Malaysia and the Cold War Era

116  Tan Chee Seng



­

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  117
Academia Historica (Guoshiguan, Taipei, hereafter abbreviated as AH) ‘Waijoa-
obu Dang’an’ 外交部档案 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives), document no.:
020-010699-0003, accession no.: 020000000318A (AH).
27 Yong and McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, p. 193.
2 8 Ibid.
29 For details, see Sun Bifeng ed. 孙碧峯, Wuzhuanshi xuanwei nanqiao teji 吴专使
宣慰南侨特辑 (Special Issue of Special Envoy Wu to Convey Gratitude to The
Nanyang Overseas Chinese) (Xinjiapo: Sun Bifeng & Wang Ziping, 1941). Sce-
narios of welcome receptions for Wu’s visit at each town in Singapore-Malaya
were also recorded.
3 0 For details, see The Second Historical Archives of China (Zhongguo Di’er Lishi
Dang’anguan, Nanjing, China, abbreviated as DELSDAG) DSG 1/(5)/930 (Mi-
crofilm: 16J-2963), file ‘Guomin Zhengfu’ 国民政府 (Nationalist Government),
Pile huaqiao huanying Wuzhuanshi jiniankan 吡叻华侨欢迎吴专使纪念刊 (Com-
memorative Magazine of Perak Overseas Chinese Welcoming Special Envoy
Wu), dated August 1940. Scenarios of welcome receptions for Wu’s visit at each
town in Perak were also recorded. There was also a compilation of essays and
opinions of local Overseas Chinese leaders on the occasion of welcoming Wu to
Perak.
31 For details, see Li Pusheng 李朴生, ‘Wu Tiecheng yu Chen Jiageng jian yiduan
qiaowu gong’an’ 吴铁城与陈嘉庚间一段侨务公案 (A Much Discussed Over-
seas Chinese Affairs Issue Between Wu Tiecheng and Tan Kah Kee), in Zhu
Chuanyu ed. 朱传誉, Wu Tiecheng zhuanji ziliao 吴铁城传记资料 (Sources of Wu
Tiecheng Biography) (Taibei: Tianyi chubanshe, 1979), pp. 54–55; Chen Shicheng
(Tan Chee Seng) 陈是呈, ‘Wu Tiecheng de Nanyang zhixing (1940–1941): yizai
Malaiya de huodong wei taolun zhongxin’ 吴铁城的南洋之行 (1940–1941): 以在马
来亚的活动为讨论中心 (Wu Tiecheng’s Trip to Nanyang, 1940–1941: A Discus-
sion Focusing on Wu’s Activities in Malaya), in Chen Hongyu (Chen Hurng-yu)
ed. 陈鸿瑜主编, Wu Tiecheng yu jindai Zhongguo 吴铁城与近代中国 (Wu Tiech-
eng and Modern China) (Taibei: Huaqiao xiehui zonghui, 2012), pp. 101–114.
32 Leong, ‘Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism
in Malaya,’ pp. 608–609. It was viewed that within the rivalry of this movement,
prior to Wu’s visit as Phase 1: July 1937–October 1940, while after his visit as
Phase 2: November 1940–December 1941.
33 Yi, ‘Di 63jie Huaqiaojie heli’, p. 42.
34 Tan Chong Tee, Story of a WWII Resistance Fighter: Force 136, trans. Lee Watt
Sim and Clara Show (Singapore: Asiapac Books Pte Ltd, 1995), p. 10.
35 For report, see Wu Tiecheng 吴铁城, ‘Fulu Er: Xuanwei Nanyang Baogaoshu:
1941nian 5yue zai Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Changhui zhi baogao’
附录二: 宣慰南洋报告书: 1941 年 5 月在中国国民党中央常会之报告 (Appendix 2:
Report of Convey Gratitude at Nanyang: Report at the KMT Central Execu-
tive Committee in May 1941), in Chen Hongyu (Chen Hurng-yu) ed. 陈鸿瑜主编,
Wu Tiecheng yu jindai Zhongguo 吴铁城与近代中国 (Wu Tiecheng and Modern
China) (Taibei: Huaqiao xiehui zonghui, 2012), pp. 231–248. For article, see Wu
Yanchang ed. 伍燕昌, Wu Tiecheng xiansheng zhoujia rongshou tekan 吴铁城先
生周甲荣寿特刊 (Special Issue on the Sixty Years Old Birthday of Wu Tiecheng)
(Shanghai: Wu Yanchang, Zheng Guansong & He Hanzhang, 1947), pp. 32–39.
36 Wu Tiecheng 吴铁城, ‘Wushinianlai haiwai dangwu de renshi yu nuli’ 五十年来
海外党务的认识与努力 (Understanding and Efforts of Overseas Party Affairs in
Fifty Years), in Archives Committee of the Central Party 中央党史史料编篡委员
会, Zhongguo Guomindang wushizhounian jinian tekan 中国国民党五十周年纪念
特刊 (Special Commemoration Magazine on the Fiftieth Year of Kuomintang
China) (Chongqing: Zhongyang dangshi shiliao biancuan weiyuanhui, 1944),
pp. 31–33.

118  Tan Chee Seng

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  119

4 Anti-Japanese movement to
Haadyai Peace Accord

The mobilization of Malayan
women in the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP),
1930s–1989

Mahani Musa

Between 1930 and 1941, the activities of the Chinese in Malaya were
very much oriented towards political developments in China. When
Japan attacked China in 1937, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP)1 as well as Chinese organizations in Malaya
boycotted Japanese goods and collected donations to help China, an act
that annoyed the British. However, with the outbreak of the Second World
War (1939–1945), the MCP, which led the anti-Japanese movement, and the
British, forged cooperation that brought about the birth of the Malayan
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in January 1942. With this cooper-
ation, the MCP managed to enjoy the status of a legal body in the post-war
British Military Administration (BMA) until the Malayan Emergency
(1948–1960, 1968–1989)2 that was proclaimed by the British government in
June 1948. Since then the MCP became an illegal organization. In fact, June
1948 saw the beginning of the armed struggle between the MCP and the
colonial government. A major change occurred in the MCP when counter-
attacks from the government, in the form of ambush, food restrictions or
proclamation of red areas, caused the MCP to relocate to south Thailand
in 1953. The MCP remained along the Thai-Malaysian border, crisscross-
ing to and fro on either side of the divide, until the Haadyai Peace Accord,
which was signed in 1989. The physical move clearly had a big impact on
the MCP in terms of its members’ morale because they were now far away
from Malaya and the opportunity to launch an attack on Malaya dwindled
progressively as well as the opportunity to recruit members from Malaya
became dimmer. Hence, if we traced the development of the MCP and the
inception of the anti-Japanese movement in the 1930s until 1989, political
work, including propaganda campaigns, was given prominent attention.
This political work was shouldered not only by men in the MCP, but also
by the female members of the organization. From the examination of the
memoirs and documents released by the MCP, the role of women in terms
of political work was clearly acknowledged by MCP leaders as providing a
major contribution to the history of the Malayan revolution.

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  121

Political work in the MCP

In any revolutionary and guerilla movement, the role of women was often
seen as ‘subsidiary’ to the movement. In discussing the Hukbalahap rebellion
in the Philippines, Vina A. Lanzona saw many plans of the Japanese to curb
the Huks failed due to the intelligence work undertaken by women, particu-
larly those who worked as couriers and communication agents. However,
many male, or even female, Huks themselves, regarded what women couri-
ers did as only subsidiary work for the Hukbalahap, especially because these
activities did not require much training or decision making. Hence, the role
of women as couriers and communication agents was generally perceived
as secondary to the activities of military soldiers and leaders, activities that
were mainly helmed by men. Therefore, the important task of women gue-
rillas in the Hukbalahap camps revolved around housekeeping and nursing
because women themselves perceived that they were best equipped to care
for and nurture their injured comrades.3

Political work in the MCP generally involved aspects of mass organi-
zation, propaganda, united front, wireless communication, politics and
culture as well as the arts and sports as can be seen in the organizational
framework of the 10th Regiment, the wholly Malay fighting unit that was
established by the MCP on 21 May 1949 (see Table 4.1).4

The aforesaid political activities were regarded as important to the MCP
and the 10th Regiment because they involved efforts to disseminate commu-
nist influence within the local society that in turn actually determined the
survival of the MCP. Even though there was such categorization (Table 4.1),
in a situation where the MCP membership was not large, members had to
shoulder a variety of tasks that transcended the above categorization. Those
who were assigned to organize the masses, for instance, were sometimes
involved in propaganda activities, while in particular situations they were
expected to perform tasks in the military and logistics sections.5 Compared

Table 4.1 Organizational framework of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP),
10th Regiment

Military body Political body Logistics body

Combat plan United front Armaments
Combat division Mass work Medicine/health
Security Propaganda/publication Dentistry
Spying/information Monitoring Facilities
Communication Politics/culture Supplies
Military training Arts/sports Procurement
Wireless communication Storage
Production

Source: Abdullah C. D., Memoir Abdullah C. D. (Bahagian Ketiga): Perjuangan Di Sempadan
dan Penamatan Terhormat [Memoir of Abdullah C. D. (Third Part): Struggle at the Border and
an Honourable End] (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information Research Development, 2009), p. 192.

122  Mahani Musa

to the military aspect (except in the communications/courier and espionage
sections), women comrades generally were often involved in political work
besides logistics. The natural characteristics of women, gentleness, being
adept at speaking and skilful at coaxing (for political and logistical pur-
poses such as collecting food items) were regarded by the MCP as assets
to be exploited. By the same token, for the purpose of battles, especially
after the move to south Thailand, more male comrades participated in mili-
tary operations. In situations where arms were limited, male comrades were
given priorities in the use of weapons. Even if there were women comrades
selected to be involved in a military expedition into Malaya, they were cho-
sen for having strong stamina, extraordinary bravery, good eyesight and
loyalty to the leadership.6

As an organization that had a close relationship with the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP), mobilizing women’s energy in political work was ac-
tually consonant with what the CCP did as revealed by Edgar Snow. Snow,
an American journalist who journeyed to the CCP’s headquarters in 1936
and 1937, saw the communist movement, what was deragotorily known as
the ‘Red Bandits’, as a grand propagandist tour and defence and not so
much of absolute rightness of certain ideas but as of their right to exist.7
No matter how horrible and tragic their situation was CCP propangandists
among Chinese young people, including women, were determined to bring
the Marxist gospel into the lives of the Chinese peasants:

to shake, to arouse, the millions of rural China to their responsibilities
in society, to awaken them to a belief in human rights, to combat the
timidity, passiveness and static faiths of Taoism and Confucianism, to
educate, to persuade, and no doubt, at times to beleaguer and coerce
them to fight for ‘reign of the people’ – a new vision in rural China – to
fight for a life of justice, equality, freedom, and human dignity, as the
Communists saw it.8

According to Snow, thousands of educated youths who believed that a bet-
ter world could be envisioned made inroads into rural China by bringing
in their formula namely the commune ideal, back to people for sanction
and support. The youths had brought to millions, through propaganda and
action, a new conception of the state, society and the individual.9

A propaganda department, propaganda corps and Red Theatre were
three machineries that were closely related to the efforts to broadcast CCP
programmes and disseminate revolutionary ideas, to win the people’s con-
fidence. In these three aspects, women were important contributors. The
formation of the Communist Women’s International at the Second Congress
of the Communist International in Moscow in July 1920 had motivated Mao
Zedong to mobilize educated Chinese women and working-class women for
revolutionary purposes soon after the CCP was established in 1921. Issues
such as wages and other forms of discrimination towards women workers

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  123

became an important Communist propaganda item in the recruitment of
working-class women.10 In fact, the first CCP manifesto that was issued on
10 June 1922 and the manifesto of the Second National Congress of the CCP
in July 1922 also included women’s welfare and equality in matters of voting
for all workers and peasants, freedom of expression and freedom of assem-
bly, association, and to wage strikes.11 It was at the 1922 Third Conference
of International Communists that a decision was made that a special com-
mittee would be set up to ensure the involvement of women in Communist
party in all countries.12 Since then, the CCP became aggressive in recruit-
ing women in an orderly manner to the extent that women propagandists
worked hand in hand with the Red Army nationwide to clarify communist
programmes to peasants and women workers. These women were then
trained in guerilla warfare, espionage and sabotage work.13

The modus operandi of the MCP in Malaya, including propaganda
tactics, was no different from that of the CCP. If judged from the incep-
tion of the MCP until the promulgation of the Haadyai Peace Accord, the
history of the MCP is the same as the CCP that resembled a propaganda
tour and defense. Secretary-General Chin Peng admitted that during the
years of the MCP armed struggle, they were not able to compete with the
strength of the colonial army, as they did not have the skills, resources or
sufficient time to compete with the massive British propaganda machinery
that often depicted the MCP as common bandits and later as communist
terrorists (CTs).14 Despite such poor conditions, the MCP had become a
great threat to the colonialists. In fact, social scientist Collin Abraham has
argued that only with the promulgation of the Haadyai Peace Accord in
1989 was Malaysia able to place itself among independent nations of the
world after so long being under the colonial yoke.15 In this long struggle,
the services of women were acknowledged by the party’s supreme leader-
ship, including Chin Peng, who allocated a chapter on women’s involve-
ment in the movement in his memoir. Although Chapter 20, titled ‘The Lee
Meng Saga’, revolved around the arrest and trial of a 24-year-old Chinese
woman called Lee Ten Tai, or better known as Lee Meng, who was caught
by the Special Branch in Ipoh on 24 July 1952, Chin Peng started the chap-
ter by introducing two names of female comrades, notably Lee Jhen, whom
he considered as the MCP’s sole radio expert, and Jhen Yin Fen, dubbed
by Chin Peng, considered one of his best couriers. Months before Britain
imposed the Emergency regulations, the MCP leadership faced difficulty
in establishing secure and reliable communication networks. Skilled op-
erators and relevant codes were much needed to detect the movement and
communications of the enemy. Lee Jhen was one of the comrades trained
by the British during the Japanese Occupation but never gained practical
experience. As a result of two other trainees who were killed during the
Japanese Occupation, Lee Jhen became the sole MCP radio expert who
participated in every transfer of the MCP headquarters. She was killed dur-
ing relocation in the late 1950s.16

124  Mahani Musa

At a time when there were no experts in communication networks, the
MCP was much dependent on couriers to keep the message traffic moving.
A secretive chain of female couriers was an important method of commu-
nication.17 Chin Peng, who was personally involved in the setting up of
the courier network, mentioned a woman named Jhen Yin Fen, who was
a middle-aged schoolteacher, as one of his best couriers. She was the coor-
dinator of a courier group comprising several older women. Her network
expanded rapidly because of her skills in organizing and training of female
couriers to the extent that Yin Fen, in a brief spell, succeeded to link various
camps in Perak and Selangor with the Mentakab headquarters. However,
Yin Fen was eventually caught by the British military in 1950. Since then,
according to Chin Peng, her value as a courier immediately ceased and her
entire network was crippled.18 In this regard, the MCP lost an important
courier in the running of the organization.

Apart from Chin Peng, leaders of the 10th Regiment appreciated the
women’s role and contributions to the MCP struggle. Abdullah C. D.,
Rashid Maidin, Ibrahim Chik and Suriani Abdullah (née Eng Ming Ching)
mentioned stories of the struggle of women comrades in their respective
memoirs. In fact, published articles regarding women were never forgotten
in the publication series of the 10th Regiment itself. For example, ‘8 March
International Women Workers’ Days’ included the views of Lenin, Stalin
and Mao Zedong on women’s emancipation.19 Meanwhile, Putera Puteri
Nasion yang Terpuji Perajurit Rakyat yang Heroik [Praiseworthy National
Princes and Princesses, People’s Heroic Soldiers] consisted of stories of the
struggle of women comrades killed in the guerilla war.20 Freedom News, the
propaganda organ of the MCP, which was launched in 1949 in Singapore to
compete with government propagandists in winning the hearts and minds
of the rakyat (masses) in Malaya and Singapore, showed how such global
and local forces were accepted and handled by the communists, including
matters pertaining to the importance of women in the struggle. In the early
part of the Cold War era, imperial decolonization and Asian nationalism,
women issues caught the attention of Freedom News. This was in line with
the changes that were taking place in communist propaganda itself, which
since 1952, started giving publicity to the achievement of the CCP and to
international communism in general with the purpose of bringing the Ma-
layan revolution to the arena of international communism, not merely con-
fined to Malaya.21 As an example, in conjunction with the International
Women’s Day on 8 March, the editorial section of the Freedom News of 15
March 1953 provided a special discussion on women compatriots. The tar-
geted audience of the Freedom News was male members of the MCP, who
appeared not to be in favour in providing opportunities to women comrades
in showing their capability in the revolutionary struggle. Moreover, they did
not seriously try to include more women in the movement.

In depicting women as living a double-pronged oppression in the hands
of the British imperialists and impinged by feudalistic values, Freedom News
declared that one of the ways for women to free themselves from miseries

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  125

and improve their lives was to get united with the broad masses of the
working class by joining the MCP. Freedom News acknowledged the MCP
women, from their leaders to women cadres, as people who made impor-
tant contributions to the Malayan revolutionary history especially during
the period of resistance against Japan during the Japanese Occupation and
the anti-British war. The editorial stated: ‘Malaya’s revolutionary history
is inseparably linked with the undertakings of these women comrades’.22
On the whole, until its March 1953 issue, Freedom News regarded the work
done by the women’s section to have failed to expand. The major problem,
from the perspective of Freedom News, was not the hardship faced by the
women, but more importantly, the MCP itself, which did not provide full at-
tention to women’s work. Hence, the editorial issued a reminder to all MCP
members on the importance of women in their struggle. Since half of the
Malayan population were women, to trivialize female ability and contribu-
tions would cause the MCP to incur losses. Freedom News emphasized that
‘the revolution cannot succeed if no women participated in it.’23

When the MCP clandestine radio network began its official broadcast on
15 November 1969, from a restricted military base in Hunan, China trans-
mitting as Suara Revolusi Malaya (Voice of the Malayan Revolution),24 the
news of the fate and struggle of women were included in its news reporting.
News regarding the miseries of women labourers who were often oppressed
and discriminated by employers, received low wages compared to the men
even though they did the same work, not given medical leave and subjected
to pay cuts when they were late for work, were among issues highlighted in
order to attract women into the MCP struggle and, in turn, to liberate them-
selves from oppression.25

Political work, such as propaganda among the masses, became more crit-
ical in efforts to form an organization that was supported by the rakyat
including women. In this regard, Freedom News showed the ways of broad-
casting correct propaganda to the ordinary people. Delivering lectures with
theories and long-winded technical speeches and cursing the British impe-
rialists to the masses were to be avoided. Such lectures would only cause
the ordinary people, including women, to stay away from the MCP render-
ing party propaganda ineffective to achieve its aim. Members who were in-
volved in propaganda activities particularly were advised to use simple oral
propaganda method and to be delivered in a natural way using examples
of oppression in their daily lives caused by exploitative British policies. In
this way, MCP propagandists not only concealed their identities, but also
aroused enthusiasm and anger towards the British imperialists.26

Involvement of female students in the anti-Japanese
propaganda movement in Penang

There was scant information available on the involvement of women in
the MCP shortly after its formation in 1930. Cheah Boon Kheng stated
that before 1930, it was not a major requirement for the COMINTERN

126  Mahani Musa
­

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  127

children’s studies would be adversely impacted if they were involved in
such activities. School authorities have a mandated ruling that if anyone is
caught participating in ‘co-curricular activities’ while donning school uni-
forms, she would be expelled.31 Ah Yan stressed that, despite such myriad
pressures, the propaganda team managed to enlist many female students;
among the active groups were teacher trainees in the Normal Class at Fuk-
ien Girls School in Penang.32 These students were not only active in Penang,
which had emerged as the centre of the anti-Japanese movement, but also
spread widely through cultural activities in other areas.

The cultural activities became a means to exploit public sympathy. Mis-
ter, Please Buy a Bouquet of Flowers was an anti-Japanese song often sang
by the students. They would sell flowers along major throughfares and side
lanes while carrying money boxes and singing the anti-Japanese song. In ad-
dition to this, a choir group was set up by the students who joined the anti-
Japanese club. They produced spirited songs utilizing different languages,
including Malay, to raise the sentiments of Penang’s multiethnic society.
The choir group visited kampung (villages) to hold ‘stage’ presentations. The
makeshift ‘stage’ was actually formed by the rear parts of two lorries parked
adjacent to one another. Despite tight British surveillance, the anti-Japanese
students’ club succeeded in establishing the North Malaya Cultural Club, a
bona fide society in Penang.33

Another mechanism that was employed by the Anti-Japanese Penang
Club was the boycott of Japanese products. Female students wore clothes
made from China-produced materials while waving a small flag written with
exhortations to boycott Japanese-made goods. Ah Yan considered the spirit
of the female students to be high since they were able to persuade Chinese
shop owners to remove Japanese-made goods and have them burnt on the
street.34 The Students’ Anti-Japanese Club also formed a special propaganda
team during the 1938 school holidays that operated for a month in Kedah.
Many students, including the females, joined this special propaganda team,
the fact that they had to bear their own expenses notwithstanding. They
performed anti-Japanese songs in various kampung in the state.

The propaganda team of the Anti-Japanese Club also distributed anti-
Japanese pamphlets to the general public. Students were divided into small
groups, each of which was headed by a representative of the Penang anti-
Japanese team. According to Ah Yan, the planning was done clandestinely
where students even planned to confront headmasters who obstructed the
anti-Japanese students’ movement. In Chung Ling High School, Penang,
the group leader, Xie Ruiling (from Fukien Girls’ School Normal Class)
bravely confronted the headmaster in his office to clarify the content of a
manifesto that appeared to be anti-Japanese pamphlets. The shocked head-
master failed to register any reaction. Meanwhile, pamphlets were distrib-
uted by her group to every teacher in the school. Assuming that these were
approved by the headmaster, the teachers read the manifesto in front of the
students.35 Such action was undoubtedly important for the Anti-Japanese

128  Mahani Musa

Club, but retribution awaited those involved. Several were expelled from
school, while the activities of the Anti-Japanese Club were curbed and sub-
sequently banned by the British colonial authorities. Pressure was intensi-
fied on 2 February 1940 when students in the Anti-Japanese Club, including
females, were apprehended by the colonial police following their involve-
ment in demonstrations near a police station demanding the release of their
friends from police custody. This prompted the colonial police to mount
a large-scale operation to arrest those involved, eventually forcing a large
segment of female students to leave their homes36 and became full-fledged
MCP members.

Role of women as propagandists during the
Japanese Occupation

A large segment of female members of the Anti-Japanese Club who were
subjected to pressure from the colonial police in Penang proceeded to
Singapore to take part in disseminating communist propaganda among
labourers. Another group directed their attention to factories, tin mines and
plantations in other parts of Malaya. In Kinta, Perak two main tactics were
employed by former female students to render themselves in proximity to
mine workers. First, they worked as tin cleaners and lived together with fel-
low workers. Second, they learned the Hakka dialect, which was the lingua
franca of the mine workers. In her memoir, Ah Yan noted that both tasks
were difficult, but the MCP women laboured hard and became proficient
within three months.

In Ipoh, Ah Yan recorded that female members of the MCP success-
fully set up the Tobacco Factory Workers’ Solidarity Society that com-
prised mainly of women workers. The movement faced many challenges;
eight women members of the MCP were arrested and jailed at the Batu
Gajah lockup for their propaganda activities.37 The MCP members who
were jailed (Ah Yan noted some 200 of them) were only released after
the British decided to accept MCP proposal of cooperation to fight the
Japanese. In February 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) occupied
Malaya-Singapore. Through cooperation with the British, the MCP was
able to move freely, which Ah Yan considered as a triumph in the history
of the party. At a time when MCP male members were busy with military
training organized by the British, the women comrades in the propaganda
team worked tirelessly on anti-Japanese propaganda. This was carried out
through women involvement in the eight MPAJA regiments located in Sel-
angor, Negeri Sembilan, North Johor and Malacca, South Johor, Perak and
Kelantan, West Pahang, East Pahang and Kedah and Perlis. The MPAJA
managed to secure the support of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Un-
ion, popularly known as Min Yuen or ‘Mass Organization’, where women
became active members. Min Yuen was regarded by Anthony Short as ‘an
auxiliary fighting unit which was often more effective and more ruthless
than the main force itself.’38

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  129

In Singapore, the MCP women who were involved in the propaganda
team were constantly exposed to danger and threats because of Japanese
intelligence from without and traitors from within. Despite such difficulties,
women comrades adhered closely to the tactics or rules set by the Singapore
Town Committee with the intention of pulling the wool over the eyes of
Japanese intelligence. First, they were required to learn the Japanese lan-
guage and to read Japanese books. Second, relationships with friends were
severed; it meant they should be quick to undertake independent action as
if they knew no one around them. Third, a member of the propaganda team
in the town area was not allowed to keep or write any document. Fourth, in
case of requiring a job to earn a living, a member would require a trustwor-
thy protector.

As a result of the directive, MCP women who were active in the ur-
ban areas were separated and placed in different houses to avoid Japa-
nese suspicion. A few were staying in coolie houses in Tofu Street (Jalan
Tofu) that were also inhabited by Japanese women and women from China
who worked as labourers. To conceal their identities, MCP women were
instructed by the (MCP) town committee to seek legitimate work to as-
suage suspicion. Even though there were those who worked as seamstress
in factories, they were nonetheless susceptible to arrests as the case of Xie
Ruiling, from the Normal Class at Fukien Girls’ School in Penang. Her
immediate reaction was to swallow a financial report that she was carry-
ing when interrogated by Japanese intelligence. Ah Yan revealed in her
memoir that there were many MCP women who were caught by the IJA
whence they were subjected to horrific tortures, not unlike that meted to
their male counterparts. Trials for alleged wrongdoers were more like an
opera. A long sofa was placed around the room while in the middle space
was placed various tools of punishment. Japanese officers used wood and
leather string to torture detainees; if tired, they would sit and, when highly
spirited, they would stand and hit prisoners. Women detainees were nor-
mally instructed to remove their clothes with the intention of intimidation
and humilation, to force them to admit guilt. When the women refused to
admit guilt, they would be severely tortured as befell Xie Ruiling. Due to
severe injury caused by the torture, Ruiling could not lie on her back, in-
stead only lie face downwards while sleeping. On several occasions, water
was poured into her mouth; at such times, she felt she was going to die. De-
spite the torture, she refused to submit to the accusations hurled at her.39
Xie Ruiling was released in conjunction with the birthday of the Japanese
Emperor. Similar experiences confronted Yu Sin, also from the Normal
Class at Fukien Girls’ School, who became Secretary of the Party Com-
mittee for Pusing and Tronoh areas in Perak. She was caught and jailed
at the Batu Gajah prison to face various forms of torture by the Japanese,
including pumping water into her stomach, pressing with a truncheon, can-
ing, being strung up and having her fingernails pulled out. She was then
released. However, the long-term effect of the torture brought about her
eventual death aged only 23 in 1945.40

130  Mahani Musa

In Perak, interestingly, the formation of the MPAJA Fifth Independ-
ent Regiment on 1 December 1942 was connected to the contributions of
women. In fact, two-thirds of the committee members in the state were
women.41 The MCP leadership highly trusted the abilities of women in or-
ganizing the masses and in propaganda works. Women members were of-
ten instructed to live in the village to befriend the villagers, to learn their
language and gradually to influence them to participate in the resistance
towards Japan.42 It could be said that many women in the Perak MCP were
involved in organizing the masses that constituted an important part of
the MCP’s political activities. Without the support of the masses, the MCP
would not be able to expand in terms of its size that could impede the party
from realizing the aim of its struggle. Suriani stated that the first task she
received from the MCP soon after becoming a party member in 1940 was to
carry out propaganda campaigns among rubber factory workers in Taiping.
As she was not used to such work, her hands were scalded; eventually she
was reassigned to teach night classes for women peasants around Sungai
Siput. The MCP had full trust in Suriani to continue organizing the masses
including among women dulang washers in Kampar. Suriani and her women
comrades blended themselves with the lives of the dulang washers, teach-
ing night classes to eradicate illiteracy and, in this process, they took the
opportunity to organize and set up a trade union.43 The contributions of
these women were much needed and duly appreciated by the MCP leader-
ship particularly because of their ability to integrate into the lives of women
workers, to teach them to read and write and to prticipate in cultural activi-
ties. All these activities projected a positive image of the MCP in the eyes of
women workers thereby enhanced their support towards the party.44

Suriani was a good example of how MCP women could improve herself to
a higher level because of her skills to the extent that she was given the trust
to lead a propaganda team alongside male leaders. In the early 1940s, Suri-
ani was involved in the Tanjung Tualang Area Committee. The members of
this committee consisted of four women with the distribution of tasks:

• Suriani – as secretary who was responsible for propaganda work in the
Tanjung Tualang town area and neighbouring villages.

• Ah Chen – responsible for the Changkat Tin area.
• Ah Ching – responsible for the Batu Gajah area.
• Siao Hong – responsible for the Kampung Melayu area around Lambor.

The task of the Area Committee was to take the lead in organizing the
masses and to establish an organization that could spread the anti-Japanese
struggle. The method implemented was no different from the one applied
by the CCP. The group that organized the masses would enter a village, get
close to the people through anti-Japanese public rallies, and to add excite-
ment to these rallies, through military dances, singing, folk dances while
Malay comrades presented Malay martial arts, candle and saucer dances.

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  131

Rallies were held often until late into the night and according to Suriani,
they received tremendous response from villagers. This method enabled the
MCP and MPAJA to widen their influence among the masses as exemplified
by the inhabitants of Tanjung Tualang that was under her jurisdiction.45
Suriani dedicated a special chapter in her memoir titled, ‘Leading the Perak
Propaganda Team’, to digress on how communist propaganda was carried
out in Perak. To get closer to the people, in the Malay, Chinese and Indian
villages, the MCP held public rallies, talks, stage plays, singing and dances
to attract the audience. Public rallies normally began with the Unity Song
sung by the entire MCP membership in three languages Malay, Chinese and
Tamil. It was meant to raise the spirit of the audience.

According to Suriani, the Perak Propaganda Team of which she was one
of the leaders (she was responsible for the Chinese section, Abdullah C. D.
for the Malay section, while Balan, the Indian section) left a huge impact on
the history of the MCP. First, the team succeeded in widening the Commu-
nist party’s influence in the entire state and acted like a ‘practical school’ for
cadres who were assigned to serve the various sections in the MCP. Suriani
maintained that the training had created many cadres drawn from various
ethnic backgrounds, who subsequently became MCP leaders. Among them
was Abdullah C. D., who later set up the 10th Regiment, a member of the
MCP Central Committee and later Chairman of the 10th Regiment. Rashid
Maidin was a member of the MCP Central Committee and represented the
MCP in the 1955 Baling Talks and the 1989 Peace Talks in Haadyai, while
Balan led the MCP Indian Department of Works and was, at one time,
vice-chairman of the MCP Central Committee.

Abdullah C. D., Commander of the 10th Regiment, regarded the propa-
ganda team as the crucial backbone of the MCP struggle:

It is most important to propagandise struggle and to raise the spirit of
independence. The entire population should be made aware that they
should unite in the struggle for the independence of the homeland. We
moved from one district to another, focusing on small towns in Perak.
We raise the spirit of independence and hatred towards the imperialist,
as well as foster unity among the races, to support the MCP etc.46

What is more interesting is Abdullah C. D.’s acknowledgement regarding
the importance the contributions of women in propaganda work under the
supervision of the MPAJA. Through this propaganda team, a children’s
team was set up (named the ‘ant team’) and they were trained to carry out
organized and cooperative activities as well as undertaking various tasks.47
The Propaganda Team, which consisted of women, was well disciplined and
was more like a military or semi-military unit in adherence to all instruc-
tions issued by the MCP top leadership. The team was provided with equip-
ment, namely a lorry transported them around, a bus to ferry its members
and one or two cars for team usage. The propaganda work, according to

132  Mahani Musa

Suriani, received tremendous response from the public. In fact, the crowd
also gave donations of various kinds. Suriani claimed she once received 60
items of jewellery after giving talks in various locations in Perak. All gifts
and donations were surrendered to the party. At the time of the Japanese
retreat in August 1945, Suriani claimed the membership of the MPAJA had
attained 10,000, compared to the 1,000 at the beginning of the Japanese
Occupation.48 To her, it was a consequence of propaganda work that she, to-
gether with her Malay and Chinese comrades, had carried out for the MCP.

Women as urban and rural political organizers
during the Emergency

Compared to the situation before or during the Japanese Occupation, the
MCP became more complex following the Emergency declaration in June
1948. Prior to the declaration, the MCP and other left-wing parties, such
as Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM, Malay Nationalist Party),
Pembela Tanah Ayer (PETA, Defender of the Homeland), Angkatan Pemuda
Insaf (API, Awakening Youth Force) and Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS,
Conscious Women’s Front), were banned. Within seven months of the dec-
laration, a total of 5,705 communists had been arrested.49 Although this
total did not differentiate male from female communists, women comrades
were not spared. News of women communists caught or killed in skirmishes
with the police often appeared in the Straits Echo & Times of Malaya. On
24 February 1949 a woman communist who was an ‘area representative’ in
Batu Gajah was killed in a skirmish with the police.50 During an ambush on
the MCP Communications Centre in Gopeng Road in Ipoh on 4 July 1949, a
Chinese woman was arrested together with a male communist.51

Compared to Malaya, which received much attention from the British
during 1948–1949, the tough police action in Singapore almost paralysed the
communist network on the island. Although prominent communists evaded
arrest by fleeing to the Malayan jungle, police pressure and communists
who had fled almost paralysed the communist organizations in Singapore.
After the initial shock, communists reorganized themselves. One of the im-
portant organizations created was the Singapore Town Committee (STC),
which became the island’s MCP branch and responsible for party actions in
Singapore. The STC communicated with the MCP Central Committee in
Pahang through the South Malaya Bureau (believed to be based in Johor)
via a complicated system of couriers.

In the period between June 1948 and March 1949, two women leaders,
Tan Swee Hiong alias Ah Har and Tan Hong served as important individu-
als within the STC. With the move of Tan Hong to China, Ah Har, who was
from a rich family in Telok Intan, Perak, led the united front work. The STC
team attempted to form an English-speaking Anti-British League (ABL) in
Singapore with the aim of attracting English-educated radicals into their
movement. Ah Har joined the MPAJA during the Japanese Occupation,

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  133

and later became a communist cadre until her promotion to the STC to
take charge of the united front work. Although she did not shine academ-
ically, Ah Har was perceived by friends as a strong-willed woman of great
courage, determination and endurance. Although she was caught in 1950
and detained for two years, she never revealed party secrets in spite of the
tough and lengthy British interrogation. The British eventually gave up and
had her banished to China in 1952. Under Ah Har’s leadership, the United
Front Committee succeeded in bringing five English-educated radicals of
the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) namely Eu Chooi Yip, P. V. Sarma,
Dr Joseph K. M., Lim Chan Yong and Lim Kean Chye into the Party. This
was a great success for the MCP.52

To avoid arrests, many members of the Malay radical parties, including
AWAS, joined the MCP guerrillas in the jungle until the establishement of
the 10th Regiment in 1949. Despite the difficulties of operating as a guerilla,
former AWAS members ably shouldered the responsibilityof organizing the
masses and to carry out MCP propaganda. Shamsiah Fakeh regarded the task
of organizing the masses as fraught with difficulties as it involved the follow-
ing aspects:

1 To provide information to the villagers regarding armed struggle
against the imperialists in order to achieve independence.

2 To call on the people to unite and support the independence struggle
initiated by the MCP.

3 To collect food items.
4 To obtain voluntary financial assistance.
5 To set up a section whose function was to disseminate news regarding

the arrival of the imperialist army.
6 To form a people’s army that was tasked to monitor traitors and spies.53

All of these tasks required mental and physical agility. Interestingly, al-
though it was not clear as to what was Shamsiah’s specific position in the 10th
Regiment, she had become an important asset due to her oratory skill since
her days in AWAS. In fact, her presence together with AWAS members was
much anticipated by the villagers. AWAS women were seen by the villagers as
having high spirits in uniting the women and imbued with heroism of Datuk
Bahaman and Mat Kilau who fought against the British at the end of the
nineteenth century.54 The fiery speeches delivered by women succeeded in
creating a group of revolutionary women who later superseded men on many
fronts. If male members were able to collect ordinary items for donation, the
revolutionary women were able to collect weapons and medical items. These
women also organized the ‘big jar movement’ (gerakan tempayan) or ‘a hand-
ful of rice a day’ campaign to assist the regiment. For Suriani, good rela-
tionships with the masses were necessary to defeat the enemy and to win the
revolution.55 Hence, building good relationship with the masses was greatly
emphasized in the 10th Regiment and the MCP in general.

134  Mahani Musa

Siti Norkiah, a former AWAS member who had joined the MCP in Pahang
as a way to evade British arrest, admitted organizing the masses was an im-
portant task for her and her friends, including Shamsiah, when they were
in the MCP. She was placed in Platoon 3, a wholly Malay unit. With this
platoon, Siti Norkiah carried out mass organization in Kampung Peruang.
Very often their movement was detected by the British, which caused them
to go on the run, often cut off from other guerilla teams and periodically
experienced severe shortage of food. Their situation improved when they
combined with another 10th Regiment platoon led by Musa Ahmad.56 Food
was sufficient in this platoon. Here a new phase of Siti Norkiah’s life began
when she undertook the ‘long march’ from Pahang to south Thailand in 1953.

Soon after her arrival in south Thailand at the end of 1954, the 10th Reg-
iment focused on organizing the masses and to activate propaganda work
to make the Malaysia–Thai border area an important headquarters of the
party. It was not an easy task because the public were initially suspicious of
their presence. It was also caused by British propaganda particularly among
Muslims in south Thailand that depicted the MCP as cruel, violent and anti-
religion. This posed difficulty to the 10th Regiment in its effort to obtain
financial assistance, food, clothes, information and other items. This situ-
ation only changed after the propaganda team stepped up its effort to ‘win
the hearts and minds’ of the people and, subsequently, change the people’s
negative perception of the party.

Siti Norkiah who was involved in organizing the masses in south Thailand
highlights several tactics employed by the 10th Regiment to cultivate rela-
tions with the border people. First, through the provision of services to the
people. When the regiment entered a village, they would bring along various
items or jungle produce such as cane, roots and fruits. In case of sick vil-
lagers, they would try to treat them. Members of the regiment also cleaned
the compound and house of villagers. The women guerillas would help with
housework such as washing dishes, cleaning the kitchen and to give the chil-
dren a bath. The team also helped in the rice field, rubber tapping and jungle
clearing. They were crucial in solving misunderstandings among villagers.
In short, through serving the people tactic, the 10th Regiment sought to
foster unity and cooperation, including maintaining peace and security in
the village.

After the success of the first method, the second tactic namely informa-
tion campaign – as a response to British propaganda – was activated. The
10th Regiment explained its struggle in terms of freeing the homeland from
the imperialists. The third tactic focused on reinforcing the internal aspect
of the regiment. Members of the team were reminded to be disciplined at
all times and to practise the 10-clause notice when in touch with ordinary
people:

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  135



Siti Norkiah regarded the propaganda movement as being most fruitful as
the masses gradually accepted their presence. This success prompted Abu
Samah to bring in Siti Norkiah and her friends to widen their propaganda
work in other villages in Narathiwat. Although the team was ambushed
several times by the Thai and Malaysian forces between 1965 and 1968,
the participation of Thai men and women did not stop. According to Siti
Norkiah, it owed to the propaganda movement that they had carried out.

Consonant with observations by Shamsiah Fakeh and Siti Norkiah, MCP
leaders considered the task of organizing the propaganda team as difficult,
especially in new places where party members were viewed as foreigners. To
Rashid Maidin, such a task requires courage, patience and perserverance
as well as a high level of discipline. Nonetheless, they gradually managed
to become closer to the locals when the 10th Regiment team offered various
assistance to villagers when they needed help, including building a madra-
sah (religious school). Rashid claimed that this tactic helped to build up
confidence and sympathy towards the team.58

What is more interesting is that Suriani, who joined the 10th Regiment in
1953 and married Abdullah C. D. in 1955, saw the task of the propaganda
team in the Thai border area as more challenging than when the 10th Regi-
ment was based in Pahang. This is because the life of the people at the border
area was economically far more backward. It necessitated team members to
improve the livelihood of the villagers including through the formation of
cooperative in line with the Malaya Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Malaya),
which was led by Abdullah C. D. at one time.59 In cooperation with local
villagers, members would build a mosque, undertake charity to look into
funeral needs in tandem with public donations through funeral committees.
They also provided assistance to build new houses to replace those destroyed
by fire and to form a ‘Medicine Fund’ to provide emergency medicine and
daily treatment for villagers. Team members even taught villagers how to
treat various illnesses.60 According to another leader of the 10th Regiment,
Ibrahim Chik, the ability to treat villagers was required from every mem-
ber of the propaganda team. Every team in the party structure consisted
of members who knew how to administer injection and acupuncture treat-
ment, while female members were well versed in midwifery.61 All these were
crucial in ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the villagers at a time when the
MCP was still in transition following the move to south Thailand. As with

136  Mahani Musa

other leaders of the 10th Regiment, Ibrahim Chik claimed strengthening
propaganda work was accorded priority after the move to south Thailand
was completed. Women were not excluded. When he was involved in pub-
lishing a Malay-language magazine entitled Zaman Rakyat, two women,
Rahmah served as the Jawi writer, while Siti Ishak as printer.62

Women’s involvement in cultural propaganda

Just as the CCP used theatre as a propaganda tool, the MCP also employed
culture to attract the people to their struggle. Since the 1930s until the move
to south Thailand, the MCP often held cultural presentations in villages
where they had made inroads. During the MPAJA era, cultural propaganda
teams were formed in every state through MPAJA and party members who
had lived and worked with the masses. Formed in November 1944 in East
Pahang and Terengganu, the 7th Regiment had set up an opera propaganda
team so as to be closer to the villagers. Cultural propaganda not only left
their mark on villagers, but also a few Kempei Tai (military police) agents
subsequently joined the anti-Japanese movement because of their sympathy
with the organization.63

There were several reasons why culture became important to the MCP.
Since the retreat to south Thailand, the MCP not only faced a crisis of cred-
ibility as a revolutionary movement, but its very survival was at stake. The
move to south Thailand was considered ‘a huge transition that is most diffi-
cult at any given time.’64 Morale among the ranks and files was low follow-
ing the poor support from Malays and Chinese of the border area, a lack
of arms and food supply since the anti-bandit campaigns undertaken by
the Malayan government security forces in the 1950s.65 On the government
side, food denial was the most successful tactic, as this compelled even the
hard-core communists to surrender. Hunger was the main cause for party
members to surrender, followed by their conviction of ‘no hope of victory’
and their ‘dislike of the leader’. Government psychological warfare mate-
rials distributed to MCP members publicized group photographs of those
who had surrendered. Such moves sapped the morale of existing party mem-
bers.66 In this pressing situation, the MCP strove to resuscitate the spirit of
its members until early 1959 when the party began to allow those who had
lost faith in the party, the old and infirm, and those who wanted to return to
their families, including going back to China, to leave the party. Until the
end of 1962, some 200 combatants had been released. From this figure, 127
had surrendered to the Thai government while seven were caught by Thai
police and the rest remained at large.67

The transfer of all armed units of the 8th, 10th and the 12th Regiments
with about 500 personnel to south Thailand was completed in 1958. From
this number, 200 personnel were released under the MCP voluntary demo-
bilization policy. With the transfer of Chin Peng to China in 1961, Ah Hoi
alias Chen Jui assumed leadership as Acting Secretary-General and held the

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  137

position until 1964. Conscious of dwindling party membership Ah Hoi began
to take recovery measures in 1962 ‘to consolidate the party’. These measures
aimed to increase public participation and to avoid face-to-face clashes with
the enemy. All regiments were instructed to expand through new recruit-
ment. Taking the CCP example, Ah Hoi started Party Schools that focused
on ideology and military training through lectures given by party leaders.
The largest and most elaborate party school was Party School No. 5, located
within the headquarters of the 12th Regiment at Nahat, Betong District,
south Thailand. The school was in existence from October 1966 until March
1967. Some 300 students – all combatants from the 8th, 10th and 12th Regi-
ments, Min Yuen Unit from the 12th Regiment – attended this school. Party
School No. 5 also carried a review of MCP mass work. As part of the critical
reexamination, the Min Yuen was found to be lacking in vigilance. They
were also exposed to bad influences such as the use of force to elicit coopera-
tion from the masses and lacking in the spirit of teamwork. To overcome this
problem, senior and experienced cadres were encouraged to obtain opinions
from subordinates with regard to their work and welfare. Min Yuen was sin-
gled out to stage cultural shows and propagate communism as a means to
boost their own morale.68 This is because cultural shows had been proved in
the past to be most useful in getting mass support.

Following the proposal, singing, dancing and drama classes were formed
at Party School No. 5 as part of its training programme. Siu Cheong, alias
Ah Soo, one of the more important individuals in the party schools, stressed
the biggest achievement was the collection of a considerable amount of
money through a cultural show in the Betong area. The money later went
into the MCP fund. Siu Cheong also emphasized these cultural shows suc-
ceeded in impressing the masses with the MCP struggle and subsequently
allowed their children to join the organization. Among the cultural shows
presented in Party School No. 5 were the following drama productions:

1 Children of the Pahang River.
2 To Glorify the Revolution Spirit of Yeung Kwo.
3 We are all a Revolutionary Family.
4 Vengeance.
5 Celebration of the 8 July Incident. (This refers to the ambush of Special

Branch personnel in Rambong, Betong on 8 July 1966 by the MCP.)
6 Great Unity of the Three Major Races in Malaya.

Besides drama, other items presented in cultural shows were song and
dance such as Saucer dance, Torch dance, Flower dance, Mak Inang
dance, Padi-planting dance, Rubber-tapping dance, Military Drill dance,
Candle dance, Chopstick dance, Coin and Drum dance, Female Vanguard
dance, Grass-cutting dance, and Red Silk dance.69 In all these presenta-
tions, women comrades participated actively as players, costume makers
and so forth.

138  Mahani Musa

Within the 10th Regiment, cultural activities were not entirely alien to
the organization. Since the PKMM, API, AWAS and PETA days, men and
women had taken part in plays, dance presentation and singing that were
interspersed with anti-imperialist rethorics despite police surveillance and
the possibility of arrest. The legacy of the anti-British struggle in Pahang
was often referred to with the intention of raising the audiences’ spirit.70
When the 10th Regiment was set up in 1949, culture became a propaganda
tool. This was not out of the ordinary because a large segment of those who
joined the 10th Regiment came from radical parties that were banned by the
British. Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied opined that although the partner-
ship of Malay radicals with the Japanese turned sour by the end of 1944, the
Japanese military administration witnessed the production of myriad cre-
ative works that were connected to the struggle of the radical groups. Syed
Muhd Khairudin noticed the Japanese themselves encouraged the flowering
of Malay culture and the arts because they felt this was an effective method
to gain the support of the peoples of Malaya to their war efforts. Apart from
that, writing novels, music and plays were tactics used by the Japanese to
ensure local peoples forget their war time sufferings. Although the creative
products of the Japanese era were looked on as part of Japanese propaganda
with Malay writers merely justifying Japanese rule, Syed Muhd Khairudin
noted that they could still produce writings that served a double-edged
purpose, to praise the Japanese and to direct the Malay minds towards the
future of the homeland. These creative works were meant to instill a sense
of patriotism, dignity of the Malays and support for the struggle of other
nations so as to liberate oneself from colonialism.71 These messages were
delivered discreetly so as to avoid Japanese censors.

Within the MCP fold, this method was used by members of the 10th
Regiment. It became more urgent after the MCP move to south Thailand.
Culture was not merely used to gain support and the participation of non-
party members but also served as antidote for the low morale of MCP gueril-
las after the party opened its doors to the recruitment of new blood into the
organization in the early 1960s. As noted by Ibrahim Chik, the entry of new
recruits gave rise to problems to the 19th Regiment because some of those
who joined did so not because of the spirit of struggle, but to ameliorate
severe economic hardship.72 This was admitted by Suriani who considered
culture was much needed in the lives of soldiers, especially in their new
environment where there were many inadequacies. According to Suriani,
Abdullah C. D. as Commander of the 10th Regiment and other regimental
leaders took to culture in a serious manner to ensure it became a part of the
guerillas’ lives. This task of promoting culture was assigned to Suriani who
led the 10th Regiment’s culture section.73 Earlier she had already proved her
mettle in the propaganda section, handled the problem of communication
between the Central Committee and the Supreme Headquarters, led the
publishing section and handled the party’s political tasks.

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  139

After being given sufficient space to plan and implement cultural ac-
tivities in the 10th Regiment, Suriani studied all aspects of the Malay lan-
guage, tradition and Malay arts. Poetry, dance, traditional songs such as
ronggeng and drama presentation that were organized by the Regiment re-
volved around the spirit of party struggle. Lyrics and songs were prepared
by members of the Regiment including Suriani. Her ability to promote the
people’s culture greatly facilitated the propaganda work of the MCP. Peo-
ple’s culture was a two-edged sword, to raise the morale of the guerillas and
to attract villagers to support the party. Among the artistic work that was
produced by Suriani was the ‘Peasant dance’ that revolved around the life
of peasants sowing padi, pounding padi to produce rice. She also directed a
drama called Revolution Test, which was staged three times within the 10th
Regiment (the third time was 23 January 1969).

In the 1970s, Suriani was tasked to direct an opera called Putera Puteri
Sungai Pahang (Princes and Princesses of the Pahang River), which was
staged a number of times for the local people. The presentation was well re-
ceived by members of the 10th Regiment and local people alike. Against the
backdrop of the peasant movement in Temerloh district, where the Pahang
River meanders its way to the South China Sea, this opera sought to inform
the audience about national contradiction and class contradiction in Malay
villages, which was caused by imperialist oppression. The play emphasized
that only with the help of the MCP and the 10th Regiment could the live-
lihood of Malay peasants along the Pahang River improve. This could be
achieved when the peasants were ready to make sacrifices by joining the rev-
olution. The ‘Princes and Princesses of the Pahang River’ was later turned
into a revolutionary opera consisting of four episodes and six sections. It
was presented in Malay and Chinese.74 Leaders of the 10th Regiment also
tried to fathom the interests and inclination of people in the border area
to ensure their artistic activities received good response. In Kelantan and
Terengganu, the 10th Regiment found the people liked Dikir Barat, a musi-
cal form that involves group singing often in a competitive setting. This led
them to change Dikir Barat into Revolutionary Dikir. This Revolutionary
Dikir was peppered with revolutionary ideas related to the spirit of fighting
the enemy and getting out of poverty. This dikir was broadcasted by the
MCP’s Suara Revolusi Malaya (Voice of the Malayan Revolution) and Su-
ara Demokrasi (the Voice of Democracy). It was also presented during local
festivities.75

Culture as a tool of MCP propaganda was further reinforced with the
formation of the Culture Troup of the 21st Company in the 1980s by high-
lighting two functions, spiritual sustenance for the guerillas, and to provide
entertainment in villages with the aim of promoting the party struggle.
Beginning in 1981, the MCP enhanced its propaganda means through the
electronic media. The 10th Regiment had its own television studio that
came under the supervision of the political body of the 21st  Company.

140  Mahani Musa

The  10th Regiment TV Studio managed to produce a few films that re-
volved around the regiment and the independence struggle. Suriani and Ah
Yan were among the MCP women leaders who contributed melodies and
lyrics for these films.

Conclusion

The active involvement of female students in the anti-Japanese propa-
ganda clubs since the 1930s, their involvement in the MPAJA and MCP
political works during the Japanese Occupation and the Emergency until
the 1980s, shows the MCP women were important actors in the history of
the party and the revolution. Imitating the CCP, the MCP mobilized edu-
cated men and women into organizing women workers, women peasants,
students and factory workers. The ability of the women in blending with
village life became an important asset to the MCP, a fact that was acknowl-
edged by party leaders. Women cadres went through similar challenges as
the men, subjected to arrests, tortures or killings during clashes with the
Japanese military and later, government forces. Some MCP women were
given the trust to lead political activities as the case of Suriani. Not only
did she lead the propaganda team at the crucial moment in the history
of the MPAJA and MCP, but Suriani continued to be the main player in
terms of political work after the MCP move to south Thailand. At a time
when the MCP struggle increasingly became stagnant after the relocation,
Suriani played a crucial role in uplifting the morale of members of the
10th Regiment and to expose locals in south Thailand to the party strug-
gle through cultural propaganda. At the very least, the tactic managed to
keep a big segment of party membership within the organization until the
signing of the Haadyai Peace Agreement in 1989 between the MCP, the
Malaysian government and the Thai government that signaled the end of
the MCP insurgency.

Notes

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  141

142  Mahani Musa

Mobilization of Malayan women, 1930s–1989  143

5 From Malayan Union to
Malayan Emergency

Nationalists’ resistance and
colonial reaction in post-war
Malaya, 1946–1948*

Azmi Arifin

Many studies that have been published on the link between the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP)1 and the declaration of Emergency by the British
colonial administration in Malaya in June 1948.2 Among Malaysian schol-
ars the following are significant: Gwee (1966), Ramlan (1973), Khong (1975),
Cheah (1977, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992), Khoo and Adnan (1984), Mohd Reduan
(1993), Chin (1994) as well as Mahmud Embong (1985, 1992, 2003, 2004).
Many interpretations of the history of the communist movement and its
interrelatedness with the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)3 have been
influenced by earlier studies from Western writers, inter alia Purcell (1955),
Hanrahan (1954), Miller (1954, 1972), Short (1964, 1975), Pye (1956), Brim-
mel (1956, 1959), Renick (1965), O’Ballance (1966), Clutterbuck (1967, 1973),
Thompson (1966) and Stenson (1970). Besides, recent works by local schol-
ars such as Ramakrishna (2002), Mahmud (2003, 2004), Cheah (2009) and
Ho (2010), latest studies appeared to be monopolized by Western analysts
comprising Stenson (1980), Coates (1992), Furedi (1994), Carruthers (1995),
Harper (1999), Short (2000), Stockwell (1987, 1993, 2006), Deery (2003,
2007), Stubbs (1989), Hack (1995, 1999, 2001, 2009), Comber (2009) and
Stahl (2009). These recent works reflected a diversity of perspectives held by
historians. However, the interpretations of Malayan political developments
in the 1940s and 1950s, especially studies dealing with Communism and
the Emergency, can be divided into four major schools of thought or idea
streams: orthodox, Marxist, neo-orthodox and revisionist.

Orthodox interpretations emerged in the writings of the Emergency
since the early 1950s. Initially pioneered by colonial administrators,
members of British Intelligence and local political leaders, such inter-
pretations were subsequently adopted by historians. The orthodox view
maintained that the Emergency was declared because of the Cold War
‘threat’ of the MCP’s planned armed uprising in accordance to direct in-
structions from the Soviet Union.4 The MCP was depicted as an influential

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  145

political organization, engendering a major threat to the British after the
Pacific War (1941–1945). It was alleged to have successfully infiltrated and
assumed control of the local political movement either among the Ma-
lays or non-Malays as well as the trade unions through its United Front
policy that was introduced since the mid-1940s. Consequent of its failure
to weaken the British through political actions and trade union activities
induced the MCP to devise a plan to take up arms in order to establish a
communist republic on Moscow’s directives.5 This directive was said to
have been channelled to MCP members through the Asian Youth Confer-
ence in Calcutta and the Indian Communist Party congress, that was held
between February and March 1948.6

In order to counter MCP’s violent uprising, the British declared a state of
Emergency throughout Malaya on 18 June 1948, two days after the brutal
execution of three European plantation managers in Sungai Siput, Perak.
Emergency laws gave wide powers to the British colonial administration as
the laws enabled them to impose ‘total rule’ over Malaya and, more impor-
tantly, including the suppression of all political activities. Anyone who chal-
lenged these laws would be regarded as posing a threat to public interest.7
Orthodox advocates generally focused on the target of the Emergency,
namely, the non-Malay political activists among MCP members. A few days
after the Emergency was declared, more than 1,000 political activists and
trade union members were arrested and imprisoned without trial.8 At the
end of 1948, a total of 1,779 communist members were arrested, 637 of them
and 3,148 family members who were Chinese were deported to China. Up to
1957, 33,992 people were arrested, 14,907 who were non-Malay activists were
deported to their countries of origin.9 The Malayan Emergency, which in-
volved armed conflicts between 8,000 communist rebels and 40,000 soldiers,
70,000 police personnel and 250,000 Home Guard members, officially ended
in July 1960 after 12 long years.10

The view that the Soviet Union directed MCP’s planned uprising existed
was based on the British government’s allegation and intelligence. This view
was expounded in a comprehensive intelligence report on Malaya’s politi-
cal activities titled Malayan Security Service Political Intelligence Journal,
1946–1948.11 In general, this view was accepted as the official history and
acknowledged by the British colonial authorities since pre-independence
to contemporary times. However, this opinion was criticized from the
1970s. Inter alia, earlier criticisms were from Mohamad Amin and Malcolm
Caldwell, proponents of a Marxist perspective in Malaya: The Making of a
Neo-Colony (1977), where they provide an interesting argument of the real
aim and the measures undertaken by the British during the Emergency.
Their views formed part of the new interpretations that dismantled the or-
thodox viewpoint. But, criticisms towards the orthodox stance only became
increasingly apparent from the 1990s consequent of new evidences released
by the National Archives in Kew, in London. The emergence of new evi-
dences prompted a revisionist stance that offered a different interpretation
of the Emergency proclamation in mid-1948.

146  Azmi Arifin

This revisionist interpretation was advocated by a number of Western
scholars such as Furedi (1989, 1990, 1994), Stockwell (1993), Harper (1999),
Deery (2007) and Stahl (2009). Furedi viewed the Malayan Emergency as
a ‘conspiracy’ and ‘colonial war’ waged by the British to destroy the anti-
colonial movement. According to his interpretation, this colonial war was
targeted at the nationalist movement that was then fighting for independ-
ence spearheaded by the MCP. Hence, as Deery, explained:

Although the conflict in Malaya bore many of the characteristics of a
colonial war, the misnomer ‘emergency’ was used throughout the twelve
years. Similarly MCP guerrillas were labelled ‘bandits’ and later com-
munist terrorist, and the British counterinsurgency were termed the
‘Anti-Bandit Campaign.12

Furedi’s opinion was revised by Stockwell whose compilation of documents
titled Malaya, Part 2: The Communist Insurrection 1948–1953 (1995)13
furnished much information regarding the MCP’s threat, British reac-
tion and measures taken towards the proclamation of Emergency. Stock-
well explained that the Emergency was, not only declared to counter the
MCP’s uprising, but also British efforts to address the upheaval consequent
of dissatisfaction among employers of enterprises (mining, commercial
agriculture) and the Malay elite leadership since the mid-1940s. In fact,
according to him, despite the British not possessing any concrete evidence
of MCP’s violence or the directive from Moscow to the MCP to take up
arms, the violence that erupted nonetheless was used as an excuse to declare
Emergency in Malaya and to ban any other ‘subversive’ activity that could
threaten public order.14

Although the revisionist perspective possessed a strong basis, it was still
not wholly accepted. Towards the close of the 2000s, it was criticized by
scholars representing the neo-orthodox school, notably Hack (2009)15 and
Chin (2009).16 Both writers attempted to reinforce the orthodox perspec-
tive by making use of evidences from official British sources and from the
MCP. They explained that, in fact, there was concrete evidence that showed
that the MCP, which was influenced by external elements, possessed a well-
arranged plan to revolt. Differences in interpretation between the neo-
orthodox and orthodox schools was attributed to the historians’ readiness
to examine the Emergency from various angles and dimensions, including
pressures exerted from within and from without. However, they shared one
similar conclusion, namely that the Emergency was declared by the British
because of the MCP’s planned armed uprising, regardless that it was Soviet
Union directed, or motivated by the development of the international com-
munist movement.

Whether Marxist, orthodox, neo-orthodox or revisionist, all have not
only dominated the historical interpretation of the communist movement,
but also that of the Cold War and the Malayan Emergency. They have

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  147

also exerted influence over the historical interpretation of the movement
demanding Malayan independence of the 1940s and 1950s. Although the or-
thodox and revisionist perspectives were based on official documents, either
from the British or the MCP, they were still regarded as inadequate in that
they had solely linked the Emergency to the threat posed by the MCP to-
wards the British colonial administration and attempted to depict the MCP
as one of the movements that had spearheaded the struggle for Malayan
independence.

This present chapter, in contrast, provides a critique of this interpreta-
tion, and, rather, argues that the MCP threat, at least until 1948, was not the
only factor that prompted the reaction of the British colonial administration
in declaring the Emergency of 1948.

Although the British viewed the MCP’s activities as a huge threat, one
that they feared was initiated in Moscow, what they truly were concerned
was the left-leaning Malay nationalist and religious movements which were
then fighting for independence for Malaya. British anxiety was fuelled by
the possibility that the popular and influential nationalist group within
the local community will be influenced by the communists, particularly
by the Soviets. This anxiety was clearly reflected in the official documents
of the British. In fact, the British often blamed the nationalist group as be-
ing part of the communist outfit and the MCP, although some of them, viz.
Malay nationalists, were clearly anti-communist. The underlying aim of the
British was to tarnish the image of the Malay nationalist group, to quash
Malay support for the Malay nationalist movement that was then waging a
legitimate struggle for independence but apparently unseen to the world. It
enabled the British to stick a negative label thereby justifying stern action
against Malay nationalists on the pretext of combating the ‘violence’ of the
communist.

In comparison to the communist movement, which received litte support
from the people, the present study argues that the left-leaning Malay na-
tionalist and religious movement had played a much more significant and
challenging role against the British colonial administration. The struggle
they initiated to attain independence not only struck fear in the British, but
also threatened the survival of a conservative Malay political party that was
pro-British, notably the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).
The rise of the prominent Malay nationalist left and Malay religious move-
ment following the huge protest of the Malays against the Malayan Union
plan in 1946 incurred the wrath of the British. They were concerned that
a united Malay nationalist movement would be exploited by the MCP to
reinforce the people’s support for it. This situation prompted the British to
take drastic measures between 1947 and 1948 to curb the influence of the na-
tionalist movement. Apart from banning a few anti-colonial movements, an
Emergency was declared to quell the threat of the nationalist movement by
making the MCP a ‘scapegoat’. Whether an ‘emergency’ or a ‘colonial war’,
what was declared in June 1948, to supposedly overcome the MCP’s armed

148  Azmi Arifin

revolt, was actually a step taken by the British to camouflage their real intent,
namely to smash the Malay nationalist-religious movement through the pre-
text of fighting ‘subversive’, ‘militant’ and ‘violent’ communist elements.

Emergency and Cold War in Malaya: the version
of orthodox history

Most historians explained that the declaration of Emergency was prompted
by the MCP’s planned revolt and the Cold War threat. This was a plan en-
gineered by the Soviet Union against the British in Malaya. The MCP was
said to have planned from the beginning to use violence and to take up arms
to fight the British, scheduled for September 1948.17 Prior to this, the MCP
had utilized moderate means, viz. sponsored the setting up of a political
party, infiltrated the left movement and trade unions, acts of sabotaging,
promoting public strike and creating economic disorder in order to weaken
the British colonial administration. These efforts, however, had failed.18 As a
result, the MCP planned to act in a more militant manner, namely, to employ
violence and the climax was to take up arms against the British by emulating
the successfully approach used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).19

A well-organized and influential MCP was said to be capable of infiltrat-
ing and controlling the entire nationalist movement, including the Malay
nationalist left and religious movement as well as the trade unions that were
widely established in the 1940s. Hence, it was seen to be highly capable of
invoking a threat towards the British and even to usurp power.20 The MCP
exploited its influence with the trade unions, by sponsoring the setting up
of a common trade union such as the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade
Unions (PMFTU) in order to encourage and organize strikes aimed at sab-
otaging the British colonial economy in Malaya.21 In 1947, witnessed more
than 300 strikes and industrial disturbances were carried out, mostly in the
rubber estates. According to Miller: ‘While the Communist admittedly did
not play a [direct] part in many of the troubles, they were behind most of
the serious ones, which invariably were accompanied by violent demonstra-
tions.’22 The violence climaxed on 16 June 1948 when three European estate
managers in Sugai Siput, Perak were killed by individuals who were thought
to be MCP’s operatives.23

The murder of the three European planters was considered to be the in-
ducing factor that triggered British reaction. The British decided to declare
a state of Emergency on 17 and 18 June 1948, outlawed the MCP together
with all political organizations and trade unions under its influence, and
subsequently, conducted a massive arrest of all anti-colonial activists.24 As
alleged by Malcolm Macdonald, the Governer-General of Malaya since
1948 and the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia during the ‘com-
munist revolt’, Emergency, was declared by the British to counter the MCP’s
threat, whereby they were ‘making a desperate effort to impose the rule of
the knife and the gun in plantations, mines and factories’.25

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  149

Orthodox historians alleged that the widespread violence, which erupted
in Malaya between 1947 and 1948, was the MCP’s initial steps in staging
an uprising. The MCP’s plan to revolt was said to have been induced by
the spread of the Cold War phenomenon to Malaya. The MCP was said to
be ready to take up arms to achieve its objective to establish a communist
republic using violence following direct instructions from the Soviet Union,
a Cold War adversary with the Western power bloc led by the US. The in-
struction to stage an uprising from Moscow was said to have been directly
accepted by the MCP members via two conferences held in India, notably
the Conference of Asian Youth in Calcutta and the Conference of the Indian
Communist Party, February–March 1948.26 Clutterbuck maintained that
the ‘Calcutta conference no doubt played some part in prompting the MCP
to remobilize the guerrilla army and to go over to the phase of the “armed
struggle” in Malaya’.27

Moscow’s influence on the anti-British movement in Southeast Asia was
most worrying to the British administration in London. Clearly, intense
anxiety pervaded among Whitehall mandarins and Prime Minister C. J.
Atlee, who viewed the advancement of Soviet influence as the main threat
towards the security of Southeast Asia at a time when there were attempts
to curb the influence in Europe.28 According to Attlee:

There is a distinct danger that, as measures are developed for the security
of Europe and the Middle East, pressure [from the Soviet Union] upon
South East Asia will increase. Conditions there are generally speaking
favourable for the spread of Communism, and if the general impression
prevails in South East Asia that the Western Powers are both unwilling
and unable to assist in resisting Russian pressure… eventually the whole
of South East Asia will fall a victim to the Communist advance and thus
come under Russian domination.29

The Colonial Office (CO) in the month of October and the Cabinet Com-
mittee for Malayan Affairs on November 1948 had confirmed the threat by
alleging that there existed ‘substantial grounds for regarding the Malayan
outbreak as stimulated by Moscow’ and ‘the existence of “Communist plot”
to overthrow the Malayan government by armed force’.30 The threat from
Moscow was also emphasized by the head of the British Far East Security
Intelligence who had issued a warning, that ‘the Soviet Union in all likeli-
hood controlled the growing local Communist parties in Southeast Asia’.31
Similarly, there existed allegations that certain individuals were sent to the
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) as agents to spread propa-
ganda and encourage the communists in the whole of Southeast Asia to
rise and revolt against colonial rule. The said individual referred to was
Lawrence Starkey, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Australia
(CPA), who was said to have become active on attending the communist
conference in Calcutta. He was alleged to have visited Singapore for two

150  Azmi Arifin

weeks after the conference and gave a speech during the MCP’s Fourth
Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee (CEC). He used this
opportunity to play ‘a considerable part in persuading the Malayan Com-
munists to adopt a policy of violence’.32

The view on the Cold War threat and the MCP’s plan to revolt which led
to the declaration of Emergency in 1948 had influenced many historians’
interpretations. Many analysts believed that the Emergency was seen as
Britain’s reaction when facing a ‘communist conspiracy’ and the Cold War
threat,33 which invariably was depicted as MCP’s planned revolt after re-
ceiving instructions from Moscow.34 Miller, for instance, explained that the
MCP’s violent activity was:

[A] part of a preconceived world-wide Russian plans to establish Soviet
Union republics in the Far East. In Malaya, they were trying for the
first time to conquer British territory, although until now Russia and
Communist China have given only lip support to the ‘struggle’ by the
Malayan Communists.35

Singapore scholar Yeo Kim Wah believed that the common view of the
MCP’s planned revolt on receiving instructions from the Soviet Union
through the conference in Calcutta in February 1949 was ‘the orthodox
view and by far the most widely accepted version of the communist uprising
in Malaya’.36 Yeo’s view was acceptable viewed from several angles. Apart
from Malaysian historians who can be said to form the majority holding an
orthodox interpretation, this interpretation was also accepted by Western
analysts, whether from among the earlier writers such as Morrison (1948),
Mosley (1951), Purcell (1955), Miller (1954), Brimmel (1956), Pye (1956), Cro-
zier (1965), Clutterbuck (1967, 1973), Thompson (1966) and Komer (1972)
to more contemporary ones such as Sanders (1990), Jackson (1991) and
MacKay (1997).

The birth of a new perspective: a revisionist interpretation

The orthodox views began to be challenged since the 1970s. Some histo-
rians rejected the contention that the Cold War was already in existence
in Malaya. They also rejected the view that the declaration of Emergency
emerged from an ‘international communist conspiracy’. This conspiracy
issued a directive to the MCP through the congress in Calcutta to rebel
against the British government. For some researchers, this view could not
be proved.37 They instead argued that local factors played a bigger role in
encouraging the use of violence. Although violence occurred in Malaya
since March 1948 that was believed to have been stoked by communist
‘elements’, they maintained that it was not part of the MCP’s rebellion plan.
In fact, the MCP was said to have been unprepared to face the British when
the Emergency was declared.

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  151

McVey was among the earliest scholars who analysed the issue of ‘com-
munist conspiracy’ through his book, The Calcutta Conference and the
South East Asian Uprising (1958). In his writing, he rejected the contention
that there existed a directive from the Soviet Union to the MCP to rebel
via the conference in Calcutta in February 1948. According to McVey, that
conference was not an appropriate place and time to deliver the message of
communist revolutionaries. This is because the conference was held openly
in India, a country that was under British control. Even though the repre-
sentatives involved in the conference, said McVey, were anti-colonial na-
tionalist groups, not all were communist supporters. Similarly, not all who
attended the conference supported the policies of the Soviet Union Union.
Instead, they came from different backgrounds, places and ideologies that
in effect fostered a clash of opinions among them. McVey’s opinion was
reinforced by a study conducted by a Russian scholar, i.e. Larisa Efimova,
which maintained that there was no directive issued by the Soviet Union
to the communists in Southeast Asia to mount an armed rebellion against
the British.38

McVey’s contention was further strengthened by the fact that only one
MCP representative was sent to the conference in Calcutta, namely Li
Siong. Even though he led a pro-communist organization, that is New Dem-
ocratic Youth League, Li however did not hold any important position in
the MCP. Li was selected as MCP representative because of his proficiency
in the English language and he attended only the first conference.39 Li also
did not immediately return to Singapore until 22 March 1948. This means
that he did not attend the MCP’s Fourth Plenary Session of the Central
Executive Committee (CEC) that was held from 17–21 March 1948. It was at
this conference that the issue of readiness to rebel was debated. The above
facts gives rise to doubts among researchers as regards the extent to which
Li played a role as a middleman who relayed the Soviet Union directive to
the MCP to mount an armed rebellion.

Another evidence used by the orthodox researchers is the resolutions
passed at the Fourth Plenary Session of MCP’s CEC held from 17–21 March
1948, which was allegedly attended by Sharkey. These resolutions were
said to instruct the MCP to act in a militant manner to counter the British
response, including the readiness to take up arms if compelled to do so.
However, this evidence was disputed by revisionist researchers. According
to several researchers, at the Plenary Session, the MCP’s CEC had passed
three important resolutions that were related to the MCP’s plan for armed
uprising.40 The first resolution emphasized the MCP’s need to reactivate
discipline within the party following the leadership era of MCP Secretary-
General Lai Teck (1938–1947), who was alleged to have betrayed the party.
Two more resolutions were more radical. The second resolution urged that
the struggle for independence in Malaya could only be achieved through
‘people’s revolutionary war’ and the MCP must be ready to lead this struggle.
The third resolution outlined the need for the MCP to change the strategy of

152  Azmi Arifin

its struggle from ‘surrenderism’ to one that was militant. What was stressed
in the last resolution was the readiness needed for the MCP to face what was
said to be ‘an uncompromising struggle for independence without regard to
considerations of legality’. Although the three resolutions shed light on the
radical change that the MCP needed to foster in order to make its struggle
more relevant, McLane, however, contended:

The resolutions did not, then, specifically called for an uprising,
although as internal party documents they might well have done so had
it been the intention of the leadership to proceed immediately to armed
insurrection. They stressed the urgency of preparing for rebellion, not yet
of precipating one.41

Furedi was one of the vocal scholars who criticized the approach of ortho-
dox historians who were regarded as being shackled by an interpretation
that was influenced by British propaganda. To Furedi, the contention that
the British declaration of Emergency was a move to counter the ‘interna-
tional communist plot’ that directed the MCP to forge an uprising was a
weak one and difficult to defend. By the same token, the issue of the Cold
War was used as ‘a weapon that sought to discredit any legitimate nation-
alist impulse by reinterpreting it as a communist conspiracy … Its aim was
to make anti-colonial nationalism invisible.’42 The real threat to the British,
Furedi clarified, was from the anti-colonial nationalist movement that was
led by the MCP and the objective of the Emergency was to neutralise that
threat.43

Furedi’s view was based on several arguments. First, the claim that there
existed an armed uprising of the MCP via the Soviet Union directive cannot
be defended with any concrete evidence. The weakness of this claim was
admitted by the British and further validated by the US through its intel-
ligence body, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Taking into account
several cases of Emergency in British colonies, Furedi declared:

In none of these cases did efforts to substantiate the arguments used
to justify calling an emergency prove successful. In the case of Malaya,
the colonial administration repeatedly conceded that it lacked evidence
for the publicly alleged communist plot. The CIA was no more success-
ful. A month before the declaration of the emergency in Malaya, the
CIA reported that ‘there is no evidence’ that the MCP was ‘financed
by or has direct contact with Moscow’. The American Departement
of State wrote its consul in Singapore that it ‘would appreciate copies
of… documents’ which the ‘British believe prove that terrorist activ-
ities are part of Communist plan to overthrow the Government of
Malaya.’ This request, though repeated on many occasions, was not
to be met.44

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  153

Second, MCP’s violence, according to Furedi, did not originate from a ‘com-
munist plot’, or the Cold War, but instead an effect of British ‘conspiracy’
itself. In Furedi’s view, the violent response mounted by the British against
political activists and trade unions was part of the provocation planned by
the British to incite these groups to react violently. This enabled the British to
blame the communists and their elements as factors that initiated violence.
British provocation was crafted through the violence employed against the
activities of trade unions since 1947.45 The climax was the restriction im-
posed on PMFTU in April and May 1948 that caused the workers’ group to
lose its voice in articulating grievances through legal means. This restriction
forced them to use violent means by creating disorder and engaging in kill-
ings. To Furedi, the pressure on trade union activities is a shrewd tactic of
the British to provoke violent reaction from radical workers’ groups that no
other groups could control, including the MCP itself.46

Third, the conspiracy was realised through British action to manipulate
the use of the term ‘Emergency’ so as to conceal their violence from the
world view. ‘Emergency’, according to Furedi, is a form of ‘colonial war’
that was staged by the British in order to quash any form of resistance,
namely the nationalists, by using the pretext of stamping out violent ele-
ments and criminals:47

The term emergency [by] itself [was] confusing. These conflicts were
either potentially or actually colonial wars. The term emergency was
essentially a public-relations concept. It had the advantage of allowing
Britain to adopt wide-ranging coercive powers while maintaining the
pretence of normal civil rule. Above all, emergencies helped create the
impression that the issue at stake was that of law and order rather than
a political challenge to colonialism. An emergency was called to restore
order – by definition it aimed to curb those who caused disorder. Emer-
gency measures allowed colonial governors to label their opponents as
law-breakers. At a stroke [,] anti-colonial activists could be transformed
into criminals or terrorists.48

Furedi’s view was followed by a study conducted by Stockwell in 1993. In
his analysis of the real relation between Communism, violence and British
response, Stockwell raised a question as to how far it is true the claim that
the Emergency was a British response to counter what was described as ‘a
widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya’.

According to Stockwell, that viewpoint was difficult to defend because
there was no clear evidence to show that there existed a ‘communist plot’ to
overthrow the British government in Malaya. Stockwell further reiterated
that the British administration admitted that they did not have any shred
of evidence to relate the violence in Malaya to the ‘communist plot’ and the
armed uprising plan of the MCP.49 Stockwell cited a few examples, inter alia,

154  Azmi Arifin

the admission of Alexander Newboult, Chief Secretary to the government
of Malaya, to the American Consul that ‘they [the British officials] had no
conclusive proof that the violence and murder was due to Communist activ-
ities, but that they are convinced of it’ and that ‘they did not know the aim
of the present activities unless it was to ruin the economy of the country and
create chaos so that many of the people might consider that the Government
could not cope with the situation.’50 Besides, Secretary of State for the Col-
onies Arthur Creech Jones, also stated: ‘There is no concrete evidence that
the Malayan Communist Party is directly responsible for the present law-
lessness[,] but extreme political factions and certain trade unions have been
infiltrated by communism.’51 Similarly, the clarification from a CO source
itself that assessed Communist activities in Malaya concurred likewise:

No decisive evidence has yet been received here [in London] of the direct
complicity of the Malayan Communist Party or the P.M.F.T.U. in any of
the actual murderous attacks which have occurred but the High Com-
missioner has stated that he has sufficient evidence to show that much
of the violence is due to organized incitement by extremist elements who
challenge the authority of the Government.52

Stockwell contended that the relations between the MCP and all forms of
violence in Malaya and the so-called ‘communist plot’ to overthrow the
government using force was exaggerated by Governer-General MacDonald.
Macdonald, who was influential in the government administration in
Whitehall, was said to have used his influence to encourage the British gov-
ernment to make a decision to ban the MCP in July 1948, an action that
his predecessor Edward Gent failed to execute. In order to justify such an
action, British administrators deliberately manufactured evidence to claim
that there was a MCP plan to have an armed uprising following a directive
from the Soviet Union to overthrow the British government in Malaya.53

While stressing that there was no clear evidence regarding the MCP’s plan
to rebel in order to overthrow the colonial government in Malaya, Stockwell
however questioned Furedi’s view that the Emergency was a British ‘con-
spiracy’ to curb anti-colonial movements. Stockwell stated that the waver-
ing reaction towards the MCP threat and their unpreparedness to take swift
action to ban the MCP without acquiring concrete evidence beforehand
shows that there was not a conspiracy on the part of the British to ban the
MCP.54 Stockwell also rejected the view that the effort to smear the MCP
and to declare Emergency in the name of the Cold War was deliberately
made by the British to gain support, or avoid pressure, from Washington.
According to Stockwell (p. 81), in mid-1948, the British government under
Labour Party leadership was not actually under the pressure of Washington
to take any action against communist activities.55 In fact, the measure to
curb the threat of the expansion of Soviet Union power and the Cold War

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  155

was taken on the initiative of the Attlee government itself, without having to
anticipate an initial move from the US government.

Clearly, to Stockwell, both views about the Emergency being declared
due to a ‘communist plot’ and the MCP’s armed resistance plan, or other-
wise, a ‘British conspiracy’ to counter communist activities so as to fulfil
the Washington’s wishes in facing the Cold War, were inaccurate. Stockwell
instead argued that the Emergency was declared by the British to lessen the
pressure from groups that served as the source of economic power mainte-
nance in Malaya, noatbly, European commercial circles and the Malay elite.
Both vested groups had always demanded that immediate action be taken to
eliminate the troublemakers in order to maintain peace in Malaya. Hence,
Stockwell declared: ‘We are led to the conclusion, therefore, that ministers
decided to ban the MCP in July 1948, not because they had irrefutable proof
of a communist plot nor because they had an interest in concocting one, but
as an attempt to restore confidence in the colonial regime.’56

Phillip Deery, in his article, ‘Malaya 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?’
(2007), also questioned the view that the declaration of Emergency was
prompted by the Cold War imperative.57 Although he did not deny the rela-
tionship between the MCP and international communist movement, Deery
stressed that the factors that caused the MCP to be more militant and to be
prepared for violent action was not because of external directive, but inter-
nal pressure, that is, leadership problems, pressure from youth and radical
factions and provocations from the British who took action against trade
unions.58 He also questioned the view that claimed that the MCP had an
organized plan to mount an armed uprising against the British. According
to him, the so-called armed uprising plan by the MCP was ‘far from being
meticulously prepared and carefully coordinated as is often alleged, was [in
fact] inadequately planned and poorly executed’.59 Even though the princi-
ple of its struggle had changed to militancy after the Lai Teck era, however,
according to Deery (p. 45), the MCP was actually not ready to fight against
the British and did not anticipate that the British would act drastically to
the extent that it compelled them (MCP) to face the British response in a
frenzied manner:

The timing of the State of Emergency clearly took the MCP by surprise.
Consequently, the party’s decision to go underground was ad hoc; its
retreat to the jungle was made in panic; and its switch from urban to
rural revolt was confused. These moves left the MCP’s ‘front’ organi-
zations off balance, leaderless, and isolated. In this sense, the decision
to mobilize for guerrilla warfare was accelerated by, and partly in re-
sponse to, the severity of government action [declaring of Emergency]
in May–June 1948. The notion that the MCP was following a carefully
planned strategy – a strategy coordinated by a highly centralized party
structure – is fallacious.60

156  Azmi Arifin

The argument of revisionist historians was strengthened by the admission
of MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng himself. In two books that narrated
his experiences, namely, Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History (2003) and
Dialogues with Chin Peng (2004): ‘The prominent factor that influenced us,
when we decided to take up arms, was the British policy at the time. We felt
we were being cornered, gradually backed into the corner. We had nowhere
to move … Of course, the international factor played some role, but not as
decisive as that.’61 Chin Peng also explained that the killing of three Euro-
pean employers in Sungai Siput was not executed on his official directive
as MCP’s high official, or MCP’s CEC, as declaration of war against the
British. In fact, Chin Peng clarified that the killing was a ‘mistake’:

[N]either I, nor the Central Committee, had ordered the killing of
European planters. Despite speculation at the time and since, the CPM
[MCP] at no point in the Emergency ever drew up a planters’ hit list.
Indeed, if I had had my way, the killings at Sungei Siput would never
have taken place. They resulted from over-enthuasiasm for revenge at
the local level coupled with a serious lack of command control at the
state level.62

Reaction and criticism of neo-orthodox historians

The approach of revisionist historians to reject completely the attempt to
connect the Emergency with an international communist ‘conspiracy’ and
the Cold War had lately received criticisms from historians, inter alia, Karl
Hack and C. C. Chin, pioneers of neo-orthodox thinking in the historiogra-
phy of the Emergency.

Hack outlined the change in the MCP tactic since the end of March 1948
from a ‘united front’ to a strategy that was more militant that influenced the
MCP’s decision to revolt although such a move was considered then as ‘over-
determined’. This change, according to Hack, was marked by an increased
violent campaign by the MCP starting from February until June 1948, that
saw a drastic spike in strikes, chaos and killings in Malaya.63 The change in
MCP’s tactic, Hack stated, must be seen as MCP’s reaction in fulfilling the
demands of international communist that stressed on a change of strategy
of the communists in Southeast Asia towards a militant struggle. Since 1948,
the communist movement in Southeast Asia rose in line with the demands of
international communists who witnessed not only the communist movement
in Malaya, but also in Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam that
pushed aside the policy of ‘united front’ for a violent campaign. According
to Hack, the change in the tactic of the MCP struggle to one that was more
violent forced the British to declare the Emergency in Malaya.

However, Hack admitted that it was difficult to establish the real reason
for the Emergency. In fact, he concurred with the approach taken by several
researchers such as Short (1975) and Stubbs (1989) who saw that the Emer-
gency was not prompted by one factor but several internal and external

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  157

ones. Nonetheless, Hack maintained that the external factor, that is the in-
ducement of the international communists and the effect of the Cold War,
had a big influence over the MCP’s decision to revolt. This was compounded
by the British provocation that encouraged a violent response from the
MCP. Although the MCP admittedly was not prepared to face the British in
open warfare, British provocation, Hack claimed, forced the MCP to make
a swift decision that was in line with the demand of international commu-
nists, namely a militant and armed struggle.

Chin claimed that the MCP had an organized plan to take up arms to
fight the British in September 1948. This was based on his assessment of
MCP documents and oral history of MCP leaders, particularly the decision
made in the MCP’s CEC meeting since March 1948.64 Chin argued that al-
though the ‘two camps’ doctrine, which was proposed by a Russian com-
munist leader, Andrei Zhdanov, in his speech in Cominform in September
1947 did influence the MCP’s decision, the MCP’s move to take up arms
was not because it embraced the doctrine or followed the Soviet directive.65
Chin was much more inclined to connect the MCP’s decision with that of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP):

The characteristics of the MCP were determined by the fact that it
evolved from the CCP’s Nanyang Branch. Thus, the MCP was greatly
under the influence of the CCP and followed the CCP tactics in its
political struggle. It is almost unlikely that the MCP would simply act
in accordance with CPSU [Communist Party of Soviet Union Union]
instructions, as the MCP followed Mao’s teaching[,] that each individ-
ual party had to observe closely its own situation and decide its own
course of action.66

Based on this argument, Chin opined that the plan to revolt was a decision
undertaken by the MCP leadership to fight the British that suited the condi-
tion in Malaya at the time, circa 1948.

Chin clarified that the MCP uprising plan originated from internal pres-
sure, i.e. British provocation towards communist and trade union activi-
ties. For Chin, the violent British action against the MCP and its elements
showed the existence of ‘a well-planned tactic by the British to provoke the
MCP to resort to armed struggle’.67 The British action apparently influ-
enced the MCP to organize a plan for an armed uprising. However, before
the plan could be implemented as engineered, that is in September 1948, the
British had already launched an offensive earlier:

The British offensive commencing in June 1948 with the declaration
of emergency in combination with mass arrests and the mobilising of
forces was planned well in advanced. Though the MCP had planned to
initiate the armed revolt in the month of September, the British offen-
sive acted three months in advance and caught the MCP by surprise.
This had created a chaotic situation for the MCP.68

158  Azmi Arifin

Between the orthodox and the revisionists: some weaknesses

Although the interpretations advanced by numerous analysts, whether from
the orthodox, revisionist or neo-orthodox streams and supported by con-
crete evidence drawn from documents and British intelligence sources, the
opinions were, however, not without shortcomings, primarily because their
discussions centred on the role played by the MCP, that in turn, caused them
to overlook the part played by other external parties beyond the communist
struggle. The influence of the anti-colonial movement that existed in various
forms and ideologies in Malaya in the 1940s was downplayed as it was only
perceived as a part of the MCP. Overall, the discourse of historians regard-
ing the Emergency, or of the nationalist movement in Malaya in the 1940s,
revolved around the following issues:

1 The Soviet Union or Chinese influence and the impact of the Cold War
towards the anti-colonial movement in Malaya in the 1940s–1950s.

2 The existence of a planned revolt by the MCP towards the British at that
time.

3 The MCP was one of the nationalist movements which fought to chal-
lenge the British. All other anti-colonial movements including the trade
union were influenced or controlled by the MCP.

4 British response particularly through the Emergency was directed solely
towards the communist movement and the MCP, which were regarded
as rivals and the main threat towards British colonization.

From this perspective, both orthodox and revisionist analysts shared a
broadly similar point of view. Although the revisionists rejected the exter-
nal role and regarded the Emergency as a tool used by the British to destroy
the anti-colonial movement, they agreed with the orthodox scholars that the
anti-colonial movement in Malaya in the 1940s was a struggle spearheaded
and activated entirely by the MCP. The orthodox and revisionist interpreta-
tion were criticized by post-revisionists, who asked, to what extent the com-
munist movement in Malaya had become the major challenge to the British
compared to other anti-colonial movements.

Aside from the attempt by historians, particularly from the West, to
characterize the MCP as influential and posed the greatest challenge to the
British, evidence shows to the contrary, the MCP, in fact, was a movement
that was weak and admittedly acknowledged by the British themselves.
While the British were vigilant towards the communist threat, they down-
played the threat from the MCP even from the very beginning as they were
considered as mere bandits.69 This explains the reason for British hesitation
to take immediate action to ban the MCP before 1948. Even until 1948, the
evidence indicating the existence of communist threat had not yet been ver-
ified, except that it was acknowledged in terms of its potential to infiltrate
and take control of other political movements, namely among the Malay

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  159

nationalists.70 In fact, the MCP failed in its effort in relation to the latter, de-
spite using various tactics and methods. Its failure to gain support from the
majority of the populace and to take control of other anti-colonial move-
ments, prevented the MCP from becoming a major challenge to the British
in leading the anti-colonial movements.

Historians clarified that the real objective of the communists in countries
under colonial rule in Southeast Asia, as indicated by the international com-
munist movement, was to infiltrate and disguise as members of the independ-
ence movement and to ‘think less exclusively in terms of military struggle’.71
However, such a move was considered as getting less support from the masses.
Through this strategy, they were confident that they would be able to pull
the wool over the eyes of the local people in order to gain support and sub-
sequently wrest control via a nationalist approach, that is by exploiting the
nationalist struggle to expel Western colonialists and then take over the coun-
tries that had gained independence. Joseph Stalin tried to apply this strategy
while the Far East Branch of the International Communists (Comintern),
which was influential with the MCP, reinforced it. This strategy, to some ex-
tent, was successfully employed in other places such as Indonesia or Vietnam.
Attempts were also made to apply it in Malaya by the MCP.72

MCP and Malay support

This situation clearly existed in the context of the MCP’s struggle before
1948. Since its inception in 1930 until 1948, the MCP had failed to win the
people’s support. As a result, it was forced to conceal its identity in order to
infiltrate Malay and non-Malay political movements and to control them.
As well, the MCP supporters had to act as a nationalist group and tried
to champion the independence movement in order to exploit the sympathy
of the local people. One of the MCP’s tactics was to sponsor the setting up
of Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM, Malayan Nationalist Party,
MNP). The MCP hoped that by winning the support of Malay politicians in
the MNP, it would become a movement that was able to gain mass support
including that from the Malays who were seen to be fervently opposed to the
communist struggle led by the Chinese.

The MNP itself was set up with the assistance of the MCP through the
role played by a supporter of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian
Communist Party), namely Moktaruddin Lasso.73 It was much easier for
Moktaruddin to act and approach Malay nationalist groups because he was
seen as more of a nationalist rather than a communist from the perspective
of Malay nationalists. Although Malay communist cadres from Indonesia
were employed to gain support of the Malays, the MCP still failed to attain
this objective. In fact, the assistance and financial support given to efforts
for the establishment of the MNP failed to help strengthen its influence
among Malay nationalists. Only a few of the Malays were involved in the
MCP struggle prior to 1948.74

160  Azmi Arifin

The failure of the MCP to take control of the Malay nationalist movement
can be seen from several perspectives. First, it was clear that the MNP lead-
ership was controlled by the nationalist group that succeeded in quelling
communist influence. There was an attempt to give MNP itself, for instance,
a moderate such as a Socialist Party but was rejected; instead, the name
kebangsaan (national) gained a wide support because the majority who were
involved in the party-naming vote came from nationalist groups, some of
whom rejected communist ideology.75 The situation became clearer after the
MNP chairman who was a communist, that is, Moktaruddin, disappeared.
The MNP was then taken over by Burhanuddin al-Helmy who was a reli-
gious leader. Although he was willing to work with any anti-colonial move-
ments, Burhanuddin was ideologically Islamic and anti-communist in his
political struggle. In fact, his action to move the MNP closer to a religious
movement based in Gunung Semanggol, Perak, such as the Majlis Agama
Tertinggi (MATA, Supreme Religious Council), and Hizbul Muslimin, fur-
ther reinforced the position of MNP as a movement that was independent
of MCP’s control.The MNP made it clear that the objective of its strug-
gle was to achieve independence without being tied to external constraints
and colonization. From the viewpoint of Burhanuddin, communism itself
is part of colonialism.76 The reality was, while a few researchers perceived
that the Malay political leadership in MNP was successfully controlled and
exploited by the MCP,77 on the contrary, it was the left-leaning nationalist
groups that were the ones that succeeded in manipulating the MCP. As a
movement that had strong financial standing, the position of the MCP had
been fully exploited by Malay nationalists to help finance the establishment
of political organizations that focused actively in fighting for independence
and subsequently the communist influence was cast aside.

There were various reasons the MCP failed to be an organization that was
strong and able to challenge the British. The chief reason was the failure of
the MCP to gain support from the locals, either Malay or non-Malay, includ-
ing the Chinese themselves. Since its early formation, the people’s sympathy
for the MCP’s ideology and struggle in Malaya was minimal. During the Jap-
anese Occupation, the MCP might have succeeded in gaining sympathy from
a big segment of the Chinese community, which was oppressed. However,
that support originated from China’s nationalist spirit and the flaring anti-
Japan sentiments, and not because of Chinese sympathy towards the commu-
nist ideology. This was clear because the sympathy towards movements that
were opposed to Japan did not morph into a general support of the Chinese
for the communists after the Pacific War. Chinese support splintered into
several groupings, notably the MCP, Guomindang (Kuomintang, KMT) and
underworld groups, some of which were pro- and some anti-MCP.78 After the
Pacific War, many Chinese and Indians (particularly estate labourers) who
were plagued with hardship might have been influenced by radical elements,
and found expression in terms of support for the MCP’s struggle that was
anti-government. But, as soon as the hardships were redressed, the MCP in-
creasingly became isolated from non-Malay support.

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  161

Support from the ordinary masses is important in efforts to mount a rev-
olution or to counter it as General Gerald Templer stressed: ‘The answer [to
successfully fight the MCP] lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle,
but in the hearts and minds of the people.’79 The MCP’s main weakness,
seldom shown by historians, was its failure to gain support from a majority
of the peoples of Malaya, namely the Malays. In fact, the primary objective
of the MCP since its inception was to be an interracial party, especially
through the support of the Malays. This necessity was acknowledged by
the leadership of the MCP since the beginning and it attempted to achieve
this aim through the help of Indonesia’s Malay communist cadres. However,
since its establishment in 1930, the MCP failed substantially in trying to get
that support, at the very least for the period prior to 1948. According to
Cheah: ‘By World War II (1939–45) it [the MCP] had ended up as a mainly
Chinese party.’80 It was estimated that out of 12,500 MCP part-time mem-
bers in 1947, there were only 35 Malays and 760 Indians.81

Cheah had listed various factors for the MCP’s failure to gain support of
the Malays.82 First, the MCP’s leadership was of Chinese extremist type;
second, the low political awareness among the Malays caused them to fail
to appreciate the MCP’s aspirations; third, the doubts of Chinese regarding
Malays and Indians who once supported Imperial Japan; and fourth, the
Malays were suspicious of the MCP that was perceived as a Chinese political
organization that only championed the rights and interests of the Chinese.
The main factor for the MCP’s failure to gain Malay support as outlined by
Cheah was that, ever since its formation in 1930 until the early 1940s, the
MCP was, generally in nature, dedicated to activities for Chinese and for the
interests of China.83 The MCP failed to be an anti-British pioneer of com-
munist hue, namely an open and international organization. Instead, the
MCP remained a Chinese political party until at least 1948. Consequently,
the attempt and action taken by the MCP leadership was made to appear
transparent and fighting for the interests of all races as well as to insist on
the ambition to set up a communist republic meant for all races, but this,
reiterated Cheah, ‘failed to emerge’.84 Up until early 1940, the MCP admit-
ted that its failure became a weakening factor and set them back from re-
belling and wresting power from the British. In fact, ‘mass organizations
and politics have not reached the stage strong enough to overthrow British
imperialism’.85

The problem of entrenched racism between the Chinese and Malays con-
sequent of the ethnic policy implemented during the Japanese Occupation
had become one of the factors that caused the difficulty of the MCP to gain
Malay support. As a result of the Japanese wartime policy to exploit the
sentiments of enmity between ethnic groups, members of the MCP who con-
sidered Malays as Japanese stooges doubted and did not seriously want the
involvement of Malays in the MCP struggle. In fact, the Malays were consid-
ered by the Chinese as ‘the running dogs’ or chou kou.86 The way the MCP
and its military wing, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA),
confronted the situation arising after thedefeat of Imperial Japan too caused

162  Azmi Arifin

the Malays to be pushed away from the MCP’s struggle.87 MPAJA exploited
the political vacuum that existed before the return of the British to Malaya
by taking control of villages and towns, some of which were inhabited by
Malay majority and to punish indiscriminately and cruelly those suspected
of being Japanese stooges.88 This became a dark spot that separated the
Malays from the MCP, the latter was considered anti-Malay.89 If during the
Japanese Occupation the Chinese were considered as an ethnic group that
suffered, in the immediate post-surrender period, the Malays were said to
be an ethnic group that experienced utmost misery under MPAJA control to
the extent that they deemed MPAJA administration as ‘a reign of terror’.90

The MCP only started to realize then of the need to gain Malay sympathy
by trying to understand their culture and sensitivities in the aftermath of a
Sino-Malay violent fight in 1945. Several measures were undertaken by the
MCP to change its struggle from that of being Chinese or ‘Chinese-ness’ to
that of ‘Malayan-ness’. Members of the MCP were urged to think and act as
Malayan citizens, focusing their efforts to fulfil the needs of the party as an
organization that placed importance of a struggle for Malaya and not en-
tirely for the Chinese and China. However, the MCP’s action was too little,
too late. Its failure to gain Malay sympathy, compared to the British success
in enlisting Malay support through campaigns to smear the MCP, became
the major cause for the MCP’s failure to confront the British.91

Apart from trying to infiltrate the anti-colonial political movement,
the MCP also attempted to infiltrate and take control of trade unions as a
means to sabotage the British colonial economy. In this context, the MCP
appeared successful. Many scholars perceived that almost the entire trade
union movement in Malaya was successfully controlled by the MCP.92 Un-
til April 1947, the membership of PMFTU, the formation of which was
sponsored by the MCP, was estimated to be over 263,598, and according
to Deery, ‘was legal, constitutional and militant – and it was controlled by
the MCP’.93 However, Clutterbuck stated that in June 1948: ‘There were
302 unions in the Federation of Malaya, with a membership of 150,000. Of
these, 129 unions with a membership of roughly 82,000 were controlled by
the Communist-led PMFTU.’94 However, this view, which is similar to the
allegation that the Malay left movement was controlled by the MCP, could
still be disputed.

The involvement of the MCP membership and the influence of the Com-
munist Party towards trade union struggle cannot be denied. In fact, as in
the case of PKMM, the formation of the PMFTU was spearheaded by the
MCP. Nonetheless, the main objective of the trade unions’ struggle was in
their interests in the economic sector, not politics. Their anger and violence
were related to the question of wage, salary, lack of food, and dreadful living
standards after the Pacific War and not because of the influence of com-
munist ideology. The hardship and intolerable life became an important
factor that induced members of trade unions to indulge in violence and, in
that dire situation, they would support any group that could champion their

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  163

cause and rights, whether the MCP or the British. Accordingly, the MCP ex-
ploited the struggle of trade union members in their hour of need in order to
make itself relevant. However, the actions of trade union members were not
completely controlled by the MCP or followed its dictates. Strikes and vio-
lence that were waged by trade union members reflected their own struggle
caused by economic interests, and not triggered in championing communist
ideology or the ambition of establishing a communist state.

The most important issue, however, was how the failure to gain Malay
support had impacted on the struggle of trade unions. Although trade un-
ions whose formation was sponsored by the MCP managed to stage large
scale strikes in 1946, the failure to gain support from the Malays in this
aspect had left a negative impact on the struggle of trade unions. According
to Stockwell:

One reason for this development lay in the failure of the MCP and
GLU to rouse the Malays. Although the importance of Malays to the
Malayan labour force was relatively insignificant – at the end of 1947
Malays accounted for only 17.5 percent of the total industrial labour
source – government and employers had come to realize that the intro-
duction of Malay labour, say on the estates, might counter the wage de-
mands and what was regarded as the politically motivated ‘blackmail’
of militant elements amongst the Chinese and Indian communities.95

Without the support of the Malays towards the struggle of radical trade
unions, apart from the ability of European employers to manipulate the in-
volvement of Malays in pro-government trade unions, it enabled employ-
ers to weaken the struggle of the radical trade unions. By offering work to
Malays to replace members of the trade unions who staged strikes or got
retrenched helped employers to push aside the demands of radical workers
and/or take violent action. At the same time, employers also received impor-
tant assistance from the British. According to Stenson, since 1947 when the
demands and threats of the trade union movement were able to be quelled,
‘the workers’ bargaining power was far weaker … The economic pendu-
lum had begun to swing in favour of the employer.’96 This situation had
prompted members of trade unions, who had lost their source of depend-
ence, to initiate violent actions on their own beyond the control of anybody,
including the MCP itself. Their actions, in fact, hurt the MCP, as it gave
justification to the British to react more violently, not only towards members
of the trade unions, but also towards the MCP itself.

The MCP and the armed uprising plan

Drawing the foregoing section, it can be concluded that the influence of the
MCP in Malaya was very weak, and this weakness did not allow it to opt
for an armed uprising against the British for as long as it had other options.

164  Azmi Arifin

Harper described the MCP as ‘the reluctant insurrectionists’.97 Without the
strong support from the Malays as well as non-Malays, it left a big impact
on the nature of the MCP’s struggle. The MCP became an organization
that was unable to challenge the British without the support of others. Dur-
ing Lai Teck’s leadership, the MCP was ready to use a moderate strtaegy,
namely to befriend the British. The policy of the MCP’s CEC was to opt for
a moderate stance and was ready to compromise with the British ever since
the latter returned to Malaya in 1945.98 Although Lai Teck was replaced
with a new leadership that was more radical, the priority of the policy to
work closely with the British did not change until 1948.

After Chin Peng took over the leadership of the MCP, the party was still
in a weak position. Many potential MCP leaders were victims of Lai Teck’s
treachery in providing information to the British. The mass murders of
MCP members in Batang Kali was an apparent example.99 Similarly, Lai
Teck was also said to have revealed an important secret regarding the lo-
cation of MCP’s arms that were concealed after the Japanese Occupation,
which enabled the British to uncover the various caches of hidden arms in
February 1947. Since then, the MCP leadership took a long time to resus-
citate itself. In the early days of Chin Peng’s leadership, the MCP was said
to have experienced a spell of paralysis. At that time, a younger generation
started to control the MCP with a radical spirit, but with less experience
and discipline. Meanwhile, communist elements from the MPAJA, which
had received military training, demanded that the MCP act in using force.
Subsequently, action was taken without the agreement of the MCP lead-
ership that was then still weak and unable to control the situation. It can
be concluded that the post-Lai Teck MCP leadership was more inclined to
undertake a militant way of struggle consequent of internal pressure as well
as its own weakness in addressing the problems from within.

The foregoing conclusion could be better understood when pondering on
a few important questions pertaining to the Emergency. To what extent did
the MCP plan to rebel and take up arms against the British? The truth be-
hind the violence and murders that occurred between 1947 and 1948 were
perpetrated by the MCP as prelude to an armed uprising against the British.
Did the murders in Sungai Siput, for instance, constitute part of this plan?
Finally, did the MCP decide on a final decision to rebel at a premeditated
time or was it forced to do so as a result of provocation from the British?
Some historians of the orthodox school of thought maintained that the
MCP did plan from the beginning to take action by force to fight the British.
But the majority view of scholars was difficult to reject. It might be true that
the MCP had ambitions to overthrow the British, either through moderate
means, or by force. However, it begs the question: Was the MCP capable and
ready to act on it before, or in 1948?

Developments in 1947–1948 clearly showed that the act of using arms to
fight against the British was not the main choice of the MCP. The MCP
leadership itself realized that it was unable to make that decision at a time

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  165

when it was entangled with various problems, viz. leadership issue, the ques-
tion of people’s support and the lack of weapons. Hence, even though, if it
was true, that external communists were involved in giving encouragement
to the MCP to use force then, the MCP was wavering and unprepared to
do so. From this perspective, it was apparent that the external factor was
less important and/or influential compared to the internal pressure that the
MCP faced at the time.

The MCP then that did not get support from the Malayan populace had
to continue its moderate approach in lieu of armed resistance. Although the
‘united front’ policy was not popular, it was sustained under Chin Peng’s
stewardship who tried to maintain the MCP’s struggle on legitimate political
grounds. This was admitted by Chin Peng himself, who said that after the
‘two-camp’ theory of Zhadanov was first published in the Journal of Comin-
form in November 1947, the MCP had decided in December to continue
with the ‘united front’ policy. Chin Peng was of the opinion that ‘communal
divisions in Malaya and the people being “thirsty of peace” made a change
(from the United Front policy) seem[ed] wrong, despite the fact that it was
the disgraced Lai Teck’s policy.’100 There were also fierce debates within the
CEC regarding the deadend of the MCP in seeking a final decision, whether
to continue with the united front policy or to choose an open uprising. The
doubt and deadend showed that the MCP leadership was not ready to stage
an armed uprising that was difficult. An armed uprising would only be a last
resort if the MCP did not have any other options. The latter emerged when
the British suddenly declared an Emergency in June 1948.

The available evidence, and the one that was often referred to by histori-
ans to show the existence of a plan by the MCP to wage an armed uprising,
was the three resolutions presented at the Fourth Plenary Session of the
MCP’s CEC that met in Singapore between 17 and 21 March 1948. However,
as McLane argued, the evidence was not concrete. The three resolutions
that were made at the Plenary Session did not clearly prove the existence
of a plan to revolt even though there was demand made to the MCP to
take more radical measures. This was admitted by Chin Peng himself who
stated that the resolutions made were more ‘defensive’ and ‘reactive’ to-
wards British provocation.101 In short, there was no concrete evidence that
could support the view that the MCP had an organized plan to rebel, and
the evidence has yet to be shown. Conversely, the evidence available only
showed diffidence that the MCP had regarding their capability to stage an
open revolt against the British. Whatever inducement and pressure to act in
a violent manner that was brought about by the British provocation left the
MCP with no other choice. The resistance of the MCP after the Emergency
was declared, was a defensive act and not offensive as admitted by Chin
Peng. In this connection, Caldwell stated that: ‘[T]here was every reason
to believe that the Party (MCP) would wait until resort to arms could be
presented as an unavoidable defensive reaction to stepped-up government
persecution.’102