the-daily-stoic_-366-meditations-on-wisdom-perseverance-and-the-art-of-living

Physis (φύσις): nature , the natural orde r; of things , s pe cie s , or kind: characte ris tic. Both Epictetus and Marcus repeatedly state that
we must use our ruling principle to keep ourselves in harmony with nature (Discourses 4.4.43; Marcus 3.9). In Stoic thought, God and nature
are one.

Pneuma (πνεῦμα): air, bre ath, s pirit; a principle in Stoic phys ics . The part of the soul set into disturbance by desires and aversions,
which Haines calls the inferior part of the soul, distinct from nous (mind). Epictetus has a memorable image in Discourses 3.3.20–22, where
he talks about the movement of a disturbed bowl of water being like the spirit in which things exist.

Proêgmena (προηγμένα): pre fe rre d things ; indiffe re nt in an abs olute moral s e ns e , but of re lative pos itive value , naturally
de s irable things , s uch as he alth. Opposite of aproêgmena.

Prohairesis (προαίρεσις): re as one d or de libe rative choice , our fre e will to choos e , the s phe re of choice . The term goes back to
Aristotle’s Ethics and has been traditionally translated there as “purposive choice.” A. A. Long, in an attempt to free it from modern moral
concepts, translates it as “volition,” a term we find too remote from everyday understanding—for generations prior it was translated as “moral
purpose” (W. A. Oldfather, George Long, and others). We are avoiding loading the term with either the moral sense of Christian tradition or
the modernist sense of will, so heavily colored since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. A. A. Long sees this as Epictetus’s preferred term for
what distinguishes human beings from animals (which also have hêgemonik on in his reading of Epictetus; Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic
Guide to Life, p. 211), something not even the gods can touch (Discourses 1.1.23). The term is used sixty-nine times in the Discourses
(1.4.18–22, 1.18.21–23, 1.22.10, 1.29.1–4a, 2.1.12–13, 2.5.4–5, 2.6.25, 2.10.1, 2.16.1–2a, 2.22.19–20, 3.1.39b–40a, 3.3.18–19, 3.7.5, 3.10.18,
3.19.2–3, 3.21.1–3, 3.22.13, 4.4.23, 4.5.34–37) and six times in the Enchiridion (13). Marcus uses it five times in the negative (ἀπροαίρετα),
or outside of our choice, and three times in the positive sense of deliberate choice (3.6, 6.41, 8.56, 12.3, 12.33). Where this is the focal point of
Epictetus’s system, Marcus leans heavily to hêgemonik on.

Prokopê (προκοπή): progre s s or improve me nt; on the path toward the virtue s of s e lf-control, courage , jus tice , and wis dom. See
Epictetus, Discourses 1.4, captioned “on progress,” especially 1.4.18–22; also 3.19.2–3. The word appears fourteen times in Epictetus (most
often in 1.4). Hanging out with the wrong people can limit our progress, according to Epictetus (4.2.1–5), and Musonius Rufus reminds us of
the same (Lectures 11.53.21–22; losing our soul).

Prolêpsis (πρόληψ ις): a primary conce ption, or pre conce ption, pos s e s s e d by all rational be ings . Epictetus talks about keeping them
ready like polished weapons (Discourses 4–5a, 6b). See also 1.22 and 1.2.5–7, where he talks about working over our preconceptions and the
true meaning of education.

Pronoia (πρόνοια): fore knowle dge , fore s ight, divine provide nce . Epictetus says we can praise providence if we have two qualities:
seeing things clearly and gratitude (1.6.1–2). Marcus talks about entrusting the future to providence in 12.1. The word appears ten times in
Epictetus (see 3.17.1) and twelve times in Marcus.

Prosochê (προσοχή): atte ntion, dilige nce , s obe rne s s . See especially Discourses 4.12.1–21. In 1.20.8–11, Epictetus says it is particularly
needed for things that might steer us wrongly. Marcus uses the term once in the body of his Meditations in speaking about what a short time
we have in life to keep indifferent things from consuming our attention (11.16; not here).

Psychê (ψ υχή): s tate of mind, s oul, life , living principle . It appears forty-three times in the Discourses, and the laconic Marcus uses it
sixty-nine times in his Meditations. Marcus has a beautiful image of the rational soul as a sphere in 11.12 (not here); Epictetus sees it as a
bowl of water in 3.3.20–22. Seneca’s term is animus, the rational soul. The Stoics were materialists, so the soul itself has substance.

Sophos (σοφός): wis e pe rs on, virtuous s age , and the e thical ide al of a practicing Stoic.

Sympatheia (συμπάθεια): s ympathy, affinity of parts to the organic whole , mutual inte rde pe nde nce .

Synkatathesis (συγκατάθεσις): as s e nt; approval to impre s s ions , conce ptions , and judgme nts , e nabling action to take place . See
Marcus quoting Epictetus in 11.37 (in verb form) and how it relates to k atalêpsis; also, in 5.10 Marcus talks about how every assent to
impressions is subject to error. This is the third level of self-coherence, concerning the will and judgment and what we choose to reject (see
chart). It appears eight times in noun form and twenty-one times in verb form in Epictetus: 3.2.1–3a, 3.8.4, and 4.11.6–7.

Technê (τέχνη): craft, art in the s e ns e of profe s s ion or vocation. Marcus says our technê is to be a good human being (11.5). Epictetus
uses the analogies of crafts and trades quite often, particularly in drawing focus to the proper material of our work as human beings.

Telos (τέλος): the e nd goal or obje ctive of life .

Theôrêma (θεώ ρημα): ge ne ral principle or pe rce ption, a truth of s cie nce ; us e d inte rchange ably with dogmata in dis cus s ing the
mind’s s tore of judgme nts .

Theos (θεός): god; the divine , cre ative powe r that orde rs the unive rs e and give s human be ings the ir re as on and fre e dom of
choice . As far as theology goes, despite reflecting the polytheism of their culture and making references to gods of all stripes, the late Stoics
were monists and pantheists: God = nature. Further, they were materialists, so even the divine spark in us—and the soul—are corporeal.
Epictetus was a Phrygian by birth and had a very vivid, personalistic view of God. He referred to God as a kindly father (see particularly
Discourses 1.6, 3.24). A. A. Long, the foremost scholar of Epictetus, put it this way: “Whether [Epictetus] speaks of Zeus or God or Nature
or the gods, he is completely committed to the belief that the world is providentially organized by a divine power whose creative agency
reaches its highest manifestation in human beings” (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, p. 134). Long thinks Epictetus was

reviving Cleanthes’s (successor to Zeno) strong religious sense. There is no transcendent god for any of the Stoics—a key difference from
Christianity. Epictetus says we must seek to bind up our choice with the will of God (Discourses 4.1.89). Marcus tends to refer to the divine in
a looser, often more polytheistic way (see 9.1.1), but he shares Epictetus’s views, especially when he says, “hold sacred your capacity for
understanding,” a gift from God requiring obedience to God (3.9). Seneca, too, speaks often of the divine in plural, but all three are agreed that
we must accept fate and seek to correct our own faults rather than blame others or the gods (Moral Letters 107.12).

Tonos (τόνος): te ns ion, a principle in Stoic phys ics accounting for attraction and re puls ion; a way of s e e ing what give s ris e to
virtue and vice in the s oul.

A WORD ON THE TRANSLATIONS,
REFERENCES, AND SOURCES

A ll the translations in this volume were rendered with the aid of two primary and indispensable
sources. The first is the incomparable treasure of the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University
Press), which has been the standard resource for the original language texts for generations. Today, in
addition to the handsome green and red printed volumes loved by many, the full Greek and Latin texts are
now available via online subscription, with terrific search capabilities in both languages, as well as in
English for the general reader, at www.loebclassics.com. I have found this service to be a godsend in
organizing and managing my work. From a lexical standpoint, the resources at www.perseus.tufts.edu
have proved to be invaluable, offering, in addition to search capabilities, links to the superlative lexicon
of Liddell and Scott (Greek) and the dictionary of Lewis and Short (Latin), along with comparative usage
statistics and occurrences across authors and time periods. I also used extensively the print editions of
both works (Oxford University Press) for particularly challenging passages and for source texts not
available online (Musonius Rufus). Of course, the translations were informed by the excellent work of
Loeb translators W. A. Oldfather, C. R. Haines, Richard M. Gummere, John W. Basore, and others. In the
case of Epictetus, I especially enjoyed consulting the works of Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a fellow
Harvard divinity graduate, and George Long (both available in print and at www.perseus.tufts.edu). There
have been quite a few more recent translations of Marcus Aurelius, and among them Ryan and I both enjoy
the lyrical Gregory Hays (Modern Library); for a more literal modern rendering, particularly for
precision with philosophical terms, the Robin Hard translation (Oxford University Press) is hard to beat.

With regard to the translations, the goal was to make the work of these late Stoic thinkers as
accessible, digestible, and coherent as possible. In the major terms of Stoic thought and its development
in Epictetus and Marcus, my effort has been placed on consistency and avoiding anachronism while
pointing out any places of difference in emphasis or use as necessary. Apart from the core terminology,
the translations have been made with an aim to remain as literal as possible, with only a few liberties
taken when needed to make a point stand out or to avoid repeated images or phrases. A special thanks to
Amanda C. Gregory for her review of my glossary and translations.

All source and line references given, unless otherwise noted, are to the original texts as found on
www.perseus.tufts.edu, and most of the remaining ones are to the Loeb texts (online version, which
occasionally differs from the printed editions in line numbering). The pieces from Musonius Rufus came
from an edition of the Greek text in Cora Lutz’s 1947 work, Musonius Rufus, Lectures and Fragments
(Yale), which I procured from a reprinter in India (but it contains only the Lectures and is missing her
introduction, the Fragments, and much of the textual notes). I have spoken with the director of Yale
University Press about possibly bringing that work back into print, and it is under review.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

I n addition to the Loeb Classics and online resources at www.perseus.tufts.edu and the other printed
translations mentioned previously, there are a handful of exceptional recent works by accessible
scholars that you should read:

Hadot, Pierre. The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, translated by Michael Chase
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

———. What Is Ancient Philosophy? Translated by Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, new edition, 2004).

Long, A. A. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004).

———. Greek Models of Mind and Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
Nussbaum, Martha. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, reissued 2009).
Robertson, Donald. The Philosophy of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (London: Karnac Books,

2010).



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