Azmi Arifin, The Colonial War 1948, 2021

EMERGENCY, COLD WAR OR COLONIAL WAR? AN ANALYSIS OF
HISTORIANS’ PERSPECTIVES OF 1948 MALAYA

Abstract

This study examines historians’ perspectives regarding the various factors that prompted the
British to declare a state of Emergency in Malaya in 1948. Although there have been
extensive discussions among analysts on this issue, however they have yet to reach a
consensus. To date, the focus of historians is on the various intrinsic and extrinsic factors,
such as the effects of Cold War, British manipulation, and Malayan Communist Party’s
(MCP) planned armed uprising. However, undue focus on the role played by the British and
MCP resulted in the historians’ failure to consider other parties, such as the anti-British left-
leaning Malay nationalist and religious movement that fought for Malayan independence.
The common view of historians is that the anti-colonial struggle which gave rise to the
Emergency was waged by the MCP, while the left-leaning Malay movement was alleged to
have been part of the communist element. Although it cannot be denied that there was a
threat posed by the MCP and the fear of the Cold War influencing British response,
nonetheless this study argues that communism was not the main source or target of the
Emergency rule. While communism at the start of the Cold War fostered British anxiety, the
British however believed that the MCP, which was regarded as a “troublemaker”, was
incapable of challenging them as long as it was not able to enlist the support of the local
people particularly the Malays. It is only after realising that the Malay nationalists were bent
on waging a “radical” struggle and that they could possibly be influenced by the communist
element that the British were ready to mount a violent response. This study argues that the
Emergency, or rather the “colonial war”, was engaged by the British to achieve a hidden
objective, i.e. to quell the entire anti-colonial movement, especially one that was led by the
Malay left nationalist and religious movement that struggled for independence and
considered by the British as more dangerous than the MCP threat.

Keywords: British colonialism, Malay nationalism, Malayan Communist Party, left
movement, Colonial War, Cold War

Introduction

Many discussions have been published on the link between MCP and the declaration of
Independence in Malaya by the British in 1948. These were authored by Malaysian scholars
such as Gwee (1966), Ramlan (1973), Khong (1975), Cheah (1977, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992),
Khoo and Adnan (1984), Mohd Reduan (1993) Chin (1995), as well as several interesting
articles by Mahmud Embong.1 Many interpretations of the history of the communist
movement and its link with Malayan Emergency have been influenced by earlier studies
published by Western writers. Among the notable ones include Purcell (1954), Hanrahan
(1954), Miller (1954, 1972), Short (1954, 1964, 1975), Pye (1956), Brimmel (1956, 1959),
Renick (1965), O’Ballance (1966), Clutterbuck (1967, 1973), Thompson (1967) and Stenton
(1971).On the whole, latest studies (apart from some local writers such as Ramakrishna 2002;
Mahmud 2003, 2004; Cheah 2009; and Ho 2010) were also monopolised by Western analysts
such as Stenton (1980), Coates (1992), Furedi (1994), Carruthers (1995), Harper (1999),
Short (2000), Stockwell (1987, 1993, 2006), Deery (2003, 2007), Stubbs (1989, 2008), Hack
(1995, 1999, 2001, 2009), Comber (2009) and Stahl (2010). Their writings reflected a

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diversity of perspectives held by historians. However, the interpretations of Malayan political
development in the 1940s and 1950s, especially the ones dealing with communism and
Emergency, can be divided into the following major streams: Orthodox, Marxist, Neo-
Orthodox and Revisionist.

Orthodox interpretations emerged in the writings of the Emergency since the early 1950s.
They were pioneered by colonial administrators, members of the British Intelligence and
local political leaders, and subsequently continued by historians. In their view, the
Emergency was declared by the British because of the Cold War “threat” and MCP’s planned
armed uprising after receiving direct instructions from the Soviet Union (Miller 1954, 15, 76;
Purcell 1955, 60; O’Ballance 1966, 76). MCP was depicted as an influential political
organisation, engendering a major threat to the British after the Second World War. It was
alleged to have successfully infiltrated and assumed control of the local political movement
either among the Malays or non-Malays and also the trade union through the United Front’s
policy that was introduced since the mid-1940s. However, its failure to weaken the British
through political actions and trade union activities induced the MCP to devise a plan to take
up arms in order to establish a communist republic on Moscow’s instructions (O’Ballance
1966, 14-15, 19, 76). This instruction was said to have been channelled to MCP’s members
through the Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta and the Indian Communist Party congress
which was held from the end of February till March 1948 (Pye 1956, 83-84).2

In order to counter MCP’s violence and uprising, the British reacted by declaring a state of
Emergency throughout Malaya on 18 June 1948, two days after the brutal execution of three
European plantation managers in Sungai Siput, Perak. Emergency laws gave wide powers to
the British as the laws enabled them to impose “total rule” over Malaya and to suppress all
political activities. Anyone who challenged these laws would be regarded as posing a threat
to public interest.3 In this matter, Orthodox writers generally focused on the target of the
Emergency, i.e. the non-Malay political activists among MCP members. A few days after the
Emergency was declared, more than 1,000 political activists and trade union members were
arrested and imprisoned without trial (Hack 2009, 472). At the end of 1948, a total of 1,779
communist members were arrested, 637 of them and 3,148 family members who were
Chinese were deported to China. Up to 1957, 33, 992 people were arrested, 14,907 who were
non-Malay activists were deported to their countries of origin (Clutterbuck 1973, 169).
Malayan Emergency, which involved conflicts among 8,000 communist rebels and 40,000
soldiers, 70,000 police personnel and 250,000 Home Guard members, was only declared to
have officially ended in July 1960 after 12 long years.

The view that the Soviet directed MCP’s planned uprising existed was based on the British
government’s allegation and intelligence. This view was especially included in a
comprehensive intelligence report on Malaya’s political activities titled ‘Malayan Security
Service Political Intelligence Journal, 1946-1948’ (MSS).4 Generally, this view was accepted
as official history and acknowledged by the authorities from colonial days till now. However,
this opinion was criticised starting from the 1970s. Among others, earlier criticisms were
forwarded by Mohamad Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, proponents of a Marxist perspective.
Their book titled Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony (1977) provided an interesting
argument on the real aim and the measures taken by the British during the Emergency. Their
views constituted part of the new interpretations which were able to dismantle Orthodox
beliefs. However, criticisms towards the Orthodox approach only became much more
obvious since the 1990s. This was attributed to the discovery of new evidences revealed by
the British National Archives in Kew, London (formerly known as Public Record Office).

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The emergence of new evidences induced the birth of a Revisionist stream which provided a
different interpretation of the Emergency proclamation in Malaya in 1948.

This new interpretation advocated by a number of Western analysts included Furedi (1989,
1990, 1994), Stockwell (1993), Harper (1999), Deery (2007) and Stahl (2009). Furedi
produced a number of interesting writings since the 1980s which explained Malayan
Emergency as a ‘conspiracy’ and ‘colonial war’5 waged by the British to destroy the anti-
colonial movement. This war, to Furedi, was targeted at the nationalist movement
spearheaded by the MCP that was fighting for independence. Furedi’s perception was revised
by Stockwell. Stockwell published a number of impressive writings particularly in 1993
which discussed the reasons for the declaration of independence. He also compiled three
important books which included official British documents released by the National
Archives, especially those that were related to British policies after the Second World War.6

Stockwell’s compilation of documents titled Part 2: The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953
(1995) presented much information regarding the MCP threat, British reaction and measures
taken towards the proclamation of independence. Stockwell explained that the Emergency
was not just declared to counter the MCP’s uprising, but it also stemmed from British efforts
to handle the upheaval which caused dissatisfaction among employers and Malay elite
leadership since the mid-1940s. According to Stockwell (1993, 74-80), although the British
did not possess concrete evidence about MCP’s violence or the directive from Moscow to the
MCP to take up arms, the violence that erupted nonetheless was used as an excuse to declare
Emergency in Malaya and to ban any “subversive” activity that could threaten public order.

Although the revisionist perspective had a strong basis, however it was still not accepted. At
the end of 2000, this perspective was criticised by a number of analysts representing the Neo-
Orthodox stream, namely Hack (2009) and Chin (2009),7 as revealed in the historiography of
the Emergency. Both writers attempted to reinforce the Orthodox perspective by making use
of evidences that were acquired from official British sources, as well as from the MCP.
Based on these sources, they explained that indeed there was concrete evidence that showed
that the MCP, which was influenced by external elements, had a well-arranged plan to revolt.
Differences in interpretation between the Neo-Orthodox and Orthodox streams can be
attributed to the historians’ readiness to examine the Emergency from various angles and
dimensions. This included pressures faced from within and without. However, they
eventually shared one similar conclusion, i.e the Emergency was declared by the British
because of the MCP’s planned armed uprising, whether it was Soviet-directed or motivated
by the development of the international communist movement.

Orthodox, Marxist, Neo-Orthodox and Revisionist perspectives have not only dominated the
historical interpretation of the communist movement, but also that of the Cold War and
Emergency. On the whole, they have also exerted control over the historical interpretation of
the movement demanding Malayan independence, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s.
Although the Orthodox and Revisionist perspectives were based on solid official documents,
either from the British or the MCP, nonetheless they were still regarded as inadequate. This is
because, at that time, they had solely linked the Emergency to the threat posed by the MCP
towards the British, and attempted to depict the MCP as one of the movements which had
spearheaded the struggle for Malayan independence. This study provides a critique of this
interpretation and instead argues that the MCP threat, at least until 1948, was not the only
factor that prompted British reaction through the Emergency of 1948.

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Although the British viewed the MCP’s activities as a huge threat, one that they feared was
initiated by the Soviet element, what they were truly concerned about was the left-leaning
Malay nationalist and religious movement which was fighting for independence. British
anxiety was fuelled by the possibility that the popular and influential nationalist group within
the local community will be influenced by the communists, particularly the Soviet element.
This anxiety was clearly reflected in the official documents of the British. In fact, the British
often blamed the nationalist group as being part of the communist element and the MCP,
although some of them were clearly anti-communist. According to some analysts, the aim of
the British was to tarnish the image of the nationalist group, to quash Malay support towards
the movement and to wage a legitimate struggle for independence unseen to the world. This
was to enable the British to stick a negative label and to take stern action towards Malayan
nationalists on the pretext of combating the ‘violence’ of the communist.

This study argues that in comparison to the communist movement which received litte
support from the people, the left leaning Malay nationalist and religious movement had
played a much more significant and challenging role against the British. The struggle they
initiated to attain independence not only struck fear in the British, but also threatened the
survival of a conservative Malay political party that was pro-British, i.e. United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO). The rise of the prominent Malay nationalist left and
religious movement following the huge protest of the Malays against the Malayan Union plan
in 1946 incurred the wrath of the British. They were concerned that a united nationalist
movement would be exploited by the MCP to reinforce the people’s support for it. This
situation prompted the British to take drastic measures between 1947 and 1948 so as to curb
the influence of the nationalist movement. Apart from banning a few anti-colonial
movements, an Emergency was declared to quell the threat of the nationalist movement by
making the MCP a ‘scapegoat’. ‘Emergency’ or ‘Colonial War’ that was declared in June
1948 to supposedly overcome the MCP’s armed revolt actually was a step taken by the
British to camouflage their real intent to smash the Malay nationalist-religious movement by
using the pretext of fighting against ‘subversive’, ‘militant’ and ‘violent’ communist
elements.

Emergency and Cold War in Malaya: The Version of Orthodox History

Most historians explained that the declaration of Emergency was prompted by the MCP’s
planned revolt and the Cold War threat. This was a plan engineered by the Soviets to go
against the British in Malaya. The MCP was said to have planned from the beginning to use
violence and to take up arms to fight the British, which was supposed to take place in
September 1948 (Chin 2009, 17). Prior to this, the MCP had only resorted to the following
moderate means: sponsoring the setting up of a political party, infiltrating the left movement
and trade union, sabotaging, promoting public strike and creating economic disorder so as to
weaken the British administration. However, these efforts were said to have failed
(O’Balance 1966, 14-15, 19, 76). As a result, the MCP planned to act in a more militant
manner, that is, to use violence, and the climax was to take up arms to fight the British by
emulating the approach used successfully by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Pye 1956,
86-87).

A well-organised and influential MCP was said to be capable of infiltrating and controlling
the entire nationalist movement including the Malay nationalist left and religious movement
as well as the trade unions which were widely established in the 1940s. Hence, it was seen to
be highly capable of invoking threat towards the British and to usurp power.8The MCP

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exploited its influence towards trade unions, for instance by sponsoring the setting up of a
common trade union such as the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) in order
to encourage and organise strikes to sabotage the British economy in Malaya (MSS, PIJ,
1948). In 1947, more than 300 strikes and industrial disturbances were carried out, mostly in
the rubber estates. According to Miller (1954, 74), “While the Communist admittedly did not
play a part in many of the troubles, they were behind most of the serious ones, which
invariably were accompanied by violent demonstrations”. The violence reached its height on
16 June 1948 when three European managers in a number of estates in Sugai Siput, Perak
were killed by individuals who were thought to be MCP’s elements (Miller 1954, 82; Pye
1956, 89; O’Ballance 1966, 82).9

The murder of three European planters was considered to be the inducing factor that triggered
British reaction. The British decided to declare a state of Emergency on 17 and 18 June 1948,
outlawed the MCP together with all political organisations and trade unions under its
influence, and subsequently conducted a massive arrest of all anti-colonial activists.10 As
alleged by Malcolm Macdonald, the Governer-General of Malaya since 1948 and the
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia during the “communist revolt”, Emergency was
declared by the British to counter MCP’s threat. This was because MCP was acting in a
violent way and they were “….making a desperate effort to impose the rule of the knife and
the gun in plantations, mines and factories...”11

Orthodox historians alleged that widesperead violence which erupted in Malaya from 1947-
1948 was MCP’s initial steps in staging an uprising. The MCP’s plan to revolt was said to
have been induced by the spread of the Cold War phenomenon to Malaya. The MCP was said
to be ready to take up arms and to achieve its objective to establish a communist country
using violence after receiving direct instructions from Soviet Union, a country which was
facing Cold War with the Western power block led by United States of America. The
instruction to stage an uprising from Moscow was said to have been directly accepted by the
MCP members via two conferences held in India, that is the Conference of Asian Youth in
Calcutta and the Conference of the Indian Communist Party from February-March 1948
(Miller 1954, 15, 76; Purcell 1955, 60; O’Ballance 1966, 76; McLane 1966, 357, 385-86;
Hyde 1968, 23-24; Short 1975, 44). From this perspective Clutterbuck explained; “…Calcutta
conference no doubt played some part in prompting the MCP to remobilize the guerrilla army
and to go over to the phase of the ‘armed struggle’ in Malaya” (1973: 56).

Moscow’s influence towards the anti-British movement in Southeast Asia was most worrying
to the British administration in London. Clearly, intense worry existed among the government
officers under the leadership of Prime Minister C.J. Atlee, who viewed the advancement of
Soviet influence as the main threat towards the security of Southeast Asia at a time when
there were attempts to curb the influence in Europe (Deery 2003, 31). According to Attlee;

There is a distinct danger that, as measures are developed for the
security of Europe and the Middle East, pressure [from the Soviet
Union] upon South East Asia will increase. Conditions there are
generally speaking favourable for the spread of Communism, and if
the general impression prevails in South East Asia that the Western
Powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Russian
pressure...eventually the whole of South East Asia will fall a victim to
the Communist advance and thus come under Russian domination.

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The colonial office in the month of October and the Cabinet Committee for Malayan Affairs
on November 1948 had confirmed the threat by alleging that there existed “…substantial
grounds for regarding the Malayan outbreak as stimulated by Moscow...” and “...the
existence of ‘Communist plot’ to overthrow the Malayan government by armed force” (Deery
2003, 34). The threat from Moscow was also emphasised by the Head of the British Far East
Security Intelligence who had issued a warning that “…the Soviet Union in all likehood
controlled the growing local Communist parties in Southeast Asia...” (34). Similarly, there
existed allegations that certain individuals were sent to the Communist Information Bureau
(Cominform) as agents to spread propaganda and encourage the communists in the whole of
Southeast Asia to rise and revolt against colonial rule. The individual being referred to was
Lawrence Starkey, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) who was
said to have become active upon attending the communist conference in Calcutta. He was
alleged to have visited Singapore for two weeks after the conference and gave a speech
during the MCP’s Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee (CEC). He
used this opportunity to play “… a considerable part in persuading the Malayan Communists
to adopt a policy of violence” (Pye 1956, 84).12

The view on the Cold War threat and the MCP’s plan to revolt which led to the declaration of
Emergency in 1948 had influenced many historians’ interpretations. Many analysts believed
that the Emergency was seen as Britain’s reaction when facing a “communist conspiracy”
and the Cold War threat 13 which invariably was depicted as MCP’s planned revolt after
receiving instructions from Moscow.14 Miller (1954: 15) for instance explained that MCP’s
violent activity was

…a part of a preconceived world-wide Russian plans to establish
Soviet republics in the Far East. In Malaya, they were trying for the
first time to conquer British territory, although until now Russia and
Communist China have given only lip support to the ‘struggle’ by the
Malayan Communists.

A local scholar, Yeo Kim Wah, believed that the common view of the MCP’s planned revolt
upon receiving instructions from the Soviet through the conference in Calcutta in February
1949 was “...the orthodox view and by far the most widely accepted version of the
communist uprising in Malaya” (Yeo in Deery 2003, 38). Yeo’s view was acceptable if it is
looked at from a number of angles. Apart from Malaysian historians who can be said to form
the majority holding an orthodox interpretation, this interpretation was also accepted by
Western analysts, whether from among the earlier writers such as Morrison (1948), Mosley
(1951), Purcell (1955), Miller (1955), Brimmel (1956), Pye (1956), Crozier (1965),
Clutterbuck (1966, 1973), Thompson (1966) and Komer (1972) to more contemporary ones
such as Sanders (1990), Jackson (1991), Mackay (1997) and other analysts.

The Birth of a New Perspective: A Revisionist Interpretation

The orthodox views began to be challenged since the 1970s. Some historians rejected the
contention that the Cold War was already in existence in Malaya. They also rejected the view
that the declaration of Emergency emerged from an “international communist conspiracy”.
This conspiracy issued a directive to the MCP through the congress in Calcutta to rebel
against the British government. For some researchers, that view could not be proven.15 They

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instead argued that local factors played a bigger role in encouraging the use of violence.
Although violence occurred in Malaya since March 1948 that was believed to have been
stoked by communist “elements”, they maintained that it was not part of the MCP’s rebellion
plan. In fact, the MCP was said to have been unprepared to face the British when the
Emergency was declared.

McVey was among the earliest scholars who analysed the issue of “Communist conspiracy”
through his book, The Calcutta Conference and the South East Asian Uprising (1958). In his
writing, he rejected the contention that there existed a directive from the Soviets to the MCP
to rebel via the conference in Calcutta in February 1948. According to McVey, that
conference was not an appropriate place and time to deliver the message of communist
revolutionaries. This is because the conference was held openly in India, a country that was
under British control. Even though the representatives involved in the conference, said
McVey, were anti-colonial nationalist groups, not all were communist supporters. Similarly,
not all who attended the conference supported the policies of the Soviet Union. Instead, they
came from different backgrounds, places and ideologies that in effect fostered a clash of
opinions amongst them. McVey’s opinion was reinforced by a study conducted by a Russian
scholar, i.e. Larisa Efimova, that maintained that there was no directive issued by the Soviets
to the communists in Southeast Asia to mount an armed rebellion against the British
(Efimova 2009, 449-469).

McVey’s contention was further strengthened by the fact that only one MCP representative
was sent to the conference in Calcutta, i.e. Li Siong. Even though he led a pro-communist
organisation, that is New Democratic Youth League, Li however did not hold any important
position in the MCP. Li was selected as MCP representative because of his proficiency in the
English language and he attended only the first conference (Keng 1984, 32-33); Deery 2003,
47). Li also did not immediately return to Singapore until 22 March 1984. This means that he
did not attend the MCP’s Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee (CEC)
that was held from 17-21 March 1948. It was at this conference that the issue of getting ready
to rebel was debated. The above facts give rise to doubts among researchers as regards the
extent to which Li played a role as a middleman who relayed the Soviet directive to the MCP
to mount an armed rebellion.

Another evidence used by the Orthodox researchers is the resolutions passed at the Fourth
Plenary Session of MCP’s CEC held from 17-21 March 1948, which allegedly was attended
by Sharkey. These resolutions were said to instruct the MCP to act in a militant manner to
counter the British response, including the readiness to take up arms if compelled to do so.
However, this evidence was disputed by revisionist researchers. According to several
researchers (McLane 1966, 386; Deery 2007, 50-51), at the Plenary Session, the MCP’s CEC
had passed three important resolutions that were related to the MCP’s plan for armed
uprising. The first resolution emphasised the MCP’s need to reactivate discipline within the
party following the leadership era of Lai Teck who was alleged to have betrayed the party.
Two more resolutions were more radical. The second resolution urged that the struggle for
independence in Malaya could only be achieved through “people’s revolutionary war” and
the MCP must be ready to lead the struggle. The third resolution outlined the need for the
MCP to change the strategy of its struggle from “surrenderism” to one that was militant.
What was stressed in the last resolution was the readiness that the MCP needed to have to
face what was said to be “… an uncompromising struggle for independence without regard to
considerations of legality.” Although these resolutions shed light on the radical change that

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the MCP needed to foster so as to make its struggle more relevant, McLane (1966: 386)
however contended;

The resolutions did not, then, specifically called for an uprising,
although as internal party documents they might well have done so
had it been the intention of the leadership to proceed immediately to
armed insurrection. They stressed the urgency of preparing for
rebellion, not yet of precipating one.16

Furedi was one of the vocal scholars who criticised the approach of orthodox historians who
were regarded as being shackled by an interpretation that was influenced by British
propaganda. To Furedi, the contention that the British declaration of Emergency was a move
to counter the “international communist plot” that directed the MCP to forge an uprising was
a weak one and difficult to defend. On the other hand, the issue of the Cold War was used as
“… a weapon that sought to discredit any legitimate nationalist impulse by reinterpreting it as
a communist conspiracy… Its aim was to make anti-colonial nationalism invisible” (Furedi
1994, 103). The real threat to the British, Furedi clarified (3), was from the anti-colonial
nationalist movement that was led by the MCP and the objective of the Emergency was to
neutralise that threat.

Furedi’s view was based on several arguments. First, the claim that there existed an armed
uprising of the MCP via the Soviet directive cannot be defended with any concrete evidence.
The weakness of this claim was admitted by the British and further validated by the United
States through its intelligence body, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Taking into account
several cases of Emergency in British colonies, Furedi (1995, 149) declared;

In none of these cases did efforts to substantiate the arguments used to
justify calling an emergency prove successful. In the case of Malaya,
the colonial administration repeatedly conceded that it lacked
evidence for the publicly alleged communist plot. The CIA was no
more successful. A month before the declaration of the emergency in
Malaya, the CIA reported that ‘there is no evidence’ that the MCP was
‘financed by or has direct contact with Moscow’. The American
Departement of State wrote its consul in Singapore that it ‘would
appreciate copies of...documents’ which the ‘British believe prove that
terrorist activities are part of Communist plan to overthrow the
Government of Malaya.’ This request, though repeated on many
occasions, was not to be met.

Secondly, MCP’s violence, according to Furedi, did not originate from a “communist plot” or
the Cold War but instead an effect of British “conspiracy” itself. In Furedi’s view, the violent
response mounted by the British against political activists and trade unions was part of the
provocation planned by the British to incite these groups to react violently. This enabled the
British to blame the communists and their elements as factors that initiated violence. British
provocation was crafted through the violence employed against the activities of trade unions
since 1947.17 The climax was the restriction imposed on PMFTU in April and May 1948 that
caused the workers’ group to lose its voice to articulate grievances through legal means. This
restriction forced them to use violent means by creating disorder and engaging in killings. To
Furedi (1994, 151), the pressure on trade union activities is a shrewd tactic of the British to

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provoke violent reaction from radical workers’ group that no groups could control, including
the MCP itself.

Thirdly, the conspiracy was realised through British action to manipulate the use of the term
“Emergency” so as to conceal their violence from the world view. “Emergency”, according to
Furedi, is a form of “colonial war” that was staged by the British in order to quash any form
of resistance, i.e. the nationalists, by using the pretext of stamping out violent elements and
criminals.18

The term emergency itself confusing. These conflicts were either
potentially or actually colonial wars. The term emergency was
essentially a public-relations concept. It had the advantage of allowing
Britain to adopt wide-ranging coercive powers while maintaining the
pretence of normal civil rule. Above all, emergencies helped create the
impression that the issue at stake was that of law and order rather than
a political challenge to colonialism. An emergency was called to
restore order – by definition it aimed to curb those who caused
disorder. Emergency measures allowed colonial governors to label
their opponents as law-breakers. At a stroke anti-colonial activists
could be transformed into criminals or terrorists.

Furedi’s view was followed by a study conducted by Stockwell in 1993. In his analysis of the
real relation between communism, violence and British response, Stockwell raised a question
as to how far it is true the claim that the Emergency was a British response to counter what
was described as “a widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in
Malaya.”

To Stockwell, that viewpoint was difficult to defend because there was no clear evidence to
show that there existed a “Communist plot” to overthrow the British government in Malaya.
Stockwell (1993, 74) further reiterated that the British administration admitted that they did
not have any shred of evidence to relate the violence in Malaya to the “Communist plot” and
the armed uprising plan of the MCP. Stockwell gave a few examples, among which was the
admission of Alexander Newboult, Chief Secretary to the government of Malaya, to the
American Consul that “… they [the British officials] had no conclusive proof that the
violence and murder was due to Communist activities, but that they are convinced of it…”
and that “… they did not know the aim of the present activities unless it was to ruin the
economy of the country and create chaos so that many of the people might consider that the
Government could not cope with the situation.” Apart from that, Creech Jones, secretary of
the British Colonies, also stated, “There is no concrete evidence that the Malayan Communist
Party is directly responsible for the present lawlessness but extreme political factions and
certain trade unions have been infiltrated by communism.” Similarly, the clarification from a
CO source itself that assessed Communist activities in Malaya also mentioned the same thing
(76).19

No decisive evidence has yet been received here [in London] of the
direct complicity of the Malayan Communist Party or the P.M.F.T.U.
in any of the actual murderous attacks which have occurred but the
High Commissioner has stated that he has sufficient evidence to show
that much of the violence is due to organised incitement by extremist
elements who challenge the authority of the Government.

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To Stockwell, the relations between the MCP and all forms of violence in Malaya and the
“Communist plot” to overthrow the government using force was exaggerated by MacDonald.
Macdonald, who was influential in the government administration in Whitehall, was said to
have used his influence to encourage the British government to make a decision to ban the
MCP in July 1948, an action that was failed to be executed by Edward Gent before this. To
justify this action, British administrators deliberately manufactured evidence to claim that
there was a MCP plan to have an armed uprising, following the directive from the Soviet to
overthrow the British government in Malaya.20

While stressing that there was no clear evidence regarding the MCP’s plan to rebel in order to
overthrow the colonial government in Malaya, Stockwell however questioned Furedi’s view
that the Emergency was a British “conspiracy” to curb anticolonial movement. Stockwell
(1993, 80) stated that the wavering reaction towards the MCP threat, and their
unpreparedness to take swift action to ban the MCP without acquiring concrete evidence
beforehand shows that there wasn’t a conspiracy of the British to ban the MCP. Stockwell
also rejected the view that the effort to smear the MCP and to declare Emergency in the name
of the Cold War was deliberately made by the British to gain affection or avoid pressure from
the United States government. According to Stockwell (81), in the middle of 1948, the British
government under the Labour Party leadership was not actually under the pressure of
Washington to take any action against Communist activities. In fact, the measure to curb the
threat of expanding Soviet power and the Cold War was taken on the initiative of the Attlee
government itself without having to anticipate an initial move of the United States
government.

Clearly, to Stockwell, both views about the Emergency being declared due to a “Communist
plot” and the MCP’s armed resistance plan, or otherwise, a “British conspiracy” to counter
Communist activities so as to fulfil the US’ wishes in facing the Cold War, were inaccurate.
Stockwell instead argued that the Emergency was declared by the British to lessen the
pressure from groups who served as the source of economic power maintenance in Malaya,
that is, European businessmen and the Malay elite. They always demanded that immediate
action be taken to seek the troublemakers in order to maintain peace in Malaya. As such,
Stockwell (85) stated; “We are led to the conclusion, therefore, that ministers decided to ban
the MCP in July 1948, not because they had irrefutable proof of a communist plot nor
because they had an interest in concocting one, but as an attempt to restore confidence in the
colonial regime.”

Phillip Deery, in his article, “Malaya 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?” (2007), also
questioned the view that the declaration of Emergency was prompted by the Cold War
imperative. Although he did not deny the relationship between the MCP and international
Communist movement, Deery (2007, 40-45) stressed that the factors that caused the MCP to
be more militant and to be prepared for violent action was not because of external directive,
but internal pressure, that is, leadership problem, pressure from youth and radical factions in
MCP as well as provocations from the British who took action particularly against trade
unions. Deery also questioned the view that claimed that the MCP had an organised plan to
mount an armed uprising against the British. According to Deery (33), the armed uprising
plan by the MCP was “… far from being meticulously prepared and carefully coordinated as
is often alleged, was inadequately planned and poorly executed.” Even though the principle
of his struggle had changed to militancy after the Lai Teck era, however, according to Deery
(45), the MCP actually was not ready to fight against the British and didn’t anticipate that the

10

British would act drastically to declare Emergency to the extent it compelled them to face the
British response in a frenzied manner.

The timing of the State of Emergency clearly took the MCP by
surprise. Consequently, the party’s decision to go underground was ad
hoc; its retreat to the jungle was made in panic; and its switch from
urban to rural revolt was confused. These moves left the MCP’s
“front” organizations off balance, leaderless, and isolated. In this
sense, the decision to mobilize for guerrilla warfare was accelerated
by, and partly in response to, the severity of government action in
May-June 1948. The notion that the MCP was following a carefully
planned strategy – a strategy coordinated by a highly centralized party
structure – is fallacious.

The argument of revisionist historians was strengthened by the admission of MCP Secretary-
General Chin Peng himself. In two books that narrated his experience, that is, Alias Chin
Peng: My Side of History (2003) and Dialogues with Chin Peng (2004, 117); “The prominent
factor that influenced us, when we decided to take up arms, was the British policy at the time.
We felt we were being cornered, gradually backed into the corner. We had nowhere to
move…Of course, the international factor played some role, but not as decisive as that.” Chin
Peng (218, 222) also admitted that the killing of three European employers in Sungai Siput
was an act committed by MCP supporters. However, it was not done on his official directive
as MCP’s high official or MCP’s CEC as declaration of war against the British. In fact, Chin
Peng clarified that the killing was a “mistake”.

…neither I, nor the Central Committee, had ordered the killing of
European planters. Despite speculation at the time and since, the CPM
at no point in the Emergency ever drew up a planters’ hit list. Indeed,
if I had had my way, the killings at Sungei Siput would never have
taken place. They resulted from over-enthuasiasm for revenge at the
local level coupled with a serious lack of command control at the state
level.

Reaction and Criticism of Neo-Orthodox Historians

The approach of revisionist historians to reject completely the attempt to connect the
Emergency with an international Communist “conspiracy” and the Cold War lately had
received immense criticism from several historians. Among them were Karl Hack and C.C.
Chin who pioneered neo-orthodox thinking in the historiography of the Emergency.

Hack outlined the change in the MCP tactic since the end of March 1948 from a “United
Front” to a strategy that was more militant that influenced the MCP’s decision to revolt
although such a move was considered at that time as “over-determined”. This change,
according to Hack (2000, 471-72), was marked by an increased violent campaign by the MCP
starting from February until June 1948, that saw a drastic spike in strikes, chaos and killing in
Malaya. The change in MCP’s tactic, Hack stated, must be seen as MCP’s reaction in
fulfilling the demands of the international Communist that stressed on the change of strategy
of the communists in Southeast Asia towards a militant struggle. Since 1948, the communist
movement in Southeast Asia rose in line with the demands of the international communists
who witnessed not only the communist movement in Malaya, but also in Burma, the

11

Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam that pushed aside the policy of “United Front” and
launched a violent campaign. According to Hack, the change in the tactic of the MCP
struggle to one that was more violent forced the British to declare Emergency in Malaya.

However, Hack admitted that it was difficult to establish the real reason for the Emergency.
In fact, he concurred with the approach taken by several researchers such as Short and Stubbs
who saw that the Emergency was not prompted by one factor but several internal and external
ones. Nonetheless, Hack maintained that the external factor, that is the inducement of the
international communists and the effect of the Cold War had a big influence over the MCP’s
decision to revolt. This was compounded by the British provocation that encouraged a violent
response from the MCP. Although the MCP admittedly was not prepared to face the British
through an open warfare, the British provocation, Hack stated, forced the MCP to make a
swift decision that was in line with the demand of the international communists, i.e. a militant
and armed struggle.

A view similar to Hack’s was held by C. C. Chin. Chin claimed that the MCP had an
organised plan to take up arms to fight the British in September 1948. This was based on his
assessment of a few MCP and oral history documents of several MCP leaders, particularly
the decision made in the MCP’s CEC meeting since March 1948 (Chin 2009, 16-27). Chin
argued that although the “two camps” doctrine which was proposed by a Russian communist
leader, Andrei Zhdanov, in his speech in Cominform in September 1947 did influence the
MCP’s decision (Chin 2009, 14), the MCP moved to take up arms not because it embraced
the doctrine or followed the Soviet directive, but because Chin was much more inclined to
connect the MCP’s decision with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Chin
(14-15);

The characteristics of the MCP were determined by the fact that it
evolved from the CCP’s Nanyang Branch. Thus, the MCP was greatly
under the influence of the CCP and followed the CCP tactics in its
political struggle. It is almost unlikely that the MCP would simply act
in accordance with CPSU [Communist Party of Soviet Union]
instructions, as the MCP followed Mao’s teaching that each individual
party had to observe closely its own situation and decide its own
course of action.

Based on this argument, Chin opined that the plan to revolt was one decision made by the
MCP leadership to fight the British which suited the condition in Malaya at the time.

Chin clarified that the MCP uprising plan originated from internal pressure, i.e. British
provocation towards communist activities and trade union. For Chin, the violent British
action against the MCP and its elements showed the existence of “… a well-planned tactic by
the British to provoke the MCP to resort to armed struggle” (Mason 2009, 4). The British
action concerned clearly influenced the MCP to organise a plan for an armed uprising.
However, before the plan could be implemented as engineered, i.e. in September 1948, the
British already launched an offensive much earlier. According to Chin (27);

The British offensive commencing in June 1948 with the declaration
of emergency in combination with mass arrests and the mobilising of
forces was planned well in advanced. Though the MCP had planned to
initiate the armed revolt in the month of September, the British

12

offensive acted three months in advance and caught the MCP by
surprise. This had created a chaotic situation for the MCP.

Between the Orthodox and the Revisionists: Some weaknesses

Although the interpretations advanced by the analysts, whether from the Orthodox,
Revisionist or Neo-Orthodox streams, were supported by concrete evidence from written
documents and British spy sources, they were however not without shortcomings. This is
because their discussions centred on the role played by the MCP which caused them to
overlook the part played by other external parties beyond the communist struggle. The
influence of the anti-colonial movement that existed in various forms and ideologies in
Malaya in the 1940s was downplayed as it was only perceived as a part of the MCP’s
element. As a result, the discussion of historians regarding the emergency or the Malayan
nationalist movement in the 1940s generally revolved around the following issues:

(i) The Soviet or Chinese influence and the impact of the Cold War towards the anti-
colonial movement in Malaya in the 1940s-1950s.

(ii) The existence of a planned revolt by the MCP towards the British at that time.
(iii) The MCP was one of the nationalist movements which fought to challenge the

British. All other anti-colonial movements including the trade union were
influenced or controlled by the MCP.
(iv) British response particularly through the Emergency was directed solely towards
the communist movement and the MCP, which were regarded as rivals and the
main threat towards British colonisation.

From this perspective, both Orthodox and Revisionist analysts roughly share a similar point
of view. Although the Revisionists rejected the external role and regarded the Emergency as a
tool used by the British to destroy the anti-colonial movement, they agreed with the Orthodox
analysts that the anti-colonial movement in Malaya in the 1940s was a struggle spearheaded
and activated entirely by the MCP. The Orthodox and Revisionist interpretation was
criticised by some post-Revisionist analysts, who asked to what extent the communist
movement in Malaya had become the major challenge to the British compared to other anti-
colonial movements.

Aside from the attempt by historians, particularly from the West, to characterise the MCP as
influential and the greatest challenge to the British, the fact shows that the MCP was a
movement that was weak and this was acknowledged by the British themselves. While the
British were vigilant towards the communist threat, they downplayed the threat from the
MCP even from the very beginning as they were considered as mere bandits.21 This explains
why the British were unsure to take immediate action to ban the MCP before 1948. Even
until 1948, the evidence indicating the existence of communist threat had not been verified
yet, except that it was acknowledged in terms of its potential to infiltrate and take control of
other political movements, namely among the Malay nationalists.22 In fact, the MCP failed in
its effort, despite using various tactics and methods. Its failure to gain support from the
majority of the people and to take control of other anticolonial movements prevented the
MCP from becoming the major challenge to the British and leading the anticolonial
movements.

Historians clarified that the real objective of the communists in countries under colonial rule
in Southeast Asia, as indicated by the international communist movement, was to infiltrate

13

and disguise as members of the independence movement and to “… think less exclusively in
terms of military struggle…” However, such a move was considered as getting less support
from the masses (Short 1975, 11). Through this strategy, they were confident that they would
be able to pull wool over the eyes of the local people in order to gain support and
subsequently wrest control via a nationalist approach, i.e. by exploiting the nationalist
struggle to expel Western colonialists and then take over the countries that had gained
independence. Joseph Stalin tried to apply this strategy while the Far East Branch of the
International Communists (Comintern), which was influential with the MCP, reinforced it.
This strategy, to some extent, was successfully employed in other places such as Indonesia or
Vietnam. Attempts were also made to apply it in Malaya by the MCP.23

This situation clearly existed in the context of the MCP’s struggle before 1948. Since its
inception in 1930 until 1948, the MCP failed to win people’s support. As a result, it was
forced to conceal its identity in order to infiltrate Malay and non-Malay political movements
and to control them. As well, the MCP supporters had to act as a nationalist group and tried to
champion the independence movement in order to exploit the sympathy of the local people.
One of the MCP’s tactics was to sponsor the setting up of Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya,
PKMM (or the Malayan Nationalist Party, MNP). The MCP hoped that by winning the
support of Malay politicians in the MNP, it would become a movement that was able to gain
mass support including that from the Malays who were seen to be fervently opposed to the
communist struggle led by the Chinese.

In terms of its origins, the MNP itself was set up with the assistance of the MCP through the
role played by a supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party, i.e. Moktaruddin Lasso
(Cheah 1983, 278). It was much easier for Moktaruddin to act and approach the Malaysian
nationalist group because he was seen as more of a nationalist rather than a communist from
the perspective of the Malay nationalists. Although Malay communist cadres from Indonesia
were employed to gain support of the Malays, the MCP still failed to attain this objective. In
fact, the assistance and financial support given to efforts for the establishment of the MNP
failed to help strengthen its influence among the Malay nationalists. Only a few of the Malays
were involved in the MCP struggle prior to 1948 (Mohamad Nassir, 2016).

The failure of the MCP to take control of the Malay nationalist movement can be seen from a
few perspectives. Firstly, it is clear that the MNP leadership was controlled by the nationalist
group that succeeded in quelling communist influence. There was an attempt to give MNP
itself, for instance, a moderate name as a Socialist Party, but it was rejected; instead, the
name “kebangsaan” (national) gained a wide support because the majority who were involved
in the party-naming vote came from a nationalist group, some of whom rejected communist
ideology (Abdul Rahman 2009, 160). The situation became clearer after the MNP chairman
who was communist, that is, Moktaruddin, disappeared. The MNP was then taken over by
Burhanuddin al-Helmy who was religious. Although he was willing to work with any
anticolonial movement, Burhanuddin was ideologically Islamic and anti-communist in
struggle. In fact, his action to move the MNP closer to a religious movement based in
Gunung Semanggol, Perak, such as Majlis Agama Tertinggi (MATA) and Hizbul Muslimin,
further reinforced the position of MNP as a movement that was independent of the MCP’s
control.The MNP made it clear that the objective of their struggle was to achieve
independence without being tied to external constraints and colonisation. From the viewpoint
of Burhanuddin, communism itself is part of colonialism (Nabir, 1976). The reality is that,
while the perception of a few researchers that the Malay political leadership in MNP was
successfully controlled and exploited by the MCP (Ramlah, 1998), the left nationalist group

14

was the one that succeeded in manipulating the MCP. As a movement that had strong
financial standing, the position of the MCP had been fully exploited by the nationalists to
help finance the establishment of political organisations that could move actively in fighting
for independence, but eventually the communist influence was cast aside.

There were many reasons why the MCP failed to be an organisation that was strong and able
to challenge the British. The major reason was the failure of the MCP to gain support from
the locals, either Malay or non-Malay, including the Chinese themselves. Since its early
formation, the people’s sympathy for the MCP’s ideology and struggle in Malaya was very
minimal. During the Japanese Occupation, the MCP might have succeeded in gaining
sympathy from a big segment of the Chinese community who were oppressed. However, that
support originated from China’s nationalist spirit and the flaring anti-Japan sentiments, and
not because of Chinese sympathy towards communist ideology. This is clear because the
sympathy towards movements that were opposed to Japan did not morph into a general
support of the Chinese to the communists after the Second World War. The Chinese support
splintered into several groupings, i.e. the MCP, Kuomintang (KMT) and underworld groups,
some of which were pro- or anti-MCP (Cheah, 1983). After the Second World War, many
Chinese and Indians, particularly estate labourers who were plagued with hardship, might
have been influenced by radical elements and found expression in terms of support for the
MCP’s struggle that was anti-government. However, as soon as the hardship was redressed,
the MCP increasingly became isolated from non-Malay support.

MCP and Malay Support

Support from the ordinary masses is important in the effort to mount a revolution or to
counter it. This was acknowledged by a British officer, i.e. General Gerald Templer who
stressed; “The answer [to successfully fight the MCP] lies not in pouring more troops into the
jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (Clutterbuck 1973, 30). The main weakness
of the MCP that was seldom shown by historians is its failure to gain support from a majority
of the Malayan people, i.e. the Malays. Actually, the primary objective of the MCP since its
inception was to be an inter-racial party, especially through the support of the Malays. This
necessity was acknowledged by the leadership of the MCP since the beginning and they
attempted to achieve this aim through the help of Indonesia’s Malay communist cadres.
However, since its establishment in 1930, the MCP failed substantially in trying to get that
support, at the very least for the period prior to 1948. According to Cheah (2009, 133), “…
by World War II (1939-45) it [the MCP] had ended up as a mainly Chinese party.” It was
estimated that from about 12,500 part-time MCP members in 1947, only 35 Malays and 760
Indians were involved in it (Deery 2003, 40, footnote 52).

Cheah (1983, 54-57, 69) had listed a few factors for the MCP’s failure to gain support of the
Malays. Firstly, the MCP’s leadership was of Chinese extremist type; secondly, the low
political awareness among the Malays caused them to fail to appreciate the MCP’s
aspirations; thirdly, the doubts of Chinese regarding the Malays and Indians who once
supported Japan; and fourthly, the Malays were suspicious of the MCP that was perceived as
a Chinese political organisation that only championed the rights and interests of the Chinese.
The main factor for the MCP’s failure to gain Malay support as outlined by Cheah was that,
ever since its formation in 1930 until the early 1940s, the MCP was generally in nature,
dedicated to activities for Chinese and the interests of China (15, 57). The MCP failed to be
an anti-British pioneer of communist nature, i.e. an open and international organisation.
Instead, the MCP remained as a Chinese political party until at least 1948. Consequently, the

15

attempt and action taken by the MCP leadership was made to appear transparent and fighting
for the interests of all races as well as to insist on the ambition to set up a communist country
meant for all races, but this, said Cheah, “… failed to emerge” (57, 69). Up until early 1940,
the MCP admitted that its failure became a weakening factor and set them back from
rebelling and wresting power from the British.24

The problem of entrenched racism between the Chinese and Malays as a result of the policy
implemented during the Japanese Occupation had become one of the factors that caused the
difficulty of the MCP to gain Malay support. As a result of the Japanese policy to exploit the
sentiments of enmity between ethnic groups, members of the MCP who considered Malays as
Japanese stooges doubted and did not seriously want the involvement of Malays in the MCP
struggle. In fact, the Malays were considered by the Chinese as “the running dogs” or “chou
kou” (Cheah 1983, 70). The way the MCP and its wing, Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese
Army (MPAJA), confronted the situation arising after the defeat of Japan too caused the
Malays to be pushed away from the MCP’s struggle (133-135). MPAJA exploited the
political vacuum that existed before the return of the British to Malaya by taking control of
villages and towns, some of which were inhabited by Malay majority, and to punish
indiscriminately and cruelly those suspected of being Japanese stooges (172-173). This
became a dark spot that separated the Malays from the MCP that was considered anti-
Malay.25 If during the Japanese Occupation the Chinese were considered as an ethnic group
that suffered, the Malays were said to be an ethnic group that experienced utmost misery
under MPAJA control to such an extent they deemed the MPAJA administration as “a reign
of terror” (178-180).

The MCP only started to realise the need to gain Malay sympathy by trying to understand
their culture and sensitivities after a Chinese-Malay violent fight in 1945. Several measures
were taken by the MCP to change its struggle from being Chinese or “Chinese-ness” to
“Malayan-ness”. Members of the MCP were urged to have an attitude and act as Malayan
citizens, focusing their efforts to fulfil the needs of the party as an organisation that placed
importance on a struggle for Malaya, and not entirely for the Chinese and China. However,
the MCP’s action was too late. Its failure to gain Malay sympathy compared to the British
success in enlisting Malay support through campaigns to smear the MCP became the cause
for the MCP’s failure to confront the British.26

Apart from trying to infiltrate the anticolonial political movement, the MCP also attempted to
infiltrate and take control of trade unions in its aim to sabotage British economy. In this
context, the MCP was seen as being successful. Many historians perceived that almost the
entire trade union movement in Malaya was successfully controlled by the MCP (Gamba,
1960; Stenson, 1970; Harper, 1999). Until April 1947, the membership of PMFTU, the
formation of which was sponsored by the MCP, was estimated over 263,598, or according to
Deery, “… was legal, constitutional and militant – and it was controlled by the MCP” (2003,
43). However, Clutterback (1973, 295) stated that in June 1948 “… there were 302 unions in
the Federation of Malaya, with a membership of 150,000. Of these, 129 unions with a
membership of roughly 82,000 were controlled by the Communist-led PMFTU.” However,
this view, which is similar to the allegation that the left Malay movement was controlled by
the MCP, can still be disputed.

The involvement of the MCP membership and the influence of the communist party towards
trade union struggle cannot be denied. In fact, as in the case of PKMM, the formation of the
PMFTU was spearheaded by the MCP. Nonetheless, the main objective of the trade unions’
struggle was for their interests in the economic sector, not politics. Their anger and violence

16

were related to the question of wage, salary, lack of food and dreadful living standards after
the Second World War, and not because of the influence of communist ideology. The
hardship and intolerable life became an important factor that induced members of trade
unions to indulge in violence, and in that situation, they would support any group that could
champion their rights, either the MCP or the British. In this context, the MCP exploited the
struggle of trade union members in their hour of need so as to make it relevant. However, the
actions of trade union members were not completely controlled by the MCP or to follow its
dictate. Strikes and violence that were waged by trade union members reflected their own
struggle caused by economic interests and not triggered by the spirit of championing
communist ideology or the ambition of establishing a communist state.

The most important issue however is, how the failure to gain support from the Malays
affected the struggle of trade unions. Although trade unions whose formation was sponsored
by the MCP managed to stage strikes on a large scale in 1946, the failure to gain solid
support from the Malays in this aspect had left a negative impact on the struggle of trade
unions. According to Stockwell (1977, 512);

One reason for this development lay in the failure of the MCP and
GLU to rouse the Malays. Although the importance of Malays to the
Malayan labour force was relatively insignificant – at the end of 1947
Malays accounted for only 17.5 percent of the total industrial labour
source – government and employers had come to realize that the
introduction of Malay labour, say on the estates, might counter the
wage demands and what was regarded as the politically motivated
‘blackmail’ of militant elements amongst the Chinese and Indian
communities.

Without the support of the Malays towards the struggle of radical trade unions, apart from the
ability of European employers to manipulate the involvement of Malays in pro-government
trade unions, it enabled the employers to weaken the struggle of the radical trade unions. By
offering work to Malays to replace members of the trade unions who staged strikes or got
retrenched helped the employers to push aside the demands of radical workers and take
violent action. At the same time, the employers also received important assistance from the
British. According to Stenton (1970, 182), since 1947 when the demands and threats of the
trade union movement were able to be quelled, “… the workers’ bargaining power was far
weaker… The economic pendulum had begun to swing in favour of the employer.” This
situation had prompted members of trade unions, who had lost their source of dependence, to
initiate violent actions on their own beyond the control of anybody, including the MCP itself.
Their actions hurt the MCP as it gave justification to the British to react more violently not
only towards members of the trade unions but also the MCP.

The MCP and the Armed Uprising Plan

Based on the above statement, it can be concluded that the influence of the MCP in Malaya
was very weak, and this weakness did not allow it to opt for an armed uprising against the
British for as long as it had other options. Harper (1999) described the MCP as “the reluctant
insurrectionists”. Without the strong support from the Malays as well as the non-Malays, this
situation left a big impact on the nature of the MCP’s struggle. The MCP became an
organisation that was unable to challenge the British without having to depend or employ the
support of others. In the era of Lai Teck leadership, the MCP was ready to use a moderate

17

way, i.e. to befriend the British. The policy of the MCP’s CEC was to opt for a moderate
stance and the MCP was ready to compromise with the British ever since the latter returned
to Malaya in 1945 (Cheah, 1983, chapter 3, 9). Although Lai Teck was replaced with a new
leadership that was more radical, the priority of the policy to work closely with the British
did not change much until 1948.

After Chin Peng took over the leadership of the MCP, the party was still in a weak position.
Actually, many potential MCP leaders were said to have been made victims of Lai Teck’s
treachery in providing information to the British. For example, the mass murders of MCP
members in Batang Kali were a case in point (Deery 2003, 42). Similarly, Lai Teck was also
said to have revealed an important secret regarding the location of MCP’s arms that were
kept after the Japanese Occupation, which enabled the British to ransack the places concerned
in February 1947. According to Deery, since then the MCP leadership had to take a long time
to resuscitate itself. In the beginning of Chin Peng’s leadership, the MCP was said to have
experienced a spell of paralysis. At that time, the young generation started to control the
MCP with a radical spirit, but with less experience and discipline. Meanwhile, communist
elements from MPAJA who got military training demanded that the MCP act using force;
eventually action was taken without the agreement of the MCP leadership that was still weak
and unable to control the situation. It can be concluded that the MCP leadership after Lai
Teck was more inclined to have a militant way of struggle as a result of internal pressure and
also its own weakness in addressing the problems facing the MCP.

This fact can be understood if we attempt to answer a few important questions pertaining to
the Emergency. Among other questions are, to what extent did the MCP plan exist to rebel
and take up arms to fight against the British? Was it true that the violence and murders that
occurred between 1947 and 1948 was violence perpetrated by the MCP towards an armed
uprising against the British? Did the murder in Sungai Siput, for instance, constitute part of
this plan? Did the MCP achieve a final decision to rebel at a premeditated time, or was it
actually forced to do so as a result of provocation from the British? Some historians
maintained that the MCP did plan from the beginning to take action by force and rise to fight
against the British. As stated earlier, this view was held by many researchers particularly
from the Orthodox stream. The majority view of researchers was somehow difficult to reject.
It might be true that the MCP had ambitions to overthrow the British either through moderate
means or force. However, the question that emerged was: was the MCP truly capable and
ready to act on it before or in 1948?

The development in 1947-48 clearly shows that the act of using arms to fight against the
British was not the main choice of the MCP. The MCP leadership itself realised that it was
unable to make that decision at a time when it was entangled with various problems;
leadership, the people’s support and lack of weapons. Hence, even though if it were true that
the external communists were involved in giving encouragement to the MCP to use force, the
MCP was still wavering and unprepared to do so. From this perspective, the external factor
was less important compared to the internal pressure that the MCP faced at the time.

The MCP that did not get support from the Malayan people had to continue its moderate
approach compared to armed resistance. Although the “United Front” policy was not a
popular policy, it was sustained in the era of Chin Peng who tried to maintain the MCP’s
struggle on legitimate political grounds. This was admitted by Chin Peng himself who said
that after the “two-camp” theory of Zhadanov was first published in the Journal of
Cominform in November 1947, the MCP had decided in December to continue with the

18

“United Front” policy. Chin Peng was of the opinion that “… communal divisions in Malaya
and the people being ‘thirsty of peace’ made a change (from the United Front policy) seem
wrong, despite the fact that it was the disgraced Lai Teck’s policy” (as quoted by Hack 2009,
477). There was also fierce debate within the MCP’s CEC regarding the dead-end of the
MCP in seeking a final decision as to whether to continue with the United Front policy or to
choose an open uprising. The doubt and dead-end showed that the MCP leadership was not
ready to stage an uprising that was difficult. An armed uprising would only be a last resort if
the MCP did not have any other options when the British suddenly declared an Emergency in
June 1948.

The available evidence and one that was often referred to by historians to show the existence
of a plan by the MCP to wage an armed uprising hitherto was the three resolutions presented
at the Fourth Plenary Session of the MCP’s CEC that met in Singapore on 17-21 March 1948.
However, as argued by McLane before this, the evidence was not concrete. The three
resolutions that were made at the Plenary Session did not clearly prove the existence of a plan
to revolt even though there was demand made to the MCP to take more radical measures.
This was admitted by Chin Peng himself who stated that the resolutions made at the Fourth
Plenary Session of the MCP’s CEC were more “defensive” and “reactive” towards British
provocation (as quoted by Hack 2009, 478). In short, there was no concrete evidence that
could support the view that the MCP had an organised plan to rebel and the evidence has yet
to be shown until today. Conversely, the evidence available only showed diffidence that the
MCP had regarding their capability to stage an open revolt against the British. Whatever
inducement and pressure to act in a violent manner that was brought about by the British
provocation left the MCP with no other choice. The resistance of the MCP after the
Emergency was declared, was a defensive act and not offensive as admitted by Chin Peng. In
this case, Caldwell (1977, 220) stated that “… there was every reason to believe that the Party
(MCP) would wait until resort to arms could be presented as an unavoidable defensive
reaction to stepped-up government persecution.”

Nonetheless, the British response that was forceful and drastic if measured against the MCP’s
unpreparedness to address it and the crisis that it was facing, for instance, the Lai Teck
treachery and the PMFTU ban, was something that actually was not expected. It was received
in a surprising situation (Tarling 1998, 311). The result was that the decision to act in an
“underground” manner was taken immediately by the MCP in a rushed and chaotic
circumstance.27 The unpreparedness and inability of the MCP to face the Emergency and an
open war against the British was admitted by Malcolm MacDonald. He even believed that if
the operation against the MCM was conducted in an open manner, the MCP would be able to
be defeated only within duration of six weeks (Deery 2003, 51).

The Emergency - a British Plan?

The British intelligence revealed that there was no clear evidence that could connect the
violence in Malaya in the 1940s with the MCP plan to rebel against the British. The question
is, if it’s true that the violence was not committed by the MCP, then who was responsible for
that?

The probability of violence breaking out in Malaya in the 1940s caused by the action of
subversive elements other than the MCP cannot be pushed aside. For example, according to
Cheah, there were a few groups that can be associated with such violence. Firstly, members
of trade unions, consisting of Indians and Chinese, who felt the economic impact and

19

hardship after the Japanese Occupation. These were the radical groups that often resorted to
violence especially in estates owned by European employers. Some of them might have been
involved as members or supporters of the MCP but they did not get any directive nor were
they controlled by the MCP (Cheah 1983, 244).

Secondly, the existence of triads and thugs; although some of them were created by the MCP,
they also could not be controlled and told to follow the MCP directive (Cheah 1983, 242).
These groups were found to have been involved in criminal activities such as robberies and
fights, and were a major element responsible for violence after the Japanese Occupation to
the extent that the MCP’s name was associated with violence. According to Cheah, crimes
and violence committed by them had smeared the good name of the MCP as well as KMT
(80-81). In fact, the murders in Sungai Siput were also believed to have been committed by
these groups. Deery (2003, 51) clarified that “The murders of the three European planters at
Sungai Siput on 16 June were not authorised or sanctioned by MCP leaders but carried out
instead by a local Communist guerrilla unit acting on its own initiative.” Stubbs in his book,
In Hearts and Minds, stated that “… lower level cadres…” took matters “… into their own
hands” (1989, 61). As mentioned before, Chin Peng also admitted to the involvement of MCP
supporters in the murders. However, he stressed that they were not done at his directive nor
that of the central leadership of the MCP. In fact, Chin Peng regarded the murders as “a
blunder”.

Nonetheless, what also cannot be refuted is the role played by the British who deliberately
caused provocation and exploited the violence that occurred so as to justify its action of
declaring the “Emergency”. Hence, the Emergency or actually the Colonial War was part of
the British plan not only to quell the MCP threat, but more importantly the threat from the
Malay nationalist left and religious movement that demanded independence, which the
British feared would be influenced by the MCP. In this context, historians should examine
how the British plot or conspiracy emerged because it was clear that the British fully
manipulated the situation so that the nationalist group that adopted a moderate stance became
its main target during the Emergency.

The threat from the anticolonial and nationalist groups that demanded Malayan independence
became more obvious especially after 1946. The emergence of left nationalist moement and
the Malay religious movement such as PKMM, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), Angkatan
Wanita Sedar (AWAS), Majlis Agama Islam Tertinggi (MATA) and Hizbul Muslimin, was
believed to have the capacity to pose a threat because they were not only anti-British but also
were alleged to have been influenced by elements of radical Communists and “Indonesia”.
Thus, the British began to smear their struggle in order to push aside Malay support and
justify the violent response towards them. The method used by the British was by giving the
impression that the communists were terrorists who were involved in violent activities in
Malaya. At the same time, however, the nationalist movement that was linked to the MCP
elements was accused of being involved in violent activities even though such accusation was
baseless. Some historians believed that the violence of the 1940s that gave rise to the
Emergency was not the MCP’s doing, but the British linked it instead to the MCP as the
“black sheep” that could be faulted for the purpose of declaring the Emergency. However, the
real target of the British during the Emergency was not the MCP, but instead the left-leaning
nationalist and Malay religious movement who struggled for independence. Their struggle
not only threatened the British but also threatened UMNO that was supported by the British.
The British attempt to link the Malay nationalist struggle with MCP’s communism was a

20

British double-edged strategy to smear all anticolonial movements, cast away Malay support
and quash all enemies in one go.

From this perspective, the Emergency was part of the British response and plan and not
caused by the MCP revolt although it cannot be denied that some parts of the chaos and
violence that occurred did involve the MCP directly or otherwise. The failure of historians
such as Stockwell to understand the existence of conspiracy and British strategy came about
from his approach that only linked the Emergency to the MCP, while the motive of the
British can only be seen as strong if viewed from the perspective of its original objective, that
is, to face the threat from the Malay nationalists.

The target of the 1948 Emergency: Communism or Nationalism?

There existed differences of opinion and confusion regarding who was actually responsible
for the declaration of Emergency and who became the target and victims, either communists
or nationalists. The dependence of the historians on official sources and British intelligence
that were full of allegations that the Malay nationalists who championed independence were
part of the MCP elements and communist “terrorists”,28 made them believe in the British
claims. Many historians believed that the Malay nationalist left and religious movement in
Malaya, which emerged in the 1940s, was part of the communist element or had been
infiltrated and controlled completely by the MCP. In their interpretation, the communist
struggle with the nationalists was mixed even though the two forms of struggle were apart
from each other and in conflict with each other. This caused all the anticolonial movements to
be equated with the communist movement. This became the foundation of Furedi’s view, for
example, who opined that communist guerrillas were a “nationalist force” (1994, 214), who
actually had struggled against the British and demanded independence. Stockwell emphasised
that communism in Malaya was a nationalist movement and independence proponent and the
MCP was “… the only party committed to the liberation of the Malayan people” (Stockwell
1993, 69).

The viewpoints of Furedi and Stockwell however constituted a form of confusion arising
from their failure to identify the real pressure or threat that the British were facing in Malaya
in the 1940s. Their confusion that regarded the MCP was led by the Chinese as proponents of
Malayan independence aside, the anticolonial political and 1940s independence movement
was actually a movement that was led and activated by a majority of the Malay nationalists
who were not communists. They were the ones who became the real threats of the British.
The independence struggle that was spearheaded by the Malay nationalist left and religious
movement such as the PKMM, MATA and Hizbul Muslimin that acted moderately possessed
clear independence ambition. They were not communist supporters, let alone championing
ideology and ambition to set up a communist state. The ambition of Hizbul Muslimin, for
instance, was to form an Islamic state that was independent of colonialism, and its
involvement in the left movement was a step taken to balance the influence between socialists
and communists in the left movement that was feared to have influenced Malay thinking
(Nabir, 1976). In this context, the struggle of Hizbul Muslimin not only was anticolonial but
also anti-communist. Although admittedly there were also communists in the Malay left
movement circles, they were however a minority group. The Malay left group who was not
communist could unite with the group that was inclined towards communism because of their
nationalist sentiments and not because the left was controlled by the communists.

21

The threat of the Malay nationalist left and religious movement actually gained serious
attention of the British. Their struggle was most feared because of their potential to attract the
support of the Malays towards a ‘radical’ anticolonial struggle. Based on the British
intelligence sources, the left from various streams either the left who were ‘radical’ or
‘moderate’ were considered more dangerous by the British compared to the MCP. The real
British fear was the process of ‘radicalisation’ of the Malay political movement that could
pose problems to the British. The British feared the threat of the left would give rise to two
effects that they wanted to avoid. Firstly, the left movement was able to compete with
UMNO by controlling Malay support that could make the indigenous people to be anti-
British and struggle towards the demand for independence so that they could weaken the
British-UMNO position. Secondly, the British were most concerned that the widening
support of the Malays towards the left would give an opportunity for the MCP to manipulate
it and enable the party to gain support from the Malays. This is because the left and the MCP,
although of different ideologies, nonetheless had a common enemy, and this could prompt
them to cooperate despite their differences in opposing the British.29

This threat was felt since 1946 when the British faced pressure in their attempts to introduce
Malayan Union. The Malayan Union plan gave rise to fierce opposition of the Malays so that
it could unite the left and right that helped create UMNO in 1946. The unity of the Malay left
and right in UMNO was feared by the British who believed that if this was not addressed, it
would cause the right wing in UMNO, who was pro-British, to be influenced by the left.
Hence, the British formed cracks within UMNO by supporting the demands of the Malay
elite who were pro-British and isolated the left from the right to the extent that the PKMM
exited from UMNO.30 However, ever since its withdrawal from UMNO, PKMM’s position as
an anti-British political movement became much stronger, and not weaker.

The influence of the Malay left nationalists became more prominent in 1947-48 when it
united with the religious movement, particularly one that was based in Gunung Semanggol,
Perak. They also challenged the British and UMNO through the setting up of PMCJA-
PUTERA in 1947 that demanded self-governance and proposed the People’s Constitution as
alternative to the Malayan proposal that was jointly crafted by British-UMNO.31The
amalgamation of the left-religious movement with the Malay-non-Malay nationalists gained
the people’s support and at the same time threatened UMNO when many of the party
members involved themselves in the left nationalist activities even though a warning was
issued by Dato’ Onn himself.32 The increasing support of the Malays towards the left
nationalists was reflected in the disbanding of UMNO branches including a few PMJ
branches led by Dato’ Onn himself, which eventually became PKMM branches (MSS, PIJ,
1948; Azmi 2014, 19-20).

The situation clearly caused anxiety not only to Dato’ Onn’s leadership but also the British.
The failed attempt to weaken the left-wing nationalist movement and strengthen the right-
wing nationalist movement under UMNO’s patronage was clearly felt by the British. The
British intelligence report from April until May 1948 revealed that the activities of the left-
wing nationalists gained increasing support, while UMNO was said to be “… steadily losing
ground to left-wing organisations…” and its leadership was very much vulnerable to “…
attack by left-wing propaganda.”33 Hence, the British intelligence report concluded that if this
situation was not arrested immediately, UMNO would be swallowed by the left movement
(MSS, PIJ, 1948; Azmi 2014, 19-20). When the attempt to weaken the left-wing movement
and strengthen the struggle of the right-wing movement failed, and when there emerged an
increasing fear that UMNO that was supported by the British might be swallowed by the left-

22

wing and Indonesian elements, and the possibility that the reinforced left-wing movement
would be exploited by the MCP to gain Malay support, the British then responded with force
by banning the political branches of PKMM, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) as well as
arresting its leader Ahmad Boestamam. API was considered by the British administration as
“…a subversive body of pro-Indonesian Malays, a militant youth corps which has been
engaged in drilling and military training and a good deal of provocative blustering.”34
Furthermore, the response of force was also applied to the activities of trade unions such as
the banning of PMFTU and the arrest of workers’ leaders who were radical whom the British
feared to have been influenced by the MCP elements. The climax of the British response was
the declaration of Emergency in June 1948 under the pretext of the murder of three European
planters in Sungai Siput, Perak that was suspected to have been committed by elements
probably influenced by the communists.

Even though officially the British often stated that the step taken during the Emergency was
to focus on the endeavour to quell violence of the Chinese in the MCP, the reality was that
the main focus of the British was to quash the influence of Malay left-religious movement
and to curb Malay support for anticolonial activities. Hence, during the Emergency the Malay
nationalist left and religious movement and their supporters, apart from the communist
elements, became the real targets of the British forceful response. Apart from banning Malay
political organisations such as the API, the entire left-wing nationalist movement also
received immense pressure when all its principal leaders were arrested and jailed on the
pretext of them getting involved in violent and militant elements. The moderate Malay left-
religious movement that adhered to democratic tenets became victims of the Emergency, not
because of their “militant” response or communist designs, but because their independence
struggle was deemed threatening to the British. This compelled members of the Malay
nationalist left and religious movement to make a difficult decision during the Emergency
either to flee to Indonesia or join UMNO so as to avoid pressure from the British security
forces. Without much choice on hand, a few of the spirited nationalists chose to remain in the
struggle against the British and entered the jungle, subsequently involved in the 10th
Regiment of the MCP. However, the majority of the Malay left-religious nationalists who did
not feel comfortable with the communists joined UMNO and struggled to gain independence
within UMNO until this induced UMNO to change its party slogan from “Hidup Melayu”
(Long Live Malays) to “Merdeka” (Independence).

During the implementation of the Emergency, the Malays who were involved in resisting the
British in the 10th Regiment of MCP were most feared and became main targets of the
British. This was clarified by a British army officer, i.e. Major-General Sir Charles Boucher:
“A dead Malay terrorist was worth seven or eight Chinese” (Short 1975, 208-09; Caldwell
1977, 225; Furedi 1994, 197). The aggressive campaign was launched by the British against
Malay villages that became the main hideouts of Malay guerrillas from the 10th Regiment;
among the villages were Temerloh, Pahang that received a collective punishment of the
British because they were believed to have supported anticolonial struggle (Mohamed Salleh,
2006). Although receiving immense pressure from the British, what was interesting was that
the MCP was not banned soon after the Emergency was declared, i.e. on 23 July 1948. The
MCP was only banned a month after the Emergency was declared, that is, on 23 July 1948.
This British action raised reasonable doubts as to whether the MCP was really their main
target before and during the 1948 “Colonial War”.

23

Conclusion

Historians often link the factors of Emergency declaration to the action of the MCP and the
British. Orthodox researchers claimed that the Emergency emerged from the MCP’s revolt
plan that received a directive from the Soviets. That opinion, however, was too weak if
measured against the inability and unpreparedness of the MCP to do it. At the same time, the
historians could not offer concrete evidence to show the existence of MCP’s uprising plan
and the directive from the external communists.

Revisionist and neo-orthodox researchers attempted to link the Emergency to the overly
provocative action of the British. They considered the Emergency was deliberately declared
by the British in order to quell the threat of anticolonial movement that was spearheaded by
the MCP. Their argument was based on a few reasons. Among them is the intelligence report
that stated that the British did not have any evidence of violence perpetrated by the MCP.
They also were of the opinion that the time when the Emergency was declared was not
suitable because compared to conditions before 1948, the chaos in Malaya was increasingly
lesser and the pressure from radical trade unions was weak. Hence, they felt that the
Emergency was declared not because there was an international communist “conspiracy” that
directed the MCP to revolt, but because there existed “British conspiracy” that wanted to ban
and obliterate the MCP threat. To Furedi, the action of the British to declare Emergency or
what was really considered as “Colonial War” was a step deliberately taken by the British to
quell all anticolonial movements that demanded for independence.

Although it cannot be denied that the MCP was involved in activities that threatened colonial
interests in Malaya between 1945 and 1948, to what extent the British regarded the MCP as
the main threat to its colonialization remains doubtful. In fact, at the early stage the British
only perceived the MCP threat as minor. They were considered as “bandit” that was not seen
as having the capability of endangering the British. This explains why the British were not
eager to take drastic action in banning the MCP by giving the excuse of them not having clear
evidence. Nonetheless, when the Emergency was eventually declared without clear proof, it
is not the MCP that became the main target of the British but instead Malay political
organisations such as API, AWAS, PKMM and Hizbul Muslimin that operated moderately
and did not have direct link to the MCP. On other hand, the MCP was left to exist as a legal
organisation and was only banned a month after the declaration of Emergency. The British
action raised questions regarding who was the real target of the Emergency, the nationalists
or communists.

In the hope of a reassessment so as to replace the position of the nationalist movement in the
historical interpretation that is more accurate and balanced, this writing proposed that the
main target and victims of the British, apart from the MCP, are the Malay nationalist left and
religious movement that struggled for independence. This movement became very influential
after the Second World War and towards the end of the 1940s, and it became prominent in
political organisations such as PKMM, API, AWAS, MATA and Hizbul Muslimin that
operated actively to gain support and carried out campaigns to achieve independence. The
British intelligence report shows that they were potentially a threat to the British because they
were able to influence Malay support and weakened UMNO. The British were worried if this
movement, which was ready to cooperate with the MCP, would be controlled by the MCP
that was eager to get Malay support.

24

Thus, in their attempt to weaken the nationalist movement and isolate its Malay support, the
British carried out campaigns to smear the left-wing movement by accusing it to be
associated with communist elements and widening their support for UMNO’s struggle that
was pro-British. However, owing to the immense independence sentiments and the failure of
UMNO to champion for independence, the Malays had given their solid support to the left
struggle. For example, many UMNO members had declared leaving the party and in fact
disbanded UMNO branches which were turned into PKMM ones. This was why the British
intelligence and the UMNO leadership issued warning to the British government that if they
failed to take immediate action, there is a high possibility that UMNO would be swallowed
by the left and “Indonesian” influence. The failure of the British to curb the threat of the
Malay left-religious movement through political pressure and laws eventually compelled the
British to use the pretext of the occurrence of violence in Malaya in 1948 to declare
Emergency and subsequently took action to smash the entire anticolonial movement.

Acknowledgement

I wish to thank Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang for having supported this research via
Research University Grant (1001/PHUMANITI/816232) 2013-2018.

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Stockwell, A. J. 1979. British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union
Experiment 1942-48, Monograph No. 8. Kuala Lumpur: The Malayan Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Society.
Stockwell, A. J. 1984. “British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52.”
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 12 (1): 68-87.
Stockwell, A. J. 1987. “Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency.”
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 25 (1): 71-81.
Stockwell, A. J. 1993. “A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in
Malaya’? The origins of Malayan Emergency.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 21 (3): 66-88.
Stubbs, R. 1989. Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-
1960. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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Stubbs, R. 2008. “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British
Strategy in Malaya, 1948-60.” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by

Daniel Marteson and Carter Malkasian, 113-130. Oxford: Osprey Publications.

1See Mahmud Embong, 1985, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 2003, 2004.
2This conference was sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of
Students from 19-25 February 1948 while the second conference which was also held at the same venue was
sponsored by the Congress of the Communist Party of India from 28 February to 6 March 1948.
3British Official Record stated that “Emergency Regulations have been made which include the reimposition
of the death penalty for the offence of carrying arms, and the authorities have been empowered to detain any
person without trial, to search persons and buildings without warrant and to occupy properties. Where local
conditions require, the authorities have power to impose a curfew and to control the movements of persons and
vehicles.” CAB 129/28, CP (48) 171, The Situation in Malaya: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 1 Julai 1948.
4MSS, Ind. Ocn. S251, Political Intelligence Journal, 1946-48. For some background on the MSS, see Leon
Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police: The role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency (Singapore: ISEAS,
2008)
5 According to Deery (2003, 29), “Although the conflict in Malaya bore many of the characteristics of a
colonial war, the misnomer ‘emergency’ was used throughout the twelve years. Similarly MCP guerrillas were
labelled ‘bandits’ and later communist terrorist, and the British counterinsurgency were termed the ‘Anti-
Bandit Campaign.” See Deery, P. 2003, ‘The terminology of Terrorism: Malaya 1948-52', Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, 34 (2), 2003, pp. 231-247.
6Stockwell, A. J. ed., Malaya, Part 1: The Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-48; Malaya, Part 2: The
Communist Insurrection 1948-53; and Malaya, Part 3: The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-57, London:
His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HSMO), 1995.
7Hack himself in his writing in 2009 said that he represented the Neo-Orthodox stream or the Neo-
Revisionists in his interpretation of the history of Emergency.
8Gurney, Sir Henry 1951, Communist Banditry in Malaya: The Emergency with a Chronology of Important
Events June 1948-June 1951, Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur: The Standard Engraves & Art
Printers. See also MSS, Ind. Ocn. S251, Political Intelligence Journal, 1948.
9 They were Arthur Walker, Manager of Elphil Estate, Sungai Siput; John Allison, Manager of Phin Soon
Estate, Sungai Siput and his assistant, Ian D. Christian. See Miller (1954, 82).
10Sir Henry Gurney, Communist Banditry in Malaya, page 2. According to Furedi (1994, 60), “In the case of
Malaya, the shooting of three European planters at Sungei Siput on 16 June 1948 is often seen as the incident
which forced the hand of the imperial power.” According to Rob Holland, it was “…this event which led the
colonial government to declare an emergency two days later.” (Holland as cited by Furedi, 160). Among the
organisations under the influence of the MCP which were outlawed during the Emergency were the New
Democratic Youth League, Indian New Democratic Youth League and Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
Servicemen’s Association.
11 Macdonald’s speech as quoted in Sir Henry Gurney’s, Communist Banditry in Malaya, page 29.
12 This allegation was supported by the Secretary General of the MCP himself that is Chin Peng who said;
“Sharkey’s words [that in Australia, strike-breakers were murdered] had inspired us to the point that, as the
meeting progressed to its final stages, there emerged total commitment among those present for a toughening of
our policy towards strikebreakers.” (Deery 2003, 35).
13 A number of scholars had discussed the influence and effects of the Cold War in inducing the Emergency
in Malaya or in the whole of Southeast Asia. Among others are Ovendale R. 1982, “Britain, the United States
and the Cold War in South-East Asia, 1949-50”, International Affairs 58 (3): 447-464; Tarling, N. 1998,
Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Greenwood, S
2000, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1991, London: Macmillan; and Richard Mason, guest editor, 2009, “1948
Insurgencies and the Cold War in Southeast Asia Revisited: Special Issue,’ Kajian Malaysia [Journal of
Malaysian Studies] 27 (1& 2).
14Crozier (1965, 64) explained the rise ofcommunism in the whole of Southeast Asia in 1948 as “…part of a
pre-determined plan worked out in Moscow and Calcutta.” In similar vein, Jackson (1991, 12-13) also claimed
that Moscow gave ‘fresh instructions’ to the MCP in Februari 1948 to create “…unrest in the far Eastern
colonies…” and it is this factor that forced the Emergency to be declared. Sanders (1990, 83) also blamed
Beijing by saying that “...the covert material support which the Beijing regime provided to the Malayan

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revolutionaries...” was the cause for the MCP uprising although this claim was denied by the British government

itself.
15 According to Deery (2003, 40), “As with many allegations of Communist plots, tangible evidence for this

view is extremely thin.” See also the view advanced by Caldwell (1977, 220); Keng (1984, 31); and Efimova’s

study (2009).
16 A similar view by Deery (2007, 50) explained that “The resolutions were about intentions. They

emphasized the need to prepare for a rebellion. The militancy of the 4th Plenum was less a turning point than a

benchmark along a path on which the MCP had been moving since 1947. Clarity, discipline, and coordination as
well as an explicit revolutiuonary program – normally the sine qua non of successful insurrection – were
absent.”

17 According to Furedi (1994, 150-51), “In Malaya, there was a noticeable increase in the repression of anti-

colonial protest from December 1947 onwards. By this time a government-appointed special committee was

charged with the task of considering whether the MCP was to be banned. A hard line was adopted against the

MCP and trade-union activity. The army also initiated major engagements from April 1948 onwards. Military

operations, such as that of Operation Haystack in the Perak jungle, were designed to demonstrate the
government’s determination to regain administrative control over all parts of the colony. But the thrust of the
offensive was directed at the MCP’s trade-union base.”

18 Deery (2003b, 237) also supported Furedi’s view by explaining that; “There was a further reason…for
calling the British counterinsurgency an ‘Anti-Bandit Campaign’ and, indeed, for labelling what was in essence
a colonial war an ‘emergency’. It was not, as Frank Furedi alleges, merely for ‘public-relations’ purposes. The

overriding reason was economic: the Malayan estates were dependent on London insurance companies for cover
whose terms only covered losses of stocks and equipment through ‘riot and civil commotion’ in an emergency.
If the conflict in Malaya were decribed in terms that implied a state of war, or actions committed by ‘rebels’,
‘insurgents’ or – worse – an ‘enemy’, then the insurance companies could repudiate their policies. In this event,
a cash-strapped Attlee administration that had barely survived the ‘dollar gap crisis’ of 1947 would be obliged to
bear the burden.”

19Jones’ view can be seen in CAB 129/28, CP (48) 171, The Situation in Malaya: Memorandum by the

Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 July 1948.
20 According to Stockwell (1993, 70); “In Malaya the evidence of direct connection between the Cominform

and the present outbreak of lawlessness as organized by the Malayan Communist Party is accepted by the local

Government as proof of such connection. It is a connection which is only by chance susceptible of absolute

proof but the presence in Bangkok of an unnecessarily large Russian Embassy, the contacts in Calcutta a few

months ago of Communist representatives from Europe and Asia, the close similarity in expression between

Cominform directive [sic] and Malayan Communist Party publications form together substantial grounds for
regarding the Malayan outbreak as stimulated from Moscow.”

21 Regarding the terms used by the British to depict MCP’s violence, see Deery (2003).
22MSS, Political Intelligence Journal, 1948.
23The MCP’s 1945 programme, therefore, said nothing of Communism or the establishment of a Communist
Party dictatorship, but called for such mildly progressive and usefully vague measures as the “establishment of
democratic government through public election of all anti-Japanese parties and race”, “support for the United
Nations’ Organisation” and “special treatment of anti-Japanese soldiers.”
24According to Cheah (1983, 57), “…mass organizations and politics have not reached the stage strong
enough to overthrow British imperialism.”
25According to Cheah (1983, 184), MPAJA purposely and exhibited cruel acts openly as a warning to others

to be fearful of MPAJA in future. In fact, according to Cheah (79) again, not only MCP but Kuomintang also

went overboard in their campaign of violence which targeted the Malays after the war. This conflict caused
both ethnic groups to be mutually suspicious. MCP’s failure to be the representative of all ethnic groups and its

open attitude to the Malays was compounded by the fact that they were supporting the Chinese in the Malay-

Chinese feud after World War Two. This denied the MCP Malay support which caused the MCP to become a

weak Chinese party.
26An MCP source agreed that apart from being ill-prepared, its failed struggle was also caused by its

lackadaisical attitude towards the benefits it could have accrued from Malay support compared to the British
support of the Malays. According to the source, “We understand the importance of racial work, but we have not

tried our best to revise the Indian Party. We never thought of finding means of carrying out Malay racial work.

This has been the cause of our being unable up to the present moment to mobilize the Indian labourers. This has

given the British Imperialists an opportunity of recruiting special constables and auxiliary police from the

backward Malays, of making them their agents, and of carrying out its policy of dividing the various races. Our

campaign is not well planned and is improperly directed. Apart from knowing a few points regarding the

development of the campaign, we have no other military stratagem. Our forces did not know what to do.

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Further, leadership was bad, so much so that platoon leaders were afraid to determine what steps to take and had
to await the orders of the high command. Our system of leadership is not democratic. The local executive
themselves could not determine the affairs in their own places. They had to seek the opinion of the State
Committee. Apart from these we have been unable to say for what aims this battle is fought. These are the errors
and disadvantages responsible for our failures.” CO717/173, PR3/49/29 (Emerg.) Federal Government Press
Release: Translation of extracts from a Chinese document found in a bandit camp during Security Forces
Operations in January, 1949.

27According to Deery (2003, 51), “The ruthlessness of the British response – first in outlawing the all-
important PMFTU, then in introducing the draconian State of Emergency regulations – was unexpected. The
timing of the State of Emergency clearly took the MCP by suprise. Consequently, the party’s decision to go
underground was ad hoc; its retreat to the jungle was made in panic; and its switch from urban to rural revolt
was confused. These moves left the MCP’s “front” organizations off balance, leaderless and isolated. In this
sense, the decision to mobilize for guerrilla warfare was accelerated by, and partly in response to, the severity of
government action in May-June 1948. The notion that the MCP was following a carefully planned strategy – a
strategy coordinated by a highly centralized party structure – is fallacious.”

28According to Furedi (1994, 3), “During this period of High Cold War, terms like communist and
nationalist would be used interchangeably.”

29The aim of the Emergency was to curb Malay support for the communists. According to Furedi (1994,
196), “In Malaya, one of the main motives for adopting special powers [during Emergency] was to prevent the
MCP from gaining influence among the Malays. The fear that the anti-colonial movement would spread from
the Chinese to the Malay communities was a constant theme in the deliberations of local administration during
the first four years of the emergency. Isolating the mainly non-Malay working class from the Malay peasantry
had always been an important undercurrent of British colonial policy. With the growth of the MCP within the
urban and rural ploretariat, the immunization of the Malay community against the virus of radical anti-
colonialism became the more important. Their loyalty was a precondition for the survival of British rule. It is
not suprising that during the emergency British officials were particularly sensitive to any evidence of disloyalty
in the Malay community.”

30CO 537/1528, H.Q. Malaya Command: Weekly Intelligence Review No. 34: General review of the internal
situation in Malaya, July 1946. PKMM and its youth wing API left UMNO mainly ‘…because of its [UMNO]
undemocratic structure (the Malay Nationalist Party, for example, though the most numerically powerful of the
affliated organisations had a voting strength no greater than that of the small local associations with a fraction of
the membership of the Malay Nationalist Party); because of the dictatorial methods of the aristiocratic leaders of
the UMNO; and, more importantly, because they felt that the policy of the UMNO, formulated in this
undemocratic and dictatorial manner, was contrary to the true interests of the Malay people. The result of this
withdrawal was that the UMNO became, and still remains, solely the organization of the Malay aristocracy.’ See
CO 537/2148, Reactions to Constitutional Proposal: Malaya People’s Constitutional Proposal: Part 1:
Constitutional and Political Developments from September 1945 to September 1947.

31CO 537/2148, Malayan Union Policy: Reactions to Constitutional Proposals: Counter Proposals by
PUTERA-AMCJA, 1947. PMCJA then changed its name to All-Malayan Council of Joint Action atau AMCJA.

32Dato' Onn cautioned UMNO members about being too close to the Il Ihya: ‘...I am not prohibiting, but I
am not also willing (UMNO members to go to the Gunung Semanggol Conference)...the danger from up the
mountain is there and now we have an even more threatening (Hizbul Muslimin) which can bring the downfall
of the Malays.’ See Nabir (1976, 197). In his presidential speech at the tenth General Assembly of the UMNO,
held at the Francis Light School on Perak Road in Penang on the 23rd of April 1948, Dato' Onn said; ‘Since the
Federation of Malaya was inaugurated the political atmosphere in Malaya has become more and more complex,
and the Malays must be aware of the dangers. One and half years ago I reminded the Malays of the dangers
coming from the forest and from the mountain. I may as well add new that these dangers are still in existence.
Additionally there is a menace amidst us, which has just sprung from the ground. Its object is to bring about the
downfall of the Malays…In regard to the Gunong Semanggol Congress, I do not support it because I can see the
danger it implies. Empty promises were made to the people there.’ CO 537/3751, Political Intelligence Journal,
30 April 1948.

33CO 537/3751, Political Intelligence Journal, 15 April 1948.
34CO 537/2151, Malayan Union Policy: Angkatan Pemuda Insaf: Minute from Morris to Russell, 5
September 1947.

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