Succession_Outline_Notes_Cases2

Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that
of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. sometime in alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
September 1963. would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
I deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT Philippines.)
THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 2. Estate of Illegitimate decedent
II a. Legitimate children and descendant
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION. Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate
III child, when such child leaves neither legitimate descendants,
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half of
PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate
FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO or illegitimate children are left, the parents are not entitled to
INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION." any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or widower survives
with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to is one-fourth of the hereditary estate of the child, and that of the
be the exclusive properties of the private respondents. surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate. (n)
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty
taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and Art. 987. In default of the father and mother, the ascendants
her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca nearest in degree shall inherit.
Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the
land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging to the
declared the same in her own name. Because of this, same line they shall divide the inheritance per capita; should
plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously they be of different lines but of equal degree, one-half shall go
thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he to the paternal and the other half to the maternal ascendants. In
had some proprietary right over the same. each line the division shall be made per capita. (937)
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty
tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter SUBSECTION 3. - Illegitimate Children
when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their
residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes administered the property Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire
name. Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, estate of the deceased. (939a)
plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the
same allegedly represents the share of his father. Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should
survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead,
"Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by
son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters right of representation. (940a)
(Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that
since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding
his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their
survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of
succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)
representation.
Art. 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate
"Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the children shall divide the inheritance with them, taking one-half
proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely of the estate, whatever be the number of the ascendants or of
scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting the illegitimate children. (942-841a)
him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes.
However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
credence to his tale. from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
"This is because the name of the child described in the manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain
'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue, either
to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his legitimate or illegitimate, his father or mother shall succeed to
bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable his entire estate; and if the child's filiation is duly proved as to
evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in both parents, who are both living, they shall inherit from him
the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even share and share alike. (944)
without taking time and space to go into further details, We
may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation 101
which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is
claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question." 4

That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this
petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding
is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe Santillon vs. Miranda

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug,
shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse who shall be Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son Claro, and his wife,
entitled to the entire estate. Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several
parcels of land located in that province.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for
the estate, and the latter the other half. (945a) letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by
the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and
b. Illegitimate children and descendant Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties
enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b)
articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4
death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the
representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a) petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of
the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a) Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

B. Surviving Spouse On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs"
and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall properties as the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta,
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was
under article 1001. (946a) entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code, to another 1/2 of the
remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's
Art. 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court.
succession the same share as that of each of the children. Two questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's
(834a) Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is
appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of
Art. 997. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be
parents or ascendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate
one-half of the estate, and the legitimate parents or ascendants child?
to the other half. (836a)
The Second Issue:— Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's
Art. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate estate on Art. 892, of the New Civil Code which provides that:
children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their "If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-
(n) fourth of the hereditary estate. . . .'

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a "If a widow or widower and legitimate children or
legitimate child. (n) descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse, and children."
illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so inequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as
that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is
and the illegitimate children the other fourth. (841a) given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art.
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one- 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a
children to the other half. (953, 837a) legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural
word "children" includes the singular, "child".
Art. 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the surviving spouse
gave cause for the separation, he or she shall not have any of Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on
the rights granted in the preceding articles. (n) Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the
chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is
- jann - obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4
of his father's estate. Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the
surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in
testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with
respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get
when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of

102

Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging
to the same line they shall divide the inheritance per capita;
shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy should they be of different lines but of equal degree, one-
occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on half shall go to the paternal and the other half to the
intestate succession shall apply; i. e. Art. 996. maternal ascendants. In each line the division shall be
made per capita. (937)
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's
chapter in legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is 2. Illegitimate parents
Art. 996. Our colleague Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, professor of Civil
Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue, either
article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they legitimate or illegitimate, his father or mother shall succeed to
share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his his entire estate; and if the child's filiation is duly proved as to
commentaries writes as follows: both parents, who are both living, they shall inherit from him
share and share alike. (944)
"One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child
surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one- D. Collateral Line
half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes
to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
"children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
that the plural can be understood to include the singular is succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
applicable in his case." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the the following articles. (946a)
Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of
The theory of those holding otherwise, seems to be premised on the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (947)
these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "children," therefore it does
not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with
Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction nephews and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's
and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because whereas in brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per
testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), capita, and the latter per stirpes. (948)
she would get 1/2 in intestate. Children:— It is a maxim of statutory
construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive
could or should be read (and so applied): "if the widow or widower together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. (949)
share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to
this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children", the Art. 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half blood, some
consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not on the father's and some on the mother's side, are the only
include "child" survivors, all shall inherit in equal shares without distinction as
to the origin of the property. (950)
In fact, those who say, "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child"
seem to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules
widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only laid down for the brothers and sisters of the full blood. (915)
legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of
"children", not "child". So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child", the Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor
same meaning should be given to Art. 996. children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated is this:
In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
intestate, if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the blood. (954a)
widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line.
the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one- (955a)
half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each
of the spouses to decide (by testament) whether his or her only child E. The State
shall get more than his or her survivor.
Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in
C. Ascending Direct line accordance with the provisions of the preceding Sections, the
State shall inherit the whole estate. (956a)
1. Legitimate parents and ascendants
Art. 1012. In order that the State may take possession of the
Art. 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the property mentioned in the preceding article, the pertinent
deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to provisions of the Rules of Court must be observed. (958a)
the exclusion of collateral relatives. (935a)
Art. 1013. After the payment of debts and charges, the personal
Art. 986. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit in equal property shall be assigned to the municipality or city where the
shares. deceased last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to

Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to the 103
entire estate of the child. (936)

Art. 987. In default of the father and mother, the ascendants
nearest in degree shall inherit.

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe Art. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of
accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the
the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall pass
situated. to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the
same charges and obligations. (986)
If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole
estate shall be assigned to the respective municipalities or Art. 1023. Accretion shall also take place among devisees,
cities where the same is located. legatees and usufructuaries under the same conditions
established for heirs. (987a)
Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public
charitable institutions and centers, in such municipalities or XXII. Partition and Distribution of Estate
cities. The court shall distribute the estate as the respective
needs of each beneficiary may warrant. A. Partition

The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own Art. 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust, so the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
that only the income from the property shall be used. (956a) heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)

Art. 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate of the Art. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and
deceased appears and files a claim thereto with the court within assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
five years from the date the property was delivered to the State, may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)
such person shall be entitled to the possession of the same, or
if sold the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for Art. 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an act
such part of the proceeds as may not have been lawfully spent. inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar
(n) as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep
SUCCESSION any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact,
may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by
XXI. Right of Accretion ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned, be paid in cash. (1056a)
Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or
more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or Art. 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa,
legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot intrust the mere power to make the partition after his death to
receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or any person who is not one of the co-heirs.
incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees.
(n) The provisions of this and of the preceding article shall be
observed even should there be among the co-heirs a minor or a
Art. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a person subject to guardianship; but the mandatary, in such
testamentary succession, it shall be necessary: case, shall make an inventory of the property of the estate, after
notifying the co-heirs, the creditors, and the legatees or
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same devisees. (1057a)
inheritance, or to the same portion thereof, pro
indiviso; and Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange,
testator, or renounce the inheritance, or be a compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
incapacitated to receive it. (928a)
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the
Art. 1017. The words "one-half for each" or "in equal shares" or estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its
any others which, though designating an aliquot part, do not partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed
identify it by such description as shall make each heir the twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of the
exclusive owner of determinate property, shall not exclude the testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.
right of accretion.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership
In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of each heir is terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is
not earmarked, there shall be a right of accretion. (983a) dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling
reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of
Art. 1018. In legal succession the share of the person who the co-heirs. (1051a)
repudiates the inheritance shall always accrue to his co-heirs.
(981) Art. 1084. Voluntary heirs upon whom some condition has been
imposed cannot demand a partition until the condition has been
Art. 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the right of accretion fulfilled; but the other co-heirs may demand it by giving
shall take place only when the free portion is left to two or more sufficient security for the rights which the former may have in
of them, or to any one of them and to a stranger. case the condition should be complied with, and until it is
known that the condition has not been fulfilled or can never be
Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the other co-heirs complied with, the partition shall be understood to be
shall succeed to it in their own right, and not by the right of provisional. (1054a)
accretion. (985)
104
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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe 7 dated 18 January, 1968 unto her thru Mrs. Harder, and here,
Carlos informed her that the price was P4.00 a square meter, —
Art. 1085. In the partition of the estate, equality shall be although it now turns out according to Exh. 3 that as early as 22
observed as far as possible, dividing the property into lots, or October, 1967, Carlos had received in check as earnest money from
assigning to each of the co-heirs things of the same nature, defendant Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of P5,000.00 and the price
quality and kind. (1061) therein agreed upon was five (P5.00) pesos a square meter, — as
indeed in another letter also of Carlos to Plaintiff in 5 November,
Art. 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her that the Doromals had given the
impaired by its being divided, it may be adjudicated to one of earnest money of P5,000.00 at P5.00 a square meter, — at any rate,
the heirs, provided he shall pay the others the excess in cash. plaintiff not being agreeable, did not sign the power of attorney, and
the rest of the co-owners went ahead with their sale of their 6/7,
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that the thing Carlos first seeing to it that the deed of sale by their common
be sold at public auction and that strangers be allowed to bid, attorney in fact, Mary H. Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was
this must be done. (1062) signed and ratified in Candon, Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh.
2, then brought to Iloilo by Carlos in the same month, and because
Art. 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one the Register of Deeds of Iloilo refused to register right away, since
another for the income and fruits which each one of them may the original registered owner, Justice Antonio Horilleno was already
have received from any property of the estate, for any useful dead, Carlos had to ask as he did, hire Atty. Teotimo Arandela to file
and necessary expenses made upon such property, and for any a petition within the cadastral case, on 26 February, 1968, for the
damage thereto through malice or neglect. (1063) purpose, Exh. C, after which Carlos returned to Luzon, and after
compliance with the requisites of publication, hearing and notice, the
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a petition was approved, and we now see that on 29 April, 1968,
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be Carlos already back in Iloilo went to the Register of Deeds and
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him caused the registration of the order of the cadastral court approving
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of the issuance of a new title in the name of the co-owners, as well as
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the deed of sale to the Doromals, as a result of which on that
by the vendor. (1067a) same date, a new title was issued TCT No. 23152, in the name of
the Horillenos to 6/7 and plaintiff Filomena Javellana to 1/7, Exh. D,
Art. 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property only to be cancelled on the same day under TCT No. 23153, Exh. 2,
shall be delivered to the co-heir to whom said property has been already in the names of the vendees Doromals for 6/7 and to herein
adjudicated. (1065a) plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, 1/7, and the next day 30 April, 1968,
the Doromals paid unto Carlos by check, the sum of P97,000.00
Art. 1090. When the title comprises two or more pieces of land Exh. 1, of Chartered Bank which was later substituted by check of
which have been assigned to two or more co-heirs, or when it Phil. National Bank, because there was no Chartered Bank Branch
covers one piece of land which has been divided between two in Ilocos Sur, but besides this amount paid in check, the Doromals
or more co-heirs, the title shall be delivered to the one having according to their evidence still paid an additional amount in cash of
the largest interest, and authentic copies of the title shall be P18,250.00 since the agreed price was P5.00 a square meter; and
furnished to the other co-heirs at the expense of the estate. If thus was consummated the transaction, but it is here where
the interest of each co-heir should be the same, the oldest shall complications set in.
have the title. (1066a)
plaintiff's lawyer, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with him her
Alsua-Betts vs. CA letter of that date and then and there said lawyer manifested to the
Doromals that he had the P30,000.00 with him in cash, and
Sps. Doromal vs. CA, Javellana tendered it to them, for the exercise of the legal redemption, the
Doromals were aghast, and refused, and the very next day, as has
Lot 3504 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of been said, 11 June, 1968, plaintiff filed this case, and in the trial, thru
La Paz, one of its districts, with an area of a little more than 2-1/2 oral and documentary proofs, sought to show that as co-owner, she
hectares was originally decreed in the name of the late Justice had the right to redeem at the price stated in the deed of sale, Exh.
Antonio Horilleno, in 1916, under Original Certificate of Title No. 2, namely P30,000.00 of the same; but defendants in answer, and in
1314, Exh. A; but before he died, on a date not particularized in the their evidence, oral and documentary sought to show that plaintiff
record, he executed a last will and testament attesting to the fact had no more right to redeem, and that if ever she should have, that it
that it was a co-ownership between himself and his brothers and should be at the true and real price by them paid, namely, the total
sisters, Exh. C; so that the truth was that the owners or better stated, sum of P115,250.00, and trial judge, after hearing the evidence,
the co-owners were; beside Justice Horilleno, 'Luis, Soledad, Fe, believed defendants, that plaintiff had no more right, to redeem,
Rosita, Carlos and Esperanza,' because, 'Plaintiff was informed of the intended sale of the 6/7 share
belonging to the Horillenos.'
all surnamed Horilleno, and since Esperanza had already died, she
was succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein plaintiff. Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
Filomena Javellana, in the proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership decision and held that although respondent Javellana was informed
each; now then, even though their right had not as yet been of her co-owners' proposal to sell the land in question to petitioners
annotated in the title, the co-owners led by Carlos, and as to she was, however, "never notified . . . least of all, in writing", of the
deceased Justice Antonio Horilleno, his daughter Mary, sometime actual execution and registration of the corresponding deed of sale,
since early 1967, had wanted to sell their shares, or if possible if hence, said respondent's right to redeem had not yet expired at the
Filomena Javellana were agreeable, to sell the entire property, and time she made her offer for that purpose thru her letter of June 10,
they hired an acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for buyers, 1968 delivered to petitioners on even date. The intermediate court
and the latter came to interest defendants, the father and son, further held that the redemption price to be paid by respondent
named Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Jr., and in preparation for the should be that stated in the deed of sale which is P30,000
execution of the sale, since the brothers and sisters Horilleno were notwithstanding that the preponderance of the evidence proves that
scattered in various parts of the country, Carlos in Ilocos Sur, Mary the actual price paid by petitioners was P115,250.
in Baguio, Soledad and Fe, in Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Rosita in
Basilan City, they all executed various powers of attorney in favor of We cannot agree with petitioners Petitioners do not question
their niece, Mary H. Jimenez Exh. 1-8, they also caused preparation respondent's right to redeem, she being admittedly a 1/7 co-owner of
of a power of attorney of identical tenor for signature by plaintiff, the property in dispute. The thrust of their first assignment of error is
Filomena Javellana, Exh. M, and sent it with a letter of Carlos, Exh. that for purposes of Article 1623 of the Civil Code which provides
that:"ART. 1623.The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall
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105

Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe relatives" should have been sternly told, as We here hold, that they
are in pari-delicto with petitioners in committing tax evasion and
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing should not receive any consideration from any court in respect to the
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. money paid for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, parties to an illegal contract. 1
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of 1st — According to Art. 1619'Legal redemption is the right to be
redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners." subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the
contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or
the letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
18, 1968, Exhibit 7, and November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted transmitted by onerous title.' pp. 471-472, New Civil Code, If it be
the required notice in writing from which the 30-day period fixed in argued that foregoing solution would mean unjust enrichment for
said provision should be computed. But to start with, there is no plaintiff, it need only be remembered that plaintiff's right is not
showing that said letters were in fact received by respondent and contractual, but a mere legal one, the exercise of a right granted by
when they were actually received. Besides, petitioners do not the law, and the law is definite that she can subrogate herself in
pinpoint which of these two letters, their dates being more than two place of the buyer,'upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in
months apart, is the required notice. In any event, as found by the the contract,' in the words of Art. 1619, and here the price.
appellate court, neither of said letters referred to a consummated 'stipulated in the contract' was P30,000.00, in other words, if this be
sale. possible enrichment on the part of Filomena, it was not unjust but
just enrichment because permitted by the law; if it still be argued that
The fact alone that in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the price plaintiff would thus be enabled to abuse her right, the answer simply
indicated was P4.00 per square meter while in that of November 5, is that what she is seeking to enforce is not an abuse but a mere
1967, what was stated was P5.00 per square meter negatives the exercise of a right; if it he stated that just the same, the effect of
possibility that a "price definite" had already been agreed upon. sustaining plaintiff would be to promote not justice but injustice, the
While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to Carlos in October, answer again simply is that this solution is not unjust because it only
1967, there is nothing to show that the same was in the concept of binds the parties to make good their solemn representation to
the earnest money contemplated in Article 1482 of the Civil Code, possible redemptioners on the price of the sale, to what they had
invoked by petitioner, as signifying perfection of the sale. Viewed in solemnly averred in a public document required by the law to be the
the backdrop of the factual milieu thereof extant in the record, We only basis for that exercise of redemption;" (Pp. 24-27, Record.)
are more inclined to believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with
concept of earnest money as the term was understood under the Old costs against petitioners.
Civil Code, that is, as a guarantee that the buyer would not back out,
considering that it is not clear that there was already a definite Alonzo vs. CA
agreement as to the price then and that petitioners were decided to
buy 6/7 only of the property should respondent Javellana refuse to The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
agree to part with her 1/7 share. conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we
apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even
We are of the considered opinion and so hold that for purposes of against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is
the co-owner's right of redemption granted by Article 1620 of the that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice.
Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623 requires to be We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in
made to the other co-owners and from receipt of which the 30-day the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
period to redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a
perfected sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
sale. This is implied from the latter portion of Article 1623 which parcel of land registered in the mane of their deceased parents under
requires that before a register of deeds can record a sale by a co- OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
owner, there must be presented to him, an affidavit to the effect that
the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the other co- On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
owners. undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
The only other pivotal issue raised by petitioners relates to the price Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
which respondent offered for the redemption in question. In this instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of
connection, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, We gather that P440.00. 3
there is "decisive preponderance of evidence" establishing "that the
price paid by defendants was not that stated in the document, Exhibit By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said
2, of P30,000 but much more, at least P97,000, according to the sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing
check, Exhibit 1, if not a total of P115,250.00 because another the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
amount in cash of P18,250 was paid afterwards." It is, therefore, the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo
contention of petitioners here that considering said finding of fact of Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
the intermediate court, it erred in holding nevertheless that "the enclosed area. 4
redemption price should be that stated in the deed of sale."
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs,
Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained. As stated in the sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
decision under review, the trial court found that "the consideration of complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale to minimize the citizen. 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir,
payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax." With this filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption
undisputed fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to claimed by her brother. 6
sanction petitioners' pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
violative of public policy and injurious to public interest, the interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
seemingly wide practice of understating considerations of interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
transactions for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
government must be condemned and all parties guilty thereof must follows:
be made to suffer the consequences of their ill-advised agreement to
defraud the state. Verily, the trial court fell short of its devotion and "Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
loyalty to the Republic in officially giving its stamp of approval to the
stand of petitioners and even berating respondent Javellana as hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
wanting to enrich herself "at the expense of her own blood relatives
who are her aunts, uncles and cousins." On the contrary, said "blood all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates
of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was
provided they do so within the period of one month from filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that
the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired.
vendor." This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen
years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her
Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished
property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for because the period for its exercise had already expired.
written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the "While the general rule is, that to charge a party with
redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that
thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running." he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he
bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 should have induced inquiry, and the means of
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable
by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the with laches, the same as if he had known the facts." 15
30-day period.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership.
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to
in view of such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
begun to run, much less expired in 1977. available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact,
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is
may be done even as the law is obeyed. adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we respondent court is REVERSED
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to Bautista vs. Grino-Aquino
"the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
Can the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife? This is the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date singular issue in this petition.
of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really In Civil Case No. 4033-P, petitioners instituted an action in the Court
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is of First Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition,
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 14182,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two. 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to Declaration No. 5147, null and void.
be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming
there was a valid notice although it was not in writing, would there be That both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the
any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under T.C.T No. 2210, and the
before the complaint was filed in 1977? latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista;
Both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22,
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that
of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the that Extrajudicial Partition;
letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied Both parties admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial
that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.-
informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and T-14182 was issued; The parties admit that the private respondents,
1964, and that such notice was sufficient. with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property;Upon registration of
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
107
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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right
of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
the Deed of Sale, T.C.T.-T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista; n August 7, The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the
1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista,
private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe
T.C.T. Nos. T-15665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of
15670, T-15671, were issued to private respondents; her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not
surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover,
Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister
Emiliana Tamayo; to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was
Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.
Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,
1949; The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial
That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition and issuance of the title in their names, private respondents
partition of property on December 22, 1966, among the heirs of the except Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of absolute sale of
late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista; the property in favor of the latter in whose name the title was also
issued. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed
Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of this time by Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to
Property; private respondents in whose names the respective titles were thus
On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the subsequently issued. This series of transactions between and among
questioned signature of Manuel Bautista; private respondents is an indication of a clever scheme to place the
That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled thereto.

(Pp. 37-38, rollo; pp. 2-3 of decision of respondent court). Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of
In a decision of January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the the property during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista.
complaint with costs against plaintiffs. On appeal, a decision was Partition of future inheritance is prohibited by law.
rendered in due course by the Court of Appeals on August 3, 1987,
affirming the decision of the trial court. As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property
belonging exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions involving the same
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION OF FUTURE property between and among the private respondents are also null
INHERITANCE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1347 and void.
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE;
Delos Santos vs. Dela Cruz
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE
PRETERITION OF PETITIONER EVANGELINE From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On
BAUTISTA IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW ON May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific
SUCCESSION." (P. 7, petition for review; p. 8, rollo) performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others, that
on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the
The petition is impressed with merit. defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of
which was attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent with an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had
Appellate Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his
questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the
by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject
Nevertheless, even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be
the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three
examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by the other co-heirs,
renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused to
supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the estate of perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the
the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista, constituting aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to
the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears comply with his obligation under the extra-judicial partition agreement
to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
respondents.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses
does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is the exclusive that the plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the said
property of Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the
Mariano Bautista, which was registered in his name under T.C.T. No. plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the
2210. property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by
mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not
settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The
decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that
are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal the plaintiff had likewise sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00,
representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the and that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as
decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the
partition. proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed
that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his
Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of
contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which P2,500.00.
does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive
the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. 108
Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by
succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the
agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the
defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against
the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the terms defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void
of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or
obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as are against public policy
described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement"
(meaning, apparently, that the defendant should develop the The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be
subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for sustained in view of the conclusion we have arrived at above.
this purpose), and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual Furthermore, actual or compensatory damages must be duly proved
damages, the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs. No (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such damages was
disposition was made of defendant's counterclaim. The defendant presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a stipulation of
filed a "Motion for New Trial' but the same was denied. Hence, this facts and no evidence was adduced before the trial court.
appeal.
Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his
In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties contention that the lower court erred in not passing on his
admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial counterclaim and, consequently, in not sentencing appellee to turn
partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on over to him his corresponding share of said portion received by
October 16, 1962 that defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said appellee under the void partition. Remote relatives or unrelated
decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la persons who unduly received and took possession of the property of
Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and void
Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance
September 22, 1935, thus pre-deceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such share has
that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide already been disposed of by appellee to a bona fide purchaser, as
and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations of the
counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is amount to defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the
an heir of the decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff- proceeds of such sale for the reason that, as already stated above,
appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could this aspect of the counterclaim has not been touched upon in the
not inherit from the latter by right of representation. stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by evidence which
appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place
B. Effects of Partition
in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
Art. 1091. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. (1068)
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or
half blood." Art. 1092. After the partition has been made, the co-heirs shall
be reciprocally bound to warrant the title to, and the quality of,
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right. each property adjudicated. (1069a)

"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative Art. 1093. The reciprocal obligation of warranty referred to in the
preceding article shall be proportionate to the respective
nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving hereditary shares of the co-heirs, but if any one of them should
be insolvent, the other co-heirs shall be liable for his part in the
the right of representation when it properly takes place . . ." same proportion, deducting the part corresponding to the one
who should be indemnified.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la
Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant- Those who pay for the insolvent heir shall have a right of action
appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece, is excluded against him for reimbursement, should his financial condition
by law from the inheritance. improve. (1071)

But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and Art. 1094. An action to enforce the warranty among heirs must
participation in the extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her be brought within ten years from the date the right of action
right to bring the present action is concerned? They did not confer accrues. (n)
upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the
extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the Art. 1095. If a credit should be assigned as collectible, the co-
stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of heirs shall not be liable for the subsequent insolvency of the
Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that debtor of the estate, but only for his insolvency at the time the
plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in representation of her partition is made.
deceased mother.
The warranty of the solvency of the debtor can only be enforced
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the during the five years following the partition.
parties thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-
appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff- Co-heirs do not warrant bad debts, if so known to, and accepted
appellee not being such an heir, the partition is void with respect to by, the distributee. But if such debts are not assigned to a co-
her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads: heir, and should be collected, in whole or in part, the amount
collected shall be distributed proportionately among the heirs.
"ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person (1072a)

believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only 109

with respect to such person."

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit
from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought
he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the
prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed
the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe directed Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro
or his representative the 229 cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2
Art. 1096. The obligation of warranty among co-heirs shall cease cavans and 23 kilos of palay respectively deposited with the said rice
in the following cases: mills upon the filing by Alejandro of a bond in the amount of
P12,000.00 duly approved by the court (Annex "T", pp. 122-127
(1) When the testator himself has made the partition, rec.).
unless it appears, or it may be reasonably presumed,
that his intention was otherwise, but the legitime shall Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
always remain unimpaired;
The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained
(2) When it has been so expressly stipulated in the and the writs prayed for granted.
agreement of partition, unless there has been bad
faith; The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
(3) When the eviction is due to a cause subsequent to delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
the partition, or has been caused by the fault of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate
distributee of the property. (1070a) the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-
15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As
Guilas vs. CFI of Pampanga long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial
Guagua, Pampanga was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir
They had no children. from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The
On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share,
Alejandro as her sole heir and executor (pp. 20-21, rec.). is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate
or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
"En el Asunto de la Adopcion de la Menor Juanita Lopez y Limson" through an independent action, which would be tried by another court
(pp. 92-94, 103, rec.), herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate
and now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar,
adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña 89 Phil., 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-
Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita 5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs Agustines, L-
Lopez as one of her heirs. 14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).
Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed
by both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez-Guilas, the right of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as
Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand
3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's paraphernal property), described and and recover their respective shares from the executor or
embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 13092, both situated in administrator, or any other person having the same in his
Bacolor, Pampanga — possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.

In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not
project of partition and directed that the records of the case be sent control the present controversy; because the motion filed therein for
to the archieves, upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes ( the removal of the administratrix and the appointment of a new
administrator in her place was rejected by the court on the ground of
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a laches as it was filed after the lapse of about 38 years from October
separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of 5, 1910 when the court issued an order settling and deciding the
partition, which case was docketed as Civil Case 2539 entitled issues raised by the motion (L-10018, September 19, 1956, 99 Phil.,
"Juanita Lopez-Guilas vs. Alejandro Lopez" in the Court of First 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the
Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more
and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of
statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to partition was approved and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when
Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, which were the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to
allocated to her under the project of partition (p. 132, rec.). claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had
In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the
motion to set aside the order of October 2, 1964 on the ground that Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited,
the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition the order dated December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and
for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate
of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided (Annex proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been
"O", p. 72, rec.). delivered to her.

Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of
the order dated April 27, 1966 (Annex "P", pp. 73-77, rec.), to which the parties suspended resolution of her petition for the delivery of her
Alejandro filed an opposition dated June 8, 1966 (Annex "Q", pp. shares until after the decision in the civil action for the annulment of
112-113, rec.). the project of partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964;
the said order lost its validity and efficacy when the herein petitioner
Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966; praying filed on June 11, 1965 an amended complaint in said Civil Case
that the palay deposited with Fericsons and Ideal Rice Mill by the ten 2539 wherein she recognized the partial legality and validity of the
(10) tenants of the two parcels in question be delivered to him said project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of lots
(Annex "R", pp. 114-116, rec.), to which Juanita filed an opposition Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which she has been insisting
dated July 26, 1966 (Annex "S", pp. 117-121, rec.). all along

In an order dated September 8, 1966, the lower court denied the De los Santos vs. Dela Cruz (see previous chapter)
motion for reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966, and
110
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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe the partition he elected or agreed that a nine-hectare portion shall be
conveyed to the Polo church for masses.
Agutines vs. CFI
It is markworthy that, in addition to the nine-hectare portion, the deed
A nine-hectare land in Marilao, Bulacan, is the subject of a three- mentions another parcel of three hectares exclusively given to
cornered dispute between Severo Valenzuela on one side and the Valenzuela. If the parties had not contemplated a nine-hectare
relatives of his deceased wife Generosa Agustines on the other, with donation to the Polo church, but empowered Valenzuela to fix the
the Archbishop of Manila as intervenor. area subsequently, they would have assigned to him 12 hectares,
In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was with the provision that he will separate therefrom such portion as he
subsequently submitted for probate in the Court of First Instance of may desire to convey to the parish of Polo. They did not say so.
Bulacan in special proceedings No. 4944. Having no children, she Instead they clearly stipulated that nine hectares were destined for
named her surviving husband Severo Valenzuela the universal heir, "misas" (to the Church), and that three hectares would be reserved
but she specified some bequests. There was opposition to the for him.
approval of the will; however, after some negotiations, the sister
(Josefa) and the nephews and nieces of the decedent (the other It is quite probable that if Generosa's kin had known, in the course of
petitioners in this special civil action) executed on February 8, 1935, bargaining, that Valenzuela would not deliver all the nine hectares to
an extrajudicial partition with the respondent Severo Valenzuela, the Polo church but would retain eight hectares thereof, they would
expressing conformity with the probate of the testament and dividing not have ceded to him an additional lot of three hectares.
the properties of the deceased. They promised specifically to respect
the wishes of the testatrix, Proof positive that he had no choice as to the number of hectares is
the fact that for eight years he never exercised it, keeping for himself
Other items of the estate were apportioned among the signers of the in breach of trust the fruits of all the land. He might have ideas
deed of partition, which, submitted for approval, was confirmed by repugnant to the religious beliefs of his wife in regard to the
the probate court on October 31, 1936, in an order directing the celebration of masses for the dead. But as a man of honor, as the
administrator to deliver the respective shares to the heirs or legatees surviving partner, he had no excuse to set his own notions against
after paying the corresponding inheritance taxes. No appeal was those of his departed spouse, especially on a subject that concerned
ever taken from such order. the disposition of her own properties. The will of the testatrix is law 1
. And his action in fixing one hectare, when his wife bequeathed a
Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part portion not exceeding nine hectares is surely such abuse of
thereof to the parish church of Polo or to the Roman Catholic discretion (if he had any) that will not easily commend itself to judicial
Archbishop of Manila. Wherefore, in May, 1944, the Agustines approbation.
connections, petitioners herein, filed a complaint against Severo
Valenzuela (civil case No. 158) seeking the return to them of that To make ourselves clear, we must state at the risk of repetition that
nine-hectare lot in Quiririt, alleging his breach of trust, plus although under the provisions of the will Severo Valenzuela might
renunciation on the part of the church of Polo that had reportedly have elected to transfer to the Polo church a portion less than nine
neglected to demand compliance with the beneficial legacy. hectares, however, in the deed of partition he agreed — exercising
his discretion — to assign nine hectares for masses (to the Polo
After the liberation and after they had become aware of Valenzuela's church). It must be emphasized that in the distribution of the
act that tended to frustrate their civil action No. 158, the petitioners decedent's assets, we must face the deed of partition which bears
herein submitted motions for reconsideration, the main theme of the court's fiat. The last will becomes secondary in value. Important
which was that the said last order amended the decree of distribution to bear this distinction in mind, because both in Valenzuela's motion
of October 31, 1936, which had become final long ago. All was to no and in the court's order approving the assignment of one hectare,
avail. Hence they started this special civil action to annul the order of only the will was quoted, and not the extrajudicial partition.
December 2, 1944, on the concrete proposition that the court had no Valenzuela's motion invoking the will exclusively induced the court
jurisdiction to issue it, the order of October 31, 1936, having become into error.
final and executory eight years before. They contend, first, that under
the will, and in accordance with the partition approved by the court in A third reason to hold that the document of partition deeded nine
1936, the Polo church was entitled to nine hectares in the Quiririt hectares to the Polo church is the fact that the court and the parties
farm of Generosa. They argue next that when that church repudiated considered it a final settlement of all the rights of all concerned, the
the nine-hectare lot, it again became a part of the whole Quiririt court approving it in toto and ordering the administrator to deliver to
property which, under the partition, had been adjudicated to them. the beneficiaries their respective portions or legacies. The court's
order even wrote finish to the expediente. And the parties, including
On the other hand, Severo Valenzuela's position is that the whole Severo Valenzuela regarded it as final for eight years, until he found
nine-hectare realty was awarded to him, subject to his obligation to it necessary, for his own interests, to make another move indirectly
donate to the Polo church such portion thereof as he may designate amending the final settlement of October, 1936. Now then, if that
in his discretion. partition avowedly settled the estate and accomplished its
distribution, the implication is unavoidable that it left nothing to future
The intervenor, the Archbishop of Manila, representing the Polo judicial action or determination. Consequently it did not contemplate
church, shares the petitioner's opinion that a nine-hectare lot had any subsequent fixing by Valenzuela, and approval by the court, of
been granted to said church. He maintains, however, that no the portion to be transmitted to the Church of Polo. The parties
voluntary renunciation of the legacy ever took place. deemed it final — because the rights of all beneficiaries were therein
defined with certainty. Therefore, the attempt by the surviving
It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines husband to modify it eight years thereafter was completely beyond
contained a provision directing her husband to donate a the pale of the law.
portion of her Quiririt farm not exceeding nine hectares to
the Polo church. What was the share of the church of Polo C. Recission and Nullity of Partition
under the will and the extrajudicial partition?
Art. 1097. A partition may be rescinded or annulled for the same
After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we causes as contracts. (1073a)
reach the conclusion that, as contended by petitioners and the
intervenor, the extrajudicial partition definitely allotted a nine-hectare Art. 1098. A partition, judicial or extra-judicial, may also be
parcel to the Polo church. Supposing, that under the will rescinded on account of lesion, when any one of the co-heirs
Valenzuela's discretion included the determination of the area to be received things whose value is less, by at least one-fourth, than
transferred — and not merely the selection of the site where the the share to which he is entitled, considering the value of the
nine- hectare portion is to be segregated — still it seems clear that in things at the time they were adjudicated. (1074a)

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
Art. 1099. The partition made by the testator cannot be obligations within such time as the court directs.
impugned on the ground of lesion, except when the legitime of
the compulsory heirs is thereby prejudiced, or when it appears SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be
or may reasonably be presumed, that the intention of the determined.—Questions as to advancement made, or
testator was otherwise. (1075) alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made. thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
(1076) and on the heir.

Art. 1101. The heir who is sued shall have the option of SEC. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid.—If at the
indemnifying the plaintiff for the loss, or consenting to a new time of the distribution the executor or administrator has
partition. retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be
applied for the expenses of partition of the properties
Indemnity may be made by payment in cash or by the delivery distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such
of a thing of the same kind and quality as that awarded to the executor or administrator when it appears equitable to the
plaintiff. court and not inconsistent with the intention of the testator;
otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to
If a new partition is made, it shall affect neither those who have their respective shares or interest in the premises, and the
not been prejudiced nor those have not received more than their apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court, and,
just share. (1077a) if any person interested in the partition does not pay his
proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the
Art. 1102. An heir who has alienated the whole or a considerable name of the executor or administrator against the party not
part of the real property adjudicated to him cannot maintain an paying for the sum assessed.
action for rescission on the ground of lesion, but he shall have
a right to be indemnified in cash. (1078a) SEC. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate.—
Certified copies of final orders and judgments of the court
Art. 1103. The omission of one or more objects or securities of relating to the real estate or the partition thereof shall be
the inheritance shall not cause the rescission of the partition on recorded in the registry of deeds of the province where the
the ground of lesion, but the partition shall be completed by the property is situated.
distribution of the objects or securities which have been
omitted. (1079a) XXIII. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the Art. 1058. All matters relating to the appointment, powers and
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved duties of executors and administrators and concerning the
that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons administration of estates of deceased persons shall be
interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay governed by the Rules of Court. (n)
to the person omitted the share which belongs to him. (1080)
Art. 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent which can be
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an applied to the payment of debts are not sufficient for that
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such purpose, the provisions of Articles 2239 to 2251 on Preference
person. (1081a) of Credits shall be observed, provided that the expenses
referred to in Article 2244, No. 8, shall be those involved in the
Revised Rules of Court administration of the decedent's estate. (n)

RULE 90 Art. 1060. A corporation or association authorized to conduct
the business of a trust company in the Philippines may be
DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE appointed as an executor, administrator, guardian of an estate,
or trustee, in like manner as an individual; but it shall not be
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue appointed guardian of the person of a ward. (n)
made.—When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance Relevant provisions from the Rules of Court
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor RULE 78
or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION,
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and WHEN AND TO WHOM ISSUED
the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as a
from the executor or administrator, or any other person executors or administrators.—No person is competent to
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy serve as executor or administrator who:
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which (a) Is a minor;
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. (b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the 112
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe him;

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute (b) To administer according to these rules,
the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, and, if an executor, according to the will of the testator,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which
by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral shall at any time come to his possession or to the
turpitude. possession of any other person for him, and from the
proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and
SEC. 2. Executor of executor not to administer charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as
estate.—The executor of an executor shall not, as such, shall be decreed by the court;
administer the estate of the first testator.
(c) To render a true and just account of his
SEC. 3. Married women may serve.—A married woman administration to the court within one (1) year, and at
may serve as executrix or administratrix, and the marriage of any other time when required by the court;
a single woman shall not affect her authority so to serve
under a previous appointment (d) To perform all orders of the court by him to
be performed.
SEC 4 Letters testamentary issued when will allowed.—
When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall SEC. 2. Bond of executor where directed in will. When
issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as further bond required.—If the testator in his will directs that
executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and the executor serve without bond, or with only his Individual
gives bond as required by these rules bond, he may be allowed by the court to give bond in such
sum and with such surety as the court approves conditioned
SEC. 5. Where some coexecutors disqualified others only to pay the debts of the testator; but the court may
may act.—When all of the executors named in a will can not require of the executor a further bond in case of a change in
act because of incompetency, refusal to accept the trust, or his circumstances, or for other sufficient cause, with the
failure to give bond, on the part of one or more of them, conditions named in the last preceding section.
letters testamentary may issue to such of them as are
competent, accept and give bond, and they may perform the SEC. 3. Bonds of joint executors and administrators.—
duties and discharge the trust required by the will. When two or more persons are appointed executors or
administrators the court may take a separate bond from
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration each, or a joint bond from all.
granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give SEC. 4. Bond of special administrator.—A special
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be administrator before entering upon the duties of his trust shall
granted: give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned
that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods,
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband account for such as are received by him when required by
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if the court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed
competent and willing to serve; executor or administrator, or to such other person as may be
authorized to receive them.
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by RULE 84
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND
the death of the person to apply for administration or to ADMINISTRATORS
request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the SECTION 1. Executor or administrator to have access
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; to partnership books and property. How right enforced.—The
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased partner
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and shall at all times have access to, and may examine and take
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person copies of, books and papers relating to the partnership
as the court may select. business, and may examine and make invoices of the
property belonging to such partnership; and the surviving
RULE 81 partner or partners, on request, shall exhibit to him all such
books, papers, and property in their hands or control. On the
BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS written application of such executor or administrator, the
Court having jurisdiction of the estate may order any such
SECTION 1. Bond to be given before issuance of surviving partner or partners to freely permit the exercise of
letters. Amount. Conditions.—Before an executor or the rights, and to exhibit the books, papers, and property, as
administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and in this section provided, and may punish any partner failing to
letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a do so for contempt.
bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as
follows: SEC. 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in
repair.—An executor or administrator shall maintain in
(a) To make and return to the court, within tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences
three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the 113
deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession of any other person for

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent.—Where the
obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the
belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the
to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court. only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to
recover contribution from the other debtor. In a joint
SEC. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate obligation of the decedent, the claim shall be confined to the
to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed.—An portion belonging to him.
executor or administrator shall have the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate.—A creditor
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage
the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. or other collateral security, may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and
RULE 86 share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or
he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security,
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE by action in court, making the executor or administrator a
party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency,
SECTION 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court.— after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property
Immediately after granting letters testamentary or of pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceedings to realize
administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in
persons having money claims against the decedent to file the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely
them in the office of the clerk of said court. upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the
same at any time within the period of the statute of
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a
notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the
the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall
not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the
after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which
at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate
the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown that such redemption shall be made.
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month. SEC. 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an
estate.—If the executor or administrator has a claim against
SEC. 3. Publication of notice to creditors.—Every the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in
executor or administrator shall, immediately alter the notice writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
to creditors is issued, cause the same to be published three administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim,
(3) weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation have the same power and be subject to the same liability as
in the province, and to be posted for the same period in four the general administrator or executor in the settlement of
public places in the province, and in two public places in the other claims. The court may order the executor or
municipality where the decedent last resided administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary
funds to defend such claim.
SEC. 4. Filing copy of printed notice.—Within ten (10)
days after the notice has been published and posted n SEC. 9. How to file a claim. Contents thereof Notice to
accordance with the preceding section, the executor or executor or administrator.—A claim may be filed by delivering
administrator shall file or cause to be filed in the court a the same with the necessary vouchers to the clerk of court
printed copy of the notice accompanied with an affidavit and by serving a copy thereof on the executor or
setting forth the dates of the first and last publication thereof administrator. If the claim be founded on a bond, bill, note, or
and the name of the newspaper in which the same is printed. any other instrument, the original need not be filed, but a
copy thereof with all indorsements shall be attached to the
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If claim and filed therewith. On demand, however, of the
not filed, barred; exceptions.—All claims for money against executor or administrator, or by order of the court or judge,
the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, the original shall be exhibited, unless it be lost or destroyed,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims in which case the claimant must accompany his claim with
for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of affidavit or affidavits containing a copy or particular
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, description of the instrument and stating its loss or
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise destruction. When the claim is due, it must be supported by
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as affidavit stating the amount justly due, that no payments have
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator been made thereon which are not credited, and that there are
may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or no offsets to the same, to the knowledge of the affiant. If the
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action claim is not due, or is contingent, when filed, it must also be
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the supported by affidavit stating the particulars thereof. When
debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the the affidavit is made by a person other than the claimant, he
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the must set forth therein the reason why it is not made by the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off claimant. The claim once filed shall be attached to the record
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is of the case in which the letters testamentary or of
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so administration were issued, although the court, in its
determined shall be considered the true balance against the discretion, and as a matter of convenience, may order all the
estate, as though the claim had been presented directly claims to be collected in a separate folder.
before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims
not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present 114
value.

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe SEC. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions which survive.—For the recovery or protection of the
SEC. 10. Answer of executor or administrator. property or rights of the deceased, an executor or
Offsets.—Within fifteen (15) days after service of a copy of administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the
the claim on the executor or administrator, he shall file his deceased, actions for causes which survive.
answer admitting or denying the claim specifically, and
setting forth the substance of the matters which are relied SEC. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned.—When
upon to support the admission or denial. If he has no an executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the
knowledge sufficient to enable him to admit or deny trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or
specifically, he shall state such want of knowledge. The for damages done to such lands shall be maintained against
executor or administrator in his answer shall allege in offset him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court
any claim which the decedent before death had against the assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time
claimant, and his failure to do so shall bar the claim forever. allowed for paying debts has expired.
A copy of the answer shall be served by the executor or
administrator on the claimant. The court in its discretion may SEC. 4. Executor or administrator may compound with
extend the time for filing such answer. debtor.—With the approval of the court, an executor or
administrator may compound with the debtor of the deceased
SEC. 11. Disposition of admitted claim.—Any claim for a debt due, and may give a discharge of such debt on
admitted entirely by the executor or administrator shall receiving a just dividend of the estate of the debtor.
immediately be submitted by the clerk to the court who may
approve the same without hearing; but the court, in its SEC. 5. Mortgage due estate may be foreclosed.—A
discretion, before approving the claim, may order that known mortgage belonging to the estate of a deceased person, as
heirs, legatees, or devisees be notified and heard. If upon mortgagee or assignee of the right of a mortgagee, may be
hearing, an heir, legatee, or devisee opposes the claim, the foreclosed by the executor or administrator.
court may, in its discretion, allow him fifteen (15) days to file
an answer to the claim in the manner prescribed in the SEC. 6. Proceedings when property concealed,
preceding section. embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.—If an executor or
administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual
SEC. 12. Trial of contested claim.—Upon the filing of an interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the
answer to a claim, or upon the expiration of the time for such court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is
filing, the clerk of court shall set the claim for trial with notice suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed
to both parties. The court may refer the claim to a away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased,
commissioner. or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge
of any deed, conveyance, bond, contracts, or other writing
SEC. 13. Judgment appealable.—The judgment of the which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title,
court approving or disapproving a claim, shall be filed with interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate,
the record of the administration proceedings with notice to or the last will and testament of the deceased, the court may
both parties, and is appealable as in ordinary cases. A cite such suspected person to appear before it and may
judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if
he pay, in due course of administration, the amount the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such
ascertained to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon examination such interrogatories as are put to him, the court
the property of the estate, or give to the judgment creditor may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison
any priority of payment. until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories
put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in
SEC. 14. Costs.—When the executor or administrator, writing and shall be filed in the clerk’s office.
in his answer, admits and offers to pay part of a claim, and
the claimant refuses to accept the amount offered in SEC. 7. Person entrusted with estate compelled to
satisfaction of his claim, if he fails to obtain a more favorable render account.—The court, on complaint of an executor or
judgment, he cannot recover costs, but must pay to the administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor or
executor or administrator costs from the time of the offer. administrator with any part of the estate of the deceased to
Where an action commenced against the deceased for appear before it, and may require such person to render a
money has been discontinued and the claim embraced full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds,
therein presented as in this rule provided, the prevailing party accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate as came
shall be allowed the costs of his action up to the time of its to his possession in trust for such executor or administrator,
discontinuance. and of his proceedings thereon; and if the person so cited
refuses to appear to render such account, the court may
RULE 87 punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order
of the court.
ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS SEC. 8. Embezzlement before letters issued.—If a
person, before the granting of letters testamentary or of
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be administration on the estate of the deceased, embezzles or
brought against executor or administrator.—No action upon a alienates any of the money, goods, chattels, or effect of such
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon deceased, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; the executor or administrator of the estate for double the
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest value of the property sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and recovered for the benefit of such estate.
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. 115

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Wills & Succession/ Atty Uribe

SEC. 9. Property fraudulent conveyed by deceased
may be recovered. When executor or administrator must
bring action.—When there is a deficiency of assets in the
hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of
debts and expenses of administration, and the deceased in
his lifetime had conveyed real or personal property, or a right
or interest therein, or debt or credit, with intent to defraud his
creditors or to avoid any right debt, or duty; or had so
conveyed such property, right, interest, debt, or creditors,
and the subject of the attempted conveyance would be liable
to attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the executor or
administrator may commence and prosecute to final
judgment an action for the recovery of such property, right,
interest, debts, or credit for the benefit of the creditors; but
he shall not be bound to commence the action unless the
creditors making the application pay such part of the costs
and expenses, or give security therefor to the executor or
administrator, as the court deems equitable.

SEC. 10. When creditor may bring action. Lien for
cost.—When there is such a deficiency of assets, and the
deceased in his lifetime had made or attempted such a
conveyance, as is stated in the last preceding section, and
the executor and administrator has not commenced the
action therein provided for, any creditor of the estate may,
with the permission of the court, commence and prosecute to
final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator,
a like action for the recovery of the subject of the conveyance
or attempted conveyance for the benefit of the creditors. But
the action shall not be commenced until the creditor has filed
in a court a bond executed to the executor or administrator,
in an amount approved by the judge, conditioned to
indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs and
expenses incurred by reason of such action. Such creditor
shall have a lien upon any judgment recovered by him in the
action for such costs and other expenses incurred therein as
the court deems equitable. Where the conveyance or
attempted conveyance has been made by the deceased in
his lifetime in favor of the executor or administrator, the
action which a creditor may bring shall be in the name of all
the creditors, and permission of the court and filing of bond
as above prescribed, are not necessary.

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