one. For this, he
stresses, both husband and wife have equally crucial roles to play.

Being, to use a Qur’anic term, the zauj of each other, husband and wife are equals.
Sadiq likens them to the two wheels of a vehicle that can only work if they are of the
same size. “If one wheel is bigger than the other,” he says, “the vehicle cannot move.”
Hence, for the “vehicle of life” to be able to function, “both husband and wife must be
considered to be equal.” Marriage, in Sadiq’s words, is a “major form of worship.” While
the ritual prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca
are time-bound, marriage, Sadiq says, is a life-long form of worship, and so, in a certain
sense, superior to ritual worship. Hence, he says, marriage should be treated with all
the sanctity that it deserves. Relations between husband and wife must be that between
two equals brought together through bonds of love and affection and respect for each
other.

Conclusion

Sadiq’s explorations of the Qur’anic vision of gender relations provide new avenues
both to critique patriarchal traditions that are sought to be given an “Islamic” gloss,
and to press the claim for a gender-just understanding of the faith. This, in turn, has
practical relevance in terms both of scriptural exegesis (tafsir) and jurisprudence (fiqh).
Not surprisingly, Sadiq is an ardent advocate of women’s education, both religious and
secular, seeing this as a fundamental duty as well a means to promote a gender-just
understanding of Islam. He suggests that one of the major reasons why the patriarchal
tradition that many Muslim scholars continue to uphold has not been effectively chal-
lenged is because there have been so few women Islamic scholars. To address this he
points to the need for more Muslim women to study Islam seriously.

656 YOGINDER SIKAND

Sadiq’s gender-sensitive understanding of Islam marks a major shift from the
approach of many traditional Islamic scholars, but he does not go as far as some would
like him to in his espousal of women’s rights, for one can discern a distinctly apologetic
and defensive tone underlying some of his claims. Critics could also point to his perhaps
deliberate glossing over of certain patently patriarchal aspects of the Shi‘ite tradition,
as, for instance, the practice of mut‘ah or temporary marriage. Likewise, in his fulsome
praise of post-Revolution Iran he ignores the very real problems that many Iranian
women have to face precisely because of a certain narrow understanding of Shi‘ite
Islam. Yet, on the whole, despite these obvious limitations, Sadiq’s elaborate reworking
of the Islamic tradition does appear to offer new and refreshing perspectives through
which to view the question of gender relations in Islam.

As the leading contemporary Indian Ithna Ashari scholar, Sadiq’s views on women
carry particular prestige among South Asian Shi‘ites. His efforts to promote women’s
rights have not remained confined to his maja¯lis. Rather, he has also sought to put them
into action, such as by providing modern education to Muslim girls in the educational
institutions that he runs in Lucknow and by supporting numerous other such initia-
tives by Shi‘ites in other parts of India. Sadiq has had to face the ire of numerous con-
servative ulama for some of his outspoken views on women. Thus, in September 2004,
when he issued a statement that family planning was permissible in Islam, numerous
Sunni ulama, including several leaders of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, of
which he himself is the vice-president, came out in vehement protest, declaring that
family planning was h. ara¯m and alleging that Sadiq’s claim was opposed to shar¯ı’ah.6
Yet, undeterred, Sadiq continues his mission, offering new ways of creatively under-
standing Islam and what it means to be an ideal Muslim woman in today’s world.

Notes

1. The most authoritative work on the Indian Shi‘ites is Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, A Socio-
Intellectual History of the Ithna Ashari Shi‘ites in India (2 vols.) (New Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal, 1986). See also John Norman Hollister, The Shia of India. 2nd edn. (New Delhi:
Oriental Books Reprint, 1979).

2. These include www.victorynewsmagazine.com, www. al-murtaza.org, www.ezsoftech.com/
giknowledge/maja¯lis.asp, www.ezsoftech.com/giknowledge/maja¯lis.asp, http://www.
yahusain.com, www.islamicentre.org, and www.winislam.com/web/maj.htm.

3. Interview with Kalbe Sadiq, New Delhi, October 4, 2004.
4. Yoginder Sikand, Shi‘a–Sunni Dialogue: Mawlana Kalbe Sadiq’s Theology of Islamic Ecumenism

(http://www.islaminterfaith.org/may2004/article-05-04-c.htm).
5. Ibid.
6. “Family Planning Divides Muslim Clerics,” Mid-Day, September 16, 2004. See also,

Yoginder Sikand, Furore over Family Planning (http://www.islaminterfaith.org/oct2004/
article3.htm).

Index

Note

The index is in word-by-word alphabetical order. Arabic names beginning with al- are filed
under the following part of the name, eg; al-Mahdi is filed under M, al-Qaeda under Q.
Titles such as Mawlana, Sultan, appear after the name. As far as possible names that are
transliterated in different styles in the text have been gathered under one heading with
cross-references from alternative forms.

Aaron, 200 adab, 582
abangan, 467, 474 Adam and Eve, 650
Abbas, Shah, 547 Adivar, Halide Edip, 30, 125, 612
Abd al-Aziz, Umar, 197 ‘adl (distributive justice), 573
Abdallah, Abdalla Fadallah, 148 administration, 572
‘Abduh, Muh. ammad, 7, 9, 190, 288, 341, adulterers, 147
adultery, 168
342, 452, 468, 476, 542, 625, 636 Advani, L.K., 516
Abdul Ghani Yakob, 450 al-Afgha¯n¯ı, Jama¯l al-Din, 7, 9, 259, 288,
AbdulHamid A. AbuSulayman, 452
Abdulhamid II, Sultan, 322 341, 562, 625
Abdurrahim, Imaduddin, 205 Afghanistan, 15, 112, 117, 165, 202, 343,
Abou-Bakr, Omaima, 632
Abraham, 222 386, 390, 411, 412
Abrahamian, Ervand, 545 Africa, 258, 318, 410, 562, 588
abrogation, 163 Afyon, Nursi trials at, 68
Abu al-A’la al-Mawdu¯d¯ı, see Mawdu¯d¯ı Aghajari, Hashem, 628
Abu Bakr, 308, 572 agnosticism, 442
Abu Daud/Dawud, 162, 197 agriculture, 91
Abu Hurayrah, 197, 650 Agung, Sultan, 482, 483, 487, 491, 492,
Abu Sayyaf, 449, 460
Abu’l Ala Maududi see Mawdu¯di 496, 498
Abu’l al-Mawdu¯d¯ı see Mawdu¯di Ahl al-Sunnah, 257
Abu-Rabi’, Ibrahim M., 298, 388, 401, 402 Ahl-e Hadith, 107, 113
Abu-Zahra, Muhammad, Shaykh, 147 Ahmad Khan, Syed, 7, 9, 13, 19, 190, 542
academic dependency, 588 Ahmad Syafi’I Ma’arif, 391
Acar, Feride, 615 Ahmad, Anis, 451
accountability, 166 Ahmad, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam, 461
acculturationism, 576 Ahmad, Israr, 180
Acehnese Independent Movement, 459 Ahmad, Khurshid, 9, 14, 178, 193, 601
Achaemenian Empire, 549 Ahmadi community, 182
Ahmed I, 329
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, 155

658 INDEX An-Na’im, Abdullahi, 154
al-Ansa¯r¯ı, Abu¯ Ayyu¯b, 202
Ahmed, Leila, 634, 635 antiheroism, 296
Akbarabadi, Sa’id Ahmad, 83 anti-Semitism, 305
Akdeniz University, 134 Antun, Farah, 258
a¯khirah (the Hereafter), 571, 573 apostasy, 147, 168
Akif, Mehmet, 42 Appadurai, Arjun, 318, 319
Aktas¸, Cihan, 616 ‘aql (reason), 264
Al Washliyah, 468 al-Aqsa mosque, 530
‘Ala, Sayyed ‘Abdul, 89 Aquinas, Thomas, St., 428
Alatas, Syed Hussein, 588, 596 Arab Renaissance, 258
Alavi-tabar, Alireza, 628, 629 Arabia, 206
‘Alaw¯ı, 331 Arabic, 25, 127
Alexander of Macedonia, 549 Arafat, Yasser, 388
Alexander, Yonah, 378 Arat, Yes¸im, 613
Algeria, 258, 302, 562 archetype, 245
Algerian Liberation Front, 380 architecture, 91
Algerian National Liberation Front, 215 ard (land), 264
‘Ali, Ahmad, Mawlana, 89 arid, 242
Ali Aybar, Mehmet, 27 Arinç, Bülent, 355
‘Ali ibn Abi Ùalib, 162 aristocracy, 346
Ali Miyan, see Nadwi, Sayyed Abul Aristotle, 258, 333, 335
Arkoun, Muhammad, 156
Hasan ‘Ali Armagan, Mustafa, 298
Ali, Mohammad, 550 armed robbery, 168
Ali, Mukti, 476 Armenians, 322, 379
Ali Sardar Jafari Committee, 513 Armstrong, Karen, 414
alienation, 368 Arnold, T.W., 418
Aligarh Muslim University, 645 Arshaduddin, Sheikh, 418
Aligarh school, 107 art, 91, 246
Alighrah movement, 9, 13 Arvas, I.brahim, 128
‘Alla¯l al-Fa¯s¯ı, 9 Arya Samaj, 511
All-India Muslim League, 179 asba¯b al-nuzu¯l, 260
Al-Risa¯la movement, 75, 78 Asena, Duygu, 615
ama¯nah (trust), 230 Ashaari Muhammad, see Ashaari, Ustaz
‘amal (action), 264 Ashaari, Ustaz, 5, 21, 195, 196, 199, 200,
Ambedkar, B.R., 97, 509
America, 203, 293, 410 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
American Civil Liberties Union, 389 208, 210, 211, 212
American Civil War, 388 Ashari, Ithna, 656
American University, 460 Ashari, K.H. Hasyim, 486
Ammianus Marcellinus, 544 Ash’arism, 257
Amos, 222 Ash’arite conception, 272
Anadolu University, 141 Ashcroft, John, Attorney General, 413
analogy, 163 Ashok Rudra, 523
anarchy, 66 Ashraf, Ahmad, 545
Anderson, Benedict, 314, 316 Asia, 258, 318, 588
angels, 263 asoib, 203
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 455 Assam, 109
assimilation, 368, 372
Ankara University, 130
Faculty of I.lahiyat, 123, 133
Ankara, 25, 69

INDEX 659

Association of Independent Industrialists and Bandung Conference, 215
Businessmen, 354 Bangkok, 393
Bangladesh, 13, 96, 109, 120, 176, 305,
Astarabadi, Bibi Khanum, 636
Al-Suhaimi, Muhammad Abdullah, Shaykh, 366, 400, 532, 535, 562, 564
Banguog˘ lu, Tahsin, 129
199 Bani Tamim, 200–1
Atabaks, 549 Bank Muamalat Indonesia, 457
Atatürk University, 132 Bank Syariah Mandiri of Indonesia, 457
Atatürk, Kemal, 11, 24, 156, 164, 346; see al-Banna, Hassan, 288
Barelwi Tanzim, 111
also Kemalism Barelwi, Sayyed Ahmad, 89
Ates¸, Süleyman, 140 Barelwis, 107
Athenagoras, Patriarch, 69 Barisan Revolusi Nasional, 459
al-’Atta¯r, H. assan, 9 Barth, Karl, 435
Aurad Muhammadiah, 198 al-Basri, al-Hasan, 279
authenticity, 257 al-Bashir, ‘Umar, 165, 166
authoritarianism, 596 Batini, 331
Avciog˘ lu, Dog˘ an, 31 Bayar, Celal, 69
‘Awdah, ‘Abd al-Qa¯dir, 9 Bayat, Sunan, 482, 487, 488, 490, 491,
Ayatollah Khomeini, 10, 164, 205, 552, 631
aydin, 26 492, 493, 494, 495, 497, 498, 499,
Aydin, Mehmed S., 140 500, 501, 502, 503, 504
Aydin, Mehmet, 355 Bayes, Jane, 627, 636
Azad, Abul Kalam, 78 Bayezid II, 329
Azamgarh, 90 Bayraklı, Bayraktar, 133
Azerbaijan, 549, 550 Behdad, Sohrab, 592
al-Azhar, 108, 175, 190 Behnam, Reza, 546
Azmi, Wan Hussain, 450 Bekta¯sh¯ı order, 331
Azra, Azyumardi, 400, 461 belief, 61–2
Belli, Mihri, 27
Babacan, Ali, 355 Ben Bella, Ahmad, President, 215
Babacan, Zeynep, 355 Benedict, Ruth, 248, 551
Baban, Cihat, 129 Bengal, 108
Babari Mosque, 512 nationalism, 13
Babri Masjid Action Committee, 96 Bennabi, Malik, 213, 245
backcasting, 570 Berkes, Niyazi, 24, 29
Bacon, Sir Francis, 335 Bey, Ali Sedat, 124
Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad, 205, 455, 578 Bey, Sadrettin Celal, 126
Bader Meinhof, 379 Bey, Vasif, 124
Badr, well of, 571 Bharat Mata, 510
Baghdad Pact, 69 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 510, 511, 518
Baghdad, 106, 171, 450 Bharatiyata, 372, 373
Bahais, 169, 551 Bhiwandi, 101
Bajrang Dal, 518 Bihar, 108
Bajunid, Omar Farouk, 458 Bill, James, 550, 552
Balambangan, 492 bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 14, 261,
Bali, 393, 492 309, 332
Balqis, (queen of the kindom of Saba’), bin Laden movement, 15
bin Laden, Osama, 164, 313, 384, 390, 396,
169 412, 461
Baltaciog˘ lu, I.smail Hakki, 31
Baluchistan, 113

660 INDEX Çelik, Ömer, 352
Central Asia, 204, 206, 410
Bin-Ba¯z, ‘Abdul-Az¯ız, Shaykh, 147 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 322, 413
BJP, see Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Çerman, Osman Nuri, 28
Black Sea, 539 Cevdet, Abdullah, 23
Blair, Tony, 388, 411 Cevdet, Ahmet, 125
Boland, B.J., 452 Chatterjee, Partha, 12
Boratav, Pertev Naili, 29 Chechnya, 293, 369, 410, 416
Borobudur temple, 485 Chelghoum Laid, 214
Bosnia, 293, 377, 410, 563 child custody, 579
Bosporus, 539 China, 202, 204, 324, 368, 369, 577, 583
bourgeoisie, 346 choseisme, 249
Boyce, Ralph, 387, 392, 398 Choudhury, Masudul Alam, 593
Boyle, Robert, 335 Christianity, 147, 221, 377
Britain, 548 Chupanids, 549
British Empire, 583 CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
British Raj, 179 citizenship, 610
Bronowski, Jacab, 335 civilization, 228, 249
Brubaker, Rogers, 315 cleanliness, 63
Bruce Lawrence, 321 Cold War, 408
Brunei, 204 Coleman, James, 558
Brunei Darussalam, 455 collectivity, 65
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 416 colonial domination, 187
Buddhism, 509 colonialism, 2, 6, 9, 12, 17, 107, 164, 179,
Buddhist, 97, 411
al-Bukhari, 145–6, 162, 650 254, 259, 261, 266, 318, 321, 322,
Bukhara, 203 323, 385, 510, 540, 577, 632, 634,
636, 640
Sheikh Jamaluddin, 417 colonizability, 233, 249
Bulaç, Ali, 292 Comaroff, John, 315
Bumin, Tülin, 620 communalism, 363
Bush, George, 387, 411, 413 communism, 52, 90, 185, 257
compassion, 66
Çakir, Rus¸en, 619 comprehensive secularism, 292, 295
Çakmak, I.brahim, 357 consensus, 163
Cairo, 108, 215, 460 conservatism, 37, 153, 468
Calcutta, 107 conservative traditionalists, 624
Calhoun, Craig, 316 Constantine, 214
caliphate, see khila¯fah Constantinople, 202
caliphs, 146, 572, 581 constitutionalism, 69
Cantwell Smith, Wilfred, 379 constructivist, 41
capitalism, 185, 314, 595 consultation, 575
capitalist system, 589 consumerism, 218, 240
captive mind, 588 contemporaneity, 258
Carlton, David, 378 contextualist, 41
Cartesian rationalism, 295 Copernicus, 286, 335
Cartesianism, 290 Cottam, Richard, 545
Casablanca, 384 coup d’état, 166
Castells, Manuel, 322 Crusades, 328, 377, 577
Catholic Church, 152, 286 Çukurova University, 134
Catholics and Protestants, 377, 411
Çelik, Hilmi, 355

INDEX 661

culture, 235, 238, 243, 249 divorce, 579
culture crisis, 249, 250 Diyarbakir, 70
Cumhuriyet University, 134, 141 dogmatism, 165, 189
Custodian (Saudi Arabia), 364 double ownership, 590
dress, 91
Dag˘ , Mehmed, 140 dualism, 257
Dahlan, Muhammad, 8 Dubos, René, 218
Dajjal, 197 Dutch Java, 198
Dalit Voice, 97
Damascus, 90 Ebadi, Shirin, 632
Dar al-H. arb, 576 economic development, 589
Da¯r al-Isla¯m, 576 economic growth, 588, 589
Dar al-Ulum, 13, 108 economists, 587–606
al-Dari, Tamim, 199 ecumenical humanism, 236
Darul Arqam, 195, 196, 198 Efendi, Emrullah, 123
Darulfünun Faculty of I.lahiyat, 126 Efendi, Hoca Tahsin, 124
Darwinism, 293 Effendi, Bahtiar, 452
Delhi, 107, 176 egocentrism, 249
Delphi method, 569 egotism, 65
democracy, 44, 53, 94, 101, 151, 153, 157, Egypt, 9, 25, 258, 302, 563, 572
Eichmann, Otto Adolf, 293
165, 267, 324, 349, 365, 388, 392, Elliot, Michael, 384
441, 576, 626 Elmessiri, Abdelwahab, 292–4
democracy reconciliation, 52 Emami, Shahrbanu, 629
Democrat Party (DP) (Turkey), 70, 346 Emmerson, Donald, 400
Democratic Party (Indonesia), 470 empire, 313–14, 322–5
Democratic Party see Democrat Party (DP) empirical theories, 592
(Turkey) empiricism, 286
democratization, 589, 636 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 378, 381
Denizli, Nursi trials at, 69 Engels, Friedrich, 547
Deoband, 13, 90 Enlightenment, 17, 23, 286, 295
Deobandi Wifaq, 111 enmity, 263
Deobandis, 107 epistemology, 243, 286, 427
Deoras, Balasaheb, 514 Erbakan, Necmettin, 47, 347
Descartes, René, 216, 217, 289, 295, 335 Erdog˘ an, Recep Tayyip, 26, 348
Desker, Barry, 453, 461 Erlangen University, 142
despotism, 249 escapism, 240
deterritorialization, 318 eschatology, 162
Deutsch, Karl, 315 Eshkevari, Yusef, 628
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (DDII), 454 Esposito, John, 291, 303
dhikr (invocation), 332 esthetics, 242
dialogue, 170, 248, 264 ETA (the Basques), 379
Dicle University, 134 ethical theories, 592
dictatorship, 150 ethico–esthetic plasma, 243
Dilipak, Abdurrahman, 46 ethics, 61, 62, 286
Dini Ta’limi Council, 90 ethos, 230, 243
Direct Action, 379 Europe, 1–20, 16, 66, 90, 163, 169, 204,
diversity, 568
divine, 578 216, 250, 286, 304, 392, 410, 475,
Divine Unity, 91 538

662 INDEX

European Union, 37, 142, 353, 582 France, 204, 215, 345, 368, 414, 582
Evren, Kenan, 610 free will, 167
exclusivism, 425, 426, 435, 574 freedom, 153, 286, 349, 382
existentialism, 293 French Revolution, 379
extremism, 165 Freud, Sigmund, 315
Eyyübog˘ lu, Sabahattin, 28 Friedl, Erika, 637
Fromm, Erich, 187, 381
factionalism, 552 Front Pembela Islam, 390, 391
Faculty of Divinity, 130 frugality, 63
Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Erzurum, 132 Fukuyama, Francis, 218, 558
Fad.lallah, Muh. ammad, 9 Fuller, Graham E., 468
Fad.lallah, Muh. ammad H. ussain, 9, 10 fundamentalism, 153, 289, 302, 349, 453,
Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, (King of Saudi Arabia),
574, 575, 576
536 future studies, 568, 583
Faisalabad, 110
faith, 61, 258, 342 Gadjah Mada University, 468
falah, 590 Galileo, 286, 335
Falwell, Jerry, 389 Gambetta, Diego, 559
Far East, 201 Gandhi, Indira, 510, 514, 517
al-Farabi, 162 Gandhi, Mahatma, 512
Farangi Mahalli, ‘Abd al-Bari, 108 Ganji, Akbar, 628
Faruqi, Ziya-ul Hasan, 82 gas chamber, 371
al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji, 190 Gaza, 302
fascism, 370, 575 Gazi University, 134
fasiqu¯n (vicious), 267 Geerts, Clifford, 235, 306, 466
fatalism, 552 Gellner, Ernest, 306, 598
al-Fatih, Muhammad, 202 gender equality, 647
Fatima, 162 generalized altruism, 592
fatwa, 163 Geneva, 90
Fawwaz, Zeinab, 636 Geneva Convention, 322
Fazl al-Rahman, Mawlana, see Fazlur Rahman Genghis Khan, (1162–1227), 549
Fazlur Rahman, 114, 572 genital mutilation, 626
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 413 Germany, 142, 214, 345, 368, 378, 511,
Felicity Party, 347
feminism, Islamic, 624–43 558, 582
feminist movement, 612 Ghafur, Abdul, Shaykh, 205
feminist theology, 633 Ghannoushi, Ra¯shid, 9
Fergan, Es¸ref Edip, 42 al-Ghaza¯l¯ı, Abu Hamid, 286, 331
Fig˘ lali, Etem Ruhi, 140 Giddens, Anthony, 289
fiqh, 579 Gilan, Eshaqis in, 549
Firat University, 134 Gilbert, William, 286
flat-earthism, 290 global television networks, 568
flexibility, 154 globalization, 16, 318, 350, 545, 581, 634
Fodio, Osman dan, 309 Gog (tribe), 197
folk Islam, 25 Gökberk, Macit, 28
Fontenelle, Bernand le Bovierde, 336 Gökmen, Fatin, 128
formalism, 236 Göle, Nilüfer, 615, 619
Foucault, Michel, 218 Golestan, treaty of, 549
fragmentation, 552 Golkar Party, 470
Golongan Karya Party, 470

Golwalkar, M.S., 371, 512 INDEX 663
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 26
Görüs¸, Millî, 48 Hatipzade, 336
governmentality, 316 Hayderbad, 100, 108
Gramsci, Antonio, 5 Haz, Hamzah, 471
Grand Ayatollah, 364 headscarf, 607–23
grand narrative, 296 Hedgewar, Dr., 511
Great Britain, 176, 549 Hefner, Robert W., 466
Greece, 415 hellfire, 263
Gujarat Genocide, 371 Helmstad University, 337
Gül, Abdullah, 348, 350 al-Hibri, Azizah, 636
Gülen, Fethullah, 5, 12, 19 Hick, John, 425, 435
Gulf states, 1–20 h. ija¯b, 607–23, 637
Günaltay, S¸emseddin, 130 Hijrah, 571
Güngör, Erol, 25, 26, 35 Hilmy Bakar Almascaty, 206
Gürüz, Kemal, 356 h. ima¯, 571
Gus Slamet, 490 Hindu Dharma, 372
Gush Emunim, 306 Hindu Mahasabha, 511
Hindu Raj, 374
Haas, Richard, 523 Hindu Rashtra, 373, 374
Habermas, Jürgen, 289 Hindu Samajotsav, 511
Habibie, B.J., 477 Hinduism, 371, 372
Hadar, Leon, 303 Hindutva, 372, 374, 511
Hadden, Jeffrey F., 450 Hiroshima City University, 458
Hadith, 135, 155, 257 Hitler, Adolph, 293, 371
Haghia Sofia, 347 Hizb-al-Tahrir, 390, 576
Hague, 413 Hizbullah, 576
Hakki, I.zmirli I.smail, 124 Hobbes, Thomas, 335
Hakki, Kiliçzade, 23 Hocazade, 336
Hale-Bopp, (comet), 197 Holocaust, 293, 318
Halley, Edmund, 335 holy war, 383
homo religiosus, 232
Halley’s comet, 197 honor killing, 626
Hamid Dabashi, 554 Hooker, M.B., 453, 470
Hanania, 222 horizontalization, 260
Haq, General Ziyaul, 181 Horstius, 337
Haqiqatjou, Fatima, 631, 634 Howard, John, 393
haqis, 549 H. udaybiyyah Agreement, 572
h. ara¯m, 571 human arrogance, 176
Haramayn, 203 human ego, 176
al-Harith Harrath, 202 human rationality, 217
Harland, Richard, 289 human resources, 588
Harran University, 134 human rights, 155, 365, 382, 392
Harras, Abdussalam, 205 humanism, 236, 316
Hartford Seminary, 402 humanity, 417
Hasani, Sayyed ‘Abdul Hai, 89 Huntington, Samuel, 303, 311, 410, 478,
Hasdemir S¸ahin, Hatice, 609
Hassan Hanafi, 257, 276 535, 573, 577
Hassan, Riffat, 635 Husain, Sayyid Abdul, 171
Hassan, Sa’d Muhammad, Shaykh, 161 Hussain, Abid, 82
Hussain, Saddam, 171, 536
Hussain, Taha, 164

664 INDEX Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle,
470
Hussain, Zakir, 82
Huwaydi, Fahmi, 170 Indonesian Islamic United Party, 470
Huygens, Christiaan, 335 inductive method, 261
Hyderabad, 100, 108 industry, 91
inequality, 183
‘iba¯dah (worship), 573 inflation, 588
Ibn ‘Arabi, 200 information technology, 568
Ibn Ba¯dis, ‘Abd al-Hamid, Shaykh, 214 inheritance, 579
Ibn Hanbal, 279 injustice, 263
Ibn Ishaqe, 339 I.nönü University, 134
Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 161, 230, I.nönü, I.smet, 125
Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia,
277, 578, 587–8, 596
khila¯fah (caliphate), 597 455
mulk (royal), 597 integration, 372
Ibn Maja, 162 interconnection, 567
Ibn Malik, 148 interdependence, 567
Ibn Taymiyya, 332 interest-free banking, 594
Ibrahim, Anwar, 574 Internal Security Act, 195
ideological polarization, 371 International Court of Justice, 413
ideology, 183 International Islamic University Malaysia,
idolatry, 91, 249
I.hsan, Mehmet Og˘ lu, 126 191, 206, 455
ijma¯’, 575 international law, 155
ijtiha¯d, 264, 562, 572, 578, 648 International Monetary Fund, 354, 577
I.lahiyat, Faculty of, 123 Internet, 419, 568
I.lhan, Attila, 26, 29 Iqbal, ‘Allamah Muhammad, 90, 179, 419
‘ilm (science), 264, 573 iqtisa¯d, 589
Ilyas, Muhammad, Mawlana, 90 Iraq, 9, 353, 540, 572
I.lyasog˘ lu, Aynur, 615 al-Iraqi, Hasan, Shaykh, 200
I.mam-Hatip schools, 126 Iran, 10, 165, 202, 205, 302, 318, 425,
imamate (politics), 272
imitation, 163 562, 572, 591
immanentization, 292 Ireland, 411
imperialism, 240, 293, 385 irrationalism, 290, 296
inclusivism, 426, 578 Is¸ik, Hüseyin Hilmi, 44
Independence, 6, 8, 20, 27, 353, 360, 382, Islam, 178, 221, 576

509, 510, 513, 514, 516, 518, 521 economy, 185
indexical truth, 430 modernity, 15–18
India, 25, 75, 90, 105, 108, 165, 175, Islamabad, 191, 203
Islamic approach, 177
176, 179, 302, 309, 369, 372, 577, Islamic banking, 186, 192, 457, 592
583 Insurance Islam, 457
modern nation state, 2 Islamic Bank of Brunei, 457
Indian Freedom Movement, 371 Islamic Development Bank of Brunei, 457
Indian National Congress, 179, 344 Islamic civilization, 195, 207, 334
individualism, 286 Islamic Constitution, 192
Indonesia, 1–20, 204, 459, 596 Islamic Defenders Front, 391
intellectual history, 3 Islamic Defense Group, 390
nation state, 2 Islamic economics, 186, 587, 591, 599
Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters, 390 Islamic Education Movement Party, 470

INDEX 665

Islamic eschatology, 206 50, 51, 52, 53, 151, 153, 158, 257,
Islamic ethics, 636 298, 300, 313, 321, 423, 453, 466,
Islamic feminism, 624–43 468, 478, 624, 625, 630, 635, 640,
Islamic heritage, 156 641, 642
Islamic ideology, 180, 581 Islamization, 116, 165, 166, 182, 191, 563
Islamic idiom, 182 Islamized sciences, 290
Islamic intellectualism, 171 isomorphism, 318
Islamic intellectuals, 5, 625, 628 Israel, 7, 305, 318, 362, 389, 415, 540
Islamic judicial, 182 Istanbul, 25, 66, 128, 358
Islamic law, 148, 165, 166, 171, 182, 264, Istanbul University, 134
istislah (public interest), 573
474, 581, 582, 587 Italy, 345, 511
Islamic leadership, 191 Izmir I.zmir, 25, 135
Islamic lines, 190
Islamic Mataram dynasty, 493 Jabalkat, Mount, 489
Islamic modernism, 7–8, 140; see also Jabir al-Alwani, Taha, 452, 579
al-Jabiri, Muhammad ‘Abid, 277
‘Abduh, Muh. ammad; al-Afgha¯n¯ı; Jakarta, 390, 468
Ahmad Khan, Syed; Azad, Abul Kalam; Jakarta University of Muhammadiyah, 396
Nursi, Bediuzzaman Said; Rid.a, Rash¯ıd Jalal Al-e Ahmad, 551
Islamic movement, 257 Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah, 9, 257
Islamic patriarchy, 629 Jamaah Islamiyyah, 390
Islamic philosophy of knowledge, 191 Jamaat-e-Islami, 13, 14, 25, 92, 176, 338,
Islamic political theory, 182
Islamic Protestantism, 628 576, 579
Islamic reassertion, 192 Jama¯l al-D¯ın al-Afgha¯n¯ı, see al-Afgha¯n¯ı
Islamic redistribution system, 186 Jamaluddin, Sheikh, of Bukhara, 417
Islamic reformism, 158 Jamia Millia Islamia, 108
Islamic republic, 182 Jami’ah Nizamiyya, 108
Islamic resurgence, 206, 562 Jami’at al-Ulama, 343
Islamic revivalism, 2, 14, 15, 78, 154, 328, Jana Sangh, 511
576 Japan, 16, 379, 558
Islamic revolution, 189, 557, 563 Jawadi-Amuli, ‘Abdullah, 26, 433–40
Islamic Salvation Front, 302, 305 al-Jaza¯’ir¯ı, ‘Abd al-Qa¯dir, 8
Islamic scheme, 183 Jazani, Bijan, 551
Islamic sciences, 175 Jemaah Islamiah, 449
Islamic society, 177 Jeremiah, 221
Islamic state, 13, 14, 41, 43, 49, 55, 78, 81, Jerusalem, 530
82, 90, 92, 93, 94, 148, 149, 152, 154, Jesus, 197, 223, 377
165, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 192, Jews, 140, 371
193, 195, 200, 201, 308, 338, 339, jiha¯d, 9, 15, 66, 178, 187, 193, 194, 264,
340, 367, 368, 369, 385, 386, 457,
458, 459, 460, 466, 471, 473, 474, 377, 383, 390, 459, 521, 562
475, 476, 485, 562, 563, 581, 596, jinn, 263
629 Jinnah, Muhammad ‘Ali, 12, 179
Islamic Summit, 563 Jordan, 9, 171, 204, 530
Islamic system, 183, 193 Judaism, 147, 221, 306, 378
Islamic values, 189, 191 Jung, Carl G., 221, 245
Islamic way of life, 182, 191 Jungian analytic psychology, 245
Islamism, 2, 9, 18, 25, 26, 27, 35, 36, 37, jurisprudence, 42, 439
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, juristic preference, 163

666 INDEX Khartoum, 151
khawd (reservoir, lake), 263
Juru Taman, 492 khila¯fah (trusteeship of human
Justice and Development Party, 26, 50, 52,
beings/caliphate), 164, 230, 571, 573,
345–61 589, 597
Justice Party, 5, 347, 390, 458, 470, 472 al-Khilafat movement, 13
justice, 63, 68, 100, 263, 417 Khurasan, 202
King, Martin Luther, 351
kadd (pain, labor, examination), 264 Kisakürek, Necip Fazil, 44
Kadivar, Mohsen, 628 Kivilcimli, Hikmet, 27
Kadivar, Muhsin, 426 kleptocratic state, 596
ka¯fir, 521 knowledge, 191
kafiru¯n (infidel), 267 Köprülü, Fuad, 24, 34
Kalam, Sadeq Ziba, 546 Korea, 411
Kalijaga, Sunan, 476, 488, 489, 493 Kothari, Rajni, 513
Kaliwungu, Nyai Ageng, 495 Krakitan, Nyai Ageng, 495
Kamel, Kareem M., 460 Kraton culture, 486
Kant, Immanuel, 289, 427, 441 Krauthammer, Charles, 323
Ku Klux Klan, 379
noumenon, 429 Kuala Lumpur, 195
phenomenon, 429 Küçükömer, Idris, 29
Kaplan, Rasih, 127 Kurdistan, 550
Karadeniz Tecnical University, 134 Kurds, 613
Karrobi, Mehdi, 629 Kuwait, 10
Kashmir, 88, 117, 369, 410 Kwi Pawilangan, 496
Katirci, S¸erife, 615, 616 Kymlicka, Will, 614
Katouzian, Homa, 547
Kazamias, Andreas M., 124 Labuan, island, Borneo, 196
Kebatinan, 461 Lacan, Jacques, 315
Kebenaran, 204 Lahiji, Mulla, ‘Abdullah, 437
kelam, 124 Lahore, 89, 110, 179
Kelang, 199 laicism, 126
Kemal, Mustafa, see Atatürk, Kemal
Kemal, Yas¸ar, 30 laic, 638
Kemalism, 3, 5, 12, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, laicity, 40
Lambton, Ann, 547
36, 42, 43, 44, 46, 49, 50, 52, 128, landlordism, 186
345, 352, 353, 536, 610, 611, 619, language, 91
622 Laskar Jihad, 391
Kennedy, Moorehead, 381–2 Latin America, 258, 377, 378, 577, 588
Kennedy, Paul, 583 Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent de, 244
Kepler, Johannes, 286, 335 Lebanon, 171
Kerala, 109 Lee Kuan Yew, 395
Khalid, Mansour, 150 Leviathan, 321
Al-Khal¯ıl, 540 Lewis, Bernard, 302, 306
Khan, Agha Mohammad, 549 liberal Islam, 453
Khan, Ayub, 110, 182 liberal reformists, 624
Khan, Halaku, 417 liberalism, 37, 257, 468
Khan, Karim, 549 Liberation Front of Pattani, 459
Khan, Prince Taimur, 417 Libya, 198, 591
Khan, Wahiduddin, Mawlana, 75–87
khanqahs, 330
Kharijism, 257

Liddle, R. William, 466, 477 INDEX 667
literal Islam, 453
literature, 91 Manila, 450
Locke, John, 335 Maoist, 386
London University, 145 Mardin, S¸erif, 32
Lord Curzon, Lord George, 544 Markham, Ian, 388, 401, 402
love, 100 Marrakesh, 90
Lovejoy, O., 3 marriage, 227, 579
Lucknow, 108, 513, 518, 645, 656 Mars, 197
Luxembourg, 90 Marseille, 214
Lyotard, Jean François, 218 Marx, Karl, 227, 547

Maarif, Sjafii, 458 Marxism, 244
al-Madani, ‘Abdel Harith, 304 Marxist theories, 589
mada¯ris, 105–21 Masyumi, 471
madrasah, 330 materialism, 90, 99, 221, 240, 258
Madrasah Aliyah Arabiyyah Fatehpuri, 176 materialist, 218
Madrasah ‘Aliyah Calcutta, 108 Mawdu¯d¯ı, Sayyid Abul A’la, Mawlana, 9, 13,
Madrasah ‘Aliyah Rampur, 108
Madrasah Nizamiyya, 108 14, 45, 92, 149, 153, 175, 260, 322,
Madrasah Shams al-Huda Patna, 108 328
Magnis-Suseno, Franz, 483 Mawil Izzi Dien, 579
Magog (tribe), 197 Mayer, Ann Elizabeth, 627
al-Mahdh¯ı, Ah. mad, 8 Mazhar, Ismail, 258
al-Mahdi, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 161 Mazuri, Ali, 563
al-Mahdi, Ima¯m (messiah), 197–204 McCarthyism, 305
Mahdi, Syed Iqbal, 594 McVeigh, Timothy, 411, 415
Mahdism, 161 Mecca, 80, 90, 203, 565
Mahdiyyah, 161 Medina, 90, 149, 151, 203
Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, 154, 166, 169 Medina arrangement, 149
Mahmud, Mufti, 114 Medina University, 108
Mahmud, Zaki Najib, 258, 276 Mediterranean, 539
maja¯lis, 645 Medreseci, 124
Majapahit, (Buddhist empire), 487 Megawati Soekarno Putri, 387, 389, 470
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, 390 Mehmet, the Conqueror, 202
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 387 mekteb, 124
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore, 457 melting pot, 372
Majlis-e Muttahida-ye Amal, 114 Menderes, Adnan, 24, 69
Majlis-i Mushawarat, 95 Mernissi, Fatima, 635
majoritarianism, 365 messianism, 197, 205
al-Makhdom (the servant), 450 meta-narrative, 296
Malaysia, 186, 191, 195, 392, 459, 596 metaphysical truth, 430
Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association, 455 metapsychism, 223
Malcolm, John, 548 methodological pluralism, 262
Malekian, Mostafa, 628 methodology, 154, 275
Malthus, Thomas, 317 Middle East, 1–20, 8, 66, 115, 202, 204,
al-Ma’munn, 279 305, 415, 461, 563
management, 572 military coup, 25, 49, 166, 612
Mangkubumi, adipati, 488 military, 346
millenarianism, 197
Miller, Judith, 303
Milo, Sandra, 382
mimesis, 240

668 INDEX

mimetic, 318 Murad IV, 329
Mindanao, 452 Murruwa, Hussain, 276
Ministry of Education, 124, 140 Musa, Hashim, 206
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, 635 Musa, Salama, 164, 258
Mirza, Iskandar Ali Khan, 528 Musharraf, Parvez, General, 105
Misuari, Nur, 460 Mushir-ul Haq, 83
miza¯n (scale), 263 Muslim Brotherhood, The, 14, 25, 145, 146,
modernism, 298, 576, 590
257, 576, 579
subjectivism, 27 Muslim feminism, 628
temporalism, 27 Muslim League, 13, 92
modernity, 15–18, 53, 217, 258, 285, 293, Muslim Personal Law Board, 96
Muslim Students Association, 214
573, 584 Muslim world
capitalism, 15–18
modernization, 153, 292, 318, 341, 362, liberalism, 10
Marxism, 10
564, 587, 589, 610, 634 nationalism, 10
modernization theory, 588 al-Mu’tasim, 279
Mohamad, Goenawan, 452 al-Mutawakkil, 279
monasticism, 333 Mu’tazilah, 106
monetarism, 594 Mu’tazilism, 257
Mongol invasion, 328, 334, 549 Mu’tazilites, 273
monotheism, 221 Müteferrika, Ibra¯h¯ım, 337
Moon and Star Party, 470 Myanmar, 370
moral, 63 mysticism, 240, 492
moral ideal, 230
morality, 167, 186, 339, 351 Nabawiyan, Sayyid Mahmud, 434
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 456 Nadi, Nadir, 129
Moro National Liberation Front, 460 Nadwat ul-’Ulama madrasah, 89
Morocco, 205, 380, 530, 579 Nadwi, Sayyed Abul Hasan ‘Ali, 13, 88
mosaic, 372 Nadwi, Sayyed Sulamian, 89
Moses, 200, 223 Nagpur, 99
Mossadeq, Mohammad, 550 Nahdatul Ulama (NU), 14, 206, 454, 467,
Motherland Party, 27
Mount Lawu, 483 485, 580
Mu’awiyah Abu Sufyan, Caliph, 202 Nahusona, Ferry, 402
Mudawana, 579 Najibullah, 564
mudharabah, 595 Nakhsibandi Order, 347
Mughal Empire, 13, 309 Namik Kemal, 69, 625
Muhammad, prophet, 77, 177, 566, 571, Napoleon, 549
Napoli, 382
573, 580 narcissism, 294
Muhammadiyah, 8, 390, 454, 468, 485, 580 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, 15–18
Muhiddin, Nezihe, 611 al-Nasser, Jamal ‘Abd, President, 12, 190
mujaddid, 197, 205 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, 295
mujahidin, 117, 563 Nasserism, 257
Mujeeb, Mohammad, 82 Nasution, Harun, 476
Multan, 110 nation, 66, 314–19, 321–2
multiculturalism, 365, 368 National Awakening Party, 471
Mumbai University, 523 National Fatwa Council, 198
münevver, 26 National Front, 145
mura¯qabah (contemplation), 332

National Islamic Center, 397 INDEX 669
National Islamic Front, 165
National Liberation Army, 215 Objectives Resolution, 181
National Mandate Party, 471 objectivity, 153
National Order Party, 347 Occident, 588
national prejudice, 187 Ogbern, William, 248
National Salvation Party, 27, 45, 347 Oklahoma, 411
nationalism, 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 23, Onsekiz Mart University, 134
ontological, 243
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, oppression, 183
40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 49, 58, 90, 103, Orabi Movement, 268
175, 179, 257, 267, 268, 314, 315, Oran, 214
317, 320, 321, 322, 323, 343, 346, Organization for the Petroleum Exporting
365, 373, 374, 515, 519, 528, 529,
530, 537, 544, 548, 550, 610 Countries, 563
Third-World nationalism, 12–15 Organization of the Islamic Conference, 416,
Nationalist Movement Party, 27
nation–state, 317 527, 563
Natsir, Mohammad, 473 Orthodox Islam, 330
naturalism, 59 orthodox Muslims, 338
naturalization, 292 Orwell, George, 2
Nazi, 187, 378, 413 Oslo agreement, 380
Nazism, 293 Osman Gazi University, 134
neo-Marxist, 589 otherization, 320
neo-modernism, 591 Ottoman caliphate, 9
neo-Salafis, 146 Ottoman Empire, 23, 287, 334, 345, 549
Netherlands, The, 393 Özal, Turgut, 26, 27, 46, 610, 613
Netland, Harold, 430 Özdalga, Elizabeth, 617
New York, 382, 387, 409, 414 Özel, I.smet, 46
New Zealand, 453 Özkan, Ercümend, 47
Newton, Sir Isaac, 216, 335 Özkaya, Eraslan, 609
Nicaragua, 380, 413 Öztürk, Yas¸ar Nuri, 51
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 219
Nietzcheanism, 293 Pahlavi monarchy, 550
Nigeria, 165 Pakistan, 8, 25, 88, 91, 105, 117, 165, 175,
nihilism, 218, 266, 297
normative, 318 176, 202, 338, 528, 562, 563, 591
normativism, 576 Palestine, 7, 118, 410
North Africa, 1–20, 206, 214 Palestinians, 294
North America, 1–20, 16, 176, 563 pan-Arabism, 90
Northern Ireland, 377 Pandan Arang, Ki Gede, see Bayat, Sunan
Northwestern University, 357 paradise, 263
Numairi, Ja’far, 145, 147, 150, 165 Parahyangan Catholic University, 453
Nu’mani, Shibli, Mawlana, 89 Paramadina Mulya University, 392, 362–74
Nur community, 12, 56, 64, 66, 67, 70 Parangtritis, 482
Nurcholish Madjid, 398, 474, 581 Parekh, ‘Abdul Karim, Mawlana, 99
Nuremberg Trials, 413 Paris, 214
Nuri, Celal, 23 Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), 398
Nursi, Bediuzzaman Said, 7, 12, 19, 21, 42, Partai Keadilan (PK), 390
44, 54, 55–71, 319, 320–1 Parthians, 549
Parti Islam Se Malaysia, 458
participation, 166
Parvez Manzoor, S., 289, 291, 295, 575
Pasha, Said Halim, 42

670 INDEX prejudice, 98
priesthood, 91
Pasqua, Charles, 304 print capitalism, 314
Pattani United Liberation Organization, 459 profit-sharing, 594
peace, 100, 392, 417 progressive, 29
Pearl Harbor, 388 prophetic traditions, 162
Pektas¸, Mesut, 357 prosperity, 392
Pemberton, John, 484, 496 Protestant Reformation, 17
penalty, 147 Protestant, see Catholics and Protestants
Pennsylvania, 387 Ptolemy, 258
Pentagon, 105, 205 public order, 67
People’s Consultative Assembly, 387 Punjab, 89, 112
Perestroika, 26 Putnam, Robert, 558
Perinçek, Dog˘ u, 27
Persatuan Ulama Malaysia, 455 Qaddianes, 169
Persian, 127, 139 al-Qaeda, 318, 321, 384, 392, 393, 396,
Persian Gulf, 176
personification, 249 412
Perwita, Anak Agung Banyu, 453 Qatar Muslim Foreign Ministers Conference,
pessimism, 552
phenomenology, 293 416
Philippines, 204, 370, 392, 459 qawm (people), 264
philosophy, 59, 62, 246 Qum, 629
pilgrimage, 482, 493, 565 Qur’an, 43, 64, 155, 178, 232, 261, 572,
Pitsuwan, Surin, 455
Plantinga, Alvin, 435 580
pluralism, 84, 425, 442 wa’d (promise), 232
wa’id (warning), 232
pluralist, 426 Qur’anic exegesis, 149, 156
plurality, 568 Qur’anic revelation, 221, 228
Poland, 293 Qur’anic wisdom, 320
polarization, 249 Quraysh, 80
political Islam, 466, 468, 612 Qurratulein, Tahira, 636
political radicalism, 187 Qut.b, Muh. ammad, 9
politics, 183 Qut.b, Sayyid, 9, 44, 45, 153, 164, 260, 288,
polity, 339
polygamy, 579 322
polytheism, 91, 221
ponderousness, 240 Rabbani-Gulpaigani, ‘Ali, 434
Pope, the, 69, 377 racism, 293
Popper, Karl, 426 radical revolutionary Islamists, 624
population, 316 Rafsanjani, Hashemi, 553, 555
positivism, 59, 221, 293 Rahner, Karl, 426
post-communist, 318 Rais, Amien, 387, 389, 393–5, 581
postmodernism, 45, 293, 298, 573, 584 Raja Muslim, Sultan, 450
postmodernity, 217, 218, 285 Rama Temple, 519
power, 316 Ramage, Douglas, 389
practical logic, 240 Ramakrishna, Kumar, 459
pragmatism, 293 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 100,
pragmatists, 453
Prambanan temple, 485 511
pre-destination, 167 rationalism, 286, 342
rationality, 153, 351
Ratu Adil, 204

INDEX 671

Rawang, 196, 204 Rumi, Jalal al-din, 429
reactionary, 29 Rushdie, Salman, 303, 512
reactionism, 27 Russia, 203, 318, 368, 369, 414, 548, 563
reason, 58, 167, 189, 216, 258 Russian revolution, 187
Red Army, 379 Rustow, Dankwart A., 352
Red Brigades, 379 Rwanda, 410
Red Indians, 294
Red Sea, 539 Saba, kingdom of, 169
reductionism, 217 sacredness, 244
reductionist, 218 al-Sadiq al Mahdi, 161–74
re-entrenchment, 576 Sadiq, Sayyed Kalbe, Mawlana, 99, 644–56
Refah party, 12 al-S.adr, Muh. ammad Ba¯qir, 9, 10, 593
reform, 154, 157, 271 Sadra, Mulla, 426, 437
rejectionist, 167 Saeedzadeh, Seyyed Muhsen, 628, 629, 637
relativism, 217, 260, 442, 584 Safavid Iran, 547
religion, 129, 219, 231, 246, 257, 342 Saharanpur, 108
religious intellectuals, 5 Said, Edward, 537
Religious Writers’ Association, 411 al-Saffa¯r, 9
Renaissance, 293 Sakarya University, 134
Republican Brothers, 169 Salafi movement, 164
republicanism, 69 Salafis, 146
respect, 66 Salafism, 257–70, 385
revelation, 58, 63, 167, 219, 223 Salafiyyah, 8–10
revivalism, 576 salvation, 165, 435
revolution, 187–9 Samarqand, 203
Samsun Ondokuz Mayis University, 133
prophetic revolution, 188 sanctity, 244
Reza Shah, 550 santri, 467, 474
Rid.a, Rash¯ıd, 7, 9 al-Sanu¯s¯ı, 8
Rifki, Falih, 125 Sanu¯s¯ı, 332
Risale-i Nur, 44, 52, 55, 57, 65 Sarai Mir, 75
Sardar, Ziauddin, 16, 594
‘aqa¯’id, 60 Sassanid dynasty, 549
faith, 61 Saudi Arabia, 108, 147, 309, 338, 362, 530,
tafs¯ır, 60
ritualism, 259 591, 627
Riyadh, 384 Savarkar, 371
Roald, Anne Sofie, 636 sa’y (effort), 264
Robertson, Pat, 389 scholasticism, 333
Robespierre, Maximilien, 379 Science of Dogma, 272
Rodinson, Maxime, 10 science, 189, 216, 238, 246, 258
Rogge, Michael, 461 Second Isaiah, 222
Roman Empire, 286 sectarianism, 249
Romanticism, 293 secular fundamentalist, 342
Rorty, Richard, 18 secular, 24, 126, 638
Rosen, Barry, 556 secularism, 52, 53, 56, 82, 84, 94, 101, 129,
Rostow, 588
RSS, see Rashtriga Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 154, 257, 286, 293, 338, 342, 532
Rububiyyah, 589 secularization, 57, 153, 158, 292, 362–74,
Rufaqa’ Corporation, 198
Rule of Law, 166 475, 610, 636
Seh Domba, 490

672 INDEX socialism, 612
socialist, 36
Seh Kewel, 490 Soekarno Putri, Megawati, see Megawati
Selangor, 196 Son Telgraf, 126
Selçuk, Ziya, 352 Sorokin, Pitirim, 248
Selim III, 329 Soroush, Abdolkarim, see Surush, ‘Abd al-
Sena, Cemil, 28
separatism, 99, 368, 370 Karim
sex segregation, 626 South Asia, 2, 3, 1–20, 7, 8, 9, 13, 21, 106,
al-Seyyed (the master), 450
Sezer, Ahmet Necdet, 355 107, 110, 118, 119, 175, 378, 542,
Sezer, Baykan, 26, 32 570, 644
sha’b (nation), 264 Southeast Asia, 1–20, 195, 378, 392,
Shabestari, Mohammad Mojtahed, 628 449–65
Shaikh Said Revolt, 57 Soviet Union, 26, 66, 378
Shamsul Islam, 524 Spain, 206
shar¯ı’ah, 10, 154, 181, 332, 391, 458, 563, Spanish Inquisition, 379
spirit, 65
572, 579, 611, 624 spiritual, 183
Shari’ati, ‘Ali, 170 Sri Lanka, 176, 366, 410
Shariati, Ali, 10, 45, 551 Stace, Walter T., 428
Shaykh, 171 Stalin, Joseph, 378
Shepard, William, 453 Stanford University, 400
Shinawatra, Thaksin, 393, 396 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 636
shirk, 176 state, 351
Shi’ism, 257 state feminism, 612
Shi’ite, 10, 106, 110, 162, 164, 198, 273, state ideology, 2, 37
State Institute for Islamic Studies, 461
331, 364, 649 state ownership, 590
Shukri, Ghali, 9 static, 189
Shultz, George P., 388 statist, 36
Shumayl, Shibli, 258 stock exchange, 414
shu¯ra, 575, 579 Straits of Malacca, 539
al-Siba¯i’, Yu¯suf, 9 struggle, 263
Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah, 207, 594 subjugation, 263
Sikh, 89, 97, 380, 519 Sudan, 146, 148, 157, 158, 165, 198,
Simmons, Martha, 388 563
sincerity, 63 Sudanese Socialist Union, 145
Sindh, 112 Sufi, 89, 162, 198, 461, 574
Singapore, 392, 459 Sufi Islam, 330
Singh, Karan, 510 Sufi orders, 450
Sinkiang, 369 Sufism, 60, 205
s.ira¯t (bridge), 263 Suharto, (President of Indonesia), 204,
Sistani, Sayyed ‘Ali, Ayatollah, 648 466
Siti Jenar, 488 Sukarno, Ahmed, 12, 467
slavery, 167 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, see Megawati
Smith, Adam, 185 Sukma, Rizal, 390, 459
Smith, Jane, 402 Süleyman Demirel University, 134
social closure, 314 Süleyman, the Magnificent, 336
social life, 226 Sullivan, Andrew, 401
social obscurantism, 187 Sunnah, 572, 581
social phenomena, 250
social security, 185

INDEX 673

sunnatization, 117 terror, 263
Sunni, 649 terrorism, 378, 387, 411, 564
Sunni Islam, 146, 197 Thai Muslim Students Association, 458
Sunni Muslims, 145 Thailand, 204, 370
Sunnite, 10, 162 Thanawi, Ashraf ‘Ali, Mawlana, 91
Surush, ‘Abd al-Karim, 425–33, 434, 441–3, theft, 168
theocracy, 267
628 Third World nationalism, 12
Sütçüiman University, 134 Third World, 1–20, 588
al-Suyuti, Jalal al-din, 199 Tibi, Bassam, 288
Swidler, Leonard, 402 Tien, Ibu, 485
Switzerland, 76, 345 Tien Suharto, 485
Syam, 203 al-Tirmidhi, 162
Syamsuddin, M. Din, 457 Tizini, Tayyib, 276
synagogue, 358 Toha, Abdillah, 398
Syria, 9, 258, 572 Tohidi, Nayoreh, 627, 636
tolerance, 286, 306
Tabari, Imam, 654 Torkomanchay, treaty of, 549
Tabataba’i, Muhammad Husain, 434 totalitarianism, 579
Tabatabai, Javad, 547 totemism, 221, 315
Tablighi Jamaat, 94 Toynbee, Arnold, 227
Tafsir, 135 trade, 91
Taha Suhaimi, Mohd., 199 traditional Islam, 575
Taha¯fut (incoherence), 336 traditionalism, 591
Taher, Tarmizi, 462 traditionalist, 157, 453
Tahir, Kemal, 30 traditionalization, 116
al-Tahtawi, 259 transcendence, 248
Tajikistan, 416 transformation, 233
Takiya Kalan, 89 transparency, 166
Taliban, 15, 117, 165, 343, 396, 412, 416, Tribals, 97
trust, 62
563, 626 truth, 216
Tamil, 379 Tuksal, Hidayet S¸efkatli, 619
Tampake, Tony, 402 Tunahan, Süleyman Hilmi, 44
Tan, Samuel K., 452 Tunaya, Tarik Zafir, 32, 128
Tanzimat, 11, 57, 124 Tunisia, 380
Tartar, 418 al-Tunisi, Khayr al-Din, 259
Tas¸er, Dündar, 26 Turabi, Hassan, 145–58
Taslima, Nasreen, 303 türban, 609
Taslima, Nasrin, 303–4, 512 Turhan, Mümtaz, 26, 34
tawh. ¯ıd, 573, 589 Türkdog˘ an, Orhan, 26
Taylor, Charles, 294 Turkey, 23, 156, 204, 206, 318, 330, 350,
Taymuriya, Ayesha, 636
tazkiyyah, 590 528, 582, 609
technique, 240 Turkish Labor Party, 28
technology, 573 Turkish Qajar tribes, 549
tefekkür, 58 Turkish Republic, 3, 5, 24, 26, 122, 124,
Tehran, 629
Tembayat, 486, 496 128, 140, 322, 611
temporal, 183 Turkish Republican party, 345
Termez, 203 Turkist, 36

674 INDEX Wadud, Amina, 636
Wahabiyyah, 8
Uganda, 531 Wahid, Abdurrahman, 204, 457,
ulama, 336, 385, 454, 581
Ülken, Hilmi Ziya, 24, 34 470
Ulster, 377 Wali Ullah, Shah, 107, 309
Uluç, Tahir, 402 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 539
Uludag˘ University, 135 waqfs (pious foundations), 571
‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, Caliph, 163, 168, 572 Washington, 384, 387, 409
Umma Party, 161 Wasil ibn “Ata”, 279
ummah, 314, 319–25, 408, 572, 575, 581, Watt, 306
Weber, Max, 314
582 Welfare Party, 49, 347
Ummayads, 164 West Africa, 309
UN Charter, 412 West Bank, 302
UN Military Staff Committee, 411 Western capitalism, 186
Unakitan, Ahsen, 355 Western civilization, 192, 538, 577
Unakitan, Kemal, 355 Western Europe, 563
United Development Party, 470 Western imperialism, 313
United Kingdom, 204, 364, 366, 368, 372, Western philosophy, 124
Westernist, 36
414 Westernization, 2, 9, 11, 19, 23, 26, 30, 32,
United Malays National Organization, 452
United Nations, 166 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 51, 55, 57, 65,
United States, 1–20, 66, 90, 155, 169, 302, 122, 124, 164, 259, 290, 291, 299,
322, 345, 360, 385, 562, 572, 589,
364, 368, 372, 613 610, 611, 640
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 166 Westernized sciences, 290
universalism, 286 Westwood, Andrew, 545
University of Canterbury, 453 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 451, 453
University of Leiden, 393 Wilkinson, Paul, 378
University of Malaya, 206 Will of God, 167
Uran, Hilmi, 69 Wittfogel, Karl, 547
Urdu, 25, 177 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 432
Ustaz Ashaari see Ashaari, Ustaz Wolfowitz, Paul, 387, 395
utilitarianism, 293, 314, 316 women, 169
Uttar Pradesh, 90, 108 divorce, 170
Uzbekistan, 202, 204, 415, 416 marriage, 170
narrator, 169
vagueness, 240 polygamy, 170
Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 510, 513 representation, 170
Vatican, 152, 377 women’s movement, 624
Vatikiotis, P.J., 303 women’s rights, 626, 645
Vattimo, Gianni, 18 divorce (t.ala¯q), 653
verticalization, 260 testimony (shahadat), 653
VHP see Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) Woolsey, James, 322
viceregency, 231 World Bank, 577
Vietnam, 293, 379, 541 World Trade Center, 105, 205,
violence, 187 388
Virat Hindu Sammelan, 511 World Trade Organization, 577
Virtue Party, 347 worship, 168
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), 511, 514,

516, 517, 518, 519, 523
Von Der Mehden, Fred R., 454

INDEX 675

Xenophon, 379 Zahedi, Fazlollah, 550
Zaidi, 171
yaqazah, 199 Zait Kotku, Mehmet, 347
Yaziciog˘ lu, Mustafa S., 134, 135 Zakariyya, Fouad, 258
Yazir, Muhammed Hamdi, 42 zakat, 112, 185, 590, 592
Yön movement, 28 zalimu¯n (injust), 267
Young Turks, 322 Zengin, Bahri, 46
Yücel, Hasan Ali, 29 Zionism, 293, 378
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 470 Zionists, 551
Yugoslavia, 318 Ziya Gökalp, 33
Yunnan, 202 Ziyaul Haq, 338
Yüreg˘ ir, Ahmed Remzi, 130 Zonis, Marvin, 545
Yüzüncü Yil University, 134 Zoroastrian, 332



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