PAPER 3 Jacques Rust WHY FLUSH YOUR TOILET WITH 9L OF WATER WHEN YOU CAN FLUSH WITH 2L – THE NEW NORMAL When properly designed, built and maintained, the VIP (Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine) provides a decent basic level of sanitation, however most people prefer a higher level of sanitation, with full flush toilets being the most desired and accepted. The drawback however with conventional full flush toilets is that they require a large amount of water, which is not always available (Recent local example Cape Town Day Zero). VIP toilets, whilst, not requiring water to operate, have several inherent problems as they do not have a water seal, can smell extremely bad, attract flies and are perceived by users to be undignified. In a VIP scenario the pit/chamber is directly below the top structure resulting in communities often using the pit as a solid waste disposal site and consequently the pits fill up much faster. By having the pit/chamber directly below there is also always the increased risk that children may fall in and when the pits are full, emptying is a messy, unpleasant, and expensive operation with many municipalities now reporting a “reverse backlog”. The complex nature of sanitation in South Africa means there is no “one size fits all” solution. Each area whether an informal settlement or rural school has its own unique set of challenges and it was essential to develop a new sanitation solution which could provide a hygienic, safe and most of all dignified solution for all users. The necessity for a suitable solution that could help address the various sanitation challenges led to the development of a Low Flush system that could flush with as little as 2L of water (Potable and Non-Potable water). The system is able to bridge the gap between a VIP and full flush toilet essentially providing users with the benefits of a flush toilet in areas with limited infrastructure and water. The versatility of the system ensures that it can be adapted to different conditions and on-site requirements. The Low Flush system has been tried, tested and approved by various government departments and independent organisations such as the Department of Science and Technology, Water Research Commission (WRC) and is Agrément certified ensuring it complies with all regulatory requirements. It has proved to be a game changer in the sanitation space and its ability to provide a safe, sustainable and dignified alternative solution has been seen in the 100 000+ units successfully rolled out. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Flushing with 2L vs 9L – The New Normal. 2. Safe, Sustainable and Dignified Sanitation for all Communities. 3. Benefit of Approved Alternative Solutions. PAPER 4 Lennin Naidoo LESSONS LEARNED THROUGH THE MISA LIC CAPACITATION PROGRAMME Labour Intensive Construction (LIC) is a method of construction which proactively seeks to replace plant based tasks and activities with people thereby enhancing job creation through public spending. LIC is implemented under the ambits of the Expanded Public Works Programme: a programme which is now in its Fourth 5-year phase. Despite being in place for more than 15 years, the roll out of LIC may not have been as effective in creating jobs with little or no projects being undertaken labour intensively. Whilst the number of jobs which are created and reported on the National EPWP reporting system has increased, this increase may be attributed to improved reporting rather the creation of more jobs. Several papers have been written about the success and failures of the Programme. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the unemployment crisis with unemployment increasing to more than 30% in 2021. In response, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced a series of governmental initiatives to stimulate economic recovery. Whilst this was effected, the presidency embarked on a capacity building programme to mainstream LIC in order to optimise job creation through projects. COGTA was commissioned to undertake the pilot programme, in who in turn utilised MISA to lead the programme. In a first Cohort, 15 municipalities were selected from around the country as pilot municipalities to implement such a programme with strong focus on job creation using MIG funding through Roads and stormwater projects. Naidu Consulting was appointed as the service provider to support 8 of the 15 municipalities through formal and informal training, data support and LIC mainstreaming support. Whilst the projects realised some success, several key lessons were learned in the process which may aid future roll out and importantly begin to understand why LIC was not being effectively implemented in the municipalities. This paper will outline the approach to programme, the scope of works, and the challenges experienced which have been identified as impeding LIC implementation. The paper will not look to unpack LIC but rather focus on unpacking some of the reasons why LIC has not gained the traction that it ought to have. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. LIC has the potential to create jobs. 2. LIC has not been adequately embraced and implemented. 3. Several barriers have hindered LIC implementation. 4. Several work arounds may exist which could enhance LIC implementation. ABSTRACTS IMESA 49
PAPER 5 Burgert Gildenhuys STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS ON MUNICIPAL SERVICE DELIVERY There remains a continuous emphasis on infrastructure investment as the solution to municipal service delivery challenges. However, this paper will show that the inability to meet service delivery targets comes from structural impediments that developed over the past three decades in the municipal environment. A strong focus is on increased delivery through improved administrations and implementation capacity. However, since 1990 many seminal events have contributed to structural challenges, making it nearly impossible to meet infrastructure and service delivery expectations. These events started with the Soweto According 1990, where the link between the cost of services and the payment for services was broken. One should also consider the impact of the De Loor Task Group on a National Housing policy in 1992 that established the principle of differentiated service levels. Differentiated infrastructure service levels were incorporated into the IDP in 1994. Over time, even the constitutional objectives of local government were conveniently ignored by politicians, policymakers and planners. Furthermore, a lack of skills to do infrastructure investment planning, establishing “wall-to-wall” municipalities that had to implement policies with a strong urban bias in rural areas, introducing free basic services, and our spatial planning legislation all created structural barriers for service delivery. These barriers make it difficult, if not impossible, to make good on political promises and meet community expectations through sustainable local government. The paper will conclude by showing how structural impediments reinforced by continuous low economic growth and higher than expected urbanisation rates bring local government to its knees. Radical new approaches and tough political decisions are required to stabilise the service delivery environment before one can expect an improvement in municipal infrastructure service delivery. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Service delivery diverted from well-founded policies developed in the 1990s. 2. The inability to adapt to a changing environment resulted in structural impediments that make service delivery as contemplated in current policies impossible. 3. Our infrastructure delivery challenges are compounded by our underestimation of low economic growth and high rates of urbanisation. PAPER 6 Esaias Oosthuizen & Sboniso Masuku REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AT LOCAL AND DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES The National Land Transport Act (NLTA, Act 5 of 2009) requires transport authorities at local and district municipality to develop Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs). The objective of ITPs is to facilitate coordinated planning between infrastructure development, operations and regulation for all modes of transport. The plans provide a five year road map for addressing transport challenges and needs and align implementation of transport projects with spatial and land-use development. The study found that the majority of municipalities do not have ITPs and therefore do not comply with the NLTA. The impact of non-compliance is evident in growing towns where new developments are accompanied by a rise in congestion, poor pedestrian infrastructure and crowded city centres; which together discourages potential investors and thereby curtail the town’s development potential. Lack of awareness, skilled personnel and financial resources were identified as some of the main barriers to compliance by municipalities. The study discusses the level of compliance and the extent of identified challenges and offers recommendations on how these challenges can be addressed. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Integrated Transport Plan 2. National Land Transport Act 3. Municipal Planning 4. Regulatory Compliance ABSTRACTS 50 IMESA
IMESA 51 PAPER 7 Geoff Tooley A TRANSFORMATIVE RIVERINE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM - A BUSINESS CASE FOR A NATURE BASED ADAPTATION PROGRAM TO PROTECT CITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND SO MUCH MORE…. So often engineers look for hard solutions to risk to infrastructure and forget about looking at nature and the options that it can provide. The same is true in eThekwini municipality when it came to damage to road crossings and rivers. Engineering solutions helped to reduce some of the risk. The analysis of the cause of damage highlighted the role of alien vegetation and solid waste in these blockages and damages. The Sihlanzimvelo project was born in a meeting of the eight departments mandated with looking after eight different facets of the same rivers. Eight departments with reduced budgets and staff compliments. This project looked to remove alien vegetation and waste from the streams through the use of unemployed people from the communities who were upskilled in business skills to form co-operatives who were then employed by the city. The program ran for 9 years on 300 km of stream and we became aware of many more benefits than just the main reason of reducing the risk to culvert road crossings. Through the C40 Climate Finance Facility we have been able to carry out a Benfit cost analysis and have proved that by managing our natural assets we can achieve the goal of risk reduction and at the same time achieve many other goals of socio-economic and environmental value. This is a case study of Nature Based Adaptation which is cost effective and which is making our city more resilient in the face of climate change. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Grey infrastructure risk reduction. 2. Job creation. 3. Environmental biodiversity improvement. 4. Socio-economic development. 5. Redressing the imbalances of the past. 6. A Covid recovery plan. PAPER 8 James van Eyk A PRACTICALLY APPLIED, HOLISTIC APPROACH TO VANDALISM PREVENTION Criminal theft has become one of the biggest problems facing South African infrastructure. If we don’t attend to repairing the social fabric holistically, the country's infrastructure will eventually be stripped bare. Anything less than an overall societal approach merely provides a band-aid when open-heart surgery is required. The breakdown of social fabric and socio-economic factors faced by many people including, but not limited to, inequality, the cycle of poverty and drug abuse drive the cause of theft and vandalism. But, while the big all-encompassing solutions to fixing the social fabric are (hopefully) the focus of national government, municipalities need to protect their assets as best they can to ensure they can still provide basic services. Community engagement is vital in building trust, educating communities, and preventing vandalism and criminal theft. South Africa, being a water-scarce country, is regularly faced with droughts. This sometimes causes intermittent or extended water supply failures. Additionally, instances of criminality on critical infrastructure are a separate cause of basic needs supply failures. Massive amounts of water can be lost through the damage and theft of critical infrastructure which in turn leads to further downtime for emergency repairs, which too are costly. There is difference between vandalism and theft, although the two are often used synonymously. Vandalism normally denotes damage just for the sake of doing damage but does not include theft for income. Criminals have monopolized the availability of an income stream through the like of illegal scrap yards. Most of our water infrastructure damage is criminal to generate income, through the sale of scrap metal. Ultimately, a person who is intent on committing crime, if given enough time or the correct tools will be successful. The key to the prevention of vandalism may lie in being a step ahead of vandals, by reverse engineering their tactics to defeat them. Physical vandalism prevention is only as effective as the security response to vandalism. The security response must be prompt and have a zero-tolerance approach with respect to the law. This paper explores actionable implementation of systems not only in water, but roads and traffic lights and other cr including physical measures to delay vandalism, and in some pilot projects the vandals reached a point of not being able to complete their mission. Further, it focusses on, community engagement to promote a sense of ownership of the infrastructure and encourage reporting of vandalism. This leads to the interrogation of the market for stolen infrastructure, and the requirements for supporting services such as security. How to bring ownership of infrastructure to the people’s door is the key question. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. The effects of vandalism and criminal theft on critical utility infrastructure. 2. Proactive, practical techniques for vandalism prevention based on reactive occurrences. 3. Community engagement and awareness campaigns. 4. Exacerbation of water supply failures as a result of vandalism. 5. Drought and contributing factors to water supply failures. 6. Ongoing successful pilot projects with roads and traffic flow. ABSTRACTS
PAPER 10 Matt Braune & Lauren de Bude SOLVING FLOODING PROBLEMS USING SUSTAINABLE URBAN DESIGN SYSTEMS (SUDS) IN A CHANGING WORLD The current urban environment is rapidly changing due to more high density developments within municipal areas. Additional climate change and sporadic, more intense storm events as South Africa has experienced this rainy season has caused an increase in flooding problems and damage to property. This combined with financial constraints increases the pressure on municipalities to solve urban flooding problems in a more cost effective manner. A recent project involving the remediation of flooding problems in a residential estate within the City of Tshwane has highlighted the benefits and cost savings achieved when considering the SUDS approach. The project involved the remediation of frequently occurring flooding problems in the Zwavelkloof residential estate. This estate which was part of the Kungwini municipality was developed without considering the impact of natural watercourses and upstream development. This caused several private properties as well as roads to be flooded and damaged. Kungwini was then incorporated within Tshwane who then became responsible for the urban drainage within the Estate. A master plan study was subsequently carried out which determined that a budget of R30 million would be required to solve the flooding problems. This budget was based on constructing an entirely new and larger underground drainage network which nobody could afford . In order to now assist the residential estate a new approach using SUDS was adopted. This approach included the use of an attenuation dam, diversion berms, as well as swales and natural floodplains thereby reducing the budget to R3,5 million. This paper presents a case study which highlights the significant benefits of solving urban flooding problems using the SUDS principles. The paper also gives details on how the flood control measures were designed, constructed and how they performed during an extreme 1:100-year storm event that occurred during February 2022. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Cost effective urban drainage control. 2. Benefits of using SUDS for stormwater control in an urban environment. 3. Reducing risk and liability claims against a municipality. PAPER 9 Dr Kevin Wall MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR BUDGET AND EXPENDITURE REGULATIONS - REALITIES AND REPERCUSSIONS Treasury has laid down that municipalities shall budget for maintenance and repair an annual sum equivalent to 8% of the “carrying value” of “property, plants and equipment and investment property”. The guidance provided by this ruling is invaluable. But a “one size fits all” norm of this type can only be an interim benchmark. Moreover, to what extent do municipalities pay much heed to the ruling on 8% of the carrying value? And what is Treasury doing about those municipalities which chronically under-budget? Furthermore, the 8% norm will likely be insufficient under most circumstances, especially given the substantial maintenance backlogs which municipalities are known to carry. Research initially undertaken in the course of reviewing budget guidelines for Treasury revealed the extent to which municipalities, with very few exceptions, are reported to be spending far less than even this inadequate 8% – in some cases, spending hardly anything at all on maintenance and repair. Also, whereas it is crucial to service delivery by any municipality that the strategic infrastructure be identified and that it must receive priority when the maintenance and repair budget is allocated, in so many cases this is not done. The purpose of the proposed paper is (i) to outline and comment on the current guidelines, and (ii) to present the spending realities, acknowledging that, while municipalities are strapped for funds, generally, more can be done, or the consequences for service delivery will be dire – as is already evident. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Does the “8% of carrying value” norm make sense for all municipalities? 2. On what basis should repair and maintenance be budgeted? 3. What to do about that great majority of municipalities which budget far less than 8%? In particular, what could, or should, Treasury do? 4. Will changing the 8%, or Treasury transferring more funding to municipalities, improve municipal repair and maintenance? ABSTRACTS 52 IMESA
IMESA 53 PAPER 11 Amanda Gcanga & James Cullis BUILDING URBAN WATER RESILIENCE FOR AFRICAN CITIES Africa is the fastest urbanizing region in the world (OECD, 2020). At the same time, African cities are currently facing climate-change related challenges such as droughts, floods, and sea-level rise. Climate change impacts are projected to worsen water availability in African cities, while water demand is projected to triple by 2030. The IPCC’s sixth report projects that this situation will worsen as climatic conditions will become more frequent putting pressure on the most vulnerable population groups. In South Africa, climate change brings the urgent attention to water-related challenges faced by cities. In recent years both Cape Town and Gqeberha have illustrated the risks associated with water systems that are vulnerable and unequipped to handle climate change impacts. Climate change is not the only cause contributing to water security challenges faced by cities, other systematic issues are at play. Sound planning, ecological management, investment and management of water resources and water services infrastructure ARE critical to climate resilience. Building water resilience in South African cities will also require new approaches that include sustainable water investments, changes in planning approaches, diversifying water sources, integrated and adaptive water management across society, and shifting behaviour and mindset towards appreciating the true value of water security and resilience. As South Africa’s cities are central to humans, economy, and ecosystems, there’s an urgent need to address immediate and future water shock and stresses within the context climate change. Through the Urban Water Resilience (UWR) Initiative in Africa, the World Resources Institute (WRI) is working with individual city and local partners to improve understanding of urban water resilience and identify concrete pathways for action through grounded research, spatial analysis, and a multi-stakeholder strategic planning process utilizing the City Water Resilience Approach (CWRA). Using the CWRA, WRI, supported by Zutari and the South African Cities Network, worked with stakeholders in Johannesburg and Gqeberha, to assess the current context behind their water systems, including shocks and stresses, natural asset and basin management, financing mechanisms, infrastructure capacity, and governance processes. The outcome of the application of this approach in these two cities will be presented. This includes the identification of critical actions as pathways to building resilience in these two cities, as well as lessons that can be learnt for improving the water resilience of other African cities. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Climate change risks for water supply in African cities. 2. Improved water security and resilience for African cities. 3. Urban Water Resilience Initiative (UWRI) in Africa. PAPER 12 François Figueres & Timothée Cargill ACHIEVEMENTS ON NRW (NON-REVENUE WATER) REDUCTION: 3 DETAILED USE CASES All around the world, water resources are subject to significant stress from human water demand. Water demand is made of the domestic and industrial consumption but also the network losses. Identifying and reducing these water losses is therefore a major functional requirement regarding the sustainability of a drinking water utility. Indeed, tackling the large amounts of produced drinkable water which do not reach the users is the way for water utilities to gain significant volume of resources and ensure a sustainable service. The understanding of the loss types and the associated volumes is not an easy task and is the key first step to define a proper action plan. Suez have a long track record doing this assessment in many operational contexts and has collected a great experience in this technical analysis. The three use cases presented here are part of this experience. However, the economic feasibility of the reduction measures is the second key issue for the utility. As a matter of fact, the cost of each cubic meter saved varies depending on the used method. The utility may have limited budget resources to execute the defined action plan. Therefore, the water loss reduction levers should be assessed based on studies and successful experiences, to compose the more cost-effective combination of actions. This combination is unique for each network, but some common elements can be discerned. This paper gives detailed feedback on 3 use cases: Bordeaux, Sao Paulo, and Santiago. In these three cities, significant reduction of water losses was achieved and carefully documented by Suez during the years of execution, taking into account all the parameters and reporting several performance indicators in a way to have a holistic panorama and understanding. The results shared present a detailed breakdown of the reduction achieved, by type of lever and with quantified evaluations, with both volume and cost breakdowns. The International Water Association having identified and documented the 4 pillars to tackle the real losses, the feedback will be presented on this scheme for better divulgation. This feedback gives actual inputs regarding the cost & benefits analysis which is a key part of any NRW reduction action plan. With the establishment of an effective and adequate water loss management action plan, the utilities can recover the large volumes of water lost through leaks and pipe bursts. Key Presentation Impact Points: Detailed feedback on NRW (Non-Revenue Water) reduction: 1. Quantified results of water loss volume saved by type of action. 2. Quantified costs by type of action. 3. Unit price of each saved cubic meter by type of action. ABSTRACTS
54 IMESA PAPER 13 Nomathandazo Makhushe THE ROLE OF SMALL, MEDIUM AND MICRO ENTERPRISES (SMMES) IN WASTE MANAGEMENT The waste management sector and corporate enterprises, in support of corporate social and environmental responsibility have a critical function in sustainable development, especially in the context of South Africa, where the waste management hierarchy in its’ approach to waste management legislation is supported, as well as the promotion of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) and employment. SMMEs are critical components in the creation of new job opportunities, maintaining the innovation cycle and strengthening regional economies (Silajdžić, 2015). The role of SMMEs in achieving sustainable and green development is increasingly becoming an important topic in developing economies. SMMEs account for up to 99% of all enterprises and two-thirds of employment across the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Usui & Martinez-Fernandez, 2011), emphasizing the key role that they play in transitioning economies towards sustainable business practices. The culture of outsourcing the waste management function in South Africa is evident, and SMMEs are an important component of the waste management value chain. There is room for improvement in environmental responsibility amongst the SMMEs in terms of their response to legislation pressure and supply chain requirements. Some challenges experienced include the bureaucracy of the waste sector legal requirements, uninformed business sector and public with regard to environmental issues, and the competitive nature of the waste management sector. In the 21st century, the unsustainable consumption of the earth’s resources is an important matter, as well as the increase in waste generation as a result of this consumption. “There is a strong link between waste creation and wealth creation (Strange, 2002) and the problem of waste has emerged as one of the most contentious and dramatic consequences of global marketdriven economic development” (Strange, 2002). The increase in waste generation should be managed to prevent public health, nuisance, and environmental problems. This presentation explores the role that SMMEs play in extended producer and environmental responsibility from a waste management perspective in South Africa. It also looks into the challenges faced by SMMEs in the implementation of environmental measures, as well as evaluating environmental responsibility in waste management. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. South African waste legislation: an overview. 2. Corporate social responsibility and corporate environmental responsibility. 3. Waste, a business resource perspective. 4. The environmental importance of waste management and recycling. 5. Current waste management practices. PAPER 14 Shuaib Yunos BIM TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENT STORMWATER DESIGN Roads form an integral part of Civil Infrastructure, providing safe and reliable access from point of origin to destination. With the rapid growth in population, urbanization, and the pursuit of smart cities, the pressure on effective road design, construction, and maintenance is ever-increasing. With this influx of demand, traditional processes are put under strain, resulting in roads designed inadequately impacting safety and service, with one of these components being stormwater design. As of 2015, there were 29 megacities with populations over 10 million, and by 2030, it is expected that there will be an additional 12, with 10 in Africa and Asia. Polycentric metropolitan regions, which are made up of several connected large urban areas, have gained prominence in recent decades, creating new challenges in transportation planning. For sustainable transport, technological innovation is essential (United Nations, 2016) and effective, well thought-out stormwater design is crucial for safety and infrastructure longevity. This is where Building Information Modelling (BIM) plays a vital role in better tackling these new challenges and design complexities. With the progression in technology, BIM has been implemented, adopted, and mandated by many countries across the world, seen as an intelligent, innovative necessity for enhanced civil infrastructure design, construction, and maintenance, helping us adapt to our changing world. This session will be showcasing the application of BIM Technologies developed by Autodesk, and The Devotech Group of Companies here in South Africa for intelligent, effective stormwater design. These BIM technologies affords designers to incorporate and review designs as a whole, ensuring that the road design complements the stormwater design, as well as a range of other benefits and automated advantages such as the modelling of the stormwater network in 3D, checking of pipe flow directions, the creation and implementation of popularly used local South African pipe catalogues, regrading of pipe networks as per cover and slope requirements, executing watershed analysis and catchment generation, as well as analytic and quantification capabilities in line with SABS and the SANRAL drainage manual. With these BIM technologies, municipal engineers, civil engineers, consultants, and other design professionals can design and analyse stormwater networks in an intelligent and futuristic manner, promoting digital transformation and sustainable design, construction, and civil infrastructure delivery in South Africa and abroad. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Modelling & editing of a stormwater network using SA catalogues. 2. Regrading of the stormwater network & generating long sections. 3. Running a watershed analysis & generation of catchment areas. 4. Analysis and resizing of stormwater network. 5. Computing of pipe & structure quantities. ABSTRACTS
PAPER 15 Altus de Klerk & André Kowalewski NO SMART WITHOUT START – INNOVATIONS IN HYDRAULIC MODELLING In Southern Africa, municipalities often face a very challenging environment comprising constrained OPEX/CAPEX funding, poor infrastructure information, skills shortages, lack of ICT and software to name a few. Add to these a complex socio-political environment and supply chain blockages, sometimes linked to corruption, results in the prospect of becoming a SMART municipality fade to an impossible dream or at best, a long-term aspiration. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking effectively eliminates opportunities to develop the digital assets required to better understand physical assets, operations, and even the potential to effectively leverage SMART technologies such as Digital Twins, IoT, AI and Cloud Processing. Rather than being complacent, these municipalities must try to establish some form of hydraulic model as a first step towards supporting operational understanding towards a preliminary digital twin, and then develop longer-term aspirations such as master planning to ultimately become a SMART municipality. At many smaller municipalities it is often found that the information required to support the establishment of hydraulic models are wholly inadequate, rendering the effort close to impossible. Critically, many of these challenges require significant and laborious interventions and to compound this, these municipalities more often do not have access to the necessary OPEX budgets to support these inventions. However, through deliberate collaboration, adaptation and innovation, new and exciting (often disruptive) approaches were developed for municipalities to solve these challenges. These included the development of costeffective methodologies comprising consumer demand analysis and profiling, data cleansing and network cleaning which are all supported by the development of intelligent software algorithms. The combination of these tools and the necessary engineering skills and creativity enabled municipalities to ingest, analyse, clean and build hydraulic models at unprecedented rates without compromising quality. This approach has successfully provided many Southern African municipalities, including the Drakenstein Local Municipality, with the capability to build and maintain their hydaulic models. Drakenstein’s efforts showcase the value this approach provides and how access to hydraulic modelling capabilities can unlock significant downstream value and set a municipality on course to being truly SMART. It is proposed that any municipality starting its journey to becoming SMART consider the establishment of hydraulic models as a top priority. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Challenges at Southern African Municipalities. 2. SMART disruptive technologies for building hydraulic models. 3. Success at Drakenstein Local Municipality. 4. Establishment of hydraulic models a top priority. PAPER 16 Yeshveer Balaram THE MANAGEMENT OF ROAD MAINTENANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA – OBSERVATIONS ON CURRENT PRACTICE AND A MODUS OPERANDI TOWARDS ADDRESSING SERVICE DELIVERY The single most important (and valuable) infrastructure asset, that affects every citizen one way or another, is a country’s road network. However, in South Africa, as with other developing and, developed nations, public expectation in terms of infrastructure service delivery varies for a number of reasons. To many people the provision of decent housing, sanitation and electricity is the most important issue, to others the timeous collection of refuse and the cleansing of streets is the main concern whilst to many citizens the provision of well managed health services is the overriding subject. All of these topics are, obviously, of significant importance and all require substantial government funding. Despite the importance of the road network to a nation’s economic wellbeing, the funding of road maintenance is, globally, often curtailed to increase budgets for other perceived more important infrastructure. With constrained (and often inadequate) budgets, the undertaking of optimized cost effective and appropriate road maintenance of even a small road network is challenged without some form of road maintenance management plan. For larger networks this task becomes even more difficult. Ad hoc road maintenance on a reactive basis is not only inefficient in terms of cost, usually leading to premature failure due to incorrect remedial intervention, but also creates a perception of inadequate service delivery, and the risk of bringing the road infrastructure into a backlog situation. This paper presents observations on the current road network maintenance practices of South African road authorities and postulates a strategy to address public expectation in terms of acceptable service delivery in this regard. Key Presentation Impact Point: Road maintenance status quo and need for paradigm shift in methodologies to so as to begin reducing the current maintenance backlog which is rapidly approaching the point of no return. ABSTRACTS IMESA 55
PAPER 17 Dr Nezar Eldidy FLOODING IN LADYSMITH, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS Flooding has been a recurring in Ladysmith for the past 170 years due to its peculiar location in the uThukela catchment at the toes of Drakensberg mountains. During 1987/88 Ladysmith was flooded on three separate occasions and extensive damage was caused to residences and businesses. The worst flooding in 30 years occurred in 1996 leading to R500 million in damages and the evacuation of 400 families. Efforts to tame the river and manage flooding date has been going on since 1940s. Due to climate changes, research shows that the rain intensity slightly increasing from year to year. Also, the return periods are getting closer than expected. The existing drainage system need to be examined and its performance to be evaluated during flood incident. This paper, diagnose the causes to the chronic flooding, present the various approaches to solve the problem. The paper, examines local the risks, suggests measures and adjustment to the current drainage system, measures to maintain the river the system’s and successfully implement the solution within tight schedule. Key Presentation Impact Points: 1. Flooding 2. Risks 3. Drainage 4. Run-off 5. Back-flow 6. Seepage 7. Project scheduling 8. Klip River ABSTRACTS 56 IMESA
IMESA 57 PAPERS INDEX TO PAPERS PAPER 1 The opportunity for Independent Water Production in South Africa Presented by Rajiv Paladh & Jay Bhagwan 58 PAPER 2 Quantitative flood risk assessments for 3 townships in Johannesburg using high-resolution modelling Presented by Tjeerd Driessen 64 PAPER 3 Why Flush your toilet with 9L of water when you can flush with 2L - The New Normal Presented by Jacques Rust 72 PAPER 4 Lessons learned through the MISA LIC Capacitation Programme Presented by Lennin Naidoo 78 PAPER 5 Structural Impediments on Municipal Service Delivery Presented by Burgert Gildenhuys 84 PAPER 6 Regulatory compliance at Local and District Municipalities Presented by Esaias Oosthuizen & Sboniso Masuku 91 PAPER 7 A Transformative Riverine Management Program - A Business Case for a Nature Based Adaptation Program to Protect City Infrastructure and So Much More… Presented by Geoff Tooley 95 PAPER 8 A practically applied, holistic approach to vandalism prevention Presented by James van Eyk 102 PAPER 9 Concerning municipal maintenance expenditure Presented by Dr Kevin Wall 109 PAPER 10 Solving flooding problems using Sustainable Urban Design Systems (SUDS) in a changing world Presented by Matt Braune & Lauren de Bude 115 PAPER 11 Building Urban Water Resilience for African Cities Presented by Amanda Gcanga & James Cullis 119 PAPER 12 Achievements on NRW (Non-Revenue Water) reduction: 3 detailed use cases Presented by François Figueres & Timothée Cargill 126 PAPER 13 The role of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) in Waste Management Presented by Nomthandazo Makhushe 132 PAPER 14 BIM Technologies for Intelligent Stormwater Design Presented by Shuaib Yunos 137 PAPER 15 No SMART without START – Innovations in hydraulic modelling Presented by Altus de Klerk & André Kowalewski 141 PAPER 16 The management of road maintenance in South Africa – Observations on current practice and a modus operandi towards addressing service delivery Presented by Yeshveer Balaram 146 PAPER 17 Flooding in Ladysmith, problems and solutions Presented by Dr Nezar Eldidy 155
58 IMESA PAPERS By Kevin Foster1 , Rajiv Paladh1 , Andy Knox2 & Jay Bhagwan3 1 Bosch Capital 2 Bosch Holdings 3 Water Research Commission ABSTRACT President Ramaphosa highlighted the need for Independent Water Producers to contribute towards South Africa’s water security future during the 2020 budget speech. The Water Research Commission initiated a study that explored this opportunity within the South African water legislative and institutional framework. This paper thus presents the findings from the study, and details future steps that need to be completed to establish Independent Water Production in South Africa. An Independent Water Producer (IWP) is an entity, which is not a publicly owned utility, but which owns and operates facilities to produce water for sale to customers. Customers can include utilities, central government, municipalities and end users (industry or farmers). There are two broad pathways for the introduction of IWP in South Africa. This is either the introduction of IWP within the existing legislative and institutional framework or amending the current framework to allow for the introduction of IWP within the existing water value chain. Including IWP within the existing legislative framework may require the introduction of additional regulations to prevent unintended consequences. The opportunity for IWP in South Africa exists around desalination, wastewater reuse and small scale production for industry. IWP could therefore be implemented by focussing on Water Boards and Water Services Authorities (WSA) that: • Are developing programmes around desalination and wastewater reuse; • Have strong credit ratings; and • Would benefit from streamlined processes for procuring these projects. An alternative approach would be to develop a single off-taker with sovereign guarantees to procure water from IWP on behalf of Water Boards and WSAs. Industry will develop its own water supply to ensure security of supply in the appropriate conditions. This additional supply and possible redundancy is useful for building resilience in the broader water sector and the national economy. However, it does pose threats to municipal revenue. Restrictions and uncertainties created in the regulations around water sector intermediaries are the biggest barrier to industry doing this and should be improved. However, these activities should not be subsidised through public funds. The study raises several key questions and positions on the role and inclusion of IWPs in the water sector. A key question is around the issue of what independence actually means in the South African landscape. Any issues of licensing and allocation of water resources raise the conflict of independence. INTRODUCTION President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his budget speech of 2020, mentioned and highlighted the need for independent water producers to play a role in ensuring South Africa’s water security future. This was a relatively new concept and institutional modality in the South African water landscape. The Water Research Commission (WRC) initiated a study to unpack and understand this opportunity within the South African water legislation and institutional context, as well as exploring the route to the introduction of independent water producers in South Africa. This study undertook a literature review of international experience of IWPs, local experience and the South African water sector landscape and legislation. It then analysed the key areas of Legislation; Regulatory mechanisms; Capacity requirements; Institutional dynamics; Financial; and Social Aspects. The study also included a stakeholder engagement component to obtain information from sector experts and institutions that may benefit from the introduction of IWP in South Africa. This paper presents the key findings from the study and aims to facilitate further discussions on the position of IWP in South Africa. The paper also presents the emerging framework for the implementation of IWP in the South African water value chain. DEFINING AN IWP Independent water production (IWP) is an increasingly common approach to securing water supplies internationally. This is particularly true of drought prone and water scarce states and regions. This typically involve the private ownership of water production assets (treatment works, dams, barges) and the sale of water to public off-takers at scale for public distribution. Recent droughts in Australia, California (USA) and Spain, as well as increasing development in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel, for example, have seen a rise in seawater desalination plants, many of which are owned and independently operated for supply to cities and industries. These operations typically have long-term offtake agreements with the public operator or other customers. The international experience of independent water producers has been varied, with viability depending heavily on contextual factors including scale, quality of feedwater, location of plant, extent of environmental regulation, cost and availability of energy, and the extent of a drought. For the purposes of this study, Independent Water Production has been defined as follows: An Independent Water Producer is understood to be an entity, which is not a publicly owned water utility, but which owns and operates facilities to produce water for sale to customers. Customers can include utilities, central government, municipalities and end users, like industry or farmers. Importantly, this definition does not include private operation of distribution networks infrastructure. CONTEXT A review of the literature and engagement with key stakeholders suggest that there are both IWP and other private sector service provision PAPER 1 THE OPPORTUNITY FOR INDEPENDENT WATER PRODUCERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
IMESA 59 PAPERS opportunities in the South African water sector. IWP opportunities exist through several technologies, some well-established either in South Africa or internationally, and others that are emerging and are untested. This section of the paper outlines the key contextual elements that will guide the positioning of IWP in the South African water value chain. These are as follows: Strengths South Africa has some high performing WSAs and Water Boards that could procure from IWPs in the short term. South Africa also has significant engineering capability in the private sector and access to international skills, and has demonstrated the ability to create the right market conditions as demonstrated through the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REI4P). Weaknesses Many South African water institutions are weak and in financial distress, with customers that have poor payment records. These are red flags that will deter investment that relies on these institutions as off-takers. Opportunities Desalination and wastewater treatment in high functioning WSAs presents the strongest short- and medium- term opportunities for IWP. Work is already being done by the DBSA towards establishing a programme for wastewater treatment PPPs and this should continue and be supported. Threats Political and institutional instability in the water sector generally and WSAs specifically pose the biggest threat the implementation of IWPs. This both threatens the business case for IWP and makes navigating long regulatory processes more challenging, as they become vulnerable to changes in key role-players within institutions. Regulation Water is a tightly regulated sector, however, there are gaps in the legislation, which does not anticipate the emergence of new modes of production in the South African water sector, such as desalination and wastewater reuse. These gaps need to be clarified, particularly if private sector investment in these modes of production is being sought. This will provide investors with regulatory certainty. Beyond water sector regulation, the regulation of public entities and municipalities seeking to do business with the state is severely slow and difficult to navigate, which significantly increase transaction costs. If the use of IWPs is to be encouraged, a means to reduce the complexity and timeframes for these processes need to be identified. Learnings from South Africa’s IPP experience could add value here. Institutions The water sector institutional landscape has many players and strict regulation over their roles. Key players in that landscape including Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), some Water Boards and many Water Services Authorities are currently in financial and organisational distress for various reasons including, weak governance, poor financial management and controls, bad debts, political instability and low engineering and project management capacity. These factors create an opportunity for independent water producers to play a role, bringing in management and technical capacity and being able to source finance. However, they also create a significant challenge. Private investment decisions are based on the ability of customers to pay for the services provided by the infrastructure and there are limitations on the ability to pay throughout South Africa’s water value chain, from end user households to Water Services Authorities, to Water Boards, to DWS and the Water Trading Entity. The combination of poor financial standing of these institutions, and weak governance in many of them make investments in water infrastructure unappealing. Social It is unlikely that there would be significant social rejection of introducing IWPs in Africa. Household attitudes appear amenable to private roles in water production and provision. Given the experience of introducing alternative technologies, particularly wastewater treatment for potable reuse in South Africa, social acceptance challenges are likely to be able to be overcome through educating citizens about the safety of the technology and the reasons as to why it is being used. OPTIONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF IWP There are two broad pathways that exist for the introduction of IWP in South Africa. These are the introduction of IWP within the existing legislative and institutional framework or amending the current legislative framework to allow for the introduction of IWP within the existing water value chain. Amending the existing legislative framework will require Ministerial approval and compliance with the consultation and other existing processes to amend legislation. However, the introduction of IWP within the existing legislation framework may still require the introduction of additional regulations to prevent unintended consequences. The potential implications of these broad pathways are outlined in each of the options that are specified below. Option 1: Conventional bulk production (ground and surface water) Conventional bulk production IWPs would involve the ownership of water source and the associated bulk production infrastructure (treatment works and bulk pipelines) by the Independent Water Producer. The IWP would also manage the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and would assume the risk associated with this. These IWPs would require long term offtake agreements with its customers. Under current legislation the IWP could not own the resource where from which they source their water. Potential impact The potential impact of using IWPs for conventional bulk production will depend on the scale at which this will be implemented. Smaller schemes will have shorter delivery periods, but the impact will be delivered at a local level, as compared to larger regional schemes. The impact of this option is also moderated by the fact that it does not increase the resilience of the system as supply options remain undiversified and the system remains vulnerable to droughts. Institutional complexity Conventional bulk production (ground and surface water) has a layer of institutional complexity as IWP will essentially be performing the same function that Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA), Water Boards, WSAs and some Water User Associations (WUA) perform, essentially becoming competitors to these institutions. It is also likely that these IWP will need to directly link into the bulk network of these competitors, which risks creating institutional friction. The introduction of another institution that duplicates the role of existing institutions also increases the overall costs of providing water services to the end consumer. Regulatory complexity IWPs operating in conventional bulk production spaces would need Water Use Licences and would need to comply with the National Water Act. They would have limited control over the water resource which would limit their ability to supply their customers. Skills availability Given the conventional nature of these projects, there are adequate private sector technical skills available for the development of these
PAPERS types of solutions in South Africa. There is a need to enhance contract management skills in some Water Services Authorities to ensure that the long-term contracts can be correctly monitored and enforced. Option 2: Desalination for bulk water production IWPs could be the owner of the desalination infrastructure. The IWP would also manage the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and would assume the risk associate with this activity. These IWPs would require long term offtake agreements with large public sector off takers such as Water Boards, and WSAs in coastal areas. It is likely that the operations of these IWP’s would take the form of a PPP. Potential impact IWP using desalination for bulk water production can have a significant impact in the areas in which they are needed. Potential sites that are being considered in South Africa include cities and large towns where there are both economically strong municipalities and significant industrial customers. IWP using desalination would be particularly effective in coastal areas that are prone to drought or are expected to experience reduced annual rainfall or increased surface water evaporation because of climate change. Climate change will particularly reduce rainfall at the coast in the Northern Cape, Western Cape and Eastern Cape, as well as parts of KwaZulu-Natal. Introducing IWP for desalination in these contexts can increase water security and resilience to drought by diversifying the water mix. Typically, these projects are expected to be large and would impact positively on the economy as industry and businesses have greater security about their water supply. The energy intensive nature of desalination, particularly reverse osmosis, also presents co-generation opportunities with electricity provision, enabling desalination alongside independent power production projects, particularly solar, wind and natural gas projects. Institutional complexity IWP using desalination would be simpler to implement from an institutional perspective as compared to Option 1 as there are currently no large institutions in the country that has been tasked with unlocking the desalination potential in the country. Whilst there have been several institutions that are considering the implementation of desalination opportunities, there has been limited delivery of these types of projects due to the costs and complexity associated with these projects. In addition, the offtaker from the IWP is expected to be a Water Board or large WSA. Institutional complexity is also reduced as these institutions are empowered to execute on their mandates whilst being supported by the Independent Water Producer. The institutional complexity could be increased by increasing the number of parties that are involved in the transaction (multiple WSAs or a WSA and industrial off takers) and if the transaction results in reduced demand by a Water Service Authority from its Water Board, thereby reducing the revenue of the Water Board. Regulatory complexity The regulatory complexity that will need to be overcome for the implementation of Option 2 are elements of the MFMA and Municipal Systems Act and their associated regulations. These include the requirements for: • Long-term contracts (section 33 processes MFMA); • Adherence to Section 78 processes; and • Adherence to any PPP regulations that may be triggered. The National Water Act does not include the regulation of the treatment of seawater that is converted to potable water or for industrial purposes. Additional regulatory complexity may be created by amendments to the National Water Act to address desalination. Site specific environmental regulatory complexity may also need to be considered. Skills availability There have been limited large scale desalination projects undertaken in South Africa, therefore the technical skills base is expected to be limited. However, there have been several examples of projects being completed internationally with smaller scale plants having been built and operated for use by industry in Mossel Bay, Saldana Bay and Richards Bay. It is therefore expected that the South African skillset would have to be supplemented with experienced international resources. There is a need to enhance contract management skills in some Water Services Authorities to ensure that the long-term contracts can be correctly monitored and enforced. Option 3: Wastewater treatment for reuse Wastewater treatment IWPs in this context would involve the ownership of the treatment works infrastructure by the IWP and the distribution network to the customer. The IWP would also manage the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and would assume the risk associated with this. These IWPs would require long term offtake agreements with off takers most likely WSAs, but potentially water boards or industry. IWP is this context would most likely be reliant on a WSA for this unless a large wastewater producer could be sourced. The IWP may need to take over management of WSA wastewater treatments plant to ensure effluent quality is suitable for potable water production. It is likely that these IWP operations would take the form of a PPP given the likelihood to integrate into a municipal network unless a large industrial or commercial customer could be sourced as an off-taker. Potential impact IWP using wastewater treatment has significant potential impact in areas where: • Reliable wastewater systems exist; • End Users (households, industry of WSAs) are in relative close proximity and are close to end-users (households and industry) or bulk infrastructure; and • End Users are in a financially sound position. There is potential for this option in coastal areas where downstream users need not be considered as effluent is discharged into the ocean, and the environmental requirements may not be as stringent for discharge in the ocean. Introducing IWP for reuse can increase water security and resilience to drought by diversifying the water mix. However, the impact of this is not as significant as Option 2 as wastewater produced under drought conditions is expected to decrease thereby reducing the volume available for production by this method. There may be an additional limitation in the discharge of effluent from wastewater treatment works that has to be returned to the river to maintain flowrates for downstream users and other environmental reasons. However, introducing IWP for reuse would increase the availability of water in non-coastal areas thus increasing resiliency. Typically, these projects are expected to be large and would impact positively on the economy as industry and businesses are more secure about their water supply. Institutional complexity There is institutional complexity associated with this option as WSAs are responsible for wastewater treatment works within the areas of jurisdiction. IWPs treating wastewater will be required to rely on Water Service Authorities for input water at reliable quality levels. This means that the WSA need a functional and well maintained water and sewerage
IMESA 61 PAPERS network as well as treatment works. This may prove challenging as 57% of wastewater treatment works in South Africa are not well run according to the last Green Drop report and the enforcement of wastewater regulations is unreliable (Kalebaila, Swartz, Marais, & Lubbe, 2020). It is also likely that IWPs operating in this context will trigger PPP processes in terms of the MFMA Regulations, particularly if treatment works need to be taken over and run by the IWP. Other institutional challenges are expected to be similar to that of Option 2. Regulatory complexity The regulatory complexity that will need to be overcome will be similar to that of Option 2. Additional regulatory complexity may be created by amendments to the National Water Act and the need to maintain flow rates for downstream users and ensure the ecological reserve have sufficient water. A further regulatory challenge is that SANS241 does not currently deal with water quality standards associated with wastewater treatment for potable use and regulations around this would need to be developed. Skills availability Private industry will draw on capacity in the South Africa and international engineering firms as evidenced by the City of Cape Town that is currently developing a project of this nature (Faure New Water Scheme) to produce 100 Ml/day. The private sector firms are expected to react to challenges with greater speed and agility than public sector institutions due to reduced supply chain compliance requirements. There is a need to enhance contract management skills in some Water Services Authorities to ensure that the long-term contracts can be correctly monitored and enforced. Option 4: Community management through water services committees IWPs in this context would involve the contracting of an IWP by a water services committee in terms of Section 51 of the Water Services Act where WSAs are unable to provide the service. The IWP could build operate and maintain new water production infrastructure, likely groundwater abstraction and treatment, wastewater treatment or seawater desalination and would assume the risk associated with this. It could also potentially manage, operate and maintain existing water infrastructure. These IWPs would likely be moderately sized and require medium term off-take agreements for implementation. Potential impact IWPs operating on behalf of water services committees have the potential to address service failures by chronically dysfunctional Water Service Authorities and implement solutions that improve water security. This could improve access to water in South Africa and improve local water infrastructure. Secure water supply would improve economic and social outcomes for those served and IWPs, could employ local people to assist with operating and maintaining infrastructure. Communities are unlikely to object to private provision where public provision is dysfunctional, although this could be contingent on the revenue collection mechanisms that is used. Institutional complexity Water services committees required the approval of the Minister of Water and Sanitation and the Water Service Authority, as well as consultation with the local community. Local politics may pose a significant challenge to getting approvals from the local water service authority to form a water services committee. Regulatory complexity The regulatory complexity lies in the requirements of the minister to consult the local community and the WSA, the minister for local government and the province. This is potentially a long process, with few guarantees of establishing a water services committee. The other regulatory barrier is the Minister’s ability to disestablish water services at short notice, at which points the assets of the committee vest in the Minister. This is a great risk to the private party that has funded the development of the infrastructure that would then be ceded to the Minister. Skills availability Significant technical skills in the private sector exist to deliver water at this scale in South Africa. Water services committees may need capacitation to manage IWP contracts. Option 5: Emerging innovations IWPs using emerging innovation will be structured in a way that best responds to the technology. They could supply potentially at any scale, which any type of off-taker. If that off-taker is a public institution there is a high possibility that the IWP will need to be procured through an unsolicited bid. Potential impact The potential impact of emerging technologies varies greatly in terms of both timelines and scale. However, supporting emerging innovations align with national objectives around development of innovation and technology development as well as the diversification of water supply sources. Institutional complexity The institutional complexity of emerging innovations lies primarily in the perceptions of risk amongst decision makers and accountable officials in the relevant water sector institutions. These decision makers face significant risks should innovations procured fail to meet the expected requirements. IWPs can avoid this by taking on risk, including financing infrastructure required to connect their technologies to appropriate point in the water systems, and asking the off-taker to only pay for water received. Transferring the cost of building and maintaining this infrastructure to the IWP ameliorate this risk to the WSA. Regulatory complexity If an innovation is marketed as supplying water to a WSA through an IWP it is likely that that innovation will encounter the MFMA SCM regulation regarding unsolicited bids. This is expected to be a protracted process and contingent on satisfying the concerns of the municipal accounting officer. In some instances, they may also trigger PPP regulations. Other regulatory concerns are likely to be innovation specific and related to the quality of water produced and the environmental impact of the production process. Skills availability The availability of skills to develop innovation from a concept into viable, scalable solutions is a challenge in South Africa. However, innovators linking with suitable partners, such as established engineering firms offers a means to overcome this and implement innovations at scale. MANAGING THE FUNDING RISK It is expected that the introduction of IWP in a South African context should be structured in a manner that is able to attract private sector investment. The factors that will impact on securing this investment are further discussed below. The customer An investor will assess the credibility of the customer of the IWP when making an investment. The customers that have been identified for IWP include:
62 IMESA PAPERS • WSAs and water boards; • Industrial and agricultural consumers; and • Communities and households. It is likely that only the large WSAs and Water Boards that serve areas that have strong economic bases and good credit ratings would attract investment. Investment in the remaining institutions would require guarantees to be provided by National Treasury. The price point There is a view that the current water tariffs may not fully reflect the cost of water produced in South Africa and IWP producing water at a higher price than existing solutions may result in the higher prices being challenged. Conversely, conversations with key stakeholders suggest that the low price of water may result in investors being reluctant to invest in the sector. Site specific costs are also expected to have a significant impact on the cost of water production. The costs of producing the water and transporting the water to the identified customer would need to be carefully evaluated before an investment decision can be made. Contractual certainty Private funding will depend on the ability of the water services committee to sign offtake agreements that will last long enough for IWPs and their funders to recover their investment. For a small-scale plant this could be achieved within a few years, but larger plants will require bigger investments and longer offtake agreements. An investor would expect that the contract entered into by the IWP will be honoured by all parties for the duration of the contract. Declining municipal revenue It may be possible to attract private sector investment if IWP produces water to be sold to industrial or commercial agricultural customers. However, this could result in a decline of the water revenue for WSAs or WUAs and would have to be carefully considered. An intervention that redirects revenue from a municipal customer (households and industrial) towards IWP could have a significant negative impact on the finances of the WSA. This would further impact on the services provided by the WSAs in the provision of water services (particularly indigent households) and other social services that are offered and cross subsidized from water and sanitation tariffs. Social considerations It is unlikely that there would be significant social rejection of introducing IWPs in Africa. Household attitudes appear amenable to private roles in water production and provision, and experiences suggests that socially challenging technologies would be acceptable. Given the relatively infancy of the IWP concept, it may be possible to use the opportunity to position IWP in manner that addresses some of the inherent challenges in the water sector whilst still protecting the rights to access of water by users, and unaffordable tariffs. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD The opportunity for IWP exists in South Africa, particularly around desalination, wastewater reuse, and small-scale production for industry. However, for IWP to contribute to addressing South Africa’s water challenges, of adequate skills, finance, and water resilience, significant TABLE 1: Emerging positions and key questions Emerging position Key questions to be addressed Position 1: IWP means the production of water by a private company, for own use or sale to and off taker. It is not useful to narrow this definition, except for programmatic purposes, and in the programming process to introduce IWP at the identified areas in the South African water value chain. Is this an appropriate definition? Is narrowing the definition per program a useful way to apply IWP in South Africa? Position 2: In most instances, the model for IWPs providing water to government agencies, is likely to be a PPP arrangement, and programmes should be established in the appropriate branches of government to enable these arrangements at the various points in the water value chain. Are PPPs the most viable approach to IWP in South Africa? Where should programmes to enable IWPs be located organisationally? Position 3: Pursuing IWP would require different programmatic approaches depending on scale and the point in the water value chain. This includes a programme toward: • The procurement IWPs for resource development and bulk production for appropriate water boards and WSAs. • Enabling WSA to appoint IWPs to treat wastewater for reuse. • Allowing IWPs to pilot and scale emerging technologies and strategies. • Enabling community self-provision through water committees and IWPs, using section 51 of the Water Services Act Should we apply a differentiated programmatic approach? Are these the appropriate programmatic approaches to take? Position 4: An economic regulator would be ideal, and assist IWPs and build confidence for IWP investment, however it needs to be highly capacitated, and be backed by a long track record of good data, which may not yet exist. The development of the track data should be a sector priority towards the establishment of a regulator. Is there a need for a regulator? What should be considered for the introduction of a regulator? This can include the need for independence, contractual obligations and risks. Position 5: Emerging Innovations should be further explored for IWP with proof of concept required before being scaled Can these innovations provide opportunity for IWP in future? How can this opportunity be unlocked? Position 6: The appropriate form of regulation of the of independent water production should be explored, whether this should fall under the National Water Act and the Department of Water and Sanitation, or the Department of Trade and Industry, or the Department of Environmental Affairs. This should also consider whither this regulation should be determined technology or resource used. Who should regulate IWPs? Should regulation of IWPs be contingent on the technology used? Should regulation of IWPs be contingent on the water source used?
IMESA 63 TABLE 2: Emerging framework for implementation Steps Key principles Investigate regulatory implications for the preferred programmes The principle of this step is to establish which is the correct regulatory domain for IWP the Department of Water Affair and the National Water Act, the Department of Environmental Affair and the National Environmental Management Act of the Department of Trade and Industry. Establish a regulator The establishment of the regulator should be done in a way that ensures alignment with current processes to establish a water regulator beyond just IWP and considers the wider institutional framework. The principles of the regulator are to: • Ensure credible quality control of water being used and entering the South African Water System. • Ensure low negative impact on municipal business models to ensure that the introduction of IWP does harm democratic local government. • Ensure IWP has limited environmental impacts that might threaten South African water ecosystems. Establish IWP Procurement Programmes Process The process principles of the establishment of an IWP Procurement Programmes are: • To ensure a proven market for independent water production so that efforts to establish IWP opportunities is not wasted. • To establish a credible, reliable and fair framework for public procurement from independent water producers to give appropriate confidence in the projects. Commercial The commercial principles of the programme are: • To ensure credible off-takers of water produced by IWP to provide security and credibility for the required investment. • To establish bankability of IWP projects to attract the required investment. • To support producers and off-takers to prepare transactions in a complex governance framework. Investigate emerging innovations for water production The principle of this process is to ensure technologies used are proven before use to maintain reliable water production and water quality, while preventing investment losses. Investigate the further use of Section 51 of the Water Services Act to enable independent community water provision in a sustainable way This process should enable communities to provide their own water and sanitation, through water committee, where municipal service provision fails, and allow them to choose the manner in which they do so but ensuring that it is done in a sustainable way. PAPERS work is needed to be done to address areas of institutional weakness in the water sector. A small number of water boards and WSAs could currently be reliable customers for IWPs, with the majority of water sector institutions being considered investment partners. IWP could be implemented either by focusing on those water boards and WSAs that: • Have strong credit ratings; • Are developing programmes associated with specific type of projects, such as seawater desalination or wastewater reuse; and • Streamline process around procuring these projects and bringing them online. An alternative approach would be to develop a single off-taker with sovereign guarantees to purchase water on behalf of waterboards and WSAs from IWP at scale, for distribution into the networks and free up water upstream in the value chain. This would require institutional restructuring at a national level. However, it may be possible to incorporate this into the development of the NWRIA. Key questions to be addressed The table below further summarises the emerging position of IWP and identifies key questions that will need to be considered in confirming the position of IWP in South Africa. These will be explored with stakeholders during the proposed workshop and further engagements. Towards the implementation of IWP in South Africa Based on the emerging position of IWP, the table below outlines the emerging framework for the way forward to enable the introduction of IWP in South Africa. It outlines the initial steps that would need to be taken and the key principles that need to be considered within each of the identified steps. REFERENCES Kalebaila, N., Ncube, E., Swartz, C., Marais, S., & Lubbe, J. (2020). Strengtheing the implementation of water reuse in South Africa. Pretoria: Water Research Commission.
64 IMESA PAPERS PAPER 2 QUANTITATIVE FLOOD RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR THREE TOWNSHIPS IN JOHANNESBURG USING HIGH-RESOLUTION MODELLING Tjeerd Driessen MSc & Oluwaseun Oyebode PhD Royal HaskoningDHV (Pty) Ltd ABSTRACT This project focused on the widespread illegal dumping in river floodplains which predominantly comprises of building rubble and fill material for creation of platforms and development of shacks. The proliferation of these informal developments is no longer sustainable as it is already resulting to encroachment of the floodplains, unsafe living conditions, damage to existing infrastructure and possible increase in flood risk due to changes in the river hydrology. These impacts are expected to worsen if no interventions are taken. The objective of this study was to assess the flood risk increase due to illegal dumping along the water courses in Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot. This project was commissioned by City of Johannesburg and implemented by Johannesburg Road Agency. Six state-of-the-art, cloud-based, two-dimensional flood models were developed using Digital Terrain Models with 1m horizontal resolution. For each area, two flood models were generated; one representing the 2012 (pre-dumping) situation and one representing the 2019 (post-dumping) situation. An extreme value analysis of the rainfall events of the three areas was done to determine the normative rainfall durations and depths which were required to force the hydraulic models. A total of 28 modelling scenarios were simulated using combinations of different time horizons (2012 and 2019), different areas and different return periods (ranging from 5 to 100 years). Not only were the flood lines derived for each scenario, but also water depth maps, water level difference maps and flood hazard rating maps were generated. This gave a good first insight how the response of the river system changed as a result of the illegal dumping of building material in the floodplains. A quantitative flood risk assessment was performed to gain a deeper understanding of the economic impact of floods and how the flood risk changed between 2012 and 2019. This assessment was performed using a Global Flood Risk Tool which is a cloud-based platform that quickly and accurately calculates flood damages and flood risk as a product of the modelled flood hazard maps, land use maps and vulnerability functions of the exposed assets. The study found among others that during a 100-year return period event water level increases of up to 1.8m could occur as a result of the illegal dumping. Also, the economic flood risk (i.e., expected annual direct flood damage) increased by 12-15% for Kaalfontein, 33-34% for Diepsloot and 8-10% for Alexandra between 2012 and 2019. Keywords: 3Di, Flood hazard modelling, Flood risk assessment, Hydrological analysis, Johannesburg, Rivers INTRODUCTION Several watercourses, floodplains and wetland areas across the City of Johannesburg are currently experiencing widespread illegal dumping, particularly of building rubble and fill material. The large-scale dumping of builder’s rubble by both small operators and large formal waste contractors has been ongoing for years at some sites. The builder’s rubble FIGURE 1: Overview of the Alexandra catchment (left), Kaalfontein catchment (center) and Diepsloot catchment (right). Blue lines are streams and red lines are streams in the areas of interest.
IMESA 65 is then flattened to create a platform and shacks are being built on the newly created ‘stands’. According to the City of Johannesburg, these are being sold by self-appointed developers. Structures are also built over pipelines, servitudes and adversely impact storm water infrastructure. The areas which are currently of greatest concern are areas in Alexandra along the Jukskei River, in Kaalfontein along the Kaalspruit, and areas in Diepsloot along a tributary which feeds into the Jukskei River. The City of Johannesburg initiated a study to deal with the environmental degradation which has occurred because of the dumping, illegal encroachment, and related pollution. The goal of City of Johannesburg is to prevent the further infilling and erection of shacks within the watercourse and to rehabilitate the water courses to an acceptable environmental standard and thereby reducing the existing flood risk. The existing situation is not sustainable and causes major problems if no interventions are taken. It causes unsafe living conditions, it encroaches the floodplain, causes river pollution, threatens existing infrastructure near the rivers and could possibly increase the flood risk by the changed hydrology. The main research question that this study answers is ‘What is the increased flood risk due to illegal dumping along the water courses in Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot?’ The Environment and Infrastructure Services Department of City of Johannesburg appointed Johannesburg Roads Agency as the implementing agent for the determination of certified flood lines and quantitative flood risk assessment for Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot areas of the City of Johannesburg. STUDY AREA The focus areas for this study encompass areas along the Jukskei River and its tributaries which are located within the Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot catchments. The Kaalfontein and Diepsloot catchments are much smaller in size than the Jukskei catchment (which is relevant for Alexandra). Based on catchment delineation using a 1m Digital Elevation Model (DEM), the relevant catchment sizes derived for Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot are 110.6km2 , 9.7km2 and 11.1km2 , respectively. Kaalfontein and Diepsloot catchments are sufficiently small that all hydrological and hydraulic processes can be captured in the model instrument used for the study. Figure 1 shows the three catchments that are analyzed in this study. DATA The development of accurate flood lines and sound flood risk assessment are both dependent on the availability and quality of relevant site-specific data. There are four key processing modules required to develop the flood models which are a high-resolution digital terrain model (DTM), infiltration and roughness grids and infrastructure data. An overview of the data required (and adopted) to drive the model is presented per module in Table 1. Other information that does not necessarily form part of the model development process but is critical in forcing the flood models relate to the historical rainfall, water level and discharge records characteristics of the three areas of interest. However, for this study, the historical water level and discharges were not available for model verification purposes. MODEL AND RISK TOOL Hydrodynamic modelling software The model software used for this study is 3Di which is a hydrodynamic simulation software for pluvial, fluvial, and coastal floods and can be applied in both urban and rural areas. The software is a cloud-based solution that combines accuracy, robustness, speed, interactive modelling, and capabilities to model hydrological and hydrodynamic processes. PAPERS These processes can be integrated in one model using 0D, 1D and 2D components. This approach is particularly suitable for surface runoff, river flows, channel and sewer flow, levee and dam breaches and coastal water systems. The computational core solves the full St. Venant equations with conservation of mass and momentum using subgrid and quadtrees as described in Casulli 2008, Casulli & Stelling 2013 and Volp et al. 2013. The subgrid methodology has the advantage that the high detail of the schematization is used without the need for extra computational power. The computational core handles dryfall in cells well, while the subgrid approach greatly reduces the need for extra time step iterations. This allows for the use of high-resolution topographic data, such as LiDAR surveys. Global flood risk tool For the quantitative flood risk assessment performed in this study, a cloud-based platform was used to run high-performance flood risk calculations using parallel computing performance. The Global Flood Risk Tool automates a wide range of calculations, such as allocating damage functions, economic land values and investment costs. The flood risk analysis tool visualizes economic flood damage, affected people and economic risk. It allows for inclusion of risk reduction measures and compares the costs of such measures with the financial benefits of reduced risk. This cost-benefit analysis supports any strategic appraisal framework and assists in building a business case whether to invest in flood risk reduction measures. The tool uses water depth maps, land use or population maps and flood depth-damage curves as input METHODOLOGY Hydrological analysis The hydrological analysis was undertaken using an extreme rainfall analysis which was aimed at estimating the rainfall depths for the three areas of interest. To this end, a design-event approach was implemented using the Design Rainfall Estimation Software (Smithers & Schulze 2012) which executes the Regional L-Moment Algorithm and Scale Invariance (RLMA&SI) procedures developed by Smithers & Schulze 2002. The Design Rainfall Estimation Software was used to obtain rainfall depths for different storm durations (30-min, 1-hr, 2-hr, 4-hr, 8-hr, 12-hr and 24-hr) and different return periods (10, 20, 50 and 100 years) from representative rainfall stations within each of the three catchment areas. TABLE 1: Overview of the data required for model development Module Data required/used in this study DTM • LiDAR survey (2012 and 2019) converted to DTM with 1m horizontal resolution • Bathymetry information (or typical cross-sections) of natural rivers/channels with clear geographic projection • Aerial imagery Infiltration grid • Soil type classification • Land use data for both pre-dumping and post-dumping situations Roughness grid • Land use data for both pre-dumping and post-dumping situations • Manning’s friction coefficients (corresponding to land use) Infrastructure • Information on the existing drainage systems, and road and rail networks at each area of interest - Location - Dimensions - Shapes - Invert levels - Type of structures and channels - Road center lines and polygons
66 IMESA PAPERS The software uses a 1 arc minute grid to provide its outputs. All grid points in Alexandra (11 points), Upper Jukskei (26 points), Kaalfontein (3) and Diepsloot (4 points) were extracted. All grid outputs were averaged for each area to determine the average catchment rainfall at different storm durations and return periods. After obtaining the rainfall depths for the predefined storm durations and return periods, triangular-shaped rainfall hyetographs were developed (for each storm duration and return period) to force the hydraulic models developed for each catchment area. Given the small size of the Kaalfontein and Diepsloot catchments, no areal reduction factor (ARF) was applied on the rainfall depths. Simulations with the flood model of Diepsloot and Kaalfontein were performed to determine the normative storm duration (based on flood extent and level) for each catchment area. The Kaalfontein and Diepsloot models include the complete catchment, so the normative storm duration is determined by the rainfall that is forced directly on the model grid. A different approach was required to determine the normative storm duration for the Alexandra catchment, because the Alexandra flood model only includes the area of interest but still receives discharges from the upper Jukskei catchment which is about 78km2 in size as depicted in Figure 1. The upstream discharge from the Upper Jukskei is much (50-100 times) larger than the lateral inflow in the area of interest in Alexandra and will thus be determining the normative storm duration of the area of interest. For the Alexandra area, a hydrological analysis for the upstream catchment (which is about 78km2 ) is performed. The idea is to capture the upstream discharge from the Upper Jukskei and translate it to an inflow on the upstream boundary of the flood model that includes the Jukskei transect between the R25 and where the Jukskei crosses the N3 near Buccleuch. A detailed understanding of the flood hydrology of the Upper Jukskei area is therefore required in determining the normative storm duration of the Alexandra catchment and hence establish which upstream boundary discharge should be adopted. The T100 (1-hr, 2-hr, 4-hr, 8-hr, 12-hr and 24-hr) hyetographs for the Upper Jukskei area were used to simulate rainfall events in an existing PCSWMM model. The discharges obtained from rainfall-runoff simulations in PCSWMM were thereafter used to perform test runs in the 3Di hydraulic model to determine the normative storm duration for the Alexandra area. Flood model development A flood model is created for each area which results in three models. Figure 2 presents the 3Di process scheme (framework) that guides the development of flood models for the three areas of interest in this study. Each model has a 2012 and 2019 schematization which gives 6 model schematizations. The 2012 schematizations differ from the 2019 schematization, because it uses the 2012 topography and land use. Hence, the 2012 schematization also has different infiltration and roughness grids, because these are dependent on the land use. Table 2 captures the main model settings that are used. Sensitivity analysis Several tests with the numerical model were performed to help understand the sensitivity of the areas to certain parameters. Based on the analysis of these tests choices in applied model settings could be made. The following aspects of the models were subjected to sensitivity test and analysis: (i) Calculation grids: a fine calculation grid size was adopted within the river channels and area of interest and a coarse calculation grid size in the remaining area. (ii) Boundary conditions: a 2D energy slope boundary condition is used as downstream boundary in all three models. The energy slope is estimated based on the slope observed in the surface level and tested based on how far its effect travels upstream. An upstream boundary condition in form of a hydrograph for applied only to the Alexandra model. (iii) Infiltration: For all areas it was found that infiltration is not an important model parameter as it accounts for <5% of the rainfall volume. This aligns well with the theory that for short extreme events, in which rainfall intensities exceed infiltration capacities, infiltration is negligible. TABLE 2: Overview of main model settings Diepsloot and Kaalfontein Alexandra Model extent Complete catchment Only area of interest. Upper Jukskei catchment is not included in the 3Di flood model. Hydrological processes Yes, captured Yes, captured for the model extent. Hydrology of the catchments upstream of the model extent are not solved by 3Di, but are captured by using an upstream discharge boundary Hydraulic processes Yes, captured in 2D (structures in 1D) Yes, captured in 2D (structures in 1D) Upstream model boundary No Yes, time-varying discharge Downstream model boundary Yes, constant water level slope Yes, constant water level slope Rainfall on model grid Yes, time-varying rainfall Yes, time-varying rainfall Computational grid Structured, staggered with refinement (cell sizes vary between 4m and 32m) Structured, staggered with refinement (cell sizes vary between 4m and 32m) Subgrid Yes, resolution is 1m Yes, resolution is 1m FIGURE 2: Process scheme for each model development
IMESA 67 PAPERS (iv) Roughness: For all models, various friction values were tested and applied to the whole model domain to better understand the sensitivity. It was found that the models are relatively sensitive to roughness values (v) Storm duration: a range of events with different durations and a return period of once every 100 years were tested for the three areas. The critical rainfall durations tested are 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 2 hours and 4 hours. The critical rainfall duration (duration resulting in the highest water levels near the AOI) are then selected based on the maximum flood depths. The normative storm durations of the areas of interest in Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot are 2 hours, 30 minutes, and 30 minutes, respectively. (vi) Structure discharge coefficients: The riverbeds and floodplains in the three areas are characterized by a lot of waste and natural debris. Clogging of hydraulic structures has a great impact on its hydrodynamics and causes adverse backwater effects. Sensitivity tests were performed to determine the influence of clogged structures by varying the discharge coefficients of the structures in the model. The discharge coefficients values were calculated following the method proposed by Ollett et al. 2017. Flood simulations Following the development of flood models, simulations were performed to determine the 1:100-year flood lines for the three areas of interest. A total of 24 simulations were run comprising three areas of interest, four return periods (10-year, 20-year, 50-year and 100-year) and two time horizons (2012 and 2019). Simulations at return periods less than 100 years were run to serve as a basis for the flood risk assessment. It is assumed that 100-year rainfall events also lead to 100-year flood lines. Flood hazard rating A flood hazard rating is typically developed based on spatial analysis of flood depths and flow velocities. In the three study areas, flood hazard ratings were obtained for the pre- (2012) and post-dumping (2019) of rubble and fill material. A matrix developed by the Environment Agency & HR Wallingford (2008) was adopted in determining the flood hazard ratings for this study. The matrix provides flood hazard ratings and thresholds for development planning and control purposes and is useful for a range of applications such as an initial indication of risk to people. The “Hazard to People Classifications” is derived as a function of depth, velocity, and debris factor and useful for a range of application as an initial indication of Risks to People. The ‘hazard rating’ based primarily on consideration to the direct risks of people exposed to floodwaters, is expressed as: (1) where, HR = (flood) hazard rating; d = depth of flooding (m); v = velocity of floodwaters (m/sec); DF = debris factor (0, 0.5 or 1 depending on probability that debris will lead to a hazard); and n = a constant of 0.5 Flood risk assessment The study performed a quantitative flood risk assessment which means that the flood impacts are quantified in actual costs which finally results in an economic flood risk value. Flood risk is the product of two components: flood hazard and flood impact. The flood impact is a result of the exposure of assets and the vulnerability of these assets. The flood hazard refers to the probability, extent, and water depths of a certain flood event. The flood impact describes the consequences as a result of vulnerability of exposed objects (or land uses) to flood hazard. It is dependent on the vulnerability of an object to flooding, its resistance to the impact of a flood and capacity to recover to the state prior to a flood event. This vulnerability is described in terms of a flood depth-damage function which is a method that is often used (Du Plessis & Viljoen 1997, Du Plessis & Viljoen 1998, Huizinga et al. 2017). As empirical data on flood vulnerability is limited in South Africa, the majority of existing damage functions are empirical ones. Depthdamage functions from literature were used and the maximum damage value per land use was corrected for price year, currency difference and GDP difference between countries as explained in Huizinga 2017. Only direct damages were considered, so indirect damage such as reduced economic activity, individual financial hardship, adverse impacts on the social well-being of a community, lost trading time, loss of market demand for products, clean up, emergency response and emergency accommodation for evacuees were excluded. Indirect damages may vary between regions and flood events but are estimated to add 25% to 40% to the direct damages. When flood hazard and flood impacts are assessed for different event probabilities (or return periods) the Damage Probability Function (DPF) can be prepared (see Figure 3). Then the economic risk becomes clear by integrating the DPF. This results in an Estimated Annual Damage (EAD) value (in ZAR/year) that can be considered an annual cost to compensate for flood losses of all possible flood events. In this study, the economic direct damages were calculated for four return periods, being 10, 20, 50 and 100 years, for both 2012 and 2019 situations. FIGURE 3: Damage-probability curve and expected annual damage (Foudi et al. 2015) RESULTS 100-year flood lines and influence of dumping Following the model runs executed using 3Di, the 100-year flood lines were generated for the post-dumping scenario (2019) for the three areas of interest are presented in Figure 4. Local stormwater ponding is also part of the model result, but the maximum water depth maps have been post-processed to ensure that all flooded areas smaller than 1 hectare are removed from the result. The flood lines are thus also partly including pluvial stormwater runoff as long as it is connected to the main channel, or the area of flooding is bigger than 1 hectare. The change in flood lines varies per location when looking at the 2019 and 2012 flood lines. In areas where the floodplain has been encroached (or raised), the flood line has moved closer to the river, while in other areas (most likely where the water
68 IMESA level increases occur) the flood line moves further away from the river. The influence of dumping and land use change on the three catchment areas, considering both the pre-dumping (2012) and post-dumping scenarios (2019) during a 100-year return period flood event are represented as a function of changes in water levels via water level maps. The water level difference maps for Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot are presented in Figure 5. Significant changes can be observed for Alexandra between Florence Mofosho Street and Marlboro Road. This significant change in water level (up to 1.8m) can be attributed to high level of dumping and encroachment of the flood plains around the area of Seswetla. A clear backwater curve can be seen that affects the water level up to 1.5km upstream. A clear water level increase can also be seen upstream of London Road where the East Bank has been raised for several meters which has seriously encroached the floodplain. The water level increase is almost 1m. The water level changes between Roosevelt Street and 600m downstream are also an effect of encroachment of the floodplain. The water level increase is up to 0.5m. PAPERS FIGURE 5: Differences in 2019 and 2012 water levels as a result of encroachment of the floodplain in (a) Alexandra; (b) Kaalfontein; and (c) Diepsloot FIGURE 4: 100-year flood lines for the post-dumping scenario (2019): (a) Alexandra; (b) Kaalfontein; and (c) Diepsloot
IMESA 69 Significant changes in water levels can be observed in and around the main channels in Diepsloot. This is again a clear result of the encroachment of the floodplain. The 2019 DTM shows a clear encroachment in almost the entire floodplain. The most extreme section is between the bridge near Thorn Street and 100m downstream of the bridge at Lemon Street where water level increases vary between 1 and 2m in both the main channel and sections of the flood plain. Flood hazard rating Based on spatial analysis of flood depths and flow velocities in the 3 areas of study, the flood hazard ratings obtained for the pre- (2012) and postdumping (2019) of rubble and fill material are presented in Figure 6. The flood hazard rating shows that the flash flood events are dangerous events for all. The ratings are higher than 2 for most areas. This would mean that crossing rivers should always be avoided and that people living in the flood line area need to be warned and evacuated in time to prevent loss of life. This is a challenge since these events occur very quick. Flood risk assessment The estimated economic damages in the 2012 (predumping) and 2019 situation (post-dumping) are reported in Table 3 for all three areas. In absolute damage values and for similar probability events, Alexandra is facing the largest damage, Diepsloot the second largest damage and Kaalfontein the least amount of damage between the three areas of interest. In Kaalfontein, the impact of dumping increases with more extreme events; from 10% at a 10-year storm to 33% for a 100-year storm. Also in Alexandra, the impact of dumping increases with more extreme events; from 7% at a 10-year storm to 22% for a 100-year storm. In Diepsloot, the impact of dumping increases with more extreme events in absolute terms, but relatively there is a stable increase ranging between 34% and 37. Both in absolute and relative terms, Diepsloot is experiencing For Kaalfontein, significant changes in water level are not as pronounced as observed in Alexandra, but significant water level increases up to almost 1m can be observed 200m up- and downstream of Glassnose Street bridge. This is a clear result of encroachment of the floodplain on both sides of the river. Another point of attention is the Main Road bridge. Upstream there is encroachment of the banks which results in local water level variation that can be significant. PAPERS TABLE 3: Overview of estimated direct flood damages Return period (years) 2012 situation (millions ZAR) 2019 situation (millions ZAR) Difference (millions ZAR) Difference (%) Kaalfontein 10 5.4 5.9 0.5 10% 20 8.0 9.8 1.8 23% 50 12.0 15.5 3.5 29% 100 16.1 21.4 5.3 33% Diepsloot 10 19.5 26.1 6.6 34% 20 25.6 35.1 9.5 37% 50 35.5 47.8 12.3 35% 100 43.8 59.5 15.7 36% Alexandra (between London Road and Marlboro Road) 10 41.6 44.5 2.9 7% 20 49.3 54.3 5.0 10% 50 61.3 71.1 9.8 16% 100 71.9 87.6 15.7 22% TABLE 4: Economic flood risk values (i.e., EAD) for all three townships, for both time horizons and with sensitivity around the start of damage Location Return period of event from which damage starts (years) EAD (million ZAR/year) Difference EAD (million ZAR) Difference EAD (%) 2012 2019 Kaalfontein 1 2.7 3.1 0.3 12 2 1.9 2.2 0.3 15 Diepsloot 1 10.3 13.8 3.4 33 2 6.7 9.0 2.3 34 Alexandra 1 24.0 26.1 2.0 8 2 13.6 14.9 1.3 10 FIGURE 6: Flood hazard ratings for the post-dumping scenario 2019): (a) Alexandra; (b) Kaalfontein; and (c) Diepsloot (a) (b) (c)
70 IMESA PAPERS the largest increase in flood damage between 2012 and 2019 because of dumping. The damage values in Table 4 form the basis for different DPFs. These curves assume damage is 0 ZAR at an event with a probability of once per year and that damage occurs at any extremer event. This is an assumption that is not verified, since no data was available. Damage may already occur with less extreme events or could only occur at a lower probability event (e.g., a storm with a 2-year return period). Since the high probability (or low return period) events have a large influence on the economic risk computation it is important to consider this uncertainty. To deal with this uncertainty, the economic flood risk, calculated by integrating the DPF, is presented by including a sensitivity around the return period event at which damage starts: a once per year event as well as once per two years event. The results are presented in Table 4 below and show a wide range in the EAD values. The results show that despite the uncertainty when damage starts exactly, the relative increase of the flood risk is in the same order of magnitude: 12-15% for Kaalfontein, 33-34% for Diepsloot and 8-10% for Alexandra. CONCLUSIONS As result of this study several conclusions were drawn. The normative storm durations differed between the three townships and were 2 hours, 30 minutes, and 30 minutes for Alexandra, Kaalfontein and Diepsloot, respectively. Alexandra had a longer normative storm duration, because it has a much larger catchment upstream of the area of interest. It became apparent that the three flood models were relatively sensitive to roughness values and discharge coefficients of the structures. The seasonal change in vegetation could therefore greatly influence the water levels. Also, litter, garbage and/or environmental waste (e.g., branches) is expected to severely impact the discharge capacity of the structures. Since the structures constrict the flow by definition and hence cause for backwater effects, proper waste management of this type of garbage is important to reduce flood risk. The flood lines varied spatially when looking at the 2012 and 2019 model results. In areas where the floodplain was encroached (or raised), the flood line was situated closer to the river, while in other areas the flood lines moved further away from the river. In Alexandra, the biggest water level increases as a result of encroachment of the floodplains could be found between Florence Mofosho Street and Marlboro Road (up to 1.8m), upstream of London Road where the East Bank (up to almost 1m) and between Roosevelt Street and 600m downstream (up to 0.5m). In Kaalfontein, these increases were found 200m up- and downstream of Glassnose Street bridge (up to almost 1m) and near the Main Road bridge (Local water level variation can be significant). In Diepsloot, encroachment in the floodplain caused water levels to increase in the entire main channel. Especially between the bridge near Thorn Street and 100m downstream of the bridge at Lemon Street water level increases were between 1 and 2m. The flood hazard rating shows that the flash flood events are dangerous events for all. The ratings are higher than 2 for most areas. This would mean that crossing rivers should always be avoided and that people living in the flood line area need to be warned and evacuated in time to prevent loss of life. This is a challenge since these events occur very quick. Logically, the direct flood damages increased with flood events with more extreme return periods. In Alexandra, direct flood damage for flood events with a 10- to 100-year return period increased relatively with 7% for a 10-year storm to 22% for a 100-year storm. In Kaalfontein, the relative increase varied between 10% for a 10-year storm and 33% for a 100-year storm. In Diepsloot, the relative increase varied between 34% for a 10-year storm to 36% for a 100-year storm. The 100-year return period flood events in Kaalfontein, Alexandra and Diepsloot are expected to cause 5.3 million ZAR, 15.7 million ZAR, 15.7 million ZAR more direct damage for the post-dumping situation (2019) than prior the encroachment of the floodplain (2012). Relatively, the economic flood risk increased by 12-15% for Kaalfontein, 33-34% for Diepsloot and 8-10% for Alexandra between the period of 2012 and 2019. RECOMMENDATIONS The results of this study have been conclusive and show an increase of flood risk in all three areas of interest. The quality of this study could be further improved by calibration and validation of the three flood models. There was no data made available within the City of Johannesburg that could be used to verify the simulated flood levels and extent. Any information on historical flood extents or water level and discharge data from river gauges should be used in future studies to further optimize the performance of the flood models. Another recommendation to improve both the flood model as well as the flood risk assessment is the use of a more detailed and accurate land use dataset. The dataset was an aggregate of various sources and has been improved in the areas along the river during this study using high-resolution satellite imagery. A more detailed and accurate land use dataset would improve the roughness and infiltration layers in the flood model and would allow for a more accurate flood damage assessment. The flood risk assessment in this study has shown the benefits of a quantitative risk analysis. This assessment can be improved in two ways. Firstly, the current assessment only considers direct economic costs while, ideally, a more comprehensive risk assessment is performed that also includes the indirect flood damages, social welfare, loss of life and other non-tangible impacts. Secondly, the damage estimates could not be verified with damage estimates of historical events. Any additional data on flood damage would assist in the validation of the simulated damage estimates and in the finetuning of the flood depth-damage functions for the different land use types. REFERENCES Casulli V 2008. A high-resolution wetting and drying algorithm for freesurface hydrodynamics. International Journal for Numerical Methods in Fluids 60 (4): 391-408. Casulli V & Stelling GS 2013. A semi-implicit numerical model for urban drainage systems. International Journal for Numerical Methods in Fluids 73 (6): 600-614. Environment Agency & HR Wallingford 2008. Supplementary Note on Flood Hazard Ratings and Thresholds for Development Planning and Control Purpose – Clarification of the Table 13.1 of FD2320/TR2 and Figure 3.2 of FD2321/TR1. Foudi S, Oses-Eraso N & Tamayo I 2015. Integrated spatial flood risk assessment: The case of Zaragoza. Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 278–292. Huizinga J, De Moel H & Szewczyk W 2017. Global flood depth-damage functions: Methodology and the database with guidelines, EUR 28552
IMESA 71 PAPERS EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN 978- 92-79-67781-6, doi:10.2760/16510, JRC105688. Ollett P, Syme B & Ryan P 2017. Australian Rainfall and Runoff guidance on blockage of hydraulic structures: numerical implementation and three case studies. Journal of Hydrology (NZ) 56 (2): 109-122. Smithers JC & Schulze RE 2002. Design rainfall and flood estimation in South Africa. Final Report to the Water Research Commission. WRC Project No: K5/1060. Smithers JC & Schulze RE 2012. Design rainfall estimation for South Africa. Software available from: https://ukzn-iis-02.ukzn.ac.za/unp/beeh/ hydrorisk/RLMA%20and%20SI%20design%20rainfall.htm (Accessed 07 June 2022). Volp ND, van Prooijen BC & Stelling GS 2013. A finite volume approach for shallow water flow accounting for high-resolution bathymetry and roughness data. Water Resources Research 49 (7): 4126-4135.
72 IMESA PAPERS PAPER 3 WHY FLUSH YOUR TOILET WITH 9L OF WATER WHEN YOU CAN FLUSH WITH 2L : THE NEW NORMAL FIGURE 1: Current Sanitation in South Africa ¹Jacques Rust and ²Brian Lewis Envirosan Sanitation Solutions, 15 Hillclimb Road, Westmead, 3610 1. ABSTRACT When properly designed, built, and maintained, the VIP (Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine) provides a decent basic level of sanitation, however most people prefer a higher level of sanitation, with full flush toilets being the most desired and accepted. The drawback however with conventional full flush toilets is that they require a large amount of water, which is not always available (Recent local example Cape Town Day Zero). VIP toilets, whilst, not requiring water to operate, have several inherent problems as they do not have a water seal, can smell extremely bad, attract flies and are perceived by users to be undignified. In a VIP scenario the pit/chamber is directly below the top structure resulting in communities often using the pit as a solid waste disposal site and consequently the pits fill up much faster. By having the pit/chamber directly below there is also always the increased risk that children may fall in and when the pits are full, emptying is a messy, unpleasant, and expensive operation with many municipalities now reporting a “reverse backlog”. The complex nature of sanitation in South Africa means there is no “one size fits all” solution. Each area whether an informal settlement or rural school has its own unique set of challenges, and it was essential to develop a new sanitation solution which could provide a hygienic, safe and most of all dignified solution for all users. The necessity for a suitable solution that could help address the various sanitation challenges led to the development of a Low Flush system that could flush with as little as 2L of water (Potable and Non-Potable water). The system can bridge the gap between a VIP and full flush toilet essentially providing users with the benefits of a flush toilet in areas with limited infrastructure and water. The versatility of the system ensures that it can be adapted to different conditions and on-site requirements. The Low Flush system has been tried, tested, and approved by various government departments and independent organisations such as the Department of Science and Technology, and the Water Research Commission (WRC), the system is Agrément certified ensuring it complies with all regulatory requirements. It has proved to be a game changer in the sanitation space and its ability to provide a safe, sustainable, and dignified alternative solution has been seen in the 100000+ units successfully rolled out across South Africa. 2. INTRODUCTION A new, more suitable, and cost-effective system had to be developed: Envirosan Sanitation Solutions have designed, developed, and tested the Eaziflush™ low/pour flush sanitation solution over five years of extensive research, with both the Water Research Commission in Pretoria and Partners in Development in KZN, both of which have independently tested and rolled out the system in various projects throughout South Africa. Every household, no matter whether in the outlying rural or peri-urban areas (where potable water is not always made available to the individual household,) still has access to enough water (either being collected from streams/rivers, and/or rainwater harvesting and/or communal taps), which they rely on for washing, bathing, cleaning, and cooking. The Low/Pour Flush Sanitation System can be easily adapted for use in all areas, ranging from rural to urban, including areas with limited or restricted water supply. As a pour flush option, the sanitation solution is entirely off-grid and requires no water connection from the main feed, as it flushes manually, with as little as two litres of grey water, thus placing absolutely no strain on the rural households' limited access to potable water supply, whilst simultaneously providing a safe and hygienic method for the disposal of the households' grey water. As a low flush (i.e. conventional flush with an internal FIGURE 2(A) AND 2(B): Typical layout designs Free Standing and/or Schools / community blocks with either internal leak free with wash basin cistern or externally mounted demand flush system with rainwater harvesting
IMESA 73 PAPERS cistern or externally mounted flush on demand tank), the sanitation solution flushes with as little as two litres of water, as opposed to the conventional nine litres usually required, translating to a significant benefit to not only the end user, but also the municipality and water services authorities. The Low/Pour Flush has been designed to be compatible with a conventional sewer system, and places far less strain on the sewage treatment plants, because of the great reduction in the volume of water required for flushing. The Pour / Low Flush sanitation system has been designed to be compatible with a range of rural "back end" solutions, including a leach pit, septic tank, conservancy tank, biodigester, solids-free sewer system or similar onsite/off-grid treatment facilities, without any adverse effects on the surrounding soil conditions. 3. EAZIFLUSH™ LOW/POUR FLUSH SANITATION SOLUTION 3.1. Bridging The Gap in Sanitation The design incorporates a water seal within the outlet (P-trap) of the pedestal, which prevents any odours from the chamber entering the toilet bowl. The "P-trap" holds less than 1L of water within the water seal and only requires between one and two litres of water to flush. FIGURE 3: Patented P-Trap water seal – designed for low water volume flushing 3.1.1. Eaziflush™ Low/Pour Flush compared to conventional full flush toilet facilities 3.1.1.1. Direct Cost saving because of less water being used: The National Standard bases a typical household to flush 20 times per day. If we base this on a standard 9L flushing cistern, it calculates to 5474L of water per month (30.41 days per month). 3.1.1.2. To compare this to the Eaziflush™ model where you only use 2L per flush, 1 216L of water per month will be used to flush the toilet (an average household water saving of 4258L per month) 3.1.1.3. The saving to the Municipality on water losses is even more important: Considering a 4 258L water saving per month per household (5474L – 1216L) or 51 000L of water saved per household per annum! 3.1.1.4. The toilet facility can be flushed by pouring greywater as a flushing medium instead of using potable water – taking the system completely off grid and saving more than 30% of the total household water usage Water saving resulting from low flush toilets are crucial, especially for a water scarce Country like South Africa, Figure 4 depicts on-going water related issues. Water crisis-Day Zero: First it was Cape Town, now it is Nelson Mandela Bay, which Metro is next? 3.1.2. Eaziflush™ Low/Pour Flush compared to dry sanitation (VIP/UDDT) There is little doubt that the Low/Pour Flush Sanitation System represents a major upgrade from both the VIP and Urine-Diverting Dry Toilets (UDDT) systems, which currently are the standard for basic sanitation in South Africa. The Low/Pour Flush System can replace the VIP/UDDT system in its entirety, since the entire system costs approximately the same as said systems, with the following significant advantages: 3.1.2.1. There is absolutely no smell or access for flies! This is due to the effectiveness of the water seal within the P-trap, which holds less than 1L water, compared to the standard 2L of water contained in a conventional toilet's P-trap. In a dense urban/peri-urban/rural context, the Low Fush/Pour Flush System can either be installed closer to (or even inside) the homestead. since the water seal prevents any unpleasant odours from being released. 3.1.2.2. The Low/Pour Flush system provides a higher standard of basic sanitation, with increased dignity to the end user. Users do not see the contents of the pit due to the P-Trap and water and therefore cannot use the toilet for solid waste disposal, effectively lengthening the lifespan of the pit and minimising emptying costs. 3.1.2.3. Community members commonly refer to the system as the ‘safe toilet', as there is no open pit below the toilet, thus negating the horrific incidents where children have tragically fallen into VIP pits in the past. 3.1.2.4. The system is extremely robust and easy to operate, with minimum maintenance requirements and limited risk involved. 3.1.2.5. If the initial project allows for a Pour Flush application it can be upgraded from pour flush to low flush with the addition of a cistern or external flush tank, once sewage and water connections are available, it can be connected at a minimal cost! Retrofitting is a simple process! 3.1.2.6. All Low/Pour Flush pedestals are precision injection moulded from SABS approved virgin raw material, thus resulting in an extremely high quality and hygienic finish to the products. The products used for the piloting, testing as well as project roll out carry Agrement Certification and are fully endorsed by the National Home Builders Regulation Council and Department of Human Settlements. FIGURE 4: The Theewaterskloof Dam, a key source of water supply to Cape Town. Image, Halden Krog, AP. (courtesy: IOL, by Corrie Kruger)
74 IMESA FIGURE 6: Overstrand Reference Letter 3.4. Development Testing PAPERS TABLE 1: Household water savings for Overstrand Municipality Overstrand Municipality (Mandela Square (83), Beverly Hills (100), Transit Camp(136), Zwelihle (125) and Masakhane (387) (831 households in total) Toilet Facility Number of households Water Saving per household Water Saving on current households per month Water Saving on current households per year Flush Toilet Connected to Sewerage 831 4 258 L / Month 3,538,398 L / month 42,460,776 L / year Ultimately, the Low/Pour Flush Sanitation System can be used to not only eliminate exiting sanitation backlogs, but also eradicate reverse sanitation backlogs. They are cheaper to empty/treat due to no solid waste / trash in the leach pits and they provide users with a dignified sanitation solution which they are content to use and so rightly deserve, without placing any strain on our already scarce water supply and at no additional operational cost to municipalities! All this whilst simultaneously establishing a new and improved benchmark of Safe, Dignified and Sustainable Sanitation throughout the Country. 3.2. Replacement For Dry and Full Flush Toilets To understand what makes the Low/Pour Flush Sanitation System innovative, you must investigate the challenges the solution was designed to overcome. Municipal engineers and planners in South Africa are engaged in the delivery of improved sanitation to the 11% of South African households without sanitation services. An additional 26% of households have sanitation services that do not meet national standards for dignified sanitation (Report on status of sanitation services in South Africa - https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ sanitation-reporta.pdf ) In addressing these issues, many engineers were stuck in a binary way of thinking, which is why a paradigm shift was needed. Towns and cities were generally characterised by flush toilets and piped infrastructure, while people living in townships usually use pit toilets of one type or another. Full flush is extremely expensive, not only in terms of actual water consumption but also in terms of infrastructure maintenance. VIP toilets are more robust and require less maintenance but have also been known to exhibit several issues when it comes to unpleasant odours and child safety. Additionally, VIPs and UDDTs tend to fill up quickly and can be difficult to clean. The Eaziflush™ Low/Pour Flush Sanitation System combines the advantages of both dry and flushing systems without any of their disadvantages. 3.3. Flush Efficiency and Water Saving Various flow and flush tests have been conducted, both for pour flush as well as for low flush options fitted with an internally mounted low volume cistern. The below figures indicate the volume of water used to flush away the different wiping media. Based on the work completed for Overstrand Municipality in Hermanus and Gansbaai, the following water savings was achieved: FIGURE 7: Piloting and Testing by the Department of Science and Technology
IMESA 75 PAPERS 3.5. Large Scale Roll Out - Requirements Before any large-scale roll outs can be considered, it is essential for any and all Low/Pour Flush Sanitation Systems and associated products to be tested, piloted and approved for use both structurally as well as system appropriateness. This as per the requirements of the South African National Standards which require at least Agrément South Africa Certification as a minimum requirement, and which are legally required. Figures 8a) and 8b) stipulates the minimum certifications required as per the South African National Standards, SANS 10400-Q (2011) Figures 9a) and b) depict potential risks by using structures that aren’t certified as per the South African National Standards. The South African National Standards make specific reference to the requirements of Agrément certifications for non-standardised systems and products such as is the case with precast concrete toilet facilities and all other related Alternative Building Technologies (ABT’s) Agrément South Africa was established to facilitate the introduction, application and utilisation of satisfactory innovation and technology development in the construction industry. This is an edict of Government and a lawful requirement as set by the Republic of South Africa. In terms of the South African National Standards (SANS) all products must have a certificate that confirms fitness-for-purpose on a non-standardised product, material or component or the acceptability of the related nonstandardised design and the conditions pertaining thereto (or both) issued by the Board of Agrément South Africa. The only way to prohibit future fatal failures of this nature is to demand a quality product that has been tested and approved for use by qualified body such as Agrément South Africa or SABS. 3.6. Low/Pour Flush Sanitation Projects Several projects, both at School level as well as individual household level has been rolled out to test the efficiency of the available Agrément Approved Low Flush Sanitation Systems. 3.6.1. Typical School Sanitation: More than 200 privately and publicly funded school sanitation projects have been completed, varying from very rural schools with limited water sources to more peri-urban schools where more formal water supply was available. The variance of School selection was to test how efficient the Low/Pour flush units will perform, even in areas where limited water sources were available including the durability and functionality testing between Junior and Senior Schools. Each School was individually visited with a full investigation report to ensure that the Low Flush Sanitation System to be installed and tested allowed for the minimum norms and standards as set by the Department of Education. Refer to figure 10 and 11 below. Schools with no access to water received new boreholes which in turn filled raised water tanks installed close to the School Ablution block and allowed to feed a low-pressure cistern. Schools with limited/interrupted water source was fitted with a raised water tank/s which was periodically filled by the existing water source. Depending on the existing water source, the water tanks was sized to suite and to allow for flushing of the toilets for 1-2 weeks before re-filling was required. This system catered for interrupted water supply allowing full time operation as would be the case with other waterborne sanitation options. FIGURES 8(A) AND 8(B): SANS, Edict of Government and typical Agrement Certification FIGURES 9(A) AND 9(B): Failed Structures with no Certification in Eastern Cape FIGURE 10: Low Flush Toilet Facilities installed in Schools in Eastern Cape FIGURE 11: Eastern Cape Low Flush Toilet Facilities at Schools
76 IMESA PAPERS 3.6.2. Typical Household Sanitation Different models of the Low/Pour Flush sanitation systems have been installed in provinces across South Africa. The options included Agrément Approved Precast Concrete Structures that can sit directly on top of the leach pit, single off-set leach pit or dual off-set leach pit with swivel drainpipe connection. All these designs are compact, can be used in any area where VIP toilets are approved for use and once any of the leach pits are full, can easily be emptied by vacuum tanker. Difference in design of leach pits depends on the frequency of emptying, municipal preference, and type of soil conditions. “The VIP and pour‐flush sludge have similar chemical characteristics; however, the pour‐flush sludge has a slower filling rate as a result of less non‐faecal material present in the leach pit and the ability of the liquid component to seep into the surrounding soil, taking with it soluble material, reducing the mass of solids in the pit” (WRC Project 2137: Deliverable 10) 3.7. Eye On The Future FIGURE 12(A) AND 12(B): Individual Household Units installed in the Eastern Cape with rear mounted Demand Flush Tank and leach pit directly below FIGURE 13(A), 13(B), 13(C), 13(D) AND 13(E): Sanitation units with off-set dual leach pits with rain water harvesting and externally mounted demand flush tank FIGURE 14: The EaziSwitch connection between dual leach pit applications FIGURE 15: Communal Sanitation Facilities: Mosselbay with 5 users to 1 facility FIGURE 16: EaziSplit upgrade to close the sanitation loop
IMESA 77 PAPERS 4. CONCLUSION The Low and Pour Flush Sanitation Solutions have clearly demonstrated that a low flush system can perform well where either toilet paper or newspaper is used for anal cleansing, Low flush technology has proven successful to provide significant savings of water over standard toilets which typically require 6 to 9L to flush. It provides a sanitation model in which scarce water resources are used responsibly and sustainably, pointing a way forward not only for those who find dry sanitation unacceptable but also for standard sanitation design which in its current form is unsustainable as it relies on freely available water. This technology provides a viable option to municipalities under pressure to provide waterborne sanitation where laying sewers is not feasible or affordable. In addition, it could provide an option for householders desiring a flush toilet to upgrade their VIP systems to a low flush toilet. The low flush system can be installed indoors or outdoors using the same VIP structures with the addition of a lech pit. As many households in South Africa are unable to afford toilet paper, the ability of the low flush system to accommodate newspaper makes this a technology which municipalities could specify even for poor communities. Low flush technology shows the potential for overcoming one of the thorniest problems facing municipalities: the difficulty of removing sludge from pits. While VIP sludge is often too dry and contains too much rubbish to be removed with a vacuum tanker, the low flush system is far more conducive to vacuum removal because sludge contains less rubbish and has a higher moisture content. 5. RECOMMENDATION With diarrhoeal diseases still a leading cause of death among young children and vulnerable people (WHO, 2013), and helminthic infections affecting as many as 80-90% of children in some South African studies (Appleton, Maurihungirire and Gouws, 1999; Appleton et al., 2008), it is imperative that an aggressive health and hygiene education programme be included in any sanitation intervention aimed at changing high risk behaviour. This is much easier achievable with a supporting sanitation system. The Low/Pour Flush Sanitation systems provide a much safer, more dignified, and healthier system compared to the dry sanitation options. Dry sanitation options in general have direct access to the pit content, which in turn attracts flies, generate odour and in turn these aspects have a direct effect on the health and hygiene of the users. As most South African people aspire to have flushing toilet facilities and previously could not be afforded such due to un-availability of water and the lack of sewer networks, it is now more than ever possible to supply these Low and/or Pour Flush Sanitation Systems as a replacement system to the currently implemented “dry” sanitation options. We recommend the Low/Pour flush sanitation options over any dry sanitation system. The Low/Pour Flush systems have been tested over most parts of the Country and with different structures, back-end solutions, and design options, proofing a higher level of acceptability and more successful compared to the dry sanitation alternatives. 6. REFERENCES • DEVELOPING A LOW FLUSH LATRINE FOR APPLICATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Report to the Water Research Commission by David Still, Robert Inglis and Bobbie Louton Partners in Development WRC Report No. 2198/1/13 ISBN 978-1-4312-0483-0 • DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF TIMBER FRAME POUR FLUSH SANITATION BLOCKS FOR USE IN SCHOOLS AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS DELIVERABLE 5: EVALUATION REPORT, Water Research Commission Project K5/2407 • Pour Flush Trials in the Western Cape, Report to the WATER RESEARCH COMMISSION by Maluti GSM Consulting Engineers • WRC 2137, Deliverable 10: Final Report on Pour‐Flush Latrines • Nwaneri, C. (2009). Physico‐chemical characteristics and biodegradability of contents of ventilated improved pit latrines (VIPs) in eThekwini Municipality. Chemical Engineering. Durban, University of KwaZulu‐Natal. Master of Science in Engineering. • Still, D. and B. Louton (2012). Piloting and Testing the Pour Flush Latrine, Technology for its Applicability in South Africa. WRC Report No. 1887/1/12. W.R. Commission. • Wood, K. (2013). Transformation of Faecal Sludge in VIPs: Modelling fill rate with an unsteady‐state mass balance. Engineering. Durban, UKZN. MSc.
78 IMESA PAPERS PAPER 4 LESSONS LEARNT THROUGH THE MISA LIC CAPACITATION PROGRAMME TABLE 1: List of municipalities supported by the consultant in the first Cohort Province Municipalities Eastern cape (1) Dr Beyers Naude Local Municipality (2) Umzimvubu Local Municipality Gauteng (3) Lesedi Local Municipality (4) Rand West Local Municipality Kwazulu-Natal (5) Greater Kokstad Local Municipality (6) Umvoti Local Municipality Northern Cape (7) Dawid Kruiper Local Municipality North West Province (8) Ramotshere Moiloa Local Municipality Devan Govender¹, Fazel Sherrif² and Lennin Naidoo³ ¹Naidu Consulting ²MISA ³Naidu Consulting ABSTRACT Labour Intensive Construction (LIC) is a method of construction which proactively seeks to replace plant-based tasks and activities with people thereby enhancing job creation through public spending. LIC is implemented under the ambits of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP): a programme which is now in its Fourth 5-year phase. Despite being in place for more than 15 years, the roll out of LIC may not have been as effective in creating jobs with little or no projects being undertaken labour intensively. Whilst the number of jobs which are created and reported on the National EPWP reporting system has increased, this increase may be attributed to improved reporting rather than the creation of more jobs. Several papers have been written about the success and failures of the Programme. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the unemployment crisis with unemployment increasing to more than 30% in 2021. In response, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced a series of governmental initiatives to stimulate economic recovery. Whilst this was affected, the presidency embarked on a capacity building programme to mainstream LIC in order to optimise job creation through projects. COGTA was commissioned to undertake the pilot programme, who in turn utilised MISA to lead the programme. In a first Cohort, 15 municipalities were selected from around the country as pilot municipalities to implement such a programme with strong focus on job creation using MIG funding through Roads and stormwater projects. One specific consultant was appointed as the service provider to support 8 of the 15 municipalities through formal and informal training, data support and LIC mainstreaming support. Whilst the projects realised some success, several key lessons were learnt in the process which may aid future roll out and importantly begin to understand why LIC was not being effectively implemented in the municipalities. This paper will outline the approach to programme, the scope of works, and the challenges experienced which have been identified as impeding LIC implementation. The paper will not look to unpack LIC but rather focus on unpacking some of the reasons why LIC has not gained the traction that it ought to have. 1 INTRODUCTION In the State of the Nation Address in February 2018, His Excellency President Ramaphosa said "Infrastructure investment is key to our efforts to grow the economy, create jobs, empower small businesses and provide services to our people." (State of the Nation Address, February 2018) In his 2019 State of the Nations address, the President instructed the former Minister of Transport to maximise job creation in the road sector using labour intensive methods among other things. During October 2020, the Minister of Finance tabled the budget adjustment, directing funding from the Presidential Employment Stimulus Package to infrastructure Programmes to stimulate the local economies and to create jobs. Government continues to direct funding to the infrastructure sector in order to create jobs. Whilst jobs are created through the extensive activities that are performed in infrastructure projects, the act of substituting processes involving large equipment with people and smaller equipment in such projects is called Labour Intensive Construction (LIC). The implementation of LIC results in income transfer to a larger pool of people doing decent work. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the unemployment crisis with unemployment increasing to more than 30% in 2021. In response, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced a series of governmental initiatives to stimulate economic recovery. Whilst this was affected, the presidency embarked on a capacity building programme to mainstream LIC in order to optimize job creation through projects. COGTA was commissioned to undertake the pilot programme, who in turn mobilized MISA to lead the programme. In a first Cohort, 15 municipalities were selected from around the country as pilot municipalities to implement such a programme with a strong focus on job creation using MIG funding through Roads and stormwater projects. One specific consultant was appointed as the service provider to support 8 of the 15 municipalities through formal and informal training, data support and LIC mainstreaming support. Whilst this programme achieved some success, valuable lessons were learnt which could impact job creation through public bodies in the foreseeable future. The paper highlights the lessons learnt through the process. 2 THE SCOPE OF WORKS AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION MISA Developed the scope of works through consultation with the National Department of Public Works, the custodians of the Expanded Public Works Programme under which Labour-Intensive Construction Projects are implemented. Whilst the programme was initially envisaged to be implemented over a period of 3 years, the contract was put out for a period of 1 year. The scope of works included the following key elements. • LIC Training and Capacitation: The element entailed the provisions of classroom training followed by on the job training through the implementation of LIC projects. The training requirement included accredited LIC training as well as capacitation workshops to ensure that stakeholders who would influence LIC understood the key concepts to make and implement decisions regarding LIC.
IMESA 79 • Enhancement of the EPWP LIC Reporting System: This process element involved improvement of the reporting processes in the EPWP to simplify the process to reduce data loss and improve the reported numbers on the EPWP system. This included a review of the reporting process as well as improvements to the EPWP Reporting System to allow Biometric Capturing and data capturing using mobile devices. • LIC Implementation: This component comprised the application of LIC knowledge through the provisions of strategic and operational support to Public Bodies to mainstream LIC. To this end, strategic support included: o The review of municipal EPWP policies to include LIC o The development of Proforma tender documents o The establishment of EPWP institutional structures Operational support has included: o The selection of projects which are conducive to LIC o The design of projects to include LIC o The appropriate specification of LIC projects o Monitoring implementation of LIC projects • Programme Reporting: communicating the progress of the project to key stakeholders throughout the project period. This aided capacitation efforts and promoted information sharing. • Typical Project Processes: which included inception, planning and close out. 2.1 Breakdown of municipalities One specific consultant was appointed to provide support to eight municipalities across 5 provinces in the country. A full list of municipalities is listed in Table 1. 2.2 Status Quo Analysis A status quo analysis was undertaken in the municipality during the first stage of the project (inception). Page 1 of the Guidelines for Labour-Intensive Construction, (International Labour Organisation, 2015) lists 4 key areas which are targeted to mainstream job creation being: • The identification of suitable projects • Appropriate designs • Specification for labour intensive works • Compilation of contract documentation for labour intensive projects. The status quo analysis was aimed at evaluating the municipalities performance against these key areas which is reported in the sections below. 2.3 The identification of suitable projects Whilst all projects could include an element of LIC, some presented more opportunities than others. As an example, a bulk water project may employ LIC principles however, the nature of the work which requires deep trenches and pipes which may not be lifted by hand, does not allow for significant numbers of people to be employed in the project. Municipalities must therefore select projects which are amenable to LIC in their project lists. Analysis of the respective municipal MIG project lists is shown in Table 2. Analysis of the projects across all municipalities showed that most municipalities are using at least 20% of their MIG budgets for LIC Conducive/ LIC Amenable projects. In this regard, policies were not updated to show the ringfencing of budgets for LIC, whilst the relevant stakeholders involved in the selection of projects for the business plans, were not aware of the principles of LIC. Specifically, such stakeholders did not understand what a LIC Amenable project was. 2.3.1 Key Lessons Learned from the identification of suitable projects • All decision-making stakeholders must be capacitated to support LIC. This may be formal (accredited) or informal (workshops). Stakeholders who need to be capacitated include: o Technical staff such as Project management unit staff, engineers, technologists, technicians, heads of department. o Non-technical staff such as supply chain management, finance, and politicians o Decision makers from COGTA and the provincial Public Works personal. o Private sector stakeholders such as a consultant who support the develop of the IDPs. • EPWP Policies must be revised to allow for the ringfencing of funding for the inclusion of LIC amenable projects. • The development process for MIG project lists must be revisited. There was inconsistency in the manner in which MIG Project lists were generated, if at all. • The approval of project lists must be revisited and COGTA must be more rigorous in ensuring that municipalities include LIC projects in their project lists. • COGTA must enforce consequence management to ensure that LIC projects are at a suitable stage prior to the start of the financial year to effectively be implemented in the set years. 2.4 Appropriate designs When rolling out Labour-Intensive Design projects, the designer will be required to carefully consider processes, materials and methods which may be incorporated into the project to enhance job creation. This may include adjusting cut to fill to reduce haul distances, choosing the type of material for a retaining wall (Gabion versus reinforced concrete) and directing the method of construction for example directing the use of labour for excavation versus excavating the works by machine. Whilst civil PAPERS TABLE 2: Analysis of MIG project lists in the municipalities Municipality 2021/22 MIG Allocation Number of projects on the MIG List Projects from list amenable to LIC Value of LIC projects from the list % LIC conducive projects Dr Beyers Naude LM R28 564 000.00 4 0 0 0 Umzimvubu LM R97 114 000.00 9 6 R7 937 011 8% Lesedi Local Municipality R27 716 000.00 7 5 R22 766 000 82% Rand West LM R96 442 000.00 8 5 R39 500 000 41% Greater Kokstad LM R18 073 000.00 5 2 R11 071 765 61% Umvoti LM R41 323 000.00 13 1 R6 104 560 15% Dawid Kruiper LM R26 323 000.00 11 5 R7 037 607 27% Ramotshere Moiloa LM R39 127 000.00 9 6 R23 785 325 61%
80 IMESA PAPERS TABLE 4: Municipal Tender BOQ/Specification Analysis Municipality Tender shows LI Items Clearly Specification describes LI Method Dr Beyers Naude LM No No Umzimvubu LM No No Lesedi LM No No Rand West LM Yes No Greater Kokstad LM Yes No Umvoti LM No No Dawid Kruiper LM No No Ramotshere Moiloa LM No No engineers are capacitated to design works through conventional methods, the use of Labour-Intensive Construction practices are not random but planned, and carefully executed and formal training and capacitation is required in order to plan and execute LIC works. The ability of stakeholders to design LIC works was evaluated including the municipal and private stakeholder sector staff. The analysis revealed that stakeholders did not have the necessary skill or experience to undertake LIC works. Municipal staff may therefore shy away from the unknown – and did not put out tenders requiring LIC qualified engineering support. Further to this, where LIC practitioners had the ability to incorporate LIC into the projects, they were not compelled to do so, or the work was simply accepted even if it was under-designed in terms of LIC. It must be noted that several municipalities embraced LIC and attempted to implement accordingly. Saying this, the lack of understanding of LIC, lead to lacklustre results with respect to LIC and great projects may be deemed to have underperformed. 2.4.1 Key Lessons Learned from using Appropriate designs • All engineering staff working on infrastructure projects must have gone through accredited LIC training. (NQF 7 or 5) • Consultant tenders must include a requirement for designers who will be working on municipal projects to have the LIC NQF 7 qualification. • Municipalities must acquire the ability to direct and monitor LIC elements in their projects through internal or external capacity. • Designs process flows must be re-evaluated to ensure that LIC is incorporated into the process. • A list of mandatory LIC items may will lead to defining the minimum LIC requirements in municipal projects. 2.5 SPECIFICATION OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE WORKS After making changes to a design, it is important to identify all items in the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) which are intended to be constructed as LIC items. This is generally annotated with the letters LI or LIC in the BOQ. Further to this, the specifier was required to include specifications which direct the use of labour in any specific bill item, specifying that excavation of trenches less than 1.5m must be undertaken by hand using small tools and plant. A summary of the sample of project specifications from the various municipalities is shown in Table 4. The analysis showed that all municipalities did not have adequate specifications and the BOQ to ensure that LIC is implemented on the ground. This reflects a lack of understanding of LIC and an inability to adequately specify LIC for any project. Whilst an appropriate project may be selected, and the design adequately undertaken there still remain risk that the municipality will not generate the optimum jobs through the project. 2.5.1 Key Lessons Learned from Specification of Labour Intensive Works • All engineering staff working infrastructure projects must have gone through accredited LIC training (NQF 7 or 5). • Consultant tenders must include a requirement for designers who will be working on municipal projects to have the LIC NQF 7 qualification. • Proforma tender documents and standard LIC clauses are to be considered for LIC projects and LIC activities. 2.6 Compilation of contract documentation for labour intensive projects Whilst infrastructure projects are guided by contractual law such as the GCC, LIC which is implemented under the ambits of the Expanded Public Works Programme is guided by Ministerial Determination for EPWP(Department of Labour, 2012). To this end, several standard clauses must be incorporated into a tender document which will allow for the effective implementation of LIC. Clauses that need to be added into traditional engineering contracts include clauses for wage rates, the job creation targets, the training requirements and the supervisory competence (NQF 5 in LIC). A proforma tender document is useful in this regard and presents a baseline on which tender documents should be produced. Due to a lack of capacity, many municipalities do not use a proforma tender document in their municipalities and rely on consultants to produce a tender document for each project. Further to this, where a proforma exists, the custodian of the Proforma has been the technical team rather than supply chain management. This presents a significant risk to municipalities. Finally, contractual clauses are not adequately included into proforma tender documents and as a result may leave room for interpretation by the contractor who may not undertake the works labour intensively. TABLE 3: Capacity of the stakeholders to effectively design LIC works Municipality Municipal Staff Municipal Consultants Number of Technical Staff Staff Who had NQF 5 or 7 Consultant Tender required LIC Staff had the qualification Staff adequately rolled out LIC Dr Beyers Naude LM 4 0 No No No Umzimvubu LM 6 0 No No No Lesedi LM 13 0 No Yes No Rand West LM 10 1 Yes No No Greater Kokstad LM 12 4 Yes No No Umvoti LM 10 2 No No No Dawid Kruiper LM 11 10 No No No Ramotshere Moiloa LM 3 1 No No No
IMESA 81 PAPERS TABLE 5: Status of Proforma tender documents Municipality Proforma Tender Utilised Proforma Tender (adequately) includes LIC Dr Beyers Naude LM No No Umzimvubu LM No No Lesedi LM No No Rand West LM No No Greater Kokstad LM No No Umvoti LM No No Dawid Kruiper LM No No Ramotshere Moiloa LM No No 2.6.1 Key Lessons Learned from the Compilation of contract documentation for labour intensive projects • A proforma tender ought to be developed for each municipality. The document ought to be managed by supply chain management. It is recommended that COGTA support this process. • All projects being put out to tender must be based on the current approved tender proforma held by SCM. • All engineering staff working on infrastructure projects must have gone through accredited LIC training. (NQF 7 or 5) • Consultant tenders must include a requirement for designers who will be working on municipal projects to have the LIC NQF 7 qualification. 3 IMPACT OF INTERVENTION As discussed in section 1, the project was aimed at capacitating stakeholders to enhance job creation through projects being implemented by the respective municipalities. To this end, support was offered to all municipalities with a summary of the achievements listed in Table 6. 3.1 Jobs created (Work opportunities and FTEs) Implementing LIC starts at the planning stages and continues through the life cycle of any project. Whilst reporting of jobs created was one of the deliverables in these projects, the figures reflect the support offered to capture information onto the national reporting system rather than the creation of any further jobs. A key challenge in implementing EPWP and LIC has been the reporting of jobs whereupon challenges in these processes led to the general under-reporting of the jobs created. This success here may be attributed to support offered in collecting, cleaning, and capturing data. This has no bearing on further job creation. 3.2 Proforma Tender Documents Support offered through the programme allowed for the creation of the proforma tender documents which included LIC. Whilst these documents may not have been adopted for use in every municipality, the use of the proforma has changed the landscape for LIC in these municipalities. There has been heightened interest in LIC NQF 5 as tenders now require the qualification and the number of jobs created through projects which are aligned to LIC, and are expected to increase as the document gets used more often. This increase will not merely attribute to improved reporting but an increase in the real number of jobs created on the ground. If adopted and appropriately utilised, this change will have a long term impact on the municipality and job creation. 3.3 Policy Documents All policies were aligned to include clause related to Labour Intensive Construction. By the end of the contract, not all municipalities had adopted their policies or were implementing them. These documents, if appropriately implemented, will create an enabling environment for the implementation of LIC in the future. 3.4 Number of project tenders reviewed Where relevant, tenders were reviewed for adequate LIC inclusion. This was done to influence current work however, importantly, such reviews were undertaken to aid on-the-job practical training of stakeholders for future works. The review of tenders allowed for the development of a benchmark for each of the municipalities for LIC activities which in turn would enhance job creation through projects. 3.5 Number of people trained on LIC It was appreciated that LIC training and capacitation could not be limited to technical resources as non-technical stakeholders influenced decision making and could easily derail LIC works. Such stakeholders included politicians, SCM and finance. Accredited training was provided to all technical staff whilst non-accredited training workshops was provided to the non-technical stakeholders. The overarching design of the training programme allowed for all affected stakeholders to better contribute to LIC decision making. This training has achieved varying degrees of success with some municipalities immediately asking for flagship/pilot projects, whilst others immediately temporarily stalled tender processes to include LIC requirements into their tenders. Whilst immediate results will largely not be seen, the impact of this training will be noticed in the years ahead. 4 OTHER LESSONS LEARNED Whilst the project has successfully supported capacitation in each of these municipalities, there were several other key lessons which may be useful when looking to implement LIC in municipalities. • The programme must be driven by the Municipal Manager (MM). It was found that accountability for job creation had to be driven by the MM. Where this was not driven by the MM, support was generally resisted with wasted expenditure in some instances. • EPWP & LIC should be led by the PMU or Infrastructure units. The programmes are incorrectly perceived as a social programme that largely relates to reporting. LIC is an engineered process and must be driven by engineers. Many municipalities appoint an administrator who has little TABLE 6: Achievements in the first Cohort of MISA projects Indicator Municipality Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Work Opportunities reported through the support (improvement) 16 173 101 184 571 513 200 71 1829 FTEs Created through the support (improvement) 7 20 37 63 230 280 27 19 683 Proforma Tender Documents revised to include clauses on LIC 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 9 EPWP Policy revised to include clauses on LIC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 Number of project tenders reviewed to include LIC clauses 1 3 10 6 5 6 3 0 34 Number of people trained on LIC 22 30 94 58 83 96 84 55 522 EPWP reporting system Updates made to enhance reporting 7 7
82 IMESA PAPERS authority as the EPWP Champion in a municipality. This is unrealistic and will not work. • Reporting must be operationalised to be undertaken by the contractors and overseen by project managers. There has been an over-emphasis on reporting and the lack of capacity to report. • Consequence management does not appear to be implemented for non-performing staff or professional service providers. To effectively roll out LIC, consequence management will be crucial in the change management process. 5 CONCLUSION The project has shown that Labour Intensive Construction has not been adequately planned, designed, specified, and implemented. Whilst the concept of LIC is not new, several key drivers are required to mobilise public bodies to create jobs through their service delivery. The project has proven that support can cause municipalities to develop this ability however this support must continue whether from the Private or Public Sector. Whilst poverty remains rife, EPWP or LIC cannot be rejected for not achieving results until it has been effectively implemented through projects. 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY Department of Labour, 2011. Code of Good Practise for employment and conditions of work for Expanded Public Works Programme, Pretoria: Government Printing Works. Department of Labour, 2012. Ministerial Determination 4: Expanded Public Works Programme, Pretoia: Department of Labour. International Labour Organisation, 2015. Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-Intensive Infrastucture Projects under the Expanded Public Works Programme. Third ed. Pretoria: Department of Public Works.
IMESA 83 ENGINEERING EXCELLENCE IN STRUCTURES & CIVILS E.g. Projects demonstrating engineering science, use of alternate materials, innovative construction processes, etc. COMMUNITY UPLIFTMENT & JOB CREATION E.g. Projects demonstrating labour-intensive construction, skills development, community awareness/participation, etc. ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE E.g. Environmental rehabilitation, renewable energy, drought solutions, coastal initiatives for rising sea levels, pollution control, educational/ technical initiatives, etc. CATEGORIES CLOSING DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS To recognise outstanding achievements in municipal infrastructure, we are calling for entries that showcase projects that demonstrate the best of civil engineering as a science and how engineering enhances the lives of the local communities, through excellence in: Planning and design Construction methods Innovation and originality Meeting social and technical challenges Contributing to the well-being of communities BIENNIAL PROJECT EXCELLENCE AWARDS CALL FOR ENTRIES ENTRY FORMS AND AWARD CRITERIA Available for download on the website: www.imesa.org.za IMESA THE INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL ENGINEERING OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (IMESA) 03 July 2023 Only projects that have reached practical or substantive completion by 30 June 2023 will be accepted for the Excellence Awards. Adjudicators reserve the right to reallocate entries in the 3 categories. QUESTIONS Contact Debbie Anderson on +27 (0)31 266 3263 or email [email protected] 1 2 3
84 IMESA PAPERS PAPER 5 STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO MUNICIPAL SERVICE DELIVERY Burgert Gildenhuys BC Gildenhuys & Associates & Spatial Data Services Africa ABSTRACT There remains a continuous emphasis on infrastructure investment as the solution to municipal service delivery challenges. However, this paper will show that the inability to meet service delivery targets comes from structural impediments that developed over the past three decades in the municipal environment. A strong focus is on increased delivery through improved administrations and implementation capacity. However, since 1990 many seminal events have contributed to structural challenges, making it nearly impossible to meet infrastructure and service delivery expectations. These events started with the Soweto Accord 1990, where the government broke the link between the cost of services and the payment for services. One should also consider the impact of the De Loor Task Group on a National Housing policy in 1992 that established the principle of differentiated service levels. Differentiated infrastructure service levels were incorporated into the RDP in 1994. However, over time, even politicians, policymakers, and planners conveniently ignored the constitutional objectives of local government. Furthermore, a lack of skills to do infrastructure investment planning; the establishment of “wall-to-wall” municipalities that had to implement policies with a strong urban bias in rural areas; the introduction of free basic services; and our spatial planning legislation created structural barriers for service delivery. These barriers make it difficult, if not impossible, to make good on political promises and meet community expectations through sustainable local government. The paper concludes by showing how structural impediments reinforced by continuous low economic growth and higher than expected urbanisation rates bring local government to its knees. Radical new approaches and tough political decisions are required to stabilise the service delivery environment before one can expect an improvement in municipal infrastructure service delivery. INTRODUCTION Thomas Sowell said that there are no solutions in politics, only trade-offs. This statement cannot be truer of municipal service delivery in South Africa. Our municipal service delivery in South Africa is the story of political power and sustainable municipal development trade-offs. There is a strong focus on increased delivery through improved administrations and implementation capacity. However, it has been several years with pronouncements on improved service delivery by politicians while analysts and commentators have a field day researching and bemoaning the deteriorating state of local government and service delivery in South Africa. The “back to basics” Campaign frequently surfaces in these discussions, but the Auditor-General’s annual report on municipal financial reporting fuels a series of press reports, political debates, and expert analysis. However, the trend in deteriorating service delivery and the state of municipal infrastructure continues unabated in a seemingly intensifying downward spiral. In this paper, we will explore three main themes. Firstly, we will show a picture of the changing service delivery position in South Africa since 1996. We will highlight the changing trends at a national level and remind the reader of the high levels of spatial diversity in South Africa and that it is unwise to generalise based on aggregated national data. Secondly, the paper explores underlying issues that affect service delivery. These are issues which we will show developed over time. Whether these issues developed intentionally or unintentionally, they make it difficult for municipalities to sustain service delivery within the current policy frameworks. These are structural issues that will be very difficult to change and make it practically impossible to achieve our service delivery targets. Finally, the paper addresses some factors and initiatives as prerequisites to breaking the impediments brought by structural challenges and the factors that will impact or need consideration in the future success or failure of municipal service delivery. DID ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES IMPROVE? Before we explore the changes in service delivery over the past 25 years, it is essential to note that any assessment of the physical extent of service delivery faces data challenges. This is because the only detailed data on service access at a national scale remains from the national censuses about a decade apart. Community surveys supplement the censuses at about five-year intervals between each census. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) also releases the annual non-financial censuses for municipalities in South Africa. The municipalities themselves provide data for these releases. It cannot be reconciled against any source and has often shown gaps and conflicting figures. Reliable data for analysis and planning is a severe challenge in addressing municipal service delivery. Furthermore, making direct comparisons is challenging because data do not exist in a consistent format between the different data sources. Since 1994 the government has aimed to eradicate backlogs and provide all South African households with access to at least basic services. From an infrastructure perspective, it targeted water, sanitation, electricity, roads, stormwater, and refuse removal services. Most national data sets report on all these services except road access and stormwater services. However, isolating refuse removal services from municipal financial reporting figures TABLE 1: Households with less than basic services4 Water Sanitation Electricity Total Households Total % Total % Total % Total % 1996 1 809 480 20% 4 471 092 50% 3 810 437 42% 9 019 357 100% 2016 2 031 975 12% 4 088 142 24% 2 106 451 12% 16 923 309 100% Change in units 222 495 -382 950 -1 703 986 7 903 952
IMESA 85 PAPERS is often challenging. The position with water, sanitation and electricity access sufficiently illustrates the South African approach to service delivery. Backlog eradication became a policy in 1994 and was measured against access to at least basic services. Basic services, as it still stands in national policy, refer to access to a communal water standpipe within 200m, a ventilated improved pit latrine, a 50MWh electricity per month, the availability of communal skips for refuse removal and access to an all-weather road within 500m of a house. The initial target was to eradicate backlogs by 2008, and 2014 was set as the target date when it was not achieved. As shown in the table below, by 2016, they still did not meet the target. It remains the subject of continued political promises and undertakings across the political spectrum. Overall, table 1 shows increases in service backlogs were arrested, although there were more households without access to basic water in 2016 than in 1996. In addition, the sanitation situation marginally improved while there were successes with households’ electrification. However, as cautioned earlier, national figures can be misleading as it does not account for spatial differences. Furthermore, high population growth in the metropolitan areas has largely aggravated the backlog while large parts of rural South Africa depopulated. From a policy implementation perspective, the relationship between Table 1 and Table 2 is significant. While backlogs did not change significantly, as shown, the service delivery drive was not aimed toward providing basic services but full services to households. Full services imply a house or on-site connection for water, water-borne sanitation, sufficient electricity to run appliances, house collection of refuse and tar roads. Table 2 shows the extent to which full service was implemented. For example, in the case of water, access improved by 89%, sanitation improved by 136% and electricity by 184%. These access improvements are commendable indeed, but the deviation from the basic service policy eventually became one of the most significant contributors to the current financial predicaments of municipal governments. A last and crucial point that need consideration is that the figures above indicate access to services in quantitative terms and do not indicate the quality of services that beneficiaries receive. OPERATING INCOME AND EXPENDITURE Table 3 and 4 show municipalities’ operating expenditure and income between 1996 and 2020. The issue to note is the structure of the budgets. • There was a decrease in the extent of Salaries, Wages and Allowances decreased. The FY1920 figure remains above the norm but also represents a sharp increase from FY1718, where it was down to 27.3% TABLE 2: Households with access to full services5 Water Sanitation Electricity Total Households Total % Total % Total % Total % 1996 3 973 255 44% 4 548 265 50% 5 208 920 58% 9 019 357 100% 2016 7 511 848 44% 10 722 762 63% 14 816 858 88% 16 923 309 100% Change in units 3 538 593 6 174 497 9 607 938 7 903 952 TABLE 4: Operating income 1996 and 2020 – real values7 FY9697(real) FY1920 % average annual change Total (R’000) % Total (R’000) % Billed Property Rates 24 937 129 20.5% 83 061 007 17.6% 5.4% Billed Service Charges Electricity 47 878 829 39.3% 140 029 723 29.7% 4.8% Billed Service Charges Water 13 439 372 11.0% 53 583 541 11.4% 6.2% Billed Service Charges Wastewater management 6 345 304 5.2% 20 886 676 4.4% 5.3% Billed Service Charges Waste management 3 595 380 3.0% 14 757 958 3.1% 6.3% Transfers and Subsidies 7 559 359 6.2% 71 451 004 15.2% 10.3% Other 17 962 774 14.8% 86 972 860 18.5% 7.1% Total revenue 121 718 147 100.0% 470 742 769 100.0% 6.1% Surplus/(Deficit) -1 043 641 -0.9% 3 342 164 0.7% Households8 9 076 635 17 418 000 2.9% Revenue per household per month 1 117.50 2 252.19 0.0% 3.1% TABLE 3: Operating expenditure 1996 and 2020 – real values6 FY9697 FY1920 % average annual change Total (R’000) % Total (R’000) % Salaries Wages and Allowances 41 332 231 33.7% 143 348 195 30.7% 5.6% Electricity Bulk Purchases 27 571 034 22.5% 101 707 968 21.8% 5.8% Water Bulk Purchases 6 790 763 5.5% 30 657 843 6.6% 6.8% Interest and Redemption 17 855 282 14.5% 13 698 125 2.9% -1.1% Other 29 212 478 23.8% 177 988 475 38.1% 8.2% Total expenditure 122 761 788 100.0% 467 400 605 100.0% 6.0%
86 IMESA PAPERS • Irrespective of the sharp rise in electricity prices, bulk purchases remain 22% of the overall expenditure budget. Notwithstanding the focus on electricity increases, all other expenditures increased similarly or higher. • Expenditure on loan repayments decreased drastically. This decrease relates to the introduction and growth of capital grants and transfers. There is more detail on this matter below. • The concerning aspect, however, is the overall increase in operating expenditure. Expenditure increased at an average rate of 6.0% per annum. This implies a nominal increase of 11.9% per annum, implying that municipal expenditure doubles every six years. To meet the ever-increasing expenditure, it was obvious that income had to increase. Overall, the income increased by an average of 12% per annum. Notable, however, is that property rates and the four trading services all decreased in proportion to their contribution to the total revenue budget. This points to a political sensitivity towards municipal bill increases and, notably, the increased difficulties with cost recovery and credit control. The shift from direct income from services rendered turned to grants and subsidies where the figures indicate that it grew in real terms at a rate of 10.3% per annum or 16.2% in nominal terms. Moreover, it shows that local government dependency on the national treasury doubles every 4.4 years. This is not sustainable. While these rapid increases occurred, households, which constitute about 97% or more of a municipality’s customer base, grew by 2.9% per annum. The net effect was that municipal income in real terms per household doubled between 1997 and 2020. However, this figure must simply be treated as indicative to show the increased burden on the municipal consumer. It does not imply an increase in municipal bills to residents as the contribution of non-residential customers is not considered. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND FUNDING The link between the consequences of capital investment and the resulting operating impact is seldom considered in long-term planning. The first section above showed how municipalities deviated from the national policy by providing full services rather than basic services to residents. The subsequent section showed how operating expenditure increases and municipalities’ dependence on grants and subsidies increases. There are no comparative figures for capital expenditure on services. However, the table below shows how capital expenditures were funded. Table 5 shows the following: • Capital expenditure did not increase at the same rate as operating expenditure. The average actual increase is 1.4% (7.3% nominal). However, the key lies in the fact that capital expenditure is a one-off expenditure in the sense that once a project is completed, the capital expenditure ends. Nevertheless, once the asset has been created, it creates an operating burden for its lifetime, which implies that capital expenditure over time has a cumulative impact on operating expenditure. This is why operational expenditure increases more rapidly than capital expenditure. The inability to meet the operational obligation created by capital expenditure simply translates into cash flow problems for a municipality. • The most significant trends in the table above are the changes in loans versus transfers and subsidies. In 1997, 49.9% of the capital budget was funded through loans. This figure declined to 17.8% in 2020. In the same period, the contributions of transfers and subsidies increased from 32.8% to 64.2% of funding. This coincides with the decline in the creditworthiness of municipalities and municipalities resigning to the fact that if they have to implement national policies, the national government must foot the bill. • In 1997 municipalities spent about 75% of their capital budgets on infrastructure services. This figure decreased to about 63%, while metropolitan municipalities struggle to direct more than 45% of their budget to infrastructure. The table above shows that municipalities spend 28% less capital per household than in 1997. The situation is aggravated by the fact that capital is diverted away from infrastructure. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURAL PEDIMENTS ON SERVICE DELIVERY Since the early 1990s, the belief persists that access to infrastructure and services is the key to unlocking development and economic prosperity in our poor communities. This is true, and the development of our policies on municipal service delivery and infrastructure developed on this assumption. However, as shown above, basic service delivery was discarded to provide full services to poor people. The common denominator in the municipal financial woes is misguided “pro-poor” service delivery, leading to decades of over-investment in welfare sustained by heavy cross-subsidisation in the local tax base. Infrastructure services to non-paying indigent and poor should not be sugar-coated as investments or economic development. Given the economy’s poor performance and rapidly increasing poverty, infrastructure provision in the current climate remains welfare in all dimensions, subsidised by a shrinking local tax base. Many changes have happened over the last 25 years. Large-scale urbanisation changed the service demand landscape, and amongst others, in 2000, a new municipal dispensation came about. The local economy is struggling, and South Africa is living through the scourge of corruption and state capture that rapidly diminishes our institutional and financial capacities. Yet, politicians stubbornly persist with policies developed in a previous era and never adapted to the changing service delivery environment across the political spectrum. These policies never changed, but in reality, many of their principles are ignored for convenience and political expediency. The key question is if one can turn around the situation given our policy legacy and the approaches adopted by political parties. Hence, the prospects for sustainable municipalities, it is necessary to look at events that shaped our current service delivery situation. TABLE 5: Capital expenditure and funding 1996 and 20209 FY9697(real) FY1920 % average annual change Total % Total % Transfers and Subsidies 14 445 373 32.8% 38 907 658 64.2% 4.4% External Loans 21 955 927 49.9% 10 798 115 17.8% -3.0% Internal Income 3 717 666 8.4% 10 899 004 18.0% 4.8% Other Revenue 3 921 022 8.9% Total Revenue 44 039 988 100.0% 60 604 777 100.0% 1.4% Households10 9 076 635 17 418 000 2.9% Investment per household/annum 4 852 3 479 -1.4%
IMESA 87 PAPERS Take a walk back in history, looking at critical moments in the development of our service delivery policies: • Soweto Accord 1990 • The De Loor Task Group on a National Housing Policy (1992) • World Bank reconnaissance missions to South Africa (1993) • The Reconstruction and Development Plan (1994) • Twenty Town study (1995) • Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF) (1995 to 2007) • The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) • The White Paper on Local Government (1998) • The Municipal Demarcations of 2000 • Free Basic Services (2000) The Soweto Accord of 1990 The Soweto Accord was signed on 24 September 1990. It was, in many respects, the practical starting point for implementing local government and broader political transformation in South Africa. The ramifications and tone of the Accord still reverberate in municipal governance to this day. Notably, the negotiations to resolve the Soweto rent and services payment boycott started around the same time as the announcement on 2 February 1990 on the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations. The Soweto Accord11 was the result of the rent and services boycott in Black Local Authorities that started in 1986. In the latter stages of the boycott, the Soweto People’s Delegation (SPD), which included Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Rev Frank Chikane, Mrs Albertina Sisulu, Mrs Ellen Khutswayo, Sister Bernard Ncube and Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, represented the people of Soweto12. The rent and services boycott was the response of civil society and particularly the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), to the establishment of black local authorities (BLA). Soon, the BLAs were not financially and economically sustainable. The problem in Soweto reached alarming proportions when Dr Simon Brand of the Development Bank of South Africa was appointed, circa 1987, to report on the Finances and Economy of Soweto. The report was completed in 1988 but not released for public consumption13. Nevertheless, the report contained approaches and recommendations that might be considered unconventional in the prevailing political climate. After nearly seven months, the Soweto Accord was signed on 24 September 1990. In terms of the agreement, the rent and service boycott was suspended. The following applied for the short-term: • All arrears, including rent on houses, were written off; • A special tariff for electricity was introduced; and • The agreement provided a R23 flat rate on water, sanitation and refuse removal. The agreement on this low rate was the result of the negotiating skills of one Cyril Ramaphosa and the total lack of experience in negotiations from the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) delegation. In terms of the longer-term issues, it was agreed that: • Houses will be transferred to the occupants. • Services will be upgraded. • Affordability will drive the tariff structure. • The current political system of BLA must be done away with. • Johannesburg and Soweto must become one city14. The Accord largely met the demands of the SPD, but it also preceded national negotiations that started in December 1991. The most significant outcome of the Soweto Accord was the establishment of the Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, which met for the first time in October 1990. The Metropolitan Chamber served as a significant event. It allowed for gaining experience for government and the ANC aligned groupings for the national negotiations when the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) began on 21 December 1991, at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg. The main impact on service delivery lay in adopting a “flat rate” for service payments, which broke the link between payment for services (the bill) and the cost of services. Whether households should pay for services was not an issue in the negotiations – only how much? De Loor Task Group 19915 Near the end of 1990, the South African Housing Advisory Council was requested by the then Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs to review the existing dispensation and advise on a new national housing policy and strategy for South Africa. Accordingly, a task group was appointed under Dr Joop de Loor which published its report in 1992. The report’s contribution was significant for infrastructure as it introduced the concept of differentiated service levels. However, while addressing the provision of infrastructure services, the report recognised the inadequacy of appropriate data on housing and infrastructure. The report stated that the installation of bulk services is expensive and can seriously delay development. Therefore, the report recommended that bulk infrastructure planning, programming and provision be part of the guide plans/urban structure plans (SDFs in the current context)16. As far as internal engineering services are concerned, the task group developed a level of service matrix to support the provision of a range of service levels that recognised household affordability as a critical consideration in providing infrastructure services. Notwithstanding the agreement on flat rates, etc., two years earlier in the Soweto Accord, the policy remained that households, rich and poor, must pay for the services they receive. Therefore, different service levels became an important tool in managing the operating impact of capital expenditure17. A more salient result of the Task Group’s work was that it was the first time that housing and infrastructure demand was modelled to inform policy decisions. Infrastructure investment modelling became a feature of the subsequent work done by the World Bank in South Africa and the quantification of inputs into the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Frameworks between 1994 and 2007. Influenced by the World Bank Reconnaissance Missions to South Africa in early 1990, the technical work regarding service levels and housing remained largely intact in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) released by the ANC in 1996. World Bank Reconnaissance Missions 1991, 1992 and 199318 During the initial urban missions to South Africa, the visits aimed to identify critical issues in formulating national policies on urban development. The following three main themes emerged: • the disparities in access to, and levels of, services available to the large majority of the urban population; • the disparity in the economic and fiscal base of the black and white cities, and the need to unify the metropolitan areas politically, administratively, functionally, and financially to address redistributive requirements and create requisite levels of efficiency, equity, and capacity in the provision of urban services; and • the underlying human costs and economic inefficiencies in the current spatial structures of the cities, and the need to reverse the continuing extensive process of urban growth in favour of consolidating the urban areas socio-economically and spatially. In the subsequent missions (July 1992 and December 1992), before the 1993 visit, the emphasis shifted from identifying urban policy issues at the national level to putting a dimension to these issues through data collection and analysis at a metropolitan-specific level. The unification of the local authorities
88 IMESA PAPERS comprising metropolitan regions has emerged as an underlying imperative in the process. The final mission in 1993 focused on quantifying service upgrading, backlog eradication and new developments to support new integrated metropolitan areas. As a basis for the work of the World Bank mission, they confirmed the approach formulated in the De Loor Task Group of differentiated service levels aligning with household income as the basis for infrastructure provision. The Reconstruction and Development Plan 1994 The ANC released the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) in 199419, and it was its election manifesto that became the basis for municipal service delivery in South Africa. The RDP was presented as a coherent socio-economic policy framework that became the basis for developing legislation and policy. Regarding housing and infrastructure, the RDP stated that at a minimum, all housing must protect from the weather, be a durable structure, and offer reasonable living space and privacy. A house must include sanitary facilities, stormwater drainage, a household energy supply (whether linked to grid electricity supply or derived from other sources, such as solar energy), and convenient access to clean water. The emphasis was clearly on access to basic services, and the concept was eventually included in the Constitution of 1996. During this period, strong political support for payment led to the Masakhane Campaign’s launch. The ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) stated, “All participants agreed that people should indeed pay for such services, when they were receiving adequate services and when they could afford to pay. Payment, in these circumstances, is part of building a sense of ownership, responsibility and active citizenship.” http://www.anc.org.za/content/masakhane-campaign20. While Nelson Mandela said in 1995 at the launch of the Maskakhane Campaign in Koeberg, “…government is putting massive investment into programmes for housing and services. We all have the responsibility to pay for what we use, or else the investment will dry up and the projects come to an end.”21 http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1995/950225_ masakhane.htm At this stage, the scene was set for implementing infrastructure provision and service delivery policies. However, two clear principles were established and entrenched for future policy development in the run-up to the post-1994 era. The first was the principle that users must pay for services, and secondly, services must be aligned with household affordability by implementing differentiated service levels. The period after 1994 up to 2000, with the implementation of the new local government dispensation, was very much a rational technocratic process. This may be the reason for the relatively stable and uneventful period between 1994 and 2000 that marked the development of policy and putting the required legislation in place. The “Twenty Towns study” 199522 For the first time, the Twenty Towns study of 1995 used a mathematical model to show the explicit link between capital expenditure and the operating impact. The report estimated that between R50 billion and R80 billion would be required to address residential infrastructure over ten years. The report recognised that how much is invested, where it is invested and financed and paid for, will have important implications for municipal services’ financial viability and sustainability. There was a strong emphasis on financial viability, recognising the role service payments will play through service levels aligned with household income. The report listed four questions that are still valid: • What level of investment can local authorities and South Africa afford? • What level of subsidy is necessary and desirable, and how should these be applied? • What are the long-term financial implications of these investments and subsidies? • What financial policies should be adopted for municipal infrastructure and services? The report recognised that providing full services to all households is unsustainable and that the alignment of service levels with household income was a more viable approach23. The MIIF 1995 to 2007 The “Twenty Towns study” ‘s immediate outflow was that it escalated to a national assessment of service delivery. As a result, the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF) was born. The first version was released in October 199524 and last of seven iterations in 200725. The purpose of the MIIF was to quantify infrastructure delivery in terms of service numbers, capital requirements and operating consequences. The models used for the MIIF, the Combined Services Model (CSM)26, evolved, and more sophisticated versions are still in use. However, with developing infrastructure investment frameworks for more than 120 municipalities in South Africa, the message since 1995 remains precisely the same: our system cannot afford or sustain services at a full level of infrastructure services. The challenge remains that the results and predicted consequences of delivery policies are not good news from a political perspective. The Constitution 199627 The Constitution adopted in 1996 and amended subsequently was a direct outflow of the pre-1994 area, the RDP vision pegged down during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations. Chapter 7 of the Constitution addresses local government in South Africa. Section 152 deals with the constitutional objectives of local government. It is vital to quote it in its entirety, namely: “(1) The objects of local government are— (a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; (c) to promote social and economic development; (d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. (2) A municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objectives set out in subsection (1).” Section 152(1)(b) underlines the importance of sustainable service delivery, and this is amplified in Section 152(2), where it clearly states that municipalities must execute their mandate within the limits of their institutional and financial capacity. The Constitution emphasises a resource-based approach and not a needs-based approach. Municipalities’ current financial and delivery predicaments may be one of South Africa’s biggest constitutional failures. Even the subsequent White Paper on Local Government of 1998 negated or did not recognise principles of institutional and financial capacity. White Paper on Local Government 199828 The latter part of the 1990s saw the rapid development of South Africa’s policy and legislative framework for municipalities. As a result, the foundation was laid for South Africa’s municipal legislation. The theme of access to basic and affordable services remained, but vital ideological elements started to surface around the conception of developmental local government29. Emphasise access to basic services from
IMESA 89 PAPERS a health and safety perspective, but the principles for service delivery are again confirmed in Section F(2.1) of the White Paper30. The White Paper strongly emphasises private sector investment and funding through public and private partnerships (PPPs). During this period, two of the most successful PPPs in Africa were also concluded as 30-year concessions for water and sanitation in Mbombela and parts of the iLembe District municipality. However, progress with PPPs was practically nipped in the bud by Cosatu’s policy and opposition to service delivery arrangements involving the private sector31. The following is a direct result and outflow of the White Paper on Local Government: • Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 • Structures Act 117 of 1998 • Systems Act 32 of 2000 • Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 • Property rates Act 6 of 2004 The Municipal Demarcations of 200032 South Africa has a strong history of rural and local government where elements survived for more than 150 years. The local government system as it existed in 1994 was fragmented and complicated. However, it served one fundamental principle and was a system that responded to local needs and had a history where “form followed function”. The Divisional Councils in the Cape grew out of the need to serve vast rural areas, while the Transvaal Board for Peri-urban areas addressed the needs of small rural settlements. Even the dreaded homeland governments had a functional relationship with the areas they had to serve33. The reasons behind the change in local government were motivated, on the one hand, to rationalise the very fragmented system and, on the other hand, to get rid of any remnants of the old Apartheid system, although the tribal system (traditional leadership) was kept intact. The concept of “wall to wall” municipalities translated into a single type of local municipal government. However, there are important consequences, namely: • All policies and strategies up to 2000 were focused on cities and urban development. However, South Africa was now confronted with a system of regional government that included vast rural areas to high-density urban areas. Municipal areas are vast. For example, the David Kruiper LM is bigger than 23 European countries, while it has a north-south distance of 460km, the same as Tshwane to Musina. Furthermore, a municipality such as Mangaung does not conjure up images of a metropolitan area when the urban footprint in the municipality is less than 2% of its total area. • The distance, size and settlement mix directly impact municipal infrastructure provision and service delivery. The 2000 demarcations resulted in regional governments whom it is required to address different demands emanating from rural and urban environments in the same jurisdiction on an equitable basis. It is simply not a practical reality. • As part of the uniform regulatory and policy environment, there is a high level of central control, and the expectations for regulatory compliance make it nearly impossible to respond to local issues that differ from municipality to municipality. • The last issue is that the pre-2000 service delivery and infrastructure policies were developed with a solid urban focus and were simply transplanted into an environment that is not suitable or conducive for achieving the objectives of those policies. These unintended consequences of the 2000 demarcations may be one of the most significant contributors to the challenges of local government service delivery in South Africa. Free Basic Services The introduction of free basic services was the last event in 2000 that had a lasting and very negative impact on municipal service delivery and the financial sustainability of municipalities. First, President Thabo Mbeki announced free basic services during the municipal election campaign in December 200035. Then, in July 2001, the policy to provide free basic services to poorer households was adopted. Under this policy, municipalities were tasked to identify indigent households that would receive services – such as water and electricity – for free or at substantially subsidised rates. At that point, the payment for service was still national policy, and indications were that progress was made. However, the notion of free basic services promised before an election rendered all previous efforts to apply cost recovery useless. Furthermore, in an apparent competition between political parties and supported by activist groups, the services provided under a basic services policy were not basic services anymore. Instead, full services became the norm, as indicated in this paper’s first sections. House connections for water, waterborne sanitation, door-to-door refuse collection, and tarred roads became the norm. Full-service levels are applied in most municipalities and national departments such as the Department for Housing. The application and implementation of free basic services was a challenge from day one. Firstly, it was not easy to apply, and there were initial attempts to apply it to all residential customers in a municipality. However, this often proved to be too costly. Identifying indigent households also remains challenging and being indigent is also dependent on many variables; a household’s status can change rapidly and regularly for many reasons. The net result was that more and more households received services they did not pay for or simply could not afford. In addition, the past decade’s economic challenges have caused municipalities’ revenue base to shrink, resulting in increasing shortfalls and cashflow problems. CONCLUSION - WHERE DOES ALL OF THIS LEAVE US? South Africa started with a clear and rational approach to municipal service delivery and infrastructure provision. As a result, very sound and sensible policy and legislative frameworks were developed and implemented. However, three events changed the course of the process. The first was the White Paper on Local Government in 1998, introducing ideological innuendos into the delivery process but, the fundamentals remained sound. However, implementing the redesigned municipal demarcations in 2000 proved to be disastrous, not necessarily by intention, but through the unintended consequences as explained by The Municipal Demarcations of 2000 above. The last and perhaps the most challenging event was introducing the free basic services policy and its implementation and evolution over the past decade. The extent of policy creep that took place shifted the focus in many instances away from the intentions and rationale of the initial policies. Free basic services clearly increased the demands on the tax base and national fiscus, which the system cannot afford or sustain. Two further factors aggravated the situation. The first is increased poverty due to low economic growth, and the second is the extent of urbanisation and how populations are literally shifting at increased rates which may also be a result of economic pressures and perceptions of better opportunities in some areas for destitute people. The irony is that the two most pressing issues, namely access to services and household income, are the aspects which are the least covered in national and public domain data sets. First, as argued earlier, it is virtually impossible to get a clear picture of service access at a detailed level. Secondly, detailed household income data only becomes available every decade in the national census.
90 IMESA PAPERS It is tough to contemplate any solutions. As the title suggests, the issue addressed are entrenched and nearly irreversible. One cannot practically dig up the services of people who cannot afford them, and, maybe, more importantly, it is doubtful if any politician in this country has the guts to say we need to change or reverse our service delivery approaches. The near impossibility of reversing the status quo is why this paper views the issues addressed as structural. The most significant gains lie in efficiency improvements and better planning. However, we have proved that our ability to plan AND implement these plans is limited. In the same way, as we allowed policy creep, we need to revert to the original policies. We see this, for example, in the changing approach of the Department of Housing, but it is not easy. With national elections looming in 2024, the obvious political approach will be to make the necessary trade-offs and shift any contentious decisions to some undefined time in the future in the hope that we will somehow a national municipal and service delivery disaster. NOTES and References 1 Sowell, T., A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, Basic Books, 2002 2 https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/backbasics 3 https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/sas-municipal-sector-isabout-to-collapse-ratings-afrika/ 4 Calculated from Statistics South Africa, Census 1996 and Community Survey 2016 5 Calculated from Statistics South Africa, Census 1996 and Community Survey 2016 6 Calculated from the SA National Treasury’s Local Government Financial Database (http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Media_Releases/mbi/Pages/ Municipal%20Budgets%20-%20Main%20Page.aspx) The data for FY9697 shows the first consolidation of municipal financial data for the transformation arrangements implemented in terms of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 7 Calculated from the SA National Treasury’s Local Government Financial Database (http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Media_Releases/mbi/Pages/ Municipal%20Budgets%20-%20Main%20Page.aspx) The data for FY9697 shows the first consolidation of municipal financial data for the transformation arrangements implemented in terms of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 8 Statistics South Africa, Census 1996 and Mid-year population estimates sourced from Spatial Data Services Africa’s database in MapAble® 9 Calculated from the SA National Treasury’s Local Government Financial Database (http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Media_Releases/mbi/Pages/ Municipal%20Budgets%20-%20Main%20Page.aspx) The data for FY9697 shows the first consolidation of municipal financial data for the transformation arrangements implemented in terms of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 10 Statistics South Africa, Census 1996 and Mid-year population estimates sourced from Spatial Data Services Africa’s database in MapAble® 11 Transvaal Provincial Administration, Soweto Woking Committee, Unpublished Report, February 1990 12 The Soweto Delegation, The Soweto Rent Boycott, Unpublished Report, PLANACT, March 1989 13 DBSA, Report on the Finances and Economy of Soweto, circa 1987, Unpublished Report 14 Soweto Civic Association, The voice of the SCA: The Soweto Accord – A victory for the residents. December 1990 15 The South Africa Housing Council, Report prepared by the task group on national housing policy and strategy, ISBN 0-621-14483-5, 1992 16 The South Africa Housing Council, Report prepared by the task group on national housing policy and strategy, ISBN 0-621-14483-5, 1992, recommendation 12.3.10. p.290 17 The South Africa Housing Council, Report prepared by the task group on national housing policy and strategy, ISBN 0-621-14483-5, 1992, Annexure Chapter 12, p.329 18 World Bank Reconnaissance Missions to South Africa. Aide memoirs, Unpublished 19 African Nation Congress, Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994 20 This link does not work since the ANC website was hacked in June 2013 21 http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1995/950225_ masakhane.htm 22 Roux A and R Eberhard, Financial Modelling of municipal services in twenty towns. DBSA. September 1995 23 Roux A and R Eberhard, Financial Modelling of municipal services in twenty towns. DBSA. September 1995, p.1 24 Ministry in the Office of the President and the Department of National Housing, Municipal Infrastructure Investment framework, October 1995 25 COGTA, The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF 7) for South Africa. Round 7 (2009 – 2010): a capital investment perspective. DBSA, June 2011 26 Gildenhuys, BC, The Combined Services Model, Model testing, documentation and training, DBSA, Unpublished. August 1996 27 RSA, The Constitution of South Africa of 1996, Act 108 of 1996 as amended. 28 DPLG, The White Paper on Local Government, March 1998 29 DPLG, The White Paper on Local Government, March 1998, See Section B: Developmental Local Government, pp17 36 30 DPLG, The White Paper on Local Government, March 1998, See Section F(2.1) p.93 - 94 31 COSATU press statement on decisions of the Central Executive Committee - 14/09/1996 http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37a/025.html This view still stands 32 DPLG, The White Paper on Local Government, March 1998, See Section D, Institutional Systems. Pp 57 - 80 33 There are two publications that gives an excellent exposition of the history and development of local government in South Africa. The first is Green, LP, History of Local Government in South Africa – An introduction, Juta & Co Ltd, 1957, which covers the period between 1652 and 1954 while the book by JSH Gildenhuys, Vrede Vryheid en Voorspoed: ‘n Uitdaging vir Munisipale Owerhede, Van Schaik, 1981 covers the history up to 1981 when the new constitutional dispensation that preceded the transformation of the 1990s came into being. 34 Spatial Data Services Africa, MapAble® database 35 Joseph, C., Free Basic Municipal Services: A Discussion Document. Occasional Paper no 6, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (South Africa), March 2002. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/07190.pdf
IMESA 91 PAPERS PAPER 6 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AT LOCAL AND DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES Masuku SM¹; Oosthuizen E² ECSA Candidate Engineer¹ ECSA Professional Engineer; SAICE Member; CESA Member² ABSTRACT The National Land Transport Act (NLTA, Act 5 of 2009) requires transport authorities at local and district municipalities to develop Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs). The objective of an ITP is to facilitate coordinated planning between infrastructure development, operations and regulation for all modes of transport. The plans provide a five year road map for addressing transport challenges and needs, and align implementation of transport projects with spatial and land-use development. The study found that the majority of municipalities do not have ITPs and therefore do not comply with the NLTA. The impact of non-compliance is evident in growing towns where new developments are accompanied by a rise in congestion, poor pedestrian infrastructure and crowded city centres; which together discourages potential investors and thereby curtail the town’s development potential. Lack of awareness, skilled personnel and financial resources were identified as some of the main barriers to compliance by municipalities. The study discusses the level of compliance and the extent of identified challenges, and offers recommendations on how these challenges can be addressed. INTRODUCTION The National Land Transport Act (Act No.5 of 2009) (NLTA) provides the requirements for the development of integrated transport plans by municipalities. These requirements provide the minimum planning required, with planning authorities given the freedom to do additional planning when they deem it necessary or as per requirements by the Member of Executive Council (MEC)(DoT, 2016). There are three levels of Integrated Transport Plans: • Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plans developed by metropolitan municipalities; • District Integrated Transport Plans developed by district municipalities; and • Local Integrated Transport Plans developed by local municipalities. The NLTA requires ITPs to be updated annually in alignment with the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). IDPs are annually reviewed 5 year plans on how the municipality aims to improve service delivery regarding, amongst others, water, electricity, housing and transport. Projects identified in the ITP should inform the transport section of the IDP. Where the municipality is planning or has recently completed the ITP, this will also be reflected on the IDP. The alignment between ITPs and IDPs is essential to the successful transformation of the fragmented spatial legacy in South Africa (Schoeman, 2004). The purpose of this paper is to investigate municipal compliance with the NLTA in terms of the development of ITPs. The quality of those ITPs is outside the scope of this investigation. THE NEED FOR TRANSPORT PLANNING Spatial Planning in South Africa The law of segregation resulted in a fragmented spatial setting in which residential areas are separated from areas of work, economic activity and social services. This spatial setting is still evident today in cities like Johannesburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg and Durban. Figure 1 shows a general scenario that can be observed across major South African cities as well as rural areas. Residential townships such as Mamelodi and Attredgeville (Pretoria), UMlazi and Ntuzuma (Durban), IMbali and Northdale (Pietermaritzburg) and Soweto and Alexandra (Johannesburg) are all located away from city centres. The adoption of the new constitution post 1994 rendered most planning laws based in segregation unconstitutional. However, new land use and development framework are still fraught with elements from these old systems, often coursing confusion and subject to legal challenges (Kimberly, 2015). While the various policies and Acts have the same objective of giving guidance to transforming the current state of planning, breaking away from the challenges of the past, and facilitating more sustainable urban developments, their implementation has been challenging (Harrison & Todes, 2021, Kimberly 2015). One such policy is the inclusionary housing policy, which aimed to improve the provision of affordable housing as part of new developments in proximity to urban centres. The policy required private developers to provide a percentage of their new developments as low cost housing. The goal of the policy was to facilitate spatial transformation by bridging the access gap for different groups, by enabling the low income class to reside within close proximity to economic opportunities (Klug et al, 2013). However, this was left to municipalities to enforce due to lack of a supporting national policy (Harrison & Todes, 2021). According to Klug et al (2013) the policy was also resisted by developers and residents in middle and higher income classes, therefore limiting its implementation. The provision of low cost housing is still one of the main challenges with regards to achieving spatial transformation. Low cost housing developments, including those facilitated by government interventions, are still mostly located outside city centres (Biermann et al, 2004). This is mainly due to the cost of acquiring land, which is higher near city centres compared to areas at the edge of cities. FIGURE 1: Schematic depiction of spatial layout in South African urban and rural areas
92 IMESA PAPERS The role of transport The separation between residential areas and urban centres creates multiple social, economic and environmental issues as people have to spend more time and money to access these places often through some form of motorised transport (public or private). Initially, public transport was provided in the form of municipal busses and trains. These were subsidised modes aimed at keeping the fares low for people to afford. Keeping the fares low also served to support the segregation of marginalised people to areas outside of city centres while enabling them to get to their areas of work situated in the city (Beavon, 2001). However, the high cost of subsidies, poor service and lack of maintenance all led to dissatisfaction with government public transport. To compound on this, the long distances and high operating costs meant that maintaining low fares and low subsidies was no longer sustainable, thus costing commuters and government more money. Figure 2 shows the rise experienced in subsidising public transport between 1967 and 1985 (McCarthy and Swilling, 1985). Challenges with formalised busses and trains gave rise to a new form of public transport, the minibus taxi industry. The industry’s initial success was based on its affordability, ease of access and flexibility compared to the continually worsening bus service (Dugard and Nkonyane, 2004). However, the minibus service was also fraught with its own challenges, which included violence over the ownership of routes, which is the reputation that persists with the industry today. The 2013 National household travel survey showed that poor service is still the main factor deterring people away from using available public transport services (Figure 3). FIGURE 2: Increase in public transport subsidies provided by government FIGURE 3: Reasons commuters do not use public transport (NHTS, 2013) Figure 3 also shows that people who do not use public transport mainly prefer to make use of private vehicles. The challenge with the use of private vehicles is evident on South African roads every morning and evening with congested roads leading into and out of city centres. The National Development Plan is to address this issue through strategic transport investments and improved spatial planning (NPC, 2012). Strategic transport investment include provision of safe and affordable public transport to improve mobility. An example of improved spatial planning is the development of shopping centres and community service centres in townships and other residential areas to reduce the need for long distance travel. However, as the spatial environment changes there is also a shift in people’s need for travel. For example, shopping closer to home can eliminate the need for vehicular travel but create a need for wider sidewalks to accommodate pedestrians. Shopping centres also attract heavier traffic in the form of delivery trucks, create a need for parking and requires improved traffic management. When new developments are implemented without considerations of their transport impact, this usually results in road congestion, deteriorated pavements and increased accident rates. The impact of lack of coordination is not only limited to urban areas. Figure 4 shows a case in the rural town of Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, which is one of the most congested towns in the area despite being limited in the scale of development. The objective of transport planning is to ensure that is to identify current and future transport needs, and determine appropriate action to address those needs. Integrated transport plans coordinate planning of all transport components including infrastructure, services, operations and regulations. This covers all modes of transport including private and public transport, freight transport and non-motorised transport. The prioritisation and scheduling of transport projects should be aligned with the municipality’s spatial development framework (DoT, 2016). This ensures that transport projects are implemented as and when needed to address and to accommodate the travel patterns of the municipal spatial framework. METHODOLOGY IDPs from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) municipalities were reviewed for stated status of the ITPs. KZN has ten district municipalities, forty-three local municipalities and one metropolitan municipality. The study was limited to IDPs between the 2020/21 to 2022/23 financial years, thus giving a usable sample of 50 IDPs (Table 1). The ITP status was divided into four categories: • No mention – meaning that the IDP does not make any mention of integrated transport plans and its status. This includes cases where the ITP FIGURE 4: Level of congestion observed in the rural town of Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal
IMESA 93 PAPERS is mentioned in the MEC’s IDP comments but there is no response provided by the municipality to those comments; • No ITP – meaning that the municipality has stated that it does not have an ITP. This includes cases in which the ITPs are outdated and there are no stated plans to update it; • Planning – this includes cases where the municipality has stated that it is in the process of securing assistance for the development of the ITP or the tendering process. This includes cases where a service provider has been appointed but work has not commenced; • In progress – this covers cases which is ongoing work on the development or reviewing of the ITP by the municipality including completion of initial drafts; and • Completed – meaning that the IDP states that the municipality has recently completed the ITP and has been adopted by the council. RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS Status of ITPs Table 2 shows that 66% of the reviewed IDPs did not indicate any municipal plans with regards to the development or review of ITPs. This includes 10 municipalities which made no mention of ITPs at all, and 23 which stated that they did not have an ITP. In one of the municipalities, UMziwabantu Local Municipality, the MEC had requested that the ITP should be developed. However, there was no response to this request by the municipality. UMkhanyakude District Municipality indicated that it does not have an ITP, but is in the process of developing a Public Transport Plan (PTP). According to the NLTA the PTP should be developed by district and metropolitan municipalities as part of the ITPs. The majority of municipalities stated that they do not have ITPs (46%). This shows a high level of non-compliance with the NLTA. Six of these municipalities stated that they had outdated ITPs which were overdue for update by up to fifteen years. The lack of planning toward the development of ITPs was mainly attributed to lack of funding and capacity (nine municipalities). The KZN Department of Transport was revealed as the go-to source for assistance in this regard. Less than a quarter of municipalities stated that they were either in the process of (8%) or finished (16%) developing or reviewing their ITPs. Six of the recently completed ITPs were adopted between 2016 and 2021 (Newcastle, KwaDukuza, Mandeni, UMhlathuze, Nkandla and UMhlabuyalingana Local Municipalities and Harry Gwala and King Cetshwayo District Municipalities). Newcastle Local Municipality refers to the Integrated Traffic and Transportation Plan (ITTP) instead of an ITP. The plan’s primary objective is to determine road network requirements to meet the demands placed by existing and projected future development for the ten year period (2015-2025) (Newcastle Local Municipality, 2021). Inquthu Local Municipality (2021) and UMsinga Local Municipality (2021) stated that they were developing their ITPs internally due to lack of funding to appoint a service provider. Ubuhlebezwe Local Municipality also cited lack of funding as the impediment to begin with the ITP development. The municipality is part of the 10% of municipalities at various planning stages towards the development of ITPs. The planning stages range from research on the requirements of ITPs (Dannhauser Local Municipality, 2021), tendering stage for service providers to assist in the development of ITPS (Ubuhlebezwe Local Municipality, 2022), and appointment of a service provider to assist with the development of the ITP (Greater Kokstad Local Municipality, 2021). Challenges and other comments on ITPs The MEC requested thirteen municipalities to develop or update their ITPs. Of these, one municipality made no comment with regards to the status of its ITP or a response to the MEC’s comments. One other municipality stated that it does not have an ITP but offered no way forward in this regard. Two local municipalities aimed to develop their ITPs from ITPs of their relevant district municipalities. This is counter to the NLTA. While the NLTA provides for district municipalities to assist local municipalities with developing their ITPs, it requires that district ITPs to provide a summary of local ITPs. This counter approach could be attributed to lack of understanding of ITP requirements. Lack of transport planning skills was identified by Govender et.al (2017) as one of the main impediments to poor transport planning in municipalities. Indeed, eight percent of municipalities cited lack of capacity as one of challenges they faced in developing their ITPs. Another indication of the lack of understanding of transport planning is that it is often limited to provision of roads and public transport. The following extract, from the 2020/21 Ray Nkonyeni Local Municipality IDP, shows how this misconception could contribute to noncompliance; “The municipality is not responsible for the local integrated transport plan, but the Department of Transport is. The Department is responsible for building new roads and maintain both the National and Provincial roads, hence the municipality does not have the LITP [Local Integrated Transport Plan].” The identification of road infrastructure forms part of the ITP, however, but is not in itself a complete full ITP. ITPs cover all transport related needs including services, operation and infrastructure. The execution of projects to address those needs falls outside the scope of the ITP and is the responsibility of the relevant authority (NLTA, 2009). Therefore the responsibility of transport planning (identification of transport needs) is separate from the responsibility of project execution. Where the responsibility to execute lies outside the municipality, it does not absolve the municipality from the responsibility of transport planning. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The investigation found that the majority of municipalities do not have ITPs, showing poor compliance with the NLTA. The main factor contributing to this, as stated by municipalities, is the lack of funding for ITPs. The second factor is the lack of transport planning capacity or understanding within municipalities. While this is not explicitly stated by most municipalities, it is critical to address to be addressed it speaks to the potential quality of transport planning undertaken by those municipalities with the resources to do so. TABLE 1: IDP Sample Municipality Type IDP not found 2017/ 18 2020/ 21 2021/ 22 2022/ 23 Local 0 0 4 5 1 District 3 1 20 17 2 Metropolitan 0 0 1 0 0 Total 3 1 25 22 3 TABLE 2: Stated status of ITPs ITP Status Local Municipalities (39) District Municipalities (10) Metropolitan Municipalities (1) Total (100%) No mention 6 4 0 20% No ITP 20 3 0 46% Planning 4 1 0 10% In progress 3 0 1 8% Complete 6 2 0 16%
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IMESA 95 PAPERS PAPER 7 A TRANSFORMATIVE RIVERINE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM : A BUSINESS CASE FOR A NATURE BASED ADAPTATION PROGRAM TO PROTECT CITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND SO MUCH MORE… Geoff Tooley eThekwini Municipality, Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa ABSTRACT So often engineers look for hard solutions to reduce risk to infrastructure and forget about looking at nature and the options that it can provide. The same is true in eThekwini Municipality when it comes to damage to road crossings and rivers, particularly during heavy rains and floods. Engineering solutions helped to reduce some of the risk but often it is not enough. The analysis of the cause of this damage highlighted the role of alien vegetation and solid waste in these blockages and damages. The Sihlanzimvelo project was born in a meeting of the eight departments mandated with looking after eight different facets of the same rivers. Eight departments with reduced budgets and staff compliments. This project looked to remove alien vegetation and waste from the streams through the engagement of unemployed people from the communities, who were upskilled in business skills to form co-operatives who were then contracted by the city. The program ran for 9 years on 300km of stream, and we became aware of many more benefits than just the main reason of reducing the risk to culvert road crossings. This became the basis for the development of an all-encompassing program called the Transformative Riverine Management Program. Through the C40 Climate Finance Facility we have been able to carry out a Benefit Cost Analysis and have demonstrated that by managing our natural assets we can achieve the goal of risk reduction and at the same time achieve many other goals of socio-economic and environmental value. This is a case study of Nature Based Adaptation which is cost effective, and which is making our city more resilient in the face of climate change. 1. INTRODUCTION Municipal engineers are required to design, install, and maintain infrastructure to support the urban framework of the city they serve. In addition to the normal engineering knowledge there is a requirement for basic knowledge of the non-engineering processes and areas which impact on the construction and maintenance of this infrastructure. These are areas such as town-planning, environmental, health etc. In essence, the engineer is required to understand the whole system in which they are operating. There is no better example of a system, than that of a riverine catchment where every action has a reaction which can positively or negatively impact the infrastructure which we are responsible for and therefore the people we serve in our cities. Our urban rivers have for many years been neglected and the services which these systems provide, have been ignored and undervalued. These services include, amongst others, disposal, management and cleansing of the urban stormwater, ecological services (such as water provision, water purification, flood attenuation, biodiversity etc), amenity services (such as recreation) and socio-economic services (such food gardens and vegetation harvested for crafts). We have taken these areas for granted and now as city inhabitants, are paying a price for this neglect. These areas have become waste areas full of alien vegetation and solid waste where children won’t play for fear of snakes attracted by the rats feeding on the waste dumped by communities or the broken glass and rusting metal or the criminals lurking amongst the tall Spanish reeds which infest our natural waterways. Poor water quality in these rivers also creates health challenges and has a negative impact on important tourism assets like Durban’s estuaries and beaches. The proliferation of alien vegetation and the increase in solid waste also translates into blockage material for the city’s many culverts and this creates a serious risk of damage to roads and property as highlighted by the April 2022 flood which devastated our city. In 2016 I presented on the installation of debris walls as an engineering response to attempt to reduce this risk and this has had some success. However, this is a systemic problem which requires a system-based solution – this was the driver for the creation of the Transformative Riverine Management Program (TRMP). It is my hope that as we share this exciting story that more cities will see the benefit of a collective effort to reclaim, rehabilitate and manage our urban streams and rivers, as we strive to make our cities resilient in the face of climate change and economic stresses. The water connects us all. 2. THE HISTORY OF INTERSECTORAL COOPERATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE RIVERINE MANAGEMENT The eThekwini Municipality tried a top down (i.e., policy-driven) approach to include climate change in the operations of the city and this was largely unsuccessful as climate change was primarily seen as an environmental issue by municipal technical sectors. Dr Debra Roberts from the Environmental Planning and Climate Protection Department began a process of identifying individuals within the different sectors of the municipality that were sympathetic to the climate change agenda and could see the potential relevance to their work, and then set about capacitating these individuals to understand the specific threats of climate change to their sectors. This involved fostering “sector champions”, or “climate change moles”, who worked within their sectors to shift the understanding of their colleagues towards climate change threats to their sector/ work. The initial sectors involved in this process were the stormwater and catchment management, sea level rise management, water, health,
96 IMESA PAPERS and biodiversity protection sectors and out of this initial collaboration came the Municipal Adaptation Plan for the Water, Health, and Disaster Management sectors. This work resulted in good relationships being built between individuals within different sectors. It was around the time of the above work, that the Durban Bremen partnership was introduced to the group. We were informed that there was a team of officials arriving from Bremen and there was a need to come together to identify the challenges being faced by the city. This was the catalyst for the team working together on developing the concept of a lighthouse project on the Umhlangane river system within eThekwini. The idea of a system approach to river management and interventions began to take form. The formalization of the Durban-Bremen partnership at a political level gave the team leverage to justify the time spent together to work on this project as well as the support of senior management. Some of the team members were fortunate to travel to Bremen to look at the issues and successes in Bremen which further cemented the trust and relationships between these members from different sectors. We grew to know more about each other’s sector and support each other as we exposed the interconnectedness between the work, we all did in working towards a more resilient city in the face of the climate change threat. The Durban-Bremen partnership then opened the way for Durban to apply through Bremen for BMZ grant funding and we were successful in obtaining this funding for the rehabilitation of the Riverhorse Valley Wetland and surrounding watercourses. This funding created the opportunity for members from the environmental biodiversity section, the catchment management section, the water and sanitation section, and the economic development section to now collaborate in the implementation of a physical project related to climate resilience which needed input from all our sectors in order to be a success. As with any difficult task, the relationships between the team members, including those from Bremen, was strengthened and the project provided proof of how our efforts could be multiplied as we worked together across sectors. About the same time, the Sihlanzimvelo project was started, and we were fortunate to be involved in this exciting beginning. As we worked on this project, we saw the benefits of the work being done in the riverine corridors. This project was also a cross sector collaboration and was providing proof of the cross-sector benefits that could be achieved. The key question was “how do we capture, articulate, and value the benefits we were seeing in projects like Sihlanzimvelo and the Riverhorse wetland projects?”, in order to prove that this was a better way of doing things in our city. Jo Douwes came across the option of the C40 Climate Finance Facility (CFF) and the team came together to put forward the proposal of developing the business case for the expansion of the Sihlanzimvelo project. As each member of the team and with the support of the CFF team, we realized that there were several initiatives in different sectors and within the private sector, that were focused on improving some aspect of the riverine corridors. As a result, the project became the Transformative Riverine Management Program (TRMP) which was designed to incorporate the contributions from all sectors. The CFF work is now complete. The exciting outputs are discussed further in this paper. Key factors that have contributed to the success of the cross-sectoral collaboration that has characterized this work include: • Strong sectoral champions who have been able to lead and drive new work in an institution that is often resistant to change. • An ability to see connections across work areas and recognize the value in working together in areas of common interest and relevance. • A willingness to be involved in exploratory work with evolving outcomes • Clear areas of work in which to focus collaborative efforts. For example, the BMZ funding provided a structured space in which to work together. The same has been true for the work on the TRMP, which is supported by the C40 Cities Finance Facility. • Mutual professional respect and trust, which has been built over many years of working together. a. Sihlanzimvelo Program In 2009, the eThekwini Municipality approved the Municipal Adaptation Plan, Health, and Water and one of the line items was to “Protect and Restore riparian vegetation so as to protect the integrity of riverbanks and retain biological buffers against flooding.” This was a recognition of the need to look at our natural ecological assets in order to improve the city’s resilience. At the same time, the engineering unit of the city was concerned with the increase in damage related to blocked culverts. The incidence of blockage and damages was increasing and needed to be addressed. Work was being done in relation to the installation of debris walls however the need for a more proactive approach was clearly evident. The initial investigations revealed that 70% of the blockage material was alien vegetation with the remaining 30% being solid waste. The April 2022 storms have confirmed this with an added finding which will be dealt with later in this report. The general cleaning and minor repair maintenance of the culverts and roads vests with the Roads and Stormwater Maintenance department (RSWM) while major repairs and maintenance of the culverts vests with the Coastal, Stormwater and Catchment Management Department (CSCM). Mark Tomlinson, of RSWM, and Geoff Tooley, of the Coastal, Stormwater and Catchment Management department (CSCM), began to explore ways of addressing the source of the alien vegetation and the solid waste within the river systems. We identified 8 city departments that were responsible for various aspects of the stream environments. The Environmental Health Department, Department of Water and Sanitation, Durban Solid Waste, RSWM, CSCM, Department of Parks, Recreation and Culture, and Environmental Planning and Climate Protection Department came together in 2007 to try and identify solutions to the problem. Mark Tomlinson and Geoff Tooley requested funding as it was hoped that resources (financial and human) could be pooled and allocated towards dealing with the problem. After discussions with all these departments, Mark Tomlinson suggested the use of co-operatives (grown out of the community) to carry out this work and he agreed to take the lead on this project. As some of the work to be done by the co-operatives would be to clear the culverts (a mandate of RSWM), the Deputy Head of RSWM agreed to the use of his budget for the establishment of this project. Unfortunately, other departments were reluctant to provide funding for this work even though it was addressing work related to their mandates. The primary reason for this related to Key Performance indicators (KPIs) and reluctance to entrust budget spend to another department. Initially, capacity development activities were implemented to support the development of co-ops, after which eThekwini put out an Expression of Interest for application by co-ops to work on Sihlanzimvelo. All co-ops that were registered went through a training process for managing waste. Terms of Reference for a consultant were also shared; the responsibility of the consultant was to identify resident members who would be trained
IMESA 97 PAPERS as project assessors, who would provide a line of communication between co-ops and government. The focus of the project, initially, was on Inanda, KwaMashu, Ntuzuma and uMlazi as it was not possible to implement interventions across the whole city. The team prioritized streams that were severely degraded and near communities with high unemployment rates. They also sought to find areas that would reduce the need for transport of co-ops. (Transforming Southern African cities in a changing climate -Learning lab 3). The main tasks of the co-operatives included: • Clearing of culverts and storm water systems • Minor erosion control of embankments • Ditching to prevent water stagnation • Litter and debris removal and disposal • Cutting back of vegetation • Alien vegetation control • Planting of indigenous vegetation The area of work is the waterway and 3m either side of the water. They are also required to report leaking sewers and erosion points. Each co-operative is given 5km of stream to manage. The streams covered have a catchment less than 1000Ha as this relates to a normal stream depth below knee height. The reasoning behind this relates to safety concerns for the people working in the stream. The state of the co-operative’s length of stream is assessed each month against a set standard and the payment is determined based on the level of maintenance achieved. Hence payment is performance based. The program preparation started in 2009 with the first co-operative starting work on the ground in November 2011. The length of stream initially covered was 295km however with the evidence produced through the C40 CFF business case work, this length has increased to 525km. 3. THE BUSINESS CASE AND C40 CLIMATE FINANCE FACILITY The Sihlanzimvelo program began to produce results and maintenance teams on the ground were recording less blockages to culverts with the associated damage normally seen. In addition to achieving the primary goal of the program a number of other benefits were emerging and being noticed by the city officials and the community on the ground. It was at this stage that the need for capturing these benefits and developing a business case in order to leverage the expansion of the program from both city and external funds became critical. The search for a support funder for this work was found in the C40 Cities Finance Facility (C40 CFF). Once the work with the C40 CFF started, and all role-players were engaged it became apparent that Sihlanzimvelo was just one of many initiatives happening within the riverine corridors of eThekwini. It was with this knowledge and the need to ensure that all programs contributed to the development of the business case and implementation plan, that the Transformative Riverine Management Program (TRMP) came into existence. The primary purposes of the TRMP are • Contribute to sustainable, efficient municipal delivery • Limit climate risk and impacts to society • Secure, valuable financial, socio-economic, human, and ecological benefits • Build climate resilience a. Sihlanzimvelo Program Benefits Identified The identified benefits of the Sihlanzimvelo work can be combined into 4 FIGURE 1: Sihlanzimvelo Streams after work has been completed main areas viz. • Presence on the stream – safety, policing, early identification of problems • Business/Job Creation – Improved business skills, local economy growth, jobs • Clearing of Alien Vegetation – reduced blockages, improved biodiversity, reduced erosion • Clearing of Solid waste – reduced blockages, recycling opportunities b. C40 Climate Finance Facility (CFF) It was recognised by C40 that although there was an abundance of funding and an abundance of good city climate change related projects, there was a gap in the ability of cities to translate these good projects into bankable projects which is what the global funders were looking for. This recognition led to the establishment of the C40 CFF. The C40 CFF is made up of: • C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) • Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) • German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) • British Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) • United States Agency for International Development (USAID) The primary objectives of the C40 CFF are • Reduce greenhouse gas emissions • Sustainable financing of urban climate change investment projects • Developing the capacity of city administrations to mobilize and access a broad range of financing instruments • Sharing knowledge of CFF partner cities via peer-to-peer learning • Developing partnerships between cities and investors/financiers and their representations. c. The Business Case The C40 CFF supported the city in the development of the business case through several studies and the business case along with the reports mentioned below at https://www.c40cff.org/knowledge-library/resourcesfrom-durban. The reports include • TRMP Durban Benefit Cost Analysis Technical Report. • TRMP Durban Green Economy report
98 IMESA PAPERS • TRMP Durban River vulnerability assessment • TRMP Durban Hydrological Vulnerability assessment • TRMP Durban Regulatory Framework Final Report • Regulatory Framework Final Report_201101 • TRMP Durban Business case for TRMP The business case purpose of the TRMP is • Contribute to sustainable, efficient municipal delivery • Limit climate risk and impacts to society • Secure, valuable financial, socio-economic, human, and ecological benefits • Build climate resilience In order to develop a business case based on all the evidence identified, a Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) was developed for management of municipal, private, and traditional authority land in riverine areas. The land ownership was highlighted as one of the key factors to be considered when developing any program intervention due to regulation restrictions. FIGURE 2: Ownership distribution of streams and rivers Nine future riverine management scenarios were modelled in the BCA. These included: • A “do nothing” scenario for municipal, private, and Traditional Authority1 land in riverine areas with climate change as a driver of river impacts. • Upscaling of Sihlanzimvelo Stream Cleaning Programme on municipal land in upper catchments with climate change. • A “basic management” scenario for private and Traditional Authority land in riverine areas with climate change, and • A “transformative management” scenario for each of the three land ownership types with climate change impacts. In the BCA, the costs, and benefits of implementation of these different riverine management models has been estimated at a city-wide scale. In order to do this the Ohlanga River Catchment was used, and the results extrapolated across the city. A “transformative” riverine management approach is assumed to include an overarching “transformative riverine governance” umbrella implemented by eThekwini Municipality. This provides the necessary framework for facilitating cross-sectoral and multi-stakeholder collaboration (including with other spheres of government) and creating enabling conditions for riverine management action across all riverine landowners in the city. Implementation of transformative riverine management assumes a focus on positive social-ecological systems change in relation to rivers. Biophysical riverine management interventions include both ecological restoration and management at a systems scale, aiming to improve the functionality and resilience of rivers to urban impacts and climate change. The condition and/or management of the built/agricultural landscape surrounding rivers would also be improved, such that accelerated stormwater, sediment loads and pollution entering rivers is minimised. Social interventions aim to build human, social and institutional capital in a way that promotes positive behaviour change and active river stewardship in response to a recognition of the value of rivers to people and the economy. Socio-economic and environmental benefits of riverine management are accelerated through circular economy initiatives that make productive use of solid waste and alien plant biomass – either arising from riverine management activities or as a means of reducing waste entering rivers. The social / economic use of riverine areas as places of recreation and tourist activities or harvesting of natural resources is assumed to be optimised within sustainable limits. Agriculture/food gardening on river floodplains is supported, where appropriate, to enhance resilience to increased river flooding and sedimentation, and to limit negative impacts on river ecosystems (Mander N, Mander M, Winnaar G, Mark M and Butler A 2020). The studies show that many of Durban’s rivers are already severely impacted by urban and agricultural development, and pollution. Due to this, it is estimated that the ecosystem services supplied by these urban rivers are 42% below the theoretical best case and that climate change will degrade these systems further, reducing ecosystem services supply by a further 11% by 2040. The eThekwini Municipality will be directly affected, with annual damages to municipal road culverts alone due to increased climate change related flooding estimated at over R151 million by 2040. Declining river water quality will affect coastal tourism and property values, as well as the ability of riverine communities to access and use rivers for household water provision, crop irrigation, and recreation. The annual cost implications for the well-being of municipal citizens and coastal users is estimated to reach R224 million by 2040. (Only historic damages costs to culverts were available to use in this study and so it is recognized that costs indicated are lower than what will be experienced once all infrastructure damage is totaled). Evidence from riverine management projects such as eThekwini Municipality’s Sihlanzimvelo Stream Cleaning Programme suggests that good condition, well-managed streams, and rivers can help buffer the municipality, citizens and businesses from the escalating flood and human health risks associated with climate change. They also contribute positively to societal well-being and cost-efficient municipal service delivery. Modelling of various riverine management scenarios in the Ohlanga River Catchment demonstrated that investing in basic riverine management even with the added pressures brought by climate change - would be almost sufficient to keep ecosystem services at current (baseline) levels. There are some riverine ecosystem services where riparian management actions alone would not be sufficient to entirely mitigate climate change related losses. A transformative management focus on both the riparian zone and the broader catchment could improve most ecosystem service levels an average of 10% above current levels, even with the effects of climate change factored in.