Table 2. Summary Coding Rules for Polity Democracy and ...

Table 2. Summary Coding Rules for Polity Democracy and Autocracy
Indicators

Authority Democracy Autocracy
Dimension Points Points

Competitiveness of 3 0
Political Participation 2 0
1 0
Competitive 0 1
Transitional 0 2
Factional 0 0
Restricted
Suppressed 0 0
Not applicable 0 0
Regulation of Political 0 1
Participation 0 2
Regulated 0 0
Factional/Transitional
Factional/Restricted 2 0
Restricted 1 0
Unregulated 0 2
Competitiveness of
Executive Recruitment 1 0
Election 1 0
Transitional
Selection 0 1
Openness of Executive
Recruitment 0 1
Election
Dual: Hereditary and 4 0

Election 3 0
Dual: Hereditary and 2 0
1 0
Designation 0 1
Closed 0 2
Constraints on Chief 0 3
Executive
Parity or

Subordination
Intermediate 1
Substantial
Intermediate 2
Slight Moderation
Intermediate 3
Unlimited Power

Figure 1. Polity Structures in Two Dimensions

Quadrant 1. Quadrant 2.
Liberal Democracy Illiberal Democracy

Political Rights

Quadrant 3. Political Liberties
Liberal Autocracy
Quadrant 4.
Illiberal Autocracy

Figure 2. Polity Structures in Polity and Freedom House, 1972-1996

Quadrant 1. Political Rights Quadrant 2.
Liberal Democracy Illiberal Democracy
(e.g., Poland 1990-1996; 10 (e.g., Turkey 1973; 1990-
United States) 1996; Thailand 1992-1995)
9
12 5 67
8 4 Political Liberties
Quadrant 3.
Liberal Autocracy 3
(e.g., Senegal 1977-1979;
Bangladesh 1991-1992) 7

6

5

4 Quadrant 4.

3 Illiberal Autocracy
(e.g., Cuba 1972-1996;

2 Poland 1972-1988)

1

Figure 3. Assesing Polity Characteristics: 1810-1998; 1972-1996

The Ratio of Democracies to All Polities, 1810- The Ratio of Democracies to All Polities, 1972-
1998 1998
.42236 .42236

Democracies
Democracies

.018182 1926 1943 1962 1974 1998 .228571 year 1998
1810 1828 year 1972 1974 Illiberal
DIlelibmeorcarlacies
Liberal Illiberal .669065 Liberal Autocracies
DLeibmeoracrl acies DIlelibmeorcarlacies DLeibmeoracrl acies
Autocracies Autocracies Autocracies
93

1 Year 1996 .007194 Year 1996
1972 1972

Figure 4a. Simulated Influences of Variables - Autocratic Baseline

Revolutionary Acts Cumulative Conflict Countries on Border Countries in Region Duration of Polity Violent Conflict
Duration of Polity 1 1
1

.8 .8 Iliberal Democracy - Internal and External Factors
.8
Liberal Democracy - External Factors
.6 .6 .6 Liberal Democracy - Internal Factors

.4 .4 .4

.2 .2 .2

0 40 49 56 0 25 30 40 49 56 0 40 49 56
123 5 910 15 20 values
123 5 910 15 20 25 30 123 5 910 15 20 25 30
values Countries on Border values
1
Revolutionary Acts Violent Conflict Magnitude of Regional Conflict
Duration of Polity Coups

1

.8 .8

.6 Liberal Autocracy - Internal Factors .6 Liberal Autocracy - External Factors

.4 .4

.2 .2

0 40 49 56 0 40 49 56
123 5 910 15 20 25 30 123 5 910 15 20 25 30
values values

Figure 4b. Simulated Influence of Variables - Democratic Baseline

Revolutionary Acts Cumulative Conflict Countries on Border Countries in Region Duration of Polity Revolutionary Acts
Duration of Polity Magnitude of Regional Conflict Countries in Region

111

.8 .8 .8 Illiberal Democracy - Internal and External Factors

.6 .6 .6 Illiberal Autocracy - Internal Factors Illiberal Autocracy - External Factors

.4 .4 .4

.2 .2 .2

0 0 0

123 5 910 15 20 25 30 40 50 56 123 5 910 15 20 25 30 40 50 56 123 5 910 15 20 25 30 40 50 56

Values of Independent Variables Values of Independent Variables Values of Independent Variables

Violent Conflict Duration of Polity Countries on Border Countries in Region
Coups Magnitude of Bordering Conflict

1 1

.8 .8

.6 .6 Liberal Autocracy - Internal Factors Liberal Autocracy - External Factors

.4 .4

.2 .2

0 0

123 5 910 15 20 25 30 40 50 56 123 5 910 15 20 25 30 40 50 56
Values of Independent Variables Values of Independent Variables

Figure 5. Alternative Paths of Polity Change The Case of Mexico
4
The Case of El Salvador

4

33
Polity Structure Polity Structure
22

1 1996 1 1996
1972 1972 1996
Year Year
The Case of Thailand The Case of Turkey Year
4 4

33
Polity Structure Polity Structure
22

1 1996 1
1972 1972

Year

Appendix 1a. Multinomial Logit Regression Results for Polity Structure
(Pseudo R2=.26)

Liberal Illiberal Liberal

Democracy (N=988) Democracy (N=83) Autocracy (N=213)

Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.

Duration of Polity .02** .00 -.09** .03 -.03** .00

Energy Consumption

Per Capita .00** .00 -.00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00 .00
Population .00** .00 .31 .47 -.97** .28
-.68 1.01 .81* .39
Revolution -.80** .24 -.88 .70 -.01 .27
-1.16* .58 1.19** .25
Coups -1.86 1.03 -.01 .09 .03 .02

Deviant Conflict .06 .20

Violent Protest .08 .19

Cumulative Conflict .07** .02

Magnitude of

Bordering Armed -.02 .02 .06 .05 .04 .02

Conflict

Magnitude of Regional

Conflict -.05** .00 -.04 .02 -.04** .00
-.15 .15 -.29** .06
Countries on Border -.42** .04 -.08 .04 .01
-1.57** .58 .00 .26
Countries in Region .06** .00 -.78**

Constant -.82** .18

(Illiberal Autocracy is the comparison group; *P<.05, **P<.01)

Appendix 1b. Multinomial Logit Regression Results for Polity Structure
(Pseudo R2=.26)

Illiberal Illiberal Liberal
Autocracy (N=213)
Autocracy (N=2058) Democracy (N=83) Coef. Std. Err.

Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. -.05**
.00
Duration of Polity -.02** .00 -.12** .03

Energy Consumption -.00** .00 -.00 .00 .00 .00
Per Capita .00** .00 -.00 .00 .00 .00
.80** .24 1.11 .52* -.16 .35
Population 1.85 1.03 1.17 1.44 2.67* 1.08
-.06 .20 -.94 .72 -.07 .31
Revolution -.08 .19 1.08 .61 1.11** .29
Coups -.07** .02 -.09 .09 -.04 .03

Deviant Conflict .02 .02 .09 .05 .07* .03

Violent Protest .05** .00 .01 .02 -.00 .01
.42** .04 .27 .15 -.13* .06
Cumulative Conflict -.06** .00 -.14** .04 -.06** .01
.82** .18 .71 .59 .29
Magnitude of -.04
Bordering Armed

Conflict

Magnitude of Regional
Conflict

Countries on Border
Countries in Region

Constant

(Liberal Democracy is the comparison group; *P<.05, **P<.01)