landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
Bini versus Sundaran
Kerala High Court
Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Harun-Ul-Rashid
Bini
Versus
Sundaran
AIR 2008 Ker 84, 2008 (1) KLJ 162, 2008 (1) KLT 331
Decided on 12 December, 2007
Hindu Marriage Act Section 13--whether conciliation is mandatory after the introduction of the Family
Courts Act in a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act even on the excepted grounds of
conversion to another religion, renunciation of the world, mental disorder, venereal diseases and leprosy.
The respondent-husband approached the Family Court, Thrissur under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground that the appellant-wife had ceased to be Hindu by
conversion to another religion. On appearance of the appellant and on the mere admission of such fact,
the Family Court granted a decree of divorce. Aggrieved, the appeal at the instance of the wife contending
mainly that by conversion to another religion alone the marriage does not ipso facto get dissolved and that
the Family Court should have made an attempt to see whether a reconciliation or settlement is yet possible
in the matter.
--Thus though under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 no endeavour for reconciliation need be made in a
petition for divorce on the ground of conversion to another religion, or other grounds excepted under
Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act or on similar or other grounds available under any other law also,
after the introduction of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court is bound to make endeavours for
reconciliation and settlement. The requirement is mandatory. That is the conceptual change brought out
by the Family Courts Act, which is a special statute. In the instant case the Family Court has not made any
efforts for conciliation. On the mere admission of conversion, a decree has been ranted, without making
any endeavour for reconciliation and settlement. That is against the spirit and mandate of the provisions
under the Family Courts Act, 1984. -- impugned order set aside -matter remitted to the Family court to
proceed afresh in the matter in accordance with law.
JUDGMENT
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph
1. The need for and role of conciliation for reconciliation and settlement in disputes relating to marriage
and family affairs pending before the Family Courts is the crux of the subject matter arising in this
appeal. In the process, a noval question to be decided is, whether conciliation is mandatory after the
introduction of the Family Courts Act in a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act even
on the excepted grounds of conversion to another religion, renunciation of the world, mental disorder,
venereal diseases and leprosy.
2. The respondent-husband approached the Family Court, Thrissur under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground that the appellant-wife had ceased to be Hindu by
conversion to another religion. On appearance of the appellant and on the mere admission of such fact,
the Family Court granted a decree of divorce. Aggrieved, the appeal at the instance of the wife contending
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Bini versus Sundaran
mainly that by conversion to another religion alone the marriage does not ipso facto get dissolved and
that the Family Court should have made an attempt to see whether a reconciliation or settlement is yet
possible in the matter.
3. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was introduced to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a
view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family
affairs and for matters connected therewith. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is stated thus:
Several associations of woman, other organisations and individuals have urged, from time to time,
that Family Courts be set up for the settlement of family disputes, where emphasis should be laid on
conciliation and achieving socially desirable results and adherence to rigid rules of procedure and
evidence should be eliminated. The Law Commission in its 59th report (1974) had also stressed that
in dealing with disputes concerning the family the court ought to adopt an approach radically different
from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings and that it should make reasonable efforts at settlement
before the commencement of the trial. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976 to provide
for a special procedure to be adopted in suits or proceedings relating to matters concerning the family.
However, not much use has been made by the courts in adopting this conciliatory procedure and the
courts continue to deal with family disputes in the same manner as other civil matters and the same
adversary approach prevails. The need was, therefore, felt, in the public interest, to establish Family
Courts for speedy settlement of family disputes.
4. It is further stated that the Bill was intended "to make it obligatory on the part of the Family Court to
endeavour, in the first instance to effect a reconciliation or a settlement between the parties to a family
dispute. During this stage, the proceedings will be informal and the rigid rules of procedure shall not
apply". It is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the law relating to Family
Courts that in dealing with the disputes regarding family affairs the first attempt of resolution of such
disputes should be by conciliation, so as to enable the parties to have reconciliation or settlement. It is
with that object in mind only, it was provided under Section 13 of the Act that a legal practitioner shall
not be entitled to represent the parties as a matter of right. In dealing with the procedure before the
Family Court it was made obligatory on the part of the Family Court to make every endeavour in the first
instance to assist and persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the
proceedings before the Court. If there is a reasonable possibility of settlement of the disputes between
the parties, the Family Court is bound to adjourn the proceedings for such period in order to facilitate
attempts for reconciliation or settlement. To the extent relevant Section 9 reads as follows:
9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for settlement.- (1) In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall
be made by the Family Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature
and circumstances of the case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of
the subject matter of the suit or proceeding and for this purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules
made by the High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit.
(2) If, in any suit or proceeding, at any stage, it appears to the Family Court that there is a
reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties, the Family Court may adjourn
the proceedings for such period as it thinks fir to enable attempts to be made to effect such
a settlement.
(3) The power conferred by Sub-section (2) shall be in addition to, and not in 4 derogation of,
any other power of the Family Court to adjourn the proceedings.
5. Under Rule 18 of the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules. 1989 framed by the High Court of Kerala
in exercise of its power under Section 21 of the Act for carrying out the purpose of the Act, it is
provided as follows:
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landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
18. Reconciliation.- The court shall make every reasonable effort for bringing about
reconciliation or settlement between the parties in the first instance in every case where it is
possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, in such manner
as it deems fit, with the help of counsellors nominated by the Court.
Under Rule 14 of the Family Courts (Kerala) Rules, 1989 framed by the Government of
Kerala in consultation with the High Court of Kerala in exercise of its power under Section
23 of the Act, for the purpose of this Act, it is provided that 'There shall be attached to
each Family Court a Counselling Centre to be known as "The Counselling Centre of the
Family Court of..." Under Rule 15 there shall be a Principal Counsellor and such number
of Counsellors as determined by the Government; in consultation with the High Court.
Under Rule 22 the Family Court Judge is bound to direct the parties to consult the specified
counsellor for the purpose of counselling. Under Rule 24 while dealing with the counselling
procedure it is provided that "the parties shall be bound to consult the counsellor on the
date and the time so fixed." Under Rule 25 in case any party does not co-operate with
the counselling the Family Court is even entitled to take appropriate action against such
defaulting party. Rule 26 reads as follows:
26. Duties and functions of a Counsellor,- (1) Counsellor entrusted with any petition shall assist
and advise the parties regarding the settlement of the subject matter of dispute between
the parties or any part thereof. The Counsellor shall also help the parties in arriving at
reconciliation.
(2) The Counsellor in the discharge of his duties shall be entitled to pay home visits to the
homes of any of the parties.
(3) The Counsellor in the discharge of his duties shall be entitled to interview relatives,
friends and acquaintances of parties or any of them.
(4) The Counsellor in the discharge of his duties may seek such information as he may
deem fit from the employer of any of the parties.
(5) The Counsellor may in the discharge of his duties refer the parties to an expert in any
other area such as medicine or psychiatry.
Under Rule 35 "When the parties arrive at a settlement before the Counsellor relating
to the dispute or any part thereof, such settlement shall be reduced to writing and
shall be signed by the parties and countersigned by the Counsellor. The court shall
pronounce a decree or order in terms thereof unless the court considers the terms
of the settlement unconscionable or unlawful". Under Section 37 even if a matter is
closed before the Family court, the Counsellor is entitled to supervise, guide or assist
the reconciled couples.
6. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for various grounds for a decree of divorce.
Under Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the Court is to grant a decree where ground for
relief exists. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 23 it is provided that it is the duty of the court first
to make an endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties. But no such endeavour
is necessary where the relief is sought on the grounds provided under Sub-clause (ii) to (vii) of
Section 13(1). Section 23 reads as follows:
"23- Decree in proceedings.- (1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if
the court is satisfied that-
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner except in cases where
the relief is sought by him on the ground specified in Sub-clause (a), Sub-clause (b)
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Bini versus Sundaran
or Sub-clause (ii) of Section 5 is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own
wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and
(b) where the ground of the petition is the ground specified in Clause (i) of Sub-section
(1) of Section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived
at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the ground of the petition is
cruelty the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, and (bb) when
a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such consent has not been
obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, and
(c) the petition (not being a petition presented under Section 11) is not. presented or
prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, and
(d) there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding,
and
(e) there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted, then and in such case,
but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly.
(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the
first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistency with the nature and
circumstances of the case to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between
the parties:
Provided that anything contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein
relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in Clause (ii), Clause (iii), Clause (iv), Clause
(v), Clause (vi) or Clause (vii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13.
(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such reconciliation, the court may, if
the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do adjourn the proceedings
for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named
by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to
name any person, with directions to report to the court, as to whether reconciliation can be
and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due regard to
the report.
(4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce, the court passing the
decree shall give a copy thereof free of cost to each, of the parties.
Section 13 reads as follows:
13. Divorce.- (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act,
may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by either the husband
or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party-
(i) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any
person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage,
treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous
period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or
(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion: or
(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently
from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Explanation. -- In this clause,-
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landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
(a) The expression "mental disorder' means mental illness, arrested or incomplete
development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of
mind and includes schizophrenia;
(b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent disorder or disability
of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in
abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other
party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or
(iv) has been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or (v) has been suffering
from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has renounced the world by entering
any religious order; or
(vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons
who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive.
Adultery and cruelty are thus the two areas where possibility for reconciliation is to be
explored under the Hindu Marriage Act. The question is, in view of the exclusion of
endeavour for reconciliation in respect of the grounds available under Clauses (ii) to (vii)
should there be endeavours for reconciliation or settlement by the Family Court.
7. Section 10 of the Family Courts Act has made applicable the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure to the suits and proceedings before the Family court. Under Section 10(3) the Family
Court also is free to evolve its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement of the cases.
Section 10 reads as follows:
10. Procedure generally.-- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the Rules, the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply
to the suits and proceedings other than the proceedings under Chapter DC of the code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the
Code, a Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have all the powers of such court.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or the rules made thereunder, shall apply to the proceedings under
Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court.
(3) Nothing in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its
own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or
proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one party and denied by the other.
Order XXXII-A was inserted by the C.P.C. Amendment Act 104 of 1976. "The provisions of this
Order shall apply to suits or proceedings relating to matters concerning the family", as per Rule 1.
Under Sub-rule (3) to Rule 1 it is also provided that in case there is any special provision or
procedure under any special law, to that extent the order will not apply. Order XXXII-A Rule 1(3)
reads as follows:
1(3) So much of this Order as relates to a matter provided for by a special law in respect of any suit
or proceeding shall not apply to that suit or proceeding.
Under Order XXXII-A Rule 3 it is the duty of a court to make efforts for a settlement. Rule 3 reads
as follows:
3. Duty of Court to make efforts for settlement.- (1) In every suit or proceeding to which this Order
applied, an endeavour shall be made by the Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do
so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist the parties in arriving at a
settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit.
496
Bini versus Sundaran
(2) If, an any such suit or proceeding, at any stage it appears to the Court that there is a reasonable
possibility of a settlement between the parties, the Court may adjourn the proceeding for
such period as it thinks fir to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement.
(3) The power conferred by Sub-rule (2) shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any
other power of the Court to adjourn the proceedings.
Recently the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the issue regarding the duty of courts
under Order XXXII-A Rule 3 in Jagraj Singh v. Birpal Kaur . It has been held that "Order
32-A Rule 3 CPC requires the court to make efforts for settlement of family disputes. The
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is a Special Act dealing with the provisions relating to marriages,
restitution of conjugal rights and judicial separation as also nullity of marriage and divorce.
The approach of a court of law in matrimonial matters is much more constructive, affirmative
and productive rather than abstract, theoretical or doctrinaire. Matrimonial matters
must be considered by courts with human angle and sensitivity. Delicate issues affecting
conjugal relations have to be handled carefully and legal provisions should be construed
and interpreted without being oblivious or unmindful of human weaknesses." In Manju
Singh v. Ajay Bir Singh the Court went to the extent of even holding that if an endeavour for
reconciliation is not made, the order would be illegal. To quote on the principle:
Section 23(2) of the Act gives a direction to the Court that before proceeding to grant
any relief under the Act it shall be the duty to endeavour to bring about reconciliation
between the parties except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to the sub-section. The
intention of the legislature is that an attempt should be made by the Court for reconciliation
before proceeding with hearing of the petition. The provision is mandatory and an effort
for reconciliation is to be made by the Court right from the start of the case by directing
and giving reasonable opportunity to the parties to appear in person before the Court,
even the filing of the written statement by the opposite party should not be insisted, and
reconciliation should be attempted by the Court. If reconciliation attempt fails, written
statement be filed. The Court however is to watch the proceedings during trial and make
further attempt for reconciliation at any stage deemed appropriate by the Court. But in any
case duty is cast upon the Court to try reconciliation between the parties before Finally
deciding the proceedings under the Act. The words "before proceeding to grant any relief,
mean during the course of trial i.e. right from the date when the opposite party is served till
the date of giving final decision.
8. However, it has to be seen that conciliation is mandatory only in respect of three grounds under the
Hindu Marriage Act, namely adultery, cruelty and desertion, which are enumerated under Section 13(1)
(i), (i-a) and (i-b). The Delhi Court has taken the view that on grounds of conversion to another religion,
renunciation of the word, mental disorder, venereal diseases and leprosy, no conciliation is required
since they are expressly excluded under proviso to Section 23(2) of the Act. It has to be noted that
there is no discussion as to the impact of the Family Courts Act nor is the issue discussed regarding the
impact of the exempted clauses as per proviso" to Section 23(2) by the Apex Court in Jagraj Singh's case
(supra). Therefore, the crucial question again is, after the introduction of the Family Courts, Act 1984 is
conciliation mandatory in a matrimonial dispute, whatever, be the ground taken for dissolution, divorce
or nullity.
9. The Family Courts Act, 1984 has an overriding effect over all other laws, notwithstanding anything
inconsistent contained in such laws. The relevant provision, Section 20, reads as follows:
20. Act to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument
having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.
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landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
It has also to be seen that under Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, there is no such exclusion of
endeavours for reconciliation on any ground.
10. The provisions of the Family Courts Act, the Rules framed by the High Court and the State, the amended
Code of Civil Procedure would clearly show the role of conciliation for reconciliation/settlement of
disputes in family affairs. The primary object is to promote and preserve the sacred union of parties to
a marriage. Only if the attempts for reconciliation are not fruitful, the further attempt on agreement on
disagreement shall be made by way of settlement. Resolution of the disputes between the parties to a
marriage on grounds available under law should be gone into only after the procedure under the Rules is
followed through the counsellors to find out the possibility of reconciliation of the parties to the marriage
or settlements of their disputes, however grave be the ground for separation. When a man and a woman
are called upon to be one, though ideally one would expect them to be one for all purposes, differences
of opinion are bound to be there on various grounds. After all, it is a fusion of two personalities. In
the event of such bickerings, even if a party to a marriage is entitled to succeed on any of the available
grounds under law, the Family Courts shall first make an attempt for reconciliation and if that fails, a
further attempt for settlement and thereafter only proceed to the trial. It is one thing to say that a party
is entitled to get relief on any of the available grounds under law but it is yet another thing to say that de
hors the legal entitlement, reconciliation/settlement ignoring such legal grounds is possible. A settlement
in a matrimonial dispute need hot necessarily be based on strict legal grounds but more on what the
parties perceive on a just and reasonable settlement bases on mutual concessions. Such a compromise
acceptable to the parties need not also coincide with the terms of a legally correct decision. If the law
expects that refinement, reconciliation and settlement is to be first attempted, without following such
a procedure, the Family Court shall not dispose of the suit or proceedings before it either granting the
relief or declining the relief on the entitlement or disentitlement on legal grounds. It is not necessary that
by mere conversion the marital tie should be broken. In a secular country like India and a literate State
like Kerala where mixed marriage itself is a well accepted course, on the mere ground of conversion to
another religion of one of the Hindu parties to a marriage during the subsistence of the marriage, the
marital tie need not be broken. The parties can disagree on matters of faith and still lead a happy marital
life if they could be convinced that matters of faith should not stand in the way of union of hearts. Thus
though under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 no endeavour for reconciliation need be made in a petition
for divorce on the ground of conversion to another religion, or other grounds excepted under Section
13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act or on similar or other grounds available under any other law also, after
the introduction of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court is bound to make endeavours for
reconciliation and settlement. The requirement is mandatory. That is the conceptual change brought out
by the Family Courts Act, which is a special statute.
11. In the instant case the Family Court has not made any efforts for conciliation. On the mere admission of
conversion, a decree has been ranted, without making any endeavour for reconciliation and settlement.
That is against the spirit and mandate of the provisions under the Family Courts Act, 1984. We set
aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the Family court to proceed afresh in the matter in
accordance with law.
The Registry shall immediately forward a copy of this judgment to all the Family Courts.
qqq
498
Dr. A.Rekharani versus K.C.Prabhu
Dr. A.Rekharani versus K.C.Prabhu
Kerala High Court
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph & Hon'ble Mr. Justice T. R. Ramchandran Nair
Dr. A.Rekharani
Versus
K.C.Prabhu
Mat Appeal No. 87 of 2007()
Decided on 4 July, 2007
Role and Duties of Family Courts- Whether a power of attorney holder is entitled to present a petition
for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 appellant filed O.P.(HMA) No.1470/04 before the Family Court, seeking a decree of
divorce under Section 13(1)(i) and (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. In the meanwhile, the appellant left for
Gulf. However, she executed a power of attorney, appointing herfather as the power of attorney holder to
prosecute the case before the Family Court. According to the appellant, O.P.(HMA) No.1470/04 was got
dismissed as not pressed on 17.12.2005 and on the same day, a joint petition for dissolution of marriage
by mutual consent was filed under Section 13B of the Act. The appellant was represented through the
power of attorney holder and the respondent appeared in person. The Family Court took the statements
of the appellant's father, the donee of power of attorney, and the respondent-husband on the same day and
by order dated 20.12.2005, a decree was passed dissolving the marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual
consent.
-A general power of attorney holder cannot be allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff
in the capacity of the plaintiff. The power of attorney holder of a party can appear only in his personal
capacity and cannot appear on behalf of the party in the capacity of that party." Thus the law is well settled
that in matters requiring personal knowledge, evidence cannot be adduced through a power of attorney.
It needs no further discussion to hold that those are matters requiring personal knowledge and in such
matters, the evidence cannot be tendered through the power of attorney older. It is significant to note
that in this case the wife herself has stated in the appeal that in the meanwhile the husband and wife met
together on many occasions. If that be so, certainly the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the decree as the
preconditions are not satisfied. Not only that, under Section 13B of the Act, a petition for dissolution of
marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent is to be presented by the parties to the marriage and not
through the power of attorney holder. They should satisfy the court that as on the date of presentation of
the case that they had not been living together as husband and wife for more than one year, that they have
not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed for the dissolution. If after presentation of
the petition, during the lie over period the parties have met and lived as husband wife, they are not entitled
to the decree for dissolution. The court on motion after the lie over period has to satisfy that the parties
had not been living together as husband and wife, at least for one year prior to the presentation of the
petition, they are not able to so live together even after the presentation of the petition, and that they have
not actually so lived during the lie over period either. The court should also satisfy that the mutuality on
consent persisted in both the parties during the lie over period. If one party has change of heart or second
thought in the meanwhile, the court has no jurisdiction to grant the decree for dissolution. The endeavour
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landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
of the court should be as far as possible to sustain and nurture the institution of marriage. The approach
made by the Family Court in the instant case is patently erroneous and it is casual too. The inquiry by the
Family Court should be with the parties to the marriage, regarding the essential ingredient for a decree
of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act.In the result, the judgment in
O.P.(HMA) No.2439/05 on the file of the Family Court, Nedumangad is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
JUDGMENT
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph
Whether a power of attorney holder is entitled to present a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of
divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is the interesting question arising
for consideration in this case. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was duly solemnized
on 29.10.2001. After three years, on the grounds of illicit relationship with another person, and cruelty, the
appellant filed O.P.(HMA) No.1470/04 before the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram (later transferred to the
Family Court, Nedumangad) seeking a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(i) and (ia) of the Hindu Marriage
Act. In the meanwhile, the appellant left for Gulf. However, she executed a power of attorney, appointing her
father as the power of attorney holder to prosecute the case before the Family Court. According to the appellant,
O.P.(HMA) No.1470/04 was got dismissed as not pressed on 17.12.2005 and on the same day, a joint petition for
dissolution of marriage by mutual consent was filed under Section 13B of the Act. The appellant was represented
through the power of attorney holder and the respondent appeared in person. The Family Court took the
statements of the appellant's father, the donee of power of attorney, and the respondent-husband on the same
day and by order dated 20.12.2005, a decree was passed dissolving the marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual
consent. At the risk of redundancy of the factual matrix, in order to appreciate the stand taken by the Family
Court, it is necessary to extract two paragraphs from the judgment under appeal, which read as follows :-
"4. The statements of both the Power of Attorney Holder of the 1st pet itioner and the 2nd pe titioner
were recorded. Their statements show that petitioners 1 and 2 got legally married on 29.10.2001
and thereafter they resided together as husband and wife and that due to incompatibility of
temperaments they are residing separately from 16.7.2004 onwards. The statements also show that
the petitioners have decided to dissolve their marriage by mutual consent and that their decision
is not vitiated by fraud, collusion, undue influence or mis- representation. It is also clear that the
marital tie is irretrievably broken and it is practically and emotionally dead and that there is no
chance for any re-union. Hence the statutory requirement of waiting for a period of 6 months
is waived. No children were born in the wedlock. All financial matters between the parties are
settled.
5. The marriage has been broken down and the parties can no longer live together as husband and
wife. In the circumstances the life of the spouses shall not be allowed to put in perpetual agony
and despair. Hence it may be better to bring the marriage to an end. Therefore, the O.P. is allowed."
(emphasis supplied)
2. According to the appellant-wife, she met the respondent on several occasions at Thiruvananthapuram
in the meanwhile and she has not given consent for a divorce. It is also contended that the procedural
requirements have not been satisfied. Hence the appeal.
3. Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads as follows :- "
Divorce by mutual consent.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of
marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage
together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the Marriage
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that they have been living separately for a
period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually
agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
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Dr. A.Rekharani versus K.C.Prabhu
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation
of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date,
if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing
the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnised and
that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be
dissolved with effect from the date of the decree."
The court gets jurisdiction to consider a petition under Section 13B of the Act for divorce by
mutual consent, only if a petition for that purpose is presented to the court by both the parties
to the marriage together. The parties to the marriage referred to in Section 13B are the husband
and wife only. They have to present the petition themselves for dissolution of their marriage by a
decree of divorce by mutual consent to the court together. The grounds available to the parties on
such a petition are; (1) the husband and wife have been living separately for a period of one year
or more and (2) they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that
the marriage should be dissolved. If the petition is not withdrawn by the parties within 18 months,
they may move the court after six months of the presentation of the petition, but before 18 months.
Thereafter, the court has to conduct appropriate inquiry to enter a satisfaction that consent was
not obtained by fraud and that there is no collusion between the parties. The period of minimum
six months' time is given in divorce by mutual consent, to give time and opportunity to the parties
to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. The mutual consent should
continue till the divorce decree is passed. The court should be satisfied about the bona fides and
consent of the parties. If the court is held to have the power to make a decree solely based on the
initial petition, it negates the whole idea of mutuality, as held by the Supreme Court in Sureshta
Devi v. Om Prakash (AIR 1992 SC 1904). There has to be a lie over period, a transitional period;
the purpose of such period is to give time and opportunity to the parties to have sound and mature
reflections on their move.
4. Whether such a petition can be presented through the power of attorney holder of the party to a marriage
and whether the court can enter a satisfaction regarding the areas required for a decree of divorce by
mutual consent is the further question to be considered.
5. The Supreme Court in Janki Vashdeo v. Indusind Bank [2005(2) KLT 265 (SC)] also has reiterated that a
power of attorney can give evidence only in respect of acts done by him in the exercise of powers granted
by the instrument, but he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter on which the principal
alone can have personal knowledge. It was also held therein that the power of attorney ..."cannot depose
for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and
in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined." A Division Bench of this Court in
Ummer Farooque v. Naseema (2005(4) KLT 565), on a question as to which sect a party to a marriage
belongs to, held that "Power of Attorney can give evidence only in respect of acts done by him in the
exercise of powers granted by the instrument, but he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the
matter on which the principal alone can have personal knowledge." In Ratheesh Kumar v. Jithendra
Kumar (2005(2) KLT 669) in the matter arising under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965,
another Division Bench of this Court held that "A general power of attorney holder cannot be allowed
to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of the plaintiff. The power of attorney
holder of a party can appear only in his personal capacity and cannot appear on behalf of the party in the
capacity of that party." Thus the law is well settled that in matters requiring personal knowledge, evidence
cannot be adduced through a power of attorney.
6. The extracted portions from the judgment under appeal would show that the power of attorney holder
of the appellant wife has deposed regarding the emotional incompatibility of temperaments between the
wife and the husband. The power of attorney holder has also further deposed that the wife and husband
have decided to dissolve their marriage by mutual consent and that the decision is not vitiated by fraud,
501
landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
collusion, undue influence or misrepresentation. Still further, it is deposed that the marital tie between
the wife and husband is practically and emotionally dead and that there is no chance for union. It needs
no further discussion to hold that those are matters requiring personal knowledge and in such matters,
the evidence cannot be tendered through the power of attorney holder. It is significant to note that in this
case the wife herself has stated in the appeal that in the meanwhile the husband and wife met together
on many occasions. If that be so, certainly the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the decree as the pre-
conditions are not satisfied. Not only that, under Section 13B of the Act, a petition for dissolution of
marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent is to be presented by the parties to the marriage and
not through the power of attorney holder. They should satisfy the court that as on the date of presentation
of the case that they had not been living together as husband and wife for more than one year, that
they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed for the dissolution. If after
presentation of the petition, during the lie over period the parties have met and lived as husband wife,
they are not entitled to the decree for dissolution. The court on motion after the lie over period has to
satisfy that the parties had not been living together as husband and wife, at least for one year prior to the
presentation of the petition, they are not able to so live together even after the presentation of the petition,
and that they have not actually so lived during the lie over period either. The court should also satisfy
that the mutuality on consent persisted in both the parties during the lie over period. If one party has
change of heart or second thought in the meanwhile, the court has no jurisdiction to grant the decree for
dissolution. The endeavour of the court should be as far as possible to sustain and nurture the institution
of marriage. The approach made by the Family Court in the instant case is patently erroneous and it is
casual too. The inquiry by the Family Court should be with the parties to the marriage, regarding the
essential ingredient for a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage
Act.
In the result, the judgment in O.P.(HMA) No.2439/05 on the file of the Family Court, Nedumangad is set
aside and the appeal is allowed.
KURIAN JOSEPH, JUDGE.
T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR, JUDGE.
qqq
502
Bhashyam Ramesh @ Rajagopalan versus R.Saroja @ K.K.Saroja
Bhashyam Ramesh @ Rajagopalan versus
R.Saroja @ K.K.Saroja
Madras High Court
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice S. Vimala
Bhashyam Ramesh @ Rajagopalan
Versus
R.Saroja @ K.K.Saroja
C.M.A.No.929 of 2002 against O.S.No.38 of 2000
Decided on 24 February, 2012
Family court jurisdiction- decree of Divorce passed by Superior Court of California, County San Diego,
Family Division, filed by the husband/appellant herein- The wife filed the suit before the 1st Additional
Principal Family Court, Chennai, for a declaration that the decree of divorce passed by the Superior Court
of California is abinitio void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff, which came to be decreed.- the
Family Court decreed the suit granting the prayer of the plaintiff.
Whether the Family Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit- -- Whether the decree of divorce passed
by the Foreign Court is legal and valid and binding upon the wife- that the Superior Court of California is
not a court of competent jurisdiction to decide the matrimonial dispute of the appellant/husband as they
have married under the Hindu Marriage Act and the marriage having been taken place in India. Therefore,
the finding of the Family Court that order passed by the Foreign Court is not binding upon the wife is
correct. --the suit filed challenging judgment passed by the Superior Court of California by the wife is
perfectly maintainable. The order passed by the Family Court is in accordance with well settled principles
and the materials on records. Therefore, the appeal has no merits and is liable to be dismissed.
JUDGMENT
Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.Vimala
The short lived marriage which got solemnized on 24.6.1999 was dissolved on 17.4.2000 by a decree passed
by Superior Court of California, County San Diego, Family Division, in Case No.D.454571 ABC, filed by the
husband/appellant herein.
1.1. The wife filed the suit before the 1st Additional Principal Family Court, Chennai, for a declaration
that the decree of divorce passed by the Superior Court of California is abinitio void, inoperative
and not binding on the plaintiff, which came to be decreed. The said judgment passed by the 1st
Additional Principal Family Court, decreeing the suit, is under challenge in this appeal.
2. Brief facts:-
The marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place on 24.6.1999 at Sholingapuram, Vellore
District as per Hindu Rites and Customs. They started living as husband and wife at Virugambakkam at
Chennai. The appellant left the respondent on 12.7.1999 for United States, with promise to take her soon.
After going to U.S.A. the communication and the contact between the sources came to an end, as the
husband became mute.
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2.1. The plaintiff/wife filed a petition for Restitution of Conjugal Rights in O.P.No.383 of 2000. The
plaintiff received the summons from the Superior Court of California on 1.10.99. She expressed
her desire to contest her proceedings by sending the defence statement in writing. She also prayed
for waiver of payment of fee. Thereafter, a decree of divorce was passed by the foreign Court on
17.4.2000.
2.2. Contending that the decree of divorce passed on 17.4.2000 by the Superior Court of California is
not binding upon her, the wife filed a suit for declaration to that effect. In the suit, the appellant
remained exparte. The main contention of the respondent/plaintiff before the Family Court was
that decree for dissolution of marriage made by a foreign Court cannot be regarded as a binding
decree on the parties in India. After perusing the oral and documentary evidence, the Family
Court has decreed the suit granting the prayer of the plaintiff.
3. The husband has challenged the judgment of the Family Court on the following contentions:-
(i) The wife/respondent after receiving the summons from the Superior Court of California sent her
response to the petition and contested the matter by raising various defences. Considering the
defences raised, the Superior Court has passed an order on merits. The wife having submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the Foreign Court.
(ii) The Family Court has no jurisdiction and power to entertain the suit.
(iii) Even though the husband remained exparte, there is a duty caused upon the Family Court to see
whether the relief sought for is within the scope, ambit and jurisdiction of the Court.
(iv) The judgment of the Family Court did not take into account the participation of the wife before
the Superior Court of California.
(v) The respondent/wife did not dispute the jurisdiction of Superior Court of California. Therefore,
the suit challenging jurisdiction of Superior Court of California is not maintainable.
4. In view of the contentions raised in the grounds of appeal the following points arises for determination:-
(i) Whether the suit filed by the wife/respondent before the Family Court in O.S.No.38 of 2000 is
maintainable?
(ii) Whether the Family Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit?
(iii) Whether the conduct of the wife in sending response to the Superior Court of California would
amount to submitting herself to the jurisdiction of Foreign Court? If so, the wife having submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of Foreign Court is whether estopped from disputing the legality of the
order passed by the Foreign Court?
(iv) Whether the decree of divorce passed by the Foreign Court is legal and valid and binding upon the
wife ?
5. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Family Court cannot grant a decree
as prayed for in the petition, just because the husband remained exparte and has got an independent duty
to examine the validity and the legality of the issues raised irrespective of the stand taken by the parties
to the case.
5.1. This contention is correct provided the order of the Lower Court is without consideration of
evidence and Law. But, in this case, the Family Court while passing the judgment has not passed
a mechanical order, just because the respondent has remained exparte. The Family Court has
not only considered the evidence of the wife and also the judgment reported in 1955 (a) Law
Weekly 53 Dr. David C. Arumainayagam Vs. Geetha C. Arumainayagam by the Madras High
504
Bhashyam Ramesh @ Rajagopalan versus R.Saroja @ K.K.Saroja
Court wherein, it has been held that a decree for dissolution of marriage made by a foreign Court
cannot be regarded as binding on the parties in India. The legal proposition has been correctly
applied. Therefore, the contention that the Family Court has mechanically passed the order is not
correct and therefore, the Judgment of the Family Court is correct.
6. The second contention of the learned counsel for appellant is that the Family Courts in India have no
competency and jurisdiction to declare the Judgment of a Foreign Court as null and void. But, the
contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is other way round, and it is his contention that it
is not the Family Court which lacks jurisdiction and competency but, it is only the Foreign Court which
lacks jurisdiction and competency to pass a decree for divorce.
6.1. In order to appreciate the contentions raised on both sides, it is appropriate to consider the
decision reported in Ruchi Majoo Vs. Sanjeev Majoo reported in (2011) 6 SCC 479 wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has pointed out, (though in the context of the case of child custody) that
as no system of private international law exists that can claim universal recognition on this issue,
Indian Courts have to decide the issue regarding the validity of the decree passed by foreign court
in accordance with Indian law. The relevant portion of the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court is extracted hereunder:
"Recognition of decrees and orders passed by foreign courts remains an eternal dilemma inasmuch
as whenever called upon to do so, courts in this country are bound to determine the validity of
such decrees and orders keeping in view the provisions of Section 13 CPC as amended by the
Amendment Acts of 1999 and 2002. ............."
"Simply because a foreign court has taken a particular view on any aspect concerning the
welfare of the minor is not enough for the courts in this country to shut out an independent
consideration of the matter. Objectivity and not abject surrender is the mantra in such cases.
Judicial pronouncements on the subject are not on virgin ground. Since no system of private
international law exists that can claim universal recognition on this issue, Indian Courts have to
decide the issue regarding the validity of the decree in accordance with Indian law. Comity of courts
simply demands consideration of any such order issued by foreign courts and not necessarily their
enforcement." (emphasis supplied) 6.2. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the
following rulings in order to support the contention that the Foreign Court has no jurisdiction to
pass a decree for divorce when the marriage has taken place in India under the provision of Hindu
Marriage Act.
a) 2010 (4) CTC 822 (R.Sridharan Vs.The presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai-600
106 and another) DIn Narasimha Rao's case, the Supreme Court categorically stated that marriages
performed under the Hindu Marriage Act can be dissolved only under the said Act. Naturally,
the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act with regard to jurisdiction would also come into play.
Section 19 clearly gives jurisdiction to the Court to deal with Matrimonial proceedings initiated
by the wife, if she is residing within the jurisdiction of the said Court. There is no question of the
Second Respondent initiating Divorce proceedings before the Court at United States of America
invoking the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The moment the Appellant has married the
Second Respondent, he has subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Court designated to deal
with matrimonial disputes under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act.DApplying the ratio to
the facts of this case, it is clear that the moment the appellant/husband herein has married the
respondent wife, he has subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Courts designated (Family
Courts), to deal with matrimonial disputes under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act. There
is no question of the husband/appellant initiating divorce proceedings before the Superior Court
of California as the husband could not have initiated the proceedings, invoking the provisions of
Hindu Marriage Act. The marriage between the appellant and respondent herein could be resolved
505
landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
only on the grounds set out under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is not the case of
the appellant/husband that application for divorce could be made before the Superior Court of
California on the grounds mentioned in the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, as contended by the
learned counsel for the respondent, the Foreign Court i.e. The Superior Court of California which
is not a Court of competent jurisdiction and only the Family Court at Chennai which has complete
competency and jurisdiction.
b) In 2010 (5) CTC 858 (Deepalakshmi Vs.K.Murugesh) a Single Judge of this Court has held as
under:-
"Thus, it is clear that only that Court will be a Court of competent jurisdiction which the Act or the
law under which the parties are married recognises as a Court of competent jurisdiction to entertain
the matrimonial dispute. Any other Court should be held to be a Court without jurisdiction unless
both parties voluntarily and unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that Court.
The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the
statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial
dispute is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law....DTherefore, the
decisions quoted above would clearly go to show that the Superior Court of California is not a
court of competent jurisdiction to decide the matrimonial dispute of the appellant/husband as
they have married under the Hindu Marriage Act and the marriage having been taken place in
India. Therefore, the finding of the Family Court that order passed by the Foreign Court is not
binding upon the wife is correct.
7. It is an admitted case of both parties that the wife received summons from the superior Court of California
and has sent written response it. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the sending of written
response amounts to submitting herself to the jurisdiction of Superior Court of California and therefore,
the suit filed by wife challenging the judgment of the Superior Court of California is not maintainable.
7.1. Therefore, the question falling for consideration is whether the conduct of the wife in sending
response to the Superior Court of California would amount to submitting herself to the jurisdiction
of Foreign Court? If so, the wife having submitted herself to the jurisdiction of Foreign Court is
estopped from disputing the legality of the order passed by the Foreign Court is the issue to be
decided.
7.2. The learned counsel for the husband has relied upon the decision reported in Supreme Court
Reports (1963) (Shaligram Vs. Daulat Ram), wherein it has been held as follows:-
That a person who appeared in obedience to the process of a foreign Court and applied for leave to
defend the suit without challenging the jurisdiction of the Court must be held to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of such Court and therefore this decree did not suffer from any defect
which a foreign decree would suffer without such submission.D(underlining added)
7.3. From the facts and circumstances available in this case whether the conduct of the wife in
submitting a written representation in response to the summons issued can be construed as
amounting to voluntarily submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of California
is to be considered. It is necessary to consider the content of the written representation sent by the
wife.
7.4. By perusal of the response, it is seen the wife has raised very pertinent issue regarding (a) jurisdiction
of the Foreign Court (b) maintainability of the petition for divorce within one year of the marriage
(c) maintainability of the petition filed by the husband seeking divorce in a foreign court which
lacks jurisdiction, when the wife has initiated a proceeding for Restitution of Conjugal Right in a
competent court and (d) inability of her to submit herself to the jurisdiction of the superior court
of California.
506
Bhashyam Ramesh @ Rajagopalan versus R.Saroja @ K.K.Saroja
The details are as extracted below: (a) Issue regarding jurisdiction:
" Both spouses are admittedly Hindus and born at Tamilnadu and brought up at Tamilnadu and
their marriage was solemnized in Tamilnadu, India, under the Hindu rites and Customs. So, if at
all the parties wanted to seek any remedy that should be under the Courts at Tamilnadu and under
the HINDU MARRIAGE ACT."
(b) The next issue raised by the wife is with reference to maintainability of petition for divorce
under Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act under which no petition for divorce could be
presented within one year of the marriage.
"As per the Hindu Marriage Act, no spouse is entitled to terminate the marriage within
one year from the date of its solemnisation. But unfortunately, the petitioner herein seeks
dissolution of marriage, within one year, that Too from the Superior Court of California."
(c) Expressing her anguish that due to distance and financial constraints and lack of legal
knowledge that she will not be able to come to California to contest the case she would state
thus:-
Further, the respondent is a poor helpless lady and she is unable to meet out her basic needs
without the support from her kins. Under such circumstances, how is it possible to the
respondent to come over to California and contest the case.
The respondent did not know the existing law at California and the procedure is being
adopted at the Superior Court California, Family Division. As a law abiding citizen she is
hereby communicated her response to the Hon'ble Court's notice.
If, the petitioner is a citizen of California, and he is entitled to file a petition for Dissolution
of Marriage at California he should reveal the same to the respondent herein before the
solemnisation of marriage. Without disclosing such material things to a poor woman and
married her and deserted her is not only SIN but also amount to cheating.
(d) After expressing the social stigma faced by the Indian Women, as a divorcee, the respondent
has conveyed the message that she has already moved the Indian Courts for restitution of
conjugal rights. It is stated as follows:-
The respondent further submits that, she has filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, for Restitution of Conjugal Right before the 1 Additional family Court at
Chennai, Tamilnadu, India, in Hindu Matrimonial Original Petition No.383 of 2000 and
the same is posted to 4th May 2000 for the appearance of the petitioner herein (let, the
petitioner herein may treat this as Notice to him for his appearance in H.M.O.P.383 of 2000
on 4th May 2000)D7.5. Whether the contents of the communication/response sent by the
Wife can be construed as amounting to submitting herself to the jurisdiction of California
Court is the issue to be decided. The meaning of the word "submit" as downloaded from the
site www.thefree dictionary.com is as follows:
"1. To yield or surrender (oneself) to the will or authority of another.
2. To subject to a condition or process.
3. To commit (something) to the consideration or judgment of another.
4. To offer as a proposition or contention: I submit that the terms are entirely
unreasonable."
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landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
If the written submissions are considered then it would be evident that the wife has offered
a proposition challenging the very jurisdiction of the court for consideration. It will not
amount to submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
7.6. What is crucial is that the wife has challenged jurisdiction of the Foreign Courts. Only, if a party
applies for leave to participate in the proceedings without challenging the jurisdiction one can
infer that the party has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. But, in this case, the wife on
receipt of summons has challenged the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court. While so challenging
the wife has categorically stated that due to financial and legal constraints her access to justice
has been denied. The contents of written submissions made by the wife to the Superior Court of
California itself would clearly go to show that the respondent/wife neither wanted to participate in
the proceedings nor subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court, either voluntarily
or involuntarily. Under such circumstances, the contention that she has submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Court cannot be accepted.
8. The issues discussed above will go to show that the suit filed challenging judgment passed by the Superior
Court of California by the wife is perfectly maintainable. The order passed by the Family Court is in
accordance with well settled principles and the materials on records. Therefore, the appeal has no merits
and is liable to be dismissed.
9. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant/husband is dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree
passed by the 1st Additional Family Court is confirmed.
1. I Additional Family Court, Chennai.
2. The Section Officer, V.R. Section High Court, Madras
qqq
508
Anitha Alfred versus K.Alfred
Anitha Alfred versus K.Alfred
Madras High Court
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi and Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subbiah
Anitha Alfred
Versus
K.Alfred
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1520 of 2011
Decided on 10 August, 2012
Divorce- Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act --appellant is said to have made an endorsement in the divorce
petition (I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009) filed by the respondent that "I submit to decree". Thereafter, the divorce
petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 was allowed on the ground that the averments in the petition stands
uncontroverted by the appellan—Appeal filled on the ground that appellant was misled to make such an
endorsement in the petition and she never intended to submit to decree nor compromised the matter
and in the absence of any counsel or any legal aid obtained by her, appellant made the said endorsement
in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 and the same cannot be construed as compromise nor does it amount to
"uncontroverting the allegations"----
The appellant only made an endorsement that "I submit to decree". There was no compromise petition filed
by either parties reducing the compromise in to writing. There is nothing to show that appellant was asked
whether she is voluntarily and willingly compromising the matter. In the absence of any such materials
or compromise memo by the parties, the endorsement made by the appellant in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009
that "I submit to decree" cannot be construed as the decree or order passed by the Family Court with the
consent of the parties, so as to bar appeal under Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act.-- In our considered
view, the endorsement made in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 cannot be construed as a decree or order passed
with the consent of the parties. In the light of serious allegations against the appellant, she has to be given
an opportunity to put forth her case. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009
on the file of I Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai is set aside and this appeal is allowed.
I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 is ordered to be restored on file. I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 is remitted back to the
Family Court, Chennai.
JUDGMENT
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi
This appeal arises out of the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 (01.8.2010) allowing the divorce petition filed by
the respondent-husband and dissolving the marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband
solemnized on 10.07.1989.
2. Brief facts are:-
Appellant and the respondent got married on 10.7.1989. The marriage was love marriage and appellant-
wife converted into Christianity before the marriage. Out of the wedlock, a daughter by name Darren
and son by name Steen Jack were born on 13.07.1992 and 29.11.1996 respectively. Respondent got the
job as seamen. Out of the earnings, Respondent is said to have purchased a Flat at New No.34/2 (Old
No.109/2), East Vanniyar street, Best Apartments, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78. In April, 2006, the
respondent was rendered jobless and he had come back from his employment of seamen. Thereafter,
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landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
differences arose between the parties and both the appellant and the respondent were living in the house
at New No.34/2, (Old No.109/2), East Vanniar Street,
Best Apartment, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78. There are allegations and counter allegations by both
appellant as well as the respondent. Respondent issued a legal notice to the appellant on 13.11.2006 seeking
divorce. Since then there were number of proceedings Dcomplaint lodged by the appellant under Tamil
Nadu Prohibition of Women Harassment Act (Crime No.16 of 2007 on the file of T14, Mangadu Police
Station, Chennai-101); maintenance proceedings (M.C.No.79 of 2007 on the file of I Additional Family
Court, Chennai); and civil suit in respect of the possession of the Flat at New No.34/2 (Old No.109/2),
East Vanniyar street, Best Apartments, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78 (O.S.No.1026 of 2007 on the file
of III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai) and also another proceedings under Domestic Violence
Act (C.C.No.6969 of 2007, on the file of XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet, Chennai).
3. In these circumstances, appellant filed petition for divorce in F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 on the ground of
cruelty under Section 10 (1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act. Respondent also filed I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009
under Section 10(1)(x)(ix) read with Section 14 of Indian Divorce Act seeking divorce.
4. Resisting the divorce petition filed by the respondent [I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009], appellant filed counter
denying the allegations. She has alleged that respondent compelled her to sign in the Deed of divorce,
in order to marry some other lady which she refused. Appellant had also referred the criminal case and
also maintenance proceedings and the criminal proceedings pending under Domestic Violence Act in
C.C.No.6769 of 2007. Filing a detailed counter, she strongly resisted the petition for divorce filed by the
respondent-husband.
5. In the divorce petition [F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2010) filed by the appellant, on 16.7.2010, appellant made an
endorsement withdrawing the petition. In view of the endorsement, the said petition (F.C.O.P.No.3839
of 2010) was dismissed as withdrawn. On the same day (16.7.2010), appellant is said to have made an
endorsement in the divorce petition (I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009) filed by the respondent that "I submit to
decree". Thereafter, the divorce petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 was posted for orders on 01.8.2010.
On 01.8.2010, I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 was allowed on the ground that the averments in the petition
stands uncontroverted by the appellant.
6. Mr.N.F.J.Ponnudurai, learned counsel for appellant contended that appellant was misled to make such an
endorsement in the petition and she never intended to submit to decree nor compromised the matter. It
was further submitted that in the absence of any counsel or any legal aid obtained by her, appellant made
the said endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 and the same cannot be construed as compromise
nor does it amount to "uncontroverting the allegations". It was further submitted that if the matter was
treated as one of compromise, the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 would have been passed on the
same day, but the same was adjourned to 01.8.2010. Drawing our attention to the order dated 01.8.2010,
it was submitted that the learned trial judge erred in saying that the allegations in the petition remain
uncontroverted.
7. Drawing our attention to the various proceedings, Mr.K.Kannan, learned counsel for respondent
submitted that respondent-husband was subjected to harassment by filing number of proceedings viz.,
criminal proceedings, proceedings under Domestic Violence Act, civil suit and subjected the respondent
to harassment and that the appellant does not want to put an end to the proceedings so instituted and
she wants to pursue further. It was further submitted that appellant having made an endorsement in
I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree", it is not open to her to resile from the same. Learned
counsel would further submit that the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dated 01.8.2010 is by consent as
per Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act, 1984 and no appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the
Family Court with the consent of the parties and the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dated 01.8.2010
being passed by consent, the appeal is not maintainable.
510
Anitha Alfred versus K.Alfred
8. We have carefully considered the submissions and perused the materials on record. We have also heard
the counsels appearing for the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband.
9. Appellant-wife filed F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 under Section 10(1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act seeking
divorce. On 16.7.2010, in F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009, appellant made an endorsement that "she is
withdrawing F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 and the same may be dismissed as withdrawn'. In view of the
endorsement made by the appellant, on the same day i.e. on 16.7.2010, F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 was
dismissed as withdrawn. According to appellant, her decision to withdraw F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 was
voluntary and the same was in order to better bringing up her children. On the same day on 16.7.2010,
appellant also made an endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree" and the order
in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dissolving the marriage between the appellant and respondent was passed on
01.8.2010. According to the appellant, the endorsement "I submit to decree" was not voluntary and that
it was forced upon by the respondent as well as by the Court. Appellant contends that she did not have
any legal assistance and if she was explained about the legal implications, she would have written in clear
terms as "I consent to divorce" and she would not have made an endorsement as 'I submit to decree'.
10. The point now falling for consideration is whether the appellant actually intended to submit to decree
and whether the order passed by the Court on 01.8.2010 in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 could be construed
as "decree or order passed by the Family Court with consent of parties".
11. The impugned order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dated 01.8.2010 reads as under:-
"4. From the affidavit as well as documents the petitioner has proved the averments in the petition. The
averments in the petition stand uncontroverted by the respondent. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled
for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.
5. In the result, this petition is allowed and the marriage solemnized between the petitioner and the
respondent on 10.7.1989 at Victorious Cross Church, Ashok Nagar, Chennai is dissolved by granting
decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. No costs."
12. In the above order, it is stated that the averments in the petition stands uncontroverted by the appellant-
wife. Trial Court was not right in saying that the averments in the petition stand uncontroverted. As
pointed out earlier, appellant-wife filed the counter referring to various proceedings and also vehemently
opposing the allegations made in the petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009. When the appellant had filed a
detailed counter vehemently denying the allegations in the petition, the learned trial judge was not right
in saying that the averments in the petition remain uncontroverted.
13. Contention of appellant is that the endorsement in the petition "I submit to decree" was not voluntary.
By keeping in view the conduct of the parties and various proceedings, in our considered view the said
contention of the appellant is fortified. Let us now briefly refer to various proceedings instituted by
the parties in particular the appellant. After the differences arose between the parties, alleging that the
respondent-husband had demanded dowry and that he had also harassed her, appellant lodged a criminal
complaint before the Commissioner of Police. Based on which, a case was registered in Crime No.16 of
2007 under Section 498(A) IPC read with Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Women Harassment
Act on the file of T-14, Mangadu Police Station and subsequently, charge sheet was filed in C.C.No.115
of 2007 on the file of Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram. Later the same was transferred to the District
Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Sriperumbudur and re-numbered in C.C.No.325 of 2008 and the trial
is pending.
14. The appellant is alleged to have gone to the respondent's rented residence at Kerugambakkam,
Chennai-101. Alleging that the appellant-wife had committed theft in the respondent's residence at
Kerugambakkam, the respondent-husband lodged a police complaint in T-14 Mangadu Police Station.
Since the police did not take any action, the respondent had filed a direction petition in Crl.O.P.No.6936
of 2007 dated 14.03.2007 directing the Police to register the case. Police registered the case against
511
landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
the appellant in Crime No.330 of 2007 for theft and the said First Information Report was closed in
three days. Respondent filed further investigation petition before the District Munsif-cum-Judicial
Magistrate, Sriperumbudur and the same was dismissed on 05.03.2010. Against which the respondent
filed Crl.R.C.No.1231 of 2010 before the Principal Sessions Court, Kancheepuram and the same is also
said to be pending.
15. Appellant also filed Maintenance Case before the I Additional Family Court in M.C.No.79 of 2007 and
the same was dismissed for default on 26.02.2008. Stating that the respondent is trying to dispossess
her from New Door No.34/2 (Old No.109/2), East Vanniar Street, Best Apartment, K.K.Nagar (West),
Chennai-78, appellant also filed a civil suit in O.S.No.1026 of 2007 for permanent injunction and by the
judgment dated 14.6.2007, the said suit was decreed. Alleging that the respondent is continually violating
appellant's right and threatened her, appellant filed petition under Sections 18,19,20 and 21 of Domestic
Violence Act before XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. By the order dated 12.01.2009,
the said petition was allowed. The XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai directed the
respondent to allot kitchen and one bed room to the appellant and also directed the respondent to pay
maintenance of Rs.500/- each per month to each of the two children i.e. Rs.1000/- per month.
16. When the parties are entangled in various litigations and are posing strict resistance to the litigations filed
by them, it is highly improbable that appellant would have made an endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of
2009 that "I submit to decree". This is all the more so, when the respondent has made a serious allegations
against the appellant in the petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009. When the respondent had not withdrawn
those allegations, it is highly improbable that appellant would have voluntarily submitted to decree in
I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009.
17. Learned counsel for respondent mainly contended that in view of the endorsement made and the decree
passed by the Court, as per Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act, no appeal shall lie and the same is to be
construed as the order passed with the consent of the parties and therefore, as per Section 19(2) of the
Act, no appeal shall lie from the order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties. The
appellant only made an endorsement that "I submit to decree". There was no compromise petition filed by
either parties reducing the compromise in to writing. There is nothing to show that appellant was asked
whether she is voluntarily and willingly compromising the matter. In the absence of any such materials
or compromise memo by the parties, the endorsement made by the appellant in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009
that "I submit to decree" cannot be construed as the decree or order passed by the Family Court with the
consent of the parties, so as to bar appeal under Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act. In our considered
view, the endorsement made in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 cannot be construed as a decree or order passed
with the consent of the parties. In the light of serious allegations against the appellant, she has to be given
an opportunity to put forth her case.
18. For the foregoing reasons, the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 on the file of I Additional Principal
Judge, Family Court, Chennai is set aside and this appeal is allowed. I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 is ordered
to be restored on file. I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 is remitted back to the Family Court, Chennai. The Family
Court, Chennai is directed to take up I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 and afford sufficient opportunity to the
appellant as well as the respondent and proceed with the matter afresh in accordance with law.
Consequently, connected M.P. is closed. No costs.
qqq
512
Selvi Vijayalakshmi versus A.Sankaran
Selvi Vijayalakshmi versus A.Sankaran
Madras High Court
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice P. Devadass
Selvi Vijayalakshmi .. Petitioner/2nd Respondent
Versus
1. A.Sankaran, 2. Sumathy .. Respondents/Petitioner & Respondent No.1
C.R.P.(PD) No.3796 of 2012
&
M.P.No.1 of 2012
Decided on 24 March, 2017
Duties of the Family Courts-DNA Test-1st respondent married the 2nd respondent on 9.2.1981 according
to Hindu rites and customs. On 13.4.86, a daughter (revision petitioner) was born. Difference of opinion
arose between the respondents (spouses). 1st respondent/husband alleged that the 2nd respondent/wife had
crossed the fence. 2nd respondent filed counter denouncing his allegation. 1st respondent filed I.A.No.32
of 2008 that as he has doubted the very birth of the revision petitioner to him, he wanted to subject his wife,
and the revision petitioner to undergo DNA test, in other words, paternity test.
The Sub Court, Arni allowed the petition and ordered the conducting of DNA test. It necessarily involves
the taking of blood samples from the respondents and the revision petitioner----Revision filled against the
Impuned order-
We have seen the contours of Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Revision petitioner was born many years
ago, at a time when the respondents/spouses led their happy married life. Onus is upon the 1st respondent
to show that he had no access to the revision petitioner's mother. In this case, he did not do so.
The revision petitioner will have her own ideology, perception of life. She revolted against giving of her
blood sample for DNA test for the sake of a crude thinking of her biological father. She is not for a dangerous
test. Absolutely, there is no prima facie case in this case to order for D.N.A. Test. We are not subscribing to
the view of the trial Court that such a test will be beneficial to the couples and the view of the Trial Court
that no prejudice will be caused to the parties in undergoing such a test is absurd and it is a poor view.
--Judges must also alive to the sensitiveness involved in the cases coming before them. Certain cases/issues
must be handled with much care and caution like handling explosive substances.--revision succeeds.
Impugned order passed by the learned Sub Judge, Arni, Tiruvannamalai District in is set aside.
ORDER
This revision is by the second respondent in I.A.No.32 of 2008 in H.M.O.P.No.2 of 2008 on the file of the
learned Subordinate Judge, Arni, Tiruvannamalai District.
2. 1st respondent married the 2nd respondent on 9.2.1981 according to Hindu rites and customs. 1st
respondent (husband) was an S.I. of Police. On 13.4.86, a daughter (revision petitioner) was born. She is
the revision petitioner.
3. In 2008, 1st respondent was 53 years old, while 2nd respondent, was 43 years old. Revision Petitioner was
22 years old. She was to be married. Difference of opinion arose between the respondents (spouses). 1st
513
landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
respondent/husband alleged that the 2nd respondent/wife had crossed the fence. 2nd respondent filed
counter denouncing his allegation.
4. 1st respondent filed I.A.No.32 of 2008 that as he has doubted the very birth of the revision petitioner
to him, he wanted to subject his wife, and the revision petitioner to undergo DNA test, in other words,
paternity test. The 2nd respondent and the revision petitioner were shocked by this bombshell. They have
resented on the move of the 1st respondent.
5. Upon hearing both sides, the Sub Court, Arni allowed the petition and ordered the conducting of DNA
test. It necessarily involves the taking of blood samples from the respondents and the revision petitioner.
6. The reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge in ordering the D.N.A. test could be found from the
following passage in the impugned order passed by the trial Court:
''Now the petitioner is suspect the legality and biological birth of the second respondent. If the doubt
is arises it would be detected by the scientific method to save the integrity and trustworthy in the
matrimonial home. No one bear the thorn in his chest throughout her life regarding the paternity of
the second respondent. The legal steps is alone is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of conscience of
the petitioner. If the petition is allowed there is no prejudice will be caused to the respondent. Because,
the result is stands with truth it is good for the parties, and averment to the hormonious life in future.
Therefore, the petition is allowed for D.N.A test. The petitioner, first respondent, and second respondent
are directed to submit for the test to find out truth". (emphasis supplied by me)
7. Aggrieved, the revision petitioner, has directed this revision.
8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that the revision petitioner is the daughter
of the respondents. She was born to them during the period they lived as husband and wife. In such
circumstances, the conclusive proof prescribed in Section 112 of the Evidence Act shuts the mouth of the
1st respondent from speaking otherwise, as to the birth of the revision petitioner to him.
9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would further contend that it is too atrocious to ask the
revision petitioner, now a married woman and a mother to undergo DNA test.
10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would also submit that it will be in violation of her right
to privacy. It is as against her right to live with human dignity and decency.
11. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would also contend that no Court could violate the human
right of a woman.
12. To carry home his point of view, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would cite Bhabani
Prasad Jena vs. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women and another (2010(8) SCC
633).
13. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would further contend that the revision petitioner is not
a party to the matrimonial dispute between her parents. She has been unnecessarily dragged into their
fight. The impugned order will result in causing incalculable damage to her and it will also affect her
family life.
14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that the 1st respondent
is asking divorce also on the ground of adulterous conduct of the revision petitioner's mother(2nd
respondent). Incidentally, the very birth of the revision petitioner to the 1st respondent itself is in issue.
This issue is to be resolved through a scientific test.
15. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent would further contend that DNA test is a modern scientific
method to establish one's paternity. It is a gift of science. Such a test is permissible under Section 45 of
the Indian Evidence Act. Medicine will not always taste sweet. Sometimes it tastes bitter. But it is good
for health. Taking of blood sample from the revision petitioner will not be to her liking. If the 2nd
514
Selvi Vijayalakshmi versus A.Sankaran
respondent passes the scientific test successfully, there ends the matter. Consequently, the very legal
status of the revision petitioner also will be confirmed. In these circumstances, considering all the above
aspects, the trial Court has adopted a right course.
16. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent contended that ordering of DNA test is not impermissible in
law.
17. In this connection, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent cited Bommi and another vs. Munirathinam
(2004(5) CTC 182).
18. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent also contended that in her counter 2nd respondent expressed
her willingness to undergo D.N.A test.
19. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions, perused the impugned order, materials on record and
the decisions cited.
20. In Ramayana, Lord Rama asked Seetha Devi to walk over the fire to prove her chastity. Then there was
no DNA test. But, now scientific development pervades all fields. Scientific development is such that one
day even human beings itself will be produced by cloning. But, for the sake of scientific development, we
cannot give up our hoary past, culture, tradition which is unique and has become our pride to be envied
by the westerners. For the sake of scientific development, we cannot disrespect womanhood.
21. As early as in 1872, Sir James Fits James Stephen, in his Magnum Opus, the great Indian Evidence Act,
introduced a form of paternity test in Section 112 of the Act.
22. The said section 112 runs as under:
"112- Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy-
The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and
any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried,
shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties
to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.''
23. The essential features of the said section is that during the matrimonial life between a man and a
woman as spouses, if a child is born to them it is conclusively presumed that it is their child. However,
the Draftsman of the said adjective law focusing the possibility of an absurdity has added a rider. He
introduced the 'principle of no access'. If the disputant is able to establish that there was no opportunity
for him to have link (access) with his wife/woman, then the conclusive presumption introduced in the
first part of Section 112 of the Evidence Act will go away. This section is also based on common sense.
24. To understand the nature of the said presumption, let us refer to Section 4 of the Evidence Act which
runs as under:
''4 ''May presume'' - Whenever, it is provided by this Act that Court may presume a fact, it may either
regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it.
''Shall presume''- Whenever, it is directed by this Act that the court shall presume a fact, it shall regard
such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved.
''Conclusive proof '' - When, one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court
shall on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the
purpose of disproving it. (emphasis supplied by me)
25. Presumptions are legal fictions. They are all creations of law. Whether one like it or not, whether it
actually exists or not, on the proof of a particular fact, the existence of another fact shall be presumed, in
other words, it shall be taken, deemed that it exists.
515
landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
26. Presumptions are of three kinds. 'May' presume, 'Shall' presume, and 'Conclusive' proof. Conclusive
proofs are 'irrebutable'. It is impermissible to refute such a presumption, because it is a presumption in
law. There are several instances of such type of presumptions. One such presumption is the presumption
as to paternity prescribed in Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
27. The concept of DNA test is much more vogue in USA and U.K. and now, it has been accepted as a
scientific mode all over the world. DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) test is not a novice to modern lawyers.
But it is to be remembered that the result of D.N.A. test is not analogous to the result of a Dactylography
test (finger print). The result of finger print comparison test is 100%, however, it is not so in the case of
D.N.A. test. It is a mystery in science.
28. A question as to DNA test cropped up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goutam Kundu vs. State of
West Bengal (1993)3 SCC 418) wherein the father of a child disputed his paternity to the child.
29. In Goutam Kundu (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted the following passage from Rayden's Law
and Practice in Divorce and Family matters (1983), Vol. I 1054), "Medical science is able to analyse the
blood of individuals into definite groups, and by examining the blood of a given man and a child to
determine whether the man could or could not be the father. Blood tests cannot show positively that
any man is father, but they can show positively that a given man could or could not be the father. It
is obviously the latter aspect that proves most valuable in determining paternity, that is, the exclusion
aspect, for once it is determined that a man could not be the father, he is thereby automatically excluded
from considerations of paternity. When a man is not the father of a child, it has been said that there is at
least a 70 per cent chance that if blood tests are taken they will show positively he is not the father, and
in some cases the chance is even higher, between two given men who have had sexual intercourse with
the mother at the time of conception, both of whom undergo blood tests, it has likewise been said that
there is a 80 per cent chance that the tests will show that one of them is not the father with the irresistible
inference that the other is the father".
30. In Goutam Kundu (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the Courts that for mere asking DNA
test cannot be ordered. And the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines: "
1) That courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course.
2) Wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for
blood test cannot be entertained.
3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to
dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
4) The Court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood
test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste
woman.
5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis. "
31. The Two Judge Bench decision in Goutam Kundu (supra) has been reviewed by a Three-Judge Bench of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharda vs. Dharmpal [(2003) 4 SCC 493]. Referring to Goutam Kundu
(supra), the three Judge Bench observed as under:
"39. Goutam Kundu is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition that under no circumstances
the court can direct that blood tests be conducted. It, having regard to the future of the child, has,
of course, sounded a note of caution as regards mechanical passing of such order. In some other
jurisdictions, it has been held that such directions should ordinarily be made if it is in the interest
of the child".
516
Selvi Vijayalakshmi versus A.Sankaran
32 There was a feeling that Sharda (supra), overrun Goutam Kundu (supra). This was clarified by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhapani Prasad Jena vs. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission
for Women and another (2010)8 SCC 633) in the following words:
''23. There is no conflict in the two decisions of this Court, namely, Goutam Kundu and Sharda.
In Goutam Kundu it has been laid down that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter
of course and such prayers cannot be granted to have roving inquiry; there must be strong prima
facie case and the court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering
the blood test. In Sharda while concluding that a matrimonial court has power to order a person to
undergo a medical test, it was reiterated that the court should exercise such a power if the applicant
has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the court. Obviously, therefore,
any order for DNA test can be given by the court only if a strong prima facie case is made out for
such a course".
33. Now, what follows from the above analysis of the ratios laid down in Goutam Kuntu (supra) and in
Sharda (supra) is that it is not that the Courts have no power to order DNA test. It can order, but it cannot
be a routine matter because it involves personal freedom of an individual. Only in rare cases and real
cases such a test can be ordered, provided there is a prima facie case for ordering such a test. (See Bommi
and another vs. Manirathanam (2004(5) CTC 182).
34 In the light of the above elucidation, we shall revert back to our case.
35. The 2nd respondent might be ready for such a test but she cannot bind her daughter/ revision petitioner
also for such a test. Each individual has got liberty, feelings and passion of his own.
36. We must alive to certain aspects in this case. 1st respondent had lived with the 2nd respondent happily
at the nascent stage of their matrimonial life. They were happy couples as it is in most of the cases.
Sometimes, ego clash crept in in their matrimonial life. It may be mainly due to lack of understanding
between them.
37. The reason that propelled the 1st respondent to raise his eyebrows as to the very birth of the revision
petitioner is laconic. It is that somebody told him that the revision petitioner does not resemble him. It is
sheer absurdity. If this is accepted, many children will be stranded in the street without legal parentage.
It will be promoting of basterdity. The 1st respondent lived with the 2nd respondent. If his ideology is
accepted then there will be more casualties in society. This revelation came to him after he had lived a full
matrimonial life with the 2nd respondent. It is too big a pill to swallow.
38. We have seen the contours of Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Revision petitioner was born many years
ago, at a time when the respondents/spouses led their happy married life. Onus is upon the 1st respondent
to show that he had no access to the revision petitioner's mother. In this case, he did not do so.
39. The alleged behaviour of the 2nd respondent, who is the mother of the revision petitioner is different
from the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner is not a party to the matrimonial dispute between
the respondents. Dragging the revision petitioner also into a murky affair at the cost of her personal life
is very difficult to digest.
40. The revision petitioner will have her own ideology, perception of life. She revolted against giving of
her blood sample for DNA test for the sake of a crude thinking of her biological father. She is not for a
dangerous test. Absolutely, there is no prima facie case in this case to order for D.N.A. Test.
41. We are not subscribing to the view of the trial Court that such a test will be beneficial to the couples and
the view of the Trial Court that no prejudice will be caused to the parties in undergoing such a test is
absurd and it is a poor view.
42. Judges must also alive to the sensitiveness involved in the cases coming before them. Certain cases/issues
must be handled with much care and caution like handling explosive substances.
517
landmark judgments on role and duties of family court
43. In view of the foregoing analysis, I hold that the order of the trial court is flawed.
44. Ordered as under:
(i) This revision succeeds.
(ii) The impugned order passed by the learned Sub Judge, Arni, Tiruvannamalai District in I.A.No.32
of 2008 in HMOP No.2 of 2008 is set aside. (iii) I.A.No.32/2008 is dismissed.
(iv) Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. However, there is no order as to costs.
(v) Uninfluenced by any observations in this order, the learned Sub Judge, Arni is directed to dispose
of H.M.O.P.No.2 of 2008 expeditiously, preferably within four months from the date of receipt of
a copy of this order.
24.3.2017 Speaking/Non Speaking order Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No vaan Note: As this order
deals with an important aspect in gender justice, the Registry is directed to place this order before My
Lord, the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice for orders to circulate the same among the Judicial Officers in this
State and in Union Territory of Puducherry for their guidance.
qqq
518
LANDMARK JUDGMENTS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Rajat Johar versus Divya Johar
Rajat Johar versus Divya Johar
Delhi High Court
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice I. S. Mehta
Rajat Johar .…. Petitioner
Mr. Prashant Mendiratta, Advocate with Mr. Harshvardhan Pandhey and Ms. Malvika Choudhary,
Advocates
Versus
Divya Johar .…. Respondent
Crl. M.C 1728/2015
Decided on November 17, 2017
Protectionof Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005 — Ss. 12(1), Object- Held, is to provide speedy
remedy in domestic violence matters — It covers protection to victim, financial relief and child custody —
The object of the Protection of Women fromDomestic Violence Act, 2005 is to provide for more effective
protection Provisions --- Held, husband is bound to provide maintenance to wife who is victim of domestic
violence and to dependent child — Relief under the Act, because of the very purpose of the Act, is different
from relief under S. 125, CrPC — Monetary relief under the Act can be in addition to relief under S. 125,
CrPC — Father cannot evade responsibility on the plea that mother has adequate means — Both parents
must fulfil their respective obligations in child's best interests, irrespectiveof their comparative financial
position — Ex parte interim relief — Held, Magistrate has such power under S. 23 — Monetary reliefs to
victim wife — Effect, if any, of divorce — Held, claims under Ss. 20 to 23 subsist despite divorce.
A. Family and Personal Laws — Protectionof Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005 — Ss. 12(1),
12(2), 20, 21 and 23(2) — Objectof legislation — Held, is to provide speedy remedy in domestic
violence matters — It covers protection to victim, financial relief and child custody — Provisions
regarding maintenance and interim maintenance — Held, husband is bound to provide maintenance
to wife who is victim of domestic violence and to dependent child — Relief under the Act, because of
the very purpose of the Act, is different from relief under S. 125, CrPC — Monetary relief under the
Act can be in addition to relief under S. 125, CrPC — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 125
B. Family and Personal Laws — Protectionof Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005 — Ss. 12(1),
12(2), 20, 21, 22 and 23(2) — Liability towards dependent child — Held, father and mother both
are responsible to support child — Father cannot evade responsibility on the plea that mother has
adequate means — Both parents must fulfil their respective obligations in child's best interests,
irrespectiveof their comparative financial position — Ex parte interim relief — Held, Magistrate
has such power under S. 23 — On facts, petitioner-father directed to provide maintenance of child
— However, trial court directed to re-assess father's liability towards maintenance after obtaining
information from parties in terms ofKusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma, 2015 SCC OnLine
Del 6793 — Meanwhile, petitioner husband to continue paying maintenance as ordered by trial court
— However, excess amount, if any, paid as a result of re-assessment adjustable in future payments
C. Family and Personal Laws — Protectionof Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005 — S. 20 to
23 — Monetary reliefs to victim wife — Effect, if any, of divorce — Held, claims under Ss. 20 to 23
subsist despite divorce
521
landmark judgments on STRIDHAN
Held :
The object of the Protection of Women fromDomestic Violence Act, 2005 is to provide for more effective protection
of women's rights guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence ofany kind occurring within
the family, and for the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The object ofawarding maintenance/
interim maintenance qua the aggrieved person is to provide speedy remedy to the aggrieved person(s) who are
unable to support themselves and are in distress. It is intended to achieve a social purpose. The maintenance
cannot be denied to children on the premise that their mother is employed or has enough means to maintain
them, or that they are in mother's custody. Both parents have a legal, moral and social duty to provide to their
child the best education and standard of living within their means. Mere fact that the spouse with whom the
child is living is having a source ofincome, even if sufficient, would in no way absolve the other spouse of his
obligation to make his contribution towards child's maintenance and welfare even if, the means/income/salary
of that spouse may be less than the means/income/salary of the other spouse. The main maintenance petition
under Section 12 of DV, Act is pending before the trial Court. The determination ofmaintenance amount will be
done by the trial Court after leading evidence by the respective parties, and on the basis of material documents
and income affidavits ofthe parties. The minor child is staying with the mother/respondent who needs medical
attention/care on regular basis and even his paternity is not disputed. The statutory obligation is paramount,
compared to father's wish, and he cannot be permitted to limit child's claim on flimsy and baseless grounds.
Since the respondent and her minor son are to be maintained by the petitioner, in the absence of denial
ofexistence of the marriage and denial of minor's paternity who is stated to be requiring constant medical
treatment and supervision, the petitioner cannot shy awayfrom his statutory obligation of maintaining his
legally wedded wife and his minor son.
The monetary relief as provided under the Act is different from maintenance, which can be in addition to an
order of maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, or any other law, and can be granted to meet the expenses
incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and child of the aggrieved person as a result of thedomestic
violence, and the question whether the aggrieved person, on the date of filing the application under Section
12 of DV Act was in a domesticrelationship with the respondent, is irrelevant. Section 23(2) empowers the
Magistrate to pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. It is within Magistrate's jurisdiction to grant
interim ex parte relief, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the application prima facie discloses that respondent is
committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may
commit an act ofdomestic violence.
An act of domestic violence once committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve respondent's liability
for offence committed or to deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled under theAct, including
monetary relief under Section 20, child custody under Section 21, compensation under Section 22 and interim
or ex parte order under Section 23.
The parties are directed to file a fresh income affidavit in the format prescribed in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder
Kumar Sharma, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11796 : (2017) 241 DLT 252. The trial Court shall pass a fresh order
within a month thereof. In the meanwhile the petitioner is directed to keep on making the payment to
respondent as well as her minor child, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties till a
fresh order ofmaintenance is passed by the trial Court and any amount, if paid in excess the same shall be
adjusted in future. The impugned order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge is modified to this extent only.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hon'ble Mr. Justice I. S. Mehta :— By way of the instant petition, the petitioner invoke the inherent jurisdiction
of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for setting aside the impugned orders
522
Rajat Johar versus Divya Johar
dated 17.03.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in
Criminal Appeal No. 131/14.
2. The brief facts stated are that, a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women FromDomestic
Violence Act, 2005 was filed by the respondent-Divya Johar against the petitioner-Rajat Johar before
the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket, Delhi. Admittedly, the marriage between the parties
was solemnized on 16.05.2009 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals at Hotel Lutyen's, Mehrauli-
Gurgaon Road, Delhi. The respondent before marriage was working as a Manager, Quality Assurance in
a reputed MNC in Gurgaon and was earning a decent salary in the year 2008-09, but she was forced to
quit the same after marriage to join the petitioner at Hyderabad in the month of May 2009. Thereafter,
in the month of August 2010, the respondent was short listed for final interview for the post of full-time
faculty (Asst. Professor) with NIFT, Hyderabad but the petitioner was completely againstof taking up a
full-time job by the respondent therefore, she did not attend the final interview on the instances of her
husband/petitioner.
3. Out of the said wedlock one baby boy (Master Avin Johar) was born on 02.02.2011 He was born about
nine weeks prematurely and was diagnosed for blood pressure and kidney problem. As a result of which
the minor child is suffering from severe medical ailment since his birth and requires constant medical
treatment and supervision. Thereafter, on 03.04.2012, the respondent along with her minor child were
thrown outof the matrimonial home and on being harassed by the petitioner and her family members the
respondent filed a domestic violence case against the petitioner and other family members. It has been
alleged by the respondent that the petitioner has neither taken her and her minor child back nor has
made any provision for their maintenance. It has been further alleged that the petitioner has refused the
respondent to stay in the matrimonial home and have further refused to hand over the Stridhan articles
including jewellery to the respondent despite repeated requests.
4. Subsequently, on 17.07.2012 the respondent filed a petition under Section 12 read with Sections 18,
19, 20, 22 and 23 of the Protection of Women fromDomestic Violence Act, 2005 against the petitioner,
father-in-law and mother-in-law, along with an application for interim maintenance under Section 23of
DV Act in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Courts, New Delhi.
5. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate after hearing the arguments of both the parties and after considering
the complaint, affidavit and other material on record, passed an order dated 12.11.2014 thereby directing
the petitioner herein to pay an interim maintenance of Rs. 2,00,000/- per month to the respondent and
her minor child which shall be payablefrom the date of filing of the petition, i.e 17.07.2012 till further
directed the petitioner herein to pay a sumof Rs. 55,000/- per month as rent in lieu of an alternate
accommodation to the respondent and her minor child.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 12.11.2014, the petitioner herein preferred an appeal under
Section 29 of the DV Act being Criminal Appeal No. 131/14 before the Court of Sessions Judge, District
Courts, Saket, New Delhi on 11.12.2014
7. Consequently, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi vide impugned
judgment dated 17.03.2015 disposed of the said appeal filed by the petitioner by modifying the interim
maintenance amount by reducing it to Rs. 1,80,000/- per month and further reduced the amount for
alternate accommodation to Rs. 45,000/- per month.
8. Hence, the present petition.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is ready to pay any amount if
factually requires but the respondent is in the habit of falsely putting allegations against the petitioner.
It is further submitted that the impugned order is bad in law and liable to be set aside on the following
grounds:—
523
landmark judgments on STRIDHAN
i. The calculation is against the income of the petitioner.
ii. The respondent and her mother is joint owner ofa commercial property and she for herself and her
minor daughter could contribute from the rent which is coming from the aforesaid property. The
document indicating 20% of the rental is of the respondent & 80% of her mother.
iii. As per the record the mother of the respondent and the respondent share 50% but as per the rent
deed 20% is shown in favour of the respondent and 80% is in favour of her mother which is not
tenable in law as she is concealing her income.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the interim order is totally illegal and is against
the settled principal of law as it shows no consideration to the documents filed by the petitioner and
further submitted that the petitioner as got no monthly income therefore, the impugned order be set
aside.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the appellate Court's order is patently illegal
therefore, the present matter be remanded back to the appellate Court to decide the appeal of the
petitioner afresh and give reasons of coming to the conclusion of reduction and upholding the findings
ofthe Trial Court. He further submits that till then let maintenance be not awarded and relied upon the
following judgments:—
1) Akanksha Jain v. Manish Jain; CM(M) No. 910/2010 decided on 21.02.2014
2) R.K Sharma v. NDMC; (2006) 1 567.
12. On the contrary the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the impugned order passed by
the Sessions Court does not require any interference by this Court as the petitioner has not complied with
the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the Sessions Court therefore, the petitioner be directed to
comply with the orders and submits that the present petition be rejected for want of merit.
13. The learned counsel for the respondent in support of its contentions has relied upon the following
judgments:—
1) Nayanika Thakur Mehta v. Mohit Mehta.
2) Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha; (2015) 2 SCC 99.
3) Rajeev Preenja v. Sarika; 2009 (V) AD (DELHI) 497.
4) Durga Prasad Ray v. Meenu; 191 (2012) DLT 275.
14. In rebuttal the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the learned Additional
Sessions Judge though reduced the maintenance amount, without going into the reasons came up with the
imaginary figure, this determination of the interim maintenance has to be based on certain documents
to reach to the conclusion as per the new affidavit in compliance to the judgment of this Court in Kusum
Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma; FAO-369/1996 decided on 29.05.2017
15. The object of The Protection of WomenFrom Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is to provide for more effective
protection of the rights of womenguaranteed under the Constitution who are victims ofviolence of any
kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
16. The object of awarding maintenance/interim maintenance qua the aggrieved person is to provide speedy
remedy to the aggrieved person(s) who are unable to support themselves and are in distress. It is intended
to achieve a social purpose, and maintenance cannot be denied to the children on the premise that their
mother is employed or has enough means to maintain them or that they are in the custody of their
mother.
524
Rajat Johar versus Divya Johar
17. It is a settled principle of law that both the parents have a legal, moral and social duty to provide to their
child the best education and standard of living within their means. The mere fact that the spouse with
whom the child is living is having a source of income, even if sufficient, would in no way absolve the
other spouse of his obligation to make his contribution towards the maintenance and welfare of the child,
even if, the means/income/salary of that spouse may be less than the means/income/salary of the other
spouse.
18. The Apex Court in Noor Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim; 1997 Crl. L.J 3972 has made the observation that
a father having sufficient means has the obligation to maintain his minor children who are unable to
maintain themselves till they attain majority and in caseof females till they get married.
19. It is an admitted fact coming on record that the main maintenance petition under Section 12 of DV,Act
is pending before the Trial Court. The determination of the maintenance amount will be done by the
Trial Court after leading of evidence by the respective parties and on the basis of material documents and
income affidavits of the parties.
20. Furthermore, in the instant petition it is an admitted case on record that the minor child is staying with
the mother/respondent who needs medical attention/care on regular basis and even the paternity is not
disputed. The statutory obligation is paramount to the wish of the father and he cannot be permitted to
limit this claim of the child on flimsy and baseless grounds. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case Dr. R.K Sood v. Usha Rani Sood; 1996 (3) 114 PLR
486 and the relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:—
“17. Under the Hindu Law father not only has a moral but even a statutory obligation to maintain his
infant children. The scope of his duty is to be regulated directly in relation to the money, status, that the
father enjoys. The right of maintenance ofa child from his father cannot be restricted to two meals a day
but must be determined on the basisof the benefit, status and money that the child would have enjoyed
as if he was living with the family, including his mother and father. Irrespectiveof the differences and
grievances which each spouse may have against the other, the endeavourof the Court has to be to provide
the best to the child in the facts and circumstances of each case and more so keeping the welfare of the
child in mind for all such determinations. Liability to maintain one's children is clear from the text
ofthis statute as well as the various decided cases in this regard. The statutory obligation is paramount to
the wish of the father and he cannot be permitted to limit this claim of the child on flimsy and baseless
grounds.”
21. Since the respondent and her minor son are to be maintained by the petitioner, in the absence ofdenial of
existence of the marriage and denial ofpaternity of the minor son, who is stated to be requires constant
medical treatment and supervision, the petitioner cannot shy away from his statutory obligation of
maintaining his legally wedded wife and his minor son.
22. The monetary relief as provided under theProtection of Women from Domestic ViolenceAct, 2005 is
different from maintenance, which can be in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C or any other law, and can be granted to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the
aggrieved person and child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence, and the question
whether the aggrieved person, on the date offiling of the application under Section 12 of DV Actwas in a
domestic relationship with the respondent is irrelevant.
23. Sub-clause 2 of Section 23 of DV Actempowers the Magistrate to pass such interim order as he deems
just and proper therefore, it is well within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to grant the interim ex
parte relief, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the application prima facie discloses that the respondent is
committing, or has committed an act of domesticviolence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent
may commit an act of domesticviolence.
525
landmark judgments on STRIDHAN
24. Furthermore, an act of domestic violenceonce committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve
the liability of the respondent from the offence committed or to deny the benefit to which the aggrieved
person is entitled under the DomesticViolence Act, 2005 including monetary relief under Section 20,
Child Custody under Section 21, Compensation under Section 22 and interim or ex parte order under
Section 23 of the Domestic ViolenceAct, 2005.
25. The Apex Court in V.D Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot;(2012) 3 SCC 183, has observed that the conduct of the
parties even prior to the coming into force of theProtection of Women from Domestic ViolenceAct, 2005
could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 of DVAct thereof.
The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:
“12. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that in looking into a complaint Under Section
12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the conduct ofthe parties even prior to the coming into force ofthe PWD Act,
could be taken into consideration while passing an order Under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. In our
view, the Delhi High Court has also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a household in the
past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the protection of
the PWD Act, 2005.”
26. Therefore, in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and reliance placed
by him on the judgment of this Court in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma; FAO-369/1996
decided on 29.05.2017, the parties are directed to file a fresh income affidavit in view of the said judgment
before the Trial Court on or before 15.12.2017 and the Trial Court shall pass a fresh order within a month
thereof.
27. In the meanwhile the petitioner is directed to keep on making the payment in favour of the respondent as
well as her minor child as per the order dated 17.03.2015, without prejudice to the rights and contentions
of the parties till a fresh order ofmaintenance is passed by the Trial Court and any amount if paid in
excess the same shall be adjusted in future.
28. Consequently, the impugned order dated 17.03.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03,
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 131/14 is modified to this extent only.
29. The present petition is disposed of in the above terms. The parties are directed to appear before the Trial
Court on or before 15.12.2017
30. Let LCR be sent back forthwith along with a copyof this judgment.
31. All the pending applications (if any) are also disposed of.
32. No order as to costs.
qqq
526
MISCELLANEOUS
JUDGMENTS
R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
R. Sridharan Versus
The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
Madras High Court
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Manikumar
R. Sridharan
Versus
The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
W.P.No.34838 of 2004
W.P.M.P. Nos. 42032 to 42034 of 2004
Decided on 18-08-2008
According to the petitioner, the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for divorce
under the Hindu Marriage Act, since the marriage was performed in United States of America.
Petitioner submitted that as the marriage between the parties was solemnized in Balaji Temple, Bridge
Water, New Jercy, United States of America and since the petitioner is not a domicile in India, Section 1(2)
of the Hindu Marriage Act, which extends to the whole of India, except Jammu and Kashmir, cannot be
made applicable to the Hindus, who are domiciled outside the territories to which the Act extends.
In both the Indian and International Law the concept of Nationality and domicile are recognised as two
different conceptions, which necessarily mean, an Indian by retaining his domicile in India may acquire
citizenship of other country. In other words, merely because a person has acquired citizenship of some
other country that does not necessarily mean that he has abandoned domicile of origin.
The uncontroverted fact is that the marriage between the parties was solemnized as per Hindu Rites and
Customs and both the parties are Hindus. Though the respondent has disputed the registration of marriage
before the Marriage Officer in U.S.A., the form of marriage is admitted.
Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not stipulate any stringent condition that both parties should
be residing within or domiciled in the jurisdiction of India for maintaining a petition under the Hindu
Marriage Act. In fact, it covers all Hindus, who are residing outside the territory to which this Act extends
also.
The above said provision enables presentation of the petition before the District Court of competent
jurisdiction or Family Court even if the respondent is residing outside the territories to which the Hindu
Marriage Act extends.
It is the law of the land that Writ of Prohibition will be issued as soon as inferior court/tribunal proceeds to
apply a wrong principle of law when deciding a fact on which jurisdiction depends.Prohibition is primarily
and principally preventive rather than remedial remedy. The effect of the remedy is an injunction against
the court or tribunal commanding it to cease from the exercise of jurisdiction to which it has no legal
claim. Prohibition is not a writ of right granted exdebito justice. But one of sound judicial discretion to be
granted or withheld according to the consideration of the particular case. When there is entire absence of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of adjudication and this is apparent on the face of the proceedings, the
granting of reliefs by prohibition is not a matter of discretion, but one of absolute right.
529
MISCELLANEOUS judgments
In the light of the decisions of the Courts dealing with matrimonial matters with reference to domicile of
the parties, I am of the considered view, the Family Court or any other competent Court has got jurisdiction
to adjudge any dispute between the contracting parties, one of whom is a foreign national, said to have
acquired domicile of his choice.
Judgment
(Writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of Writ of Prohibition the first
respondent from proceeding with the trial in O.P.No.569 of 2004 on its file)
The petitioner has sought for a Writ of Prohibition, prohibiting the first respondent from proceeding with the
trial in O.P.No.569 of 2004 on its file.
2. Facts leading to the present Writ Petition are as follows:
The petitioner is a domicile in United States of America, since 1992 and is working as a Software Engineer.
The second respondent is known to their family since childhood. Marriage between the parties to this lis
was arranged by elders. The second respondent, her parents and relatives came to United States and the
marriage was performed on 17.04.2002 and registered on 30.07.2002. The second respondent came to
India in the second week of January 2003 for a short visit promising to return after completing a dance
programme. But she began to act in films and with ulterior motive, she filed O.P.NO.569 of 2004 on the
file of the Principal Family Court, Chennai for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, alleging cruelty.
Since he was residing in United States, summons were not served and therefore, the second respondent
obtained an exparte decree of divorce on 19.07.2004. On his application, the order was set aside on
23.09.2004 and the O.P., was restored. Apprehending trial, the second respondent adopted dilatory
tactics and filed C.R.P.(PD)No.1695 of 2004, stating that the proceedings of the Family Court should
not be published by the Media and obtained an interim stay. The petitioner has filed a counter affidavit,
stating that he has no objection for the proceedings be held in camera and did not want any publicity.
Therefore, by order dated 29.10.2004, this Court vacated the interim stay and the O.P., was ready for trial.
Inspite of several adjournments, the second respon- dent has not appeared and in these circumstances,
the petitioner was constrained to file the present Writ Petition for Prohibition, prohibiting the Family
Court from proceeding with the trial in O.P.NO.56 of 2004.
3. According to the petitioner, the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for divorce
under the Hindu Marriage Act, since the marriage was performed in United States of America. After the
marriage, the petitioner and the second respondent were living as husband and wife in U.S.A and the
petitioner, being an American citizen, the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 will not apply.
The petitioner has further submitted that he is a domicile in United States of America and not in the
territory of India and therefore, Section 1(2) of the Act would come into operation and in the above
circumstances, the Family Court at Chennai cannot maintain a petition for divorce. The petitioner has
further submitted that unless both the parties are domiciled in India, the petition for divorce under the
Hindu Marriage Act is not maintainable.
4. The Second respondent in her counter affidavit has submitted that she got married to the petitioner
on 17.04.2002 in Balaji Temple, Bridge Water, New Jercy, U.S.A., in the presence of their parents and
relatives, as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Therefore, she has submitted that the rights and the obligations
of the parties flow from the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. As per Section 19(iii)(a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, inserted by Act 50 of the Central Act, with effect from 20.12.2003, she can institute the
proceedings for dissolution of the Marriage at the place where she is residing at the time of presentation
of the petition and therefore, the Family Court at Chennai, is competent to decide the lis between the
parties.
5. The Second respondent, while rebutting the averments made in Paragraph 6(b), 6(c) and 6(d) of the
affidavit filed by the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner has not explained as to how the O.P., is
530
R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
not maintainable. According to her, as the parties are governed by the personal laws applicable to them,
the rights and obligations arising there from, can be enforced in the Forums created under the Statutes
alone and therefore, the Principal Family Court, Chennai is empowered to adjudicate the dispute. The
second respondent has further submitted, that though the petitioner has not raised the plea of ouster of
jurisdiction in the counter affidavit filed in support of the Original Petition, before the Family Court,
however, he has mentioned about the application of Foreign Marriages Act, 1969 and in particular
Section 18(1) of the said Act. The second respondent has fur- ther submitted that the marriage was not
performed before the Marriage Officer notified under the said Act and it was also not registered before
him, as required under the said law and therefore, the provisions of Foreign Marriages Act will not apply
to the facts of this case. As a matter of fact, the Family Court itself can decide both the issues regarding
jurisdiction and the merits of the case and therefore, the present Writ Petition is not maintainable. It
is further submitted that once the petitioner submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court by filing
a counter statement on merits with documents in support of his case, it is not open to 'him to stall
the proceedings, by instituting a Writ Petition before this Court and under these circumstances, the
petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for in the Writ Petition.
6. Referring to Section 1(2) of the Hindu Marriages Act, Ms. K.M. Nalini Shree, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner submitted that as the marriage between the parties was solemnized in Balaji Temple,
Bridge Water, New Jercy, United States of America and since the petitioner is not a domicile in India,
Section 1(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, which extends to the whole of India, except Jammu and Kashmir,
cannot be made applicable to the Hindus, who are domiciled outside the territories to which the Act
extends. She further submitted that when the second respondent herself had admitted in her counter
affidavit that the petitioner is a resident of USA, supported by the passport issued by the authorities at
St.Francisco., USA, the Petitioner's domicile is clearly established and therefore, she submitted that the
Principal Family Court, Chennai has no jurisdiction to apply the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act
or Family Courts Act to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. According to her, domicile of a
person is a place, in which, habitation is fixed without any personal intention of removing therefrom. In
support of her contention, she relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd.
vs. Ram Narain reported in AIR 1995 SC 36.
7. Placing reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gour Gopal Roy v. Sipra Roy reported in
AIR 1978 Cal. 163, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 1(2) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, extends to the whole of India, except Jammu and Kashmir, to all persons to whom the Act applies,
should be within the territory and it excludes those who are domiciled outside the territorial jurisdiction,
to which, the provisions of the Act applies. According to her, the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act
alone would apply to the facts of the present case and in view of the Foreign Marriages Act, the question
of applying Private International Law does not arise.
8. Placing reliance on a decision in Chandrika v. Bhaiyalal reported in AIR 1973 SC 2391, learned counsel
for the petitioner submitted that though the petitioner has filed his counter statement and contested
the matter before the Family Court, Chennai, it is always open to him to raise the question of territorial
jurisdiction at any stage. As the Family Court lacks jurisdiction, the petitioner has prayed for a Writ of
Prohibition, prohibiting the Family Court from proceeding with the trial in O.P.No.56 of 2004.
9. Per contra, Mr.K.Kannan, learned counsel for the second respondent has submitted that the marriage
was solemnized according to Hindu Marriage Act and therefore the provisions of the Act are applicable
to the parties to the marriage. He further submitted that the petitioner had himself submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Family Court and agreed for the trial "in Camera" in a collateral proceedings in
C.R.P.(PD)No.1695 of 2004 and therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to raise the plea of jurisdiction
in this Writ Petition. According to him, both the parties to the marriage were originally domiciled in the
territory to which the Act extends and therefore, the Matrimonial Original Petition is maintainable.
531
MISCELLANEOUS judgments
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
10. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is relevant to extract few judgments of the Supreme Court,
as to when a Writ of Prohibition could be issued by High Courts. A writ of prohibition is issued only
when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under Article 226 is not
bound by the technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus in United Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms apply to the writ must be kept in view,
as observed by the Supreme Court of India in T.C .Basappa v. Nagappa reported in AIR 1954 SC 440 =
(1954) 67 L.W.613.
11. In S .Govindan Menon vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1967 SC 1274, the Supreme Court held that
the jurisdiction for grant of Writ of Prohibition is primarily supervisory and object of the Writ is to
restrain courts or inferior Tribunals from exercising jurisdiction which they do not possess at all or else
to prevent them from exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the objects is to confine
court or tribunals of inferior or limited jurisdiction within their bounds. The writ of prohibition lies not
only for excess of jurisdiction or for absence of jurisdiction but also in a case of departure from the rules
of natural justice. But the writ does not lie to correct the course, practice or procedure of an inferior
tribunal or a wrong decision on the merits of the proceedings. The writ cannot be issued to a court or an
inferior tribunal for an error of law unless the error makes it go out side its jurisdiction. A clear distinction
has therefore, to be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the manner in which it go out side its
jurisdiction. A clear distinction has therefore, to be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the
manner in which it is exercised. If there is want of jurisdiction than the matter is coarum non judice and a
writ of prohibition will lie to the Court or inferior tribunal forbidding it to continue proceedings therein
in excess of jurisdiction. This view was taken following the decision of Regina Versus Controller General
of Patents and Designs reported in (1953) 2 WLR 760.
12. In Thirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam and another versus Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu and another
(2003) 8 SCC 134=2003-4-L.W.652 at paragraph 14 the Honourable Supreme Court of India held as
follows:
“14. On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Court have power to
issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior
court or tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation
of the rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional,
or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern the exercise
of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare
cases. Judicial discipline of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be
remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate jurisdiction.
13. In the light of judicial pronouncements of the law of the land, on the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
to issue prohibitory Writs, the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act, Foreign
Marriage Act are required to be extracted for examination, whether the Family Court, Chennai lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the matrimonial Original Petition, to adjudicate the dispute, leading to the
prayer for divorce between the spouses, where one of the party is an American National and said to have
acquired domicile of that country, where the marriage between them is admittedly solemnised as per
Hindu Rites and Customs.
14. Sections 1 and 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with short title, extent and Application of the Act
and they are as follows:
"1. Short title and extent:- (1) This Act may be called the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
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R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir and applies also
to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said
territories.
2. Application of Act:- (1) This Act applies‑
(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a
Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a Follower of Brahmo, Prathana or Arya Samaj
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and to any other person domiciled
in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by
religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the
Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt
with herein if this Act had not been passed."
15. Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is extracted hereunder:
"19. Court is to which petition shall be presented:- Every petition under this Court shall be presented
to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original Civil jurisdiction:‑
(i) the marriage was solemnized, or
(ii) the respondent, at the time of presentation of the petition, resides, or
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the
respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has
not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who
would naturally have heard of him if he were alive."
16. Section 31 of the Special Marriage Act (43 of 1954) reads as follows: "31. Court to which petition should
be made:
(1) Every petition under Chapter V or Chapter VI shall be presented to the district Court within the
local limits of whose original civil jurisdiction‑
(i) the marriage was solemnized; or
(ii) the respondent, at the time of presentation of the petition, resides; or
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together; or
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the
respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has
not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years by those who would naturally
have heard of him if he were alive.
(2) `without prejudice to any jurisdiction exercisable by the Court under sub-section (1), the district
Court may, by virtue of this sub-section, entertain a petition by a wife domiciled in the territories to
which this Act extends for nullity of marriage or for divorce if she is resident in the said territories
and has been ordinarily resident therein for a period of three years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition and the husband is not resident in the said territories."
17. Section 4 of the Foreign Marriage Act (33 of 1969) contemplates conditions relating to solemnization of
Foreign Marriages and it reads as follows:
"A marriage between parties one of whom atleast is a citizen of India may be solemnized under this
Act by or before a Marriage Officer in a foreign country, if, at the time of the marriage, the following
conditions are fulfilled, namely:‑
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(a) neither party has a spouse living,
(b) neither party is an idiot or a lunatic,
(c) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and bride the age of eighteen years at
the time of marriage, and
(d) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship.
Provided that where the personal law or a custom governing at least one of the parties permits of a
marriage between them, such marriage maybe solemnized, notwithstanding that they are within the
degrees of prohibited relationship."
18. Sections 5 and 6 of the Foreign Marriage Act read as follows:
"5. Notice of intended marriage:- When a marriage is intended to be solemnized under this Act,
the parties to the marriage shall give notic thereof in writing in the form specified in the First
Schedule to the Marriage Officer of the District in which atleast one of the parties to the marriage
has resided for a period of not less than thirty days immediately preceding the date on which such
notice is given, and the notice shall state that the party has no resided.
6. Marriage Notice Book:- The Marriage Officer shall keep all notices given under section 5 with
the records of his office and shall also forthwith enter a true copy of every such notice in a book
prescribed for that purpose, to be called the "Magistrate Notice Book", and such book shall be
open for inspection to all reasonable times, without fee, by any person desirous of inspecting the
same."
19. Section 17 of the Foreign Marriage Act deals with registration of foreign marriages and it reads as follows:
"17. Registration of foreign marriages:- (1) Where‑
(a) a Marriage Officer is satisfied that a marriage has been duly solemnized in a foreign country
in accordance with the law of that country between the parties of whom one at least was a
citizen of India; and
(b) a party to the marriage informs the Marriage Officer in writing that he or she desires the
marriage to be registered under this Section, the Marriage Officer may, upon payment of the
prescribed fee, register the marriage.
(2) No marriage shall be registered under this section unless at the time of registration it satisfies the
conditions mentioned in section 4.
(3) The Marriage Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to register a marriage
under this section on the ground that his opinion the marriage is inconsistent with inter-national
law or the comity of nations.
(4) There a Marriage Officer refuses to register a marriage under this Section the party applying for
registration may appeal to the Central Government in the prescribed manner within a period of
thirty days from the date of such refusal; and the Marriage Officer shall act in conformity with the
decision of the Central Government on such appeal.
(5) Registration of a marriage under this section shall be effected by the Marriage Officer by entering
a certificate of the marriage in the prescribed form and in the prescribed manner in the Marriage
Certificate Book, and such certificate shall be signed by the parties to the marriage and by three
witnesses
(6) A marriage registered under this Section shall, as from the date of registration, be deemed to have
been solemnized under this Act."
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R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
20. Section 18 of the Foreign Marriage Act (33 of 1969) reads as follows:
"18. Matrimonial reliefs to be under Special Marriage Act, 1954 – (1) Subject to the other provisions
contained in this Section, the provisions of Chapters IV, V, VI and VII of the Special Marriage Act,
1954, shall apply in relation to marriages solemnized under this Act and to any other marriage
solemnized in a foreign country between parties of whom one atleast is a citizen of India as they
apply in relation to marriages solemnized under that Act.
Explanation:- In its application to the marriages referred to in this sub-section, Section 24 of the Special
Marriage Act, 1954, shall be subject to the following modifications, namely:‑
(i) the reference in sub-Section (1) thereof to clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 4 of that Act shall
be construed as a reference to clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively of Section 4 of this Act, and
(ii) nothing contained in Section 24 aforesaid shall apply to any marriage:‑
(a) which is not solemnized under this Act; or
(b) which is deemed to be solemnized under this Act by reason of the provisions contained in
Section 17:
Provided that the registration of any such marriage as is referred to in sub-Clause (b) may be declared to
be of no effect if the registration was in contravention of sub-section (2) of Section 17."
21. As domicile and nationality of the petitioner being the core objection of the petitioner to contend that the
Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Hindu Marriage Act, let me reproduce
the definition of the word `domicile' as extracted in Union of India and others versus Dudhnath Prasad
reported in (2000) 2 SCC 20 and how the word should be interpreted in a given case.
"20. In Tomlin's Law Dictionary, "domicile" has been defined as "the place where a man has his home".
21. In Whicker v. Hume [(1858) 28 LJ Ch. 396], it was held that a person's domicile means, a generally
speaking, the place where he has his permanent home.
22. In Mc.Muller v. Wadsworth [(1889) 14 AC 631], it was observed that "the Roman law still holds
that `it is not by naked assertion but by deeds and acts that a domicile is established–.
23. Lord Macnaghtenin in Winams v. A.G. [1904 AC 287] observed that:
"Domicile of origin, or, as it is sometimes called, perhaps less accurately, domicile of birth, differs
from domicile or choice mainly in this---that its character is more enduring, its hold stronger and
less easily shaken off."
24. In Ross v. Ross [1930 AC 1], Lord Buck-master while dealing with a case relating to change of
domicile observed that:
"Declarations of intention are rightly regarded as determining the question of a change of domicile,
but they must be examined by considering the person to whom, the purposes for which, and the
circumstances in which they are made and they must further be fortified and carried into effect by
conduct and action consistent with the declared expression.
26. Etymologically, "residence" and "domicile" carry the same meaning, inasmuch as both refer to the
"permanent home", but under private international law, "domicile" carries a little different sense
and exhibits many facts. In spite of having a permanent home, a person may have a commercial,
a political or forensic domicile. "Domicile" may also take many colors; it may be the domicile of
origin, domicile of choice, domicile by operation of law or domicile of dependence. In private
international law, "domicile" jurisprudentially has a different concept altogether. It plays an
important role in the conflict of laws. The subject has been elaborately considered by Dicey in his
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MISCELLANEOUS judgments
book Conflict of Laws (6th Edn.) as aldo in another book by Phillimore on domicile. An equally
valuable discussion is to be found in Private international Jurisprudence by Foote and by Westlake
on private international law.
28. In view of the above, the concept of “domicile” as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants
with reference to change of nationality or change of domicile from one country to another, cannot
be imported in the present case. Moreover, “domicile” and “residence” are relative concepts and
have to be understood in the context in which they are used, having regard to the nature and
purpose of the statue in which these words are used”.
22. Y. Narasimha Rao and others versus Y. Venkatalakshmi and another reported in (1991) SCC 451=1991-
2-L.W.646, at paragraph 20 and 21, the Supreme Court held that,
“20. From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced for recognizing a foreign
matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well
as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law
under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows:(i) where the
matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and
permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under
which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits
to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contents the claim which is based on
a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where
the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in
accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.
21. The aforesaid rule with its stated exceptions has the merit of being just and equitable. It does
no injustice to any of the parties. The parties do and ought to know their rights and obligations
when they marry under a particular law. They cannot be heard to make a grievance about it later
or allowed to by pass it by subterfuges as in the present case. The rule also has an advantage of
rescuing the institution of marriage from the uncertain maze of the rule of the Private international
Law of the different countries with regards to jurisdiction and merits based variously on domicile,
nationality, residence- permanent or temporary or ad hoc, forum, proper law etc, and ensuring
certainty in the most vital field of national life and conformity with the public policy. The rule
further takes account of the needs of modern life and makes due allowance to accommodate them.
Above all, it gives protection to women, the most vulnerable section of our society, whatever the
strata to which they may belong. In particular it frees them from the bondage of the tyrannical and
service rule that wife’s domicile follows that of her husband and that it is the husband’s domiciliary
law which determines the jurisdiction and judges the merits of the case”.
23. In Stanely v. Bernes [162E.R.1190],while dealing with the case relating to domicile of origin , the court
observed as follows:
"For certain purposes a man takes his character, prima facie, from the place where he is domiciled, and,
prima facie, he is domiciled where he is resident, and the force of residence, as evidence of domicil, is
increased by the length of time during which it has continued. All these principles are clear; but time
alone is not conclusive, for where is the line to be drawn? Will the residence of a month, or a year, or
five years, or fifty years be conclusive? As a criterion, therefore, to ascertain domicil, another principle
is laid down by the authorities quoted as well as by practice - it depends on the intention, on the quo
animo – that is the true basis and foundation of domicil; it must be a residence sine animo revertendi, in
order to change the domicilium originis: a temporary residence for the purposes of health, or travel or
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R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
business has not the effect: it must be a fixed and permanent residence, abandoning finally and for ever
the domicil of origin; yet liable still to a subsequent change of intention."
24. In Sondur Rajini v. Sondur Gopal reported in 2005 (4) Mah.LJ 688, the petition was filed by the wife,
seeking a decree for judicial separation for custody of minor child and for maintenance. The respondent-
husband after having tied the nuptial knot at Ban-galore was working in Sweden. The couple lived abroad,
purchased their own house in Stockholm and were blessed with a child. Thereafter, the respondent-
husband went to Australia, but on losing his job, came back to India with children. She filed petition
seeking for judicial separation. Objection was raised by the respondent- husband as to the maintain-
ability of the petition on the ground that both parties are citizens of Sweden and not domiciled in India.
A letter of the respondent was produced before the Court that he never had an intention to permanently
settle in Australia. There was also nothing on record to show that he had ever given up his domicile of
origin, i.e., India. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court, after analysising the law on domicile, held
that the Family Court in Mumbai has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for judicial separation. While
upholding the contentions of the wife, the Division Bench ob- served as follows:
"....the marriage was solemnised by Hindu Vedic Rites and registered under H.M. Act. It may be noticed
that none of the provisions of H M. Act lay down the time and condition under which it will cease to
apply. In other words, once the provisions of H.M. Act apply, it would continue to apply as long as the
marriage exists and even for dissolution of the marriage. The Hindu marriage gives rise to bundle of
rights and obligations between the parties to the marriage and their progeny. Therefore, the system of law
which should govern a marriage, should remain constant and cannot change with vagaries/whims of the
parties to the marriage. We may briefly glance at Cheshire and North Pvt.
International Law, wherein the learned Author at page 124 points out that "it has been universally
recognised that questions affecting the personal status of a human being should be governed constantly
by one and the same law, irrespective of where he may happen to be or of where the facts giving rise
to the question may have occurred". The time at which the domicile is to be determined is when the
proceedings under H.M. Act are commenced, is accepted then every petition filed by the wife whose
husband moves from one country to another for the purposes of job or for any purpose whatsoever,
he would be able to frustrate a petition brought by the wife by changing his domicile even between the
presentation I the petition and the hearing of the case. The rule is "once competent, always competent"
and this will be so even if the party domiciled in India at the time of their marriage has since changed
his domicile, disassociated himself from the determination of his status by the Court in India. The
proposition of law canvassed, that the time at which the domicile is to be determined is when the
proceedings are commenced, therefore, cannot be accepted, insofar as the petitions under H.M. Act is
concerned, inasmuch as it would be against the public policy in this country and which may create a
serious social problem. The Hindu society is deeply interested in maintaining integrity of the institution
of the marriage. Once the parties have selected H.M. Act as their personal law, they cannot abdicate the
same at their free will or as per exigencies of situation or according to their whims and fancies. There-
fore, we are of the considered opinion that the time at which the domicile is to be determined is when the
parties tie nuptial knot under the Hindu Marriage Act and not the date when an application is made for
matrimonial reliefs. As a natural corollary thereof, even if a party to the matrimonial petition establishes
that after marriage he acquired domicile of some other country, it would not take away the jurisdiction of
the Court in India if on the date of the marriage he was domiciled in India. It is unjust that a party to the
marriage can change his entire system of personal law by his or her unilateral decision. If that is allowed it
would make the position of a wife very miserable or helpless. We have therefore, no hesitation in holding
that the provisions of H.M. Act will continue to apply to the marriage of parties who were admittedly
domiciled in India on the date of their marriage and they cannot be heard to make a grievance about it
later or allowed to by-pass it by subterfuges. The rule, as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Y.
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MISCELLANEOUS judgments
Narsimha Rao also has an advantage of rescuing the institution of marriage from uncertain maze of the
rules of the Private International Law of the different countries with regard to jurisdiction.
25. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Navin Chander Advani v. Leena reported in AIR 2005
Bombay 277, considered a case, in which, both parties are Hindus, domiciled in India before marriage,
soleminised their marriage in United States of America, according to Hindu Vedic Rites. The Husband
invoked the jurisdiction of the Family Court and the petitioner was rejected on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the same, he moved the High Court and pleaded that he was domiciled in the
State of Maharashtra and the marriage was solemnised, according to Hindu Vedic Rites and registered
before the Registrar of San-Jose California State. The appellant submitted that he was a permanent
resident of Bombay and professing Hindu Religion. While setting aside the order of the Family Court,
the Division Bench held as follows:
"Thus, from reading these averments it appears that the husband and wife both are Indian citizens,
domiciled in India. However, they have performed their marriage according to Hindu rites on 19th
July, 1998 in U.S.A. Let the fact as it is what we find that since the parties are Indian citizens and
domiciled in India, the Courts in India will have jurisdiction. The Family Court has jurisdiction to deal
with the matters under the Special Marriage Act and equally under the Hindu Marriage Act. It has
even jurisdiction to deal with matrimonial matters where the parties are Muslims. Except, the Parsi
Marriage Act for all other marriage the Family Court is having jurisdiction. While deciding the matter
the Family Court is only expected to look into personal law of the parties. Looking from this angle with
reference to Section 31, sub-section (1), Clause (4) of Special Marriage Act and Section 19, sub- section
(1) Clause (4) of the Hindu Marriage Act are at verbatim. Under Section 31(1) it provides that every
petition under Chapter V or Chapter VI shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits
of whose original civil jurisdiction - (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the
petition, in a case where the respondent is at that time residing outside the territories to which this Act
extends ……………………." and under Section 19 it provides "Every petition under this Act shall be
presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction- (iv)
the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent
is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends……… " there by the situation
has been contemplated that the appellant is residing within the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court
and other side namely the respondent is residing outside the territories to which this Act extends. This
aspect has not been considered b) the Family Court, therefore, keeping this it view what we find is that
it was obligatory for the Family Court to find out as to whether the marriage petition is to be considered
under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Ad It was equally necessary for the Family Court to
look into the provisions pertaining to the jurisdiction which we have quoted from both the enactments.
The Family Court has not looker into these provisions and in casual marine stated that the marriage is
performed outside India. The parties are residing in USA and has returned marriage petition. In fact
on proper application of law even it was obligatory for the Family Court to consider conversion of the
petition, if the request for amendment, is made to that effect by the applicant. In short, what we find is
that the marriage petition has been re-turned in very casual manner without looking.
26. In Vinaya Nair v. Corporation of Kochi reported in AIR 2006 Kerala 275, a Division Bench of Kerala High
Court considered a case of refusal to register a marriage on the ground that husband was a Canadian
domicile. The first petitioner therein was a Hindu by birth, professing Hindu Religion, married the
second petitioner, a Hindu by religion, as per Hindu Rites and complied with all the conditions for valid
Hindu marriage. It was held that the Act does not give much emphasis to the word "domicile" except in
Section 1(2) of the Act. In the reported case, the first petitioner husband was an employee of Canada and
the second petitioner was his wife. The first petitioner was born in Canada while parents were at Canada
and he acquired Canadian citizenship by birth and therefore he has a Canadian domicile by birth. While
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R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
directing the municipal authorities to register the marriage, the Division Bench, at Paragraph 6, held as
follows:
“Though S.1(2) states that the Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir
and also to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends, the word "domicile" does
not figure in sub-clause (a) and (b) of S.2(1). Sub-Clause (a) of S.2(1) states that the Hindu Marriage
Act applies to any persons who is Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a
Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Sama. Sub-clause (b) of S.2(1)
states that the Act applies to any person who is Buddhist, Jaina or sikh by religion meaning thereby cls.
(a) and (b) require the form of Hindu to make Act applicable. Sub-clause (c) states that the Act applies to
any other person domiciled in the territories to which the Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian,
Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the
Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of the law. A conjoint reading of Ss.1 and 2 of the Act would
indicate that so far as the second limp of S.1(2) of the Act is concerned its intra territorial operation of the
Act which applies those who reside out-side the territories. First limp of Sub-Section 2 of S. 1 and Cls.(a)
and (UJ of S.2 (1) would make it clear that the Act would apply to Hindus reside in India whether they
reside outside the Territories or not. The word "Hindu" as such is not defined in the Act. All the same,
Sub-Section (3) of S.2 says that the Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a
Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained
in the Section. Section 5 as we have already indicated deals with the conditions for a Hindu Marriage. It is
not the conditions in Section 5 that the Hindu who is solemnizing the Marriage under Hindu Marriage
Act should have domiciled in India. We may in this connection referred to the applicability of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. Section 1(2) of the Act states that it extends to the whole of India except the State
of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 2(1) deals with the applicability of the provisions of the Act and also
the jurisdiction of the Court. There is no second part to sub-Section (2) providing for extra territorial
operation. Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act also does not contain any reference to domicile. When
we compare the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it is clear that
the concept of domicile has been brought only in the second limb of sub-section (2) of S.1 of the Hindu
Marriage Act read with S.5(1) of the Act. So far as the present case is concerned, clause applicable is the
first limb of sub-section (2) of S.1 read with Cl.(a) of sub-section(2) of S.2 of the Act. Test to be applied
is whether both the parties are Hindus by religion in any of its forms and whether they have satisfied the
condition laid down in S.5 of the Hindu Marriage Act and whether they have followed the ceremonies of
Hindu Marriage Act as provided in S.7 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The concept of domicile as we have
already indicated would apply only in a case where the second limb of S.1(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act
read with sub-Clause (a) of S.2(1) is attracted. We are of the view that the petitioners have satisfied the
conditions laid down in S.5 of the Act and also the first limp of sub-section (2) of S. 1 read with Cls.(a)
and (b) of S.2(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955."
A few judgments on the aspect of relevance of nationality to domicile is also necessary for adjudicating
the dispute in this case.
27. In D. P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another reported in AIR 1985 SC 334, the Apex Court
observed that citizen-ship and domicile represent two different conceptions. Citizenship has reference to
political status of person and domicile to his civil rights. Domicile has reference to the system of law by
which a person is governed and when we speak of domicile of a country, we assume that the same system
of law prevail all over the country.
28. In Michael Antony Rodrigues v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1956 Bombay 729, the Court observed
that under Article 5 of the Constitution of India nationality and domicile are two different concepts.
In Private International Law, a man may have one nationality and different domicile. He may have a
national to one country and he may have a domicile in another country.
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MISCELLANEOUS judgments
29. At Cheshire and North's Private International Law, it was observed that,
“Nationality is a possible alternative to domicil as the criterion of the personal law. These are two different
conceptions. Nationality rep resents a person's political status, by virtue of which he owes allegiance to
some particular country; domicil indicates his civil status and it provides the law by which his personal
rights and obligations are determined. Nationality, depends, apart from naturalisation, on the place of
birth or on parentage, domicil, as we have seen, is constituted by residence in a par- ticular country with
the intention of residing there permanently. It follows that a person may be a national of one country but
domiciled in another."
30. It is therefore, clear that in both the Indian and International Law the concept of Nationality and domicile
are recognised as two different conceptions, which necessarily mean, an Indian by retaining his domicile
in India may acquire citizenship of other country. In other words, merely because a person has acquired
citizenship of some other country that does not necessarily mean that he has abandoned domicile of
origin.
31. In Udny v. Udny reported in 1989 LR 1 SC Div, it was held that a person may have domicile at one point
of time. If a person takes up foreign domicil, his origin or native domicil simply remains in abeyance.
As soon as he abandons foreign domicil, the original domicil is automatically received. If the domicil of
origin is displaced as a result of acquisition of a domicil of his/her choice, the domicil is merely placed in
abeyance for time being.
32. In the present case, the uncontroverted fact is that the marriage between the parties was solemnized as
per Hindu Rites and Customs and both the parties are Hindus. Though the respondent has disputed the
registration of marriage before the Marriage Officer in U.S.A., the form of marriage is admitted. Judicial
pronouncements of the Courts makes it clear that in a case determining the domicile of a person, it
should be examined and understood in the context to which the word “domicil” is used having regard to
the nature and purpose of the statute. As observed in Stanley v. Berries [162 All. ER 1190], it depends on
the intention "on the quo animo", the true basis and foundation of domicil, whether he has abandoned
finally and for ever the domicil of origin. As held in Ross v. Ross (cited supra), the declaration of intention,
conduct and actions of a person, alleging change of domicile is relevant to conclude as to whether he *has
completely abandoned the domicile of his origin and accepted and conducted in a manner, adopting the
domicile of his choice. While doing so it should be kept in mind that Citizenship and Nationality has
reference only to political status and allegiance to a country and domicil has reference to the system of law
which a person is governed and it indicates civil status, personal rights and obligations flowing from the
laws to which he/she acquiesces himself/herself to its jurisdiction. It should be borne in mind that Hindu
Marriage Act has extra territorial jurisdiction to all Hindus, even if they reside outside the territories of
India. The Hindu Marriage Act, hi particular Section 2, does not stipulate any condition that both the
parties should be domiciled in India at the time of presentation of the petition before the Family Court
or any other Court of competent jurisdiction. Even as per the averments of the petitioner, the members
of the family were known to each other before the marriage and they were neighbours residing next door.
Admittedly, the petitioner, domiciled in India before setting up his residence in U.S.A. Therefore, his
domicile of origin is within the jurisdiction of Family Court, Chennai.
33. As stated supra, Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not stipulate any stringent condition that both
parties should be residing within or domiciled in the jurisdiction of India for maintaining a petition
under the Hindu Marriage Act. In fact, it covers all Hindus, who are residing outside the territory to
which this Act extends also. Clause 4 of Sub-Section 1 of Section 31 of the Special Marriages Act, and
Clause 4 of Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act are pari-materia pro-visions. As per Clause 4 of Section
19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the petition, under this Act shall be presented to the District Court, within
the local limits of whose ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction, where the peti- tioner is residing at the
time of presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at the time, residing outside the
540
R. Sridharan Versus The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai
territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or
more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him of he were alive.
34. The above said provision enables presentation of the petition before the District Court of competent
jurisdiction or Family Court even if the respondent is residing outside the territories to which the
Hindu Marriage Act extends. Admittedly, the petitioner is domiciled in India by birth and origin and
acquisition of domicile of another country by choice or nationality, cannot be imported into Section 2
of the Hindu Marriage Act and it will not oust the jurisdiction of the Family Court/District Court of
competent jurisdiction to entertain a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriages Act, as
the case may be.
35. Except in Section 1 and 2, the Word `Domicile' does not figure in any of the provisions of the Hindu
Marriage Act. A conjoint reading of Sub-Clause (a) and (b) of Section 2(1) and sub-Clause 2(a) of Section
1, would mean that the Hindu Marriage Act applies to any person, who is Hindu by religion in any of
its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or
Arya Samaj.
36. The Act only stipulates certain conditions for the valid Hindu Marriage and one of the conditions being
that both the parties should be Hindus. It is well settled rule of construction that if there are two or more
provisions in a statute, appear to be in conflict with each other, the provisions have to be in- terpreted in
a manner to give effect to the pro-visions and that any construction which renders the operation of one
provision as ineffective, should not be adopted, except as a last resort. Therefore, on a conjoint reading
of above three provisions, viz., (1) Section 1 (2), Section 2 and (3) Section 19 of the Hindu Marriages Act
and applying the rule of Harmonious construction, this Court is of the considered view that the Family
Court at Chennai, has jurisdiction to maintain the Original Petition filed by one of the parties to the
Hindu Marriage Act, against the other. In a given case, where marriage is solemnised between Hindus
and the wife stranded in a foreign country without financial or parental assistance, returns to India under
fear of living in foreign country without any assistance, for such women, the Court should not remain
as a mute spectator and dismiss the complaint/petition on the ground that the husband has acquired
domicile in foreign country of his choice and therefore, no proceedings can be initiated against him
under the Hindu Marriage Act for appropriate relief, which could be for judicial separation or divorce or
for even alimony.
37. In the instant case, the petitioner is domicil of India by origin. The marriage was solemnized as per
Hindu Vedic Rights and Customs and therefore, there is no doubt to this Court that the intention of the
parties was to be governed by the personal law, viz., Hindu Marriage Act. Having chosen to accept the
said Act as their personal law, one cannot abdicate the same on his free will and fancies and deny the
other contracting party, the rights and obligations flowing from the statute. As observed by the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sondur Rajini's case, it is unjust that a party to a marriage can
change his entire system of personal law by his or unilateral decision and if that is allowed, it would make
the position of the wife miserable". Again, as observed by the Supreme Court in Narasimha Rao's case,
the parties contracting the marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, knows their right and obligations
when they solemnized their marriage and one of them cannot be allowed to bye-pass it by subterfuge. If
that is to be allowed by the Courts, it would create chaos in applicability of the laws. The contention of
the petitioner that he was an American National and therefore, the Hindu Marriage Act is not applicable,
is not tenable, in view of the difference in the concepts that, Nationality represents the man's political
status, by virtue of which, he owes allegiance to the country, whereas, Domicile indicates his civil status
and it provides the law by which his personal rights and obligations are determined. Personal Law to
which the party belongs, is not dependent on the nationality as both are conceptually different. Personal
law is closely associated with the domicil of origin, his personal status and relationship, such as, marriage,
divorce, legitimacy, succession, etc., which cannot be changed overnight by acquiring the domicile of his
choice, unless the said person who claims change, places strong and acceptable legal evidence.
541
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High Court Judgments Book in 4th Regional Conference
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