From-Third-World-to-First

38 From Third World to First

what you have told me. At the moment I have an open mind." He asked
me to see Roy Jenkins, then home secretary. Roy Jenkins listened to me
quietly and said that he would support naming no dates, but that Britain
must be off the mainland by 1975.

The minister most opposed to our position was Dick Crossman, then
Leader of the House. For one hour, he hectored and berated me for mis­
leading and beguiling his colleagues into staying east of Suez. He set out
to shock me by being deliberately rude. He wanted Britain to get out
quickly, by 1970. He and his group of MPs wanted savings for more old­
age pensions, cheaper interest for home loans, and more votes. In his frus­
tration, he said, "You don't have to worry about me for I am a minority
voice in the cabinet for the time being but I am winning, and more and
more the Party is coming around to my point of view." Our high commis­
sioner, A. P. Rajah, who was present, thought Crossman was letting off
steam because my arguments had strengthened the hand of those who
wanted to stay.

I believed we were all right this time, but there was no guarantee
there would be no further knocks on the pound, which would lead to
another fit of depression in the British cabinet, another defense review,
and further watering down of their forces. This danger was one beyond
the control even of the British government. The sad fact was the malaise
of the British people, and the leadership was not inspiring their people.
Both Labour ministers and backbenchers were despondent that they had
had to do all the things they had said they did not want to do, including
the stop-go economic policy for which they had criticized the Conser­
vative government.

President Lyndon Johnson's papers showed that he had urged Wilson
in Washington in June 1967 "not to take any steps which would be con­
trary to British or American interest and to the interest of the free nations
of Asia." But Johnson did not push as hard as his aides had urged in their
submissions to him before the meeting. Robert McNamara, Johnson's
defense secretary, had written to Johnson as early as December 1965 that
America placed a higher value on British presence and commitment in
the Far East than in Europe.

The British Defense White Paper published in July 1967 announced
their intention to reduce forces in Southeast Asia by 50 percent by

Britain Pulls Out 39

1970- 197 1 and to withdraw completely by the mid-1970s. A dismayed
Harold Holt wrote to Wilson and made his views known to me: "We see

the U.K. government as having taken historic decisions to reduce its
world role and contract, to a significant degree, from any kind of interna­
tional responsibility that Britain has carried for many, many years" and
that the Australians must now "rethink our whole situation."

Soon afterward, Wilson invited me to speak at his Labour Party
annual conference in October 1967. I agreed, knowing he wanted me to
talk his party into not opposing his staying on in Singapore. I was their
main guest speaker, a fraternal delegate at their eve-of-conference rally on
Sunday, 1 October, at Scarborough.I expressed the hope that Singapore's

long association with the British over a period of 150 years could allow
them to make the disengagement in a way "to give us the best chance of
continuing security and stability, " and that given a little time and no lit­
tle effort, we would live as well in the mid- 1970s without British base
expenditure as we were doing then. I knew the delegates would be pre­
occupied with Vietnam. Since I could not ignore the subject, I said, "I do
not want to sound like a hawk or a dove. If I have to choose a metaphor
from the aviary, I would like to think of the owl.Anyone looking at what
is happening in Vietnam must have baleful eyes.It need never have been
thus. And perhaps it was not the wisest place, nor the safest ground in
Asia to have made a stand. But enormous sacrifices have already been
expended and in blood, both Vietnamese and American." For that anti­
Vietnam audience this was the furthest I could go to hint that if the
Americans pulled out, there would be severe repercussions for the rest of
Southeast Asia.

Barely six weeks later, without any warning, on Sunday, 18 November
1967, Keng Swee received a message from Callaghan, as chancellor of the
exchequer, similar to one he must have sent to all Commonwealth finance
ministers, that the British were devaluing the pound sterling from
US$2.80 to US$2.40. That meant we had lost 14.3 percent of the reserves
we kept in London in sterling. Britain's currency came under selling pres­
sure soon after the Labour government took office in 1964 but we had not
moved out our reserves. Their forces were defending us against Indonesian