The politics of heroin CIA complicity in the global drug trade by Alfred W McCoy (z-lib.org)

Notes 7 The Golden Triangle: Heroin Is Our Most Important Product

97. Interview with Touby Lyfoung, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
98. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 161, 296; interview with Touby Lyfoung, Vientiane, Laos, September 1,
1971.

99. Hugh Toye, Laos: Bufler State or Battleground (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 161.

100. Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 75-76.

101. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 179, 207.

102. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

103. Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.

104. Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.

105. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 207.

106. Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 97-100.
107. Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, "Resources for Unconventional Warfare, S.E. Asia," in The New York
Times, The Pentagon Papers, pp. 138-140.

108. Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 103, 115-116.

109. Ibid., pp. 162-163.
110. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Kingdom of Laos, 91 st Cong., I st sess., 1970, pt. 2, p. 473.
111. Interview with William Young, Chianginai, Thailand, September 8, 1971; interview with a former USAID
official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.

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112. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 197 1; Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 171-
173.

113. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 183.

114. The New York Times, April 25, 1963, p. 7.

115. Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.
116. An Australian anthropologist working in northern Thailand has shown that the high price of opium enabled
the Meo in one village to support themselves on only onethird of the land it would have required to produce an
adequate amount of rice for the village's subsistence (Douglas Miles, "Shifting Cultivation-Threats and
Prospects," in Tribesmen and Peasants in North Thailand, Proceedings of the First Symposium of the Tribal
Research Center [Chiangmai, Thailand: Tribal Research Center, 1967], p. 96.)

117. Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 240-245.
118. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971; interview with Gen. Thao Ma,
Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.

119. Inter-view with Lo Kham Thy, Vientiane, Laos, September 2, 1971.

120. Interview with a former USAID official, Washington, D.C., June 1971.

121. Interview with high-ranking Meo officials, Vientiane, Laos, September 1971.
122. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee

on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, pt. 2, p. 465.

123. Ibid., pp. 470, 490.

124. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 297, 299.
125. A Meo social scientist of Paris now working for his doctorate at the University of Paris estimates that there

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were eighty thousand Meo in Meng Khouang Province and fifty-five thousand in Sam Neua Province before the
mass migrations began (interview with Yang Than Dao, Paris, France, March 17, 1971). One USAID refugee
official at Ban Son estimates that there are a total of about 250,000 hill tribesmen living in the mountains of these
two provinces (interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Son, Laos, August 30, 1971 ).

126. Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 294-295; Senate Committee of the Judiciary, Refugee and Civilian War
Casualty Problems in Indochina, pp. 24-28.

127. Interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Son, Laos, August 30, 1971.

128. Ibid.; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, War-Related Civilian Problems in Indochina,
Part II: Laos and Cambodia, 92nd Cong., Ist sess., 1971, p. 48.

129. Interview with Lyteck Lynhiavu, Vientiane, Laos, August 28, 1971. (Lyteck Lynhiavu is a member of one
of the most prestigious Meo clans in Laos and director of administration in the Ministry of the Interior.)

130. Ibid.; interviews with Meo villagers, Long Pot village, Laos, August 1971. The Royal Laotian government
conducted an investigation of Vang Pao's regular infantry - battalions in September 1970 and found that all of
them were far belO*w their reported payroll strength of 550 men: the Twenty-first Battalion had 293 men, the
Twentyfourth Battalion had 73, the Twenty-sixth Battalion had 224, and the Twentyseventh Battalion had 113.
According to Laotian army sources, Vang Pao was pocketing the difference.

131. Interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Son, Laos, August 30, 19 1. (George Cosgrove is a USAID refugee
officer for Military Region II.)

132. James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Laos: April 1971, 91st Cong., Ist sess.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1971), p. 16.

133. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 352.

134. Interview with Chinese merchants, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971. It is very difficult to measure the exact
impact of the U.S. bombing campaign and refugee movements on Laotian opium production. However, the U.S.
Bureau of Narcotics has made an attempt. In 1968 the Bureau estimated Laos's production at 100-150 tons. In
mid-1971 it estimated Laos's total production at 35 tons. (U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "The
World Opium Situation," p. 10; U.S. Congress, Senate Committeee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and
Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, 92nd Cong., Ist sess., 1971, p. 583.)

135. The authors visited Long Pot District from August 18 to August 23,

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1971. Most of the following information is based on these six days in Long Pot unless otherwise noted.

136. Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.

137. For a detailed examination of the problem of "choice" in a Meo village in Thailand, see W. R. Geddes,
"Opium and the Miao: A Study in Ecological Adjustment," in Oceania 41, no. I (September 1970).

138. One Thai government study reported that "tasting" is an important part of opium cultivation:

"In each village, one or a few men are able to determine the suitability of the terrain for poppy by tasting the soil;
apparently a highly respected qualification. When the ph [soil acidity index], after several years of continual use,
begins to decrease, these men can 'taste' when the soil becomes unsuitable for further poppy cultivation" (F. R.
Moormann, K. R. M. Anthony, and Samarn Panichapong, "No. 20: Note on the Soils and Land Use in the Hills of
Tak Province," in Soil Survey Reports of the Land Development Department [Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand,
Ministrv of National Development, March 19641, p. 5).

139. F. B. G. Keen, The Meo of North-West Thailand (Wellington, New Zealand: Government Printer, 1966), p.
32.

140. For a description of the burn-off in other hill tribe villages, see Paul J. Zinke, Sanga Savuhasri, and Peter
Kunstadter, "Soil Fertility Aspects of the Lua Forest Fallow System of Shifting Cultivation," Seminar on Shifting
Cultivation and Economic Development in Northern Thailand (Chiangmai, Thailand, Janu~iry 18-24, 1970), pp.
910.

141. Geddes, "Opium and the Miao: A Study in Ecological Adjustment," pp. 8-9.

142. Keen, The Meo of North-West Thailand, p. 35.

143. Ibid., p. 36; Dessaint, "The Poppies Are~Beautiful This Year," p. 36.

144. In comparison, Professor Geddes found that the Meo village of seventyone houses he surveyed in northern
Thailand produced a minimum of 1,775 kilos, or over 11/4 tons of raw opium. This is an average of 25 kilos per
household compared to an estimated 15 kilos for Long Pot villaee (Geddes, "Opium and the Miao: A Study in
Ecological Adjustment," P. 7).

145. Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Southeast Asia, August 1971.

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146. Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.

147. A Report on Tribal Peoples of ChianRrai Province North of the Mae Kok River, Bennington-Comell
Anthropological Survey of the Hill Tribes in Thailand (Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1964), pp. 28-29; Delmos
Jones, "Cultural Variation Among Six Lahu Villages, Northern Thailand," (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University,
1967), pp. 40-41, 136.

148. Interview with the headman of Nam Suk village, refugee village, Long Pot Divrict, Laos, August 21, 1971.

149. Interview with the headman of Nam Ou village, refugee village, Long Pot District, Laos, August 21, 1971.

150. Many Meo clan leaders regard Vang Pao as something of an uncultured usurper. According to a number of
influential Meo, Vang Pao is acutely aware of his low social stature and has tried to compensate for it by
marrying his relatives into Touby's family. In 1967 Vang Pao's daughter,

May Ken, married Touby's son, Touxa Lyfoung. In 1969 Vang Pao's son, Franqois Vangchao, married Touby's
daughter, May Kao Lyfoung. Finally, in 1970 Vang Pao's nephew, Vang Gen, married Touby's niece, May
Choua Lyfoung. Vang Pao was threatened by military setbacks and mounting opposition from the Lynhiavu clan,
and so felt compelled to arrange this last marriage to shore up his declining poli ical fortunes.

151. Interview with Edgar Buell, Ban Son, Laos, August 31, 1971.

152. Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 22, 1971.

153. Ibid.

154. When the authors left Long Pot District on August 23, a number of village headmen explained that their
people would begin dying from starvation in several months and urged us to somehow force the Americans into
making a rice drop. Upon return to Vientiane, we explained the situation to the local press corps and an article
appeared several days later in The Washington Post and on the Associated Press wires. As might be expected,
many American officials denied that the rice had been cut off.
Edgar Buell was incensed and told the authors, "When you're saying that no f-- rice gets into that village you're
not saying that Charlie Mann [USAID director] won't send it in. And sending or not sending soldiers don't make
any difference. Hell, hippies, yippies and every other thing won't go. Now if they won't send soldiers we don't
take 'em out of college or pL4 'ern in jail; we give 'em rice. . . .

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"You shouldn't have snuck into that village and then talked to Charlie Mann. You should have come here right
off and talked to Pop Buell and got the real story. You've caused a lot of trouble for people here. Hell, I'd kill
anybody who'd say old Pop Buell would let somebody starve" (interview with Edgar Buell, Ban Son, Laos,
August 30, 1971).

On September 2 Norman Barnes, director of United States Information Service, and Charles Mann, director of
USAID/Laos, flew to Long Pot village to make a report on the situation for USAID/Washington. Norman Barnes
later contradicted Edgar Buell's assertion that the rice drops had not been cut off and admitted that there had been
no deliveries since early March. Mr. Barnes denied that there were any ulterior motives and explained that the
presence of Pathet Lao troops in the immediate area from early March until August 20 made it impossible for
aircraft to operate in Long Pot District. But, Mr. Barnes was now happy to report that deliveries had been
restored and a rice drop had been made on August 30 (interview with Norman Barnes, Vientiane, Laos,
September 3, 1971).

However, the authors saw an Air America UH-lH helicopter land at Long Pot on the afternoon of August 19 and
were told by villagers at the time that Air America's helicopters had been flying in and out of the village since the
rice drops stopped. Moreover, villagers reported that Pathet Lao forces had left the area several months earlier.

155. Interview with the assistant headman of Ban Nam Muong Nakam, Long Pot village, Laos, August 21, 1971.

156. Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971. In late 1971 one American reporter
flew over the Plain of Jars and described what he saw:

"A recent flight around the Plain of Jars revealed what less than three years of intensive American bombing can
do to 6 rural area, even after its civilian population has been evacuated. In large areas, the primary tropical color-
bright green-has been replaced by an abstract pattern of black, and bright metallic colors. Much of the remaining
foliage is stunted, dulled by defoliants.

"Today, black is the dominant color of the northern and eastern reaches of the Plain. Napalm is dropped regularly
to burn off the grass and undergrowth that covers the Plain and fills its many narrow ravines. The fires seem to
burn constantly, creating rectangles of black. During the flight plumes of smoke could be seen rising from
bombed areas. . . .

"From an enlarged negative of a photograph covering one small, formerly grass-covered hill about 100 feet high,
I spotted several hundred distinct craters before losing count. In many places it is difficult to distinguish
individual craters; the area has been bombed so repeatedly that the land resembles the pocked, churned desert in
stormhit areas of the North African desert" (T. D. Allman, "Plain Facts," Far Eastern Economic Review, January
8, 1972, p. 16); for a description of life under the bombs in northern Laos, see Fred Branfman, ed., Voices from
the Plain of Jars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

157. Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.

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158. Interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Sop, Laos, August 30, 1971.

159. The bombing has seriously disrupted opium production even in villages that manage to survive the attacks
and remain in their original location. In August 1971 the authors visited the Yao village of Pha Louang. in the
mountains eighty miles north of Vientiane. Residents reported that their village had been bombed in August 1964
by a squadron of T-28s bearing Royal Laotian Air Force markings. When the planes first appeared over the
village, people hid in their houses. But as the bombs began hitting the houses they tried to flee into the forest. The
aircraft strafed the village, shooting the people as they tried to climb up the steep ridges that surround the village.
All the houses were destroyed, most of the livestock was killed and twelve people (about 20 percent of the
inhabitants) were killed. There were five Pathet Lao soldiers hiding in a cave about a mile away and villagers feel
they might have been the cause of the attack. Once the planes left, the Pathet Lao emerged from the cave
unharmed and marched off. Villagers report that the mid 1971 opium harvest will equal the harvests before the
bombing attack. However, intervening harvests have been much smaller because of the material and human
losses they suffered.

Long Pot itself is no longer producing opium. In late 1971 Roval Laotian Army troops turned the village into a
forward combat base in preparation for the upcoming dry season offensive by Pathet Lao forces. When the
offensive got underway in December, Pathet Lao forces attacked the area and reportedly "overran" Long Pot on
January 10, 1972. This dispatch appeared in a NLF newspaper:

"Meantime, at Salaphoukhoun [junction of Route 13 and Route 7], 70 km west of the Plain of Jars, LPLA
[Laotian Peoples' Liberation Army] overran the Phouphaday, Phouvieng and Ban Long Pot positions, knocked
down hundreds of enemy troops, captured many others, and seized a great deal of weapons."(South Vietnam in
Struggle [Hanoi, DRVN], January 17, 1972, p. 7.)

160. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.

161. Interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.

162. The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, pp. 313-314, 362.

163. Interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.

164. The New York Times, October 22, 1966, p. 2.

165. Gen. Thao Ma had good reason to fear Kouprasith. Following the February 1965 coup, General Phourni's
right-hand man, General Siho, fled to Thailand. After consulting with a monk in Ubol, Thailand, who told him
that it would be good luck to go home, General Siho returned to Laos. General Kouprasith had him arrested and
imprisoned at Phou Khao Kquai, where he was shot while "attempting to escape" (Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p.
287). According to a former USAID official, Loring Waggoner, Kouprasith's right-hand man, Gen. Thonglith
Chokbengboung, told him at a funeral for one of Thonglith's relatives several years after the incident, "Siho was

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dirty and corrupt," and that he was "glad" that he had a hand in eliminating him (interview with Loring
Waggone~, Las Cruces, New Mexico, June 23, 1971).

166. Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.
167. Ibid.; interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, August 21, 1971; interview with Gen. Thao
Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.

168. Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #232/66), October 22, 1966.

169. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 290.
170. Interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971; The New York Times, October 22,
1966, p. 1; ibid., October 24, 1966, p. 4.

171. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 29 1.

172. Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.

173. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.

174. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 217-218.

175. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 1971.
176. Interview with Maj. Chao La, Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971; Peter Kandre, "Autonomy and
Integration of Social Systems: The In Mien ('Yao' or 'Man') Mountain Population and Their Neighbors," in
Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, 1. 11, p. 585.

177. Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.

178. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

179. Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.

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180. J. Thomas Ward, "U.S. Aid to Hill Tribe Refugees in Laos," in Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes,
Minorities, and Nations, vol. 1, p. 297.

181. Inter-view with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
182. Fred Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos, 1964-1970," in Adams and McCoy, eds., Laos: War and
Revolution, p. 270.

183. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

184. Interview with Maj. Chao La, Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971.

185. Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.

186. Ibid.
187. Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, New York, June 1971; interview with
William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
188. In the early 1950s for example, anthropologists estimated that there were 139,000 Lahu in China's Yunnan
Province, 66,000 in northeastern Burma, and 2,000 in Nam Tha. Currently, there are 16,000 Yao in Nam Tha and
probably over 100,000 in Yunnan, most of whom dwell in the border regions. (Frank M. Lebar, Gerald C.
Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia [New Haven, Human Relations
Area Files Press, 19641, pp. 31, 82; interview with Maj. Chao Lao, Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971; Peter
Kunstadter, "China: Introduction," in Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, vol. 1, p.
1~4.)

189. Kandre, "Autonomy and Integration of Social Systems," p. 607.

190. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

191. Sowards and Sowards, Burma Baptist Chronicle, p. 409. (Emphasis added.)

192. Ibid., p. 411.
193. Ibid., pp. 412-413; for one of Reverend Young's early reports from China, see Lizbeth B. Hughes, The

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Evangel in Burma (Rangoon: American Baptist Mission Press, 1926), pp. 124-129.

194. Sowards and Sowards, Burma Baptist Chronicle, pp. 413-414.

195. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

196. Lebar et al., Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia, p. 32.

197. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

198. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 159-160.
199. Josef Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma," Journal
of Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (November 1958), 54.
200. F. K. Lehman, "Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems," in Kunstadter, ed.,
Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, vol. 1, pp. 94-95. The vehemence of the Shan reaction to these
arrests by Ne Win can be seen in these paragraphs from a communiqué by the Shan State Army:
"Our leaders secretly and fervently hoped against hope that they would come out successful and save Union of
Burma from plunging into Racial Wars and eventually forced into a potentially hot-spot for the stability of
Southeast Asian Countries. Their dreams turned into a nightmare, and their hopes shattered but shaping up of
events and situation developments shows that what they had forseen [sic] are materializing and we are
witnessing it. Everything proved to the Shan people's suspicions on the Burmese or rather Newin and the only
choice we had in wanting to own our own rights proved to be correct. This armed struggle that they did not want
was the only choice after all" (Communiqué from the Central Executive Committee, Shan State Progress Party,
typescript [Chiangmai, Thailand, September 1971, pp. 1-2).

201. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
202. Interview with Rev. Paul Lewis, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 7, 1971. (Reverend Lewis was working in
Kengtung at the time of the U Ba Thein's departure.)

203. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971. departure.)

204. The Washington Post, August 6, 1971. departure.)

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205. One of the first camps used for training was located in a river valley about twelve miles due north of Nam
Keung, but this was closed in 1965 when Chao La arxd a group of Chinese opium smugglers opened an opium
refinery nearby. Young was afraid that the constant movement of mule caravans and boats in and out of the area
would compromise the base's security; eventually it was moved across the Mekong River into Thailand and
rebuilt in an uninhabited mountain valley, known only by its code name, "Tango Pad" (interview with William
Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971). departure.)

206. Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tba Province, New York, June 1971. departure.)

207. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971; interview with U Ba Thein,
Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971. departure.)

208. The Boston Globe, September 3, 1970; interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos,
New York, June 1971. In general, the security on these cross-border operations was terrible, and almost every hill
tribesman in the Golden Triangle region knew about them. In mid 1971 the authors met several Yao tribesmen in
northern Thailand who knew the names of five or six Yao who had been on the forays and could recite their
itinerary with remarkable accuracy. Both the Chinese and Burmese governments knew about the operations,
since they have captured a number of teams. In fact, it seems that the American public were the only interested
party ignorant of their existence. departure.)

209. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971; interview with U Ba Thein,
Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971. (Since Young's resignation from the CIA in 1967, these
bases have declined in importance and may no longer be in operation.) departure.)

210. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971. There have been a
number of reports that Air America helicopters have been forced to land in Burma because of mechanical failure.
According to one report by Dispatch News Service International correspondent Michael Morrow, an Air America
helicopter was forced to make an emergency landing in May 1971 in the eastern Shan States. The helicopter had
been chartered from Air America and was reportedly carrying a CIA operative (Dispatch News Service
International, November 8, 1971 ). departure.)

211. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.

212. Ibid.

213. Interview with Rev. Paul Lewis, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 7, 1971; interview with William Young,
Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

214. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

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215. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.

216. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

217. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang KhoUg District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
218. Adrian Cowell, "Report on a Five Month Journey in the State of Kengtung with the Shan National Army,"
typescript (1965).
219. Ibid.; For Eastern Economic Review, July 24, 1971, p. 40; interview with Adrian Cowell, London,
England, March 9, 1971.
220. Cowell, "Report on a Five Month Journey in the State of Kengtung"; Far Eastern Economic Review, July
24, 1971, p. 40.

221. Cowell, "Report on a Five Month Journey in the State of Kengtune."
222. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chianamai, Thailand, September 14, 1971. (This story was confirmed by
several former members of the SNA, leaders of other Shan armies, and residents of the Huei Krai area.)
223. Out of the seven hundred tons of raw opium produced in northeastern Burma, approximately five hundred
tons are exported to Laos and Thailand. A maximum of 15 percent of the opium harvest is consumed by hill tribe
addicts before it leaves the village (Gordon Young, The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand, The Siam Society,
Monograph no. 1 [Bangkok, 19621, p. 90). In addition, an estimated sixty-five tons are smuggled into Burma's
major cities for local consumption (interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971).

224. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.

225. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

226. The New York Times, February 17, 1961, p. 4; ibid., February 18, 1961, p. 1.
227. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 193; according to President Kennedy's Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
affairs, Roger Hilsman, Kennedy pressured Taiwan to withdraw the KNIT forces from Burma in order to
improve relations with mainland China. However, Taiwan insisted that the evacuation be voluntary and so "a few

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bands of irregulars continued to roam the wilds (Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation,pp. 304-305).
228. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
229. Paul T. Cohen, "Hill Trading in the Mountain Ranges of Northern Thailand" (1968).
230. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
231. Ibid., pp. I 1- 14.
232. Young, The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand, p. 83.
233. F. W. Mote, "The Rural 'Haw' (Yurmanese Chinese) of Northern Thailand," p. 489.
234. Ministry of the Interior, Department of Public Welfare, "Report on the SocioEconomic Survey of the Hill
Tribes in Northern Thailand," mimeographed (Bangkok, September 1962), p. 23.
235. Ibid., p. 37.
236. Interview with Col. Chen Mo-su, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 10, 1971; The New York
Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1.
237. Interview with Col. Chen Mo-su, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 10, 1971.
238. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
239. The Weekend Telegraph (London), March 10, 1967, p. 25.
240. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971; interview with Jao Nhu, Chiangmai,
Thailand, September 8, 1971; interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.

241. The New York Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1; interview with Jao Nhu, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8,
1971.

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242. The New York Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1; interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand,
September 11, 1971.

243. Interview with Jao Nhu, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

244. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.

245. Interview with Jao Nhu, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.

246. Ibid.; The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2.
247. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2; interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12,
1971.

248. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

249. Ibid.

250. The New York Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1.

251. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.
252. In May 1965, for example, The New York Times reported that General Ma was operating in a mountainous
area of western Yunnan about twenty miles across the border from Ving Ngun and said that unmarked aircraft
were making regular supply drops to his troops (The New York Times, May 18, 1965, p. I).

253. Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
254. The Weekend Telegraph (London), March 10, 1967, pp. 27-28. In September 1966 four hundred of General
Tuan's best troops left their barren wooden barracks on top of Mae Salong mountain, saluted the gaudy, twenty-
foot-high portrait of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that decorates the parade ground and marched off into the
jungle. After plunging across the Burma-China border into western Yunnan Province, General Tuan's troops fled
back across the border, leaving eighty casualties behind (The New York Times, September 9, 1966, p. 3; The
Weekend Telegraph, March 10, 1967, p. 27).

255. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

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256. "Opium War-Take Three," dispatch from McCulloch, Hong Kong, filing from Saigon, to Time World, New
York (August 22, 1967), p. 10.

257. Jeffrey Race, "China and the War in Northern Thailand" (1971), p. 26.

258. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
259. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971; "Opium War Add," dispatch from
McCulloch, Hong Kong, filing from Saigon, to Time World (August 23, 1967), p. 2.
260. "Opium War-Take Two," dispatch from Vanderwicken, Hong Kong, filing from Saigon, to Time World,
New York (August 22, 1967), p. 4.

261. The New York Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1.
262. Race, "China and the War in Northern Thailand," p. 27; interview with Lawrence Peet, Chiangrai, Thailand,
August 9, 1971. (Lawrence Peet is a missionary who was working in Lahu villages near the caravan trail at the
time of the Opium War.)

263. Interview with the principal of Ban Khwan public school, Ban Khwan, Laos, August 9, 1971.

264. Ibid.; interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.

265. Race, "China and the War in Northern Thailand," p. 27.

266. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.

267. Ibid.

268. "Opium War-Take Two," dispatch from Vanderwicken, p. 5.

269. Interview with Gen. Quane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.

270. The New York Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1.

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271. Race, "China and the War in Northern Thailand," p. 28.
272. "Opium War-Take Two," dispatch from Vanderwicken, pp. 4, 6; The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., June
19, 1972.

273. The New York Times, AuPust 11, 197 1, p. 1.

274. Interview with the principal of Ban Khwan Public School, Ban Khwan, Laos, August 9, 1971.
275. Race, "China and the War in Northern Thailand," p. 28; Mote, "The Rural 'Haw' (Yunnanese Chinese) of
Northern Thailand," pp. 488, 492-493.
276. Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium-Producing
Areas in Thailand, p. 64.

277. Race, "China and the War in Northern Thailand," pp. 21-23.

278. Ibid.
279. Ibid., pp. 29-3 1; the insurgency in northern Thailand is regarded as the "most serious" military problem
now facing the Thai government. (A Staff Report, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January 1972, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972, p. 14.)
280. Alfred W. McCoy, "Subcontracting Counterinsurgency: Academics in Thailand, 1954-1970," Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars, December 1970, pp. 64-67.

281. The Weekend Telegraph, p. 27.
282. According to a 1961 report by Gordon Young, 50 percent of the Meo, 20 percent of the Lahu, 75 percent of
the Lisu, and 25 percent of the Akha tribesmen in northern Thailand have some fluency in Yunnanese. In
contrast, only 5 percent of the Meo, 10 percent of the Lahu, 50 percent of the Lisu, and 25 percent of the Akha
speak Thai or Laotian (Young, The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand, p. 92).

283. Interview with Col. Chen Mo-su, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 10, 1971.

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284. Interview with General Krirksin, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 10, 1971.

285. Interview with Col. Chen Mo-su, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 10, 1971.

286. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2; NBC Chronolog, April 28, 1972.

287. "Opium War-Take Three," dispatch from McCulloch, pp. 1-2.

288. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Cb~angmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.

289. Interview with Hsai Kiao, ChiaNrai, Thailand, September 13, 1971.

290. Interview with Jao Nhu, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

291. Inter-view with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.
292. The Shan Unity Preparatory Committee was a coalition of the rightwing Shan rebel groups formed mainly to
provide effective joint action against the Burmese Communist party. This quotation from one of their
communiqués conveys the group's conservative character and its anti-Communist first principles:
"In the areas bordering Communist China in the Kachin and Northern Shan States particularly, armed bands
trained and armed by the Communist Chinese composed mostly of China born Kachins and Shans are now very
active.... The Shan Unity Preparatory Committee (SUPC) believes unity within the Union of Burma is definitely
attainable and there is no reason why unity based on anti-communism, a belief in Parliamentary democracy and
free economy, and last but not least, a unity based on the principles of Federalism cannot be achieved..." (The
Shan Unity Preparatory Committee, "Communiqué No. 5," mimeographed [Shan State, March 14, 1968], pp. 12).

293. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.
294. Communiqu6 from the Central Executive Committee, Shan State Progress Party, September 1971, pp. 1-2.

295. The Shan State Army admits to having transported the following quantities of raw opium from the northern
Shan States to northern Thailand: 160 kilos in 1964, 290 kilos in 1965, 960 kilos in 1966, 1,600 kilos in 1967,
nothing in 1968, and 80 kilos in 1969 (interview with Jao Nhu, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971).

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296. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

297. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1968 Yearbook (14ong Kong), p. 123; Far Eastern Economic Review, 1971
Yearbook (Hong Kong), p. 108.

298. In September 1971, for example, the authors were invited to visit a Shan rebel camp near Huci Krai.
However, on the morning of the visit (September 13) the authors received the following note:
"Sorry to inform you that your trip with us to Mae Sai is not approved by the Thai authorities. Because it is near
the Burmese border and it might be possible for the Burmese to know it.
"It is better to stay within the regulations since the host, the Thais, is giving us a warm and friendly reception.
[signed] Hsai Kiao"

299. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 1971, pp. 47-49; ibid., April 17,1971,pp.19-20.

300. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971; interview with Jao Nhu,
Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

301. Interview with Hsai Kiao, Chiangrai, Thailand, September 12, 1971; interview with Jimmy Yang,
Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

302. Interview with Psai Kiao, Chiangrai, Thailand, September 12, 1971.

303. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2.

304. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 1970, p. 22; ibid., April 17, 1971, p. 20.

305. Newsweek, March 22, 1971, p. 42,1 interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8,
1971.

306. The New York Times, January 3, 1971, p. 9; ibid., January 31, 1971, p. 3.

307. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

308. It was not possible for U Nu to ally with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which controls much of
Kachin State. Its leaders are Bantist Christians who resented U Nu's establishment of Buddhism as a state
religion. The head of the KIA is a Baptist Christian named Zau Seng. He founded the Kachin Independence
Army with his brothers in 1957, and with the exception of brief negotiations with Ne Win in 1963, he has been

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fighting ever since. When he is in Thailand trading in opium and buying arms, his brothers, Zau Dan and Zau Tu
direct military operations in Kachin State. Unlike the Shans, Zau Seng is the undisputed leader of the
conservative Kachins, and his troops control most of Kachin State. Relations between Zau Seng and the Kachin
Communist leader, Naw Seng, are reportedly quite hostile.

309. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

310. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

311. Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

312. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.

313. Interview with Hsai Kiao, Chiangrai, Thailand, Sentember 13, 1971; interview with Brig. Gen. Tommy
Clift, Bangkok, Thailand, September 21, 1971.

314. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.

315. Interview with Hsai Kiao, Chiangrai, Thailand, September 13, 1971.

316. It appears that the Young family is revered mainly by the Black Lahu of northern Kengtung State and
western Yunnan. The original prophecy of the White God was made by a Black Lahu, and the Youngs had a
remarkable conversion rate among them. In contrast, the Red Lahu have generally remained animist and regard
the "Man God" as their living deity. The "Man God" has his headquarters west of Mong Hsat and is influential
among the Red Lahu of southern Kengtung State. The terms "red" and "black" derive from the fact that different
Lahu subgroups wear different-colored clothes. On the other hand, the term "Red" Meo is a political term used to
designate Communist Meo insurgents. Many Red Lahu tribesmen have now become afraid that their
ethnolinguistic designation may be misinterpreted as a political label. Red Lahu tribesmen in northern Thailand
usually claim to be Black Lahu when questioned by anthropologists. Thus, when the "Man God's" son spoke, he
said that the Red Lahu were not Communists as many people thought and would willingly join their brother Lahu
in the struggle against Ne Win (interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971).

317. Ibid.

318. Tinker, The Union of Burma, pp. 38, 395.

319. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

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320. Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram 2, no. 3 (March-April 1971), 6.
321. The Burmese Communist party's (BCP) reasons for abolishing the opium trade are very pragmatic:
1. Since the BCP is a political enemy of the Burmese government, the KMT, and the Shan rebels, it would be
impossible for it to send an opium caravan into Thailand even if it wanted to.
2. Continuing the exploitative opium tax would alienate the BCP from the people.
3. Since Shan rebels and government militia are only interested in occupying opiumproducing territories, opium
eradication weakens their desire to retake lost territory (interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand,
August 12, 1971).

322. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.

323. Interview with residents of Chiang Saen, Thailand, August 1971.

324. Interview with officers in the Royal Laotian Air Force, Vientiane, Laos, JulyAugust 1971.

325. "Opium War Add," dispatch from McCulloch, p. 2.

326. "Opium War-Take 2," dispatch from Vanderwicken, p. 6.
327. According to a U.S. narcotics analyst, General Ouane's control over the opium traffic in the Ban Houei Sai
region was further improved in 1968 when Colonel Khampay, a loyal Ouane follower, was appointed regional
commander. Colonel Khampay reportedly devoted most of his military resources to protecting the Ban Houei
Tap refinery and moving supplies back and forth between Ban Houei Sai and the refinery (interview with an
agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, New Haven, Connecticut, May 3, 1972); The Evening,
Star, Washington, D.C., June 19, 1972.

328. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2.

329. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
330. The attack on Long Tieng in early 1972 has inevitably created problems for narcotics dealings among Vang
Pao's troops. It is entirely possible that they are no longer in the heroin business, but it will require time before
we know whether they have reopened their laboratory somewhere else.

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331. Interview with Elliot K. Chan, Vientiane, Laos, August 15, 1971.
332. Cabled dispatch from Shaw, Vientiane (Hong Kong Bureau), to Time, Inc., received September 16-17,
1965.

333. Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #56/66), March 16, 1966.

334. Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #58/66), March 18, 1966.
335. Direction du Protocole, Ministre des Affaires ttrang6res, "Liste des Personnalit6s Lao," mimeographed
(Rovaume du Laos: n.d.), p.155.

336. Interview with a Thai police official, Bangkok, Thailand, September 1971.
337. Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, New Haven, Conn., May 3 - 1972.

338. Interview with Western dir)lomatic official, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971; interview with Third World
diplomatic official, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971 (this account of the incident has been corroborat(-.d by reports
received by the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs [Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, New Haven, Connecticut, November 18, 19711) -, interview with a Laotian
political observer, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971.

339. Interview with a Laotian political observer, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971.

340. Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #1566/71), September 6, 1971.
341. Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Southeast Asia, September 1971.

342. Ibid.

343. Hamilton-Paterson, The Greedy War, p. 194.

344. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1971, pp. 40-41.

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345. In its July 19, 1971, issue, Newsweek maga7ine hinted that the United States had used its "other means of
persuasion" to force Gen. Ouane Rattikone into retirement. This suggestion is based only on the imagination of
Newsweek's New York editorial staff. According to the Vientiane press corps, Newsweek cabled its Vientiane
corresnondent for confirmation of this story and he replied that Ouane's retirement had been planned for over a
year (which it was). Reliable diplomatic sources in Vientiane found Newsweek's suggestion absurd and General
Ouane himself flatly denied that there had been any pressure on him to retire (Newsweek, July 19, 1971, pp. 23-
24).
346. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.

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Notes 8 What Can Be Done?

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia

8 What Can Be Done?

1. In 1965 there were 57,199 known addicts. Using standard conversion ratios for years past, this yields an
estimated addict population of 150,000. (Bureau of Narcotics, U.S. Treasury Department, Traffic in Opium and
Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ending Dec-ember 31, 1965 [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1966], p. 45.)

2. Statement of John E. Ingersoll, Director, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Department of
Justice, before the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, New York City, February 24, 1972, p.
5.

3. In May 1970 one research organization reported: "Until recently, middle-class drug users almost always stayed
away from heroin. In the last year there has been a sizeable increase in various parts of the country in the number
of middle-class drug users who are willing to try heroin. . . . It is reasonable to expect that within a few years in
any community of heavy drug users a noticeable percent will try heroin, and some smaller percent will become
addicted." (Max Singer, Project Leader, Policy Concerning Drug Abuse in New York State [Croton-onHudson, N.
Y.: Hudson Institute, May 31, 1970] 1, 27.)

4. The New York Times, June 11, 1971, p. 1.

5. ]bid., July 23, 1971, p. 1.

6. Singer, Policy Concerning Drug Abuse in New York State, p. 61. One Congressional study group estimated
that the national total for property stolen by heroin addicts was $7.5 million a day, or $2.7 billion a year. (Morgan
F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, The World Heroin Problem, 92nd Cong., Ist sess. [Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, May 1971], erratum sheet p. 4.)

7. In 1969 the British government reported to the U.N. that there were 2,782 known addicts during the year 1968.
Reliable sources in Great Britain feel that there may be as many as twice that number of practicing addicts who
maintain their habits buying from registered addicts or regular pushers. (Her Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, "Report to the United Nations," mimeographed [London, 1969],
p. 5.)

8. Whitman Knapp, Chairman, Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, "Interim Report on
Investigative Phase," Xeroxed (New York; July 1971 ), p. 4; The New York Times, October 28, 197 1, p. 1. In
1968, thirty-two agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics were forced to resign after a Justice Department
investigation showed that they were selling confiscated heroin and accepting bribes from known traffickers (ibid.,
December 14, 1968, p. 1).

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Notes 8 What Can Be Done?

9. The New York Times, June 18, 1971.
10. Before the eradication of illicit opium production can become completely effective, illicit poppy fields in
Afghanistan and Pakistan would have to be eliminated. Together these two nations account for about 24 percent
of the world's illicit opium production. Although only small quantities of South Asian opium get beyond local
markets, it is quite possible that Afghanistan and Pakistan might become America's major source of opiates if
production in Southeast Asia were eradicated. There is also a possibility that opium might be diverted from legal
Iranian and Indian production to supply American markets once Southeast Asia's illicit production is eliminated.
In this case, it would probably be wise to urge these governments to eliminate legal opium production (Murphy
and Steele, The World Heroin Problem, p. 17; The New York Times, July 1, 1971, p. 1).
Once legal production in India and Iran is abolished, the international pharmaceutical industry will have to find
an alternate source of opium for the production of medical morphine, one of the best pain killers known to
modern medicine. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been able to produce opium for
medical purposes without significant diversion, and they could become an alternate source of supply. Also, the
Tasmanian state government in Australia has introduced large-scale mechanized poppy cultivation with fairly
strict controls, and is currently supplying several British pharmaceutical firms (see The Nation [Australia], April
6, 1963, p. 12; A. G. Allen and B. D. Frappell, "The Production of Oil Poppies," Tasmania Journal of
Agriculture, May 1970, pp. 89-94).

11. The New York Times, July 24, 1972, p. 1.

12. Newsweek, July 19, 1971, pp. 23-24.

13. The New York Times, July 1. 1971, p. 1.

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Notes 9 Appendix

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia

Appendix

1. Ch'en Ching-jen, "Opium and Anglo-Chinese Relations," Chinese Social and Political Science Review 19
(1935-1936), 386-437, 386-388.
2. Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 1. (London: Longmans Green,
1910), pp. 172-173.
3. For a brief account see David Edward Owen, British Opium Policy in India and China (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1934), P. 10.

4. Ibid., pp. 22 ff.

5. Ibid., p. 23.
6. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, India controlled the trade of the Far East through an export
surplus that consisted chiefly of opium (E. J. Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire: The Pelican Economic History
of the British Empire, vol. 3, 1750 to the Present [Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1969], p. 149).

7. Owen, British Opium Policy in India and China, p. 37.

8. Ibid., p. vii.

9. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
10. Ibid., p. 87, quoting governor-general in council to the Court of Directors (of the East India Company), July
30 1819, in India Office Letters from Bengal, vol. 81.
11. No more than one-tenth of the total importation of opium from both India and the Middle East was carried on
American ships or received on consignment by American firms (Arnold H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the
Narcotics Traffic 1900-1939: A Study in International Humanitarian Reform [Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 19691, p. 8).
12. Chang Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1964), pp. 41, 132.

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Notes 9 Appendix

13. These and many other Chinese antiopiurn regulations are quoted and discussed in Yu En-te, Chung-kuo chin
yen fa-ling pien-ch'ien shih (History of the Changes in Chinese Antiopium Laws) (Shanghai: China Press,
1934), pp. 16 ff.

14. Frederick Wakeman, Jr., "Les soci6t6s secr&es du Guangdong (18001856)," in Jean Chesneaux, Feiling
Davis and Nguyen Nguyet Ho, eds., Mouvements populaires et Soci&js secr&es en Chine aux XIXe et XXe
Si~cles (Paris: Frangois Maspero, 1970), p. 93.

15. Opium was exported from India in chests. According to H. B. Morse, Malwa and Persian opium weighed 135
pounds per chest and Bengal opium weighed 160 pounds (Hosea Ballou Morse, The Trade and Administration
of China [London: Longmans Green, 19131, p. 355).

16. Owen, British Opium Policy in India and China, p. 80.

17. The East India Company's monopoly of the Britain-Asia trade was ended in 1834. The company had been
undermined by the development of Singapore as a port, by its own inefficiency, and by increasing pressure from
advocates of "free trade," by which they meant trade that would be government supported but not controlled. As
a result the number of resident British merchants engaged in the China trade at Canton jumped from 66 in-1834
to 156 three years later (Maurice Collis, Foreign Mud: Being an account of the Opium Imbroglio at Canton in
the 1830's and the Anglo-Chinese war that followed [London: Faber & Faber, 19641, p. 55).

18. Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 176.

19. China, Inspectorate General of Customs, Imperial Maritime Customs, Opium 11, Special Series no. 4
(Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General, 1881), p. 1.

20. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, p. 378.

21. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1894), Reverend Hudson Taylor's testimony to the Royal Commission
on Opium, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, vol. 1, p. 30.

22. China, Inspectorate General of Customs, Imperial Maritime Customs, Native Opium 1887 11, Special Series
no. 9 (R. E. Bredon, Hankow no. 385, June 17, 1887) p. 18.

23. S. A. M. Adshead, "Opium in Szechwan 1881-1911," in Journal of Southeast Asian History 7, no. 2
(September 1966), 93-99, 96. See also W. Donald Spence, Acting British Consul at Ichang, to the Assistant
Secretary of India Finance and Commerce Department, no. 13 (confidential), April 11, 1882, in Parliamentary

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Notes 9 Appendix

Papers, 1894, Royal Commission on Opium, vol. 2, app. 12, p. 384.

24. W. Donald Spence estimates that by the early 1880s the Szechwan government made not less than 1.5 million
taels (Chinese dollars) per year from opium (Spence, to the Assistant Secretary of India Finance and Commerce
Department), p. 384.

25. Spence puts total production in 1881 at over 21 million pounds of which almost 17 million pounds was
exported (ibid., p. 387). A similar figure for Szechwan is given by R. E. Bredon, Hankow no. 385, in Native
Opium 1887.

26. Spence, to the Assistant Secretary of India Finance and Commerce Department, p. 385.

27. Consul-General Litton of Yunnanfu to Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, October 3, 1903, enclosure in
Southwest China Confidential, February 23, 1905 (FO 228/2414) in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Embassy and
Consular Archives. China, Correspondence on Opium (FO 228/2414-2466 [1905-19171 and FO 228/3357-3371
[19181927]). These documents are in the Public Record Office in London. Hereafter all citations from these
documents are given only by the reference number. Unless otherwise indicated, citations are communications
from consul s-ge n eral, consuls or acting consuls, and are addressed to the chief of mission, either His Brittanic
Majesty's Minister or his charg6 d'affaires in Peking. "Confidential" indicates that the document was intended
only for staff circulation.

28. As is true of most statistics on opium in China, estimates of numbers of smokers vary tremendously. This
figure is rather conservative. Compare, for example, Ch'en, "Opium and Anglo-Chinese Relations," p. 423.

29. Fei Hsiao-t'ung and Chang Chih-i, Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. 295.

30. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1894, Marcus Wood's testimony to the Royal Cotnmission on Opium,
vol. 1, p. 49.

31. J. F. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond: An Account of Journeys in China, Chiefly in the Province
of Sze Chuan and Among the ManTze of the Samo Territory (London: John Murray, 1899), p. 509.

32. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 189,t, Reverend Hudson Taylor's testimony to the Royal Commission
on Opium, vol. 1, p. 30.

33. A. E. Moule, "Essay: The Use of Opium and Its Bearing on the Spread of Christianity in China," in Records
of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries in China Held at Shanghai, May 10-24, 1877

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Notes 9 Appendix

(Shanghai, 1878), pp. 352-362.
34. Reverend R. Wardlaw Thompson, quoting Griffith John in Griffith John: The Story of Fifty Years in China
(London: The Religious Tract Society, 1906), p. 408. For an account of the missionary campaign against opium
in the late nineteenth century, see Hilary J. Beattie, "Protestant Missions and Opium in China 1858-1895," in
Harvard Papers on China 22A (May 1969), 104-133.
35. See Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1894, The Royal Commission on Opium, particularly the
introductory section in the first volume on the purpose of the commission. See also Great Britain, India Office
Private Secretary, "Opium Commission," April 24, 1895, in Home Office Archives (HO 45/9875/1315025).

36. Ch'en, "Opium and Anglo-Chinese Relations," p. 430.
37. An excellent account of this period is Mary C. Wright's introduction to the volume she edited, China in
Revolution: The First Phase 19001911 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969).
38. Government of India Finance Department to Morley, Secretary of State for India, February 21, 1907
(F0228/2416), pp. 1-2.
39. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir John Jordan, His Majesty's Minister Peking,
telegram ref. no. 180, October 1906 (FO 228/2415).
40. For example, see Hewett, Hong Kong, to Sir Edward Grey, telegram ref. no. 20787, June 10, 1910 (FO
228/2432).

41. Ch'en, "Opium and Anglo-Chinese Relations," p. 432.
42. See Alexander Hosie, On the Trail of the Opium Poppy (London: George Philip and Son, 1914), esp. vol. 2,
app. pp. 232 ff.

43. Ritchie, India Office to Foreign Office, Confidential, October 2, 1910, (FO 228/2435).

44. "List of Provinces Closed to Opium," 1916 (170 228/2463).
45. Beattie, "Protestant Missions and Opium in China 1858-1895," p. 121, citing Records of the General
Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai May 7-20, 1890, pp. 356-359.

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Notes 9 Appendix

46. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, p. 379.
47. Cited in F. D. Lugard, "Memorandum Regarding the Restriction of Opium in Hong Kong and China," March
11, 1909 (FO 228/2425).

48. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, p. 380.
49. League of Nations, Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Annual
Reports on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1932, p. 109.

50. Peking and Tientsin Times, June 11, 1909, p. 7.
51. The International Anti-Opium Association (Peking), The War Against Opium (Tientsin: Tientsin Press,
1922), p. 49.
52. Finance Commission Office, Burma, to Revenue Secretary to the Government of Burma, August 12~ 1920
(FO 228/3362).

53. Eastes, Tengyueh no. 8, March 21, 1918 (170 228/3357).

54. Fei and Chang, Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan,pp.282-283.

55. H. W. Sammon, Yunnanfu no. 26, October 22, 1912 (FO 228/2451).
56. "L'Opium A Nos Fronti6res" in the Depeche Coloniale (Indochina) enclosed in Carlisle, Saigon no. 5
political. September 23, 1912 (170 228/ 2451).
57. G. E. Morrison, quoted in Cyril Pearl, Morrison of Peking (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books,
1970), p. 137.

58. The International Anti-Opium Association (Peking), The War Against Opium, p. 43.

59. "Opium in Yunnan'~-Seventh Report enclosed in Fox, Yunnanfu no. 34, June 30, 1913 (FO 228/2455).

60. Eastes, Tengyueh no. 3, "Opium Report for December Quarter," 1916 (170 228/2465).

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61. Eastes, Tengyuch no. 20 (confidential), July 21, 1916 (FO 228/2465).

62. Eastes, Tengyueh no. 25, October 16, 1918 (170 228/3357).

63. G. E. Morrison, quoted in Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 371.
64. League of Nations, Annual Reports on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year
1924, Annex 3, Reports from the Chinese High Commissioners, p. 13.
65. "Opium-General Review," in H. G. W. Woodhead, ed., The China Yearbook 1925-1927 (Tientsin: Tientsin
Press, 1927), pp. 620-647, 643-644.
66. League of Nations, Advisory Committee, Analysis of the International Trade in Morphine,
Diacetylmorphine and Cocaine for the Years 1925-1929, 1931, p, 39.
67. League of Nations, Advisory Committee, Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, 12th Session, 1929, Annex 3,
p. 202.

68. League of Nations, Permanent Central Opium Committee, Statistics for the Year 1930, pp. 102 ff.
69. League of Nations, Advisory Committee, Annual Reports for the Year 1932, 1934, p. 58. Interview with
John Warner, Chief, Strategic Intelligence Office, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Washington, D.C.,
October 14, 1971 (Alfred W. McCoy, interviewer).
70. Tadao Sakai, "Le Hongbang (Bande rouge) aux XIXe et XXe Si6cl,s,,, in Chesneaux, Davis, Ho, eds.,
Mouvements populaires et Socijtis secr~tes en Chine aux XjXe et XXe Si~cles, pp. 316-343, 316.
71. Y. C. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography" in Journal of Asian Studies 26,
no. 3 (May 1967), 433455. 435. Much of this study is based on a memoir written by one of Tu's private
secretaries (see note 91 below).
72. Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 2nd rev. ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1961), p. 142,

73. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," p. 436.

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74. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 135 ff.
75. Ibid., pp. 145, 151. Emily Hahn, Chiang Kai-shek: an Unauthorized Biography (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1955), pp. 110-111. (Hahn's treatment is generally sympathetic toward Chiang, yet her account of his
Shanghai coup closely resembles other less favorable treatments such as Isaacs'.)

76. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 145 ff.
77. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," p. 437. Cf. Harold Isaacs, "Gang
Rule in Shanghai," The China Forum, May 1932, pp. 17-18, 17.

78. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," p. 437.

79. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, pp, 175 ff.

80. Isaacs, "Gang Rule in Shanghai," p. 18.

81. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," p. 437.

82. Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 7 9.

83. Isaacs, "Gang Rule in Shanghai," p. 18.
84. Garfield Huang, "Three Aspects of China's Opium Problem," The Chinese Recorder and Missionary
Journal 16, July 1930, pp. 407-415. (This estimate and other figures dealing with the KMT's involvement in the
opium trade are speculative. Not surprisingly, no official figures are available.)
85. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," p. 442. According to Isaacs, Tu
dropped out of the trade in deference to the KMT government's wish to strengthen its own control over the
opium traffic ("Gang Rule in Shanghai," p. 18).

86. League of Nations, Advisory Committee, Annual Reports for the Year 1934, 1936, p. 90.

87. 1 am indebted to John Hall of the Contemporary China Institute, London, for this theory.

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Notes 9 Appendix

88. Loss of opium revenue was one of the motives behind Kwangsi's 1936 agitation against the Nationalist
regime (F. T. Merrill, Japan and the Opium Menace [New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations and the
Foreign Policy Association, 1942], p. 33).
89. Ibid., p. 32.
90. League of Nations, Advisory Committee, Report to the Council ort the Work of the 24th Session, 1939, pp.
9-10.
91. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," p. 445, citing Shih-i (pseudonym for
Hu Hsij-wu), Tu Yuehsheng wai chuan (Hong Kong, 1962), pp. 51-53. (Hu Hsij-wu was a private secretary to
Tu Yueh-sheng.)
92. Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946),
p. 311.
93. Harrison Forman, Report from Red China (London: Robert Hale, 1946), p. 10.
94. For an account of how the campaign operated in one area, see Alan Winnington, The Slaves of the Cool
Mountains: The Ancient Social Conditions and Changes Now in Progress on the Remote Southwestern
Borders of China (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1959).
95. Interview with Mr. Graham Crookdake, Hong Kong, July 5, 1971 (Alfred W. McCoy, intervie~ver). (See
appendix to Chapter 4.)

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Opium in the Tai Country: Denouement at Dien Bien Phu

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia

Opium in the Tai Country: Denouement at Dien Bien Phu

With the exception of Laos, the largest opium-producing region in Indochina was the adjacent area of
northwestern Tonkin (now part of North Vietnam) known as the Tai country. The ethnic geography is
quite similar to that of the Shan States of Burma; the upland valleys are inhabited by wet-rice farmers at
altitudes unsuitable for poppy cultivation. But on the cool mountain ridges live Meo tribesmen whose
highland slash-and-burn agriculture is ideal for poppy cultivation. Since the Meo of northwestern
Tonkin had no large population centers or powerful political leaders like Lo Bliayao and Ly Foung,
French efforts to organize local militia or regular civil administration in the 1930s had consistently
failed. (92) In contrast, the French found it easy to work with the valley populations, the White Tai and
Black Tai.

Consequently, as French administrators mapped their strategy for expanding opium production in
northwestern Tonkin in 1940, they decided not to work directly with the Meo as they were doing in
Laos. Instead, they allied themselves with powerful Tai feudal leaders who controlled the lowland
market centers and most of the region's commerce. To make the Tai leaders more effective opium
brokers, the French suspended their forty-year policy of culturally Vietnamizing the Tai by
administering the country with Vietnamese bureaucrats.

Although the French had confirmed the authority of Deo Van Tri, White Tai ruler of Lai Chau, when
they first pacified the Tai country in the 1890s, they had gradually reduced the authority of his
successors until they were little more than minor district chiefs. (93) Potentially powerful leaders like
Deo Van Tri's second son, Deo Van Long, had been sent to school in Hanoi and posted to minor
positions in the Tonkin Delta. However, in 1940 the French reversed this policy in order to use the Tai
leaders as opium brokers. Deo Van Long returned to Lai Chau as a territorial administrator. (94) In
exchange for French political support, Deo Van Long and the other Tai leaders negotiated with their
Meo mountain neighbors for the purchase of opium and sent the increased harvest to the Opium
Monopoly in Saigon for refining and sale. After 1940 these feudal chiefs forced Meo farmers to expand
their opium harvest; (95) by the war's end there were 4.5 to 5.0 tons of Meo opium available for
shipment to Saigon. (96)

This use of Tai leaders as opium brokers may have been one of the most significant administrative
decisions the French made during their entire colonial rule. For, in 1954, the French decided to risk the
outcome of the First Indochina War on a single decisive battle in a remote mountain valley of
northwestern Tonkin named Dien Bien Pbu. The French commanders, boning to protect their ongoing
operations in the Tai country and block a Viet Minh offensive into Laos, felt it would be impossible for
the Viet Minh to bring in and set up artillery on the ridges overlooking the new fortress. They planned a
trap for the Viet Minh, who would be destroyed in the open valley by French aircraft and artillery fire.
But on the commanding mountain ridges lived the Meo who had been cheated and underpaid for their
opium for almost fifteen years by Tai feudal leaders, who were closely identified with the French.

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Opium in the Tai Country: Denouement at Dien Bien Phu

Thousands of these Meo served as porters for the Viet Minh and eagerly scouted the ridges they knew so
well for ideal gun emplacements. The well-placed Viet Minh artillery batteries crumbled the French
fortificafions at Dien Bien Phu and France's colonial empire along with them. France's century of
official involvement in the Asian opium trade had come to an end.

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