Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage

386 Marriage marriages are intended to be temporary, and the spouses can fi x the duration of the marriage. Some might decide on a fi ve-year marriage, while others on a ten-year one, though I suspect that such marriages would appeal mostly to couples with a preference for fi xing a short period of time (what’s the point otherwise?). It will depend on the desires of the potential spouses, though it is conceivable that, if the state is going to recognize such marriages, it would place a minimum time period on them, such that a minimum temporary marriage would have to be for, say, three years, and no potential spouses would be legally allowed to enter a temporary marriage for a period shorter than that. Nolan argues that the idea of temporary marriages is plausible in itself and it does not face insurmountable diffi culties. First, the principle of equality dictates that the state should recognize marriages equally, such that if there are some people who wish to enter into temporary marriages, the state should recognize that as marriage, especially since there are no good social reasons against doing so. Second, temporary marriages either exist or have existed in some cultures (Nolan gives the example of Shi’ite mut’ah marriages, which I mentioned in the previous chapter, and the example of neo-pagan headfasting marriages; 2016 , 186). Finally, temporary marriages have benefi ts to the spouses: those who wish to have them might not be criminalized were the state to recognize them, some potential spouses who take marriage seriously but who worry about its permanent aspects might prefer to commit to temporary ones (and then renew them if all goes well), spouses would not take each other for granted and have a chance to assess their marriage when the expiration date nears, and some spouses would feel that they are not stuck in loveless, bad marriages with costly and rancorous divorce proceedings as the only other option. Moreover, Nolan does not propose that temporary marriage replace permanent marriage, only that it be an option for those who want it. In addition, there is nothing about the idea of temporary marriages that limits it to straight people, to cisgender people, or to two and only two spouses per marriage. This openness to the inclusion of various forms of spousal partners is a plus (or so some would think). The idea of temporary marriages does face some diffi culties, however, as Nolan recognizes (though he thinks that none is insurmountable). One set of diffi culties is social: what is socially expected of friends, family, acquaintances, and so on, to do when a marriage nears its end? How are people to respect these marriages when the know that they will expire or are about to expire? Should Alfred start courting Nina knowing that her marriage to Craig will be over in a few months? Parents are of course a whole other headache: how many of them will be excited about the prospect of, let alone helping plan, a wedding of their son who is to be married for fi ve years? And speaking of weddings, how rich would someone have to be to undertake a series of weddings (assuming that he or she does not renew his or her temporary marriage)? However, such social diffi culties might not be serious. People eventually adjust to new social phenomena, including fi guring out their ethics and their

Is Marriage Necessary? 387 etiquette. Parents can put their sentimentality aside and enjoy the temporary weddings of their children. And we would all be better off were people to have smaller, less extravagant, and less expensive weddings. Legal diffi culties might not be so easy to set aside. The laws surrounding marriage would have to be seriously adjusted to accommodate temporary marriages. For example, should the state provide the citizenship or the permanent residency to a spouse of a fi ve-year marriage? What would inheritance law look like in the absence of a specifi c will from a spouse? Should the state provide tax benefi ts to temporary marriages, especially those of short durations? Nolan suggests that many of the rules can be modeled on the existing laws surrounding de facto relationships ( 2016 , 195), though if this happens much of the incentive for entering into a temporary marriage would go away. This is because rules surrounding non-marital relationships tend to discriminate against them, so partners to a relationship always have an incentive to enter into a marriage because of its legal benefi ts. If temporary marriages do not receive these benefi ts, out the window goes one crucial reason for desiring them. In any case, and although Nolan might be correct that some appropriate legal changes might be drawn up “by a handful of competent lawyers . . . in a matter of days” ( 2016 , 196), I worry that much of the laws surrounding permanent marriage are there because of its permanence: current immigration laws, for example, make most sense when based on the presumption that marriage is permanent. Still, Nolan is right that the law can be fl exible, and we can always distinguish between temporary marriages that have fi xed long durations and temporary marriages with short ones. The laws of permanent marriage can easily apply to the former, and with smart adjustments they can apply to the latter also. Another worry with the proposal is children, and how well they would fare in such marriages, especially those that have short fi xed durations (which I surmise would be the majority of them). Nolan argues that despite the studies that show that children in permanent marriages tend to fare better than those of single parents or of couples going through divorce, it is hard to know whether it is the permanency of the marriage that is the cause of the benefi t, or something else such as the fi nancial state of the family, its race, the school—these factors need to be controlled for in such studies ( 2016 , 191–192). It might also be that temporary marriages might be better for children than permanent marriages that end in divorce. Nolan is right about all this, but none of it assuages the worry that children who go through temporary marriage dissolutions would fare well, even if they would fare better than children who go through the divorce of a permanent marriage. Even if the parents entering into the marriage agree in advance on what should happen with the children when the marriage expires, as Nolan recommends ( 2016 , 193), this is little consolation to the children who have to go through the dissolution. Perhaps with temporary marriages the dissolutions would not be bitter or as bitter as the usual divorce (though, given human psychology, one never really knows), and this might lessen the impact on the children. If such marriages also become culturally accepted, children

388 Marriage might not feel the dissolution to be a problem. In any case, we know nothing about this, and much will depend on the age of the children, how the marriage ends (remember that temporary marriages could end in divorce if the spouses decide that they cannot last for the fi xed time period), how socially common and accepted are temporary marriages, and a host of other factors. In short, the worry about the welfare of children should not be taken lightly (as I worry that Nolan takes it). Nonetheless, temporary marriages are important to consider for all the reasons given above, such as avoiding feeling that marriage is a trap, feeling able to live up to one’s vows, avoiding costly divorce proceedings should the permanent marriage go bad, giving the spouses the chance to renegotiate their relationship at the time of expiry, and pushing the spouses to not take each other or their marriage for granted. It might even reduce infi delity to some extent, and it might be an incentive for parents to refrain from having children or at least to not have them for the wrong reasons (e.g., as a way to keep a bad marriage going). But another crucial reason to take temporary marriage seriously is that it might be a good stepping-stone on the way to reforming marriage or extending it to caring relationships in general per Brake’s proposal. The state could use it to tinker with how the laws of marriage should be fi xed, and how to parcel piecemeal directives for different spouses wishing to enter marriages of different durations. Temporary marriage would temporarily solve some serious problems with divorce, and spouses can use it to test their marriages before they decide on a longer-term marriage (with each other or with someone else). Crucially, and assuming that group marriages are on the horizon, temporary marriage might be especially suited for them. For unless the group is truly harmonious, larger numbers might mean more confl ict, which might mean a higher rate of divorce. Having temporary marriage might help groups stick it out. But there are two potentially serious worries with temporary marriage, both of which are interconnected. First, one might wonder what the point of temporary marriage is: Although one can understand why some people might prefer it, per the above reasons, why should marriage ever be temporary? If the above people are not sure about their commitments, maybe they should postpone getting married, period. The point is that a crucial feature of marriage—perhaps part of its social meaning—is its intended permanence. Marriage is a serious commitment, and it should be intended to be permanent. This might be especially pressing from the point of view of the state: Why should the state go through the trouble of fi xing the laws of marriage and supporting marriage if couples can marry for short periods of time? Whether this above objection is powerful I leave up to the reader, but temporary marriage, if adopted, would send a serious social message: we do not think that marriage is as important as we did, given that much of its importance lies in its intended permanence. Second, if caring relationships are the basis of marriage, and if such relationships need to be long term, temporary marriage does not sit well with them,

Is Marriage Necessary? 389 except under special circumstances (Brake’s example of Rose and Octavian indicates that some minimal marriages might be temporary, and intended to be so). Nonetheless, minimal marriage is not meant to replace current marriage, and under current marriage, people in non-caring relationships marry, so perhaps this is not a serious objection. But what both of the objections point to is the purpose of marriage: Why should relationships intended to be short term receive benefi ts and the backing of the state and be called marriages? Summary and Conclusion We have seen that arguments for abolishing marriage are not convincing, and that state intervention in some form and in some adult human relationships is necessary. Specifi cally, we have seen that there is a need for the state to support many more caring relationships than what currently go under the label of “marriage.” Of course, that state support is necessary does not mean that marriage is. State-supported relationships lead to the question of whether they should be called “marriage” and what effects this would have on the social and political status of marriage—all open questions. Indeed, whether we will have marriage if minimal marriage and temporary marriages were to exist, and exist somewhat commonly, is the question. Study Questions 1. What arguments for same-sex marriage can you think of, additional to the two explained in the chapter? Might one such argument rely on the benefi ts of marriage? 2. Does marriage have to be a basically good institution (or not a bad one) to understand or justify gay people’s desire to have it be an option for them? Can it instead be a morally neutral institution? 3. If divorce is unilateral—if a spouse can dissolve a marriage at will, without providing compelling grounds—would this undermine (at least to some large extent) the importance or point of marriage? 4. If the law does not provide access to the property and the person of the spouse, would this undermine (at least to some large extent) the importance or point of marriage? 5. Even though assimilationist arguments against same-sex marriage do not apply to group or bi-marriages, do they apply to trans-marriages? Why or why not? 6. Granted that being married has an elevated social status, to what extent is marriage’s legality a part or a cause of this elevated status? 7. Which of the three features of Wedgwood’s shared, social meaning of “marriage” would Brake’s expansion be opposed to? Is it compatible with the second and the third? How?

390 Marriage 8. Is Brake’s view really about marriage or about something else? That is, would all the caring relationships she wishes to include under marriage really be marriages? 9. Which of the following two options is preferable and why? (1) Extending marriage (its name and its benefi ts) to all caring relationships. (2) Extending the same benefi ts of marriage to all caring relationships but reserving the name “marriage” to what is currently understood by marriage (including same-sex marriage, and possibly group and bi-marriages). To what extent are these two options similar to the past debate about giving gay couples domestic partnerships but not marriage? 10. If Brake’s proposal can in principle allow marriages between siblings, among large groups of people, and between human beings and animals of high intelligence and emotional complexity, would this be a serious objection to her proposal? 11. Is there a morally neutral conception of “care” that a liberal state can support? Or would the state have to take sides in agreeing to whichever conception of care it agrees to? As important, even if there were a neutral conception of “care,” would the state be taking sides against the nonmarried in supporting marriage, no matter how widely understood? 12. Evaluate the idea of temporary marriage. Is it a good or a bad idea? Why? 13. Would marriage be, in some sense, destroyed if minimal and temporary marriages were to be part of our reality? Why or why not? And would this be a welcome or an unwelcome result? Further Reading A good essay on the legal and material rights and obligations of marriage is Chambers (1996 ). Brake (2012 , “Introduction,” note 17) provides additional references to the legal rights and obligations of marriage. On the general question of the position of the state in a liberal society, see Ackerman (1980 ); Kymlicka (2002 ); and Rawls (2005 ). For extending marriage to include polygamous and group marriages see Baltzly (2012 ). A good overview of the philosophical issues in the debate over same-sex marriage is Calhoun (2006 ). For more on Mohr’s views, see especially ( 1988 , 1994 ). For another infl uential argument for same-sex marriage, see Mohr (1988, 1994, and 2005). Two infl uential non-philosophers who argue for same-sex marriage are Eskridge (1996 ) and Sullivan (1995 ). A recent book about the law and its extension to non-traditional families is Polikoff (2008 ). On marriage and transsexual and transgender people, see Robson (2007 ). Notes 1. For a list of the benefi ts and rights of marriage, see Chambers (1996 ). In other countries, marriage is not a purely state matter: some countries anchor marriage in religious institutions, with the state recognizing it once it is religiously performed. Rules and regulations surrounding inheritance, divorce, and other matters are religiously handled.

Is Marriage Necessary? 391 2. These are in effect the arguments given by Richard Mohr (2005 ) and Cheshire Calhoun (2000 ), and which I discussed in the fi rst edition of the book ( Halwani 2010 ). In the previous chapter, we have seen one aspect of Wedgwood’s argument in favor of same-sex marriage, namely, that the shared social meaning of “marriage” does not exclude same-sex marriage. 3. Some gay writers think this is a good thing. We have seen this with Rauch, and Andrew Sullivan agrees ( 1995 , esp. ch. 5). The subtitle of William Eskridge’s (1996 ) book says it all: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment . 4. Warner’s argument draws on many issues already discussed in this chapter (e.g., marriages’ legal benefi ts denied to the non-married). In presenting it, I focus on those strands of the argument that are conceptually distinct from these other points. 5. Indeed, this portion of the discussion relies heavily on Chambers (2016 ). 6. Chambers has a forthcoming book entitled Against Marriage that I have not yet read. I’m hoping she addresses these points. 7. Brake also briefl y responds to the objection that what she proposes is not marriage by saying that she is not redefi ning marriage, because what she is proposing already refl ects “the fact that there are already a number of competing conceptions of marriage” ( 2012 , 188). I am not sure, however, that this is true. What is true is that there are more and more voices rising in defense of the equal value of non-marital relationships, which is not the same thing as competing conceptions of marriage. 8. Lest you think this is stupid, remember that animals are often the solace of many lonely people, providing their lives with meaning and direction. There is also a growing literature on the idea of a deeper sort of intimacy between human beings and other animals than is usually recognized, and on how many more people see their primary care-taking relationships as being with non-human animals. See Haraway (2003 , 2008 ) and Rudy (2017 ). 9. It is noteworthy that Brake’s rejection of adult-child marriages is based on the criminality of these marriages given their sexual content. In so doing, she seems to forget that on her own account such marriages need not be sexual or romantic. Now, whether a non-romantic and nonsexual marriage to a child would remove the objection to such marriages is unclear. But Brake would be better off relying on the ability for genuine consent to rule out such marriages.

I would like to conclude by emphasizing two points. In the introduction, I mentioned how the three areas of this study are conceptually and morally separate from each other. Here, I would like to emphasize how different they are from each other in their natures, so to speak. Consider, as an instance of what I have in mind, sexual desire and RL2. Sexual desire seeks variety—it might be exclusive for a while, but its roving eye soon comes to life again: one desires multiple people at a time, fi nding numerous people sexually desirable or attractive. Sexual desire also loses interest in its object after some time (unless, say, circumstances force people apart, which often keeps the sexual fl ame between them alight). Once it is satiated, it moves on to something else, something new. In addition, sexual desire also objectifi es—it reduces its object of attraction to a mere body, thereby throwing out the window non-selfi sh moral considerations. Sexual pleasure, to offer a fourth and fi nal point, goes up in direct proportion to sexual objectifi cation: the more we are able to merely use our sexual partners as pieces of meat, the more enjoyable the sexual act is. If you want to kill the joy of sexual desire, allow moral considerations to intrude. Romantic love, RL2 specifi cally, is vastly different. It does not seek variety, and if it stumbles upon it, it faces conceptual limits: one cannot be in RL2 with too many people at a time. In this respect it resembles friendship: it is content with a few close ones, whom it trusts and with whom it shares some basic values. Moreover, RL2 does not fade away after some time lapses—it does not get bored with its beloved. RL2, in addition, is non-selfi shly concerned with the moral and non-moral well-being of the beloved. The beloved’s good is sought for its own sake. And the pleasures of love are reaped and most enjoyed in a relationship whose partners know that the other is doing well. No lover is happy knowing that his or her beloved is not doing well. RL2 and sexual desire are thus very different from each other. It is a puzzle why human beings have thought these two go together. The answer must surely have something to do with RL1, a phase in which the desire to be with the beloved, sexually and nonsexually, creates the impression that the lovers are going to stay like this forever. They will be one, a “ we .” This is true in many cases, but the “we” that ends up coming into existence is a very different “we” from what the lovers originally thought. It is a togetherness Concluding Remarks

Concluding Remarks 393 structured and pervaded by the realism and needs of daily life, an RL2 “we” that is rid of the illusions of the “we” of RL1. Marriage is an altogether different animal still: insofar as it is defi ned or understood essentially by legal rules and regulations, it is an institution that need have nothing to do with love or sex, an institution designed (for good or for ill) to regulate specifi c intimate human relationships, whether such relationships are ones of love, of sex, or of something else altogether. Even those philosophers who disagree with me about the vast differences between sex and love (and marriage—here the disagreement is less likely, I predict), they, too, must agree that that similarities or the shared terrain are not many or expansive. Once we see this, we will have to think of love, sex, and marriage in new and different ways: we will have to defi ne and characterize them differently, and their value will have to be looked at differently also. I now come to the second point I wish to emphasize in this conclusion, one that will elicit even more disagreement from fellow philosophers. This second point has to do with the value of love and sex in human life. There are four positions one can occupy, and I fi nd myself occupying the fourth. It is a position that many will fi nd diffi cult to accept but I leave it to the reader to evaluate it and to decide which position he or she accepts. The four positions refl ect different combinations of optimism and pessimism about life (life in general, not particular human lives) and about sex and love. I will leave marriage out since it is a fully socially constructed institution that can be in principle fi xed, changed, improved, and even obliterated altogether. The fi rst position is the fully optimist one: life is good, and so are love and sex. Though particular lives may be bad, life in general is a good thing, and we should be thankful to be alive and enjoying the good things that life has to offer (even though it dishes out bad things on occasion). Human beings are generally good, even though they morally backslide every so often and can use the occasional moral push to help them along. Love and sex are two prime examples of the good things that life has to offer. A life can be good without them, but a life without them is much poorer for that. The second position is half pessimist, half optimist. It is a pessimist position about life, thinking it to be generally a burden, with much suffering and pain and with very little to overcome them, save for the occasional human goodness and the beauty and bounty of nature. Human beings, on such a view, are generally selfi sh, inclined to satisfy their desires, and full of vices, especially greed, vanity, envy, and self-indulgence. But life does have a few good things, which include love and sex. Love manages to help us be less selfi sh and sex brings much pleasure to a life otherwise containing little pleasure. The third position is half optimist, half pessimist. Though particular lives may be bad, life in general is a good thing, and we should be thankful to be alive and enjoying the good things that life has to offer (even though it dishes out bad things on occasion). Human beings are generally good, even though they morally backslide every so often and can use the occasional moral push.

394 Concluding Remarks However, love and sex are mixed goods at best, and we should be on our guard against them: love is selfi sh, absorbing the lovers into each other, and its tendency for self-absorption endangers the goodness of human beings. Friendship love and parental love stand in stark contrast to romantic love in this respect. Sex is also dangerous: it objectifi es and is thus inherently morally dangerous. It is also a powerful desire, one that can push people to do irrational and immoral things. We should be on our guard against it if we wish to maintain our moral integrity. The fourth position is fully pessimist. It is a pessimist position about life, thinking it to be generally a burden, with much suffering and pain and with very little to overcome them, save for the occasional human goodness and kindness. Human beings, on such a view, are generally selfi sh, inclined to satisfy their desires, and full of vices, especially greed, vanity, envy, and self-indulgence. This position is also pessimistic about love and sex: they are mixed goods at best, and we should be on our guard against them: love is selfi sh, absorbing the lovers into each other, and its tendency for self-absorption endangers the goodness of human beings. Friendship love and parental love stand in stark contrast to romantic love in this respect. Sex is also dangerous: it objectifi es and is thus inherently morally dangerous. It is also a powerful desire, one that can push people to do irrational and immoral things. We should be on our guard against it if we wish to maintain our moral integrity. (Note that these four positions can be multiplied by mixing and matching parts of them or by making them more fi ne-grained. For instance, one might think that life is generally good, but human beings bad, or that sex is good but romantic love bad or vice versa. Thus, one can carve a view better suited to one’s philosophical temperament.) About the fourth view: We human beings are caught in a diffi cult circumstance, to put the point mildly. Life is nasty business, full of suffering and pain. Yet our nature is such that we are driven to constantly procreate and such that when we are young we are blind to life’s pain and thus keep it going. Life is diffi cult not only because of natural processes and reactions, such as physical pain due to sickness or aging, and psychological pain due to worry and anxiety, but also because of the suffering we perpetuate: because of our greed, stupidity, selfi shness, cowardice, self-indulgence, envy, vanity, and pride. We thus need morality in the form of both moral restraints and moral incentives to get us to act decently to and by each other (and to non-human animals). What makes our situation particularly diffi cult (and somewhat absurd) is that even the few joys that life has to offer must be subject to moral restraint. That is, we cannot simply claim that life is diffi cult so we should enjoy as fully as we can its good things, because doing so in all likelihood violates the very moral strictures needed to make life as painless as possible. Now, there is no denying that love and sex are one of the few joys that life brings, and, if poets, philosophers, artists, and popular culture are to be trusted, they are one of the basic values of life, precisely because they can make life happy and meaningful and give it direction. Yet if I am correct, they too are in special need

Concluding Remarks 395 of moral control: love has the tendency to make the lovers self-absorbed, to turn their attention away from the world and to each other. Even RL2 has this tendency insofar as we couple it with the idea that our signifi cant others take priority over all else. Thus, love, while generally good for us, can also morally isolate us. Sex fares worse: it undermines reason, it objectifi es, and it is complicit in perpetuating the species. It is especially in need of moral restraints. We are caught, then, between a rock and a hard place: we must endure life and enjoy it as much as we can, given its hardships, but those very things that can make it enjoyable require moral control. But the news is not fully bad: First, even under moral control, romantic love and sexual pleasure continue to make life bearable and even enjoyable. Second, in bringing them under moral guidance, we do the right thing, and we can be content with the thought that we have at least lived a morally decent life. If we can pull this off, we would have saved our souls. Life is diffi cult, yes, but at least we can go through it and leave it having loved, having enjoyed sex, and having done all this morally. We cannot ask for much more.

Bibliography I use the following abbreviations in the bibliography for frequently cited books: AM: After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships , ed. E. Brake. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016 . DLI: Desire, Love, and Identity: Philosophy of Sex and Love , ed. G. Foster. Don Mills, Canada: Oxford University Press, 2017 . EAP: Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love , ed. A. Soble. New York: Paragon House, 1989 . PEL: The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love , eds. R. Solomon and K. Higgins. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991 . POS2: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 2nd ed., ed. A. Soble. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 1981 . POS3: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 3rd ed., ed. A. Soble. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 1997 . POS4: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 4th ed., ed. A. Soble. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2003 . POS5: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 5th ed., eds. A. Soble and N. Power. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2008 . POS6: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 6th ed., eds. N. Power, R. Halwani, and A. Soble. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2013 . POS7: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 7th ed., eds. R. Halwani, A. Soble, S. Hoffman, and J. Held. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2017 . PSL: Philosophy: Sex and Love , eds. J. Petrik and A. Zucker. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2016 . PS2: Philosophy and Sex , 2nd ed., eds. R. Baker and F. Elliston. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984 . PS3: Philosophy and Sex , 3rd ed., eds. R. Baker, K. Wininger, and F. Elliston. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998 . SE: Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality, Virtue, and the Good Life , ed. R. Halwani. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 . SPP1: Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia , vol. 1, ed. A. Soble. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006 . SPP2: Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia , vol. 2, ed. A. Soble. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006 . SS: Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science , and Culture of Homosexuality , ed. J. Corvino. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 1997 .

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Index Abramson, Kate, moral properties, love as based on 129–131 accidental properties 86 acquired properties 87–88 act consequentialism 203–204 acting on beliefs 69–70 actions: duty 101; Kantian ethics 99; moral restrictions on 108–110; morality of 93–94; and practices 202–203; virtuous acts 228 adult-child marriages 391n9 adultery 178–184; hybrid view of 182; and intimacy 184; spousal consent 180 agape love 83 agency: Kantian ethics 99; moral particularism 35–37; moral restrictions on action 108–110 altruism 22; selfi shness of romantic love 64–68 a-necessary feature of romantic love 79–80 anger 103 anticipation 191–193 anti-natalist philosophers 117n1 anti-pornography views 262–272 Aquinas, Thomas, New Natural Law 330–332 arguments of New Natural Law philosophers 332–334; causal version of slippery slope arguments 339–341; evaluation of 334–339 Aristophanes 54–55 Aristotle 18, 102–103, 146; friendship, views on 49, 92n12; virtue ethics 220–222 Arkes, Hadley 342 Armstrong, John 146; infatuation, views on 25 art: particularism in 36–37 artistic pleasure 194–195 aspirational nature of love 137–138 assimilation and cultural injustice arguments against marriage 372–375 attachment 22 autonomy: and concern 69–71; diminished autonomy 23; and liberty 105–106; shared identity 61–64; SUVs 63–64; of “we” 57; WUVs 63–64 “bad sex” 280 Baier, Annette, prudence of love 146–149 Baltzy (“Baltzly”), Dirk, philosophical account of sexual perversion 299–302 Banville, John 123 Barry, Peter Brian 384–385 bases of love, restrictions on 113–115 BDSM (bondage, discipline, and sadomasochism) 308–310; and degradation 315–318; moral innocence of desires in 310–315; moral objections to 309 beauty 81–82 Beck, Andrew xiv “bedroom death” 20 behavior: degradation 259–262; sexual behavior 158–159; sexual objectifi cation 241–243 beliefs 14; acting on 69–70; in constancy 51; cultural beliefs shaping sexual transactions 209–216; false beliefs about the beloved 25; moral restrictions on 110–113 beloved xiii; desired properties as basis for love 88; false beliefs about 25; fl ourishing of 39; history-commitment view of love 37–43; important versus unimportant properties 87; innate versus acquired properties 87–88; loving a

414 Index person as a whole 83–85; loving a person for who they really are 86; mental versus physical properties 87; object of love 81–86; pain at loss of as characteristic of romantic love 76–77; warped conception of good 71–72 benefi ts of marriage 390n1 Bennett, William 341 Bentham, Jeremy 98, 200–201 Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron 22, 23 bestiality 291 bestowal 45n11 betrayal of love 182–184 “better sex” 280 bi-marriage 351–353 Blankschaen, Kurt 362n6 Brake, Elizabeth xiv, 92n12, 329; minimal marriage 375–385 Brogaard, Berit 45n9 Cahill, Ann 278n19 Card, Claudia 91n6, 248; unjustness of marriage argument 367–372 care 20 casual sex 176–178; and objectifi cation 256; rape as 178 Categorical Imperative 100–101 Catholicism, philosophical basis of doctrine 331–332 causal explanations of love 121 causal notion of commitment 38 causal version of slippery slope arguments 339–341 causes: consequentialism 98–99; reasons, comparison with 45n6 characteristics of romantic love: applying to RL1 and RL2 80–81; concern for the beloved 64–68; constancy 50–52; emotional intimacy 75–76; exclusivity 47–50; irreplaceability 52–54; longing 76; pain at the loss of the beloved 76–77; physical intimacy 75–76; sexual activity 73–75; sexual desire 73–75; union 54–64; uniqueness 52–54 charm 53 children: adult-child marriages 391n9; love for parents 148 choosing between objects of love 144–146 Christian-like views of love 27–28; agape love 83; gift-love 29; “natural law” 219n3; New Natural Law 330–332 Christina, Greta 157, 161 cohabitation of partners 326 commitment: betrayal of love 182–184; casual sex 176–178; causal notion of 38; conceptual aspect of 38–39; genuine 41–42; history-commitment view of love 37–43; “indefi nite constancy” 50–52; “we” 55–60 commonsense morality 106–107 “companionate love” 22 comparison: of reasons and causes 45n6; of RL1 and infatuation 23–26; of RL1 and RL2 22 conceptual aspect of commitment 38–39 conceptual issues found in the philosophy of love, sex, and marriage 1–2 concern 20, 41–42, 77; and autonomy 69–71; as characteristic of romantic love 64–68; robust concern 128; robust concern for moral well-being, love as 138–143; and union 59–60; warped conception of good 71–72; and well-being 69–71 condition, romantic love as 19–20 consequences of sexual activity 194 consequentialism 98–99, 200–216; act consequentialism 203–204; actions versus practices 202–203; and homosexuality 206–207; notion of consequences 201–202; offensiveness of sex 203; persons affected by sex acts 201–202; and privacy 203; and prostitution 209–217; rule consequentialism 203–204; rules of thumb 207–208; and sex 204–209 constancy 17, 39, 50–52; “indefi nite constancy” 50–51; and no-reason view of love 29 constructionist functionalism 13–15 consumption, temperance 223 contact with sexual body parts 159–160 contraception, “rhythm method” 331 controlling emotions 94–95 Corvino, John 363n11 courage 231 criteria for choosing objects of love 145–146 cultural beliefs shaping sexual transactions 209–216 cultural injustice and assimilation arguments against same-sex marriage 372–375

Index 415 de Sousa, Ronald 11, 19–20, 22, 46n20 decision-making, moral particularism 35–37 defi ning sexual acts 158; contact with sexual body parts 159–160; intentions 162–163; sexual behavior 158–159; sexual desire 163–164; sexual pleasure 160–162 degradation 259–262; and BDSM 315–318; objectifi cation in pornography 272–274; pornography as endorsement of 266–267 Dembroff, Robin 362n9 desire: “bedroom death” 20; defi ning sexual desire 165–171; dispositional 122; feature-based approach to sexual desire 170–171; “higher-order desire” 58; love as 122; moral innocence of desires in BDSM 310–315; nonsexual 257; preconditions for 257; racial desires 232–237; RL1 14; romantic love as 14–18; self-objectifi cation 248–253; sexual desire 73–75, 163–164; temperance 222–227; underdescribing sexual desire 168–169 desired properties as basis for love 88 diffi culty of being virtuous 231–232 dignity 120; and degradation 259–262; as metaphysical property 254–255 dispositional desires 122 dispositional emotion, romantic love as 20 divorce 369–370; unilateral divorce 370–371 dominance of men as cultural belief 211–212 Drowning Wife Case 126–127 dual nature of romantic love 13–14 Due Process Clause 325 duty, acting from 101 Eaton, Anne W. 267–268 ego, love as defeating 123–128 Ehman, Robert: commonsense morality 106–107; preferential treatment in romantic love 95–97 elements of proper BDSM encounters 308–309 Ellis, Anthony 176–178 emotion: desire, romantic love as 14–18; disposition to range of, romantic love as 20; intentionality 14; love as reasonbased emotion 28; moral emotion 45n8; reasons for changes in xiii; romantic love as 49–50; syndrome, romantic love as 19–20; see also RL2 emotional intimacy as characteristic of romantic love 75–76 emotions: anger 103; controlling 94–95; justifying 94; see also moral emotion empathy 124–125 encyclicals, Humanae Vitae 331 envy 19 Equal Protection Clause 325 erotic love 22 essential versus accidental properties 86 ethics: Kantian ethics 99–102; virtue ethics 102–105, 220–222; see also morality Ettelbrick, Paula, cultural injustice and assimilation arguments against samesex marriage 372–375 evaluating: arguments of New Natural Law lawyers 334–339; Kant’s view of sex 253–254 evaluating sexual activities 191–199 evaluative issues found in the philosophy of love, sex, and marriage 2 excitement 192 exclusivity: of reason view of love 33; of romantic love 47–50, 77–78 exhibitionism 166 explanation: causal explanations of love 121; reason view of love 28–29, 33–34 The Fable of the Bees (Mandeville) 210 fa-exclusive feature of romantic love 79–80 failed attempts to resolve diffi culties with reason view of love 30–37 fairness 103 faithlessness 182–184 false beliefs about the beloved 25 fantasizing 168; morality of 304–308 feature-based approach to sexual desire 170–171 features of “we” 58–59 feeling approach to sexual pleasure 172–173 feminism, anti-pornography views 262–272, 321n13 fetishism 291 f-exclusive feature of romantic love 79–80 fg-exclusive feature of romantic love 79–80 Finnis, John 333–334

416 Index Fisher, Helen 22 fl ourishing of the beloved 39 Form of Beauty 81–82 Formula of Humanity 245–248 Four Loves, The (Lewis, 1960) 29 Frankfurt, Harry 27, 46n17, 132, 154n9 Freud, Sigmund 213 friendship 48–49, 78; Aristotle’s views on 92n12; g-necessity of love 78–80; preferential treatment in romantic love 95–97; prudence of 148; resource pooling 92n12 functions of virtue ethics 220–222 fungibility 244 Garry, Ann 269–272 gender-specifi c bisexuality, bi-marriage 351–353 “generality” of reasons 28; moral particularism 35–37; relational reasons for love 32–34; tweaking of 31–32 genital organs, non-feeling approach to sexual pleasure 173 genuine commitment 41–42 gift-love 29 g-necessity 78–80 Goldman, Alan 163, 166–168; philosophical account of sexual perversion 291–292 Gonzalez Tovar, Helkin Rafael xiv good life, love as necessity for 131–137 “good sex” 280–281 Green, O. H. 14 grief 51 Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant) 246–247 Hage, Rawi 268 happiness: as rationale for romantic love 149; and virtue 67–68 HCV (history-commitment view of love) 37–43; genuine commitment 41–42; irrationality of 40 Hershfi eld, Jeffrey 321n8 heteronormativity 375 higher forms of sexual pleasure 195–197 “higher-order desire” 58 Hill, Judith 262–265 homosexuality: Bentham on 200–201; and consequentialism 206–207; rule consequentialism 204; same-sex marriage 325; see also consequentialism Hopkins, Patrick 311 human beings: as “bundle of properties” 84; defi ning 169–170; dignity 254–255; essential versus accidental properties 86; Formula of Humanity 245–248; important versus unimportant properties 87; innate versus acquired properties 87–88; love as making us want to be better people 137–138; loving a person as a whole 83–85; loving a person for who they really are 86; mental versus physical properties 87 Humanae Vitae 331 humiliation, degradation in BDSM 315–318 hybrid view of adultery 182 hybrid view of love 27 impartiality, love as response to rationality 119–123 implausibility of love as response to rationality 121–122 important versus unimportant properties 87 “indefi nite constancy” 50–51 indispensability of love 137 infatuation 23–26; as unrequited love 25–26 innate versus acquired properties 87–88 instrumentality 244–245, 254 intemperance 222–227; and sexual acts 227–231 intense liking, love as 45n7 intentionality 14; and prostitution 187 intentions 162–163; and adultery 180–181; in sexual pleasure 161 intimacy 48–49, 75–76, 77; and adultery 184; as characteristic of romantic love 75–76 irrationality 153n2; of HCV 40 irreplaceability of love 52–54 Jacobsen, Rockney 170 Jenkins, Carrie 11; constructionist functionalism 13–15; “modal monogamy” 47–48 Jollimore, Troy 27, 46n15; Drowning Wife Case 127–128; love as defeating egoism 123–128; Love’s Vision (Jollimore, 2011) 124 Jones, Ward E. 154n11 justifying emotion 94 justifying love, qualifi cations to 105–106

Index 417 Kant, Immanuel 99, 200; Categorical Imperative 100–101; failed attempts to resolve the Kantian problem with sex 254–258; Formula of Humanity 245–248; self-objectifi cation 248–253 Kantian ethics 99–102; permissibility of love 100–102; view of sex, evaluating 253–254 Kierkegaard, Søren 65; preferential treatment in romantic love 95 Kieslowski, Krzysztof 182–183 kink.com 278n17 Kolodny, Niko 33–34, 46n18 Krauthammer, Charles 342 “lack of principles” version of slippery slope arguments 341–347 Lady Chatterley’s Lover (Lawrence) 278n8 Layda, Elliot xiv legal rights of access to spouse’s person and property 369–370 legality of sex acts 320n1 Leite, Adam, moral properties, love as based on 129–131 Levinson, Jerrold 320n5 Lewis, C. S. 29 liberty and autonomy 105–106 limerance 22 living with sexual objectifi cation 258–259 Lochtefi eld, Vera xiv longing as characteristic of romantic love 76 Longino, Helen 265–267 love: agape love 83; aspirational nature of 137–138; as based on moral properties 129–131; bestowal 45n11; betrayal of 182–184; choosing between objects of love 144–146; Christian-like view of 27–28; “companionate love” 22; concern 59–60, 64–68; consequentialism 98–99; constancy 17; as defeating egoism 123–128; as desire 122; desired properties as basis for 88; erotic love 22; exclusivity of 39; failed attempts to resolve diffi culties with reason view of love 30–37; features of love relationships 79–80; fl ourishing of the beloved 39; friendship love 48; genuine commitment 41–42; gift-love 29; g-necessity 78–80; history-commitment view of 37–43; important versus unimportant properties 87; indispensability of 133; innate versus acquired properties 87–88; as intense liking 45n7; irreplaceability of 52–54; Kantian ethics 99–102; as making us want to be better people 137–138; and marriage 326–330; mental versus physical properties 87; moral obligation to romantic love 94–95; moral prohibition of romantic love 95–97; moral restrictions on 107–108; and morality 93–94; as necessity for a good life 131–137; need-love 29; non-general reasons for love 34–37; no-reason view of 26–30; normative conception of 72; object of 81–86; pain at loss of beloved as characteristic of romantic love 76–77; parentchild love 78; prudence of 143–151; qualifi cations to the justifi cation of 105–106; “reactive” 129–131; reason view of 26–30; reason-responsiveness of 40; reciprocity 49–50; as response to rationality 119–123; restrictions on action 108–110; restrictions on the bases of 113–115; as robust concern for moral well-being 138–143; romantic love 9–10; shared identity 61–64; unattainability of 25; unconditional love 51–52; union 54–64; uniqueness of 52–54; unrequited love 24; “we” 55–60; wellbeing 69–71; see also romantic love Love (Milligan, 2011) 131–137 Love and Responsibility (Wojtyla) 331 lover, the xiii; relational reasons for love 32–34 Love’s Vision (Jollimore, 2011) 124 lower forms of sexual pleasure 195–197 lust 22; sexual desire 73–75 male prostitution 214–215 Mandeville, Bernard 210 marriage 4–5, 393; adult-child marriages 391n9; adultery 178–184; anti-natalist philosophy 117n1; arguments of New Natural Law 332–334; arguments in support of same-sex marriage 366–367; assimilation and cultural injustice arguments 372–375; benefi ts of 390n1; betrayal of love 182–184; bi-marriage

418 Index 351–353; causal version of slippery slope arguments 339–341; cohabitation of partners 326; defi ning 326–330; divorce 369–370; evaluating arguments of New Natural Law lawyers 334–339; “lack of principles” version of slippery slope arguments 341–347; legal rights of access to spouse’s person and property 369–370; “modal monogamy” 47–48; monogamy 353–359; New Natural Law 330–332; Obergefell v. Hodges 325; polyamory 353–359; polygamy 354–355; regulation by the state 328, 364–365; rights and obligations in 365; same-sex marriage 325; and slippery slope argument 347–350; as social construction 365–366; spousal consent of adultery 180; temporary marriage 385–389; unilateral divorce 370–371; unjustness of marriage argument 367–372; see also same-sex marriage masturbation 167–168, 171–172, 190n2; as adultery 179 McMurtry, John 354–355 “meaning” 133 Mendus, Susan 24 mental states as social construction 14 mental versus physical properties 87 Mill, John Stuart 98, 201 Miller, Shaun xiv, 313–314 Milligan, Tony 153n3; love as necessity for a good life 131–137 minimal marriage 375–385 “modal monogamy” 47–48 models of sexual behavior 191–194 monogamy 353–359; “modal monogamy” 47–48; serial monogamy 178 moral emotion: love as 118; romantic love as 119 moral particularism 35–37 morality 93–94; beliefs, restrictions on 110–113; commonsense morality 106–107; consequentialism 98–99; of empathy 124–125; Kantian ethics 99–102; moral obligation to romantic love 94–95; moral prohibition of romantic love 95–97; moral properties, love as based on 129–131; moral restrictions on love 107–108; New Natural Law 330–332; of objectifi cation 243–245; partiality of 123–124; restrictions on action 108–110; robust concern for moral well-being, love as 138–143; of romantic love 18; and sex 199–200; of sexual fantasies 304–308; virtue ethics 102–105, 220–222 Morgan, Seiriol 168 motives, Kantian ethics 99 Moulton, Janice, models of sexual behavior 191–194 Nagel, Thomas, philosophical account of sexual perversion 282–287 “natural law” 219n3 nature of romantic love 10–20 necrophilia 168 need-love 29 negative aspects, of sexual desire and activity 4 neutrality of the state in marriage 366 New Natural Law 330–332; causal version of slippery slope arguments 339–341; evaluating arguments of New Natural Law lawyers 334–339; “lack of principles” version of slippery slope arguments 341–347; lawyer arguments of 332–334; marriage and slippery slope argument 347–350 Newman, Micah 337–338 Newton-Smith, W. 92n12; g-necessity 78–80 Nolan, Daniel, temporary marriage 385–389 nonconsenual sex, virtue of 230 non-feeling approach to sexual pleasure 173–174; Primoratz’s view on 174–175 non-general reasons for love 34–37; moral particularism 35–37 nonsexual desire 257 non-substitute masturbators 167–168 no-reason view of love 26–30; and constancy 29 normative conception of love 72 normative privacy 219n7 notion of consequences 201–202 Nozick, Robert 24; “we” 55–60 NRSFs (non-real sexual fantasies) 304–308 Nussbaum, Martha 243–244, 254, 256; on Kant 277n3

Index 419 Obergefell v. Hodges 325 object of love 81–86; beauty 81–82; choosing between 144–146; living with 258–259; selection criteria for choosing 145–146 objectifi cation 241–243; and casual sex 256; failed attempts to resolve the Kantian problem with sex 254–258; feminist anti-pornography views 262–272; morality of 243–245; in pornography 272–274; selfobjectifi cation 248–253; “victim pornography” 262–265 obligation to romantic love 94–95 offensiveness of sex 203 orgasm 190n2 other forms of love 77–80 pain at the loss of the beloved, as characteristic of romantic love 76–77 Paradise Lost (Milton) 267 parent-child relationships 33–34, 78; love for parents 148 partiality of morality 123–124 particularism 35–37 patience 102–103 permissibility of love 100–102 perversion see sexual perversion Phaedrus Claim 137–138 phenomenology of romantic love 54 philosophical account of sexual perversion, Robert Solomon’s account of 289–291 philosophical accounts of sexual perversion: Alan Goldman’s account 291–292; Roger Scruton’s account 293–299; Sara Ruddick’s account 288–289; Thomas Nagel’s account 282–287 philosophy: anti-natalist 117n1; value of 1 physical intimacy 75–76 physical properties 87 “Plain Sex” 163 Plato, Symposium 54–55, 81–82 plausibility of Nozick’s “we” 56–58 pleasure: artistic pleasure 194–195; defi ning sexual pleasure 171–175; feeling approach to sexual pleasure 172–173; non-feeling approach to sexual pleasure 173–174; quality of 195–197; temperance 225–227 polyamorous relationships 92n10, 353–359; prudence of 151 polygamy 354 pooling resources 92n12 Popular Claim 137–138 popularity of belief in romantic love’s exclusivity 47–48 pornography 259–262; as endorsement of degradation 266–267; feminist anti-pornography views 262–272; objectifi cation in 272–274; “victim pornography” 262–265 Pornography, Sex, and Feminism (Soble) 254–255 power dynamics 91n4 practical wisdom 221 practices 208–209; and actions 202–203; reifi cation of sexual practices 214–215 preconditions for desire 257 preferential treatment in romantic love 95–97 Primoratz, Igor 171–172; defi nition of prostitution 185–186; on sexual perversion 288–289; view on nonfeeling approach to sexual pleasure 174–175 privacy 49; and consequentialism 203; normative privacy 219n7 procreation 330–332, 346–347 properties: as basis for love 84–86; desired properties as basis for love 88; dignity as metaphysical property 254–255; essential versus accidental properties 86; important versus unimportant properties 87; innate versus acquired properties 87–88; mental versus physical properties 87; moral properties, love as based on 129–131 prostitution 184–185, 184–187; casual sex 176–178; and consequentialism 206, 209–217; cultural beliefs shaping sexual transactions 209–216; and intentionality 187; male prostitution 214–215; types of 187 prudence of love 143–151; choosing between objects of love 144–146; polyamorous relationships 151 qualifi cations to the justifi cation of love 105–106 quality of sexual pleasure 195–197 racial desires 232–237 rape: in BDSM 314–315; as casual sex 178; as objectifi cation 245

420 Index rationale for romantic love 149–150 rationality: Formula of Humanity 245–248; love as response to 119–123 Rauch, Jonathan 342–347 “reactive” love 129–131 reason view of love 26–30; failed attempts to resolve diffi culties with 30–37; Kolodny, Niko 33–34; love as response to rationality 119–123; non-general reasons 34–37; reasons, comparison with causes 45n6; relational reasons 32–34; tweaking the generality of reasons 31–32 reason-responsiveness of love 40 reasons, “universality” of 28 recipe for an account of sexual perversion 302–303 reciprocity in romantic love 49–50 regulation of marriage by the state 364–365 reifi cation of sexual practices 214–215 relational reasons for love 32–34 relationships: autonomy 57; concern 59–60; features of love relationships 79–80; polyamorous 92n10, 353–359; power dynamics 91n4; preferential treatment in romantic love 95–97; reason view of love 33–34; romantic love 49–50; SUVs 63–64; “we” 55–60; WUVs 63–64 resource pooling 92n12 respect, dignity as metaphysical property 254–255 restrictions on the bases of love 113–115 “rhythm method” 331 rights and obligations in marriage 365 RL1 14, 20–23, 22; beliefs, restrictions on 110–113; characteristics of 80–81; commonsense morality 106–107; comparison with RL2 22; as defeating egoism 123–128; historycommitment view of love 37–43; as infatuation 23–26; intimacy 75–76; irreplaceability of 52–54; Kantian ethics 99–102; longing 76; moral obligation to romantic love 94–95; moral prohibition of romantic love 95–97; moral properties, love as based on 129–131; as necessity for a good life 131–137; preferential treatment in 95–97; prudence of 143–151; qualifi cations to the justifi cation of love 105–106; rationale for 149–150; as response to rationality 119–123; restrictions on action 108–110; restrictions on the bases of love 113–115; as robust concern for moral well-being 138–143; sexual desire 73–75; virtue ethics 102–105 RL2 14, 392–393; beliefs, restrictions on 110–113; characteristics of 80–81; commonsense morality 106–107; comparison with RL1 22; as defeating egoism 123–128; fl ourishing of the beloved 39; history-commitment view of love 37–43; intimacy 75–76; Kantian ethics 99–102; longing 76; moral obligation to romantic love 94–95; moral prohibition of romantic love 95–97; moral properties, love as based on 129–131; as necessity for a good life 131–137; no-reason view of love 26–30; preferential treatment in 95–97; prudence of 143–151; qualifi cations to the justifi cation of love 105–106; rationale for 149–150; reason view of love 26–30; as response to rationality 119–123; restrictions on action 108–110; restrictions on the bases of love 113–115; as robust concern for moral well-being 138–143; sexual desire 73–75; successful cases of 21; virtue ethics 102–105 robustness: of commitment 41; of concern 59–60, 64–68, 77–78, 128 romantic love 3, 9–10, 392–393; beliefs, restrictions on 110–113; choosing between objects of love 144–146; commonsense morality 106–107; “companionate love” 22; concern 59–60, 64–68; as condition or syndrome 19–20; consequentialism 98–99; constancy 50–52; constructionist functionalism 13–15; as defeating egoism 123–128; as a desire 14–18; desired properties as basis for love 88; as disposition to range of emotions 20; dual nature of 11–12, 13–14; exclusivity 77–78; features of love relationships 79–80; fl ourishing of the beloved 39; g-necessity 78–80; history-commitment view of love 37–43; important versus unimportant properties 87; infatuation 23–26; innate versus acquired properties 87–88;

Index 421 intentionality 14; intimacy 48–49; irreplaceability of 52–54; Kantian ethics 99–102; longing 76; loving a person as a whole 83–85; loving a person for who they really are 86; mental versus physical properties 87; as moral emotion 119; moral obligation to 94–95; moral properties, love as based on 129–131; moral restrictions on love 107–108; and morality 93–94; morality of 18; nature of 10–20; a-necessary feature 79–80; as necessity for a good life 131–137; non-general reasons for love 34–37; no-reason view of love 26–30; normative conception of 72; object of love 81–86; and other forms of love 77–80; pain at loss of beloved as characteristic of 76–77; phenomenology of 54; preferential treatment in 95–97; prudence of 143–151; qualifi cations to the justifi cation of love 105–106; question of moral prohibition of 95–97; rationale for 149–150; reason view of love 26–30; as response to rationality 119–123; restrictions on action 108–110; restrictions on the bases of love 113–115; RL1 14, 21; RL2 14; as robust concern for moral well-being 138–143; scientifi c basis of 11–13; as sentiment 20; as syndrome 19–20, 22; shared identity 61–64; unattainability of 25; union 54–64. See also union; uniqueness of 52–54; as virtue 18–19; virtue ethics 102–105; “we” 55–60; well-being 69–71 Rorty, Amelie 111–112 RSFs (real sexual fantasies) 304–308 Ruddick, Sara, philosophical account of sexual perversion 288–289 rule consequentialism 203–204 rules of thumb, act consequentialism 207–208 sadomasochism see BDSM (bondage, discipline, and sadomasochism) same-sex marriage 325, 393; arguments in support of 366–367; arguments of New Natural Law lawyers 332–334; assimilation and cultural injustice arguments 372–375; bi-marriage 351–353; legal rights of access to spouse’s person and property 369–370; minimal marriage 375–385; New Natural Law 330–332; unilateral divorce 370–371; unjustness of marriage argument 367–372 satisfaction 191–194 satisfying sexual desire 163–164 Schopenhauer, Arthur 182–183, 199–200 science of romantic love 11–13 Scruton, Roger, philosophical account of sexual perversion 293–299 secrecy 219n7 selection criteria for choosing objects of love 145–146 selfi shness of romantic love 64–68 self-objectifi cation 248–253; in pornography 272–274 self-worth, romantic love as means of attaining 137 sentiment, romantic love as 20 serial monogamy 178 sex 3–4; and consequentialism 204–209; evaluating Kant’s view of 253–254; “good sex” 280–281; Kant’s suspicion of 248–253; with love 197, 198–199; and morality 199–200; offensiveness of 203; between strangers 198; value of 393–394 sex drive, cultural beliefs about 210–211 sexual activity 3–4, 73–75; adultery 178–184; casual sex 176–178; consequences of 194; degradation 259–262; evaluating 191–199; excitement 192; legality of 320n1; negative aspects of 4; non-feeling approach to sexual pleasure 173–174; persons affected by 201–202; prostitution 184–187; temperance 222–227, 227–231 sexual anticipation 191 sexual arousal 170–171 sexual behavior 158–159; models of 191–194 sexual desire 3–4, 12, 73–75, 77, 163–164; and BDSM 308–310; “bedroom death” 20; defi ning 165–171; exhibitionism 166; as expression of romantic love 74–75; feature-based approach 170– 171; lust 22; moral innocence of desires in BDSM 310–315; negative aspects of 4; racial 232–237, 261–262; satisfying 163–164; self-objectifi cation 248–253; temperance 222–227; underdescribing 168–169; voyeurism 166; see also RL1

422 Index sexual dispositions 299–302 sexual fantasy 303–304; and BDSM 308–310; morality of 304–308 sexual objectifi cation 241–243; and casual sex 256; failed attempts to resolve the Kantian problem with sex 254–258; feminist anti-pornography views 262–272; living with 258–259; morality of 243–245; in pornography 272–274; self-objectifi cation 248–253; “victim pornography” 262–265 sexual perversion 280–282; Alan Goldman’s account of 291–292; fetishism 291; recipe for an account of 302–303; Robert Solomon’s account of 289–291; Roger Scruton’s account of 293–299, 299–302; Sara Ruddick’s account of 288–289; Thomas Nagel’s account of 282–287 sexual pleasure 160–162; bestiality 291; defi ning 171–175; feeling approach 172–173; higher and lower forms of 195–197; masturbation 167–168, 171–172; non-feeling approach to 173–174; quality of 195–197 sexual practices 208–209; reifi cation of 214–215 sexual preference, racial desires 232–237 sexual satisfaction 191–194 shared identity 61–64 Shrage, Laurie 187, 209–210 sibling relationships 33–34 Singer, Irving 27, 257 slippery slope arguments: causal version 339–341; “lack of principles” version 341–347; and marriage 347–350 Smuts, Aaron 20 Soble, Alan xiv, 25, 27, 46n13, 144, 254–255 social constructionist view of romantic love 13–15 social meaning of marriage 348–350 Socrates 81–82 Solomon, Robert 18; philosophical account of sexual perversion 289–291; shared identity 61–64 spousal consent to adultery 180 Spring Torrents (Turgenev, 2003) 25 the state: minimal marriage 375–385; neutrality of in marriage 366; regulation of marriage 364–365 Stear, Nils-Hennes 311–312 stereotypes 235 strangers, sex between 198 strong male sex drive as cultural belief 210–211 Sullivan, Andrew 341 SUVs (strong union views) 63–64 Symposium (Plato) 54–55, 81–82 syndrome, romantic love as 19–20 Taylor, Richard 182–183 temperance 222–227 temporary marriage 385–389 terminology used in this book xiii themes of this book 3 theology, New Natural Law 330–332 Thou Shalt Not Commit Adultery 182–183 time, “indefi nite constancy” 50–51 traits, virtue ethics 222 Triumph of the Will (Riefenstahl) 267 trust 49 Turgenev, Ivan 25 tweaking the generality of reasons 31–32 types of prostitution 187 unattainability of love 25 unconditional love 51–52 underdescribing sexual desire 168–169 unilateral divorce 370–371 unimportant properties 87 union 54–64, 77; and concern 59–60; shared identity 61–64; SUVs 63–64; “we” 55–60; WUVs 63–64 uniqueness of love 52–54; charm 53 “universality” of reasons 28; moral particularism 35–37; tweaking 31–32 unjustifi ed cases of love 105–106 unjustness of marriage argument 367–372 unrequited love and infatuation 24, 25–26 utilitarianism 98, 200–201; and consequentialism 201–202 Vadas, Melinda 315 value: of philosophy 1; of sex in human life 393–394 values 112; restrictions on 110–113 Vannoy, Russell 65, 74–75, 197 Velleman, J. David, love as response to rationality 119–123 Vernallis, Kayley 342–347; bi-marriage 351–353 Vernon, Mark 24

Index 423 viciousness 239n1 “victim pornography” 262–265 victims of sexual objectifi cation 258–259 virtue: as requirement for well-lived life 67; romantic love as 18–19 virtue ethics 102–105, 220–222; courage 231; diffi culty of being virtuous 231–232; and nonconsensual sex 230; practical wisdom 221; racial desires 232–237; and sexual acts 227–231; temperance 222–227; and well-being 103–104 virtuous acts 228; examples of 229–230 Vlastos, Gregory 82–83 voyeurism 166 Wainwright, Lisa xiv Walton, Kendall 312 Warner, Michael 372–375 warped conception of good 71–72 “we” 55–60; desire to form 58–59; features of 58–59; limitation on autonomy 57; plausibility of 56–58; robustness of concern 59–60; see also shared identity websites, kink.com 278n17 Wedgwood, Ralph 347–350 “welfare interests” 92n8 well-being 68; and concern 69–71; love as necessity for a good life 131–137; love as robust concern for 138–143; and virtue 103–104; warped conception of good 71–72 Williams, Bernard 100–102; Drowning Wife Case 126–127 Wojtyla, Karol 331 women, cultural beliefs shaping sexual transactions 212–213 Wood, Allen 246–247, 257–258 WUVs (weak union views) 63–64