A. RECRUITMENT 1. Child Mujahideen - trackingterrorism.org

A. RECRUITMENT

1. Child Mujahideen

True to its name, al-Shabaab’s main target population is the Somali youth, forcing
children as young as 10 years old to join and wage militant jihad.1 A report last year from the UN
Secretary General suggests that recruitment of child soldiers by al-Shabaab dramatically
increased as of April 2010 and estimated that approximately 2,000 children were abducted for
jihadist training that year.2 Al-Shabaab’s success in attracting Somali youth is probably due to
the fact that the younger generation is relatively more adventurous and exuberant about jihadist
operations, and less emotionally and financially attached to the clans than their elders who have
much more to lose by leaving their well-respected and powerful positions.3

Several personal accounts from former child recruits and family members detail the
horror in which al-Shabaab soldiers storm into local schools and mosques, kidnap young boys
and girls and force them to serve on the front lines of battle, often threatening them with
punishment and death for refusing and use the children as human shields when firing upon the
TFG and AMISOM.4 This controversial practice of using human shields and indiscriminant
killing of Muslims is known in Islam as at-Tatarrus and was strongly defended by Abu Yahya
al-Libi aka Mohamed Hassan Qaid, al-Qaeda’s number two man and leading theologian who was
killed in a U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan, Pakistan this June.5 Al-Libi wrote a lengthy
piece in 2008 arguing, through extensive references of the Qur’an and ahadith, and dismissal of
nearly 14 centuries of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), that in the course of jihad the ends justify the
means. Essentially, al-Libi argued that fellow Muslims killed by al-Qaeda are ash-Shuhada’
(martyrs) and subsequently receive their just rewards in Paradise for dying in the way of Allah,
further underscoring one of the core tenets of al-Qaeda’s as well as al-Shabaab’s extremist
ideology that nobody is innocent.6

1 “Somalia: Warring Parties Put Children at Grave Risk: Al-Shabaab Rebels Impose Forced Marriages, use Students
as ‘Human Shields,’” Human Rights Watch, 21 February 2012. Available online at:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/21/somalia-warring-parties-put-children-grave-risk. (Accessed 13 May 2012).
2 See pp. 30-33 in UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and
armed conflict, A/65/820-s-2011-250, 23 April 2011. Available online at:
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/S2011250.pdf. (Accessed 13 May 2012).

3 See p. 23 in Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro, and Vahid Brown, “Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa.”
4 “No Place For Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia,” Human Rights
Watch, February 2012. Available online at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0212ForUpload.pdf. (Accessed 13 May 2012).

5 Jason Burke, “Abu Yahya al-Libi obituary,” The Guardian, 6 June 2012. Available online at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/06/abu-yahya-al-libi. (Accessed 20 June 2012).
6 Abu Yahta al-Libi, At-Tatarrus fi al-Jihad al-Mu’aasir (Human Shields in Modern Jihad), 2008. Available online
at: http://ia700304.us.archive.org/30/items/tatross/tatross.pdf. (Accessed 20 June 2012). Also, see Jarret Brachman
and Abdullah Warius, “Abu Yahya al-Libi’s ‘Human Shields in Modern Jihad,’” CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 6,
May 2008, pp. 1-3. Available online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CTCSentinel-
Vol1Iss6.pdf. (Accessed 20 June 2012).

Al-Shabaab forces girls to marry the jihadists, sometimes raping them, as well as coerces
them into fulfilling “domestic” roles such as cooking and tending to the wounded.7 Al-Shabaab
also trains females for martyrdom operations,8 such as the suicide bombing carried out by a
teenage girl at the reopened Somali national theater in April of this year killing 10 people.9 Al-
Shabaab exploits the destitute situation of Somalis by offering economic incentives such as a
mobile phones and roughly $30 a month salary for recruits.10 The al-Shabaab controlled Andulus
radio station based near Mogadishu held their annual Qur’an recitation contest during the month
of Ramadan for children ages 10-17, awarding weapons like an AK-47 or RPG, some with a cash
value of up to $700, as prizes for first, second, and third place winners.11 Al-Shabaab also
recruits disabled and mentally challenged Somalis as fighters and spies.12

The Somali children are considered easy prey, pressured by their peers and influenced
heavily through the Islamist teachings at the dugsi and madrassa or local religious school.13 The
curriculum controlled by al-Shabaab is solely based on Wahhabist and Salafi-jihadist
interpretations of the Qur’an and Ahadith, which includes Quranic recitations, discussions about
jihad fi sabil Allah (waging militant jihad in the name of Allah), the rewards of paradise,
idolizing martyrs who carried out suicide bombings, and implanting a burning hatred for infidels
and Western-secular practices. This ideological indoctrination goes hand in hand with al-
Shabaab’s immediate goal of purifying the land by expelling all un-Islamic, foreign, secular and
Western influence, and thereafter Islamizing the educational system of the local schools and
mosques by replacing the teachers and imams (mosque leader). Consequently, al-Shabaab
effectively turns the entire town into a training camp.14

In addition to the mosques and schools, indoctrination is conducted at several various
training camps in Somalia such as the Girileey camp in the Gedo region,15 El Adde camp 16 and

7 “No Place For Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia,” Human Rights
Watch.
8 Abdi Abtidoon, “60 Women Complete Al-Shabaab Training: Women Trained in Suicide Attacks and
Assassinations to be Deployed to Mogadishu,” Somalia Report, 8 December 2011. Available online at:
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2250. (Accessed 13 May 2012).
9 Mike Pflanz and Abukar Albadri, “Teenage girl suicide bomber blows up Somalia theatre,” The Telegraph, 4 April
2012. Available online at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9185534/Teenage-girl-suicide-bomber-
blows-up-Somalia-theatre.html. (Accessed 13 May 2012).

10 Ibid.
11 “Al-Shabab radio gives weapons prize to Somali children” BBC News.
12 Ahmed Mohamed, “Al-Shabaab Recruiting Disabled Somalis: Physical and Mentally Challenged Citizens Used as
Fighters, Spies,” Somalia Report, 19 April 2012. Available online at:
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3243. (Accessed 12 May 2012).
13 Abdi Latif Dahir and Suleiman Abdullahi, “How Al-Shabaab captures hearts of Somali youths,” Daily Nation, 24
February 2012. Available online at: http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Diary+of+a+would+be+suicide+bomber/-
/1056/1334538/-/11dx9hy/-/index.html?goback=%2Egde_167748_member_97404336. (Accessed 5 March 2012).
14 MJD, “Al-Shabaab’s Child Soldiers: Brainwashing, Bribers, Kidnapping Part of Shabaab’s ‘Recruitment’
Process,” Somalia Report, 7 May 2012. Available online at: http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3324.
(Accessed 13 May 2012).

15 MJD, “Al-Shabaab’s Child Soldiers: Brainwashing, Bribers, Kidnapping Part of Shabaab’s ‘Recruitment’
Process.”

Labaatan Jirow camp in the Bay region,17 and a former police station turned training camp called
Fish Trafico near Mogadishu,18 where recruits undergo a regimented physical and psychological
program. Recruits spend the first few months essentially being beaten down, a period dubbed in
Somali as madax jabis (breaking the head), until they are obedient and submissive, become
ideologically indoctrinated, and then go on to learn basic weapons maintenance and bomb-
making skills.19 Following several month of initiation, the recruits undergo more specialized
training to become expert bomb makers, able to construct explosives from basic household
materials, or intelligence sleuths used to deceive and spy by posing as deaf mutes, shoe polishers,
and street beggars. 20 According to one former recruit, the daily training routine which can last
for several months “is meant to create diehard terrorists well-versed in making bombs and who
are brainwashed to believe in bizarre ideologies that aim to harm the ‘enemies of Islam.’”21 The
truly dedicated and most talented of the young recruits are called the Umniyat (wishes),
described by one former recruit as “the ones who finish off senior government officials or well
guarded elders,” such as the suicide bombing that killed the Somali Interior Minister Abdi
Shakur Sheikh Hassan in June 2010, which was carried out by his teenage niece who slipped past
security unchecked.22

2. Foreign Mujahideen and Somali Diaspora

Al-Shabaab’s recruitment network extends well beyond its own borders of Somalia, with
an estimated 2-3 million Somalis living in diaspora outside of the HOA.23 Al-Shabaab seeks to
attract, inspire, and radicalized foreign Muslim youth through a vigorous and well networked
online media campaign and effective dual marketing strategy that incorporates elements of
Somali nationalism and Islamist zeal. By simultaneously portraying itself as the champion of
Somali independence and jihadist vanguard of the one true Islam, al-Shabaab seeks to exploit the
nationalist and religious fervor of Somalis and Muslims worldwide.

Recruitment in both the physical and virtual worlds is conducted primarily in a
combination of English, native Somali and Arabic, the latter being the vehicle language of the
global Sunni jihadist movement. In addition, al-Shabaab media has used French,24 and only

16 “Somalia: Fighter Jets Strike Al-Shabaab Training Camps,” All Africa, 2 December 2011. Available online at:
http://allafrica.com/stories/201112021352.html. (Accessed 13 May 2012).
17 Abdi Abtidoon, “60 Women Complete Al-Shabaab Training: Women Trained in Suicide Attacks and
Assassinations to be Deployed to Mogadishu.”
18 See p. 18 in Anonymous, “Somalia’s al-Shabab Reconstitutes Fighting Force,” CTC Sentinel, 15 February 2008,
pp. 17-19. Available online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/somalia%E2%80%99s-al-shabab-reconstitutes-
fighting-force. (Accessed 7 March 2012).

19 Abdi Latif Dahir and Suleiman Abdullahi, “How Al-Shabaab captures hearts of Somali youths.”
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 “Statement of Philip Mudd, Associate Executivve Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,” 11 March 2009.
Available online: http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/111-1/2009-03-11-fbi-mudd-recruitment.pdf. (Accessed 2
April 2012).
24 “A Message To The People Of Burundi,” Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen, Al-Kataib Media, 3 March 2011 in
Aaron Y. Zelin, “New audio message from the Amīr of Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn Shaykh Mukhtār Abū
Zubayr: ‘A Message To The People Of Burundi,’” Jihadology.net, 3 March 2011. Available online at:

recently begun using Swahili, with the emergence of a local Kenyan al-Shabaab affiliate headed
by Ahmad Iman Ali and a new Swahili language jihadist magazine called Gaidi Mtaani (On
Terrorism Street),25 in order further extend the group’s regional and international reach. Al-
Shabaab propaganda includes but is not limited to calls to jihad, martyrdom videos, and training
camps, which are published by numerous media sources such as al-Shabaab’s Al-Kataib (the
Brigades) or al-Qaeda’s As-Sahab (the Cloud) and Al-Jabha Al-‘Ilamiya Al-Islamyia Al-‘alamiya
(Global Islamic Media Front) and thereafter reposted infinitely across cyberspace in the scores of
jihadist websites and Islamic forums such as Ansar Al-Mujahideen,26 Shumukh Al-Islam
Network,27 and Al-Qimmah Islamic Network28 as well as through social media like Twitter29 and
FaceBook.30 For instance, foreigners yearning to wage jihad in Somalia first need to secure a
safe and trusted route through the jihad pipeline, and the Islamic and Jihadist Forums online
provide solutions for such logistical problems.31

Al-Shabaab has made unprecedented inroads into recruitment and radicalization of
Westerners to the global Sunni jihadist movement. Canadian authorities estimate that 20-30
Somalis have left the country to join al-Shabaab, and Swedish authorities report similar figures,
and in the U.K. authorities report possibly over 100.32 On 1 January 2010, Danish authorities
arrested a Somali man named Mohammed Muhideen Gellea with alleged ties to al-Shabaab for
attempting to murder Kurt Westergaard, one of the cartoonists who drew a caricature of the
prophet Mohammed in the newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005.33 On 16 December 2011, three
Somali men with ties to al-Shabaab were convicted in Australia for conspiring to carry out a
terrorist attack against the Holsworthy army barracks in South-West Sydney.34

http://jihadology.net/2011/03/03/new-audio-message-from-the-amir-of-%E1%B8%A5arakat-al-shabab-al-
mujahidin-shaykh-mukhtar-abu-zubayr-a-message-to-the-people-of-burundi/. (Accessed 20 May 2012).
25 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Issue #1 of a new Swahili magazine: ‘Gaidi Mtaani,’” Jihadology.net, 5 April 2012. Available
online at: http://jihadology.net/2012/04/05/issue-1-of-a-new-swahili-magazine-gaidi-mtaani/. (Accessed 20 May
2012).

26 Ansar Al-Mujahideen Forum. Available online at: http://ansar1.info/. (Accessed 18 May 2012).
27 Shumukh Al-Islam Network. Available online at: http://www.shamikh1.info/vb/index.php. (Accessed 20 May
2012).
28 Al-Qimmah Islamic Network. Available online at: http://al-qimmah.net/. (Accessed 19 may 2012).
29Al-Shabaab Twitter account, HSM Press Office, @HSMPress. Available online at: http://twitter.com/#!/hsmpress.
(Accessed 18 May 2012).
30 J.M. Beger, “Oops, My Facebook Friend Just Joined AQ,” Intelwire.com, 9 February 2012. Available online at:
http://news.intelwire.com/2012/02/oops-my-facebook-friend-just-joined-al.html. (Accessed 5 March 2012).

31 See p. 36 in Evan F. Kohlmann, “Shabaab al-Mujahideen: Migration and Jihad in the Horn of Africa.”
32 See p. 225-227 in Lorenzo Vidino et. al., “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western
Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict,” African Security, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 216-238.
Available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2010.533071. (Accessed 7 March
2012).

33 See p. 226 in Ibid.
34 Andrew Zammit, “The Holsworthy Barracks Plot: A Case Study of an Al-Shabab Support Network in Australia,”
CTC Sentinel, Volume 5, Issue 6, June 2012, pp. 13-16. Available online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss67.pdf. (Accessed 24 June 2012). Also, see Leah Farrall, “What the
al Shabab-al Qaeda merger means for Australia,” The Conversation, 5 March 2012. Available online at:
http://theconversation.edu.au/what-the-al-shabab-al-qaeda-merger-means-for-australia-5665. (Accessed 5 March
2012).

U.S. authorities claim that between 2007 and 2008 approximately 20 Somalis left
Minnesota to join al-Shabaab. J.M. Berger, author and terrorism researcher, wrote in Foreign
Policy magazine that “the disturbing truth is that al-Shabab has had more success recruiting
Americans than any of al Qaeda’s other franchises.”35 According to an investigation led by U.S.
Representative Peter T. King, Republican Congressman from New York and Chairman of the
Committee on Homeland Security, al-Shabaab has successfully recruited at least 40 or more
Americans, primarily from Minnesota, including the first ever recorded American suicide
bomber carried out by Shirwa Ahmed on October 2008.36 Also, several Somali Americans have
been engaged in terrorist financing, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section,
such as the indictment of Ahmed Hussein Mahamud in June 2009 on four separate accounts of
providing terrorist support to al-Shabaab.37

Two of the most famous American recruits to join al-Shabaab are Daniel Joseph
Maldanado aka Daniel al-Jughaifi and Omar Shafik Hammami aka Abu Mansur al-Amriki.
Daniel Maldanado, a former resident of Houston, Texas, was studying in Egypt in 2005 and
regularly posted information online about the virtues of the ICU in Somalia, before finally
moving there to practice the “true Islam” and wage militant jihad. Maldanado was arrested in
2007 by Kenyan military officials and subsequently questioned by FBI agents, during which he
provided a detailed account of his experience with al-Shabaab including how he was recruited
and the combat training he received afterwards.38

By far, the most prominent and influential of any of al-Shabaab’s Western and foreign
mujahideen is Hammami.39 The Mobile, Alabama native born to a Syrian Sunni Muslim father
and Irish-American Roman Catholic mother joined al-Shabaab around November 2006 after
meeting Maldanado a year earlier in Egypt through an online internet forum, and the two later
decided to travel to Somalia seeking jihad.40 Despite his falling out with the al-Shabaab
leadership due to disagreements over ideology and shari’a law culminating in the surprising
YouTube video in which he claimed that his life is in danger, Hammami remains a member of al-

35 J.M. Berger, “Al Qaeda’s Merger: Al Qaeda has joined forces with its Somali cousin, the insurgent-terrorist group
al-Shabab.”
36 Peter T. King and Bennie G. Thompson, Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim
American Community and the Threat to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, 112th Congress, 27 July 2011. Available online at:
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Investigative%20report.pdf. (Accessed 5 March 2012).
37 United States of America v. Ahmed Hussein Mahamud, United States District Court, District of Minnesota, CR-
11-191 DWF/AJB, 9 June 2011. Available online at:
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mn/downloads/Mahamud%20indictment.pdf. (Accessed 16 May 2012).

38 United States of America v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado a/k/a Daniel Aljughaifi, United States District Court,
Southern District of Texas, Case Number H-07-125M, 13 February 2007. Available online at:
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/Maldonado_Complaint.pdf. (Accessed 18 May 2012).
39 Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” The New York Times, 27 January 2010. Available online at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html. (Accessed 20 May 2012).
40 See pp. 38-39 in Evan F. Kohlmann, “Shabaab al-Mujahideen: Migration and Jihad in the Horn of Africa,” The
NEFA Foundation, May 2009. Available online at:
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefashabaabreport0509.pdf. (Accessed 26 March
2012).

Shabaab albeit in a much more limited role as he is currently under house arrest in Kismayo,41
negating the initial reports that he was killed as a result of his outburst.42 With a commanding
fluency in Arabic and English as well as a strong proficiency in computers from his early
academic studies in computer science, Hammami rose quickly through the ranks of al-Shabaab
and has been an incredibly important asset for al-Shabaab’s media propaganda.43 From his first
media appearance with his face covered during an interview with Al-Jazeera in October 2007
under the jihadist moniker Abu Mansur al-Amriki, Hammami has since appeared unmasked in
numerous al-Shabaab publications including written statements, audio/video messages that range
from discussions of jihad, declarations of al-Shabaab’s goals such as establishing a universal
Islamic Caliphate, and pledges of allegiance to al-Qaeda to open threats against U.S. government
officials including President Barack Obama, American style rap songs resembling jihadist chants
(anashid) and demonstrations of jihadist training at various al-Shabaab camps.44 Most recently,
Hammami has published an autobiography titled “The Story of An American Jihaadi: Part One”
that gives readers a firsthand historical account of his progression from a disgruntled youth to his
social metamorphosis leading to the current jihadist that he is.45

3. Refugees and Potential Communities

Al-Shabaab exploits the humanitarian crisis in the HOA by recruiting from the vulnerable
communities and refugees. The HOA is currently experiencing one of the worst humanitarian
disasters ever, with approximately 13.3 million people needing assistance, as seen in Figure 6
below. In addition, the region is afflicted with widespread and severe malnutrition, starvation and
famine resulting from the worst drought in 60 years plus a constant threat of spillover from the
conflict in Somalia.46 By some estimates, the severity of the crisis results in one child perishing
every six minutes.47 To make matters worse, al-Shabaab consistently disrupts and restricts access
to humanitarian aid, having prohibited 16 aid agencies from entering large parts of Somalia
under its control48 until partially lifting the ban last July.49 Still, al-Shabaab continues to prevent

41 Robert Young Pelton, “Al-Amriki Proof of Life Continue: American Jihadi Keeping a Low Profile in Marka After
Embarrassing Video,” Somalia Report, 27 April 2012. Available online at:
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3256. (Accessed 10 May 2012).
42 Catherine Herridge, “US officials scrambling to confirm reports of American terror leader’s death in Somalia,”
Hiiraan Online, 16 April 2012. Available online at:
http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/apr/23663/us_officials_scrambling_to_confirm_reports_of_american_terror_le
ader_s_death_in_somalia.aspx. (Accessed 19 April 2012).
43 “Profile: Omar Hammami,” Anti-Defamation League, 27 March 2012. Available online at:
http://www.adl.org/NR/exeres/9375F0BB-5A4B-454D-868F-9547E5B7C5CD,DB7611A2-02CD-43AF-8147-
649E26813571,frameless.htm. (Accessed 20 May 2012).

44 Ibid.
45 Abu Mansur al-Amriki, “The Story of an American Jihaadi: Part One,” 16 May 2012 in Aaron Y. Zelin, “New
book from Omar Hammami [Abū Manṣūr al-Amrīkī]: “The Story of an American Jihādī, Part 1,” Jihadology.net, 16
May 2012. Available online at: http://jihadology.net/2012/05/16/new-book-from-omar-hammami-abu-
man%E1%B9%A3ur-al-amriki-the-story-of-an-american-jihadi-part-1/. (Accessed 20 May 2012).

46 See pp. 1-3 in Rhode Margesson et. al., “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International
Response,” Congressional Research Service, R42046, 6 January 2012. Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42046.pdf. (Accessed 15 March 2012).
47 See p 6 in Ibid.
48 See p. 3 in Ibid.

certain foreign aid groups from entering,50 citing their corruptive and subversive Western backed
political schemes.51

Figure 6. Snapshot of Humanitarian Crisis in HOA52
According to an analysis on Somalia Report, al-Shabaab’s exploitation of the
humanitarian crisis is a “win-win” situation, arguing that,
Should the agencies return, al-Shabaab can point to its magnanimous gesture, while
reaping the benefits of youths remaining in its areas, being able to requisition aid for its
fighters and potentially gaining much-needed funds through demanding agencies pay to
operate. If the humanitarian organizations do not step up projects and respond adequately
to the drought crisis, the militants will be able to tell the local communities that despite

49 “Somali armed group lifts aid ban amid dought: Al-Shabaab welcomes ‘Muslim and non-Muslim’ foreign aid
groups as region faces worst drought in 60 years,” Al-Jazeera, 6 July 2011. Available online at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/07/20117618146721399.html. (Accessed 15 May 2012).
50 “PRESS RELEASE: Save the Children Agreement Permanently Revoked,” HSM Press Office (@HSMPress),
TwitLonger, 13 March 2012. Available online at: http://www.twitlonger.com/show/gdg6bh. (Accessed 15 May
2012).
51 See p. 16 in Rhode Margesson et. al., “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International
Response.”
52 OCHA, Horn of Africa: Humanitarian Snapshot, 16 December 2011. Available online at:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_1462.pdf. (Accessed 16 May 2012).

positive commitments made by local al-Shabaab leaders, the foreign agencies decided not
to respond, essentially still making them look like the good guys.53

The failure of the TFG to provide the citizens of Somalia with basic services like access to food,
water, and medicine benefits al-Shabaab who seeks to prove to the Somali nation and wider
international audience that the organization is fully capable of governing without external
support.54 Al-Shabaab supplants this lack of government assistance and exclusion of foreign aid
through zakat55 and taxation, which the group utilizes in widely publicized projects run by the
“emergency relief committee” headed by Hussein Ali Fidow.56 In July 2009, al-Shabaab
established the Office of Supervising the Affairs of Foreign Agencies with the intent to continue
manipulating the humanitarian crises to its advantage.57

However, reports from Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ weekly publication, A
Week in the Horn of Africa, reveal that the humanitarian crisis has negatively impacted al-
Shabaab and stirred up internal conflict over the aid ban. In particular, Mukhtar Robow and
certain clan elders disagreed with al-Shabaab’s decision to restrict access to foreign aid being
delivered to areas under the group’s control, such as the Bay and Bakool regions as well as
certain areas of Mogadishu, claiming that the people hardest hit by the lack of such assistance is
primarily the Rahanweyn clan, which supplies a substantial number of men to fill al-Shabaab’s
ranks. In fact, the Ministry’s journal publication reported that a violent confrontation between
Godane and Robow over the aid ban was only avoided by an intervention from Hammami who
called for an urgent meeting to discuss the issue, which failed, and later insisted that the group
would need to wait for a decision from al-Qaeda.58

Kenya’s permanent refugee complex at Dabab, the largest on Earth, as well as the Dollo
Ado camp in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the al-Yasir camp in the lower Shebelle region
of Somalia act as readily available recruitment pools for al-Shabaab. Several Somali youths

53 “Suspicion Over Al-Shabaab Lifting of Aid Ban: Move Presents Win-Win Scenario for Insurgent Group,”
Somalia Report, 8 July 2011. Available online at: http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1111. (Accessed 15
May 2012).
54 “The Tenth Army Provides Aid to Tens of Thousands of Affected Children in the Al Yasir Refugee Camp,”
Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen, Press Office, 5 September 2011 in Aaron Y. Zelin, al-Katāi’b Media presents a
new statement from Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn: “The Tenth Army Provides Aid to Tens of Thousands of
Affected Children in the Al Yāsir Refugee Camp,” Jihadology.net, 6 September 2011. Available online at:
(Accessed 16 May 2012).

55 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam, similar to tithing in Christianity, whereby a financially capable Muslim
must donate approximately 2.5% of his/her income to the poor and benefit of the greater Muslim community.
56 “For Immediate Release: Drought Relief Team Extend Food Assistance to the Affected Regions,” Harakat Al-
Shabaab Al-Mujahideen, Press Office, Ansar Al-Mujahideen Forum, 19 August 2011 cited on p. 24 in Christopher
Anzalone, “Al-Shabab’s Setbacks in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4, Issue 10, October 2011, pp. 22-25. Available
online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss107.pdf. (Accessed 5 March
2012).

57 “Youth Mujahideen Movement: Press Release by the Office of Political Affairs and Regional Administrations of
Shabaab al-Mujahideen,” Ansar Al-Mujahideen Forum, 20 July 2009. Available online at:
http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?s=ca935c8e3eac3a68cc65bd1d20923960&t=9890. (Accessed 15 May
2012).
58 “Al-Shabaab leaders disagree over drought relief,” A Week in the Horn of Africa, 7 July 2011. Available online at:
http://www.mfa.gov.et/Press_Section/Week_Horn_Africa_July_22_2011.htm. (Accessed 15 May 2012).

living as refugees in Kenya were lured into a promise of a job and financial compensation by
imams in Nairobi who were receiving money from al-Shabaab, only to be deceived and find
themselves being transported back to Somalia to wage jihad for al-Shabaab.59 An even more
disturbing revelation for the Western backed TFG and allied regional nations are reports that al-
Shabaab has successfully infiltrated several intelligence and military services of neighboring
countries, such as Kenya and Eritrea.60

Similar promises of money and claims of justice and morality are given by Kenyan and
Somali government officials to the Somali youths, many of them as young as 12 years old and
primarily refugees, who are transported into sanctioned government training camps such as
Manyani in Southern Kenya in order to fight al-Shabaab.61 In the semiannual journal Refugee,
published by the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University in Toronto, Canada, author
Avery Burns reports that,

TFG General Yusuf Dhumal in a press conference in Mogadishu stated that Somalia and
Kenya have entered into an agreement to recruit soldiers from the [North Eastern
Province] of Kenya and that these recruits were being trained outside of Mombasa.
Despite that, he did not explain that this recruitment was targeting refugees, likely
because this would be tantamount to confessing to violating human rights.62

Not only is the Kenyan government’s recruitment of young Somalis an international human
rights violation, but arming and training them is in violation of the UN arms embargo, as well.63

59 Bosire Boniface, “Police investigate al-Shabaab recruitment in Kenya,” Sabahi Online, 1 March 2012. Available
online at: http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/03/01/feature-01. (Accessed 16 May
2012).
60 “East Africa: How Al Shabaab Recruitment Agents Lure Kenyans to Somalia,” All Africa, 4 June 2011. Available
online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201106040055.html. (Accessed 11 May 2012).
61 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somali refugees recruited to fight Islamist militia,” Washington Post, 6 April 2010.
Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/05/AR2010040504374.html.
(Accessed 16 May 2012).
62 Avery Burns, “Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al-Shabab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis,” Refuge, Vol. 27, No. 1,
2010, pp. 5-15. Available online at: http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/34356/31263.
(Accessed 7 March 2012).
63 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somali refugees recruited to fight Islamist militia.”