case digest

Lagon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc

FACTS: Sometime in April 1981 Lagon, a businessman and HOOVEN entered into two (2)
contracts, denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00 HOOVEN
agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagon‘s commercial building in
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. HOOVEN filed an action against Lagon claiming that the latter failed
to pay his due despite HOOVEN‘s performance of its obligation. Lagon, in his answer, denied
liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party guilty of breach of contract by failing to deliver
and install some of the materials specified in the proposals; that as a consequence he was
compelled to procure the undelivered materials from other sources; that as regards the
materials duly delivered and installed by HOOVEN, they were fully paid.

ISSUE: Who among the parties is entitled to damages?

RULING: HOOVEN's bad faith lies not so much on its breach of contract - as there was no
showing that its failure to comply with its part of the bargain was motivated by ill will or done
with fraudulent intent - but rather on its appalling temerity to sue petitioner for payment of an
alleged unpaid balance of the purchase price notwithstanding knowledge of its failure to make
complete delivery and installation of all the materials under their contracts. Although petitioner
was found to be liable to respondent to the extent of P6,377.66, petitioner's right to withhold
full payment of the purchase price prior to the delivery and installation of all the merchandise
cannot be denied since under the contracts the balance of the purchase price became due and
demandable only upon the completion of the project. Consequently, the resulting social
humiliation and damage to petitioner's reputation as a respected businessman in the
community, occasioned by the filing of this suit provide sufficient grounds for the award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages. On the part of Lagon, he is ordered by the court to pay HOOVEN
the amount corresponding to the value of the materials admittedly delivered to him.

Bantolino et al v. Coca-Cola Bottlers

62 employees of Coca-Cola filed a complaint for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal,
violation of security of tenure and implementation of the “cabo” system. 52 of the complaints
were dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to attend the mandatory hearings. The point
of contention of the remaining 10 complaints is the existence of an employee-employee
relationship for being route helpers, bottle segregators and others to which basis the Coca-Cola
Corporation filed a motion to dismiss. The Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the negative
declarations of Coca-Cola’s witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of the company denied
knowing the complainants personally, the testimonies of the complainants were more credible
as they sufficiently supplied every detail of their employment, specifically identifying who their
salesmen/drivers were, their places of assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and

dismissal. One of Coca-Cola’s arguments is that the affidavits of some of the complainants,
namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia,
Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their
failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision with respect to Bantolino et al for failure to affirm their contents in a
cross-examination. The main issue of the case is the propriety of giving evidentiary value to the
affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of
cross-examination. In reversing the CA decision, the Supreme Court held that "the argument

that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is
not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers only." A criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the
discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings

are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with
supporting documents and their affidavits.

Samalio vs CA

Facts:
On February 2, 1993, Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport was taken to Augusto
R. Samalio, Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), because
Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarilla suspected that her passport was fake. Sensing a demand for
money
in exchange for her passport, Qin flashed $500 in front of Samalio which the latter grabbed.
Samalio
returned Qin’s passport but without an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter, Qin complained
against
Samalio.
On February 4, 1993, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City, through its resolution No. 0-93-
0224, recommended that Samalio be prosecuted for Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the
Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan. In an Indorsement Communication dated February
9,
1993, former NAIA General Manager Gen. Guillermo Cunanan enclosed a copy of the said
resolution.
Thereafter, BID Commissioner Zafiro L. Respicio issued Personnel Order No. 93-179-93
commencing an
administrative case against Samalio for violation of CSMC No. 46 Rule 2 Section 1 and requiring
Samalio to submit his answer to the charges together with supporting statements and
documents, and
whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. In
the same

Personnel Order, Samalio was preventively suspended for 90 days since the charge against him
involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct. Samalio attempted to lift his preventive
suspension
but was struck down.
In his Answer, Samalio denied the charges against him and elected a formal investigation if the
same was not found to be satisfactory. His answer contained the affidavits of his witnesses
namely
Rodrigo Pedrealba, Dante Aquino, Florencio Austria and Winston Vitan. Since his answer was
found to
be unsatisfactory, the case was set for formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID.
On July 25, 1996, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag, issued the decision finding Samalio
guilty of the charges and was ordered dismissed from service. In the first Indorsement dated
August
30, 1996, former Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. confirmed the penalty of dismissal.
The
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 1997. Guingona’s decision
was
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) but the CSC in its Resolution No. 974501 dated
November 26, 1997, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decisions of Acting Comm. Liwag
and
Secretary Guingona. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CSC.
Samalio filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed it;
hence, this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not Samalio was not accorded due process.
Held:
No. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. It is not legally objectionable for being violative of due
process for an administrative agency to resolve the case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of
their
direct testimony.
In this case, Samalio was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the Board of
Discipline of the BID when he filed the answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as other
motions and
papers. He was able to participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to
elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal.
Hence,

Samalio’s denial of due process cannot be invoked since he was given the opportunity to be
heard on
his motion for reconsideration.

Domingo vs. Robles

Facts: Petitioner wants to dispose her property located in Marikina. Bacani volunteered to act
as petitioner's agent in selling the lot. Petitioner delivered her owner's copy of TCT to Bacani.
Thereafter, the TCT was said to have been lost. In its reconstitution, petitioner gave Bacani all
her receipts of payment for real estate taxes. Bacani also asked petitioner to sign what she
recalled was a record of exhibits. Petitioner waited patiently but Bacani did not show up any
more. Later, petitioner visited the lot and was surprised to see the respondents starting to build
a house on the subject lot. Verification with ROD revealed that the lost title has already been
reconstituted and cancelled with the registration of deed of sale executed by the petitioner in
favor of the respondent. A transfer of certificate of title was also issued to the respondent.
Petitioner claimed not to have met any of the respondents nor having signed any sale over the
property in favor of anybody. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery and
therefore could not validly transfer ownership of the lot to the respondents. Respondent
contented that she is a buyer in good faith and for value; that the lot was offered to them by
Bacani, as the agent of the petitioner. That after some time when they were already prepared
to buy the lot, Bacani introduced to them the supposed owners and agreed on the sale. Bacani
and the introduced seller presented a Deed of Absolute Sale
already signed by the petitioner needing only respondent’s signature. That she paid full
purchase price and the
original of the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title was given to her. Petitioner filed
a case for the nullity
and reconveyance. RTC dismiss the complaint. CA affirmed lower court’s
decision. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her claims. Held: No. Notarized
instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and
convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. Forgery cannot
be presumed. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. ITC, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to prove her allegations. However, the petitioner failed to do
so. The sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioner's agent, who had with him
the original of the owner's duplicate Certificate of Title to the property, free from any liens or
encumbrances. The signatures of Spouses Domingo, the registered owners, appear on the Deed
of Absolute Sale. Petitioner's husband met with Respondent Yolanda Robles and received
payment for the property. The Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the
production of the owner's certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. The registered
owner who places in the hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land
effectively represents to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal
with the property.

people v galleno

G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL
GALLENO, accused-appellant. Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno was charged and convicted
with the crime of rape of a 5-year old child. He seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial court
alleging that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial since the judge discounted the accused
testimony and actively participated in the cross examination of the accused-appellant. Issue:
W/N, the trial judge is guilty of undue interference. Held: Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides: While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up
some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should
always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the
cause or the ascertainment of truth. The court held that there is undue interference if the judge
extensively propounds questions to the witnesses which will have the effect of or will tend to
build or bolster the case for one of the parties. In the instant case, the court found that the trial
court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did propound questions but this was done
only for clarification purposes and not to build the case for one of the parties. The line of
questioning referred to hardly shows bias on the part of the trial court, but a pure clarification.

















People vs Larrañaga

Larrañaga et al were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape on February 3, 2004; and for serious illegal detention. The first crime is punishable by
death and the second is punishable by reclusion perpetua. One of the co-accused, James
Andrew Uy, alleged that on July 16, 1997, the date of the commission of the crime, he was only
17 years old and 262 days old. To prove his claim, Uy presented his birth certificate duly
certified by the City Civil Registrar and the National Statistics Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Uy is entitled a mitigating circumstance due to minority?
HELD: Yes. Uy was able to prove his claim hence he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance in
both crimes charged against him. This is pursuant to Article 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that persons below 18 years of age are entitled to a penalty one degree
lower than that imposed by law.

G.R. No. 152230 August 9, 2005

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, respondent.

CALLEJO, SR., J:

Facts:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig. The residents in the area needed the road for water and
electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter
property of the Ching Cuancos which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that
the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access
road but they rejected the offer.

The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of
its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The
plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration
covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be
expropriated. The plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-
92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had
purchased the property. Plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with called Damayan Street.

JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted.
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiff’s messenger, testified on direct examination that on February 23, 1993,
he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco at his store. The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to the co-
owners. However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.

RTC: plaintiff as having a lawful right to take the property in question for purposes for which the same is
expropriated. As gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance with the
definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most
convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.

CA: affirmed the order of the RTC. Plaintiff substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
particularly the requirement that a valid and definite offer must be made to the owner. The letter of Engr. Reyes,
inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a
substantial compliance with the “valid and definite offer” requirement under said Section 19.

Issues:

1. WON the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid
and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint

2. WON property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the
respondent

Held:

1. NO.
2. YES.

Ratio:

1. The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer (Art 35 IRR of
LGC) to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent
upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove
compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint.

An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It
creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise
into a contractual obligation.

The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely
stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a clear
certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.

The respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to
acquire the property for public use as an access road. - Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners,
the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is
merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project
and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.

2. Court rejected the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent
because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members.

Judgment: Petition granted.

Phil. Pryce Assurance Corp. vs CA

Insurance Case Digest: Philippine Pryce
Assurance Corp. V. CA (1994)

G.R. No. 107062 February 21, 1994
Lessons Applicable: Acceptance by obligee by surety bond (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Sec. 177 of the Insurance Code

FACTS:

Gegroco, Inc filed for a collection of the issued surety bond for P500K and
P1M by Interworld Assurance Corporation (now Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation) in
behalf of its principal Sagum General Merchandise
RTC: favored Gegroco, Inc

CA: affirmed RTC
Interworld: checks issued by its principal which were supposed to pay for the premiums
bounced and it was not yet authorized by the Insurance Commission to issue surety bonds

ISSUE: W/N Interworld Assurance Corp. should be liable for the surety bond that it
issued as payment for the premium

HELD: YES. RTC and CA: confirmed

Interworld did not and never attempted to pay the requisite docket fee and was not present
during the scheduled pre-trial so it is as if third-party complaint was
never filed
Sec. 177. The surety is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the contract of
suretyship or bond is perfected and delivered to the obligor. No contract of suretyship or
bonding shall be valid and binding unless and until the premium therefor has been paid,
except where the obligee has accepted the bond, in which case the bond becomes valid and
enforceable irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by the obligor to the
surety
Interworld's defense that it did not have authority to issue a Surety Bond when it did is an
admission of fraud committed against Gegroco. No person can claim benefit from
the wrong he himself committed. A representation made is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon.