Time: A New Research Lens - Research Showcase @ CMU

Carnegie Mellon University

Research Showcase @ CMU

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10-2001

Time: A New Research Lens

Deborah J. Ancona

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Paul S. Goodman

Carnegie Mellon University

Barbara S. Lawrence

University of California - Los Angeles

Michael J. Tushman

Harvard University

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Time: A New Research Lens
Author(s): Deborah G. Ancona, Paul S. Goodman, Barbara S. Lawrence, Michael L. Tushman
Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 645-663
Published by: Academy of Management
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3560246
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? Academy of Management Review
2001, Vol. 26, No. 4, 645-663.

TIME:A NEW RESEARCHLENS

DEBORAHG. ANCONA
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PAULS. GOODMAN
Carnegie Mellon University

BARBARAS. LAWRENCE
University of California Los Angeles

MICHAELL. TUSHMAN
Harvard Business School

We tend to use different lenses-strategic de- other lenses, it is usually peripheral. In contrast,
sign, political, and cultural-to understand how the temporal lens puts time and timing front and
organizations function, depending on our theo- center. As such, although we can see the tempo-
retical orientations (Ancona, Kochan, Scully, ral lens as an additional component of the other
Van Maanen, & Westney, 1999). Like different three lenses-organizations are designed using
schema, each of these lenses leads us to focus temporal parameters (Ancona, Okhuysen, & Per-
low, 2001), the power and influence styles used
on certain variables and relationships while ig- to create change depend on how quickly one has
noring others. Focusing multiple lenses on a to act (Huy, 2001), and cultures differ with re-
given phenomenon highlights different aspects spect to temporal norms and expectations
of that phenomenon-much like the story of the (Blount & Janicik, 2001)-it is also clear that the
blind men and the elephant. Finally, each lens
suggests a different set of practices and solu- temporal lens can stand on its own. This lens
tions to managers. The goal of this special issue offers its own set of variables and relationships,
is to sharpen the temporal lens we use in con- its own view of specific phenomena, and its own
ducting organizational research. In this final ar- set of parameters to guide managerial action.
ticle we revisit and delineate this new lens and
Using the temporal lens, we begin to think not
then identify some new and promising areas of just about processes and practices but also
temporal organizational research. about how fast they are moving (cf. Eisenhardt,
1989; Huy, 2001), their trajectories over time (cf.
In the organizational behavior literature the Albert, 1995; Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001),
strategic design lens focuses on designing strat- the cycles they align with (cf. Ancona et al., 2001;
egies that "fit" the environment and the struc- Gersick, 1994; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983), and
ture of the firm and on looking for further con-
the historical positions they take on the contin-
gruence among organizational components. uum of time (cf. Blount & Janicik, 2001; Clark,
Managers play the role of organizational archi-
tects who design an organization in a way that 1985). We think not only about the individual
improves its ability to adapt to its environment. personality but the individual's time urgency
The political lens focuses on power, influence, and time perspective (Conte, Landy, & Mathieu,
and conflict. Here, managers need to leverage 1995;Perlow, 1999;Waller, Conte, Gibson, & Car-
power and negotiate across multiple interest
groups. The cultural lens focuses on norms, penter, 2001). Is a person focused on the past, the
meaning, artifacts, and values. Managers be- present, or the future (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999)?
come the creators of meaning, using symbols When these things are taken into account, work
and stories (Ancona et al., 1999). is not only designed to fit task interdependen-
cies but also to fit group-member temporal ori-
The papers in this issue and the work that entations and to provide "flow" (Mainemelis,
they represent give us a new lens-the temporal 2001). We seek to understand when an activity
lens. Although time plays a role in each of the starts and stops and how a changing deadline

645

646 Academy of Management Review October

impacts behavior (cf. Blount & Janicik, 2001; Lim signed around teams than it did in an individu-
& Murningham, 1994). Finally, we begin to ex- ally based organization. Through a political
amine the cultures of time-how monochronic lens, the researcher sees that there was consen-

versus polychronic temporal cultures affect the sus for the change in the first company, whereas
very nature of behavior-and what happens as a high-level manager in the second company
we move across temporal cultures (Ancona et resisted the new technology. The cultural lens
al., 2001; Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Zerubavel, shows two different cultures-one based on ex-

1979). perimentation and risk and the other based on
In other words, the variables of interest in this rejection of new ideas and change.

new lens include timing, pace, cycles, rhythms, In the two situations each of these lenses
flow, temporal orientation, and the cultural
meanings of time. As time can be allocated missed some key temporal dimensions. In the
across activities, likewise, activities can be first organization the new system was intro-
scheduled, fit to a deadline, accelerated, or duced just as some other organizational
shifted in time. Time can be objectively por- changes were taking place. Organizational
trayed and interpreted based on the measured, members were ready for change and were ex-
linear, forward-moving, and exact clock time. It pecting their work to shift. In the second organi-
also can reflect the subjective experience of zation the new system was introduced when
each individual. members were rushing to finish all of their
projects by the end of the quarter. They did not
As we sharpen the temporal lens, it permeates feel as though they had the time to finish their
our research methods. We begin to think about work and learn a new technology at the same
when and how often to measure key variables time.
and how to measure the "correct" lag across
causal variables (Mitchell & James, 2001). Fur- Furthermore, members in the first organiza-
thermore, our data collection and analysis take tion had heard from colleagues at competitor
on new forms. Graphs of activities mapped to firms that this new technology had already
time pinpoint the temporal location of phenom- swept through the industry and resulted in real
ena, their pace, cycles, and rhythms as they competitive advantage. In the second organiza-
repeat over time. We draw the interactions tion the technology was new to the industry and
across temporal maps and the shape of changes no fevered race to catch up to the competition
over time (Ancona et al., 2001; Lawrence et al., existed. Finally, the CEO of the first organiza-
2001). Does the change move smoothly and tion had a very long-term planning horizon, and
monotonically over time, or is there a spiral that she saw the move to this technology as part of a
shifts exponentially where small swings grow to larger trend to computerize particular processes.
major gyrations? We can even draw maps that The CEO of the second organization, however,
correspond to different cultural interpretations had a shorter-term perspective and was more
of time-for example, by juxtaposing a clock- concerned about the temporary disruption of
time map, an event-time map, and multiple sub- work that the new technology would cause.

jective-time maps. This example clearly shows why we should
take on a temporal lens: it provides an important
RATIONALE framework for explaining and understanding or-
ganizational behavior. Another advantage of
Why take on such a new lens? To make it this new lens is that it focuses our attention on
worthwhile, the discomfort of learning a new
way of thinking must be offset by some key new classes of independent and dependent
advantage. Perhaps the best way to show this is variables. In this example, and in articles by
through an example. Suppose a researcher is Huy (2001) and Lawrence et al. (2001), the se-
interested in understanding why the introduc- quencing, pacing, and duration of change are
tion of a new information technology system critical variables that provide new theoretical
worked in one organization but did not work in
another. Through a strategic design lens, the insights.
researcher comes to understand that the system Still another reason for selecting the lens is to
worked better in an organization that was de-
sharpen our methodological approaches. The
duration of X and Y and the temporal relation-
ship between X and Y are fundamental ques-
tions, yet in their review of the literature, Mitch-

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 647

ell and James (2001) conclude that these hard time deciding whether we needed to exam-
ine days, weeks, months, or years. In looking at
questions are addressed in very few empirical entrainment patterns, we did not know which
studies. It seems that an explicit consideration cycles to include (technology, customer, fiscal,
of these timing issues would improve the qual- and so on). Only through some difficult trial-
ity of empirical research in our field. and-error learning will we improve our use of
the temporal lens. Last, some features of tempo-
OBSTACLESTO THETEMPORALLENS ral research are inherently complex. For exam-
ple, we have been trying to study teams that
It may be instructive to ponder briefly why respond to attacks on the internet. One obvious
time is not embedded in our research. If it is problem is that we do not know when attacks
(e.g., the spreading of viruses) will occur. Also,
such a pervasive phenomenon, why don't we see the definition of an attack is socially defined.
a well-articulated temporal view throughout or- We can identify attacks after they are publicly
ganizational research? Why do researchers re- determined to be so, but we cannot easily deter-
sist using a temporal lens? mine when an incident is dismissed as not an

One reason may be that most field studies of attack. In addition, the groups that respond to
organizations are often "studies of convenience these attacks are distributed, have a life of a few
or opportunity." It is hard enough to gain organ-
izational access. It is even harder to capture hours or a few days, and change in their com-
events over time using multiple measures. This position from one attack to the next. This means
not only takes time but additional resources and we cannot study group behavior over time.
lots of cooperation. We are accustomed to get- These and other factors make using the tempo-
ting in and out of organizations quickly. These ral lens hard to do.
additional considerations preclude the use of a
temporal lens. There also are broader, institutional reasons

Similarly, much of the experimental work re- for the lack of focus on time. Doctoral disserta-
garding organizational behavior is built around
very short-term tasks. There are a lot of reasons tions are planned around short rather than
for this short-term mentality: existing designs longer stays. Tenure clocks focus new professors
legitimated in the literature, the focus on con- on shorter-term products. The application of
trol, and so on. In any of these cases, the short- time-based research requires new methodolog-
term design makes it more difficult to use a ical approaches that may not resonate with the
temporal lens. It is tricky to include variables of editorial boards of traditional journals. These
duration, pacing, or sequencing in a fifteen- and other institutional factors focus our atten-
minute task (although it has been done; cf. Ger-
sick, 1988; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Waller, Giam- tion on the short term, detracting from temporal
batista, & Zellmer-Bruhn, 1999). issues.

Overall, perhaps the biggest impediment to The basic thesis of this issue is that the
using the temporal lens is that it is simply hard
to do. The difficulty stems from several sources. temporal lens brings new functionality to re-
First, we still have little theory about time lags, search. At the same time, understanding the
feedback loops, and durations, making it diffi- reasons why so little temporal research exists
cult to know when, for how long, and how often may allow us to realistically assess our ability
to measure key variables, even when we want to to stimulate this new form of research. This
take on a temporal perspective. Second, we do
not yet have all of the methodologies needed to special issue will have little effect unless we
measure complex temporal phenomena. Al- (1) rethink how we do our research (e.g., we
though we are skilled at detecting linear pat- need to create new "contracts" with firms that
terns and even quadratic forms, we are not yet
able to readily detect spirals that increase and will let us explore important temporal issues,
decrease over time. Third, we are not experi- to the benefit of both parties), (2) rethink some
enced enough to know how to choose temporal of our institutional arrangements, such as en-
variables. For example, in a study of entrain- couraging more time-based research in theses
ment in software development teams, we had a and our journals, and (3) experiment with
new forms of data collection and analysis. If
new members of our profession begin using
temporal lenses in their research, the body of
research will grow quickly.

648 Academy of Management Review October

LOOKINGTOWARDFUTURERESEARCH TIMINGNORMS:THERHYTHMOF

OPPORTUNITIES INTERACTION

In the remainder of the article, we chart some Barbara S. Lawrence

possible paths for future research. Once we Our temporal lens draws attention to timing
adopt the temporal lens, what new opportunities norms, which people experience as shared, ex-
for research does it reveal? The three paths de- pected patterns of paced activity. Timing norms
lineated represent the views of the special issue govern many activities in organizational life.
editors. We are writing about what we think is Schedules for project completion (Ancona &
important in exploring the temporal lens. There Chong, 1996; Gersick, 1988), patterns of activity
is no attempt to integrate these perspectives; in work processes (Pentland, 1999), and career
rather, they represent important opportunities timetables (Lawrence, 1991) enable people to co-
for research. Coupling these perspectives with ordinate their behavior with that of others and
the concluding sections of other papers in this
issue gives the reader a nice set of directions for help them create meaning out of action. Yet
temporal organizational research. much of our literature focuses on personal expe-
riences with time-for example, on an indi-
In the first discussion Barbara S. Lawrence vidual's time perspective and time urgency
(Waller et al., 2001) or his or her experiences of
explores the idea of timing norms. In all aspects timelessness (Mainemelis, 2001) and flow (Csik-
of organizational life, there are timing norms
that govern a wide range of behaviors in organ- szentmihalyi, 1990). Although the importance of
izations. Questions such as what timing norms individuals' encounters with timing norms is ac-
look like, where they come from, and what their knowledged in the literature (Blount & Janicik,
effects are form the basis of the discussion. Law- 2001; Lawrence, 1988; Zerubavel, 1981), we know

rence also pays attention to methodological is- little about how people jointly create and expe-
sues in studying timing norms. Readers should rience such norms. This essay examines four
be stimulated to think about how timing norms important questions: What do organizational
can be integrated into their own research or timing norms look like? What processes produce
explored as a research topic in their own right. these norms and the meanings they acquire?
What are the individual and organizational con-
The second discussion, by Paul S. Goodman, sequences of such norms? Finally, what tools
builds upon the Mitchell and James (2001) paper can we use to study them?
by examining in more depth their question
about understanding lags in organizational re- One of the classic examples of timing norms
search. That is, given X, when will Y occur? The is Roy's 1959 article, "Banana Time," which de-
goal is not just to help us be more explicit about scribes a small group of machine operators who
when Y will occur but to focus on developing construct their day around time-based rituals.
better theoretical tools to help us understand Hourly, they take a short break named after the
lags in organizational phenomena. Goodman activity that occurs during the break: coffee
draws examples from the literature on organi- time, peach time, banana time, window time,
zational change and organizational errors and lunch time, pick-up time, fish time, and Coke
pays attention to the timing between X and Y in time. These coordinated activities represent
single and multilevel contexts. In much of our daily timing norms. When events do not occur
current research, this timing question is not at the appointed times, the workers experience
carefully considered. But if we adopt the tempo-
ral lens, it forces us to think about the issue. disruption.
Several attributes in this example are worth
In the last discussion Deborah G. Ancona and
noting. First, there is an event timeline. The pat-
Michael L. Tushman use the lens to reframe how terned events-in this case, break times-occur

we think about temporal leadership. They exam- daily. They do not take place on a weekly or
ine top management teams as they entrain their monthly basis; rather, they recur every day. Sec-
organizations to technology cycles, manage ond, the event timeline is paced. The events
across multiple time frames, create temporal ar- don't just transpire every day; they occur at spe-
chitectures, and maintain a vision that provides cific times throughout the day. Third, the event
an anchor for the strategic pacing of the firm. timeline is a norm. We know from Roy's obser-
vations of the workers' coordinated behavior

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 649

that they have a shared understandings and termined by the duration of the expected events
expectations of these events. Work is disrupted (see Pentland, 1999, for a discussion of this dis-
when the prescribed events do not occur at the
prescribed times. Finally, the meaning of the tinction). In "Banana Time" the described activ-
workers' timing norms is socially constructed.
While events and pacing may be either emer- ities occur within a workgroup and could be
gent or scheduled, timing norms are always studied as a group-level phenomenon. However,
given meaning through social interaction. our concern is not so much the group as it is the
expected, shared pattern of behaviors-a timing
Several theoretical questions about such tim- norm for which the level of analysis is one
ing norms need study. The first is What do tim- workday. Other examples include the pacing
ing norms look like? Answering this question of work during a project, where the unit of anal-
involves exploring whether there are different ysis is the project, and sequences of jobs both
types of timing norms, examining what "level of within and outside organizations, where the unit
analysis" means when studying these phenom- of analysis is the career (Lawrence, 1991;
ena, and defining what characteristics consti-
tute a norm in the first place. One way of cate- Zerubavel, 1981). Similarly, organizational
gorizing timing norms is to distinguish between change processes develop timing norms, where
those that emerge through social interaction the unit of analysis is the length of the change
and those that result from formally scheduled effort (Huy, 2001) or the time elapsed for new
events. Although the process of creating socially practices to become diffused and legitimated
shared meaning is the same for both, they differ within an organization (Lawrence et al., 2001).
in how events and pacing are established. At
one extreme, emergent timing norms such as One problem that remains is to define what it
those in "Banana Time" are purely emic (cf. means to observe a socially shared, expected
Headland, 1990). Both the events and their pac- pattern of paced activity. In "Banana Time" the
ing are socially constructed, created, and expe- answer is reasonably simple, since only four
rienced solely by the workers. At the other ex- workers are involved during each one-day time
period. However, in more complex examples,
treme, scheduled timing norms, such as those where the event timeline is longer, more people
for a routine project's PERTchart, display an etic are involved, and the number of events is larger,
quality. Both the events and their pacing are it becomes more difficult to define each event.
established by an external authority. Does this
difference alter the creation and experience of How many people must agree that a timing
event is typical before it is considered to be
meaning around timing norms? Do emergent socially shared?
timing norms exert more control over people's
behavior than scheduled timing norms? Emer- Lawrence (1988) shows that people do not al-
gent timing norms may be stronger because ways perceive the timing of typical events in the
they require a level of buy-in that is unneces- same way. When managers in a large organiza-
sary for scheduled timing norms. Alternately, do tion were asked to describe their organization's
scheduled timing norms exert more control over career timetable, their answers showed strong
people's behavior than emergent timing norms? modal timing patterns: about two-thirds agreed
This might occur because the visibility of sched- on the ages when each career level was
uled timing norms increases people's shared reached. However, this means that one-third dis-
agreement about when events occur. The social
agreed. Is two-thirds agreement "enough" to say
construction of emergent timing norms may de- that the managers' perceptions are socially
crease people's shared agreement. When events shared? What criteria should we use to decide
are not formally scheduled, it is easy to disagree
about when they occur. when we reach sufficient levels of agreement?
Moreover, if more or less agreement exists at
A related issue is what "level of analysis" different times within the timeline of an event,
means in this context. Timing norms do not oc-
cur at the individual, group, and organizational this suggests that deviation at one point may
levels of analysis, although they might be expe- create more or less difficulty than deviation at
rienced this way. Rather, they occur at the event another. The correct timing of events just before
timeline level of analysis, where the unit is de- the curtain falls is more important to the success
of a show than their timing during the middle.

The second question to be answered is Where
do timing norms come from? In "Banana Time"
we can guess that the norms were motivated by

650 Academy of Management Review October

workers' boredom with repetitious work and de- ronmental cues become institutionalized over
sire for meaningful social connection. The
themed breaks emerged during typical eating time. If new technologies increase the speed of
and snacking times, when workers had time to change within the environment, these original
interact with one another and to coordinate their timing norms may no longer work. The organi-
zation's ability to adapt becomes impaired,
efforts. Waller et al. (2001) suggest that a team's reducing its chances of survival (Tushman &
composition of individuals with differing time Romanelli, 1985). Ancona and Tushman discuss
perspectives and time urgency affects its overall
performance. It seems likely that timing this problem in more detail later in this article.
norms-the shared time-related rules for coordi- A second mechanism is change. People expe-

nation-mediate this relationship. For example, rience varying degrees of difficulty in respond-
teams composed of individuals with potentially ing to changes in timing norms. Blount and
conflicting time-related attributes, such as Janicik (2001) explore these potential effects
crammers with their high impatience and irrita- through individuals' cognitive responses. They
bility and visioners with their risk taking and propose that people experience unwanted
focus on future goals, may fail because they schedule changes more negatively when they
have difficulty constructing timing norms that are unexpected, uncertain in length, and have
coordinate their work. What are the processes significant associated opportunity costs. In
by which people negotiate timing norms in sit- "Banana Time" a misunderstood joke changes
uations where individual differences in time ur- the daily schedule. The banter disappears; the
workers' participation in timing norms is de-
gency and time perspective make this difficult? stroyed. Roy describes the effect of this schedule
Timing norms also emerge from the patterned change as "a succession of dismal work-
days devoid of times and barren of themes"
recurrence of events that become artifacts to
(1959: 165).
which people respond. Institutionalization,
learning, adaptive forces, and routines all influ- A third mechanism is comparison. People use
ence the evolution of timing norms (Blount &
Janicik, 2001; Lawrence et al., 2001). However, the event timelines to gauge whether they are on

processes by which these patterns help to create schedule and compare their progress to that of
norms require further explication. It seems
likely that there is close interaction between others (Abbott, 1990; Neugarten, Moore, & Lowe,
workers' observations of socially significant, re-
curring events, such as promotions and project 1965). Lawrence (1988), for example, found that
schedules, and their establishment of timing
norms. People attempt to make sense of the people who are seen by others as ahead of
events they observe and begin to associate each
event with certain timing. Lawrence (1991), for schedule in their organizational careers are
example, found that employees develop shared
perceptions of a career timetable, which appear viewed more positively than those who are seen
to be based on their inferences about the firm's
as on or behind schedule. Managers who are
actual age distribution at different career levels.
While the data show that the actual and per- seen as ahead of schedule are more likely to get
ceived timetables are similar, people tend to
create larger time differences between levels high performance ratings than would be ex-
than appear justified. Thus, although these per-
ceptions are socially shared, they represent an pected by chance. Lawrence (1984a) discovered
exaggeration of reality.
that individual perceptions mediate these ef-
The third question is What are the effects of
timing norms, both positive and negative? There fects. Managers who perceive themselves to be
are at least three mechanisms that predict the
outcome of timing norms. The first is fit. Are the behind schedule have more negative attitudes
timing norms appropriate for the task at hand
(Ancona & Chong, 1996)? An organization's tim- toward work than other managers, even when
ing norms for scanning and incorporating envi-
those perceptions are inaccurate.

The final question is What tools might we use

to explore questions about timing norms? All of

the standard research restrictions apply to this

question, and the answer requires both quanti-

tative and qualitative methods. However, in ad-

dition to standard approaches, two additional

tools should be considered-one conceptual

and one empirical. The conceptual tool is histor-

ical perspective (Lawrence, 1984b). Based on an

idea from Hume (in Mannheim, 1952; 277), plac-

ing events in unlikely settings can generate un-

expected insights, and the contrasts inherent in

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 651

historical comparison may be useful for time moted, we may miss the fact that the former get
research. For example, in studying the human to the top by pathways that are paced quite
life span, scholars have identified consistent, differently than those of their white counterparts
age-specific developmental stages in adult- (Bailyn, 1980; Thomas & Gabarro, 1999). Individ-
hood, punctuated in the middle by a midlife uals are not just promoted or socialized to new
crisis (e.g., Jaques, 1965; Levinson, 1978, 1996). If jobs; they are promoted or socialized within a
we place this result in historical perspective, we timetable spanning their careers (or even their
see that some of the events typically associated lives). If we examine only the success of venture
with this punctuation are historically dependent capital funding, we may miss the fact that fund-
(Lawrence, 1984b). Two hundred years ago, and ing decisions depend on timing norms. In Sili-
without birth control, men in their middle years con Valley, venture capitalists expect an entre-
still had young children running around the preneur's timetable to be fast, furious, and
house: thus, there was no empty nest. People did young, whereas in Great Britain, investors ex-
not expect to change careers and did not pect a more moderate timetable (Cowe, 1998;
experience as many job opportunities as do peo- Moody, 1998).
ple today. Moreover, the human life span
has lengthened, changing the very definition To use this temporal lens, we must first under-
of "midlife." Considering this timing norm in a stand timing norms as a significant phenome-
different historical context generates ques- non in their own right. Consistently paced pro-
tions about its theoretical boundaries and inter- cesses, whether they involve work or social
activity, pervade organizational life. From the
actions. short event timeline of a single customer service
call to the long event timeline of an industry's
An additional empirical tool with which we value chain (Slywotzky, 1996), timing norms de-
might explore timing norms is sequence analy- scribe the rhythm of interaction. They require us
sis (Abbott, 1990). This analysis is particularly to view individual, group, and organizational
suited for timing norms, because it allows us to interaction as paced and meaningful sequences
use event timelines as the unit of analysis. By of events, rather than single, isolated occur-
using optimal matching, we can test hypotheses rences.
about the similarity of events and pacing during
a specified duration. For example, Abbott (1990) UNDERSTANDING TIME LAGS
studied the careers of 595 German musicians in
Paul S. Goodman
the eighteenth century. In this study the events
are the different positions a musician holds, the An important contribution of the temporal lens
pacing is the time between positions, and the and, more specifically, the Mitchell and James
unit of analysis is the career. Abbott found dis- article (2001) is to refocus our attention on criti-
tinctive job sequences for organist, church, and cal timing issues in organizational research.
court careers but not for town or opera careers. That is, if we are interested in the relationship
In the organizational literature Pentland (1999) between X and Y, we need to determine when Y
discusses event sequences as stories, where the
unit of analysis is the story and where the event will occur, given X. If a supervisor changes a
timeline and the narrative it acquires provide reward system, when will an individual perfor-
the basis for much organizational reality. This mance change follow? If a group has more au-
methodology allows us to focus more broadly on thority and responsibility for decision making,
timing norms and to study not only whether peo- when will its performance change? If a large
ple perceive each event or the pacing between organizational change is instituted, when will
events but whether they see the entire event organizational benefits, such as increased pro-
timeline (the "story") and understand its mean- ductivity and customer satisfaction, be realized?
ing to organizational life.
In this section this question of when is ex-
In summary, timing norms provide a temporal plored. Although Mitchell and James (2001) iden-
lens that requires us to think of all behavior, tify this key question, they are more interested
interaction, activity, and events as embedded in a host of methodological time issues, such as
within a paced, temporal context. For example, the duration of X and Y. They also provide the
if we just compare the experiences of minority reader with a set of X and Y configurations,
and white executives after they have been pro-

652 Academy of Management Review October

including reciprocal causation between X and Y * we can develop tools that will permit some
or changes in X and Y over time, and so on. They dynamic forecasting and understanding of
do not go into depth about when Y might occur the lags.
and why it might occur. These are two funda-
mental questions at any level of organization Organizational Change-Single Level
research and are important issues for people
who are interested in multilevel phenomena. Let's assume a multiple-system intervention
is introduced at the departmental level of an
In this discussion some conceptual tools for organization. The intervention includes changes
understanding the lag between X and Y are ex- in rewards, such as pay for knowledge and
amined, beginning in a single-level setting and profit sharing, recognition, communication, and
then moving to a multilevel context. The latter decision-making systems. The intent is to in-
case is interesting because the question of when crease productivity, quality, and employee sat-
changes in a group's performance will affect isfaction. How can we begin to understand the
organizational-level performance, if at all, is ex- when question?
amined. It has been relatively clear over the
past decade that we need to look at organiza- First, the nature of existing work characteris-
tional issues in a multilevel context (Chan, tics can be an important tool in predicting the
results of an intervention. A number of studies
1998). Time lags in a single or multilevel context
have not been explored in any of the articles in (e.g., Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994; Ster-
this issue. man, 1994) have shown that the impact of
changes will be seen more slowly in certain
I begin this exploration by focusing on work settings. For example, Sterman, Repen-
planned organizational change. When an organ- ning, and Kofman (1997) indicate that change
izational intervention is introduced, one ques- was much slower in a product development
tion concerns when we might expect changes in group than in a manufacturing group. In the
outcomes such as productivity, quality satisfac- latter unit tasks were more concrete and less
tion, and so on. Following is an example of this
interesting theoretical and practical problem. I abstract, the problems to be solved were often
had the opportunity to conduct a large-scale more visible, and outcomes such as increased
multidisciplinary assessment of an organization-
al change over multiple years (Goodman, 1979). productivity were easier to measure as com-
A very simple question was when to do the as- pared to the product development group.
sessment. Looking at the organization over a
three-year period, I saw no initial improve- While the nature of work does not predict ex-
ments, but noticeable improvements were visi- actly when the outcomes are likely to appear, it
ble fourteen months into the change. These pos- does indicate that there will be differences
itive outcomes were directly tied to the change
effort. Between years two and three, however, across workgroups and gives us some idea of
there was a gradual decline of the improve- why these differences may occur. The idea is to
ments to the original baseline. The problem is think about the features of work in various set-
that the time periods you select to measure Y
will determine what you will learn. In the exam- tings and the interaction with specific organiza-
ple above, if I had done solely annual measure- tional change interventions. In the above exam-
ments in this study, I would have observed no ple the intervention was designed to improve
team problem-solving skills, ultimately lower-
change. ing costs and improving quality. In the manu-
The basic question, ex ante, is can we better facturing setting the visibility of problems, ease
of measuring outcomes, and fast feedback cy-
understand when Y might occur? Our assump- cles complemented the intervention. In a prod-
tions are uct design group or, similarly, in a research lab,
this form of intervention will not be as good a fit.
* we can develop theories about time lags; As work becomes more abstract, outcomes
* we cannot do point estimates-that is, pre-
harder to measure, and the feedback cycles
dict exactly when changes in outcomes will longer, the lag between changes and results is
occur (e.g., in four days or four months);and likely to be both longer and more difficult to
predict. I introduce other work features in sub-
sequent analyses to sharpen the role of such
features in predicting when Y will occur.

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 653

A second tool that might help in our analysis time, changes the ability of the problem-solving
of when is positive feedback cycles. In these teams to improve cost effectiveness and quality.
cycles, changes in one variable lead to changes This is the beginning of a positive feedback
in a second variable, which lead to changes in cycle. Eventually, as the frequency of problems
the first variable. These cycles tend to acceler- decreases, members of the reactive problem-
ate in one direction, rather than to seek equilib- solving teams can switch to performing contin-
rium. An important issue is the rate and direc- uous improvements, which, in turn, should fur-
tion of acceleration. Positive feedback cycles are ther improve the organization's performance
going to help us predict lags and understand indicators. This is another example of a positive
them in the following way: when the feedback feedback cycle. The positive level of interaction
cycle starts, the acceleration rates are slow; between these two problem-solving processes
however, if we can track the cycle as it begins to should improve organizational outcomes, such
accelerate faster, we will be in a better position as costs, quality, capacity, and utilization,
to predict when Y will occur. which, in turn, should motivate the teams to

Consider the following examples. A multiple operate at higher levels, which, in turn, should
intervention is introduced in a department. Ini- lead to organizational improvements.
tially, there are only a few participants who
work on high-yield and immediate-results In the above examples we cannot give point
projects. Their initial success is broadcast to estimates about when the changes will occur,
others, which motivates other employees to both and we cannot make strong predictions before
participate in the change and produce results. the changes actually begin. But understanding
The positive feedback cycle is underway. As the when a positive feedback cycle starts or fails to
percentage of participants in the change in- start, and the rate at which it accelerates, pro-
creases from 0 to 10 percent to 30 to 40 percent, vides important information about when depart-
the force attracting more people to become in- ment-level outcomes will change. Another inter-
volved in the change accelerates. Also, the ac- esting research challenge is understanding
tual impact on the outcomes will be greater. when these cycles begin to decelerate.
Change effects are not linear. The effects of
moving from 30 to 40 percent participation are By continuing the discussion of the nature of
different, and possibly much larger, than the work variables and the positive feedback cycle,
move from 0 to 10 percent. There is an acceler- we can make the following observations:
ating feedback among participation, motivation,
and results. Better results lead to greater partic- * Positive feedback cycles will start earlier
ipation and motivation, which, in turn, lead to and accelerate faster in manufacturing
even greater results. As these relationships, units versus product development units.
which are all measurable, begin to accelerate, Features of the work (e.g., degree of struc-
the probability of a noticeable change in out- ture, abstract versus concrete tasks, visibil-
comes at the department level will be greater. ity of problems, and visibility of results) af-
fect this timing.
A second example of using positive feedback
cycles to understand temporal lags concerns * Delays in achieving significant benefits or
planned change involving problem-solving and results in product development units (com-
continuous improvement teams. The role of pared to manufacturing units) may discour-
problem-solving teams is to react quickly and age these workers from actively participat-
effectively in solving problems. Continuous im- ing in the change.
provement teams focus on improving the sys-
tem. Initial improvements by the continuous im- * "Quicker"results in a manufacturing unit
provement teams should reduce the number of may lead the organization to move more
resources for change into that unit, which
problems facing the problem-solving teams, may furtheraccelerate the change and pull
which should permit faster response time and resources away from product development
better-quality solutions to the problems these units, which may need these resources
teams do observe. That is, the success of the more. This, in turn, will increase the lag in
the product development unit (Sterman et
continuous improvement teams improves both al., 1997).
cost effectiveness and quality and, at the same
What has been accomplished with this anal-
ysis? First, we can now say more than just
"make time lags explicit." Second, two concepts
were introduced that will help us think about
lags in a change context. These tools do not tell

654 Academy of Management Review October

us exactly when Y will change, but they provide in organizational effectiveness indicators. Any
some guidance on determining when a change increases in the number of constraints or inter-
in outcomes is likely to occur across different
contexts. mediary activities suggest that no effects or very
delayed effects will occur. Compare this picture
Organizational Change-Multilevel to one in which the form of organizing is addi-
tive (e.g., units in a department store), where
A different question is, given change out- typically there are no constraints or intermedi-
comes at one level (e.g., group or department),
when will change occur at the organizational ary activities between the unit and the larger
level? This is an important theoretical and prac- organizational entity. Here, the time between
tical problem. In the literature on organizational changes in one unit's outcomes and the organi-
change, there is some evidence that positive zation's outcomes may be limited only by the
changes at one level do not necessarily have accounting control system (see Goodman, 2000:
positive benefits at other levels (Goodman,
2000). Other studies (MacDuffie, 1995) have Chapters 4-6, for more detail).
shown positive organizational benefits from
change but give little, if any, documentation of Although the nature of work should provide
how individual- and group-level performance some insights regarding the when question,
contributed to these changes. some other concepts discussed earlier may also
be helpful. For example, in the scenario of prod-
Let's go back to one of the earlier examples uct development improvements in the presence
and assert that through technological and or- of constraints and a long manufacturing/sales
ganizational interventions, there were produc- cycle time, it was indicated that changes in Y
tivity improvements in the firm's product devel- might not occur at the organizational level. How-
opment group. Today, the group can design ever, there are some possible compensatory pro-
more products in the same time. The question is cesses. Perhaps this firm has strong reactive
when will the positive changes in this unit im- problem-solving and continuous improvement
pact organizational-level outcomes, such as teams. If a positive feedback exists between
sales and profitability? these two types of teams, the aforementioned
constraints might be removed, or both teams
As with the single-level analysis, the nature of could focus on reducing cycle times. If con-
work is a good place to begin. First, the presence straints are removed and problems with cycle
of constraints elsewhere in the value chain (e.g., time are reduced, we may be better able to link
in production or sales) will help us to under- the changes in the product development unit
stand whether changes in the number of new with the timing of organizational changes in
products a team can design will lead to changes sales and profitability. That is, although certain
in overall organizational sales levels. If there work features lead to long delays in Y, compen-
are constraints in manufacturing or sales capac- satory processes may speed up changes in the
ity to absorb the new products, there will be no organizational outcome variables.
change in organizational-level indicators. How-
ever, if there are no constraints, then the inher- Some Observations

ent time embedded in the manufacturing or In this section only one content area-that of
sales cycles will identify at least the minimum
time frame for organizational-level outcomes to organizational change-has been explored.
occur. For example, if the manufacturing/sales
cycle were three to four weeks, we would have to How generalizable is this approach to other ar-
wait at least that long to see whether changes in
product development led to changes in organi- eas? In a very different kind of literature-that
zational-level outcomes.
of organizational errors-we could use a similar
Another nature-of-work variable takes the
approach (Goodman, 2000). "Organizational er-
form of interdependence. In this example the
workflow is sequential (Thompson, 1967), and rors" refers to deviations from standard prac-
intermediary activities take place between
changes in product development and changes tices that result in negative organizational con-

sequences, such as the Three Mile Island crisis,

the Barings Bank scandal, and so forth.

If we briefly look at some snapshots of the

bankruptcy of Barings Bank, we see a trader

operating well outside the explicit trading limi-

tations-a clear deviation from standard prac-

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 655

tices. In addition, we see a bank providing funds To advance our understanding of when, we
to cover the positions of its trader, motivating must face at least two important challenges.
the trader to further exceed the limits, that at the First, we need to build "minitheories" about lags
in our specific research. In this discussion I pre-
end amounted to more than 28,000 contracts sented the nature-of-work variables (e.g., visibil-
ity of results, constraints, form of interdepen-
worth $29 billion. In this case the positive dence) and positive feedback cycles as
feedback cycle discussed earlier accelerated examples of tools that can help explain lags in
the potential vulnerability of the bank by the organizational change literature and organ-
encouraging the trader to deviate further from izational errors literature. While we need to cre-

accepted practice. ate new theory, rich bodies of conceptual tools
No one could have predicted the earthquake already exist in this literature for us to draw

in Japan that led to a major decline of the Nikkei upon.
Index and the subsequent demise of Barings. The second challenge is to design our re-
However, the accelerating feedback cycle that
put Barings at high risk was observable and search in a way that permits an examination of
avoidable. It was possible to predict that Bar- the when question. If we do quick, cross-
ings was at risk of experiencing a financial di- sectional studies or ten-minute experiments, it
saster. That is, although we could not have pre- is unlikely we can address the question. How-
dicted exactly when Barings would announce ever, this is not simply a call to do only longitu-
bankruptcy, and we could not have predicted dinal studies, although many others have made
anything when the trader began working for the that request. Rather, this is an assertion that
bank, when the trader began to exceed the lim- when Y will occur is a theoretical, interesting
its and the bank reinforced that behavior by question, and whether we prefer to do field stud-
providing funds to cover his positions, the like- ies, experiments, or observational work in a
lihood of bankruptcy increased. As the positive quantitative or qualitative mode, we should
feedback cycle accelerated, so did the probabil- build theories and design research to address
ity of Barings' demise. that question.

Another potential limitation of this analysis is TIME,TECHNOLOGYA, ND DYNAMIC
its focus on only a few concepts-the nature of CAPABILITIEST:OWARDTEMPORAL
work and positive feedback cycles. While there
are, of course, other relevant concepts, the goal LEADERSHIP
of this discussion is to make you think about
how to apply this lag question in your own work. Deborah G. Ancona and Michael L. Tushman
I do not believe there is a generic theory of time
lags; each research problem and each context We now focus the temporal lens on leadership
will evoke a different cluster of factors to help and the temporal tasks of the senior team. The
understand when Y will occur. However, the na- temporal lens centers our attention on cycles,
time perspectives, temporal structures, and
ture of the work and the positive feedback cycle timeless visions. This view complements that of
can help us to understand time lag issues across the three lenses mentioned at the start of this
research areas.
article and the top management team literature
Conclusion by bringing time into the foreground.

The purpose of this discussion has been to The three lenses suggest the role of architect
stimulate the reader to think more explicitly for the firm (strategic design lens), power broker
about the time lags between X and Y. "When and coalition builder (political lens), and mean-
will Y occur?" is a fundamental question at any ing creator (cultural lens) for the senior team
level of organizational analysis. It also is a fun- (Ancona et al., 1999). The top management team
damental question across different levels of literature focuses us on top team demography
analysis. As we conduct more research in a mul- (cf. Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Williams & O'Reilly,
tilevel context, the mapping of changes in Y at 1998), team affect (cf. Staw & Barsade, 1993),
one level to changes in Y at a different level team cognition (cf. Isenberg, 1988), team pro-
presents an exciting area, and the temporal lens cesses (cf. Eisenhardt & Zabaracki, 1992; Peter-
becomes an even more important tool. son, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1998),

656 Academy of Management Review October

and strategy-making capabilities (cf. Burgelman Finally, USA Today built its newspaper fran-
& Doz, 2001; Hambrick, 1997). Yet, in these per- chise over a twenty-year period, based on re-
spectives time has been relegated to the back- porting, producing, and delivering a daily na-
ground (see Eisenhardt, 1989, for an exception). tional paper. By 2000, USA Today was the most
widely circulated newspaper in the United
Here we bring time into the foreground by States. It was, however, challenged by news de-
examining the temporal leadership challenges livered instantaneously by its major competi-
senior teams face as they help their organiza- tors' internet-based organizations. Tom Curley,
tions adapt to changing environments. Teams USA Today's CEO and the architect of its news-
enact temporal leadership as they entrain their paper business, had to grapple with the ques-
organizations to technology and competitive cy- tion of "when is news news": is it once a day or
cles, manage across multiple time frames, and is it second by second? Where other competitors
create temporal architectures for their organiza- floundered, Curley drove streams of innovation
tions. In the context of these multiple and con- inside his organization and built capabilities
trasting time frames, the senior team must such that both his paper and its dot.com busi-
maintain a timeless organizational vision that nesses flourished. By 2001, Curley and his senior
provides an anchor for the strategic pacing of team simultaneously managed both a mature
the organization. 20-year-old newspaper organization and a
young, entrepreneurial web-based news deliv-
To anchor our discussion of time, cycles, dy- ery organization. In executing this proactive rev-
namic capabilities, and temporal leadership, olution, Curley changed five of the seven mem-
consider three brief examples. The senior team bers of his senior team.
at Firestone Tire and Rubber Company had sub-
stantial knowledge of and capabilities in radial These examples illustrate the role of senior
technology and tires in the early 1970s. These teams in building multiple time frames into
competencies were rooted in their considerable their organizations and in shaping the rate of
experience with the European tire business. Fur- both technology cycles and organizational
ther, this senior team had considerable knowl- change. These examples also illustrate the con-
sequences for organizations that do not build
edge of the changing demands of the American the capacity to operate simultaneously in mul-
auto producers (Sull, 1999).Although radial tech- tiple time frames. In this essay we further dis-
nology was fundamentally different from the cuss these challenges and indicate the possibil-
then-standard bias-ply technology, and radial ities for future research.
tires had a significantly longer life span than
bias-ply tires, the business and organizational Technology, Competitive Cycles,
models Firestone's senior team employed were and Entrainment
the same as those employed in their bias-ply
tire business. As a result, Firestone missed the Top management teams face temporal lead-
ership decisions, including how fast to act and
radial tire revolution, underperformed the rest of with which external cycles to coordinate. These
the tire industry throughout the 1970s, and fi- decisions are linked to the concept of entrain-
nally was forced to undergo radical change ini- ment (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983). Entrainment
tiated by an external CEO in 1980. entails adjusting the pace or cycle of one activ-
ity to synchronize with that of another (Ancona &
While Firestone used its bias-ply organization Chong, 1996). In the case of top teams, the lead-
to get into the radial business, Polaroid sepa- ership challenge is to match the pace and cycle
rated its digital camera business from its histor- of organizational change to the competitive and
ically dominant film business; staffed this dis- technological cycles that are of strategic impor-
tinct unit with a new, digitally competent senior tance to the unit. For example, USA Today's
team; and had its senior leader report directly to Curley was able to build a senior team and
the CEO (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Yet, Polaroid's organizational architecture that helped them
senior team, when given the opportunity and entrain to multiple technology cycles, whereas
competencies to operate simultaneously in mul- the teams at Firestone and Polaroid remained
tiple time frames, retreated to its historically
anchored film-based business model. Through
2001, Polaroid's digital business has floundered,
even as the technology it pioneered has pros-
pered in other firms.

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 657

entrained to their historically dominant bias-ply vation streams, as at USA Today, are also asso-
and film-based cycles. ciated with shifts within middle management
(Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992; Pettigrew, 1985, 1987).
The literature on technology cycles is an- If implemented incrementally, reorientations
chored in unfolding processes of variation, se- run the risk of being sabotaged by the politics,
lection, and retention (McGrath, 2001; Tushman structures, and competencies of the status quo
(Kearns & Nadler, 1992; Sabherwal, Hirschheim,
& Murmann, 1998). A technology cycle begins
with a technological discontinuity (e.g., bias-ply & Goles, 2001; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli,
tires, analog camera technology) that triggers
periods of technological ferment. These fermen- 1992).
tation periods are, in turn, closed by the emer-
gence of new dominant designs or industry Top management teams exhibiting temporal
standards. Thus begins a period of incremental leadership do not simply entrain organizational
change that is ultimately destabilized by a sub- change to key technology changes-they act to
sequent technological discontinuity (e.g., radial directly shape the timing and nature of those
tires and digital cameras). external cycles. Managerial actions shape and
direct both technological discontinuities (e.g.,
Effective temporal leadership involves the en- Michelin's action with radials), as well as
trainment of internal organizational change to
external technology cycles. Major organization- the closure on dominant designs (Cusumano,
al changes must be entrained with technologi- Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992). Equally impor-
cal discontinuities (Miller, 1994; Rosenbloom, tant, eras of incremental change typically are
punctuated by managerial actions to initiate
2000; Sastry, 1997; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). product, process, or service discontinuities. For
For example, USA Today's move into web-based example, the initiation of radial tires, digital
news on demand was coupled with sweeping cameras, or instantaneous news was less a
shifts in the firm's structure, controls, systems,
and culture. As previously mentioned, Curley function of technological possibilities than it
replaced nearly all of his senior team during was a choice that senior teams made regarding
this time. In contrast, at Polaroid and Firestone, when to act on technological discontinuities
and/or when to act on creating a dominant de-
a stagnant senior team and organizational iner- sign (Van de Ven & Garud, 1994). While there are
tia stunted the companies' ability to mesh with different rates of technological change for high-
the changing technology cycles (Tripsas & versus low-technology industries, managerial
and community action shape the timing, pacing,
Gavetti, 2000). and nature of technology cycles (Chesbrough,
1999; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; West, 2000).
The frame-breaking organizational changes
required to entrain to shifting markets and/or Managing in Multiple Time Frames
technologies are often initiated by transformed
senior teams (Ancona, 1990; Meyer, Brooks, & Senior teams must build organizational capa-
Goes, 1990; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). While bilities that allow them to function in multiple
temporal environments, each paced by funda-
reorientations are risky, and often done incom- mentally different technological and market
petently (e.g., Carroll & Teo, 1998; Henderson, time frames. These dynamic capabilities mean
1993), persistence in the face of a changing in- that incumbents must exploit their current prod-
novation stream is even riskier. Further, if stra- uct/market position even as they explore new
product/market positions (Foster & Kaplan, 2001;
tegic reorientations are not done proactively, Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). These streams of
they are done reactively-as with Polaroid in innovation, each with their own technology/
digital cameras and Firestone in radial tires. market time frames, must be executed not
Reactive reorientations (turnarounds) are more
sequentially or in rhythmic shifts, but simulta-
risky than proactive reorientations, because neously. For example, Tom Curley was able to
they must be implemented under crisis condi- incrementally innovate his traditional newspa-
tions and under considerable time pressure per business even as he experimented with on-
(Hambrick, Nadler, & Tushman, 1998; Rosen- line and dot.com innovations. Similarly, to be
successful over time, Polaroid had to become
bloom, 2000).

The most effective discontinuous changes are
initiated rapidly and are directed by a senior
team with an integrated change agenda (Nadler
& Tushman, 1998). Proactive moves across inno-

658 Academy of Management Review October

ever more efficient in its analog business, even Ambidextrous organizational designs are
as it experimented with digital technology and composed of radically differentiated subunits
business models (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). with weak tactical integration but with strong
integration within the senior team (Tushman &
Dynamic capabilities require that an organi- O'Reilly, 1997). These subunits represent differ-
zation have two temporal orientations: the ent "time zones," each with its own culture of
present and the future (Brown & Eisenhardt,
1998). In the present, exploitation dominates time, mapping of activities to time, and experi-
through sustained incremental innovation and ence of time (Ancona et al., 2001). As such, the
short-term learning that is entrained to the dom- cultures, goals, and processes of these highly
inant industry design and its associated era of differentiated zones are inconsistent with each
incremental technological change. In contrast,
preparing for the future involves learning-by- other. For example, the dot.com unit at USA To-
doing, creating new product designs, and luck day had a completely different set of structures,
that allow the organization to drive possible norms, and values. The unit's job was to report
new designs, architectural innovations, and/or the news instantaneously, whereas the newspa-
product substitutes. Whether done internally or per reported the news once a day. Curley and
externally, through alliances or acquisitions, se- his new senior team separated the dot.com unit
nior teams learn about alternative futures from from the newspaper; helped it develop its own
competencies, structures, and processes; and
entrepreneurial activity that allows entrainment managed the integration across these units. In
to technological discontinuities and evolving contrast, Firestone's radial unit was embedded
technology cycles (McGrath, 2001). Thus, tempo-
ral leadership is rooted in the senior team's abil- in its bias-ply unit. The history, inertia, and time
ity to operate simultaneously in the present and frames rooted in the incumbent technology pre-
the future. vented the company from successfully imple-
menting the new radial technology.
Organizational Architectures and Time(s)
By building ambidextrous organizational ca-
Dynamic capabilities are rooted in streams of pabilities, the senior management team can
innovation-in simultaneously exploiting and maximize the probability that it will have both
exploring. These contrasting strategic, task, and the expertise and the luck from which to make
temporal requirements must be reflected in dif- proactive, industry-shaping decisions, rather
ferentiated organizational forms (Nadler & than react to others' activities. Ambidextrous or-
Tushman, 1998; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). Se-
nior teams that exhibit temporal leadership de- ganizations create options that allow the senior
sign organizational architectures in a way that team to make informed bets on the future
allows them to operate in multiple time frames.
(Burgelman & Grove, 1996;McGrath, 1999). While
Exploitation requires more highly structured correct strategic bets can be identified only in
processes, roles, and systems; more tightly con- retrospect, managerial action within the firm-
trolled cultures; and a greater emphasis on and with collaborators, alliance partners, and
hierarchy than exploration (Bradach, 1998; governmental agencies-can affect the ultimate
Levinthal, 1997). The time frames for exploitation selection of a new industry standard or the
activities are shorter than those for exploratory success of a product substitute (Cusumano &
activities (Jaques, 1956). Further, for incumbent Yoffee, 1998; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998).
organizations, exploratory activities take place
in the context of larger, older exploitation units, Integration Through a Time-Free Vision
which have their own sense of both time and
Operating in multiple time frames to develop
history (Milliken & Lant, 1991). Because organi- streams of innovation that entrain to different
zational inertia is so strong, exploratory units
must be physically and culturally distinct from technology cycles requires organizational archi-
the exploitative units and must have incentive tectures composed of subunits that are them-
structures rooted in different time horizons selves inconsistent with one another. Beyond
the actions of the senior team, what prevents
(Burgelman, 1991). these internally incongruent organizational
units from destroying each other? The answer is
a clear, emotionally engaging vision that pro-
vides a strategic anchor from which the senior

2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman 659

leadership balances the contrasting require- the background of our field's theory and re-
ments of different innovation streams (Hamel & search, but it clearly needs to be brought to the
Prahalad, 1994;Rotemberg & Saloner, 2000). Sim- foreground. By applying a temporal lens, we
ple, direct organizational aspirations allow the may discover a fundamentally new view of
members of an organization to simultaneously leadership, organizations, and dynamic capa-
host incremental and discontinuous innovations bilities.

(Hurst, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1998). Strategic Future researchers can clearly build on this
integration is further reinforced by senior man- work by further exploring the temporal vari-
agement's consistent behaviors in support of the ables described here or by examining others. In
vision through a small set of overarching core the area of entrainment, we have focused on
values and the use of common-fate reward sys-
tems for the senior team (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000). technology cycles. Clearly, there are additional
cycles that are of importance, including cus-
With a clear, consistent vision the senior team tomer cycles, supplier cycles, and economic cy-
cles. We still need to understand which cycles
can support the internally contradictory organi- are most important. Furthermore, we need to
zational architectures associated with ambidex- understand how to entrain to multiple cycles
with conflicting demands. Finally, we need to
trous organizations and still be seen as consis- explore how many cycles can act as external
tent and credible. In the context of multiple pacers before the internal cycles of the firm
inconsistent time frames, a clear vision and a overwhelm us with their speed and complexity.
Or, put another way, what kinds of internal pac-
few core values provide timeless anchors. For ing and cycles allow for maximum entrainment
example, at USA Today the dot.com and news- to external ones?
paper units were united by Tom Curley's overall
network vision and by shared values of fairness, In the area of dynamic capabilities and ambi-
accuracy, and trust. It is the senior team's role as dextrous organizations, we have argued that
a temporal leader to link these paradoxical re- strategic linkages must be present within the
quirements-to exploit and explore, to act both senior team to ensure strategic control and co-
in the present and the future-together through ordination of innovation streams. However, sub-
its substantive and symbolic actions. Indeed, a
key integrating device may be the coupling of stantial theoretical and empirical differences
multiple time frames associated with ambidex- exist regarding how to effectively design and
trous organizations with a vision and a set of implement structures that enhance dynamic ca-
core values that are time free. pabilities (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998;
Siggelkow, in press). Other models suggest that
Conclusion the entrepreneurial units must be completely
separated or spun out from the business unit
Choosing a few temporal parameters and (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Klepper &
then applying them to the role that senior teams Sleeper, 2000). Still other work suggests lower-
play in organizational leadership and the devel- level integration mechanisms, such as temporal
opment of dynamic capabilities provide a fresh crossing periods and temporal boundary objects
point of view to guide inquiry and practice. Tem- (Ancona et al., 2001). Research is required to
poral leadership on the part of the senior team further understand when and under what condi-
involves the entrainment of organization
change to key technology and competitive cy- tions highly differentiated units should be inte-
cles. It involves managing across multiple tem- grated versus split out from the incumbent unit.
poral orientations, creating appropriate organi- Furthermore, what range of mechanisms can co-
zational architectures, and providing a timeless ordinate across these differentiated units?
vision that both integrates and focuses temporal
decisions. Temporal leadership is about map- In the area of vision, we have argued that a
ping and shaping technology cycles and inte- clear and consistent vision, reinforced by con-
grating across disparate units. sistent managerial action, is needed. Future re-
searchers need to focus on other properties of
Entraining to key technology cycles, moving such a vision and the mechanisms that help
in multiple time frames, and creating temporal organizational members internalize key values
structures are, we believe, the keys to an organ- and behaviors. Future researchers also can ad-
ization's dynamic capabilities. Time has been in
dress the difficulties of changing certain tempo-

660 Academy of Management Review October

ral elements of a culture while maintaining core tional levels of analysis. Here, the language of
values; how can we continue to offer high levels time is translated into specific temporal con-
of service but do it faster and more efficiently? cepts, such as pacing, timing, and sequencing,
which are the direct objects of research. In this
While we have addressed entrainment, multi- article the discussion of timing norms and the
discussion of temporal leadership are exem-
ple time frames, ambidextrous organizations, plars of time-focused research. Taken as a
and vision, future researchers could examine group, the articles in this issue chart a broad
range of research challenges surrounding tem-
the interplay between the temporal issues we poral issues.
raise and other strategic, interpersonal, cultural,
and design issues. In addition, by examining We must acknowledge that working at this
other temporal parameters (such as speed, level is much harder. There is not yet a rich set
rhythm, and scheduling), we can identify addi- of theoretical and methodological tools regard-
tional aspects of temporal leadership. Through ing time. We argue, in this article, that there are
such inquiry the concept of temporal leadership many obstacles to temporal research. There are
can take hold. inherent difficulties in doing this research, as
well as strong institutional forces that work
CONCLUSION against the development of this form of re-
search. However, there are also tremendous op-
The goal of this article-and the issue as a portunities for examining issues of time in cur-
whole-is to advance our understanding of time rent and future research.
in organizational research. Adopting a temporal
lens provides a new and powerful way to view While we do not expect this issue to spark a
sudden proliferation of time-based research, we
organizational phenomena. It makes us speak in believe the temporal lens can be an important
intellectual tool for both refocusing our work
a different language (cf. Ancona et al., 2001), ask and creating new intellectual opportunities.
This issue presents valuable ideas, perspec-
different questions, and use a different frame- tives, and models for doing research on tempo-
ral issues.
work in the methodological aspects of our re-
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Deborah G. Ancona is the Seley Distinguished Professor of Management and a
professor of organization studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her
research centers on team process and performance, time, and entrainment.

Paul S. Goodman holds the Richard M. Cyert Professorship and is a professor of
organizational psychology at Carnegie Mellon University. His research centers on
groups, organizational errors, and tools for multilevel research.

Barbara S. Lawrence is an associate professor of management at The Anderson School
at UCLA. Her research focuses on organizational reference groups, norms, organiza-
tional demography, and social comparison processes.

Michael L. Tushman is the Paul R. Lawrence, MBA Class of 1942 Professor of Business
Administration at the Graduate School of Business, Harvard University. His research
focuses on the relations between technological change, executive leadership, and
organization adaptation, and on managing R&D laboratories.